Comprehensive Metropolitan Reform

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Comprehensive Metropolitan Reform:The Application of Urban Regime Theory

Richard Eric Bielke Dornfeld

An Honors ThesisSubmitted for partial fulfillment of the requirements

for graduation with honors in the Political Science Departmentfrom Hamline University

April 27, 2012



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AbstractThe urban exodus of largely middle-class Americans during the post-war housing boom led tothe unprecedented expansion of U.S. metropolitan areas. Rapid development of the suburbsstrained traditional urban cores, which were left with the region’s most impoverished residents.Developing suburban areas also faced challenges as they competed with other suburbs and

struggled to accommodate an influx of new people. Increasing racial isolation and suburbancompetition were not only the products of the geographic shifts. This suburban expansion alsoled to the multiplication of governmental units. Highly dispersed suburban governmental unitsare an inefficient way to deliver services. Reformers long have called on metropolitanreorganization to improve service delivery and reduce the inequity between urban and suburbanresidents. Proponents of metropolitan reform often encourage strategies designed to reducefragmentation, capture suburban growth within the central city and force local governments toconsider regional concerns.

By examining the experiences of the Portland, Indianapolis, Houston, and Minneapolis-SaintPaul and Saint Louis metropolitan areas via comprehensive histories, first-hand documents and

interviews with former and current policymakers, I have identified key factors that impactcomprehensive reform. I then compared my factors to urban regime theory. Since itsdevelopment in the mid-1980s, urban regime theory has developed into one of the dominantparadigms in urban politics. Its position as one of the primary approaches to urban theory makesit an ideal choice for integrating my findings with urban politics.

I find that urban regime theory is generally able to explain the politics of metropolitan reform. Inmany cases, reform coalitions develop into regional regimes as described by regime theory. Evenin cases where the coalitions deteriorate post-reform, these shorter-term coalitions often mimicpatterns found in their long-term cousins. For these reasons I conclude that urban regime theoryis an appropriate vehicle for understanding comprehensive metropolitan reform.



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IntroductionIn any metropolitan area there may be dozens of local government units encompassing cities,counties, special taxing and service districts, and transit or water authorities. Undoubtedly thereis inefficiency as redundant services are provided and governmental units fail to collaborate.Scholars, good government activists, and politicians have argued that in an era of increasing

globalization the region has become the primary unit of economic competition. Greaterprosperity can be achieved when local governments work together to attract business from acrossthe world as opposed to competing with each other for limited local businesses. Others believethat close regional or metropolitan (terms I use interchangeably) cooperation can alleviate manyof the problems suffered in many of America’s urban cores, where more prosperous suburbstypically surround struggling inner cities.

Despite a myriad of justifications for structural reform in America’s metropolitan regions, itsimplementation has been rare. Since the 1960s only two regional governments have developed inthe United States: in the Portland and Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan areas (Gainsborough2001). A few cities and counties have merged—notably Indianapolis/Marion County,

Nashville/Davidson County, and Louisville/Jefferson County—to reduce service inefficienciesand improve growth. Other cities like Houston and Albuquerque aggressively have used theirannexation powers to capture suburban growth within their boundaries (Rusk 2003).

I argue that urban regime theory (regime theory) provides a proper lens for understandingmetropolitan reform. Regimes can be the product of reform or a pre-requisite for it depending onthe unique conditions in a given metropolitan area. Despite a number of compelling reasons forsignificant metropolitan reform, future attempts are unlikely. Current regional regimes are lesslikely to attempt reform due to changes in American living patterns, while the potential for futureregimes similarly has declined.

Theoretical approach and methodsThough metropolitan reform is rare, those attempts that succeed frequently share common traits.To better understand the dynamics of metropolitan politics and reform movements; I employurban regime theory. Unlike other urban paradigms, regime theory is broad enough to accountfor both the wide-range of actors involved in metropolitan politics and the governing coalitionsthat often develop as a result. Since its development in the mid-1980s, regime theory has becomeone of the dominant paradigms in urban politics. Regime theory focuses on the connectionsbetween governmental and non-governmental actors. Clarence Stone, a leading regime theorist,defines it as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interest functiontogether in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (1989, 6).

Regime theory views power as fragmented between both public and private interests, and thuslike many elite theory approaches it recognizes that most local governments lack the capacity togovern alone. Unlike elite theorists, regime theory does not presume that government willnecessarily collude with the local economic actors to maintain control either. Instead, regimeanalysis finds that political actors look for any suitable partners to form and maintain control inthe local arena. This is at once both a rejection of many elite conceptions of power that presumethat local government requires the support economic actors and the pluralists’ belief that



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government is able to independently develop and implement policy (Mossberger, Stoker 2001,812).

Regime theorists describe the possibility of four different types of regimes: “Maintenanceregimes, which seek no major change, but rather to preserve [the status quo]… Development

regimes [that require] more resources… to promote growth or counter decline… Middle-classprogressive regimes that seek environmental protection and control over growth… [and] Lower-class opportunity regimes, which require substantial mass mobilization and resources… that areoften absent in American cities” (Judge, Stoker, Wolman 1995, 60). Regime analysis recognizesthat economic elites are more likely to dominate governing coalitions because of their superiorpolitical capital and financial resources. Due to these conceptions regime theory uniquelystraddles the balance between elite theorists and pluralists.

Its ability to reject both elite and pluralists views comes from a different ideas on power. Insteadof viewing power as a coercive “power over” others, regime theory conceives of power ascapacity, or “the power to” act. Stone argues that the “power over” model is based on the

“Weberian idea of A getting B to do what B would not otherwise do.” The “power to”conception focuses on the ability of individual actors “to be part of the political community [and]have an enhanced capacity to pursue collective aims” thus increasing the ability to act (2006, 25-6). Both the recognition of different types of regimes and the different conception of power givesregime theory greater flexibility, while maintaining theoretical integrity. These factors are crucialto applying regime analysis to metropolitan reform.

Metropolitan reforms come in many different forms and are widely shaped by unique conditionsin each region. Unlike other types of urban theory that focus on specific local actors, the regimeparadigm accepts a wide-range of actors. These include typical local actors, but potentially thosefrom state or national arenas as regime members as well. As a theoretical framework, regime

theory also is well suited to metropolitan politics because it does not attempt to predict themotives of regional actors in the general case.

Stone writes “we should begin our understanding of regimes by understanding that informalarrangements are by no means peculiar to cities” on the first page of his seminal book: “RegimePolitics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988” (1989, 3). Despite this admission, almost all regimeresearch focuses on the affairs of a single city. To the best of my knowledge there is only oneexample of research that applies regime theory to the metropolitan scale. Christopher Leo usesregime theory to examine the politics of land use planning in the Portland, Oregon metropolitanarea (1998). I also have applied regime theory to my own case study research.

My own research differs from Leo’s in several ways. I studied five different metropolitan areasto maximize the universability of my results. I chose to examine areas that are bothgeographically diverse and underwent different types of metropolitan reform. I only appliedregime theory after closely examining these areas and their reforms—concluding that it betterexplains reforms at the regional level than other theories. I attempted to use other theoreticalapproaches such as Harvey Molotch’s urban growth machine theory (1976, 1987) and thetraditional lenses that I have already discussed (namely pluralist and elite theories). These otherapproaches either focused too much on economic growth (growth machine theory) to explain the



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regional reform I found in case studies. Similarly, the pluralist and elite theories conception of power failed to capture the nature of reform that I found. Unlike these other approaches, urbanregime theory’s focus on relationships and coalition building gave it greater utility in explainingregional politics.

Reform justificationsThe following section describes the wide-range of arguments that proponents make to justifymetropolitan reform. The circumstances under which these arguments are made vary based onthe conditions in a particular region.

Regionalism and globalization

Suburban development in the United States has been characterized by rapid outward growth.From 1970 to 1990 the Chicago metropolitan area’s population grew by four percent, while itsland area increased by 64 percent. Cleveland's population actually fell by three percent duringthe same period, though its land area expanded by 30 percent (Schneider 1996). In some regions,first-ring suburbs have begun to decline reminiscent of their core cities. Suburban development

outpacing population growth suggests a dramatic population shift and the recreation of urbanservices on America’s metropolitan fringes. The multiplication of governmental units creates aredundant service environment where every suburban community provides every service to itsown residents. Excessive fragmentation can create a combative attitude that encouragescommunities to play political hot potato with where to locate the area water-treatment facility orpower plant because it could lower property values. Core cities have experienced drops in theirproperty values because their middle class residents have left for the suburbs. Paradoxicallysuburbanites may continue to enjoy a variety of services and regional goods provided by thecentral city that they no longer support via the tax base—further straining the metropolitan core.

Though central cities experienced economic decline during the latter half of the 20th century,

they remain relevant to a region’s overall economic success. Studies have found that on average33 percent to 67 percent of suburban income was generated by the central city (Stanbeck, Knight1976; Savitch, et al 1993). Savitch, et al further found that when the central city’s income wasrelatively close to its suburbs the region experienced better job growth. Despite the dispersion of people and businesses, core cities remain crucial to a region’s economic growth because they areoften centrally located and frequently home to regional transportation centers such as airports,rail hubs, or highways. These cities also are more likely to house corporate headquarters andhigh profile public resources like stadiums and theaters that draw people from the broadermetropolitan region.

The suburban-core city connection has become more important in a globalized economy. In the

past, cities and suburbs competed for the location of local businesses and residents. Now regionsaround the world compete for businesses and individuals who drive the knowledge-basedeconomy. Richard Florida writes, “The shift to knowledge-intensive capitalism goes beyond theparticular business and management strategies of individual firms… involving the developmentof new inputs and a broader infrastructure at the regional level… The nature of this economictransformation makes regions key economic units in the global economy” (1995, 531). In thisenvironment, communities achieve superior economic outcomes by partnering with neighboringcommunities to attract businesses and educated individuals.



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Competing in a globalized environment means that regions must find ways to attract members of the knowledge-based economy. For government this means providing fertile ground for theinformation economy by providing superior education, research facilities, infrastructure andcultural amenities to attract and keep both people and businesses located in their region. Political

boundaries are becoming less relevant in an international sense, but also at the metropolitanlevel. Local governments interested in economic success have begun to recognize that peoplelive, work, shop, and relax in varying communities across the region and accommodate thistrend.

Social and poverty concerns

Rapid suburban expansion has aggravated the isolation of minorities. More affluent whiteAmericans have largely migrated to suburbs, leaving minorities in the inner-city cores and morerecently declining first-ring suburbs. As a result, the urban poor are living in homogenouslyimpoverished neighborhoods (Denton, Massey 2003; Orfield 1997). This isolation means thatthese urban poor (largely minorities) lack access to jobs that have moved to the suburbs. Urban

public schools become overwhelmed with underperforming students and lack the property taxbase to dramatically improve them. The decline of traditional poverty reduction programs hashardened the economic positions of the urban poor. Helen Ladd and John Yinger argue thatincreased (regardless of whether it as achieved via annexation, merger, or tax-sharing) fundingfor means-based programs create the possibility of raising the real income of low-incomehouseholds. They further suggest that increased revenue for core cities and impoverished suburbsis most potent when addressing education funding, which in many areas is directly connected toproperty value (1994).

Maintaining a strong fiscal position remains tenuous for suburban bedroom communities, whichare highly dependent on high property values and continued growth to pay for city services and

long-term debt. Unlike core cities, suburban communities usually lack developed centralbusiness districts and industrial parks—forcing them to rely almost exclusively on residentialdevelopment—thus the perceived quality of the housing, schools, and safety become even moreimportant. Allan D. Wallis writes, “Suburban municipalities try to enhance their economies byencouraging the development of tax generating activities, such as shopping malls and officeparks. In more technical terms, their actions are based on maximizing internal benefits andcapturing spill-over benefits, while externalizing as many costs as possible” (1994, 7). Suburbsadopt these types of policies to keep the tax-base expanding, which is crucial to paying for thecosts of development (i.e. roads, sewers, fire and police protection). To achieve this goal,suburban communities will create zoning requirements (larger lot sizes, low-densityrequirements) that increase residential property values. Increased property values not only

improve the city’s financial resources, but also shut out urban poor (primarily minorities) whosepresence in a suburban community is perceived to signal decline particularly in housing valuesand school quality, while requiring more governmental and community support than the typicalsuburban resident (Denton, Massey 2003).

Proponents of annexation and city-county consolidations argue that by capturing growth withinthe central city racial isolation is lessened, job access is improved, and suburban-type growth canhelp pay the costs associated with redevelopment in the inner city and improving schools. Others



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argue that the implementation of strict regional land use planning coupled with subsidized oraffordable suburban housing requirements will begin to alleviate these poverty-related problems.Higher population densities increase the viability of mass transit, and reduce suburban homesprices so that the poor may live closer to higher paying jobs and schools that are notoverwhelmed with a deluge of impoverished and underperforming students (Downs 1994).

Inefficiencies and democracy

Local government fragmentation typically comes in at least one of four forms: “(1) Proliferationof incorporated communities within the metropolitan area… (2) Overlapping of city and countyfunctions and responsibilities… (3) Existence of special districts, public authorities, and schooldistricts… [and the] (4) Extension of the metropolitan area boundaries without concern for statelines” (Dolan 1990, 29). The Chicago metropolitan area is highly fragmented with more than1,200 units of local government composed of 273 municipalities; county and townshipgovernments, special purpose districts and joint action water agencies. Of the 273 municipalities,166 of them have fewer than 15,000 residents. Proponents of regionalism argue that regions likethe Chicago metropolitan area are excellent candidates for reform because they experience

several types of fragmentation.

Drew Dolan summarizes the arguments against fragmentation, arguing that it:Leads to confusion in responsibility for service provision, reductions in politicalscrutiny and control, political unresponsiveness, duplication of effort,inefficiencies lead to less than effective methods of providing services, high per-unit costs, larger governmental outlays, units of government concerned only withtheir own problems, and metropolitan governments too fragmented and unstablein their policy-making to manage their money and implement their programseffectively (Ibid, 30).

Dolan also finds a strong positive relationship between fragmentation and increased cost

of government. Additionally, in regions like the Chicago metropolitan area it can becomedifficult for voters to hold government accountable because it is highly diffused amongvarious levels. Some of these governmental units have little public accountability becausethey are somewhat inconspicuous and may lack elected officials such as in a specialpurpose district. Other scholars have come to similar conclusions as Dolan over the pastforty years as well (Ecker-Racz 1970; Schlitz, Mofit 1971; Baird, Landon 1972; Hahn,Levine 1980; Yates 1980; Schneider; Grant, Nixon 1982; Chicoine, Walzer 1985).

Strategies for reducing local government fragmentation vary. David Rusk argues that centralcities need to remain or regain elastic (or expanding) borders to capture suburban growth withintheir own boundaries. In doing so, core cities can reduce racial, ethnic, and class fragmentation,

while using acquired suburban tax rolls to combat urban decline (Rusk 1999; 2003). City-countymergers also can capture some or all of suburban tax revenues without the severe political costsof continual suburban annexations. Revenue sharing programs also have been proposed (and inseveral locations implemented) to reduce fiscal disparities between metropolitan communities.Myron Orfield cites the example of Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area’s experience withthe fiscal disparities program as a way of sharing a region’s tax-base without traditional politicalboundaries (1997). While this programmatic solution addresses fiscal inequality, it does little tocombat racial, ethnic, and class fragmentation.



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Others suggest that either capturing a significant portion of metropolitan development within thecore city’s limits or creating new metropolitan forms of government will help to lessen many of the other problems that plague urban areas. Reformers argue that urban sprawl creates economicinefficiencies because urban services (e.g. roads, schools, water and sewers, police and fire

protection) must be continually extended to or replicated on the metropolitan fringes. In additionto these economic issues, sprawl also is blamed for the degradation of the environment astraditionally rural areas are developed in suburban subplots.

Pointing to Oregon’s (and in particular the Portland metropolitan area’s) success controllingsprawl reform, proponents such as Orfield and Downs, have called for “smart growth” policiesthat implement strict land use planning programs. In addition to controlling sprawl, these policiescreate greater housing densities along major transportation corridors—encouraging higher transitusage and reduced highway dependency. These policies also are best suited to equitably sharethe costs of the region’s negative externalities (power plants, landfills, water treatment facilities)and share the benefits of regional goods (airports, stadiums, theaters, parks).

Calls for reform

The creation of the Federal Housing Administration in 1937 and the Veteran Administration in1944 pumped millions of dollars into the housing industry in the post-war era, spurring rapidsuburban growth (Denton, Massey 2003, 53). Coupled with rising auto ownership and thecreation of the interstate highway system in 1956, American metropolitan areas quickly becamedecentralized as people left urban centers. In 1940, only a third of Americans living inmetropolitan areas resided in suburbs. By 1970 over half of Americans lived in suburban areas(Ibid, 44). Regionalists began calling for metropolitan reform much earlier in an attempts toreduce inefficiencies created by governmental units. Though reform proposals date to the 1920s(Maxey 1922), they picked up with increasing frequency in the post-war era (Banfield 1957;

Grant 1955). Suburban growth continues today, raising many of the same concerns that previousscholars, politicians, and proponents of good government voiced in the past.

Rather predictably, efforts to forge regional reform usually face significant opposition. Mostresearch into regional restructuring assumes that reform is doomed to fail. Frequently thoseremaining in the urban core are unsupportive of reform and any benefits because “consolidation[may] increase the power of regional elites at the expense of poor central city residents,especially regarding economic development decisions” (Weir 2004, 6). Many suburbanites have“deliberately sought to [escape] from the big, crowded city and to achieve ‘status’ for themselvesand their families” (Gulick 1962, 126). Studies have shown since 1921 only 17.6 percent of consolidation referendums have passed, confirming for many that with both urban and suburban

resident typically opposed reform fail (Weir 2004).

Dual disinterest appears to be a reasonable explanation of past reform failures, but it does notcover the variety of examples where major structural reform has occurred. The model cited byWallis and Weir—in addition to other scholars—creates monolithic cities and suburbs, instead of acknowledging the many varieties of both types of municipalities. In some situations urban areasmay have similar interests as neighboring older, declining suburbs (Orfield 1997), such as thedesire to spur economic development and improve regional infrastructure (Rusk 2003). This



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monolithic model is singularly focused on city-suburb conflict, resulting in a failure toacknowledge complications created by state laws that ensure municipalities remain “creatures of the state” (Barron 2003, 2260). These problems raise the larger question of what is required forregional reform to be successful. Based on past attempts, what must the political landscape looklike and what regional coalitions must be formed for structural reform to occur?

Traditional metropolitan reform narrative obscures the multiplicity of reform options. Thesuccessful implementation of reform is dependent on desired outcomes, institutional rules, andthe realities of electoral politics. Most reforms can either be categorized as developmental orredistributive. Developmental reforms are the most likely to accepted in a metropolitan regionbecause they bring the promise of economic growth or increased governmental efficiency.Redistributive reforms are less viable because they threaten the status quo for some individuals.Typically social and poverty related reforms are the most likely to be considered redistributive innature because they threaten (or appear to threaten) one group’s economic interests or perceivedschool quality (Thomas, Murphy, 1991; Massey, Denton 2003). In any case, we see that thestandard reform movement narratives begin to break down—simply because reform proposals

can vary greatly.

Despite the breadth of the topic, most research on the obstacles to reform exists merely as atangential reference in articles with another focus. A few studies do exist on specific instances of regional or metropolitan reform (LeSage, Stefanick 2004; Norris 2001; Nunn, Rosentraub 1996).Regionalism research largely is limited to questions surrounding economic efficiency and socialoutcomes (Ellickson 1971; Oakland 1994; Tiebout 1956). Frequently research is focused on theinternal political dynamics of regional organizations and governments resulting from reform asopposed to dynamics surrounding the implementation of actual reform (Frisken, Norris 2001;Gainsborough 2001; Visser 2004).

Reform options and regions of studyDuring the 20th century there are numerous examples of successful reform efforts among themyriad of failures. Identifying common strategies and key factors involved with reform, I havechosen to closely examine a variety of metropolitan areas that attempted different types of reform. I divide the types of regional reform into the categories of annexation, city-countyconsolidation/merger, and metropolitan government.

Annexation (particularly small-scale action) does not improve the prospects of collectiveregional action. However, when annexation captures a large portion of metropolitan area’sgrowth, it allows the core city to function like a metropolitan government in both the area underits direct jurisdiction and by virtue of its size relative to the rest of the region. “Elastic regions

[have] more unified governance”… [Elasticity occurs when] the central city… serves over 40percent of the region’s inhabitants” (Rusk 2003, 39). Houston used its annexation powers torapidly grow and perhaps even more importantly to quash the developmental aspirations of rivalcommunities. Though Houston’s ability to use annexation as a viable strategy has lessened in thepast 30 years, it remains a valuable example on viability and utility of annexation in themunicipal politics arena.



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City-county consolidations are less common than annexations, but a number of them haveoccurred in the past 60 years. I examine Indianapolis and Marion County’s 1970 consolidation.Mergers occurred somewhat regularly in the South during the 1950s and 1960s, whileIndianapolis is the only major city to merge with its county in the Midwest. In the case of theIndianapolis-Marion County merger, it was not a complete consolidation with the city providing

county services, while other municipalities within the county are still providing some localservices. By selecting a city outside of the South, which experienced a rash of consolidationsbased on uniquely southern conditions, I hope to find results can be more readily generalized.

Metropolitan governments are uncommon in the United States. Two notable examples are theTwin Cities’ Metropolitan Council and the Oregon Metropolitan Service District in Portland(Metro). Others do exist in North America, such as Metro Toronto or Winnipeg’s Unicitygovernment. I chose to focus solely on the American experiences because they will have themost applicability to other U.S. municipalities—the focus of my research. Both the MetropolitanCouncil and the Metro were created during the 1970s and have jurisdiction over their entiremetropolitan areas. However, differences do exist between the two as well as the contexts for

their creation, which will give the subject more depth.

Finally, I briefly examine Saint Louis region’s unsuccessful 1959 attempt to enact metropolitanreform, which for a variety of factors failed miserably. It falls most closely into the category of metropolitan government, however the setbacks faced by the Saint Louis metropolitan areaprovide clear examples of the potential pitfalls associated with most forms of comprehensiveregional reform.

Houston metropolitan area, Texas

The Houston area brings a radically different vision of planning and regionalism—essentiallythey do not have one. The fourth largest city in the United States, Houston dominates the affairs

of its region unlike any other area examined here. Houston’s economic elites who long havecontrolled the region’s agenda have been almost exclusively driven by the desire to ensuregrowth. Houston first developed its energy and shipping sectors before branching into otherssuch as chemicals, manufacturing and medical fields.

Houston’s location is hardly an obvious place for a city—sitting on the dry Texas plains by theBuffalo Bayou 50 miles from the Gulf of Mexico. For its first 70 years, Houston was bested bynearby rival Galveston, which is located on the gulf. In 1900, a hurricane devastated Galveston.Making the most of the opportunity, Houston with the help of the federal government dredgedthe bayou and created a viable port safe from hurricanes. Since then Houston has grown rapidlyin 1900, the area had a population of 64,000; by 1950, it had increased to 807,000. Today,

Houston has a population of 2.1 million with another 3.9 million living in the nearbycommunities.

Houston deftly used Texas state law for much of the 20th century to annex huge swaths of territory into its borders, while insuring that potential rivals were kept in check. In 1940, Houstonwas 73 square miles in size; by 1960, it had increased 350 square miles. Today, Houstonstretches over 600 square miles. Texas state law includes a mechanism called extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) that gives incorporated cities based on their size some control outside their



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limits. Houston because of its size is given ETJ authority in any territory five miles from the citylimits (assuming that land is not part of another incorporated community). ETJ authority allows acity to block the incorporation of that land as a new city and to annex that territory by cityordinance. Through aggressive use, Houston has managed to capture much of the valuablegrowth in the region, including the international airport (Bush International) that is disconnected

from the rest of the city and located 20 miles from much of the city. To capture wealthycommunities, Houston also annexed areas of Lake Houston located some 30 miles to thenortheast, connected to the rest of city by thin strips of land.

V.O. Key, Jr. writes that Texans are “concerned about money and how to make it, about oil andsulfur and gas, about cattle and dust storms and irrigation, about cotton and banking andMexicans” (1950, 254). Governmental policy in Texas has largely focused on economic growthand led to a “hands-off” approach. The limited involvement model also applied to therelationship between the state and local governments. For Houston this has meant relatively littleinterference from the state government. This historical policy has changed some in recent years.By the 1980s, the City of Houston found suburban residents increasingly resistant to being

annexed by the central city and with enough political power to fight back. In 1977, residents of the Clear Lake area fought back with a grass roots campaign and a lawsuit that Clear Lakeultimately lost. In 1996, the City of Houston annexed the wealthy planned community of Kingwood, which also led to a lawsuit and almost cost Houston its annexation powers in theTexas state legislature. Since then Houston has only used its annexation powers in limitedfashion reasoning “that much of the power of annexation lies in threat rather than action”(Gainsborough 2001, 503).

Despite these newer limitations on Houston’s power, the city remains the dominant force inregional affairs. It still contains 40 percent of the region’s population and 54 percent withinHarris County the largest in the region. Houston remains the economic center of the region with

400,000 people coming to work in the city every day. During the workday 42 percent of theregion’s population is located within the city limits. Houston has not decentralized to the extentof most American metropolitan areas—giving the city immense influence. The threat of annexation and its economic clout gives Houston numerous advantages in regional politics. Pastannexations also have reduced the number of governmental units involved in metropolitanaffairs. In all this has created an environment that has allowed the region to push forward with itregional agenda (though it is rather limited) focused on ensuring economic growth,transportation and other infrastructure projects.

“We’re the largest city in America without zoning and Houstonians tend to say that with pride”(Gainsborough 2001, 509). Crucial to understanding Houston’s development is its sprawling

nature. Without zoning the city’s development has largely been decided by economic forces—leading to unique developments where single-family homes are located next to office buildings.For most of its development Houston has used on a low-tax, low-service model. Key toperpetuating this model is the unique usage of special taxing districts called Municipal UtilityDistricts (MUDs). “With tax-exempt bonding authority, these districts finance the constructionof streets, sewers, and drainage facilities without increasing city or county debt obligations”(Thomas, Murray 1991, 19). MUDs allow developers to finance the construction of necessaryinfrastructure in unincorporated areas. Once enough new residents move into the area they



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become responsible for debts. Houston encouraged the use of this mechanism because once thedistrict reaches a favorable revenue to debt ratio, it becomes suitable for annexation. At the sametime, MUDs have encouraged rapid sprawl because they provide developers an incentive to keepbuilding outwards.

Houston has begun to deviate from its traditional low tax, sprawl and capture model. First, it hasbecome politically untenable to keep annexing land with increased suburban influence in thestate legislature. Second, Houston has become less concerned with ensuring it has space for itsphysical growth since it continues to have largely undeveloped swathes within its currentboundaries. The city also has the ability to work with regional partners that it can still dominateto a large extent. Finally, Houston has experienced significant demographic and economicchange. Entering the 21st century, Houston has increasingly become an international city withgreater diversity and the higher expectations that come with that image. Concerns overworkforce preparedness and efficient movement regionally have caused both Houston and othercommunities in the region to focus on education and mass transportation to a greater degree than30 or 40 years ago. Houston is expected to continue trending towards a higher tax (although still

low compared to other regions), higher service model with closer connections to othercommunities in the future as well.1

Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana

In 1967, prior to Indianapolis’s consolidation with Marion County, there were 60 governmentalunits in the county: nine townships (Pike, Washington, Lawrence, Wayne, Center, Warren,Decatur, Perry, and Franklin), 23 cities and towns, 11 school districts, 16 special purposedistricts, and the county itself.2 This would be a relatively low number of governmental unitscompared to other metropolitan areas in the United States, except that other than Indianapolisonly three suburban communities had more than 10,000 residents (Beech Grove, Lawrence, andSpeedway). Another issue was that governmental organization in Indiana had changed very little

since statehood and resulted in overlapping and inefficient service delivery particularly in urbanareas like the Indianapolis metropolitan area.

What allowed the largely Republican political coalition to even begin working on consolidationwere the 1967 elections. A split in the Marion County Democratic Party allowed the Republicanmayoral candidate Richard Lugar (he would later be elected to the U.S. Senate) to win by 9,000votes and take control of the city council because Indianapolis elected its city council membersat-large. In 1968, the Republicans took control of the Marion County government, the statelegislature, and the governor’s office. These two elections allowed Republicans in MarionCounty to enact policies without regard for typical partisan concerns.

Unlike in other metropolitan regions, such as St. Louis or the Twin Cities, little study wasconducted prior to proposing reform. Instead, Owen and Willbern explain, “The issue was

1 Robert D. Thomas and Richard W. Murray provide a more detailed history of growth and politics in Houston in their book“Progrowth Politics: Change and Governance in Houston.” Julie F. Gainsborough examines how Houston has worked with itsneighbors and community partners in her work: “Business Organizations as Regional Actors: The Politics of RegionalCooperation in Metropolitan America” and “Bridging the City-Suburb Divide: States and the Politics of Regional Cooperation.”2 The entire state of Indiana is divided into townships, which have distinct legal responsibilities in relation to other municipalunits. They are responsible for things like “poor relief” and in some rural areas basic services like volunteer fire protection andambulance departments. Also note that most of pre-consolidation Indianapolis was located in Center Township.



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decided by a politically powerful group of experienced local government operatives. These menwere keenly aware that the conventional wisdom of merger proposals emphasized economy,efficiency, and effectiveness in local government” (1985, 30). These issues were not the onlydrivers behind reform. Rather, it was the perception that the current governance structures inIndianapolis and Marion County were ineffective (Ibid). Others argue that the real reason that

reform was attempted was to secure suburban control over the core city of Indianapolis during aperiod of rising African-American influence there.

Republican political operatives were hardly the only ones interested in reforming government inMarion County. Chief among these supporters were the League of Women Voters and theChamber of Commerce. The league was concerned with the impact of complicated governancestructure on the democratic ideal in the area. They believed that the dilution of political power inthis manner reduced accountability to the electorate and reduced public awareness andinvolvement. The chamber remained concerned about the business climate in Indianapolis andthe inability of the current governance structure to address the issues of the metropolitan area.Perhaps the least tangible, but real concern of many of the interested parties was the perception

that Indianapolis was a backwater area highlighted by the derisive nickname: “India-no-place.”Many hoped that drastic reform could shake the region out of its economic and perhaps evenpsychological malaise.

Mayor Lugar worked behind closed doors with a policy committee that included business elites,county political operatives, and notable members of the media. Meeting informally, the groupworked through the issues surrounding city-county consolidation. Eventually lawyers withexperience drafting legislation were brought into the process to do the technical work. Theirproposal was to convert Indianapolis into a countywide metropolitan government, to be calledUnigov, with a single executive. For political reasons the school districts and the municipalitiesof Beech Grove, Lawrence and Speedway were left out of the consolidation proposal.

The greatest opposition to consolidating Indianapolis and Marion County came from theIndianapolis News and the Indianapolis Star. The largest daily newspapers in Marion Countyboth were owned by Eugene C. Pulliam and shared the same editorial board. To tamp down oncriticism, Lugar met with Eugene S. Pulliam, the publisher’s son, and M. Stanton Evans, theStar’s assistant publisher, to address concerns that the Unigov proposal made the chief executivetoo powerful. In exchange for reducing the strength of the executive, the newspapermen agreedto support the proposal during the next legislative session.

Others opposed to Unigov included the John Birch Society, which feared the specter of communism. Chet Webb, who had chaired George Wallace’s 1968 presidential campaign in

Marion County, showed up at one hearing regarding Unigov claiming that Lugar was attemptingto setup a Marxist dictatorship (Owen, Willbern 1985, 95). Other more mainstream groups thatcould have opposed the proposal such as the Democratic Party remained divided on the issue.The African-American community remained generally opposed to Unigov. However since theyonly made up a fourth of the population in the City of Indianapolis and less in the county as awhole their opposition was relatively inconsequential.



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In seeking passage of the legislative package put forth by Lugar and other Indianapolis elite, thereformers had two advantages: First, the reform was a Republican proposal—supported byRepublicans—headed to a Republican-controlled legislature. Second, Lugar, popular throughoutIndiana, had traveled across state campaigning for Republican legislative candidates. Thisexperience gave Lugar close connections with a large swath of the GOP conference and it gave

these legislators an incentive to side with him.

While having statewide support was important; success for the reformers lay with the MarionCounty delegation, which was all Republican. By tradition in Indiana, legislation that onlyimpacted a specific area of the state typically was passed if the legislators from that areasupported it. Despite all the political advantages enjoyed by the Unigov’s supporters, thelegislative session was still tenuous. Senator Lawrence Borst, one of the leader’s of the MarionCounty delegation recalled, “Politically speaking, we felt the Senate would be far-and-away thehardest chamber to get [Unigov] through because the conservative membership is stronger there.And we knew if we could get it through the Senate we could get it through the House” (Ibid 76).Thus the bill first went to the Senate.

In the Senate, the Unigov legislation (SB 543) experienced two notable changes. The first of which increased the number of members on the city-county council to 29 by adding four more at-large members. The additional at-large members were to give the mayor a majority on thecouncil, though some have suggested more political motives. The other change was to allowUnigov to swap territory with those communities not being included in the consolidation. One of the most contentious issues was whether to require referendum. In the end, a referendum was notrequired since Indiana did not typically use the mechanism for other public policy decisions.Senator Daniel Burton argued, “People elect their representatives to do the legislative work, andif dissatisfied, they can vote the representative out” (Ibid 70).

The bill passed the Senate on February 15, 1969 on largely party line vote with only twoDemocrats voting for the proposal. The process in the House was much faster and the onlychanges made to bill were minor and was passed eight days later again on a straight party linevote 57 to 34. The House avoided making significant changes to Unigov proposal to ensure itsfinal passage in the Senate after the conference committee and was then signed into law.3

Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area, Minnesota

The Twin Cities metropolitan area is composed of Minneapolis and Saint Paul and the suburbsthat surround them are traditionally located in seven counties (Hennepin, Ramsey, Anoka,Dakota, Washington, Scott, and Carver).4 Like much of the United States the Twin Citiesexperienced rapid suburbanization beginning in the late 1940s. Until then most of the urban

development was almost exclusively located in the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul and as aresult these other areas were less prepared for an influx of new residents.

3 C. James Owen and York Willbern provided a more detailed account of the events leading up to the consolidation and the earlyhistory of Unigov in their book, “Governing Metropolitan Indianapolis: The Politics of Unigov.” William Bloomquist and RogerB. Parks’ “Fiscal, Service, and Political Impacts of Indianapolis-Marion County’s Unigov” takes a critical look at Unigov’simpact on pre-consolidation Indianapolis.4 In recent years, the federal government has expanded this definition to include six more counties (four in Minnesota: Isanti,Chisago, Sherburne, Wright, and two in western Wisconsin: Pierce and Franklin) though the Metropolitan Council’s jurisdictionremains the original seven counties.



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In 1959, the Minnesota Health Department found that 47.5 percent of the private wells in 39suburban communities were contaminated with septic waste. As a result the Federal HousingAdministration threatened to stop insuring home loans in these communities unless the problemwas addressed. For suburban communities their choices included opting for wells and septic

tanks, contracting with either Minneapolis or Saint Paul for service, or building their own watersystems. For most suburban communities these choices were either ineffective (wells and septicsystems), cost prohibitive (building individual systems), or created conflict with a central city(which typically overcharged).

In the years leading up to the 1959 sewer report, “many [Twin Cities area] leaders came torealize that there was no meaningful coordination of the plan and operation of the several areawide special-purpose governments” (Harrigan, Johnson 1976, 4). These governments includedthe Minneapolis-Saint Paul Sanitary District created in 1933, Metropolitan Airports Commissionin 1945, and Metropolitan Planning Commission in 1957. Based on these past experiences andthe breadth of the sewer problem, it became clear that a regional approach would be the most

effective solution.

After several failed attempts at reform in the 1961 and 1963 state legislative sessions a coalitionof reform supporters began to develop. The Citizens League, a nonpartisan, independenteducation organization of 3,600 members (at the time) took an active role in supporting thecreation of regional organization. The league’s annual budget is financed by member dues andfrom donations from local foundations and major businesses giving the organization a degree of legitimacy from a political standpoint. The Citizens League began financing studies in 1963 andpressing the state legislature to do the same in 1965 (Baldinger 1971, 93). Crucial support furthercame from the mayors of Minneapolis and Saint Paul—Arthur Naftalin and Tom Byrnerespectively.

Support also was found on the editorial pages of Minneapolis Star and both Saint Paul papers—the Pioneer Press and the Dispatch. According to Baldinger, “Scarcely a day went by,particularly during the legislative sessions and times of heated community discussion on criticalissues without the appearance of an editorial or byline article” (1971, 119). The suburbannewspapers were generally supportive as well though not as consistently with dissent comingfrom the Sun newspaper chain, which produced 22 suburban papers.

While the state legislature was nonpartisan at the time, both the Republican Party and theDemocratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL) supported the creation of a multi-purpose metropolitanbody with governance powers. The Republican platform in 1966 argued that metropolitan area’s

“most critical problems—sewage disposal, mass transit, regional parks and open space, taxrevenues, and planning” required regional solutions (Baldinger 1971, 103-4). The DFLersbacked a similar plan for largely the same reasons. Like his party, Republican Governor HaroldLeVander supported the formation of a regional agency (Ibid, 107).

However, it was the support of the business community that got the rural-dominated legislatureto finally move on the development of the Metropolitan Council. The Twin Cities businesscommunity contained a number of large corporations, such as 3M, Honeywell, General Mills,



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and Pillsbury. These firms and others believed that addressing regional problems such as sewersand transportation were important to the overall business climate of the region. Considering theireconomic importance to the state, they were able to pressure rural conservatives who wereconcerned about the growing political influence of the Twin Cities. Traditionally political powerwas vested in the rural areas, while the Minneapolis and Saint Paul were the economic center of

the state. However, rapid growth in the Twin Cities was shifting political power as well. Forthese conservatives, there was fear of losing the overall control of the state legislature; however,totally ignoring the powerful business community was not a realistic proposition either (Kolderie2011).

Opposition to the proposal to create a regional agency remained generally limited anddisorganized throughout the entire process. It was primarily limited to individuals living on themetropolitan fringe, some county officials, Sun newspapers, and rural conservatives. Consideringthe expansive nature of the proposal, the lack of a more significant opposition would besurprising if not for trends towards regionalism in the Twin Cities. By the 1960s, the competitionbetween Minneapolis and Saint Paul were receding as they joined forces to bring things like

major league sports to the area, which required greater regional cooperation. Neither core cityhad reputation for corrupt politics, which could have created further suburban mistrust.Minnesota had trended toward more progressive-reform minded politics since the early 20thcentury, making it more likely to attempt a new approach to regional affairs.

In 1965, rural dominance was lessened when the U.S. Supreme Court case Baker v. Carrrequired legislative districts to be reapportioned to match population figures, resulting in morelegislators from the Twin Cities. And then during the 1967 legislative session, two bills wereintroduced to create the regional agency. The Ogdahl-Frenzel bill called for a directly electedcouncil and some governance powers. The Ashbach-Newcome bill described a council appointedby the governor with more limited authority. In the end, the latter bill supported by rural

conservatives, who still controlled many of the key leadership positions, passed the statelegislature and was signed into law by Governor LeVander.5

Portland metropolitan area, Oregon

“Since Oregon declared war on urban sprawl, the Portland area has become a mecca for cityplanners,” wrote Bob Ortega in the Wall Street Journal (1995). And rightly so, the Portland areaarguably boasts the most active metropolitan government in the United States. Coupled withOregon state land use laws, the region has been able to stop sprawl and reorient growth inwards.The Metropolitan Service District (Metro) is a multipurpose government with a home rulecharter. It is the only directly elected regional governance body in the United States. It has sevencouncil members, each serving four-year terms, who are elected by district with a council

president elected region-wide. Metro is responsible for the regional zoo, solid waste disposal,land use and transit planning, and coordinating growth management (Savitch, Vogel 1996, 253).

5 For a more detailed account of Metropolitan Council’s creation than provided here consult Stanley Baldinger’s “Planning andGoverning the Metropolis: The Twin Cities Experience” or John Harrigan and William Johnson’s “Governing the Twin CitiesRegion.” They explain in earnest the events leading to the council’s creation and the legislative history.



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The Oregon state legislature in 1977 approved the creation of Metro, which was then approvedby the voters of Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington counties in 1978.6 Though Oregon’sland use laws have only existed since 1973 and Metro since 1979, planning has long been on theregion’s agenda. In 1925, “the state of Oregon created a committee to study the problems of localgovernment in the Portland area. The automobile… was allowing rapid and unplanned

suburbanization that was outrunning both provision of services and the pace of annexation toPortland” (Abbott, Abbott 1991, 4). Though the state legislature ignored to recommendation toconsolidate Portland and Multnomah County, the concepts of regional reform would remain.

The Great Depression and the World War II pushed regional affairs to the backburner. Between1950 and 1955, Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington counties all created planningcommissions. In 1956, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) was created by localagreement to make use of the federal funds available for regional planning under Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 (Abbott 1983, 241). The MPC used the federal funds to collectinformation, develop valuable area-wide maps, and make population projections for the region.Additionally, the agency tracked the needs for and supplies of industrial, commercial, and

recreational property (Ibid 242).

To run the MPC, a four-member board was set-up with a representative from Portland and onefrom each of the counties (Abbott, Abbott 1991, 10). The assumption was made that the countyboard members would be able to properly represent suburban interests. However, the suburbancommunities felt the board ignored their problems (Ibid, 5). To replace the MPC, the ColumbiaRegion Association of Governments (CRAG) was created in 1966. As the name suggests, CRAGwas designed to be a council of governments for the Portland metropolitan area. It continued theplanning function of the MPC and took over the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan AreaTransportation Study (P-VMATS), which was created in 1959; so that the MPC would fit thefederal definition of a metropolitan planning organization required for federal transportation

dollars.

A voluntary organization, CRAG’s lack of an independent political base weakened the ability of its staff to advocate for policy that conflicted with the goals of any particular municipality. Likemany voluntary councils of governments, CRAG suffered due to municipal parochialism—largely becoming a collection of local plans rather than creating regional policy. In 1973, theOregon legislature restructured CRAG, making it membership mandatory for communitieslocated in Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington counties, while Clark County, Washingtonalso participated. The City of Portland under the charismatic leadership of Mayor NeilGoldschmidt was able to get the voting rules weighted based on population, thus dramaticallyincreasing Portland’s influence in CRAG.

In 1970 the Oregon state legislature created yet another regional governmental unit—theMetropolitan Service District. While sharing the same name as the current Metro government,this unit was radically different. “It was intended to be a governmental ‘box’ [that] could hold asmany service responsibilities as voters or the legislature were willing to assign. Depending onregional politics, it had the potential to be either a shell or a powerful operating agency” (Abbott,

6 The updated federal definition of the Portland Metropolitan Statistical area includes four more counties: Columbia and Yamhillcounties in Oregon and Clark and Skamania counties in Washington.



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Abbott 1991, 15). MSD’s early function included responsibility for solid waste disposal andoverseeing the metropolitan zoo. Both CRAG and the MSD faced similar problems. They bothstruggled to find solutions to the problems while lacking real authority to address them. MSDwas not given taxing authority by voters, leaving its budget in the relatively tenuous position of generating its revenues totally from service fees. CRAG, on the other hand, was dealing with the

consequences of a growing metropolitan area while remaining largely a forum for discussion.While it performed its information-gathering function well, CRAG was unable to develop clearregional goals due to the conflicting interests of its members.

With funding from the National Academy of Public Administration, the Tri-County commissionwas formed in 1975 to study the region’s problems. In 1977, the commission came to theconclusion that it made sense to form a regional government by merging CRAG’s planningfunctions with the MSD’s service delivery. The commission also supported creating a directlyelected council to ensure the most democratic and responsive government. Finally, thecommittee proposed merging CRAG into the MSD because the service district had beenconfirmed by referendum and thus was more legitimate in the eyes of the public.

In 1978, the Oregon state legislature passed a bill to create the new Metro largely along therecommendations of the Tri-County commission. The major changes included reducing thenumber of councilors from 15 to 12 and requiring that Metro secure an independent tax basebefore taking over a variety of regional services. Finally, the legislature required that the bill beapproved by referendum. Metro benefited from confusion on the referendum ballot, which read“Reorganize Metropolitan Service District, Abolish CRAG.” Confusion based on the wordingcould have led “voters [to back] the measure expecting to rid themselves of the metropolitanplanning agency (CRAG) rather than create a more powerful one. While rural voters outside theshrunken boundaries [of Metro could have voted for the measure] in order to remove themselvesfrom the jurisdiction” (Abbott, Abbott 1991, 24-5). On January 1, 1979 the reconstituted Metro

began operating.

The new Metro still would have been a relatively powerless organization if not for the earlierenactment of Oregon’s state land use laws. In January of 1972 McCall addressed the Oregonstate legislature telling them,

There is shameless threat to our environment and to the whole quality of life—unfettered despoiling of the land. Sagebrush subdivisions, coastal condomania,and the ravenous rampage of suburbia in the Willamette Valley all threaten tomock Oregon’s status as the environmental model for the nation… The interestsof Oregon today and in the future must be protected from grasping wastrels of theland (McCall, Neal 1977, 196).

To many in Oregon, rapid, unchecked development was associated with “the disease of ‘Californism’ and the sin of ‘Californication’” that would result in the degradation of Oregon’smost precious resource—its environment (Abbott 1983, 250).

Passed in May 1973, Senate Bill 100 created the Land Conservation and DevelopmentCommission, a state agency that oversees the development of Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB)for every urban area in the state. Inside the boundary, urban development is allowed to occurwhile land outside of it is reserved for agriculture and open space. The support of Republicans



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Governor Tom McCall and state Senator Hector Macpherson, a dairy farmer, was crucial to SB100’s passage. McCall had a history of pushing environmental legislation. Macpherson wasconcerned about increasing urbanization in the Willamette Valley, which was depleting thevalley of farmland and driving up property taxes of commercial farmers. The Willamette Valleyis home to Oregon’s richest farmland and its urban centers creating conflict between the needs of

both populations.

Most cities in Oregon have their own Urban Growth Boundaries. In the Portland metropolitanarea, Metro is responsible for overseeing a regional UGB. For Metro this means ensuring there is20-year supply of land available for development (as Oregon law requires) and working withlocal communities to ensure their particular plans comply with state law. Oregon’s land use lawsremain crucial to Metro’s role in guiding the region’s growth agenda. The law gives Metro thelegal mechanisms for interacting with local municipalities and for enforcing state law. Metro hasclearly become a major player in the Portland metropolitan area, surviving several ballotchallenges to eliminate it and gaining a home-rule charter in 1992.7

St. Louis metropolitan area, MissouriThe Saint Louis metropolitan area has roughly 2.8 million residents spread across two states, 16counties, 274 towns, and including school districts and special districts. The entire region has atotal of 1,027 governmental units, placing the Saint Louis area second only to the Chicago areain terms of fragmentation. Beginning in the 1920s, the Saint Louis region began exploring waysof reducing its sprawl and addressing the traffic problems the area was experiencing.

By the mid-1950s, the Saint Louis business community was becoming increasingly frustrated bygovernmental inefficiencies that hobbled economic development. To that end, the Ford andMcDonnell-Douglas corporations funded a $300,000 study by the political science departmentsof Saint Louis University and Washington University. The two departments were charged with

examining the region’s governmental problems and recommending solutions. The study“Metropolitan St. Louis Survey” suggested that a new metropolitan government be developedand be made responsible for arterial roads, transit, planning, economic development, sewers,civil defense, and property assessment. The study also recommended dissolving municipalities of fewer than 4,000 residents.

Next, the proposals went to a board of freeholders, with nine representatives from Saint Louisand nine from the county and one representative from elsewhere in the state. Schmandt, et alwrite,

“Most of the members were unknown to a wide public audience and few wererecognized as community leaders. No one of major stature in local government

and politics was included among the appointees; neither was elite of the localbusiness structure… top leadership of the chamber of commerce were notincluded… [And] key officials of civic organizations were also missing” (13).

7 Carl Abbott, a professor at Portland State University, the preeminent scholar on the history of Portland and planning in theregion provides a detailed history of the city in “Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City.” CarlAbbott and Margery Post Abbott provide a detailed account of Metro’s creation and challenges in “Historical development of theMetropolitan Service District.” http://oscdl.research.pdx.edu/resources/20060717/1153167314QGCERYI.pdf Governor Tom McCall gives a detailed account of SB 100 and the events leading up to its passage in “The Oregon Land UseStory.” www.orgov.org/Oregon_Land_Use_Story.pdf



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The board suffered a credibility gap with the general public and lacked proper connections toSaint Louis area elites whose support would be crucial for successful reform. In addition to thetypical city-county divide, another problem the board faced was that few actually liked therecommendations of the study, which had been conducted without any input from an advisorycommittee. However, the freeholders were unable to directly criticize the study because the two

universities, which enjoyed region-wide respect, had produced it.

The freeholders ended proposing a middle-ground approach—the creation of a metropolitandistrict. This proposal had the effect of alienating advocates of reform, who felt this plan wouldmake significant reform difficult in the future, while still raising the opposition of those in thesuburbs who opposed any reform (Schmandt, et al 1961, 38-40). The total lack of support fromboth Saint Louis Mayor Raymond Tucker and urban African-Americans and the activeopposition by county officials did not help the reformist cause. The business community, whichhad expressed interest in governmental reform and provided the study funding, remained on thesidelines during the campaign for public support. Support primarily came from citizen activists,civic groups, churches, and professional societies (Ibid, 38). In a 1959 special election the

proposal failed by wide margins—2-1 in the City of Saint Louis and 3-1 in Saint Louis County.

8

Other reforms were attempted, but by the late 1960s most proponents of consolidation concludedit was a lost cause. “Local growth interests, most prominently Civic Progress and the City andCounty Chambers of Commerce continued to lament the costs and inefficiencies of localfragmentation. But, as Civic Progress concluded glumly in 1969, the combined opposition of suburban interests and the City’s African American wards left ‘little or no chance of majorgovernmental consolidation” (Gordon 2008, 49). As a result little has occurred on the subjectsince the last failed attempt in 1962.

Metropolitan reform factors

Over the past 60 years metropolitan reorganization or reform has clearly become a formidabletask. In recent decades, reform has become even more improbable. Reform in American politicstypically occurs incrementally. Its rarity has led some to use revolution theory typically reservedto understand the replacement of national governments to describe change at the metropolitanlevel (Rosenbaum, Henderson 1972). I found from these case studies that most successfulmetropolitan reforms share several key factors. Many of these factors are beyond the control of local communities, placing reformers at a disadvantage. What becomes clear is that creatinggoverning capacity requires a coalition of actors with converging interests and different,complementary strengths.

Leadership and elite support

Individual leadership is imperative to navigating a reform. Well-known and respected political,civic, and business leaders are able to confer a degree of credibility on a reform proposal.Increased credibility may improve the public views on a reform proposal, attract other partnersand support from politicians. Business leaders are particularly adept in this capacity because of their superior financial resources and likelihood of having valuable political connections. In theHouston area, political power was quite literally exercised by the business community from a

8 The most detailed examination of the 1959 Saint Louis regional reform attempt is Henry J. Schmandt, Paul G Steinbicker, andGeorge D. Wendel’s “Metropolitan Reform in St. Louis: A Case Study.”



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room in the Lamar Hotel by a small group of economic elites. “Houston’s business communityfrom the late 1930s to the 1960s was primarily centered around the Suite 8F crowd, a loosecoalition of business leaders… These top leaders had a threefold power base: substantial wealthfounded on corporate development, general support of the local business community, andintimate ties to major officials in local and national politics” (Feagin 1988, 121). While political

power in the Houston area has diffused considerably, the business community is able to exerciseleadership through organizations like the Greater Houston Partnership (a chamber of commerce),which plays a large role in regional agenda-setting by indicating its preferences through a publicpolicy department. In the early 2000s, the president of the Greater Houston Partnership, James T.Edmonds, was also the chair of the Houston Port Authority as well as a large contributor to boththe mayor’s and the county judge’s campaigns. These close connections give the businesscommunity a great deal of sway in the Houston area’s regional politics (Gainsborough 2003,569). In the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area, rural legislators blocked efforts to act onthe Metropolitan Council legislation until 1967 when the chairmen of the Northern States PowerCompany, the Dayton Corporation, and the president of the First National Bank of Saint Paul—leading members of the business community—appeared at a hearing in favor of metropolitan

reform. Though the trio did not say word, their presence in the first row was enough todiscourage rural legislators from “stonewalling” reform proposals (Kolderie 2011). At the behestof Indianapolis Mayor Richard Lugar, business elites were involved in the development of theIndianapolis-Marion County consolidation proposal. The mixture of economic resources andcivic connections often give economic elites greater capacity to impact regional policy thoughthey do not do it alone.

In other places, business elites may play less of role. In the case of Saint Louis, little leadershipwas provided by any of the major elites (political, civic, or economic), playing a large role in theultimate failure of reform there. The creation of Oregon’s land use laws and the Portland area’sMetro was dependent on strong political leadership of Governor Tom McCall and Portland

Mayor Neil Goldschmidt. Far from a supporter, the business community generally opposed theproposals that created stronger land use controls and more active metropolitan government.Instead, the political support was found among civic and environmental organizations. Groupslike the League of Women Voters supported reform because they believed it would be in linewith democratic principles—encouraging the public to be more active. Environmental groupslike 1000 Friends of Oregon supported reform because it would protect open space from urbansprawl. In Minnesota, the business elites were important in forcing rural legislators to act on abill that might reduce their power, but civic groups were crucial to garnering support for theproposal with the public, as were local political leaders. The Citizens League both funded studiesand then worked to educate the public, while both the Minneapolis Mayor Arthur Naftalin andSaint Paul Mayor Tom Byrne endorsed the proposal.

The region’s economic and civic elites are often intertwined with individual political leaders.These groups take cues from each other. In successful reform efforts, they almost always holdconsensus views. The support of economic and civic elites is similarly able to confer credibilityon a reform proposal, which may provide political direction to state legislators or cover forsupporting a potentially unpopular bill. For reforms that require public consent, such as inIndianapolis, some voters may follow the lead of regional elites. More importantly, elites maytake the lead in educating the electorate about the reform proposal and connecting with other



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viable regional partners. What begins to become clear is that generally political, civic, andeconomic elites must have similar interests for a reform movement to be effective. In somecases, like the Houston area and Oregon and Portland area, particular groups may have enoughcontrol of enact change without as much input from others. In the reform experiences of Indianapolis-Marion County, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area, and the Saint Louis

metropolitan area, strong political leadership is required with the support of civic and economicelites to be effective.

Political and senior government support

Significant metropolitan reform rarely occurs in a highly divisive or partisan environment. Majorreform is most frequently found in metropolitan areas and states with single-party control. Forthis reason the southern and western United States, which has long been controlled by a singleparty, has experienced many of the most significant metropolitan reorganizations. If Republicanshad not completely controlled the political process in Indiana, it is unlikely that the Indianapolis-Marion County consolidation would have occurred. The political benefits for the GOP were clearand provided additional incentives to push through reform. Mayor Richard Lugar recalled, “I’ll

be candid. I know this is good for Republicans. That’s how I sold it to the state legislature”(Myers 1969). Reform is bound to create winners and losers. Controlling the entire processcreates a powerful reason to favor it. Some coalition members may support reform in hopes of creating a friendly political environment for the long-term.

In regions without single party control, reform has occurred in a bipartisan manner (often withRepublicans or conservatives) taking a leadership role in guiding reform with strong rank-and-file Democratic or liberal support. Both the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan and the Oregonland use reforms enjoyed bipartisan support. The cleavages were less ideological in a traditionalsense and primarily geographic. In Minnesota, rural conservatives who had long dominated thelegislature were concerned about the rising political power of the Twin Cities and feared that the

Metropolitan Council would reduce state control over the region. In Oregon, Senate Bill 100garnered support from 49 of 60 legislators from the Willamette Valley and only 9 of 30legislators from coastal and eastern counties. Rural Republican legislators representing farmersconcerned with development in agricultural land partnered with urban Democrats concernedabout the detrimental impact of sprawl on the city. Their opposition was drawn from areas of thestate where sprawl was little concern and fear that state would interfere with development andeconomic activity was high.

Senior governments (state and federal) also play a crucial in the prospects for regional reform.All regional reforms fall under the dominion of state governments, which create the parameterswithin which all proposals must fit. Depending on the state, its legislators, and history,

metropolitan areas may find that their prospects for reorganization will be encouraged or largelyblocked with more strenuous reform criterion. The City of Houston has been able to use Texasstate law to its advantage. Unlike other cities in the Northeast and Midwest that have becomeboxed in by suburbs, Texas state law empowered urban expansion at the expense of suburbandevelopment. In Minnesota, Oregon, and Indiana, the state legislatures played crucial roles inenacting metropolitan reform policy. Metropolitan reform occurs if and when the stategovernment allows it, and within the parameters the state sets. This is what makes state



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governments so crucial to metropolitan reform—they control all the political power since theU.S. Constitution does not make any protections for local government.

In the past, the federal government has attempted to encourage metropolitan areas to addresscertain issues in a more regional manner. Since the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, the

federal government has required regions with more than 50,000 residents to form MetropolitanPlanning Organizations to distribute federal transportation dollars. The federal government laterbegan requiring metropolitan areas to form Councils of Governments to address issues such aswater use, pollution control, transit administration, and transportation planning. While theeffectiveness of many of these organizations has been hampered by parochialism, they havehelped the public and some public officials become more comfortable with the concept of regional planning.

Incremental reform buoyed by federal money is exactly what occurred in both the Portland andthe Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan areas. In the Portland area, the Metropolitan PlanningCommission was created in 1956, followed by the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Area

Transportation Study in 1959, the Columbia Region Association of Governments in 1966, theMetropolitan Service District in 1970, and finally Metro in 1979. The Twin Cities’ experiencewith regional planning generally predates federal funding, but the same general pattern of incrementalism holds. The Minneapolis-Saint Paul Sanitary District was created in 1933, theMetropolitan Airports Commission in 1945, the Metropolitan Planning Commission in 1957, andthe Metropolitan Council in 1967. Precursor organizations lessened suspicion of regionalism andallowed for more comprehensive agencies to develop. Without the injection of federal money, itis unlikely that many of the early organizations would have matured, particularly before theydeveloped regional constituencies. Further, the incremental approach allows a governingcoalition (assuming one exists) to implement change at a measured pace that all the partnersaccept.

Crisis or credible cause

Metropolitan reform enjoys strong support from academics and proponents of good governmentfor its theoretical benefits. However, reform movements based solely benefits touted by thesegroups largely fail. Voters and politicians respond to crisis, especially when reform is expectedto address the problem the most effectively. In the Twin Cities, opposition to the MetropolitanCouncil was largely blunted by a sewer crisis; in Oregon and Portland, it was fears that rapidsuburbanization was destroying farms and forests. In Indianapolis, Mayor Lugar and othersbelieved drastic change was needed to improve the region’s economic prospects. If a crisis orcredible issue does not exist, metropolitan reorganization is more likely to take a highlyincremental approach, if it happens at all. In the Saint Louis area, reform took an academic bent,

while the problems the region faced, however real, were unclear to voters. Or the problems werenot serious enough to consider a reduction in autonomy. The wide-reaching solutions developedat the University of St. Louis and Washington University simply were not in line with the viewsof the public, leading to reform failure. The Houston area has not experienced a regional crisislike the Twin Cities or Oregon and Portland, or even perceived one like some in the Saint Louisarea. Decision-makers in the City of Houston were interested in facilitating growth. As a resultthey actively worked to capture growth within the city and create ideal economic conditions.This meant using Texas state law to their advantage, keeping taxes low, and making key public



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investments to spur development. Houston never experienced a growth crisis that would havepossibly caused its leaders to consider something drastic like city-county consolidation.

The crisis that occurs must also resonate with a viable political group in that region. The TwinCities sewer crisis sparked concern among suburban residents and economic elites concerned

with growth—together forming both a sizable chunk of the public with considerable resources.Rapid urban expansion in Oregon worried conservative farmers, liberal urbanites, andenvironmentalists who formed a politically dominant coalition. What was a credible reason forreform in Oregon—rapid expansion—was the primary goal of policymakers in the Houston area.Certainly there are those in Houston metropolitan area who disagree with growth strategy theregion has undertaken, but unlike in Oregon they do not form a politically viable coalition.Readily identifiable regional problems are important in the development of these coalitionsbecause they impact multiple parties with the ability to help enact reform. Thus major regionalissues are often crucial to the reform process.

Electorate

In the United States, all governmental action begins and ends with the voters. Even in situationswhere metropolitan reform proposals are not decided by referendum, politicians fearful of upsetting the public quash most attempts. Voters are skeptical of government and perhaps evenmore so of proposals to dramatically change it. In many areas, voters also have a strong bias infavor of local government, where they have a greater chance to influence decision-making. Thus,success depends on the ability of reformers to sway the public (especially in suburban areas) thatregionalism has significant benefits. Other factors that appear to impact voter willingness toaccept metropolitan reform include past experience with regional planning and government (suchas MPOs, COGs, and sewer districts). Along with past experience, proposals have came in tightgrouping during the early 1960s and early 1970s—suggesting that voters may have been morewilling accept metropolitan reorganization if other regions were as well.

The socio-economic and ideological breakdown of the region is also reliable indicator of reformviability. Metropolitan areas with ethnically homogenous populations and greater numbers of educated citizens who have a progressive view of government (not necessarily liberal politicaloutlook) are more likely to embrace reform. Even in the Portland metropolitan area with itsreputation and active metropolitan government, reform was hardly given a ringing endorsementby the voters when it was approved. Metro benefited from the vague wording of the proposal onthe referendum ballot. The leaders of the Indianapolis-Marion County consolidation workeddiligently to avoid sending the proposal to a referendum. And for good reason, since 1921 only17.6 percent of consolidation referenda have passed (Weir 2004).

Applying urban regime theoryTo the extent that regimes may exist in these metropolitan regions, they generally appear tocoalesce around economic and political elites with the exception of Portland area. Using theframework described by Stone (1989), both the Indianapolis and Houston areas are controlled bydevelopmental regimes. I find that a progressive regime maintains power in the Portland area.Unlike these other areas, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul and Saint Louis areas lack regimes.



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The dominant role that economic actors have played in the regional politics of both Houston andIndianapolis suggest the presence of a developmental regime. Throughout Houston’s historygrowth politics have played a dynamic role in shaping the region. This regime has changedovertime. Initially, Houston’s regime was based on relatively informal relationships betweenmajor economic elites and select politicians (a system that last through much of the 20th

century). In more recent years, Houston’s growth regime has become more institutionalized withthe various partners exhibiting control via several business-oriented regional policyorganizations. Regional political power in the Houston area remains highly consolidated,allowing economic elites to continue to dominate metropolitan policy.

Reform often creates political restructuring. Indianapolis’s development regime was the result of a city-county consolidation that also consolidated the control of Marion County Republicans andtheir business community partners. This regime was concerned with the decline of Indianapolisand the regime’s policies illustrate that. Between 1974 and 1984, nearly $800 million (well over$1.5 billion in 2011 dollars) was spent on projects like “Merchants Plaza, a downtown complexof two office towers and a Hyatt hotel with an elaborate atrium” (Lamar, Winbush 1984). In the

decades since, economic development has consistently been a top concern of politicians andpolicymakers in the Indianapolis area—again highlighting a regime’s role in agenda setting andoverall influence.

In the Portland metropolitan area, an entirely different type of regime exists. Instead of a regimebased on economic elites, middle-class progressives wield widespread control over regionalpolitics. A unique coalition of environmentalists, agricultural interests, and urban progressiveshas been able to control the region’s political discourse. Only in the Portland area would anenvironmentalist group such as 1000 Friends of Oregon wield more regional influence than alogging industry association like the Oregon Forestry Industry Council (Leo 1998). Notably,once regimes become established, they become harder to challenge as other groups begin to

adapt their own agendas to fit with those of the regime. The Oregon Forestry Industry Councilproclaims its support for environmentally sound logging and the urban growth boundary—aproduct of a political environment where policy is controlled by a progressive regime. As evenfringe partners like an industry association join, the regime’s overall capacity increases anddecreases the likelihood of future challenges.

The experiences of the Saint Louis and the Minneapolis-Saint Paul areas suggest that regionalregimes are neither normative nor inevitable in a post-reform (or attempt) environment. Clearlythe failure of Saint Louis to enact any reform despite attempts in 1924, 1930, 1959, and 1962suggests that the major actors in metropolitan politics there were unable to identify areas of similarity and compromise. This was illustrated by the 1959 failure where urban and county

interests were never able to work out the differences they needed to at least present a unifiedposition to the public.

In the case of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area, the initial reforms and the policies taken in yearssince have largely been driven by significant problems and less by any coherent agenda. Stategovernment, suburban communities and the core cities have typically brought very differentagendas for the region. Lacking strong and consistent leadership, decisions regarding the role theMetropolitan Council should play in regional affairs remain unresolved. Thus, developing a



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regional agenda around the council is a wholly unrealistic proposition. The affairs of the councilare largely dominated by the governor who appoints its members—reducing the ability of otherregional stakeholders to directly influence it. Currently, the urban core and the suburbs havediffering visions of the future, which further decreases the likelihood that a regional regime willdevelop in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area.

Regimes and the unique capacities of economic elitesIn each of these case studies, perhaps one of the defining concerns is the position of the businesscommunity. In most areas, residents worry about their well-being—typically described ineconomic terms. Though most municipal leaders are indeed cognizant of voter’s economicconcerns, at the regional and local level there is little that government can do on its own. StephenElkin points out, “A reputation for being antibusiness, for not listening to local businessmen’sschemes for making a greater city, is an invitation to fiscal trouble that even the hardiestprogressive politicians are unlikely to be anxious to accept” (Elkin 1987, 31-2). Business elitesare typically more cohesive and homogenous in their views relative to those of the region at largeand have superior fiscal resources than other groups. Their ability to manipulate the economic

conditions of a given metropolitan area provides a superior bargaining position in politicalaffairs. Unlike the federal government and to a lesser degree state governments, local andregional governments lack any monopoly of place. When the federal government changespolicies businesses typically must simply bear them because totally moving to another country isusually not feasible (though multinational corporations are changing this norm). When thesesmaller governmental units create conditions unfavorable to business, businesses can and oftendo relocate to new areas.

The dynamic role that economic elites play in regional politics force politicians to take notice. Ipreviously highlighted the importance of support from economic elites during metropolitanreform efforts because of the unique capacity they hold to enact change. The impact of business

elites is particularly acute when the primary goal of reform is improving governmentalefficiency—a frequent goal of reformers—because the major beneficiary of this type of reform isoften the business elites themselves. Their typically homogenous and cohesive nature reduces thepotential for infighting within the group and allows them to better harness their typically superiorresources (both civic and fiscal). It is this cohesion that is most likely overlooked by outsiders,but is incredibly important. Unlike potential regime partners or rivals (e.g. consider the oftendiverse nature and sometimes divergent interests of progressive coalitions) business elites aretypically united by a singular or set of goals to improve the commercial climate of themetropolitan region.

Though economic elites frequently dominate existing regimes (such as Houston area,

Indianapolis, and others) in the metropolitan arena there are exceptions. Middle-class andpotentially lower class groups often struggle with less cohesive internal views that make itdifficult for them to work closely with external groups for the extended period of time requiredfor regime centered on these groups to develop. Middle-class progressive regimes areuncommon, but not unheard of because they are still more cohesive than the poor and havegreater civic capacity. Even when their interests diverge from those of the business elite, themiddle-class regime can accommodate many of the elite’s commercial interests without totallygiving up its own goals. This sort of compromise is apparent in the Portland metropolitan area,



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where even though there is a growth boundary within its boundaries growth is largely uncheckedto the benefit of developers, banks, and other economic interests dependent on growth. Theboundary further protects the economic interests of those living outside the boundary whodepend on cheaper land such as farmers. The accommodation of business elites increases theviability of middle-class progressive regimes that often only have a few issues of divergence

from their wealthier counterparts.

According to Stone, lower-class opportunity regimes are theoretically possible though they rarelyappeared in American metropolitan politics. Members of the lower-class seeking to organize aviable coalition with which to build a regime around face many of the same problems of theirmiddle-class counterparts, but in more severe forms. First, lower-class coalitions are more likelyto struggle with divergent internal issues (such as race, location, employment status) that impacttheir overall cohesion more than other groups. Second, these coalitions are less likely to havesignificant resources and civic capacities making it difficult to challenge the interests of middleand elite groups. Finally, lower-class opportunity regimes are more likely to have redistributive(or equality) based concerns that will rally both business elites and middle-class groups to protect

their current economic position.

Thus the unique capacity of economic elites is felt in the dynamics of regional regimes evenwhen this particular group of actors is not one of the primary groups within the coalition. When aregime attempts to enact a particularly demanding reform or policy like regional reform, thesuperior civic and financial resources of economic elites become more valuable increasing theiroverall influence in the eventual outcome of reform.

ConclusionsIn the Houston, Indianapolis, and Portland areas, there are clear goals that cross the urban-suburban divide. Common or overlapping interests allow different stakeholders to identify

potential partners, who may support some or all of the agenda. Three conclusions can be drawnabout the nature of regional regimes. First, they typically have consolidated authority—Houston,Indianapolis, and Portland all have coalition members and leaders (often representing these keyconstituencies) that exercise a great deal of influence on the policies of the regime. Second, theseregimes play a crucial role in regional agenda setting. In the Houston and Indianapolis areas,these regimes play a large role in encouraging growth. On the other end of the spectrum, thePortland area regime has taken the leading role in checking excessive urban growth intoundeveloped land. These regimes eventually may also exercise leadership in other areas as well.In Houston, the business-led regime has taken increasing interest in education, while Portland’sregime has expanded into social advocacy (Welch 2011; Leo 1998). Finally, regimes are self-perpetuating in nature because opponents often conclude it is better to work within the ruling

structure than be totally excluded, which often strengthens the regime as its opponents decrease.

What does this mean for regional reform? The challenges to new regional regimes andmetropolitan reform are unlikely to lessen in coming years. The American electorate has grownmore conservative in the past several decades. Suburbs have become a dominant political forcein American politics in state legislatures and in the Congress. If suburban residents seethemselves disconnected from the issues of the urban core it becomes less likely that they will bewilling partners with those located in the city. Growth patterns over the past half-century have



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moved more economic power out of central business districts in the urban core and into suburbanareas crucially reducing the interest of economic elites to lend their considerable influencetowards solving metropolitan issues.

These trends inhibit regional regime formation and similarly the capacity of comprehensive

metropolitan reform. This is likely to continue into the future unless changes occur that shiftAmerican living patterns closer to those found before the construction of the interstate highwaysystem and governmental policies of the 1950s. A reversion could occur if fossil fuels continueto increase in cost and the federal government stops supporting urban sprawl. These changeswould bring the city and suburb into closer contact—reviving the need for new relationships andreforms in the future.

Other than changes in American living patterns, economic concerns provide the other plausibleopportunity for regional regime formation and metropolitan reform. Americans generally aresensitive to financial concerns and have been willing to embrace change in the name of jobs andan improved economic environment in the past. In the global economy, regimes and reforms

based on economic development should make sense to good government scholars, members of business communities and the general public. While economically oriented reforms may improvethe business climate and help government become more efficient, they are unlikely addresssocial welfare issues. Both regime creation and metropolitan reform will continue to bechallenging endeavors barring changes in American living patterns or in the public’s view of regionalism.



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Comprehensive Metropolitan Reform

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