Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and Defenses · Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and...

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Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and Defenses Eric Zeng [email protected] Graduate Research Assistant University of Washington

Transcript of Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and Defenses · Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and...

Page 1: Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and Defenses · Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and Defenses Eric Zeng ericzeng@cs.washington.edu Graduate Research Assistant ... attack

Computer Security: A Taste of Attacks and DefensesEric [email protected]

Graduate Research AssistantUniversity of Washington

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New technologies bring new benefits...

… but also new risks

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Security and Privacy ResearchGoal: Improve the security and privacy of technologies

Security mindset: Challenge assumptions, think like an attacker.

Study existing technologies:attack and measure.

Design and build defenses and new technologies.

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Example: Modern Automobiles

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Exercise: Security MindsetAssetsWhat should be protected?

AdversariesWho are possible attackers?

Threats and VulnerabilitiesHow might an adversary try to attack the system?

RiskHow important are the assets? How likely are the exploits?

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Hacking a real car!

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How did they do it? [Checkoway et al. ‘11]

Long-range wireless attack (cellular connection)

Physical attack (malicious CD)

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Ethics

1. Do no harm2. Don’t attack systems unless you have permission

✓ OK if you own it✓ OK if there is a bug bounty program

3. If you find a vulnerability, disclose it responsibly✓ Report it to the manufacturer✗ Don’t sell it to hackers

What ethical guidelines should you follow when doing security research?

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AttacksIn what ways are technologies insecure?

DefensesHow can we make our technology more secure?

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What does the green lock mean?

1. Your communication with Google is encrypted.

2. You know you’re actually talking to Google (probably).

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EncryptionWhy?

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Encryption

mail.google.com

Secret Message

Symmetric key encryption

You

a2j6nk9xfn3m0g

How do we exchange keys?

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Asymmetric Encryption

mail.google.comYou

public

private

Symmetric key generation info symmetric

(aka public key encryption)

How do we know this key is really from Google?

Why not just use public key encryption? It’s much slower than symmetric key encryption

a2j6nk9xfn3m0g

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Certificate Authorities

mail.google.comYou

public

private

Certificate Authority

signed

Certificate

Your browser knows some trusted authorities

private

public

public

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Trusted(?) Certificate Authorities

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What if the certificate is bad?

Problem: 70% of people ignored this warning!

[Felt et al. ‘15]

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Challenge: Usability1. People don’t notice the absence of a lock icon (when

connection is not encrypted)2. People ignore browser warnings (shown when certificate

is untrusted)

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Security Warning DesignAdherence N

30.9% 4,551

Original Warning (Chrome 36)

[Felt et al. ‘15]

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Security Warning DesignAdherence N

30.9% 4,551

32.1% 4,075

Less technical jargon

[Felt et al. ‘15]

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Security Warning DesignAdherence N

30.9% 4,551

32.1% 4,075

58.3% 4,644

Opinionated Design:Choice visibility, choice attractiveness

[Felt et al. ‘15]

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Conclusion● Security mindset: different way of looking at the world;

applies not just to technology● Many aspects of computer security

○ Attacks, Defenses○ System Design○ Cryptography○ Human Factors