1

ò What You Should Take Away from the Briefing

ò Transformation is a Process, not a Destination

ò Implications for the Army

ò The Path to Army Transformation

ò What the Blueprint for an Information Age Army MightLook Like:

Operational Level

Tactical Level

ò Summary + Back-Up Slides

Concepts for Army Transformation:A Briefing for the Transformation Task Force

What You Should Take Away from theBriefing

What You Should Take AwayFrom this Discussion

Reorganize the Army:

•to provide more ready, deployable combat powerthrough rotational readiness and unit cohesion.

•to continuously absorb new technologies and developnew capabilities.

•to integrate Army capabilities with the Navy, Marines,and Air Force.

•to mount combined operations and incorporateallies into US-led formations.

òInformation processes are sources of power andshould drive organization for combat.

òWarfighting systems should co-evolve with conceptsand organization.

òIntroduction/adaptation of new technology to theforce should be continuous.

òTransformation begins when the force exploits newtechnology and develops the concepts andorganizations that are indicated by the newcapabilities.

Transformation is a Process, not a Destination!

44

xxxx

xxx

xx

x

II

I

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct OffensiveOPNS in Joint

Operational Area)

(ConductTactical

Maneuver)

(FIGHT!)

CORPSHEADQUARTERS

(Joint Capable)DIVISION HQTRS

(Joint Plugs)

Brigade HQTRS

Battalion Task Force

Company-Team Platform

ARMY HQTRS

Army’s Single Service Structure:Designed to Deploy Mass, not Capabilities!

Six echelonsof C2 to

direct thesoldiers who

fight!

Too Many Echelons - Too Slow to Decide - TooExpensive to Modernize - Too Vulnerable to WMD!

•Army ground forces must integrate seamlessly into theemerging global strike complex.

•New technology compels and enables change in theway Army ground forces organize to fight.

•Army capabilities must be organized for integrationwith other services at increasingly lower levels.

•Integration of ground maneuver forces with powerfulstrike assets is the foundation for a true revolution inmilitary affairs!

Implications for the Army in the Age of Air, Spaceand Missile Power

•Historically, armies confuse transformation with re-capitalization.

•Armies transform when they successfully exploit newtechnology, new operational concepts, new organizations, aswell as new approaches to training and leadership to attainqualitatively superior fighting power.

•Army transformation should create powerful synergies withthe new technologies and concepts fielded by air and navalforces.

66

The Key to Army Transformation:

Question: “What capabilities can the Army field thatthe Joint Commander is likely to need?”

7

The Path To Transformation

JStep 1. A New Joint Operational Concept

JStep 2. A New Organization for Combat thatCan Execute the Concept

JStep 3. A New Joint Operational Architecture

JStep 4. A New Approach to Modernization,Training, Readiness, Personnel Management,Recruiting, etc, … leveraging technology, aswell as concepts across service lines.

Redefining Warfare with a new OperationalConcept

•The objective of Dominating Maneuver (DM) is togain a positional advantage in time and space thatplaces the opposing force at such a disadvantagethat he is compelled to surrender or be destroyed.

•Dominating Maneuver is not single service.

•Its success depends on the ability to projectmilitary power rapidly using air, land and seapower from all points on the globe to convergenear simultaneously as joint forces that act inconcert to paralyze and defeat the enemy.

Operational Command and Controlfor the Combat Groups

• Position warfighting C2 in the unified commands.

• Reduce timelines for deployment and enhanceresponsiveness to crisis.

• Set the stage for an integrated standing JointTask Force.

• Flatten the Army’s hierarchical structure topermit rapid decision making and planning.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Lieutenant GeneralJoint Force Land Component

Commander (JFLCC)(Army or Marine Based)

Major General(Deputy CDR for Close

Combat)

Major General(Deputy CDR for DeepCombat/Strike Opns )

Major General(Deputy CDR for RearCombat/ Sustainment

Opns )

•Army C2 exists within larger “plug and play” joint operationalarchitecture.

•The deep C2 structure plugs the Army into the JFACC.

•The close/deep/rear framework facilitates integration withemerging global strike complex.

Theater Commander

Army Group

Army

Corps

Division

Regiment

Battalion

Company

Army

Corps

Division

Brigade

Battalion

Company

World War II C2 Gulf War C2

(Remagen, 1945) (Desert Storm, 1991)

CINC, USCENTCOM CINC,Unified Command

JFLCC or JTFCombatGroupBattalion

Company

21st CenturyC2

(Information Age)

Change in the Operational Architecture EnhancesJointness

1212

Adaptive organization leverages specializedmodules of Army combat power.

BGCommands

5,000 Troops

Within a training and readiness system thatensures the Army is strategically relevant to Joint

Operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Aviation in every Close Combat Group!

SUSTAINMENT

ARMEDRECON

STAND-0FFATTACK

CLOSECOMBAT

EMBEDDEDC4ISR

Fewer Echelons - Faster Decision Cycle -Cheaper to Modernize

13

JTF

II

I

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint Operational Area)

(Conduct TacticalManeuver)

(The Fighters!)

JTF CDR

Combat Group

MNVR TF

Co/Tm OA

Jointness Begins Here!

Platform

Tactical Reorganization for Joint Warfighting andRapid Response to Crisis and Conflict

How does the Army construct new specializedmodules of combat power from existing assets

and incorporate new technologies with newcapabilities in the process?

Employ the Close/Deep/Rear framework tosimplify Army organization for combat in a

network-centric “plug and play” jointoperational architecture.

NOTIONAL ARMY GROUND FORCES IN THE 21st CENTURY

Close BattleEchelon

8 Airborne-AirAssault Groups

3 Recon-StrikeGroups

15 CombatManeuver Groups

7 Aviation StrikeGroups

Deep BattleEchelon3 Rocket ArtilleryGroups

7 Air DefenseGroupsTBM/GLCM/ADA

7 C4I Groups

Rear BattleEchelon3 Early DeployingSupport Groups

3 Late DeployingSupport Groups

3+ SpecializedSupport Groups MP,MED ...

3 Engineer Groups

6 Aviation SupportGroups

Reorganization creates a larger combatbase of ready, rapidly deployable ground forcesthat can exploit paralyzing strikes.

US Air and Naval Forces can strike targets quickly andaccurately nearly anywhere on the earth’s surface.

This creates the conditions for an “Inchon-style” operation wherever the strikes areconcentrated.

Deployment Reconstitution8 Airborne-Air Assault

Groups

3 LightRecon Strike

Groups15 CombatManeuver

Groups8 Aviation

StrikeGroups

5 C4IGroups

5 TheaterAir-Missile

DefenseGroups3 EarlyDeployingSupportGroups

TrainingForwardPresence

2 2 2 2

1 1 1

4 4 4 3

2 2 2 2

1 1 1 2*

1 1 1 2*

1 1 1

*PartiallyForwardDeployed

Notional Rotational Readiness Scheme

ARMEDRECON

CMD (C4I) &

CONTROLSPT

LRSG 5,000 Troops

COMBATMOBILITYSTRIKE

Brigadier GeneralCommands LRSG

1818• 3 Groups CONUS-based designed to move by USAF andcommercial aircraft!

Notional Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (LRSG)

Twice theManeuver

Strength of aConventional

Maneuverbrigade task

force!

Robustcommand

structure, IWSR,Cruise Missile &

NBC defensewithin a new

Joint Framework

StrikingPower of

an ArtilleryBrigade

Ability tobreech

obstacles,mines and

sustainmomentum in

the attack!

Power tosustain

independentoperations for

more than a fewdays!

LRSG

X

Phase I: MEU Seizes Airstrip 50 kilometers from the port city.

Phase II: LRSG Deploys to Secure Airstrip. (Assumes C17/C5Aavailability).

Phase III: LRSG and MEU secure Port for use by follow-onMarine/Army Forces (Maritime Prepositioning Force) [MarineExpeditionary Brigade (MEB)].

NCA Direct a CarrierBattlegroup (CVBG)and MarineExpeditionary Unit(MEU) to position offthe coast of the N.African State.

Setting: Crisis in the Mediterranean. Competingfactions position cruise missiles and air defensetechnology in a port on North African coast todeny access to US forces.

LRLRLRSGSGSG

                        

X XARG MEU,,, (-)

TLAGX

ARGX

MEUX

,,,

ABCT

X

AEF

JMTFXXX

TLAGX

JFETFXX

JSTFXX

CVWCVBGX X

SLOCPG MPWX X

MPS-1

XXX

Pre-positioned MEB

CVWCVBGX X SLOCPG MPW

X X

MPS-1

XXX

Pre-positioned MEB

JSDTFXX

APS-1

XX

Pre-positioned HBDE

LRSG

X

,,,

LRSG

Joint Maritime Task Forcefor Forcible Entry on Day (N+10)

An LRSGIntegrated into a

Marine-Based JTF!

MEU

NDay

42 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

CVBG + MEUDeploy

MEUSecuresAirport

LRSGDeploys

LRSG + MEUSecure Port

MEBLands

Linking the LRSG to the AEF integrates maneuver andstrike assets across service lines!

AEFs are cross sections ofcapabilities made availablefor deployment duringspecified periods and sized bycurrent force.

òUnder JFACC command,the LRSG can contribute toAEF success in the halt phaseof future crises and conflicts!

òLRSG can conductoperational maneuver to keyobjectives, compelling enemyto concentrate.

òLRSG Strike assetscomplement, not duplicateAEF/Naval strike efforts.

Kosovo: The arrival of an LRSG inJanuary 1999 might have made adifference to Belgrade’s calculus.

BOSNIA -

HERZEGOVINASARAJEVO

SKOPJE

TIRANA

THESSALONIKI

MONTENEGRO

BULGARIA

VJ Corps

XXX49,000 troops355 Tanks500 BMPs/BTRs900 ArtillerySystems

In a coercive campaignLRSG:

òProvides lighter, butcredible landcomponent.

òMakes air and navalcomponents moreeffective.

òSignals escalationdominance.

òCan shift rapidlybetween combat andpeace enforcement.

KOSOVO

JFLCC (integrated into unified C2 Structure)

1 COMBAT MANEUVER GROUP (CMG)

1 CMG Army Prepositioned Equipment

2 CMG Army Prepositioning Afloat Set

1 JTF SPT GP Army Prepositioning Afloat Set

1 AIR DEFENSE GROUP (strategic air/sea lift)

1 AVIATION STRIKE GROUP (in theater)

1 ROCKET ARTILLERY GROUP (strategic lift)

1 LIGHT RECON-STRIKE GROUP (strategic air lift)

1 C4I GROUP in theater

Bottom line: This Group-based Force could be ready to attackin two weeks and close in less than 30 days. Anotherequivalent force is immediately behind the deployedforce in the training phase. Mix could include more!

TROOPS NO. SOURCE

600 In Theater

5,000 In Theater

5,000 CONUS

10,000 CONUS

7,000 CONUS

2,500 CONUS

3,000 CONUS

3,000 CONUS

5,000 CONUS

2,500 CONUS

43,600 Total Strength

Example: Group-based Response Force to aMajor Theater War (ROK/SWA)

1

JTF

II

I

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint Operational Area)

(Conduct TacticalManeuver)

(The Fighters!)

JTF CDR

Combat Group

MNVR TF

Co/Tm OA

Jointness Begins Here!

100,000Troops in120+ days.

VII corpsmoved to

Desert Stormfrom

Germany/US:

xxxx

xxx

xx

x

II

I

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct OffensiveOPNS in Joint

Operational Area)

(ConductTactical

Maneuver)

(FIGHT!)

CORPSHEADQUARTERS

(Joint Capable)DIVISION HQTRS

(Joint Plugs)

Brigade HQTRS

Battalion Task Force

Platform (tank)

ARMY HQTRS

43,600 Troopsin 30 days.

Combatcapabilityequal to or

greater thanVII corps in

Desert Storm.

•America’s NATO allies are moving to force designsthat are consistent with the Group approach.

•The British and French armies orient contingencyplanning along the lines of large brigadebattlegroups (5,000 troops).

•Contemporary German army doctrine organizeswarfighting around large mobile brigadebattlegroups (5,000 troops).

•The Group-based structure can become a model fora commonality of doctrine, organization, andcommunications in US-led alliance structures.

Group-Based Structure Supports Combined Operationsin the NATO Alliance

JTransformation should result in significantchange to enhance joint warfighting capabilities.It should not “tinker on the margins!”

JThe uncertain promise of future technologymust not thwart change now through thecontinuous interaction of technology and neworganizations for combat.

JThe combat group concept is a critical bridge tothe future. It facilitates continuous adaptationthrough the incorporation of new technology.

Summary of Key Points