ConActually Existing Globalisation, Deglobalisation, and the Political Economy of Anticapitalist...

7/28/2019 ConActually Existing Globalisation, Deglobalisation, and the Political Economy of Anticapitalist Protest byRay Kiely

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Ray Kiely

Actually Existing Globalisation, Deglobalisation,and the Political Economy of Anticapitalist Protest

Recent events at Seattle, Washington, Melbourne,

Gthenburg, Nice, and Genoa, among other places,have taken many people by surprise, encouraging

ill-conceived, knee-jerk reactions. Tony Blair expressed

(selective) anger and dismay at the level of violence

at Genoa, but has showed far less anger (or construc-

tive engagement) when confronted with destructive

and growing global social inequality.1 Clare Short,

seemingly oblivious to the long history of anti-global-isation protest in the developing world, dismissed

the protests as the actions of over-privileged white

westerners. Her description of development NGOs

in the North as being full of middle-class people with

good but misguided intentions, sounds remarkably

like a description of her own government though

one is tempted to suggest that the latters intentions

are malicious. The tone of the dismissals of the pro-

testors by Blair, Short, and others (for instance, John

Lloyd and Philippe Legrain, as well as leading gures

at the WTO and World Bank), suggests that they do

1 Blair was quick to praise the actions of the Italian police at Genoa. However, whenit became clear that there had been massive police brutality, rather than condemn this


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not really believe that a debate is necessary. The protestors are obviously irra-

tional, and it is unclear what they are for anyway. At Genoa, Tony Blair was

emphatic that if the protestors want poverty reduction, then they should not

protest against a summit committed to this cause. He made much of the

launch of a global health fund and progress on debt cancellation. In fact, thehealth fund had been agreed prior to the Genoa summit, and the amount

pledged by the G-8 was just $1.5 billion, an amount which is only a tenth of

the minimum target set by the United Nations, and which is also likely to

come out of existing aid budgets. On debt, there were no serious advances

on promises made in 1999, which have not yet been implemented anyway

and there remains a commitment to economic and social policies which, for

many, are part of the problem.2 For Blair and this is the key argument thelong-term solution to poverty and inequality is to embrace a global free mar-

ket. Even if this is not quite as perfect a system as neoliberals in the 1980s

believed, it is still the best system, and is certainly preferable to the protec-

tionist and backward-looking alternatives proposed by anticapitalists.

It is true that the anticapitalist movement is divided and often unclear con-

cerning alternatives to the current global order. The problem is that Short,

Blair, and Michael Moore of the WTO and, as we shall see, some thinkers

on the Left appear to think that this is sufcient ground for justifying the

status quo. Those that want radical change are expected to provide a clear-

cut alternative without contradiction; those who support the existing order

are seemingly under no obligation to do the same thing.

Bearing these comments in mind, I set out in this article to do three things.

In the rst section, I interrogate and reject cases made for global free trade.

3

Besides focusing on neoliberal arguments, I discuss neoclassical Marxist

approaches, associated in the 1970s with Bill Warren and more recently with

94 Ray Kiely

2 Structural adjustment policies (now known rather bizarrely as Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers) are discussed briey in the text. See also Guardian 2001, and Jubilee

Movement International for Economic and Social Justice 2001.3 The term global free trade is in inverted commas, because it will become clearthat this and similar terms (such as free market) are ideological ones that do not


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the writings of Marxist Labour peer, Meghnad Desai.4 In discussing this

work in some detail, I will argue that Desai is wrong about Marx and, more

importantly, about the contemporary global economy. In the second section,

I examine how the case against free trade is manifested today in debates

around the World Trade Organisation (WTO). I will argue that the promo-tion of global free trade is part of a tendency of capital to penetrate more and

more areas of social life, resulting in intensied uneven and unequal devel-

opment. Anticapitalist movements resist such tendencies, and attempt to

regulate and possibly transcend global capitalism. I will argue that the ten-

dency towards increased commodication expressed, in part, through the

promotion of global free trade and resistance to it, are part of a renewed

double movement,5 most clearly manifested in debates around the WTO. In

the third section, I critically examine some of the alternatives proposed by

the anticapitalist movement to actually existing globalisation, focusing par-

ticularly on the question of deglobalisation.6 I point out that the movement

is not so much anticapitalist as it is anti-neoliberal. Nonetheless, I still make

a case for critical support of the movement, thereby challenging some Marxists

who espouse revolutionary purity.

Neoliberalism, Marxism and global free trade

Orthodox trade theory basically suggests that competition increases the

efciency of production and thereby lowers prices and raises world output.

Each country should therefore specialise in producing those goods (or ser-

vices) that it can make most cheaply that is, those goods in which it has a

comparative advantage. This theory was further developed by Eli Heckscher

and Bertil Ohlin in the 1930s.7 They argued that equilibrium in exchange is

based on equally available factor endowments throughout the world. A par-

ticular country (A) may have an initial comparative advantage in, say, both

The Political Economy of Anticapitalist Protest 95

4 Many apologists for global free trade claim some allegiance to the Left, or at leastCentre-Left Desai however appears to support global free trade through allegiance


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cloth and corn, and produce both more cheaply than Country B. However,

if Country A produces cloth more cheaply than it produces corn, it should

specialise in the former, because it could then produce more cloth which it

can exchange for Country Bs corn. In this way, world production of both

cloth and corn is stimulated and both countries benet from the tradingrelationship. The Heckscher-Ohlin model develops this standard argument

further, and argues that, if corn is labour-intensive relative to cloth, and if

labour is relatively abundant in Country B, then that country will specialise

in corn production. As production continues, there is a tendency for factor

endowments (including wages) to be equalised; this is because, as Country

B specialises in corn production, its production pattern becomes more labour-

intensive, thus reducing labour abundance and increasing productivity andwages. Meanwhile, in Country A, as cloth production increases, labour will

become less scarce, and productivity and wages will fall. In the long run,

there is a tendency towards equilibrium in international trade.8

It was Ricardo who rst formulated the theory of comparative advantage,

but he also pointed out that such a win-win situation had to satisfy certain

conditions.9 Most crucially, he argued that, for free trade to be mutually

benecial, the factors of production (land, labour and capital) must be immo-

bile and countries must have equal capacities to produce goods.10 This, in

turn, rested on the assumptions of balanced trade, perfect competition, and

full employment.

While Marx was highly critical of many of the assumptions of Ricardian

political economy, he appeared at times to show support for the integration

of poorer economies into the world capitalist economy. He argued that cap-italism is progressive compared to previous modes of production in history,

as it led to an unprecedented expansion of the productive forces. It was also

this argument that led Marx to sometimes support colonialism. Thus, Marx

and Engels contrasted the modernising inuence of Western capitalism with

backward India, which has no history at all.11 They went on to argue that

96 Ray Kiely

8 See Ohlin 1933, pp. 3449. This summary draws heavily on Kiely 1996, pp. 345.See also Shaikh 1979.


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England has to full a double mission in India: one destructive, the other

regenerating the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the

material foundations of Western society in Asia.12 Marx also gave his (criti-

cal) support to free trade for similar reasons.13

For Marx, colonialism may have been exploitative, but it was also deemednecessary, in that it laid the foundations for the capitalist development of

backward societies. The tendency of capitalism to develop the productive

forces was contrasted with the stagnation of precapitalist, non-historic soci-

eties. Capitalism acted as a bridge to a communist future as the development

of the productive forces provides the potential for everybody to live off the

social surplus product rather than just a ruling-class minority. In the words

of Cohen, [s]o much technique and inanimate power are now available that

arduous labour, and the resulting control by some men over the lives of oth-

ers lose their function, and a new integration of man and nature in a new

communism becomes possible.14 This potential can be realised by the devel-

opment of the proletariat, the really revolutionary class,15 that, united in the

process of production, has the power to overthrow the ruling capitalist class.

Marxs apologies for colonialism were rejected by most Marxists in thetwentieth century, but were revived by Bill Warren in the 1970s. He argued

that:

If the extension of capitalism into non-capitalist areas of the world created

an international system of inequality and exploitation called imperialism,

it simultaneously created the conditions for the destruction of this system

by the spread of capitalist social relations and productive forces through-out the non-capitalist world.16

Expanding on this argument, Meghnad Desai contends that globalisation rep-

resents progress for the contemporary developing world. Countries that have

not received signicant amounts of investment need to integrate into the

global order or they will be left even further behind. The third world needs



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capitalism because capitalism alone will lead to its growth. No other plausi-

ble, feasible alternative has been found. Desai correctly rejects Andre Gunder

Franks view that capitalist development in the core can only lead to under-

development in the periphery and instead argues that capitalism can lead

to growth in countries which are willing to trade and that, far from monop-oly capital stiing growth in countries, capital goes wherever it will make

prots.17 He points out that, in the last twenty-ve years, there has been a

decline in global inequalities, as OECD countries share of global GDP declined

from 80 percent in 1975 to 70 percent in 2000.18

Over the last twenty years, numerous studies have attempted to substan-

tiate the claim that integration into the world economy has led to progress

for all countries.19 These studies all claim that there is a causal link betweengreater openness in the world economy and economic growth. However, each

of them suffers from empirical inconsistencies, unclear measures of what con-

stitutes openness, and above all, the failure to provide any convincing grounds

for justifying the assertion that there is a causal link between openness and

growth.20 Despite their intentions, the 1983 and 1987 World Development

Reports could nd no consistent relationship between low price distortion

and outward orientation as factors explaining economic growth.21 The Banks

1993 report, The East Asian Miracle, is supposed to prove that the most suc-

cessful East Asian developers were those whose policies were most market

friendly. In fact, the Banks own data suggest that inefcient Brazil and

India are more market friendly than South Korea and Taiwan22 which, in

itself, undermines the contentions of much of the reports previous 300 pages.

The 1994 report, Adjustment in Africa, attempts to demonstrate that themost successful African economies in the 1990s are those that have most

fully carried out adjustment policies an intrinsic part of which is greater

integration into the world economy. But, again, the Banks own data under-

mines their claims and suggests that there were as many policy differences

98 Ray Kiely

17

Desai 2000, p. 44.18 Desai 2000, p. 44. See also Warren 1973 and Harris 1986.19 See World Bank 1983, 1987, 1993, 1994; Sachs and Warner 1997; WTO 1998; Collier


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among the six countries deemed to be good policy performers, as there were

among the 23 others.23 The Bank also grudgingly admits that, despite an

improved climate, investment rates have not increased.24 Overall, there is no

convincing evidence that growth performances have improved with trade

liberalisation.25

Even if there is some link between openness and growth, it is not the case

that the former caused the latter, and it is more likely that the strong inward

orientation of many of the poorest economies of the world is a reection,

rather than a cause, of slow rates of economic growth.26 If this is the case,

then an alternative explanation of global inequalities would focus less on

trade per se (and the argument over whether this is a good or bad thing) and

more on trade inequalities as a reection of unequal structures of production.

The global economy and global free trade does not tend to equilibrium.

Uneven development is the norm, and it is a product of the normal workings

of capitalist competition. Anwar Shaikh effectively summarises this alterna-

tive view:

It is only by raising both the level and the growth rate of productivity that

a country can, in the long run, prosper in international trade . . . [This] will

not happen by itself, through the magic of free trade. On the contrary, pre-

cisely because free trade reects the uneven development of nations, by

itself it tends to reproduce and even deepen the very inequality on which

it was founded. It follows that success in the free market requires extensive

and intensive social, political, and infrastructural support.27

The history of successful capitalist development supports this claim. Thus,the much cited rise of the East Asian newly industrialising countries was

not a product of limited government or even market friendly intervention

as the World Bank28 claims but of a strongly interventionist state that

only selectively integrated into the world economy.29 For example, in the


23

See Mosley et al. 1995.24 World Bank 1994, p. 153.25 Weeks 2001 pp 26974 This point applies to the world as a whole too See Centre


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1960s, many South Korean rms exported at a loss, including those in labour-

intensive sectors like textiles.30 Losses were recovered through sales in the

protected domestic market, but these sales were tied to export performance

standards set by the government. Without such intervention, countries like

South Korea and Taiwan would still be exercising their static comparativeadvantage, and rice would continue to be their main export. Such practices

(and many others31) are a world away from the uncritical embrace of global

market forces advocated by neoliberals and neoclassical Marxists.

Uneven development, rather than equilibrium based on an equalisation of

factor endowments, is a central feature of the world capitalist economy. Capital

does not move from areas of abundance to areas of scarcity, but actually tends

to be attracted to existing areas of accumulation. This concentration of capi-tal is a product of the competitive accumulation of capital. The introduction

of new technology will usually contain an element of monopoly rent, [and

so] it is not surprising that scarce factors of production like capital and skilled

labour will, contrary to the expectations of orthodox economists, tend to be

drawn towards areas where they are already abundant.32 Clearly then, Ricardos

provisos concerning the mutual benets of free trade do not hold, and bal-

anced trade, perfect competition, and full employment do not exist. Therefore,

countries do not have the capacity to compete equally in the world economy,

and so the case for free trade collapses.

Such uneven development is substantiated if we look at the share of devel-

oping countries in world trade and investment. Their share in world trade

stood at 27.7% in 1995, up from 18.9% in 1970, but down from 33% in 1950.

This share is also unequally distributed: the share of the rst tier NICs increasedfrom 2% in 1970 to 10.4% in 1995; in Latin America over the same period,

the share fell from 5.5% in 1970 (and 12.1% in 1950) to 4.4%; in Africa from

2% (and 5.3% in 1950) to 1.5% in 1995.33 In 1999, the proportion of foreign

investment that went to developing countries was just 24%.34 Moreover, the

main recipient was China, where such investment is highly concentrated in

a few select areas.

100 Ray Kiely


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Seen in this light, Geoff Kays statement that [c]apital created under-

development, not because it exploited the Third World, but because it did

not exploit it enough35 makes sense. Desai (and indeed Clare Short, who

has used this quote in modied form) draws the conclusion that the answer

is to create a favourable climate to attract foreign investment. However, mydiscussion above makes clear and this was Kays intention36 that, in the

context of a global free market, even the most favourable climate for invest-

ment in developing countries is unlikely to alter the tendency of capital to

concentrate is some areas and marginalise others.37 This uneven development

is reected in the degree to which inequality has continued to increase in the


35 Kay 1975, p. x.36 Kays statement has often wrongly been interpreted as Warrenite. Warrens

argument was that the global capitalist economy was developmental, and eveningup capitalist development (though whether Warren unlike Desai would have hadsuch enthusiasm for wholesale integration into the world economy is anothermatter). Kays argument, on the other hand, is that global capitalism is intensifyinguneven development.

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Colin Leys 1994, p. 35, therefore rightly argues that many commodities producedin Africa are increasingly being produced several times more efciently outside Africaunder capitalist conditions of production, forcing prices steadily downwards towardslevels at which Africans will no longer be able to live on what they can get froma days labour in producing them. As far as I am aware, no neoliberal has (yet)recommended that workers pay their employers a wage in order to increase com-petitiveness though the logic of some stabilisation and structural adjustmentprogrammes sometimes comes close to adopting such a position. Manuel Castellsswork (Castells 1996, 1998) on the network society also usefully presents an accountof globalisation based on the intensication of uneven development and margin-

alisation. However, he tends to argue that the modern, post-industrial sector has adifferent logic to classical capitalism and that therefore the contradictions of capital-ism have been overcome, at least within this sector. At times, his argument is close tothe notion that we live in a new economy which has transcended the business cycle(see Castells 1996, pp. 8094). This argument has also been made by Hoogvelt (2001,pp. 10913) who, strongly inuenced by Castells, accepts the new economy argumentthat production and consumption can now be balanced. This up-date of the 1997 edi-tion of her book is strongly inuenced by new economy rhetoric and the potential ofe-commerce. Given the fate of many e-businesses, the wiping of $4.6 trillion in investorwealth in Wall Street in the late 1990s (a sum equivalent to half of US Gross Domestic

Product), and the United States move to recession from early 2000 onwards, the ironyis that the rst edition now seems more up-to-date than the second (see Business Week2001a and 2001b) Both Castells and Hoogvelt are clearly anti-third-worldist but iron-


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period of globalisation. Desais claim that globalisation has reduced inequal-

ities as OECD countries share of global income has declined is based on one-

sided evidence. It ignores the diversity of economic performance in the

developing world and the fact that the rise of (highly interventionist) East

Asia largely accounts for this relative decline. It also ignores inequalities mea-sured on a per capita basis. In the last forty years, the ratio of per capita

income in the developing world to OECD per capita income has worsened,

except in the case of East and South-East Asia.38 Perhaps most scandalous,

the income and wealth gaps between the worlds richest 20% and poorest

20% has increased from 30:1 in 1960 to 74:1 in 1999.39

Clearly, integration into the world capitalist economy is not the same thing

as the development of capitalist relations of production. Competition in theworld economy is intrinsically unequal and the move towards global free

trade has intensied uneven development. Marx himself was fully aware of

this, and the claim that he believed that simple integration would develop

capitalism in backward areas is one-sided. He argued that the veiled slav-

ery of the wage earners in Europe need the unqualied slavery of the New

World as its pedestal, and that commerce in countries which export princi-

pally raw produce increased the misery of the masses. He also criticised the

bleeding process whereby the British extracted resources from India for the

benet of the British ruling class, and talked about English vandalism in

India, which pushed the indigenous people not forward but backward.40

Even Marxs earlier support for free trade was qualied, and he argued that

protection for industrialists was progressive compared to protection for mer-

chants. In the same speech, he also stated that [i]f the free traders cannotunderstand how one nation can grow rich at the expense of another, we need

not wonder, since these same gentlemen also refuse to understand how within

one country one class can enrich itself at the expense of another.41

The key question concerning integration into the world economy is thus

not whether one should participate or not a simple integration versus

autarchy dichotomy but the terms on which one integrates.42 Desai and

102 Ray Kiely

38 Weeks 2001b, pp. 202.


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before him Warren is correct that capitalism can be developmental, but he

implies that simple integration into the global economy means that capital-

ism willbe developmental.43 Little attention is paid to the specic conditions

that may promote development. Thus, integration into the world economy

may actually increase levels of unproductive economic activity, such as pettytrading and speculation (including capital ight).44 Moreover, capitalisms

tendency to develop the productive forces is not spontaneous or natural,

but is in part a product of class struggle, which takes different forms in dif-

ferent parts of the world.45 The struggle for workers rights forces capitalists

to extract relative surplus-value through investment in new technology, which

raises labour productivity, rather than extract absolute surplus-value through

low wages.46 Thus, even if we accept Desais contention that socialism is not

on the agenda for the foreseeable future, the fact remains that the struggle

for a more progressive capitalism rests in part on the struggles of workers

and other groups,47 rather than some limited (and technocratic) notion of inte-

grating into the world economy.


from the world economy. This is true of a small minority of green fundamentalistlocalisers, whose views are rejected below. It is not true of most of the key thinkerswithin the movement, who would accept that total delinking is neither viable nordesirable. The strength of the case against total delinking does not however strengthenthe case for total integration.

43 Warren himself paid little attention to specic forms of capitalist development.Desai suffers from a similar weakness, but he takes this one step further, and argues

that being part of a world capitalist economy is sufcient in itself to guarantee capi-talist development.44 See Gibbon 1996.45 And, therefore, so too does capitalism. Marx was quite explicit that his account

of the evolution of capitalism was expressly restricted to the countries of Western Europe.Marx 1984, p. 124.

46 This has enormous implications for contemporary debates over issues such aschild labour. Apologists (such as neoliberals and cultural relativists) for this practiceargue that its abolition will have an adverse impact on incomes for poor families.While this may be true in the short term, in the long run there may be dynamic growth

and development spin-offs though, of course, it must be remembered that new tech-nology is introduced primarily to increase protability. Nevertheless, some socialbenets may occur (and this will also depend on levels of class struggle) What is


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Thus, contra Warren and Desai, my argument is that capitalism takes a

variety of forms throughout the world, and uneven development means that

dynamic development in some countries, regions, and sectors, is also accom-

panied by (relative) marginalisation elsewhere. As Weeks argues, [i]nherent

in the progressiveness of capitalism on a world scale is the simultaneousdestructive impact of capitalism in particular regions.48 This view of uneven

development does not mean that the development of a dynamic capitalism

in previously marginalised areas is impossible, but neither does it mean that

it is inevitable. What is clear is that the development of a dynamic capitalism,

through neoliberal policies and simple integration into the global economy,

is highly unlikely.49

In marked contrast to this analysis is Desais neoliberal contention that,given a choice between state and market, Marx would have opted for the lat-

ter.50 This is patently absurd. Marx saw state and market not as dichotomous

opposites, but as internally related institutional forms of capitalist social

relations. This point brings us back to the question of the current global

anticapitalist movement.

Anticapitalism, the double movement and the WTO

It is in this context of a movement towards a global free market that

the anticapitalist movement should be located. In his economic history of the

rise of market societies, Karl Polanyi argued that such societies did not arise

spontaneously, but were actually the deliberate creation of states. A separate

market economy was the product of historical social struggles such as the

enclosure of land. Marx similarly argued that [t]he formation of the politi-

cal state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals . . .

is completed in one and the same act.51 This is not to say that the separa-

104 Ray Kiely

48 Weeks 1997, p. 106.49 The World Banks recent utilisation of the concept of social capital (see http://world-

bank.org/poverty/scapital) does little to change its commitment to neoliberalism.

Like the concepts of market friendly intervention and good governance (WorldBank 1992, 1993), the concept of social capital (at least as used by the World Bank) isassessed in terms of its capacity to generate an efcient free market economy (Kiely


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tion of polity and economy created capitalism; rather, it is that separate

economic and political spheres are forms of appearance of capitalist social

relations. This separation has real effects, as the autonomous economic sphere

tends to dominate increasing areas of social life instead of economy being

embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economicsystem.52 This tendency for capital to penetrate increasing areas of social

life, while developing the productive forces in unprecedented ways, also has

devastating consequences in terms of uneven development (see above),

increasing levels of inequality, and environmental destruction. Polanyi there-

fore argued that [t]o allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the

fate of human beings and their natural environment . . . would result in the

demolition of society.53 However, such a tendency was resisted in the nine-

teenth century in what Polanyi described as a double movement. In phase

one of this movement, the market became separated from social control, which

led to social conict, while, in phase two, society restored some control over

the market economy largely through the rise of mass politics.

The breakdown of neo-Keynesian state-directed capitalism has facilitated

the development of a new double movement, in which global social move-ments resist the resurgence of (a now global) neoliberalism. This can be seen

with the rise of anti-IMF riots, struggles against privatisation and trade agree-

ments, demonstrations against multilateral institutions and international

summits, environmental protests, and general strikes, all of which have in-

creased in recent years.54 Clearly, then, the current anticapitalist movement

is against the relentless commodication of everything,55 reected in two

slogans of the movement: The World is Not for Sale and We Live in a Society,

Not an Economy.56

The events at Seattle in late 1999 brought these issues into sharper focus.

The World Trade Organisation was set up in 1995 to deal with international

trade issues, replacing the more informal GATT system. The Millennium

Round of talks was arranged for Seattle in late 1999, but was met by massive


52 Polanyi 1957 p 57


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protests, which led to wider public debate over international institutions and

free trade. The WTO is committed to continuing the work of GATT in reduc-

ing tariff rates, especially in agriculture and textiles (although there is some

dispute that there is a commitment in the latter sector), and expanding into

services and intellectual property.

57

There is also a more formal DisputeSettlement system in operation, in which disputes are not necessarily settled

by joint consensus, and are subject to economic sanctions if there are trade

violations.

The WTO thus promotes the expansion of the separation, or disembed-

ding, of economy from society. For instance, the creation of Trade Related

Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) expands patent protection for established

producers and therefore keeps the price of pharmaceuticals too high for theworlds poorest to afford them. These rights also reinforce the monopoly

power of established technological producers and so undermine the capac-

ity of later developers to develop indigenous technological capacity. The

General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) effectively undermines the

capacity of governments to run public services by subjecting such services

to competition from the private sector.58

The WTO has been defended in a number of ways. First, the argument is

made that free trade and the market is more efcient than the alternatives.

The case for free trade has been rejected above, and the argument concerning

the market suffers from similar weaknesses. It rests on a false separation of

state and market, and assumes that the latter is more efcient than the for-

mer, because it allows for competition between innately self-interested human

beings. The assumption that humans are naturally selsh ignores the ways

106 Ray Kiely

57 At WTO talks in Doha, Qatar in 2001, these disputes continued. Although theoutcome of these talks about talks are difcult to predict (as the disputes will con-tinue), developing countries appear to have won real concessions over patents relatedto health, but have lost out over the reduction of tariffs on textile imports intothe advanced countries, particularly the United States. On agriculture, developingcountries may have won a slight concession from the European Union over exportsubsidies, but this is likely to be a major issue of contention in the next few years. As

things stand, developing countries face tariff peaks four times larger than developedcountries for their key exports to the developed world. It is partly for this reason thatthe likes of Short and Desai argue that a consistent free trade rgime would be


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in which humans co-operate in everyday life, and so ignores collective ratio-

nalities such as a commitment to public service.59 There is also strong evi-

dence that the private sector, and public-private partnerships (PPPs), offer

worst public services at higher costs the main service that they offer is to

private shareholders (who in the case of Blairs much hyped PPPs or PrivateFinance Initiatives (PFIs), are guaranteed a prot, as losses as well as inter-

est are paid for by taxpayers).60 Pharmaceutical companies also repeat the

dogma that private enterprise/the free market is efcient in their defence

of patents. They argue that extended patents are necessary to recover research

and development expenses, and that, in the long run, the new drugs pro-

duced will trickle down to the poor. Companies also point out that many

governments in the developing world spend more on defence than they do

on healthcare. In fact, many companies spend more on advertising than on

R&D, and much research is carried out by the public sector, but the private

sector reaps the benets in terms of prots. States in the developing world

may overspend on defence and underspend on health (although it should be

stressed that adjustment programmes have not discouraged, and often actively

encouraged this practice), but this fact does not let pharmaceutical compa-nies off the hook. Most crucially, the tendency of capital to concentrate in

some sectors and regions and marginalise others (discussed above) is clearly

demonstrated in this sector. Spending on drugs in the whole of sub-Saharan

Africa totals around $1 billion, and these sales are very unequally distributed.

This amount is less than the value of sales of Viagra in the Western world.

Clearly then, [p]atent protection will not signicantly change the relative

protability of nding cures for diseases aficting rich and poor countries

for the simple reason that poor people lack purchasing power.61

The second defence is that the WTO is not committed to total free trade

anyway, and there are ways in which such trade can be limited by govern-

ment. The British government, for instance, has argued that public services

exercising public authority are excluded from GATS. However, there is pro-

vision in the GATS agreement to include any service that is being delivered



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commercially or in competition with the private sector, which potentially

could mean health or education. The key argument made by the WTO in

this regard is that it does not dictate policies to national governments, as it

is representatives of these governments that make WTO agreements.62 This

contention is true, but only shows the ways in which such governments havebecome increasingly committed to a corporate-led agenda.

A third argument in support of the WTO is that it is not a simple exten-

sion of American interests and that developing countries have some voice

within the organisation. The WTO ruled in favour of Asian countries whose

shing industries failed to comply with the requirements of the Endangered

Species Act of the United States. While it is true that the WTO is not a sim-

ple mechanical extension of US, or Western, interests, it is also the case thatan organisation largely committed to global free trade is likely to favour the

most powerful. Disputes over free trade are not a simple extension of a sta-

tic North-South global divide, but instead reect competing interests in an

unevenly developed global capitalism. Thus, at WTO talks, weaker agrarian

producers have sided with the European Union against the United States and

more powerful agrarian producers (including some from the developing

world) the Cairns Group over the continuation and extent of protection

for agrarian products. At the Millennium Round, talks broke down over a

number of issues. The United States advocated liberalisation in agriculture

and services, and some discussion of labour standards in trade agreements;

recession hit Japan largely opposed further liberalisation; the European Union

advocated selective trade liberalisation in agriculture for some developing

countries; and many developing nations wanted the enforcement of Specialand Differential Treatment Clauses, such as preferential access for some exports,

as occurred at previous GATT talks. There was also much resentment at the

setting up of Green Room meetings where key issues were discussed among

representatives from a select minority of countries.63 Thus, the fact that the

WTO does not represent the interests of a small lite in any mechanical way

does not mean that it represents the interests of all of its members, either

equally or democratically. Just as crucially, such members are not committed

108 Ray Kiely


17/30

to collective or public interests within nations, but increasingly reect the

dominance of what is now called corporate interests.

It should be clear then, that the cases made in defence of the WTO are

unconvincing. The WTO is an organisation committed to regulating inter-

national trade, as its (qualied) free-market defenders make clear. However,like the IMF and World Bank, such regulation is made largely on the assump-

tion that global free trade is the best option for all countries in the world

economy. When there are qualications to free trade, these are insufcient.

The anticapitalist movement therefore argues that the WTO does not so much

regulate, as promote, the expansion of capitalism and the commodication

of social life and therefore the intensication of uneven and unequal devel-

opment, as well as environmental destruction. It has suggested a variety of

ways of regulating, and even transcending, global capitalism. The question

of these alternatives will now be addressed.

Anticapitalist alternatives: the question of deglobalisation

This section broadly examines two proposed alternatives to globalisationfrom above. This will be done by critically examining Walden Bellos notion

of deglobalisation.64 The focus will be on two ways in which we can talk

about deglobalisation: localisation and regulation. I will argue that neither

strategy is explicitly anticapitalist, but different lessons can be drawn from

each of them. In the case of the rst, questions concerning technology and

the environment are important, but not at the cost of promoting backward-

looking, reactionary utopias. In the case of the second, I argue that the

movement is currently principally concerned with regulating rather than

transcending global capitalism. However, I conclude by suggesting that a

reform-revolution dichotomy is articial and counter-productive, and that

the struggle to regulate can be part of a struggle to transcend.



18/30

(i) Localisation

Advocates of localisation argue that this is preferable to globalisation because

it is based on three broad principles: equity, community, and sustainability.65

The ecofeminist, anti-globalisation activists, Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva,

argue that globalisation means simply the global domination of local and

particular interests . . . under the control of a few multinational corporations

(MNCs) and the superpowers that assist them in their global reach.66 In con-

trast, local communities develop a subsistence perspective, which is regarded

as an ecologically sound, non-exploitative, just, non-patriarchal, self-sustain-

ing society.67 Pre-colonial India is supposedly the society that most closely

approximates this ideal.68 Such societies are also said to be self-sufcient,

which is said to guarantee food for the local population in contrast to cash-

crop production for export in societies integrated into the global economy.69

Finally, these societies embrace the feminine principle of respect for Mother

Earth, in contrast to industrial capitalism, which attempts to (patriarchally)

dominate nature.70

There are enormous problems with these claims, however. First, it abstracts

from inequalities within local communities. For instance, pre-colonial Indiawas highly unequal in terms of caste, class, and gender, and these inequalities

persist in the (much championed) domestic sphere to this day in a partic-

ularly acute form in India.71 More generally, the peasantry has never been a

110 Ray Kiely

65 See Indigenous Peoples Caucus 2001.66

Mies and Shiva 1993, p. 9.67 Mies and Shiva 1993, p. 297.68 Shiva 1989, 2000.69 Shiva 1989, p. 113.70 Shiva 1989, p. xviii, Mies and Shiva 1993, p. 13.71 Shiva recognises that women are oppressed in Indian society, but blames this on

outside inuences such as the Green Revolution (Shiva 1989, p. 118). This argumentignores the fact that inequalities existed before both the Green Revolution and colo-nialism. Her appeal to the feminine principle is based on Sanskrit texts, to whichwomen were not even granted access. Shiva also tends to conate Indian with Hindu,

a very dangerous position in the contemporary political climate in India and oneactively taken up by Hindu communalists. Her politics are best described as reac-tionary anti-globalist. Contemporary anticapitalists, who refuse to criticise her views


19/30

homogenous social group, and has always been divided on the basis of access

to land, inputs, credit, markets, and the labour of others.72 This point applies

equally to the question of cash crops. Local inequality includes unequal access

to food production and consumption, and so self-sufciency in itself is no

guarantee of access to food.73 Moreover, in many cases, domestic food andproduction for export go hand in hand, and it is simplistic to suggest that

there is a simple zero-sum game between the two.74 Furthermore, traditional

agricultural production may be more vulnerable to unfavourable local weather

conditions and pests damaging local harvests. The famine in Wollo, Ethiopia,

in 19845, had many complex causes, but lack of development of agrarian

production was more than likely a contributory factor.75

Less traditionalist localists like David Korten and Colin Hines76 favour

local over global business and markets, but their argument suffers from

similar problems. There is little evidence that small-scale capitalism is some-

how more humane than transnational capital. Indeed, the common targets of

anticapitalist protest sweat-shop production, cash-crop production, high

polluting industries involve the use of small and local rms at least as much

as transnational corporations. The involvement of such rms may involvesome form of contracting with TNCs, but the fact that such practices occur

shows that small rms are equally committed to prots rather than (local)

needs.77

Clearly, localisation does not offer a viable or progressive alternative to

global capitalism. However, while it fails to offer a convincing alternative

strategy, it does ask some important questions concerning technology and

the environment. As discussed above, Marxists have argued that capitalism

is progressive because it leads to the development of the productive forces.

On the other hand, environmentalists have argued that modern society (dened


72 Bernstein 2000.73

The classic statement of this position is Sen 1981. The arguments in this book canalso be used against crude globalisers (discussed above) who stress participation inmarkets without regard to the unequal ways in which people participate


20/30

as either industrial or capitalist society) leads to the (partial) destruction of

nature, reected in global warming, pollution, and wasteful overproduction

and overconsumption. Deep ecologists including the ecofeminists discussed

above use this argument to make unsubstantiated claims about nite

resources, overpopulation, and the rejection of technology.

78

Nevertheless,more subtle ecological critiques show the need for a re-development of

Marxisms approach to technological development.79 Critical accounts of glob-

alisation must focus not only on the question of whether or not integration

into the world economy will promote economic growth, but also the ques-

tion of the quality of that growth. As we have seen, some Marxists support

integration on the grounds that this will lead to the development of the pro-

ductive forces, which acts as a bridge to socialism. Leaving aside the questionof whether or not integration leads to economic growth (discussed above),

there is the additional question of whether such growth acts as such a bridge.

In some ways, the development of technology in capitalist society is inappro-

priate for a democratic socialist future for example, the mass production

of armaments, high polluting industries, automobiles, and so on. Socialism

may involve the socialisation of technology, but this process will be more

complicated than a simple takeover of technology developed in capitalist

societies.80

On the other hand, deep ecology seems intent on a blanket rejection of any

technology developed under capitalism.81 Capitalist technology has led to

many gains, even if these are unevenly and unequally distributed. Strategies

based on straightforward localisation therefore often romanticise pre-indus-

trial, local communities, falsely contrasting a noble local to an evil global.

82

Ultimately then, localisation strategies do not constitute a progressive alter-

native to actually existing globalisation.

112 Ray Kiely

78

For an excellent critical survey, see Pepper 1996.79 On Marxism and environmentalism, see Benton 1996, and Bellamy Foster 2000.80 Sutcliffe 1992, pp. 3434.


21/30

(ii) Regulating global capitalism, and the case for revolutionary reform

An alternative deglobalisation strategy focuses on the development of an

alternative and more progressive global structure. Within this context, local

development may take place, but it will not be based on the backward-lookingdystopias advocated by the likes of Shiva. Bello envisages deglobalisation

based on the following: production for the local market; local nance (not

foreign investment); less emphasis on growth per se; the subjection of the

market to social control; and the development of community-based and

public-sector initiatives, along with the continued development of the (local)

private sector.83 For these developments to occur, there needs to be a recon-

struction of global institutions that rejects the monolithic approach of the IMF,World Bank, and WTO and instead adopts a more pluralistic system. Although

far from perfect, Bello argues that the GATT system from the late 1940s to

the 1970s at least allowed for some room for manoeuvre for state-managed

capitalist development, particularly in East Asia.84 In practice, the movement

for a different regulatory rgime would involve policies such as international

debt cancellation, an international tax on nancial transactions, defence of

public services, and controls on capital movements.85

Such policies are not without their problems.86 For instance, debt cancella-

tion on its own could starve countries of future sources of nance, as previously

indebted countries become nancial pariahs. It also does not guarantee that

funds will be diverted into socially useful ventures. Ultimately, debt cancel-

lation will not alter capitalisms tendency towards uneven development. Trade

decits are likely to re-occur and therefore new forms of debt crises mayemerge the current neoliberal period, including the debt crisis, emerged out

of the ruins of the neo-Keynesian capitalism of the post-war period. This fact

leads Callinicos to ask the question, how would a revised version of the post-

war order avoid the tendency that ultimately destroyed the original?87


83

Bello 2001, p. 17.84 Bello makes this point partly to indicate that abolition of the WTO does not meana return to some law of the jungle This perfectly correct point is used to challenge


22/30

Moreover, even if we could revive the post-war global order, the fact remains

that the experience of capitalist development in the period from the 1950s to

late 1970s was far from ideal. Late capitalist development in East Asia, the

foundations of which were laid in the 1960s and 1970s, was a history of state

repression, class and gender exploitation, and environmental destruction.

88

These problems lead us to address more specic questions concerning the

effects of reforms. The implementation of a Tobin tax on international spec-

ulation would not on its own discourage massive speculation based on the

expectation of a large devaluation. For broader policies of redistribution to

occur, more stringent controls are required, and these are only likely to be

implemented at the national or regional level, at least in the short term.

National capital controls are one such mechanism, but these can easily degen-erate into a nationalism in which labour movements protect their capital

from foreign investment.89 Nationalism is a question that needs to be con-

fronted more directly by the anticapitalist movement. Struggles against trade

agreements such as NAFTA and the FTAA90 have often had a nationalist focus,

which undermines international labour solidarity as workers in one country

blame workers in another for stealing our jobs. Such a focus lets capital off

the hook, as it is implied that it is the trade agreement, rather than capital-

ism itself, that is responsible for loss of jobs, declining work conditions, and

so on.91

However, a call for national capital controls is not necessarily reactionary,

so long as the case for them avoids simplistic appeals to a mythical national

interest.92 In any case, as we have seen, the absence of capital controls has

not led to an increase in investment to capital-starved areas, but rather an

114 Ray Kiely

88 As Bello recognises. See Bello and Rosenfeld 1992.89 On protectionism and labour economism, see Kiely 2001b. Such nationalism can

take extreme forms, such as the fascist British National Partys opposition to the inter-nationalisation of British capital.

90 The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), introduced in 1994, and theFree Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA), under negotiation with planned agreement

by 2005.91 On the AFL-CIOs Campaign for Global Fairness, see Kiely 2001b.92 A full discussion of the development of strategies that challenge neoliberal hege-


23/30

intensication of uneven development, with adverse social consequences

in all countries. In the advanced countries, the threat of capital ight has

been used as a device to discipline labour and undermine standards.93 In the

developing countries, capital ight is an endemic problem which free trade

makes easier, and inward ows are often short-term, speculative and unsta-ble. Better (public) mechanisms are therefore needed for transfers of capital

to the developing world. This implies an internationalist policy whereby

national capital controls are used to promote egalitarian policies both within

and beyond the nation-state exercising such controls. Such a policy could

include increased aid from advanced to underdeveloped countries, in

terms of both quantity and quality that is, aid not necessarily targeted at

governments in the South, but rather at social movements committed to

progressive social change.94 This strategy could also be applied to trade with

sectors where there is evidence of a levelling up process among producers

a strategic trade policy a long way from Desais technocratic notion of

integration into the global free market.

It is clear then that the implementation of even the most basic reforms can,

and no doubt will, lead to new contradictions. Moreover, such reforms areunlikely to be implemented without a massive struggle, and capital will surely

nd new ways of evading regulation. These are problems that need to be

recognised and debated. However, the search for the absolute certainty of

socialist purity, based on a fully worked out programme of advance and

therefore based on positivist conceptions of social change is not produc-

tive. Capitalism has certain tendencies, but these laws of motion do not

operate entirely independently of the actions of human beings. The future is

uncertain because the fate of class and other struggles cannot be predicted

in advance. Socialist programmes can help in these struggles providing

some direction in terms of strategy but they cannot replace them.95 At its


93 Key thinkers in the anticapitalist movement often argue that there is a race to

the bottom. However, a strong version of this argument wrongly implies that thereis a global convergence based on a levelling down process. Such levelling down takesplace in the context of uneven development and is therefore relative and limited See


24/30

current stage of development, the anticapitalist movement is actually anti-

neoliberal; leaving aside the arguments of backward-looking romantics and

direct action fetishists,96 the movement calls for the reform of global capital-

ism. If reforms are implemented, they may help to bring about more successful

capitalist development for some parts of the world. Such a development willbe full of contradictions, as Marx reminded us, but in some respects it may

also be progressive. The history of late development in East Asia is also the

history of increased life expectancy, better health care and education, and

higher incomes. For some revolutionaries, this is not enough, and they will

no doubt argue that a reformist programme can easily be co-opted by global

capitalism. However, the struggle for reforms is not separate from the strug-

gle for a socialist future.97 If reforms are co-opted then there will be renewedstruggles for greater reforms, and it is this struggle which is a necessary step-

ping-stone to wider social transformation. Thus, it is not integration into the

world economy, but class and other struggles that constitute the real bridge

to socialism.

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