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Compensation and Corrective Actionas the BP Response to the DeepwaterHorizon IncidentWilliam Forrest Harlow a & Rachel Martin Harlow aa Department of Visual and Performing Arts , University of Texas ,Permian BasinPublished online: 12 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: William Forrest Harlow & Rachel Martin Harlow (2013) Compensation andCorrective Action as the BP Response to the Deepwater Horizon Incident, Communication ResearchReports, 30:3, 193-200, DOI: 10.1080/08824096.2013.806252

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Compensation and Corrective Actionas the BP Response to the DeepwaterHorizon IncidentWilliam Forrest Harlow & Rachel Martin Harlow

The April 2010 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon deep-sea drilling rig in the Gulf of

Mexico killed 11 people working on the rig, and resulted in substantial economic and

environmental damage to nearby U.S. states. BP responded to the crisis with an ineffec-

tive public relations (PR) strategy that focused on describing their efforts to resolve the

problem and their attempts to compensate the victims. Their response temporarily shifted

when the response received attention from President Obama in the United States, but it

otherwise stayed consistent for 6 months before largely ending. This study applies Benoit’s

Image Repair Theory to BP press releases concerning the Deepwater Horizon explosion

and spill, and judges that Benoit’s work provides a strong framework for understanding

the PR response to this crisis. The study also comments on the appropriate unit of

analysis for capturing a corporate PR response using Benoit’s framework.

Keywords: BP; Image Restoration; Public Relations

After the petroleum-drilling rig Deepwater Horizon exploded off the coast of

Louisiana on April 20, 2010, it took 3 months to fully stop the flow of oil from its

ruptured wellhead into the Gulf of Mexico. The states of the U.S. Gulf Coast—Texas,

William Forrest Harlow (PhD, Texas A & M University, 2002) is an associate professor in the Department of

Visual and Performing Arts at the University of Texas of the Permian Basin. Rachel Martin Harlow (PhD, Texas

Tech University, 2005) is an assistant professor in the Department of Visual and Performing Arts at the

University of Texas of the Permian Basin. We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Trey Garcia and

Ben Clark for their work in coding the data, particularly given that they were willing to spend a significant

portion of their Summer doing it. We particularly thank Diana Hinton for her continued inspiration on this

project, and we are grateful for the guidance of this scholar. Correspondence: William Forrest Harlow,

Department of Speech Communication, University of Texas of the Permian Basin, 4901 E. University Blvd.,

Odessa, TX 79762; E-mail: harlow_w@utpb.edu

Communication Research Reports

Vol. 30, No. 3, July–September 2013, pp. 193–200

ISSN 0882-4096 (print)/ISSN 1746-4099 (online) # 2013 Eastern Communication Association

DOI: 10.1080/08824096.2013.806252

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Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida—experienced significant damage to

their tourism and fishing industries and to their marine ecology, and the operator

of the rig, BP (the company formerly known as British Petroleum), faced at least

two distinct problems: (a) how to correct physical and environmental damage caused

by the explosion and resulting oil spill and (b) how to manage its public image. BP

had been facing public relations (PR) challenges well before this incident (Garfield,

2010), but its public response to this crisis was widely noted as ‘‘disastrous’’ (Bush,

2010), leaving the company with a ‘‘tarnished name’’ (‘‘BP Walks Fine Line,’’ 2010).

Whereas previous research (Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011) attempted to describe

BP’s initial response to the crisis, the medium-term and long-term responses to the

crisis have not yet been explored. Thus, the question that guides this study is, ‘‘How

did BP respond to the Deepwater Horizon incident over time?’’

Scholars of communication have examined the role of PR in crisis situations at

various stages of crisis response, from preparation through the conclusion of the post

crisis period (Millar & Heath, 2004). Researchers have applied and generated a num-

ber of theories about how organizations do respond to crises (Coombs, 2007; Schultz,

Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz, & van Atteveldt, 2012) and how they should respond to

crises (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012), and have used a variety of methods and analytical

approaches to analyze such responses, including ethnography (Kriyantono, 2012),

content analysis (Choi, 2012; Stephens, Malone, & Bailey, 2005), and factorial experi-

ments (Claeys, Cauberghe, & Vyncke, 2012). However, to extend the focus of

research further into the post crisis period of the BP disaster, this study turns to

Image Repair Theory (IRT).

The PR tools available to BP were what Benoit (1995) called image restoration

strategies. Extending the work of Burke (1970, 1973), Rosenfield (1968), Ryan

Table 1 Benoit’s (1995) 14 Strategies

Strategy Example

1. Simple denial We did not do it

2. Shifting blame Someone else did it

3. Provocation We did it, but were provoked

4. Defeasibility Lack of information or control

5. Accidents The incident was an accident

6. Good intentions The error was the result of good intentions

7. Bolstering Our good characteristics outweigh any error

8. Minimization The problem is not that bad

9. Differentiation This incident is different from some other act

10. Transcendence The act should be understood in a different context

11. Attack accuser The person blaming us is the one at fault

12. Compensation The victim will be compensated

13. Corrective action We will fix the problem

14. Mortification We admit responsibility or ask for forgiveness

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(1982), Ware and Linkugel (1973), and others, Benoit described 14 strategies typically

employed when responding to a crisis (see Table 1). These strategies include

accepting blame, assigning blame to others, redefining the crisis, attacking the person

making the accusation, and shifting attention elsewhere. Whereas Burns and Bruner

(2000) and others have noted some limitations to Benoit’s work in IRT, Smudde and

Courtright (2008) argued that IRT is an effective way for PR professionals in industry

to ‘‘manag[e] emergency situations’’ (p. 12).

Avery, Lariscy, Kim, and Hocke (2010) suggested that researchers critique the use

of IRT and its specific image repair strategies in a number of industries and contexts,

and that they examine its use at various points in the development and management

of a crisis. Thus, this study uses IRT to analyze the press releases through which BP

actively responded to the Deepwater Horizon tragedy; although initially numerous,

the volume of such messages diminished over time, ending about 12 months after

the incident. Although BP continues to respond in a number of other formats, this

provides a focused dataset. We then comment on the skill with which BP appears

to have employed these strategies and the usefulness of this theory in describing

BP’s response. We also include comments on the appropriate unit of analysis for

applying Benoit’s (1995) framework to a corporate PR effort.

Method

BP’s public response to the early stages of this crisis was studied (Harlow et al., 2011).

In contrast, this study analyzes BP’s response for the length of time they were actively

providing press guidance on the situation. Jaques (2007) helped justify this change in

focus in explaining that corporate image repair strategies change as a crisis pro-

gresses. As previously noted (Harlow et al., 2011), initial strategies may emerge from

existing emergency management plans where later strategies are more specifically tail-

ored to the emerging details of a crisis.

Because the focus of this article is to determine BP’s own response to the PR crisis

presented by the Deepwater Horizon incident, the collected data were best supplied

directly by BP. William Forrest Harlow visited the BP Web site (www.bp.com) on

June 7 and 8, 2011, clicked ‘‘Press,’’ then ‘‘Press Releases,’’ and then did a search

by month for the theme ‘‘Gulf of Mexico response.’’ The results yielded the 128 press

releases that BP had categorized as relevant—125 press releases were from the period

April 2010 to September 30, 2010, and 3 were from later dates (October 1, 2010, April

21, 2011, and April 25, 2011). No other press releases dealing with the Deepwater

Horizon incident were available through this channel. The number of press releases

by month is represented in Table 2.

The 128 articles were coded by two undergraduate students, and neither coder is

an author of this article. Neither coder used for this project was involved in the pre-

vious project mentioned earlier (Harlow et al., 2011). Each coder was trained in the

meaning of Benoit’s (1995) 14 strategies and was obligated to provide a single code

for each article. The coders were also allowed to select one of three additional codes:

that BP had expressed sympathy for the victims without using any of Benoit’s other

Communication Research Reports 195

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strategies, that BP was attempting a technical description of the event without

employing any of Benoit’s other strategies, and that the article involved did not

appear to discuss the Deepwater Horizon incident in any regard. These additional

codes were provided to allow for limitations uncovered in the study mentioned ear-

lier (Harlow et al., 2011); they were also consistent with an initial screening of the

articles by us. Four articles were later excluded due to the failure of one of the coders

to provide a response to the relevant item. That left 124 articles included in the final

analysis for this project.

Results

The raters agreed on the coding of 102 of the 124 paragraphs, representing a percent-

age agreement rate of 82.3%. The kappa statistic was used to measure observed agree-

ment against expected agreement. Interrater reliability was found to be j¼ .688—a

level Altman (1999, p. 404) described as ‘‘good’’ and Landis and Koch (1977, p.

165) described as ‘‘substantial.’’ Although researchers such as Krippendorff (1980)

noted that higher levels of agreement are desirable, he allowed (p. 147) that this level

of agreement permits the drawing of tentative conclusions. The following results

represent the number of articles assigned each code:

1. Compensation¼ 25 (20.2%)

2. Corrective action¼ 67 (54%)

3. Sympathy¼ 1 (0.8%)

4. Technical description¼ 4 (3.2%)

5. Not about this incident¼ 5 (4%)

6. No agreement¼ 22 (17.7%)

The prior summary descriptions provide useful data about BP’s overall response to

this situation. However, an analysis of the responses by month reveals an interesting

change in the pattern in which these responses were employed. Table 3 represents the

percentage of times that compensation, corrective action, and other strategies were

used by BP each month. These data strongly suggest that BP’s PR response to this

incident focused on describing their compensation to the victims, as well as the

Table 2 Number of Press Releases by Month

Month Number of Press Releases

April 2010 10

May 2010 29

June 2010 31

July 2010 20

August 2010 22

September 2010 13

Later 3

Total 128

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actions they were taking to correct the problem. We note that more press releases

described corrective action than compensation in each month, except June, when

the balance was equally weighted between those two strategies. This was the month

in which President Obama delivered his first Oval Office address and directly spoke

to the situation in the Gulf. We also note that BP appears to have largely quit issuing

press releases about this incident after only 512 months (according to their Web site at

the time this article was written).

Discussion

BP certainly had responses to the Deepwater Horizon incident that were not captured

in this data. For example, they issued a major report about the incident; spoke pub-

licly in a number of settings; and, as of 2012, continued to run television ads discuss-

ing their response to the event. However, these data are a strong representation of

BP’s response to the crisis. They represent all of the press releases that BP had avail-

able on the subject as of June 8, 2011, and they provide a dataset with clear bound-

aries. Most important, these articles represent the narrative BP itself created. Based

on these results, it is reasonable to say that BP’s response throughout the crisis

focused on the dual strategies of describing compensation to the victims, as well as

efforts to remedy the problem. It is interesting to observe that there was no apparent

attempt to blame another party, nor to minimize the crisis. Beyond this general find-

ing about BP’s response, we note three other items as being of particular interest.

First, there is no immediately apparent justification for stopping the press releases

on the first of October 2010. BP continued to address the issue on their Web site, con-

tinued to make the press releases available, and continued to receive public attention

for some time. Nonetheless, the halt in the press releases was abrupt. William Forrest

Harlow searched the BP press releases of every month between April 2010 and June

2011, and only two press releases were available after October 1, 2010. Future research-

ers should consider both how long companies maintain an active PR response to a

crisis and what causes the medium used for those responses to change over time.

Table 3 Content of Press Releases by Month

Month

Content of Press Releases

Compensation Corrective Action Other No Agreement Total

April 2010 0 (0.0%) 5 (50.0%) 1 (10.0%) 4 (40.0%) 10

May 2010 1 (3.4%) 21 (72.4%) 3 (10.3%) 4 (13.8%) 29

June 2010 12 (38.7%) 12 (38.7%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (22.6%) 31

July 2010 2 (10.0%) 10 (50.0%) 3 (15.0%) 5 (25.0%) 20

August 2010 6 (27.3%) 10 (45.4%) 2 (9.1%) 4 (18.2%) 22

Sept 2010 2 (15.4%) 7 (53.8%) 3 (23.1%) 1 (7.7%) 13

Later 2 (66.7%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3

Total 25 (19.5%) 66 (51.6%) 12 (9.4%) 25 (19.5%) 128

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Second, it is interesting that there was an apparent shift in BP’s response in the

month President Obama gave his major address on this subject. The president spoke

from the Oval Office on June 15, 2010, and the fact that it was his first televised

speech from that location suggests the seriousness with which he was treating the

matter. We claim that only coincidence, and certainly not that the president’s speech,

directly caused this apparent shift in BP’s strategy. Nonetheless, some shift seems to

have occurred when public attention to the Deepwater Horizon incident was

particularly heightened.

Third, we observe that, except for the shift noted earlier, BP maintained essentially

the same response for the entire time they continued to issue press releases on this

subject. This is consistent with the findings mentioned earlier (Harlow et al.,

2011), which noted that BP’s response in the initial stages of the crisis centered on

the same two strategies of compensation and corrective action. Although there were

certainly some shifts in the monthly responses, they each maintained a balance of

corrective action first, compensation second, and then the odd article that either used

a different strategy or appeared to have been mischaracterized by BP as applying to

the Deepwater Horizon situation. It is reasonable to assume that a corporate PR

response would shift as the situation progresses, but that did not appear to happen

in this case.

Of course, it is possible that we failed to capture the nuance of BP’s response by

coding entire articles, rather than paragraphs or some other unit of analysis.

However, the kappa level of .688 was both strong and almost identical to the .689

kappa achieved in the previously cited study (Harlow et al., 2011) where those

authors studied the initial stages of the same crisis by asking coders to consider indi-

vidual paragraphs. The two studies also achieved substantially similar findings about

the overall BP strategy, and they did so while using different coders for each project.

For purposes of this particular PR crisis, it appears that coding these data by article

and by paragraph substantially achieved the same results. Coding by entire articles,

however, was substantially more time-efficient and easier to keep organized. We

encourage future researchers to continue considering the question of the appropriate

unit of analysis with which to apply Benoit’s (1995) work. In this case, however, it

seems unlikely that changing the unit of analysis would have shifted the results

very much.

Beyond the understanding of the particular response of BP and the appropriate

unit of analysis for this type of study, it is also worth commenting on the utility

of Benoit’s (1995) framework for this type of project. As mentioned earlier, coders

in the previous study had some difficulty coding paragraphs in which BP described

what happened. We believe we saw additional strategies apparent in BP’s longer-term

response to the crisis. However, these data here do not support giving coders the

additional codes used as options in this study. Although one article appears to have

expressed BP’s sympathy for the victims and four more addressed the technical issues

at hand, this represents only 4% of the dataset. Had the coders been compelled to

select one of Benoit’s original 14 strategies, rather than being given the additional

options, it is possible that they would have achieved greater agreement. In summary,

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it appears that Benoit’s typology provides an excellent vehicle for understanding the

corporate response to crisis and that this strength is true regardless of the unit of

analysis used. Although there is always room to describe further nuance, this

framework does a consistently strong job of explaining the options an organization

has available.

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