Conceptualization of Ideology

8/2/2019 Conceptualization of Ideology

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CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IDEOLOGY

The term 'ideology', as noted above, has a long and complex history, appearing in the writings of many

authors and infiltrating nearly every modern discipline in the social sciences and humanities.

A survey of its occurrences in the literature today would show that the term is used in two

fundamentally differing ways.(3) On the one hand, 'ideology' is employedby many authors as ifit were a

purely descriptive tenn: one speaks of'systems of thought', of'systems of belief' of'symbolicpractices' which

pertain to socialaction orpolitical projects. This use ofthe term gives rise to what

maybe called a neutral conception of ideology.No attempt is made, on thebasis ofthis conception, to

distinguishbetween thekinds ofaction orprojects which ideology animates; ideology is

present in everypolitical programme, irrespective of whetherthe programme is directed towards the preservation

or transformation ofthe social order. There is, however, anothersense of 'ideology'

which is evident in the current literature. In the writings ofsome authors, ideology is essentially linked to

the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations ofpower- that is, to the process of maintaining

domination. This use of the term expresses what maybe called a critical conception of ideology. It

preserves the negative connotation which hasbeen conveyedby the term throughout most ofits history

and it binds the analysis of ideology to the question ofcritique. The essays in this volume offera plea for,

as well as a reformulation and defence of, a critical conception ofideology. In my survey

of recent work in English on the theory ofideology (essay 3), I criticize the ways in which authors such as Martin

Seliger andAlvin Gouldner conceive of ideology, for their accounts effectivelystrip the term of its

negative sense. I then attempt, in the final partof essay 3 and elsewhere, to formulate the key features of a

criticalconception. To study ideology, 1propose, is to study the ways inwhich meaning (or signification)

serves to sustain relations ofdomination. I argue that, in orderto clarify the nature ofsuch astudy, we must

provide a cogent analysis ofpower and dominationwithin the context of an account of the relations

between action, institutions and social structure. Here I do not claim toprovidethis analysis, nor do I

develop a thorough and detailed account ofthe latter relations. However, I do offer the beginnings ofsuch

ananalysis in the final part ofessay 3; and in my study of'the theoryofstructuration' (essay 4), I assess

one ofthe leading attempts toexplicate the relations between action and structure. In these

various ways I seekto substantiate the view that the study of ideology canbe satisfactorilypursued only in

the context ofa moregeneralsocial theory.(p4)

Ifwe mustbe sceptical of the assumption that oursocieties arestabilized by a consensus concerning values and norms, we must

also resist the view that ideology ispure illusion, an inverted ordistorted image of what is 'real'. This view draws support from a

famous and oft-quotedpassage in which Marx and Engels compare

the operation ofideology to the workings of a camera obscura,

which represents the world by means ofan image turned upsidedown.


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We must resist this view because, once we recognize that

ideology operates through language and that language is a mediumof social action, we must also acknowledge that ideology ispartially

constitutive of what, in our societies, 'is real'. Ideology is not

apale image of the social worldbut ispart of that world, a creative6Introduction

and constitutive element of our social lives. This fundamental

feature ofideology is brought out wellby Cornelius Castoriadisand Claude Lefort, whose workI discuss in the first essay. Theseauthors explore the linksbetween ideology and 'the social imaginary',

by which they understand primarily the creative and symbolic

dimension ofthe social world, the dimension through which

human beings create their ways of living togetherand their ways of

representing theircollective life. Whateverdifficulties there may be

in the writings of Castoriadis and Lefort. Ibelieve that this notion

ofthe social imaginary is of great interest for the attempt to explore

the relationbetween language and ideology. Forin using language

we are constantly engaged in a creative, imaginary activity. We are

constantly involved in extending the meaning ofwords, in producing new meanings through metaphor, wordplay and interpreta

tion; and we are thereby also involved, knowingly ornot, in

altering, undermining orreinforcing ourrelations with others and

with the world. To study ideology is to study, in part, the ways inwhich these creative, imaginary activities serve to sustain social

relations which are asymmetrical with regard to the organization

of power.

LANGUAGE AND THE ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSEInproposing to explore the relationbetween language and ideol

ogy, I am recommending a course ofresearch which hasbeen

neglected by many philosophers and linguists. This neglect may

seem somewhat surprising, in view ofthe emphasis of the laterWittgenstei n, Austin and others on thesocialcharacter oflanguage

and on the active character oflanguage use. Did not Wittgenstein

stress that expressions function only in the context oflanguage.

games which are played (and must be playable)by more than one

individual, and which are therefore, in some sense, forms ofsocial

life? Did not Austin remind us that speaking is a way of acting and

not simply a way ofreporting ordescribing what is done, so that

an adequate account oflanguage must take into consideration the

various kinds of things we do, and the various conditions which

renderthese doings possible and appropriate, when we utterspeech-acts? The contributions ofWittgenstein and Austin are

Studies in the Theory ofIdeology 7profoundly insightful and I do not wish to impugn theirimportance.

However, theiremphasis on the social characteroflanguage

and the active characterof language use has tended to remain

abstract. Few attempts havebeen made to examinejust what isinvolved in regarding language as a social phenomenon, that is, as a

phenomenon which is enmeshed in relations of power, in situationsof conflict, in processes ofsocial change. Few attempts have


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been made to explore the institutional aspects of the conditions

which renderspeech-actspossible and appropriate, aspects whichare related to specific social-historical circumstances and which

could notbe derived by attending to the utterances alone. To

explore the relationbetween language and ideology requires an

analysis which is more concrete. It requires, therefore, that wedevelop an approach which differs somewhat from theperspectives

adopted by many English-speakingphilosophers.The development ofsuch an approach also requires that we

break with some of thepresuppositions ofmodern linguistictheories. The ways in which these presuppositions have restricted

ourview of language, highlighting some features at the expense of

others, are analysed by Pierre Bourdieu, whose work I discuss in

the second essay. Bourdieu forcefully argues that any attempt toconstruct an autonomous and homogeneous object oflinguistic

analysis - whetherSaussure's langue or Chomsky's 'competence'isbound to lead astray, forit conjures away the social-historical

conditions underwhich a particularlanguage orcompetence isconstituted as legitimate. is acquiredby some speakers. imposed on

others. and reproduced as the dominant fonn oflanguage use.Moreover, the Chomskyan notion of competence is deceptively

abstract. Forwhat we possess as competent speakers is not thecapacity to produce an unlimited sequence ofgrammatically wellfonned

sentences,but rather the capacity toproduce sentences apropos. that is. expressions which arc relevant to specifi c situations

and tacitly adjusted to the relations ofpower which characterize

those situations. Ourcompelence lies nOl in our capacity to produce

an utterance like 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth'

anytime and anywhere,but ratherin ourcapacity toproduce sucha sentence when it is appropriate to do so and when we areendowed with the requisite authority to carry out the act. O ur

competence to speakis apracticalcompetence. It is also a com8Introduction

petence which is differentiated socially and which is always manifestedin actual instances ofdiscourse.

To introduce the concept ofdiscourse is to open an avenue for

the investigation ofthe relationbetween language and ideology.

This is a concept which has been widely used, and much abused. inrecent discussions, partlybecause it derives from many different

sources and debates. Here I shall not attempt to enumerate these

sources or to review these debates; some of the relevant literature isdiscussed in essays 3, 5 and 7. I shall try instead to indicate, in abrief and very general way, some of the characteristics which are

common to much ofthe work that is done under the label of

'discourse analysis'. In the first place, to study discourse is to study

actually occurring instances of expression. The object of analysis isnot a well-honed example designed to test our linguistic intu itions,

but ratheractual instances of everyday communication: a conversation


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between friends, a classroom interaction, a newspaper

editorial. A second characteristic which is common to manyforms of discourse analysis is a concern with linguistic units that

exceed the limits of a single sentence; hence the focus on extended

sequences ofexpression in a conversation or a text. A thirdfeature sharedby most forms ofdiscourse analysis is an interest in

the relations between linguistic and non-linguistic activity. It is thisinterest - expressed in a variety ofways and with varying degreesof sophistication - which makes discourse analysis particularly

relevant to the attempt to explore the relationbetween languageand ideology.

While the analysis ofdiscourse may offera promising approach

for the study oflanguage and ideology, the various forms of

discourse analysis have yielded results which are disappointing inmany ways. In essays 3 and 7 I argue that the principal shortcomings

of this material canbe traced backto certain methodologicallimitations. There are two limitations which are mOSt prominent

in this regard. First, by focusing on extended sequences ofexpression, the discourse analysts have tended to emphasize form

and structure at the expense of content. These analysts have examinedexchange structure, conversational struCture and the structure

of 'semantic domains';but they have tended to neglect thequestion ofwhatissaidin discou rse, that is, the question of

meaningand ofthe interpretation ofmeaning. To raise this quesStudiesin the Theory of Ideology 9

tion is to prepare the way fora constructive appropriation of themethods of discourse analysis within the frameworkof a more

comprehensive interpretative theory. The second limitation of

these methods is that, while they are rightly concerned with the

relations between linguistic and non- linguistic activity, they fail toprovide a satisfactory account of the non-linguistic sphere and of

the relations between linguistic and non-linguistic activity. Thisfailure is especially evident in the English-speaking literature,

which seldom explores the social relations within which discursivesequences are embedded. But a similar shortcoming can be discemed

in the rigorous and original methods developed by Michel

Pecheux and his associates in France (essay 7), in so far as the

implementation oftheir methods depends upon a series of assumptionsabout social structure which are notprovided with an explicit

and convincing defence.

METHODOLOGY OF INTERPRET A nONAs the above remarks indicate, many of the essays in this volumeare concerned with issues ofa properly methodologicalkind. Theseissues are ofthe utmost importance, for in addressing the theme of

ideology we must ask, not only how ideology is tobe conceptualized

and how its links with language are in general tobe understood,

but also how ideology can be analysed, specifically andconcretely, in the expressions which are uttered in the course of

our everyday lives. It is in an attempt to respond to this methodological


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demand that I have outlined a theory forthe interpretation

of ideology. The word 'interpretation' is used advisedly: itbearsthe weight of a tradition ofthought which, formany centuries, has

been concerned withproblems of meaning and interpretation. The

tradition ofhermeneutics reminds us that the object of our

investigations - utterances, expressions, texts - is apre-interpreteddomain. It reminds us, that is, that the forms ofdiscourse which

we seekto analyse are already an interpretation, so that to undertakean analysis of discourse is toproduce an interpretation of an

interpretation, to re-interpret a pre-interpreted domain. The traditionof hermeneutics also reminds us that the discourse which

forms the object ofinvestigation is the discourse ofasubject. To10Introduction

analyse discourse is to investigate an object which is produced by a

subject and received - read, listened to, understood -by other

subjects; and the understanding of discourseby the subjects whoproduce and receive it is an element, althoughby no means the

only element, of ourinvestigation. These hermeneutical conditionsofsocial-historical inquiry have consequences not only for the

nature ofthe methodology appropriate to the study ofideology,but also for the status ofthe results ofsuch a study.

While the tradition of hermeneutics reminds us ofsome ofthe

conditions ofour inquiry, it is not immediately dear that thistraditionprovides the most suitable resources forthe study of

ideology. For the tradition of hermeneutics, it might be remarked,

has emphasized the symbolic constitution ofthe social-historical

world, the way in which this world is createdby speaking and

acting individuals whose creations canbe understood by others

who partake ofthis world; but authors within this tradition have

given less attention to the ways in which the social-historical worldis also a field offorce, a realm of conflict and coercion in which

'meaning' may be a mask for repression. How can we elaborate a

methodology which takes account ofthe latterphenomena, withoutlosing sight of the meaningful character of the discourse which

is the object of investigation? Ibelieve that a valuable key to this

task maybe found in the theory ofinterpretation developed byPaul Ricoeur. In numerous studies oflanguage, of literature and of

psychoanalysis, Ricoeur has sought to develop a 'depth hermeneutics'

which would integrate explanation and understanding into a

comprehensive interp retative theory. In essay 5 I assess the

strengths and weaknesses of this imaginativeproject. I argue that,

while there is much to bepraised in Ricoeur's approach, nevertheless

he tends to abstract too readily from the social-historical

conditions in which texts (ora~alogues oftexts) are produced and

received, an abstraction which limits the usefulness ofhis approach

for the study ofideology.

In an attempt to unfold the potential of Ricoeur's account without

succumbing to its limitations, I sketch (in essay 5 and in the

final part ofessay J) a procedure for the interpretation of ideology.

The procedure consists ofthreeprincipalphases which together


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constitute a form of depth hermeneutics. The first phase, which

may be described as 'social analysis'. is concerned with the socialStudies

in the Theory ofIdeology 11

historical conditions within which agents act and mteract. It isessential to analyse these conditions - both in terms of theirinstitutional features and in terms oftheir historical specificity -

because we cannot study ideology without studying relations ofdomination and the ways in which these relations are sustained by

meaningful expressions. The secondphase of the depthhenneneutical

procedure maybe described as 'discursive analysis'.

To undertake a discursive analysis is to study a sequence of expressions,not only as a socially and historically situated occurrence,

but also as a linguistic construction which displays an articulatedstructure. This structure canbe studied in various ways, with a

view towards explicating the role of discourse in the operation of

ideology. In essays 3, 6 and 7 I discuss some of these methods of

study and indicate what seem to me to be the mostpromising

fonns. However- and here 1 rejoin my earlier remarks about thelimitations of discourse analysis - I do nOt believe that a study ofthestructure ofdiscourse can be treated as an autonomous and

exhaustive concern, let alone as a sufficient method for the investigationof ideology. Such a study must be complemented and

completed by a third phase of analysis, a phase which may properly

be described as 'interpretation'. In interpreting a form of

discourse we may seek to move beyond the study ofdiscursivestructure and to constructa meaning which shows how discourse

serves to sustain relations ofdomination. The interpretation ofideology may thus be conceived as a form ofdepth hermeneutics

which is mediated by a discursive analysis oflinguistic constructions

and a social analysis of the conditions in which discourse isproduced and received.One of the kinds ofdiscursive analysis which is particularly

interesting forthe investigation of ideology is the analysis ofnarratives.For ideology, in so far as it seeks to sustain relations of

dominationby representing them as 'legitimate', tends to assume anarrative fonn. Stories are told whichjustify the exercise of power

by those who possess it, situating these individuals within a tissue

of tales that recapiwlate the past and anticipate the future.

Various methods have been developed forthe analysis of narratives.from Propp to Greimas and Barthes; in essay 6 I focus on

one approach which I regard as exemplary. In his extensive studyofthe narrativesproducedby political groups in Germany during12Introductionthe Weimar period, Jean Pierre Faye shows how these narratives

circulated in a structured space which circumscribed theirsphereofoperation and endowed them with efficacy. And there can be no

doubt that these narratives were efficacious. Hiderand the NaziParty did not rise [0power in a vacuum. Their accession was

renderedpossible, not onlyby a series oftraumatic economic


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events, but alsoby a battle that took place in words, abattle whichdrew upon the languages ofGerman nationalism, of anti-Semitism,

ofrevolution and restoration. In the cou rse of this battle old words

acquired new meanings and fresh alliances were formed, creating a

field within which Hitlerand his associates could exploit the

accumulated reservoirs of sense. One may have doubts about

Faye's preoccupation with the narrative field and his relativeneglect ofcertain social and political considerations;but his insightful

study attests to the interest and importance of exploring

the ways in which express ions circulate in the social world.

IDEOLOGY,jU5TIHCATION AND CRITIQUEOne ofthe reasons 'Why the study ofideology has been treated

with suspicionby many thinkers is that it seems to give rise to

intractable problems of justification. If'ideology' is an evaluativeterm, ifits very use conveys a critical note and calls for a process of

critique, then how are we tojustify the characterization ofsome

discourse as ideological? How can wepretend to stand above thefray, aloofly assessing the discourse ofothers, when our interpretation

isbut anotherinterp retation, no different in principle from theinterpretations ofthose whose discourse we seekto assess? Questions

such as these give rise to complexproblems which must,

in my opinion,be confronted in a direct and systematic way. I

therefore wish to put aside two types of response which I regard as

unsatisfactory. In the first place, it will not suffice to suppose that

theseproblems canbe resolved by discarding the critical conception

ofideology and adopting a more neutral notion, as some

authors seem to think. This will nOt sufficebecause the term

'ideology' cannotbe so read ily stripped ofitS negative sense and

because problems of justification are not thereby resolved but only

displaced, pushed into a murky background where they are conStudies

in the Theory of Ideology t3veniently lost from sight. The second type of response which I

regard as unsatisfactory is the appeal to some form of'science'

which allegedly provides the counter-pole to ideology and the

standpoint from which the illusions ofthe lattercanbe grasped.This type of response establishes too dose a connection between

ideology and illusion and commonly takes forgranted a conceptionof science which is by no means self-evident.

In attempting to fonnulate a different response to the epistemological

problems raisedby the study of ideology, we can learn a

great deal from the workofJiirgen Hahennas. More rigorouslythan any othercontemporary thinker, Habermas has examined the

conditions ofpossibility of a critical theory ofmodem societies.He has sought to do so in a way which renounces a dogmatic

appeal to 'science' and a confident anticipation of the future,without abandoning eithersystematic analysis or a concern for

developmental trends. Through an investigation ofvarious aspects

oflanguage use, he has tried to show that participants in linguistic

interaction make certain assumptions which are relevant to questionsof knowledge and critique. In uttering a speech-act we necessarily


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assume, for example, that the statement made is true and that

the speech-act is correctin tenns of the prevailing normative context.We also assume that, ifchallenged, thesepresupposed claims

of truth and correctness couldbe defended or'redeemed'by being

supported with reasons which would be capable of eliciting the

agreement ofothers. Hence there is an internal connection betweenthe 'validity-claims' raised by speech-acts and the notion of

reason orrationality. In his most recent work, a two-volume

treatise entitled Theone des kommunikativen Handeins, Habermasattempts to link this notion ofcommunicative rationality to an

account ofsocial rationalization, itselfcouched within theframework of a theory ofsocial evolution.

In essays 8 and 9 I offer an assessment ofHabennas's novel andfar-reaching proposals. The first ofthese essays was written in

1979 and focuses on theprogramme ofuniversal pragmatics, as it

had been developed up to that time. By 'universal pragmatics'

Habermas understands the attempt to elucidate the general competencies

required for the successful exchange ofspeech-acts andthereby to reconstruct the 'universal validity basis' ofspeech. I try

to unravel the basic theses of thisprogramme, explicating and14 Introduction

CriticIZing the arguments upon which they rest. Among other

things I maintain that Habermas does not satisfactorilyjustify therestriction ofhis analysis to speech-acts in the 'standard form', so

that the exclusion of counter-examples to his theses is somewhat

arbitrary. I also call into question Habermas's analysis oftruth and

try to show that his characterization ofthe conditions underwhicha truth-claim canbe redeemed - the so-called 'ideal speech

situation ' - is problematic in several respects. Some of these issues

are re-addressed in the second essay, which examines the centralarguments ofthe two-volume treatise that appeared in 1981. By

situating Habennas's views on language within the context of his

account ofsocial rationalization. this essayprovides a more generalperspective on Habermas's recent work. Once again, however, Iexpress certain reservations about Habermas's analyses.Not onlydoes his notion ofcommunicative rationality remain abstract,

largely unrelated to the specific issues which confront the conductof critique,but also his account of social rationalization is linked toa theory of evolution which is as sweeping as it is unsubstantiated.

Moreover, the problem ofideology and the critique of ideology,

far from being the focal point ofHabermas's current concerns,seems to have faded into the background ofhis work.

While 1 have reservations about some ofHabermas's views, Inevertheless believe that he has proposed a line ofreflection which

is worthy ofbeing pursued. In variousparts ofthis volume -

especially in the final part of essay 3 - I take up this line ofreflection and indicate how it couldbe rendered relevant to a

critique ofideology. For an interpretation ofideology, as a constructionofmeaning and a formulation ofwhat is said in discourse,


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raises a claim to truth which calls for recognition. That is, an

interpretation raises a claim to be acceptable orjustifiable in someway; and we seem to presuppose, as Habermas suggests, that an

interpretation could notbejustified by being imposed. Hence we

could say that an interpretation ofideology raises a claim to truth

which cou ldbe justified only under certain conditions. An adequatecharacterization of these conditions would have to take

account bothof the formal requirement ofnon-imposition and ofthe specific procedures by means ofwhichparticular claims may be

defeated or sustained. But it is important to stress that, in the caseofinterpreting ideology, there is an additional consideration whichStudies in the Theory ofIdeology 15

comes into play. For the interpretations generated by the depthhermeneutical

method are about an object domain which consists,

among otherthings, ofsubjects capable ofreflection; and if their

claim to truth is tobe sustained, then these interpretations wouldhave to bejustifiable in the eyes of the subjects about whom they

are made. Such interpretations thusprovide a potentialbasis fortheself-criticism ofthe subjects whose discourse is the object of

interpretation, as well as a relevant resource fora critique oftherelations ofdomination which meaning serves to sustain.

The following essays contain the elements of apositive account of

ideology and the critique ofideology, but they do notpurport to

develop this account in the detail that it demands. The essays seekprimarily to introduce the readerto a rich and varied field of

research. And if in the present volume my own contributions aremore critical than constructive, more concerned to identify shortcomings

than to elaborate alternatives, they are nevertheless

offered with a constru ctive aim. Forthe theory ofideology cannot

be advanced unless we are fully aware of the difficulties tobeovercome.

Conceptualization of Ideology

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