Compilation of Case Digests in Political law-prelims

8/13/2019 Compilation of Case Digests in Political law-prelims

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COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS POLITICAL LAW

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 4/2/2013

Facts:

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) inan effort to reverse various resolutions by the COMELEC disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-listrace. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012,ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent amarginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalizedand underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not trulyrepresentative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of thepetitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also

lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.

Issue:Whether or not the said party-list groups were validly disqualified

Held:

The 54 petitions were remanded to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations coveredby the 41 petitionsthat obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance tomake it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine whetherpetitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 otherpetitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may begranted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013 elections.

The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body (COMELEC)may not be faulted for acting on thebasis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-listsystem. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who may participate in the party-listsystem.

There are three groups that may participate in the party-list system:

(1) national parties or organizations,

(2) regional parties or organizations, and

(3) sectoral parties or organizations.

On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizationswhich intend to

participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organizealong sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.

As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-listsystem and no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressionalcandidates, however, are not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they needto do is register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shallbe considered an independent sectoral party linked to a political party through a coalition .


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The questionis: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented sectors comein?

The answer: on the SECTORAL PARTIES or organizations that intend to participate in the party-listsystem.

The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized

and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined political constituencies.The high court went on to enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor,peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, andoverseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,the elderly, women, and the youth.

The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also appliesonly to the sectoral parties or organizations . The high court ruled that it is enough that [a] majorityof the members of the SECTORAL PARTIES or organizations mustbelong to the marginalizedand underrepresented sector they represent. The same is true for those who lack well -definedpolitical constituencies.

As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that

they must either be members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.

Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations bedisqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have atleast one nominee who remains qualified.

The party-list system, according to the Decision

Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it isnot synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The high court stressed that the framersof the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list systemand exclusively limit it to sectoral groups.

The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list

system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusivelyto sectoral parties.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected theproposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearlyintended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.

To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, whichstates:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fiftymembers, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned amongthe provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respectiveinhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be

elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR SECTORAL

PARTIES?

SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT, DURING THE

FIRST THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES

SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR,


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PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH

OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive

terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list

representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban

poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,

except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not

exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to

non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for

sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented.Second, the reservation of one-half

of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for th e first three consecutive terms after the

ratification of this Constitution,clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first

three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or

type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoralparties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as theParty-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principlesand policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securingtheir adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates forpublic office

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated inSection 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector

Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only meanthat they are not one and the same.

Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum

As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v.Comelec (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and BANAT v.Comelec (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm) .

NOTES: SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES

WHAT ESSENTIALL Y WAS THE RULING OF THE COURT:

that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretionin following prevailing decisions of thisCourt in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national,regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in thedecisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all thepresent petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm


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and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed inthis Decision.

WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION?

TO DEMOCRATIZE POLITICAL POWER BY GIVING POLITICAL PARTIES THAT CANNOTWIN IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS A CHANCE TO WIN SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES.

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win inlegislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects tworepresentatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and anotherfor his or her party-list group or organization of choice .

WHO ARE INCLUDED IN THE PARTY L IST SYSTEM?

SECTORAL AND WELL AS NON-SECTORAL PARTIES.

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-listsystem to include not onlysectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute apart, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates who comefrom the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.53

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first threeconsecutive terms.55

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected theproposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intendedthe party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

WHAT IS THE COMMON DENOMINATOR BETWEEN SECTORAL AND NON-SECTORAL PARTIES?

THEY CANNOT EXPECT TO WIN IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS BUT THEY CANGARNER, IN NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win inlegislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number ofvotes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be theentry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties thatcould not compete in legislative district elections.

WHAT COMPOSE THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM?

3 DIFFERENT GROUPS: (1) NATIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS; (2) REGIONALPARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS; AND (3) SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional partiesor organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties ororganizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particularsector.


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WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THE PARTY L IST SYSTEM IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR SECTORAL

PARTIES?

SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT,DURING THE FIRST THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THERATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TOPARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BYSELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUSCULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BEPROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first threeconsecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seatsallocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from thelabor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors asmay be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party -listsystem is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for

sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one -half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after theratification of this Constitution, clearly mak ing the party-list system fully open after the end of the firstthree congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any classor type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), ArticleVI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, butalso for non-sectoral parties.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A POLITICAL PARTY AND A SECTORAL PARTY.

THE DIFFERENCE IS STATED IN R.A. NO. 7941.

POLITICAL PARTY REFERS TO AN ORGANIZED GROUP OF CITIZENS ADVOCATING ANIDEOLOGY OR PLATFORM, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR THE GENERAL CONDUCT OFGOVERNMENT.

A SECTORAL PARTY REFERS TO AN ORGANIZED GROUP OF CITIZENS BELONGING TO ANY OFTHE SECTORS ENUMERATED IN SECTION 5 HEREOF WHOSE PRINCIPAL ADVOCACY PERTAINSTO THE SPECIAL INTEREST AND CONCERNS OF THEIR SECTOR.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a po litical party or a sectoral party or a coalitionof parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 furtherprovides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A.No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of thesectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest andconcerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

DOES R.A. NO. 7941 REQUIRE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES TO REPRESENT THE

MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS?

NO. TO REQUIRE ALL NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES UNDER THE PARTY-LISTSYSTEM TO REPRESENT THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED IS TO


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DEPRIVE AND EXCLUDE, BY JUDICIAL FIAT, IDEOLOGY-BASED AND CAUSE-ORIENTEDPARTIES FROM THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM.

.To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart frombeing obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented politicalparty is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral partyand need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a nationalor regional political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It issufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens .

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urbanpoor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseasworkers, and professionals. The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarilymarginalized and underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by definition marginalized andunderrepresented, not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly,women, and the youth may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselvesinto sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not requirenational or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to representthe marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse orcancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.

WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE IF WE INTERPRET THAT ALL THE SECTORS MENTIONED IN

SECTION 5 ARE MARG INALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED?

IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURDITIES.

TO WHAT DOES THE PHRASE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED REFER TO TAKING

INTO ACCOUNT THE BROAD POLICY DECLARATION IN SECTION 2OF R.A. NO. 7941 WITH ITS

SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS, BEARING IN MIND THE APPL ICABLE PROVISIONS OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ON THE MATTER?

THE PHRASE SHOULD REFER ONLY TO THE SECTORS IN SECTION 5 THAT ARE, BYTHEIR NATURE, ECONOMICALLY MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED.

WHAT ARE THESE SECTORS?

THESE SECTORS ARE: LABOR, PEASANT, FISHERFOLK, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUSCULTURAL COMMUNITIES, HANDICAPPED, VETERANS, OVERSEAS WORKERS, ANDOTHER SIMILAR SECTORS.

SHOULD ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECTORAL PARTY BELONG TO THE MARGINALIZED

AND UNDERREPRESENTED?

ONLY A MAJORITY.

For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized andunderrepresented.

HOW ABOUT THE NOMINEES OF THE THE SECTORAL PARTY?

EITHER THEY MUST BELONG TO THE SECTOR OR MUST HAVE A TRACK RECORD OFADVOCACY FOR THAT SECTOR.


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The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record ofadvocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector doesnot mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector,is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized and underrepresented arethose who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58

HOW ABOUT SECTORAL PARTIES OF PROFESSIONALS, THE ELDERLY, WOMEN AND THE

YOUTH, DO THEY NEED TO BE MARGINALIZED?

NO. THEY BELONG TO IDEOLOGY-BASED AND CAUSE ORIENTED PARTIES. ALLOWING THEMTO RUN AS PARTY LIST WILL GIVE GIVE SMALL IDEOLOGY-BASED AND CAUSE-ORIENTEDPARTIES WHO LACK WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES A CHANCE TO WIN SEATSIN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-basedand cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in theHouse of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented thesectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of

society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in theHouse of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941and will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both ineconomic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House ofRepresentatives.

WHAT IS ONE RESULT OF THIS INTERPRETATION?

IT WILL MAKE THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM HONEST AND TRANSPARENT.

This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need forrelatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution andinfirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

CAN POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS?

NO, EXCEPT THROUGH THEIR SECTORAL WINGS.

THEY CANNOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE BECAUSE THEY NEITHER LACK WELL DEFINEDPOLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES NOR REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND UNDDERPRESENTEDSECTORS.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major politicalparties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined politicalconstituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or regionalparties under the party-list system are

necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national

and regional parties under the party-list system to those who lack well-defined political constituencies,giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

WHY ARE POLITICAL PARTIES ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY LIST ELECTIONS

THROUGH THEIR SECTORAL WINGS?

TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO WORK ASSIDUOUSLY IN EXTENDING THEIR CONSTITUENCIES TOTHE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED AND TO THOSE WHO LACK WELL-DEFINEDPOLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES.


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The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list electionsso as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized andunderrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The participation of majorpolitical parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House ofRepresentatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined politicalconstituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking.

Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislativedistrict elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SECTORAL WING?

IT MUST MUST HAVE ITS OWN CONSTITUTION, BY-LAWS, PLATFORM OR PROGRAM OFGOVERNMENT, OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, A MAJORITY OF WHOM MUST BELONG TO THESECTOR REPRESENTED.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or programof government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. Thesectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a

coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component partiesor organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalitionof which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes aspecial qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

WHAT IS THE QUAL IFICATION OF A PARTY-LIST NOMINEE?

HE MUST BE A BONA-FIDE MEMBER OF THE PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH HE OR SHESEEKS TO REPRESENT.

IN THE CASE OF SECTORAL PARTIES, TO BE A BONA FIDE PARTY-LIST NOMINEE ONE MUSTEITHER BELONG TO THE SECTOR REPRESENTED, OR HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF ADVOCACY

FOR SUCH SECTOR.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks torepresent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong tothe sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

WHAT ARE NOW THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC?

THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. THREE DIFFERENT GROUPS MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM: (1) NATIONALPARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, (2) REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AND (3) SECTORALPARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

2. NATIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS DONOT NEED TO ORGANIZE ALONG SECTORAL LINES AND DO NOT NEED TO REPRESENT ANYMARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTOR.

3. POLITICAL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS PROVIDED THEYREGISTER UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND DO NOT FIELD CANDIDATES IN LEGISLATIVEDISTRICT ELECTIONS. A POLITICAL PARTY, WHETHER MAJOR OR NOT, THAT FIELDSCANDIDATES IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS CAN PARTICIPATE IN PARTYLISTELECTIONS ONLY THROUGH ITS SECTORAL WING THAT CAN SEPARATELY REGISTER UNDER


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THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. THE SECTORAL WING IS BY ITSELF AN INDEPENDENT SECTORALPARTY, AND IS LINKED TO A POLITICAL PARTY THROUGH A COALITION.

4. SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS MAY EITHER BE MARGINALIZED ANDUNDERREPRESENTED OR LACKING IN WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES. IT ISENOUGH THAT THEIR PRINCIPAL ADVOCACY PERTAINS TO THE SPECIAL INTEREST ANDCONCERNS OF THEIR SECTOR. THE SECTORS THAT ARE MARGINALIZED ANDUNDERREPRESENTED INCLUDE LABOR, PEASANT, FISHERFOLK, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUSCULTURAL COMMUNITIES, HANDICAPPED, VETERANS, AND OVERSEAS

62 RULE 64 IN RELATION TO RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. WORKERS. THESECTORS THAT LACK WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES INCLUDEPROFESSIONALS, THE ELDERLY, WOMEN, AND THE YOUTH.

5. A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS THATREPRESENT THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED MUST BELONG TO THEMARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTOR THEY REPRESENT. SIMILARLY, AMAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT LACK WELL -DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES MUST BELONG TO THE SECTOR THEY REPRESENT.THE NOMINEES OF SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT THE

MARGINALIZEDAND UNDERREPRESENTED, OR THAT REPRESENT THOSE WHO LACK WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES, EITHER MUST BELONG TO THEIR RESPECTIVESECTORS, OR MUST HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF ADVOCACY FOR THEIR RESPECTIVESECTORS. THE NOMINEES OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS MUSTBE BONA-FIDE MEMBERS OF SUCH PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

6. NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS SHALL NOT BEDISQUALIFIED IF SOME OF THEIR NOMINEES ARE DISQUALIFIED, PROVIDED THAT THEY HAVEAT LEAST ONE NOMINEE WHO REMAINS QUALIFIED.

CITY OF MANILA VS. TE

FACTS:

City of Manila instituted a complaint for expropriationagainst herein respondent. The latter filed a motion

to dismiss on the ground that Ordinance 7951 (an expropriation measure enacted on February 3, 1998 by

the city councilauthorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property

along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets) was an invalid expropriation measure because it

violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation and that it did not comply with

the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Furthermore, respondent is qualified as a small

property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of RA 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of

realty that she owned. Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC. Petitioners appeal to CA but to no avail.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss by the respondent is improper.

HELD: Yes, it was improper.

The present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such

as that required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of

an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides:


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If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, orany objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within thetime stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify theproperty in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interestclaimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. Nocounterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or anysubsequent pleading.

Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondents motion to dismiss andrequired her to submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period.

Petition was granted. The dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court.

{Important notes}

- Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff

to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminatesin an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the

property for the public use or purposedescribed in the complaint and second, the determination

by the court of thejust compensationfor the property sought to be expropriated.

- the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified

beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of

public use or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of eminent domain.

Del Castillo v. People

January 30, 2012

(Presence of Barangay Tanod will NOT Validate an Illegal Service of Search Warrant)

Facts: Acting upon a confidential report that Del Castillo is engaged in the illegal sale of drugs, police

officers secured search warrant. On their way to Del Castillo's house, someone shouted for "raid"which

caused for the commotion in the place. Police officers hurriedly went to the house; the latter was able to

escape. The wife was present. In the presence of the barangay tanods, the officers searched the house

but they found nothing. It was a barangay tanod who found 4 plastic packs of a crystalline substance

(shabu). [to cut the long story short] Del Castillo was convicted by the RTC, affirmed by CA. Hence, this

appeal.

Del Castillo's contention:Search is invalid. The illegal substance was searched in the place not

particularly described in the search.

People's contention:Such defect was cured because it was not the police officers who searched

the illegal substance, but the barangay tanod who is a private individual. Thus, Bill of Rights


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(protection against unreasonable searches and seizures) will not apply, as the same may only be

enforced against the State or its agents.

Issue: Is the contention of the Peoplemeritorious?

Held: No. A barangay tanodis not a private individual. The Local Government Code (RA 7160) contains

provision which describes the function of a barangay tanodas an agent of persons in authority. Hence,

constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable as against government

authorities.

Gamboa v. Chan, et.al.

GR No. 193636. July 24, 2012

Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom

from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, it is to be repository of freedom. The

right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right.

This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc (22 S 424) (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on

an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by

plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is

violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:

Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it

must include privacy as well, it it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the

beginning of all freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice

Brandeis the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The concept of

liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique

individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion

or constraint.

- However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks (541 S 456) (2007), this Court

underscored that the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE, viz: With respect to the right of privacy which

the petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While

it is true that Section 21, Art. VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected

by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a


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legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access

information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial

transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an

overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe

v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure of

information is for valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in

regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to

state the this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative

investigation.

Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to

protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide

a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and informational privacy.

- The writ of habeas datait seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself,

particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to

achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,

there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or

security on the other.

Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other

armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.

- The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not

recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that

is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police

commission.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court erred in ruling that the Zenarosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or

indispensable party;

2. WON the trial court erred in clearing in declaring that (Gamboa) failed to present sufficient proof to link

respondents as the informant to the Zenarosa Commission;

3. WON the trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;

4. WON the trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zenarosa Commission to the PNP as

alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;


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WON the trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.

Luz v. People

February 29, 2012

(Search and Arrest for Traffic Violation)

Facts: While driving along a highway in Naga City, Rodelo Luz was flagged down by a policeman/traffic

enforcer, who was then assigned in that area, for violation of a traffic ordinance, particularly driving

without a helmet. Luz was invited to the nearby police station. While the policeman prepared for the

citation ticket for the violation, he noticed Luz to be "uneasy and kept on getting something from his

jacket." With this suspicion, he asked Luz to take out all the contents inside of his jacket. Among the

things revealed was a metal container. Policeman asked him to open the same. It contained 2 sachets of

shabu. [to cut the long story short]Luz was convicted by the RTC for violation of RA 9165, particularly for

illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, this appeal.

Luz's contention: search incidental to a LAWFUL arrest is inapplicable, because he was not

lawfully arrested; thus, search was invalid.

People's contention: there was a lawful arrest because Luz committed a violation of traffic

ordinance right there and then; thus, search was also valid as it is incidental to a lawful arrest,

and Luz consented to the search.

ISSUE 1: Was there a valid arrest? NO. [thus, search incidental to a lawful arrest not valid]

Under RA 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing

with a traffic violation is NOT the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's

licenseof the latter. In addition thereto, under the PNP Operations Manual, if the cause for the

flagging down of a vehicle is a traffic violation, the officer's duty is only to issue Traffic Citation

Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR), and never to indulge in prolonged,

unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver violator.

The roadside questioning of a motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be

considered a formal arrest.

ISSUE 2: Were Luz's constitutional rights violated? YES.

At the t ime a person is arrested, the latter shall be informed of their constitutional rights to

remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against

them. In the case at bar, the police officers informed Luz of his aforementioned rights only after

he had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.


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Berk emer v . McCarty , 468 US 420 (1984)Miranda warnings must also be given to

a person apprehended due to a traffic violation.

Kn ow les v. Iowa, 525 US 113 (1998)When a police officer stops a person for [traffic

violation] and correspondingly issues a citation, this procedure does not authorized the

officer to conduct a full search of the car.

ISSUE 3: Was there a consented search? NO.

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from

the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following

characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent in given: (1)

the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)

whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and

intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of the coercive police procedures; (6) the

defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police

questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly

vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of provingthat the necessary consent was given freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was

alleged was that the petitioner was alone at the police station at 3:00 AM, accompanied by

several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against the finding of valid consent to

a warrantless search.

- IN SUM, Luz acquitted of the offense charged.

Magallona, et.al. v. Sec. Ermita, et.al.

GR No. 187167. August 16, 2011

(Archipelago's Separate Baseline from that of the "Regime of Islands" is Constitutional)

Facts:

In March 2009, Congress passed RA 9522 (the present Philippine Baselines Law), as

compliance to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS III).

RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the

Philippine archipelago and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the

Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their ownapplicable maritime zones.

Petitioners (as citizens, taxpayers, and/or legislators) assail the constitutionality of RA

9522 on two principal grounds: (1) the law reduces Philippine maritime territory, and

logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power in violation of Art. 1 of the

1987 Constitution, and (2) the law opens the country's waters landward of the baselines

to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and

national security.


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Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS

III.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty

regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, i.e. territorial waters (12

nautical miles from the baselines); contiguous zone (24 na); exclusive economic zone

(200 na); and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III State parties

to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.

Far from surrendering the PH's claims over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,Congress' decision to classify them as "rgime of islands" consistent with Art. 121 of

UNCLOS III manifests the State's responsible observance of its pacta sun t

servandaobligation under UNCLOS III. Art. 121 thereof states, any "naturally formed

area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of

the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their

own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioner's assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters"

under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by

optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the PH's total maritime space by 145,

216 square nautical miles.

UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime spacethe EEZ - in waters previously part

of the high seas. However, it preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other

States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the PH will find

itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime

zones and continental shelf is measured. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the

part of the PH in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution

and our national interest.

NPC vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

Promulgated August 24, 2011

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution


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The Case

NPC (petitioner), seeks review on certiorari of CA decision which affirmed RTC decision (1999)

ordering NPC to pay just compensation to respondents.

Facts

NPC constructed several underground tunnels to be used in diverting water flow from the Agus

River to the hydroelectric plants, to generate electricity for Mindanao (pursuant to its mandate under RA

6395).

In 1997, respondent claimed they had belatedly discovered the construction of the tunnels and

sued NPC in the RTC for recovery of damages and of the property, with alternative prayer for just

compensation, alleging that the tunnels deprived them of the use and value of their land, also creating

their land unsafe for habitation.

NPC countered that the heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of

Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was made.

RTC denied the request for removal or dismantling of the tunnel but ordered NPC to pay plaintiffs

Php113,532,500.00. NPC appealed to CA. CA rendered decision affirming RTC decision.


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Issue

WON the act constructing tunnels constituted taking of property (as against a mere easement)

entitling the landowners to just compensation.

Ruling

We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation. NPCs construction of

the tunnelconstituted taking of the land andentitled owners to just compensation.

NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through

formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them

beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and interests

because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on

the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.

Did such consequence constitute taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just

compensation?

We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC,

notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the

taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or

appropriation.[36]

Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession,

or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.[37]

Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,

diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment

of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.[38]

It is neither necessary that the
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owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property,[39]

nor material whether the property is removed from

the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.[40]

Ouano vs Republic, February 9, 2011

Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose.

FACTS:

In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor

agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No.

R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and

development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned.

Furthermore, it was established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAAs

predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners

that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used

for airport purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former owners of expropriated lands- not used for the purpose intended

be allowed to recover the same.

HELD:

The SC held that the government only acquires the rights in expropriated parcels of land as may

be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means that in the event the

particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not

be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is

expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. In the present case, the

above final decree of expropriation allows the recovery or repurchase, upon abandonment of the

Lahug airport project, as a condition of approving expropriation. In effect, the government merely

held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots

were condemned was actually consummated by the government.

Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of

the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties

after the payment of the condemnation price . A condemnor should commit to use the property

pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another

petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to
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its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it

expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of

expropriation.

Political Law Review

Republic vs Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc. (GR No. 185124 January 25, 2012) 664 SCRA 233

Facts:

National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation createdunder Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation developmentand management in the country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 552 on 11September 1974and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized

under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain.

NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-MarigadoIrrigation Project. On 8 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for theexpropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14, 497.91 square meters.

On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the areasought to be expropriated, the exact address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. NIAfurther prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing withthe Philippine National Bank the amount of 19, 246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.

On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses andCounterclaim. They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land,because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties,

because there was an abandoned government property adjacent theirs, where the project could passthrough; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of theirexpropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have placedits value at % million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their propertiesfor the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties.

On 11 September 1996, RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fairmarket value of the properties. On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it wouldissue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair arket value of the properties.The lower court later amended its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of Possession in favor ofNIA.

On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners Report to the RTC. The report,

however, stated that the committee members could not agree on the market value of the subjectproperties and recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners to replace the onescoming from the parties only.

On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its Commissioners Report to the lowercourt. The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land should be 65 per square meterbased on the zonal valuation of the Bureau if Internal Revenue (BIR.)

On 3 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another report, which had adoptedthe first Committee Report, as well as the formers 25 November 1996 report. However, the committee


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added to its computation the value of the earthfill excavated from portions of Lot. Nos. 3039 and 3080.Petitioner objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of theland.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the trial courts finding of just compensation of the landand the improvements thereon based on the report of the commissioners.

Held:

Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation --- In expropriation proceedings, justcompensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by theexpropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensifythe meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be

rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutionallimitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value ofthe property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual andordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between onewho receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by thegovernment.

In National Power Corporation vs. Diato-Bernal, this Court emphasized that the just-ness ofthe compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data a bases for fixing thevalue of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we referred to in that case were thesworn declarations of realtors in the area, as well as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. Indisregarding the Committee Report by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus: Itis evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis.

First, the market values of the subject propertys neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupportedby any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, taxdeclarations or zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercialestablishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers andconvenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally, the market sales data andprice listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto. As correctly invoked byNAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence ismanifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. The trial court adopted the flawed findings ofthe commissioners hook, line and sinker. It did not even bother to require the submission of the allegedmarket sales data and price listings. Further, the RTC overlooked that fact that the recommended justcompensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than two years after the complaint wasfiled on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of thetaking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the

institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as ofthe time of the filing pf the complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in te commissionersreport is unacceptable.

We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in thepayment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil fromthat of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriationproceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensationordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses . Suchvalue could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.


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Ownership of lands are indivisible, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well asto the subsoil under it.

Note: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with thecommencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into

the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

Political Law Review

Sto. Tomas vs Salac (G.R. No. 152642 November 13, 2012) 685 SCRA 245

Facts:

On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers andOverseas Filipinos Act of 1995bthat, for among other purpose, sets the Governments policies onoverseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare ofmigrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) tobegin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migrationof overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the PhilippineOverseas Employment Administration (POEA.)

On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus withapplication for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners beforeRTC of Quezon City, Branch 96.

Salac, et al. sought to: (1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 and POEA Memorandum Circular15; (2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rulesand regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers; and (3)also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of RA8042.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 8042 is constitutional as a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

Constitutional Law; Police Power --- As the Court held in People vs. Ventura, the State under itspolice power may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the generalwelfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as ofdeception and fraud. Police power is that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it toprohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.


22/22

R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment ofOFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking towork abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. TheCourt cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department.Hence, in the absence of clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court mustuphold its validity.

Compilation of Case Digests in Political law-prelims

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