Comparative Studies From Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and the Bhopal Disaster in India

7/28/2019 Comparative Studies From Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and the Bhopal Disaster in India

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European Journal of Social SciencesVolume 34 Issue 2

October 2012

PP: 328-341

Assessing Community Resilience to Man Made Dissaster: Comparative Studiesfrom Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and the Bhopal Disaster in India

Achmad Room Fitrianto

Abstract

The Porong Mud flow in Sidoarjo represents a major environmental and socialdisaster in Indonesia. Some experts mentioned that it caused by oil drilling activitiesand others mentioned it was triggered by the Jogjakarta earthquake that stroke on the27th of May 2006. However, both opinions agree that this dissaster was caused by theunderground blowout which is an un-controlled flowing of fluids that flow into theweakest areas. It cannot be denied the mud-flow has ruined the environment,depopulated the region, thrown many out of employment and income, and ultimately

has adversely impacted the regional GDP. Disasters, whether natural or human-made,adversely impact mostly the poor.

In order to mitigate the negative impacts government set up such benevolent andrational policies. However those policies that are set up still cannot fulfill communitysatisfaction especially for the victims. Policies that cannot achieve communityexpectation are a sign that there are missing links in the mitigation and redevelopmentplan mechanism. This is because the government policies are not free from values andinterests. As Ramesh & Howlett (2003) said that every policy is always related topolitics.

There was some similarity in the Bhopal tragedy and the mudflow disaster: firstly,both disasters occurred in residential areas. Secondly, both disasters involved nationaland multinational companies (BPK report, 2007; Pohl, 2007; Mokhiber, 1985;Ungarala, 1998). Thirdly, both tragedies indicated an abuse of power from thegovernment in granting permits (Broughton, 2005; Mokhiber, 1985; BPK report,2007). Governments should be brave enough to disregard all private interests thatintervene in government policy-making. Moreover, the government has to bring innew and tougher regulations for potentially dangerous industries such as mining anddrilling and for the chemical industry, especially if they are close to residential areas.As Karpagam (1999) suggests, the government should charge high pollution taxes tothese high-risk industries in order to prevent unwanted accidents and to reducepollution. Besides the pollution tax, subsidies should be introduced to control high

risk industries. Through subsidies, the government is able to offer rewards tocompanies that manage to reduce their emissions from some base level or to those thatcan develop sufficient pollution control installations. Another instrument is refundabledeposits and pollution permits (Karpagam, 1999). Refundable deposits could act asfuture funds to assist recovery efforts in case of any disaster occurring.

Webber in Healy (2006) defines planning as a process of open argumentation thatshould facilitate the debate among societies regarding future, planned development.This development planning should use and combine all potencies that areimplemented based on certain measurements and organised by formal institutions. Forthat reason, sustainable and environmentally friendly planning is needed, not only tosolve the mudflow problems but also for the Sidoarjo sustainable development

program as a whole.


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Introduction

The Sidoarjo mudflow resulted in a major environmental and social disaster.

Consideration of this case provides strong insight into the Indonesian governments

recent environmental management of the disaster, which demonstrates weaknesses,

particularly in terms of enforcement and accountability.

Based on 2001 census data, Sidoarjos population was 1,293,111 with a local

income of Rp. 133,790.02 million (AU$ 15.7 million), much of it originating from

taxes. The district is the second richest after Surabaya. In the last decade, Sidoarjo

experienced an annual economic growth rate of roughly 5 % (The Sidoarjo Statistics

Board, 2006). This growth was supported by industrial activities that are concentrated

in three sub districts: Waru, Sidoarjo1 and Porong. Porong is one of Sidoarjos sub

districts, located approximately 40 kilometres south of Surabaya. Porongs economic

activities were supported by 19 villages, comprising in total of 17, 954 households.

Land use in Porong is distributed as follows: housing: 845.37-hectares, industry:

24.63-hectares, mining: 5.09-hectares, agriculture: 1,287.24-hectares. (The Sidoarjo

Statistics Board, 2006)

Mining exploration in Sidoarjo

Based on geographical and geological conditions, the East Java province can be

divided into three parts: the first is in the north, where oil, gas and limestone resources

are present; the second is located in the centre of the province and has farming

potential, water and geothermic resources. The last is the south, where mineral

resources are present (Dinas ESDM Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2007).There are at least

1 Sidoarjo district consists of 18 subdistricts with Sidoarjo being one of those subdistricts


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fourteen oil and gas fields in East Java which are currently being explored by thirteen

companies. It is estimated that the oil fields contain 583,475.5 million barrels of oil

and 10,301.7 billion cubic feet of gas (Dinas ESDM Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2007).

Figure 1.1Brantas Production share contract map

Source: Gelder & Denie (2007)

Brantas Block Production is one of East Javas oil and gas blocks, and is operated

by Pertamina and Huffco Brantas Inc. These companies were authorised to explore

14.950 km2 in 1990 (BPK report, 2007). According to a letter from the Acting

Director General of oil and gas, addressed to the Head of BP Migas,

No.816/DJM/2002, the Brantas Production share contract allowed for oil and gas

exploration of over 3,041.64 km2

At the time of the mudflow disaster, this block was being explored by Lapindo

Brantas Inc which held 50% of the shares. PT. Medco E&P Brantas held 32% and

the Australian company Santos Brantas Pty Ltd held 18% (BPK report, 2007;


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Gelder & Denie, 2007). Brantas Production consists of twelve exploration wells

with another 30 wells still in the process of being explored.

The disaster

The Porong mudflow disaster occurred on the 29th

of May 2006. Five thousand

cubic meters of mud a day spurted up in the beginning. This has now increased to

around 130,000 cubic meters a day and remains constant (Williamson, 2007). There is

now a lake of mud, which has buried approximately 600 ha of land and villages and

caused more than 10,000 people to become internal refugees. Moreover, based on the

National Planning Bodys (BAPPENAS) calculations, this disaster has caused an

infrastructure damage of Rp 7.6 quintillion (1 billion dollars Australian).

Public opinion adjudged that the disaster was triggered by oil drilling activities

conducted by PT Lapindo Brantas. The drilling had been subcontracted to PT Medici

Citra Nusantara, which is owned by the Bakrie Group2. It arose as a result of PT

Lapindo Brantass failure to install a casing to cover the drilling well as required by

the Indonesian mining regulations. The mud leaked at a depth of around 1,800 metres

below the surface (Pohl, 2007).

The drilling took place in Banjar Panji village which is now known as the

Banjarpanji-1 well and is located in the Brantas Production Sharing Contract (PSC)

area in Sidoarjo regency, East Java province. This area is operated by Lapindo

Brantas, which had a 50% working interest in the contract, while PT Medco E&P

Brantas had 32 % and the Australian company Santos Ltd had 18%. (Gelder &

Denie, 2007; US embassy, Jakarta , 2006).

2 The Bakrie Group consists of the business unit PT Bakrie & brothers.


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Many experts agree that the Porong Mudflow disaster was caused by the

underground blowout which is an un-controlled flowing of fluids that flow into the

weakest areas. These areas could be those that have high permeability and high

porosities or flow into the fracture zone near the casing shoe (BPK report, 2007).

Interestingly, there are two explanations that outline the causes of the underground

blowout: the first is that drilling activities caused the mudflow eruptions. Davies

(2007) states that the Porong mudflow disaster was caused by a high-pressure aquifer

that was initiated by the fracture of propagation many kilometers below the surface.

The nearest human activity being carried out in that region was the drilling in

Banjarpanji-1 well.

According to the second explanation, the mudflow was triggered by the

Jogjakarta earthquake on the 27th of May 2006. This caused a fracture zone in Porong.

This is also the explanation given by the BPPT (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan

Teknologi - Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology) after a series

of workshops that were held on the 6th October 2006 and from the 20-21st February

2007. BPPT concluded that the centre of the mud was located at a depth of 1000-2000

meters. The mud erupted to the surface due to the tectonic activities that are related to

geo-hydrology and geothermal activities. In short, the Porong mudflow disaster was

triggered by the earthquake in Jogjakarta (Istadi, 2007; Budi, 2008).


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Figure 1.2The map location of the mudflow

Source: Centre for Remote Imaging,Sensing and Processing, 2008

Source: Sidoarjo Tourism , 2008 -edited

Despite the controversy about the causes, the leaking of hot toxic mud must be

stopped. There are at least four methods that have been used. The first was to re-drill

the well using a snubbing unit. This failed because the snubbing unit that was inserted

was blocked by the fish that were left in the well. (Indonesian Government website,

2006; Purbalingga regency website, 2006; Tempo Interactive, 15 July 2006).

The second was to re-enter the well using a side tracking drill, but this also

failed as the land surface gradually flattened (Energi Mega Persada, 2006). The third

was to use a relief well. This method involved the drilling of three different wells

using 1.500 HP (horse power), in Kelurahan Jatirejo (relief well 1), in Desa

Renokenongo (relief well 2) and in Desa Kedungbendo (relief well 3). The drilling

was to achieve a depth of 3000 -4000 feet in order to stop the leaking of the well. The

method involved a side drilling technique angled at around 10 degrees from the target

angle of 50 degrees, but this method failed as well (Hot Mud Flow Word Press

website: 2006; Energi Mega Persada: 2006). The last method attempted involved


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inserting into the mud a high density chained ball (HDCB), described as killing mud

softly by the expert. This method was also not successful (Jawa Pos, 25 February

2007).

To date, there have been two presidential decrees established to prepare and

search for a method to stop the mudflow and manage the surface problems caused by

it, including the social and economic effects. The first decree, (Presidential decree

number 13/2006) gave a mandate to the National Team for the Mitigation of the

Sidoarjo Mudflow disaster. (Timnas Penanggulangan Lumpur Lapindo) (National

Secretary Website: 2007). According to this decree, the team was established from the

29th of May 2006 to the 8th of March 2007 until it was replaced by the Sidoarjo

Mudflow Mitigation Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo) which based

itself on the second decree, Presidential decree Number 14 /2007, which included the

main guide to mitigate the mudflow disaster.

Problems That Occurs

This disaster has affected the development planning of regional and provincial

areas since it occurred 29th

of May 2006. As Bridgman and Davis (1998) commented,

since the problems have been identified, a private concern such as an oil-drilling leak

has been transformed into a policy issue.

Stone (1989) points out three aspects that should be understood in order to

establish priorities: firstly, the actors involved must be identified and their problems

understood. In this case, besides understanding the problems of the people who were

displaced, other people who were affected indirectly such as the businesses that used

the freeway daily must be also recognised. Secondly, the multiple effects of the


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problems must be identified. For example, the mudflow not only disturbs the

distribution of goods but the ecosystem as well. The next aspect is that clear and well

defined policies are needed to solve the problems that have emerged.

Hot and hazardous mud

Dwi Andreas Santosa, Executive Director of the Indonesian Centre for

Biodiversity and Biotechnology (ICBB), found that the content of the Lapindo mud in

early December 2006 consisted of 10.45 ppm (parts per million) Cadmium (Cd),

105.44 ppm Chromium (Cr), 0.99 ppm Arsenic (As) and 1.96 ppm Mercury (Hg)

(Antara, 2006). Moreover, analyses conducted by the Public Works Department of

East Java province found that the content of Hg was higher, namely 2.5 ppm.

(Mawardi, 2006). In addition, according to an environmental analysis initiated by the

East Java Regional Development Office, the Sidoarjo Regional Environment and

Mining Office, and PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., the mud contains phenol at

concentrations exceeding the maximum residue limit. Phenol is toxic to fish and

aquatic vegetation, not to mention human health (Pohl, 2007).

In addition, the mud microbiology analyses that were also conducted by the

ICBB showed that the Lapindo mud contains dangerous bacteria such as Coliform,

Salmonella and Staphylococcus aureus (Antara, 2006). Furthermore, this mud

volcano emits H2S (hydrogen sulphide) gas radiation from the centre of the gushing

mud. It was reported that levels of H2S were at 700 parts per million (ppm) on the first

day of the mud flow, then dropped to 3 ppm on the second day and apparently to zero

on the third. In addition, small amounts of H2S continue to spew out from the site at

certain levels that make the air smell foul (Down to Earth, 2006). However, analyses


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conducted by PT Energi Mega Persada, classified the mud as non-hazardous and non-

toxic (Pohl, 2007).

The relocation of businesses

Hamzirwan (2007) states that at least 20 factories, each consisting of 2,500

employees, have been closed and approximately 1,000 workers were fired due to their

factories being buried under the mud. Tempo (22 January 2007) reported that at least

15,000 factory workers lost their jobs. Moreover, the Executive Director of

Greenomics Indonesia estimated that this disaster would reduce the East Java

domestic gross product by 10 % or Rp 469.2 quintillion (Kompas, 27 April

2007).BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan-the Finance Auditor Board) calculated that

approximatley Rp 71,383.37 million of potential income from that region was lost

(BPK report, 2007).

Figure 1.3Buried industrial area in Porong

Source: hotmudflow , wordpress,2006 Source: Farm1,2006

According to the Sidoarjo Regencys Department of Small and Medium Business

and Cooperation data, approximately 2,299 small businesses and medium sized


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Figure 1.4The buried freeway and threatened railway in Porong

Source: Bromund Volker, 2006 Source: Antara, 2006

Furthermore, this mudflow threatened the gas and water line under Porong Road.

The gas pipe line exploded on the 22nd of November, 2006 and killed thirteen people.

Moreover, the flattened lands surrounding the mud caused damage in water

installations. Since the disaster, the water pipe line has been broken 10 times.

(Kompas, 1 October, 2007) This has caused the breaking of optic wire used by Indosat

(Indonesian telecommunications company).


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The gaps between government policy and community needs

The policy initiatives that have been set up to cope with the disaster demonstrate

the willingness of the government to mitigate the effects of the disaster (Ife &

Tesoriero, 2006). The governments willingness is the result of a political process that

reflects the impact of government on society (Heywood, 2004). In more detail,

Heywood (2004) describes the policy as a linkage among intentions, actions and

results. By intention, Heywood (2004) is referring to whether the government is for

the people or for the interested groups. On the other hand, policy implementation

reflects government action, whether the government really means to solve the

problem or is just paying lip service. The level of community satisfaction

demonstrates the result of the policy. If the community is satisfied with the

government policy, it will support the government.

The governments response to the disaster was demonstrated in the two

presidential decrees: Presidential Decree 13/2006 (Keputusan presiden 13/2006) and

14/2007 (Peraturan Presiden 14/2007). Both decrees clearly state that the tasks and

duties of the mitigation authority were to formulate methods to stop the mudflow, and

manage the surface problems caused by it, including its social and economic impacts3.

However, the government effort to mitigate the impact of the mudflow showed lack of

political willingness. The mitigation authority was just a technical body whose only

effort was to dam the mud without considering other aspects.

As Ife and Tesoriero (2006) explain, the community based services are seen as

structures and processes for meeting human need, drawing on the resources, expertise

3

Presidential decree 14/2007, article 1, sub-article two, mentions the social and physicalreconstruction.


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and wisdom of the community itself. Structurally, the presidential decrees are on

track for providing the expertise to stop the mudflow and to provide adequate

compensation to the victims. However, the social construction programs that have

been set up are not sufficient4. The government simply assumed that giving society

more money would solve the problems. Community members need further assistance

to normalise their lives after being disturbed by the disaster.

There are four aspects that seem to have been neglected by the Sidoarjo Mudflow

Mitigation Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo): the first is that there

was no adequate support for empowering and providing assistance programs for small

and medium sized enterprises that were affected by the mud. It was reported that

around 2,299 small businesses and medium sized enterprises collapsed and became

bankrupt. Therefore, it is important to regenerate the local business activities.

Secondly, there was no adequate training for the victims who lost their jobs.

Chapter 10 of the Presidential Decree 14/2007, states the duties of the social deputy5

of the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency who was to develop strategies to solve

the social problem that resulted. Moreover, the Presidents direct instruction given on

the 28th December 2006 stated that the government agencies responsible for the

disaster had to explore new employment opportunities for the victims who lost their

jobs as a result of the disaster. However, the facts are that insufficient assistance was

given to workers who lost their jobs. For example, there were around 1,022 farm

workers registered in Renokenongo, Jatirejo, Siring Ketapang, and Kedungbendo

4 The Surabaya post of 27 May, 2009 reported that in 2008 the Indonesian footwear centre and BPLStrained 440 disaster victims in a new life skill such as food processing, handicraft production, andautomotive mechanic training. It plans to train another 420 victims in 12 rounds in 2009.5

The Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency is comprised of the head of agencies, vice head ofagencies, secretary and three deputies that are responsible for the agencys operational activities withregards to infrastructure and social matters.


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villages (BPS- Sidoarjo in figures 2008). When the mud buried the farmlands in those

villages, these workers were not skilled to obtain employment in other sectors.

Therefore, government involvement in providing special training to provide new

working skills is important (Karpagam, 1999)

Thirdly, there were no sufficient educational incentives for the victims. Logically,

if 15,000 factory workers lost their jobs, none of those could replace the 1,022

farmers in order undertake farm work without adequate re-training. As 2,299 small

businesses and medium sized enterprises collapsed and became bankrupt, many

parents could not continue to pay tuition fees for their children. Therefore, these

children would have found it difficult to enroll in a school or university. Moreover,

based on the Indonesian Supreme Audit Board (BPK report, 2007), up to the 13 th

December 2006, 18 schools were buried and about 5,397 students were affected.

Therefore, special treatment for these affected students was essential.

Finally, it is general knowledge in Indonesia that every village has its own

customs; therefore, the government or the agencies must consider this when

formulating resettlement programs. Providing social assistance in order to prevent

social clash is essential as social clash could occur as a result of the difference in

customs in new settlement areas. For example, in Indonesia there are two big Islamic

movements, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both groups practise

different customs and rituals as part of their daily activities. If there was no social

assistance from the government, this would create new tension between both Islamic

movements.

In short, the government should be aware of its policy gaps. A more proactive

approach towards the formulation of creative programs to reduce the negative effects


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Figure 5.1 Bhopals location

Source: Google map, 2009

In order to revitalise the dead city of Bhopal, the Indian Government sued the

Union Carbide Company (UCC). This action was in response to the tragedy and

pressure from the Indian people. The government sued for an estimated US$ 3 billion

compensation (Ungarala, 1998). However, in October 1991, the Indian Supreme

Court endorsed the lower court decision of 1989, sentencing the Union Carbide

Company to pay $470 million for all claims (Broughton, 2005). The full payment was

made to the Indian government ten days after the decision (UCC, 2001).

However, at Union Carbides annual meeting in 1996 it was announced that

nothing further would be done regarding the disaster. However, the annual meetings

members reversed the companys original publication when it announced that it

would build a $ 20 million hospital for the victims of the Bhopal tragedy through a

London-based independent charitable trust (Ungarala, 1998). Moreover, the

corporation and its subsidiary were also charged with corporate irresponsibility for


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pursuing profits over safety and hazard standards (Ungarala, 1998). The employees of

UCC worked together, and with their acquaintances and stakeholders, participated in

reducing the impact of the terrible facts of the tragedy (Ungarala, 1998).

Despite the court decisions and rejection from the Union Carbide Company, a

formal statement from UCC stated that the company instantaneously granted

approximately $2 million in aid to the Prime Minister of India as a relief fund.

Moreover, there were three programs that were set up: firstly, to extend medical

support to the victims by providing medical equipment supplies or medical expertise

and assistance, and by sending an international team of medical experts to Bhopal.

Secondly, to provide sustainable health support. For example, UCC funded the

enhancement of the ability of health workers to provide services to the victims by

sending Indian medical experts to special meetings and training overseas. In another

example, UCC provided a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish a

vocational-technical center in Bhopal. Thirdly, to build a philanthropical program

through the Indian Red Cross and establish an independent charitable trust for a

Bhopal hospital. In addition, UCC provided initial funding of $5 million to the Indian

Red Cross and approximately $20 million to the hospital. Interestingly, UCC also

provided approximately $90 million to the charitable trust for the hospital from the

sale of its interest in Union Carbide Indian Limited (UCIL)6 (UCC, 2001).

The lessons

The Porong mud flow disaster has produced huge material losses, torn the social

fabric, and exiled thousands of people. The Supreme Court and the police are still

6 UCIL(Union Carbide Indian Limited) is the company that runs the Union Carbide Company in India


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2007). Governments should be brave enough to disregard all private interests that

intervene in government policy-making. Moreover, the government has to bring in

new and tougher regulations for potentially dangerous industries such as mining and

drilling and for the chemical industry, especially if they are close to residential areas.

As Karpagam (1999) suggests, the government should charge high pollution taxes to

these high-risk industries in order to prevent unwanted accidents and to reduce

pollution. Besides the pollution tax, subsidies should be introduced to control high

risk industries. Through subsidies, the government is able to offer rewards to

companies that manage to reduce their emissions from some base level or to those that

can develop sufficient pollution control installations. Another instrument is refundable

deposits and pollution permits (Karpagam, 1999). Refundable deposits could act as

future funds to assist recovery efforts in case of any disaster occurring.

Webber in Healy (2006) defines planning as a process of open argumentation that

should facilitate the debate among societies regarding future, planned development.

This development planning should use and combine all potencies that are

implemented based on certain measurements and organised by formal institutions. For

that reason, sustainable and environmentally friendly planning is needed, not only to

solve the mudflow problems but also for the Sidoarjo sustainable development

program as a whole.


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Comparative Studies From Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and the Bhopal Disaster in India

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