Component-Level Risk Management for Higgyhway...
Transcript of Component-Level Risk Management for Higgyhway...
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Component-Level Risk Management for Highway Tunnelsg y
Steve Ernst for the Transportation Security Administration
Bruce A. WaltonU.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District Protective Design Center
US Army Corps of EngineersBUILDING STRONG®1
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P i D i CProtective Design CenterArmy's center of expertise ‐protection and protective designprotection and protective design
Wartime threats, secure storage, accidental explosions, classified programs
Security engineering Vulnerability analyses and risk assessmentsassessments
Criteria for Dept. of Defense
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Web Page: https://pdc.usace.army.mil
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Bridge and Tunnel Assessment Program for TSA
Focus on Antiterrorism Vulnerability AssessmentRi k A l i Risk Analysis
Recommended Mitigation Measures (with cost) TSA coordinates with structure owner,
h Three step in process: 1 ‐ Site survey 2 – Risk Assessment 3 – Report to TSA
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Tunnel Assessment Process
Leverage Best Practices and Recommendations from past work: TSA ASCE NCHRP TSWG AASHTOwork: TSA, ASCE, NCHRP, TSWG, AASHTO.
Risk Analyses in Two Separate Parts:
Operation Risk Analysis (Closure), component based
Casualty Risk Analysis (Injury), scenario based
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O i V l bili / Ri kOperation Vulnerability / Risk Identify ThreatsId tif l bl t Identify vulnerable components
Vulnerability function of threat size that causes catastrophic damage leading to Operational loss of service for three months
Prioritize For High‐risk combinations: For High‐risk combinations: Validate risk numbers Evaluate the mitigated risk – risk reduction
B fit i d b d ti i th t i Benefit is measured by reduction in threat size
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Threats
VBIED Vehicle borne improvised explosive device HEIED Hand‐emplaced improvised explosive devicep p p NECD Non‐explosive cutting device VI Vehicular impact – ship impact, anchor drag Fire Five to Three Hundred MW Fire ‐ Five to Three Hundred MW
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Industrial Chemical S illSpill
AASHTO/FHWA “Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel gSecurity” by the Blue Ribbon Panel
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Casualty and Damage Calculation A terrorist attack is intentionally and initiated
quickly. Fires and chemical releases will occur suddenly. Blasts will have immediate effects.
Weapon and geometry Weapon and geometry Use simplified Blast, Fire, and/or Chemical Dispersion
models. O Outputs:
Blast pressures and Structural damageSurface Temperatures, Smoke, Toxic GasesHuman evacuation routes and timeHuman exposure levels to toxic gasses and chemicals.
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Mitigationg Initial incident ‐ Limit threat access structural and system hardening, hazardous materials drainage systems and reduce materials drainage systems, and reduce population density in tunnel.
Occupant Response & Self Rescue ‐decrease evacuation times reducing decrease evacuation times, reducing hazardous environment in tunnel.
Response and Rescue – Concept of Operations Event assessment Access for Operations, Event assessment, Access for responders, Special rescue equipment, Training, Fire and Utility systems.
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Highway Tunnel Systems
TUNNEL
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VENTILATION TRAFFIC CONTROL
SCAD
ALAR
SENS
CCTV
ACCE
CONT
COMPUTER / NETWORK
A MS
ORS
SS
ROL
POWER
COMPUTER / NETWORK
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C l i Ri kCasualties Risk The casualty risk evaluation procedure is to select a threat size and location and
then evaluate the current and mitigated state. The risk reduction value is based on the change in number of casualties.
Weighting Factors
Occurrence Vulnerability Importance
General Threat Likelihood 0.20 Resistance to Threat 1.00Casualty
Importance 1.0
Threat Likelihood At Location 0.60
Likelihood of Specific Threat Size 0.30
Sum 1.00 Sum 1.00
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C l V l bili / Ri k C l l iCasualty Vulnerability / Risk Calculation Use a subset of the identified range of threat sizes, 3 or 4 sizes each.
VBIED, HEIED, Fire, Chemical (heavier and lighter than air)
Identify critical threat locations in tunnels: Tunnel Tunnel at ventilation building Ventilation building interior and exterior
Estimate vulnerability for each threat‐location scenario by calculating the number of casualties.
Prioritize scenarios using risk analysis Highest risk scenarios are further evaluated to:g
Validate risk numbers for each scenario Evaluate the mitigated risk reductions The risk reduction value is based on the change in casualties
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Vulnerability Examples Empirical assessment of vulnerability – spreadsheet tool is p y p
simple, fast, not a design tool Shows extent of various effects from VBIED.
Input:Input:DiameterCover depthExplosive W& other parameters& other parametersLengthRoof thicknessPerson/lengthRoad structure P-IRoad structure P IRoof structure P-I
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Ventilation Duct or Roadway Failure Roof or road P‐I damage curve for severe damage is used.
P‐I curve from SBEDS code. Blast wave propagation in tunnel
pressure decays, impulse is constant
Compare blast pressure to P asymptote since impulse will ll b l
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ssur
e, psi
usually be large
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0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Pres
Distance along tunnel, feet
Slid 1313
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Airblast Injuries Airblast effects:Airblast effects: Crushing automobiles, breaking glass hazards Pressure – ears, organs (lungs)Bl i d l i f l d d b i Blast wind translation of people and debris
Pressure vs Human Injury
Psi * % Survival% Casualty
50 5 1 99681012
ure, psi
50.5 1 99
44 10 90
37.5 50 50
30.6 90 10
024
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Pressu
Distance along tunnel, feet
27.5 99 1
* Values for small humanRef FHWA/ERDC curve
Slid 1414
Ref TM 5-1300 Fig 1-2
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Z=R/W 1/3 units m/kg 1/3
Over Pressure Damage on VehiclesWitness Targets – Side On Blast Wave
Z R/W , units m/kg
Z = 2.51 Z = 3.14
Witness Targets – Front On Blast Wave
Z = 1.25, 120 psi Z = 2.51, 25 psi Z = 3.14, 15 psi 15
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Tunnel Fire Damage
CFD codes like the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). Simple models can be run quickly (hours) to get Simple models can be run quickly (hours) to get approximate answers for assessments.
Engineering judgment and empirical damage criteria for systems and concrete and steel tunnel components can systems and concrete and steel tunnel components can then be used to estimate damage to tunnel components, and systems. For example:
No damage T < 100 C, Surface spall T < 400 C, Surface spall T < 400 C, Heavy damage T > 1000 C.
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Tunnel Fire Damage
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Casualty Fire Calculation Weapon and tunnel geometry input to simplified fire Weapon and tunnel geometry input to simplified fire
model in FDS‐EVAC code. Standard and Emergency operating conditions.
Outputs: Air temperatures Evacuation routes and Outputs: Air temperatures, Evacuation routes and times, toxic gas concentrations, exposure levels to toxic gasses, and Purser’s Fractional Effective Dose (FED).(FED).
Casualties caused by attack are estimated. Engineering Judgment.
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Tunnel Operational Out of Service forTunnel Operational Out of Service for Damage from Industrial Chemical Spill
Engineering judgment and empirical damage criteria.
Estimated Damage is then used to estimate the Estimated Damage is then used to estimate the time out of service.
The time out of service includes investigation, cleanup, decontamination, and repair.
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Ch i l R l C l C l l iChemical Release Casualty Calculation
For a pressurized gas chemical release scenario in a p gtunnel, the weapon and geometry of the tunnel are input into a simplified Chemical Dispersion model in the Fire Dynamics Simulator FDS‐EVAC codein the Fire Dynamics Simulator FDS EVAC code.
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Chemical Release Casualty Calculation
AUTOMATICALLY CALCULATE REDUCED EVACUATION VALUES: Once FDS is run the output file can be processed to calculate the accumulated dose of chlorineof chlorine.
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Program Insights
Bridge Type # Main Span length Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 3
Girder 11 < = 600’ VB @ pier, VB @ girder HE @ girder@ p @ g @ g
Arch 3 240’ to 1000’ VB @ arch rib HE @ column VB @
column
Truss 9 250’ to 1600’ VB @ truss Fire @ truss HE @ truss
Suspension 11 1500’ to 4000’ VB @ tower VB @ cable HE @ anchorageg
Bridge Security Checklist – being filled out for each site, will be evaluated/modified in aggregate report.
Note: all bridges surveyed to date have the risk assessment
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Note: all bridges surveyed to date have the risk assessment complete and are included in this table.
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Program InsightsT l T # L th Ri k Ri k Ri k Tunnel Type # Length Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 3
Operational Out of Service
Submerged Tube 1 3500’ VB @ vent
building VB @ tube wall VB @ exhaust ductg
Cut & Cover VB @ exhaust duct
VB @ vent building
Fire @ exhaust duct
Rock 1 3800’ VB @ vent building
VB @ exhaust duct
Fire @ exhaust ductbuilding duct duct
Injuries
Submerged Tube 1 3500’ VB @ in tube Chem@ in tube Fire @ in tube
Rock, C&C 1 3800’ VB @ in tunnel Chem@ intunnel Fire @ in tunnel
8 site assessments done, risk and reports in process. Note: not all tunnels in the program have risk assessment
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Note: not all tunnels in the program have risk assessment complete so they are not included in this table.
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TSA and USACE Evaluate Attack Scenarios for Highway Tunnels and Bridges
Questions??
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center
Questions??
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