Competent, Concealed, Congested: The Challenges of Future … · 2012-03-14 · 4 Israeli Strategic...
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Dr. David Johnson
Competent, Concealed, Congested:
The Challenges of Future Warfare
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Hard Fighting:
Israel in Lebanon and Gaza
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Israel Did Not Fare Well in Second Lebanon War
• Hezbollah abducted IDF soldiers
and launched rocket attacks after
IDF response
• IDF initial approach: fires (mostly
air) attack and limited ground raids
• Army committed late; operations
not against a strategic purpose—
looked ineffectual and cannot stop
short range rockets
• After 34 days ceasefire agreement;
Hezbollah moves from border and
UN peacekeepers deployed
War not a defeat for Israel, but absence of victory very problematic—IDF looks weak for the first time
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Israeli Strategic Perspectives Before Lebanon—
Not Dissimilar From Those of Many Western Countries Today
• Belief by 2006 that Israel beyond era of major
war: “the main challenge facing land forces
would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts”
(Winograd Commission Report)
• IDF interpretation of Kosovo, OEF, and OIF:
standoff attack by fires (principally air power)
can deter state adversaries
– Promises lower IDF casualties (key domestic
consideration)
– Less collateral damage than ground operations
(vital for managing international and regional
opinion)
– Budgetary savings
• U.S. presence in Iraq reinforces these views and
gives sense of time to prepare if U.S. starts to
leave
• In 2000, Israeli Army riveted on stopping second
al-Aqsa intifada terrorist attacks inside Israel
• This all made sense at the time—and was wrong
“From 2000 until 2006, the typical
mission for an Israeli infantryman was
to man a checkpoint in the Palestinian
territories or to snatch a suspected
Palestinian militant out of his house in
the middle of the night—missions very
similar to those currently being
executed by U.S. infantrymen in Iraq”
Source: Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War:
A Military Assessment”
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IDF Adapts to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
• Palestinian LIC (low intensity conflict)
problem (intifada) becomes Army focus
• Israeli Army got very good at LIC (this is
not COIN)
• Conventional (combined arms)
capabilities atrophy after large budget
cuts, mostly in army, and reduced
training
• Regular army stretched by Second
Intifada; removal of Israeli citizens from
Gaza—“fighting is training”
• Armored forces and higher HQ (division
and above) not relevant to LIC; training
largely ignored; reserves neglected
• Air controllers removed from brigades;
little CAS training
“At no stage was an Israeli unit required to face down an enemy force of a size larger than an unskilled infantry squad.”
Source: Harel and Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon
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Insights From Lebanon: Competent Adversaries
• Israeli issues in Lebanon:
– Hezbollah not 10-feet tall, but did present a qualitative problem
for IDF not solvable with existing low intensity conflict mindset
– Air-centric approach could not stop short-range rockets—
needed ground forces
• Hezbollah stand-off fires (ATGMs, MANPADS, mortars) required
tightly integrated and joint combined arms fire-maneuver-ISR
solution the IDF could not execute in 2006
• Scale issue:
– Lebanon 45 KM x 45 KM; complex terrain; towns and villages—
used elements of 4 divisions (at least 12 brigades) in 2006
– Not unlike clearing from Fredericksburg to Dale City Virginia
and 40 KM west of I-95 corridor
• Lebanon War a “wake-up call”—in aftermath, IDF shifted focus to
high intensity conflict, joint combined arms fire and maneuver,
and armored (tanks and APCs) forces—“Back to Basics”
• IDF did not abandon low intensity conflict missions (territorial
brigades West Bank/Gaza)—realized it had to prepare for full range
of operations
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1967:
Airfields
1970:
Surface-to-
Air Missile
Installations
1973:
Mobile Surface-
to-Air Missiles
1991:
Scuds
2006:
Mobile Katyusha
Rockets
Requires an
integrated
air-ground
approach
*Source: Israeli Air Force 2006-2009:
Short-range
rockets
The Changing Nature of Targets: Concealment
• Size
• Signature
• Price
• Order of battle
• Mobility
• Urban operations
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Cast Lead a Limited Operation for Limited Objectives
• Objective: To create conditions for a better security situation in southern Israel, by the following:
– Inflicting severe damage to Hamas
– Decreasing terror and rocket attacks from Gaza
– Increasing Israel's deterrence
• While minimizing collateral damage and avoiding escalation in other fronts
• Employ air, ground, reserves
This is the IDF model for the future—including for a future Lebanon fight
Paratroopers Brigade
GolaniBrigade
GivatiBrigade
401st “Tracks of Iron” Armor
Brigade
Southern Command Regional Brigades x 2
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IDF Learning Pays Off in Gaza
• Combined Arms:
– Combined arms down to battalion
level (engineers, armor, air)
– HQs at all levels much more effective
at integrating capabilities from across
IDF
– Combined arms against ATGMs,
maneuver in a limited battle-space
• Intelligence:
– Fusion at battalion and brigade levels
– Tight commander-sensor-shooter
links
• Joint Fires:
– “Paralyzed the enemy” (fixed position)
and allowed ground forces to reach
the enemy/his abandoned positions
– Effective integration of air and artillery
• Maneuver:
– Maneuver, enabled by fire and ISR,
forced the enemy to react, to move,
and to expose himself
Lessons from Cast Lead limited:
Hamas not Hezbollah; Gaza not Lebanon
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Insights From Lebanon and Gaza (1)—Terrain and Scale Matter
• Hybrid opponents, like Hezbollah and Hamas, create
a qualitative challenge, despite their smaller size,
because of their
– Training, discipline, organization, C2
– Stand-off weapons (ATGMs, MANPADS, mortars,
rockets)
– Use of complex terrain (“nature reserves,”
urban) and fighting among the people
• Can force change in operational methods (limit
helicopter use)
• Air defense against unmanned aircraft of growing
concern
• Strategy relies on protraction, causing large
numbers of casualties, influencing the media—and
reluctance of western states to put “boots on the
ground”
• May become the form of warfare for adversaries
who confront the “Western Way of War”
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Insights From Lebanon/Gaza (2)
• Precision, stand-off fires are critical, but not sufficient to
defeat hybrid adversaries concealed in complex terrain
• Ground operations are an essential component of military
operations against hybrid opponents
• Joint combined arms fire and maneuver and responsive
intelligence are key against these opponents
– Ground maneuver produces operational pressure on the
enemy—makes him move
– Movement immediately increases the enemy’s
operational signature and generates new targets for air
and other fires
• Air and ground and ISR (intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance) must be tightly integrated and highly
responsive to be effective against these relatively small,
fleeting targets
• Heavy forces (tanks and IFVs) reduce operational risks and
minimize friendly casualties
• Artillery is a key suppression weapon; area fires are still
important
• Unmanned aircraft will increase air defense challenges
• This can be high intensity combat at brigade and below
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• Although both contextually deeply
linked to Israel and the Palestinian
question, they do provide insights into a
category of potential adversaries that
the United States, and others, could
encounter in the future
• These types of actors may emerge from
the ongoing turmoil in North Africa and
the Middle East (or elsewhere)
• Not necessarily “insurgencies”—
irregular warfare COIN and “stability
operations” may be largely irrelevant
Why Are Hezbollah and Hamas Important?
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Non-State Irregular
State-Sponsored Hybrid
State
The Full Range of Military Operations—
The Future Security Environment
Future U.S. capabilities should be linked to potential adversary capabilities
across the full range of military operations
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Non-State Irregular
• Organization: Not well-trained;
little formal discipline; cellular
structure; small formations
(squads)
• Weapons: Small arms, RPGs,
mortars, short-range rockets,
IEDS/mines
• Command and Control: Cell
phones; runners; decentralized
State-Sponsored Hybrid
State
“Low-End” Non-State Irregular Adversaries
• Mujahideen (Afghanistan 1979)
• PLO West Bank (2001)
• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2007)
• Taliban Afghanistan (2009)
U.S. Joint Force, particularly the Army, has focused increasingly on
irregular adversaries since 2001—as had the Israelis had before 2006
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Non-State Irregular
• Organization: Not well-trained;
little formal discipline; cellular
structure; small formations
(squads)
• Weapons: Small arms, RPGs,
mortars, short-range rockets,
IEDs/mines
• Command and Control: Cell
phones; runners; decentralized
State-Sponsored Hybrid
State
• Organization: Hierarchical;
brigade or larger-sized
formations
• Weapons: Sophisticated air
defenses; ballistic missiles;
conventional ground forces;
special operations forces;
air forces; navies; some
with nuclear weapons
• Command and Control: All
means; generally centralized
“High-End” State Adversaries
• Mujahideen (Afghanistan 1979)
• PLO West Bank (2001)
• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2007)
• Taliban Afghanistan (2009)
• Soviet Union (Afghan 70s-80s)
• Russia (Chechnya 1990s)
• Israel ( Lebanon 2006)
• Georgia (2008)
• Russia (Georgia 2008)
• Israel ( Gaza 2008)
• United States (Afghan/Iraq 2010)
U.S. joint force focused on major combat operations before OIF;
how much the institution remembers is an important question
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Non-State Irregular
• Organization: Not well-trained;
little formal discipline; cellular
structure; small formations
(squads)
• Weapons: Small arms, RPGs,
mortars, short-range rockets,
IEDs/mines
• Command and Control: Cell
phones; runners; decentralized
State-Sponsored Hybrid
• Organization: Moderately-
trained; disciplined; moderate-
sized formations (up to
battalion)
• Weapons: Same as irregular,
but with stand-off capabilities
(ATGMs, MANPADs, longer-
range rockets)
• Command and Control:
Multiple means; decentralized
State
• Organization: Hierarchical;
brigade or larger-sized
formations
• Weapons: Sophisticated air
defenses; ballistic missiles;
conventional ground forces;
special operations forces;
air forces; navies; some
with nuclear weapons
• Command and Control: All
means; generally centralized
Minding the “Middle”—State-Sponsored Hybrid Adversaries
• Mujahideen (Afghanistan 1979)
• PLO West Bank (2001)
• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2007)
• Taliban Afghanistan (2009)
• Mujahideen Afghanistan (1988)
• Chechnya (1990)
• Hezbollah Lebanon (2006)
• Hamas Gaza (2008)
• Soviet Union (Afghan 70s-80s)
• Russia (Chechnya 1990s)
• Israel ( Lebanon 2006)
• Georgia (2008)
• Russia (Georgia 2008)
• Israel ( Gaza 2008)
• United States (Afghan/Iraq 2010)
United States has not confronted hybrid adversaries since the Vietnam War:
high intensity combat challenges that require
joint, combined arms fire and maneuver—and armored forces
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Air and Ground Across the ROMO—Significant DOTMLPF Implications Across the Joint Force
Decentralized Centralized
Irregular Warfare State-Sponsored Hybrid Warfare Deterrence/Major Combat
Role of Air
Power
• Overhead ISR and signals
intelligence are crucial because the
enemy does not mass. These
capabilities are critical to finding
and attacking high-value targets.
• Air mobility is critical to supply and
evacuation.
• Air power is used mostly in ground-
directed close air support with tight
rules of engagement. It is key for
force protection in extremis.
• Air superiority is contested below
3,000 feet. Above 3,000 feet, air
power is mainly invulnerable.
• Overhead ISR and signals
intelligence are tightly linked with
precision strike.
• Air power is critical to attacking the
enemy’s deep strike assets and
high-value targets.
• Tight rules of engagement for
centralized strikes and close air
support are required.
• Air power is used for the
suppression of enemy standoff
systems to support (complement)
ground maneuver.
• Air power complicates the enemy’s
ability to mass and be reinforced.
• Air superiority may be contested
below 20,000 feet.
• Air power is critical to deterrence achieved through global
reach and strike capabilities.
• Overhead ISR and signals intelligence are tightly linked
with precision strike.
• Strategic and operational air mobility and tankers are
critical capabilities.
• Air and space superiority may be contested at all levels.
• Centralized control is critical.
• Air power precludes large-scale ground maneuver by the
enemy.
• Air bases may be contested.
• Operations may occur in a nuclear, biological, or
chemical environment.
Role of
Ground
Power
• Ground power is focused on
establishing security, obtaining
human intelligence, and training
indigenous forces.
• Maneuver is focused on clearing,
holding, and building.
• Dispersed operations increase the
difficulty of force protection.
• Tight rules of engagement demand
rigorous target identification.
• Ground power is critical to forcing
enemy reaction and to uncovering
hidden assets.
• Combined-arms operations are
fundamental to success.
• Ground power closes with enemy
forces.
• Ground power conducts
decentralized operations against
dispersed adversaries.
• High-intensity MCO-like operations
are possible at the brigade level
and below.
• Lines of communication may be
vulnerable.
• Troop deployment is a key signal of national
commitment.
• Combined-arms operations are the key to success.
• Ground maneuver forces an operational reaction from the
enemy.
• Ground power engages ground units that avoid air
attacks and indirect fire.
• Ground power is critical for exploiting operational
opportunities and pursuing enemy forces.
• Ground power deals with hybrid or irregular threats.
• Ground power is critical to establishing post–MCO
security and stability.
• Basing and staging may be contested.
• Operations may occur in a nuclear, biological, or
chemical environment.
Level of Air-
Ground
Integration
• Operations are ground-centric but
highly dependent on air power.
• C2ISR and joint tactical air
controllers are best integrated at
lower echelons for direct support.
• Balanced operation requires tighter
coordination and extensive training
and rehearsals.
• Integration ensures high
responsiveness to ground units and
integration at levels below the
theater.
• Air power control is highly centralized.
• Air superiority is critical to ground maneuver.
• Integrated suppression of enemy air defenses is key.
• Supported-supporting relationships depend on the
operation; the air or ground commander could lead.
Leadership could change during an operation.
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The 2008 Battle of Sadr City:
Reimagining Urban Combat
“It is prima facie better strategy to make
the enemy come to you than to go to him
and seek a decision on his own ground.” Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911)
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Urban Combat and War “Amongst the People”: Congestion
• In wars between states cities, particularly capitals,
often considered a center of gravity
• Mega-cities are central to the future security
environment
• Enemy fighting “amongst the people” has decided
advantages in the city
• Mounted maneuver channelized and vehicles
vulnerable—similar to mountainous/channelized
terrain
• Almost always costly for your soldiers and remaining
civilians—who may number in the millions
• Recent examples: Grozny and Fallujah—city is a
military objective that must be taken and cleared;
terrorists a cancer that has to be removed
• Sadr City (and Gaza) offer alternative approaches
Fallujah 2004
Grozny 1995
Hue 1968
Aachen 1944
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Fallujah 2004: Take and Clear the City
• Geographically isolated
• Before operation Fallujah has
population of approximately
300,000
• 270,000 leave before fight
• Army and Marines fire thousands
of 155mm and mortars
• 3,000 terrorists buried; 4,000
individuals detained
• 80 U.S. dead; 600 wounded
• Grozny similar to Fallujah: isolated and less than 500k residents—but has multi-story
buildings
• Sadr City has a much larger population—2.4 Million—with nowhere for non-
combatants to go
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Setting the Conditions for the Battle of Sadr City: 2-82 and the Surge
• Surge and returning to Baghdad focused on
reducing violence, particularly in Baghdad
• 2nd BCT, 82nd AB deploys January 2007 to Camp
Taji
– Immediately deploys into enemy-held Baghdad
neighborhoods
– Remains in sector to operate among the population
• Approach:
– Build the Iraqi Security Forces
– Defeat the enemy networks: raids, cordon &
knocks, and vehicle check points (VCPs)
– Facilitate reconciliation
– Protect the population: fight with concrete
• Results:
– Killed and captured over 1,200 insurgents
– Established 4 Joint Security Stations (JSSs) and 6
Combat Outposts (COPs)
– Emplaced over 49 km of concrete barriers
– Trained and employed 3000 Concerned Local
Citizens (CLCs)
– Isolated the strategic terrain of Sadr City
• Key gap: ISR to the objective
• RIP/TOA with 3rd BCT, 4ID in March 2008
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Changing the Security Situation in Baghdad
• Isolation and access control
– Much of Baghdad has access
controlled by T-walls: “fighting
with concrete” and creating
“gated communities”
– Route clearance (double walls)
– Large reduction in deaths from
VBIEDs
– Big events harder for insurgents
to execute
• Hunting leaders
– SOF mission with conventional
help
– 2-82 standard: initiate movement
to a target within 30 minutes of
receiving trigger
– Highly reliant on SIGINT and other
intelligence
22
5038 36
18
42
19 18 20 14 8 6 8 6 3
159
244
192
79
186
83
48
1
44
142
301
471
338
231
375
135
98 99
4356
17
48 45
51713
35
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
VBIED Events 50 38 36 18 42 19 18 20 14 8 6 8 6 3
KIA 159 244 192 79 186 83 48 35 13 17 1 44 14 2
WIA 301 471 338 231 375 135 98 99 43 56 17 48 45 5
Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08
VBIED Attacks
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Basra Operation Triggers Action in Sadr City
• 23 March: Rocket attacks begin against Green Zone (23 to 31 March: 86 Rockets
fired)
• 25 March:
– Government of Iraq offensive in Basra begins
– Muqtada al-Sadr lifts Aug 2007 cease fire; militias attack Coalition and Iraqi Army
outposts across Baghdad
– Half of Iraqi Army checkpoints near Sadr City are overrun
– Prime Minister Maliki directs Iraqi Army and Coalition forces to stop rocket attacks and
defeat criminal militias in Sadr City
23 25 March Attacks
1
Sadr City
Ishbiliya
Thawra District
Habbibiya5 km 6.75 km
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The Close Fight: Operation Striker Denial (26 March-14 April)
• Decisive Terrain: 107mm Rocket Boxes
• 1-2 SCR seizes firing positions in south of
Phase Line Gold; takes 2 weeks rather than
planned 2 days
• 1-68 CAB seizes Route Grizzlies
• Enemy in prepared positions: sandbags,
sectors of fire
• 6 Strykers lost in 6 days
• Armor (Abrams and Bradleys) moved in—
survivable, lethal, intimidating
• 5 Additional companies surged to 3-4 BCT
• 6 April - 11th Iraqi Army Division reaches
Route Gold
• Enemy continues to infiltrate across Phase
Line Gold
“I stopped counting the
reported dead after Comanche
hit 100 enemy KIA on the 25th”
Company Commander, 1-2 SCR
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The Close Fight: Operation Gold Wall (15 April-15 May)
25
• Concrete barrier (Gold Wall) to deny the
enemy key terrain south of PL Gold
• Deliberate combined arms breach every
day
• 818 tank main gun rounds and 12,091
25mm rounds
• 4.6 kilometers long; 3,000 12-foot-tall
T-Walls (9 tons each)
• 2 battalions in continuous operations: 24
April to 15 May
• Wall “agitates the enemy”—JAM attacks to
stop its construction; play to U.S. strengths
• “Like a Roman siege engine”
• Intense IO campaign and reconstruction
efforts
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The 3-4 BCT Deep Fight—107 mm Rockets
• 3-4 BCT had unprecedented assets for a
BCT: Predators, Shadows, 3 x AWT,
CAS, GMLRS—24/7
• Not staffed or trained to use these
assets—OJT
• mIRC and PSDS2 key technologies
• Target hand over between systems
– Radar acquisition (find)
– Shadow (fix)
– Predator or AH-64 (finish)
– Limited visibility (rain and sandstorms) a
problem
• Dedicated “Scouts” in the TOC (avoid
“Best Buy Syndrome”)
• Patience (“watch the rail”) and defeat
Network
26
Battle of Sadr City
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Hunting and Killing Rocket Teams
27
Rocket on Rail
Transport
Vehicle
1
Rocket Firing
Transport
Vehicle
2
Transport
Vehicle
3
Transport
Vehicle
4
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Urban Fighting: Insights from Sadr City and Gaza (1)
• Focus is enemy fighters and
their capabilities: more a
“wide area security” than
“clear and hold” mission
• Full range of operations
force that can transition
fundamental:
– Units engaged in COIN have
to reorient to a combined
arms fight and then return to
COIN
– Big swings in ROE and who
can pull the trigger
– More difficult for leaders than
soldiers
• Isolating adversary (walls)
and hunting leaders key to
setting conditions
Sadr City
Gaza
1
Sadr City
Ishbiliya
Thawra District
Habbibiya5 km 6.75 km
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29
Urban Fighting: Insights from Sadr City and Gaza (2)
• Ground maneuver indispensible
– Forces enemy from prepared
positions; separate from
population (“agitates”)
– Armored forces—based on tanks
and IFVs—are key elements of
maneuver in complex terrain
• Survivable, lethal, precise,
intimidating
• Versatile: can scale down
(dismounted) or up (tanks and IFVs)
– Snipers and SOF important
enablers
• Enemy is fleeting
– Decentralized decision making
(mission command) fundamental
– Capabilities pushed to, and
integrated at, lower levels
(brigade and below) important for
responsiveness
Sadr City
Gaza
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30
Final Thoughts—A Joint Force for the Future
• Potential adversaries know our capabilities—and
vulnerabilities—and are adapting
• Future challenges require joint forces
– Prepared for a range of adversaries—
irregular, state-sponsored hybrid, and state
– Prepared for operations in complex terrain,
particularly large urban areas—with the
adversary operating “amongst the people”
– Capable of joint, combined arms, fire and
maneuver
• Balanced ground force key:
• Armor (tanks/IFVs/APCs) matters against
adversaries with stand-off fires
• Dismounted infantry fundamental to close fight
• Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery key for
success against competent adversaries
• Scale matters—it takes troops to control
complex terrain in large areas www.rand.org