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Community in Conservation and Management:
A Study of .Joint Forest Management in Orissa
A Thesis Submitted to the University of Mysore, Mysore, for
Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology
By
Satyapriya Rout
Research Supervision by
G. K. Karanth Professor and Head, Sociology Unit
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE NAGARABHAVI, BANGALORE-5600n, INDIA
October 2005
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the present thesis titled 'Community in
Conservation and Management: A Study of Joint Forest
Management in Orissa', is a result of the original research undertaken
and carried out by me with the guidance of Prof. G. K. Karanth, of
Sociology Unit of Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC),
Bangalore.
I have properly acknowledged the sources from which I may have
borrowed ideas. I declare that the material of the thesis has not formed, in
any manner, the basis for awarding of any Degree or Diploma previously
of University of Mysore or any other University.
Place: Bangalore
Date:
~rt~r~ Satyapriya Rout
(Ph. D. Fellow)
FAX: 91-80-23217008 Phones: Direct - 23212907 (Office)
Residence - 23212675 Mobile: 9845731403
e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE Professor V.K.R.V. Rao Avenue, Nagarabhavi PO: BANGALORE-560 072
Dr. G. K. Karanth Professor and Head, Sociology Unit
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have guided and supervised the preparation and writing of
the thesis titled 'Community in Conservation and Management: A Study of
Joint Forest Management in Orissa', by Mr. Satyapriya Rout.
I also certify that the thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award of
any Degree or Diploma of the University of Mysore or any Other University.
Place: Bangalore Date: Professor of Sociology and
Research Guide
ACKNOWLEDGEM ENT
It gives me great pleasure to place on record my sincere thanks and gratitude to several persons who have helped me in my research and writing the thesis.
I am grateful to my supervisor Professor G. K. Karanth, Head, Sociology Unit, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, without whose guidance and cooperation, the thesis would not have been possible. His encouragement and enriching ideas on the subject made this work more valuable. lowe him to a great deal for the support in professional as well as the personal aspect of my life. I would also like to thank Ms. Rajalaxmi Karanth for her hospitality and encouragement.
Many thanks are due to Professor Gopal Kadekodi, Director, Institute for Social and Economic Change, and Prof. M. Govinda Rao, former Director, ISEC, for giving me an opportunity to carry out my research work at the institute. I am also thankful to the facuity, student community and administrative staff for their abundant support during the cntire period of my stay at ISEC.
It was a privilege to have had Dr. Sharad Lele as my panel member in all my seminars at the institute. His constant criticisms, comments and suggestions were extremely helpful. I thank Prof. K. V. Raju, Prof, D. Rajasekhar, Prof. Sangita and Dr. M. D. Ushadevi for their suggestions and comments on the topic. Sincere thanks are due to Dr. Anand Inbanathan, Dr. K. G. Gayathri Devi, Dr. Manohar Yadav, and Dr. V. Ramaswami of Sociology Unit for their support and encouragement to finish the work.
I sincerely thank Mr. K. S. Narayana of Ph.D. section, Mr. Krishna Chandran and Satish Kamat of Computer Section, and the Library staff of the Institute for their kind support and cooperation extended to me.
It's a time to recall some of my teachers at the University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, who laid the foundation of Sociology in me and endear research as the profession in my life. Many thanks are due to Professor C. S. Bhatt, Professor E. Haribabu, Dr. S. S. Jodhka, Dr. Apama Rayporulu and Dr. K. Laxminarayan. I am also thankful to Dr. Sasheej of University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, who taught me the basics of research and whose initial guidance helped in choosing my area ofresearch.
I would like to place in record my gratitude to some of my colleagues at the Department of Sociology at Banaras Hindu University (BHU), Varanasi. Many thanks are due to Dr. Ashok Kaul for his constant encouragement to finish the writing of the thesis.
To the people of Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur, who shared with me their views, ideas and experiences and supported me throughout the period of my stay in the villages during my fieldwork, lowe a huge debt. Mr. Ananta Charan Mohanty, President and headman of Nagiapasi village committee introduced me to the villagers and paved the way for a useful stay in the village. I can offer nothing, but my sincere thanks to Mr. Dillip Kumar Mohanty and his family of Nagiapasi village, who accommodated me and my wife in their family during my fieldwork days.
I thank many of my student friends at the Institute for their constant help, motivation and support. It is not possible on my part to name each and everyone. However, I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Kashi Vai, Milu Apa, Gagan, Prabir, Pratap, Rajib Vai, Amit, Pravakar, Bhanumurthy, Amal, Mini, Dipthi, Dukhi, Ashish, Kshama, Kannan, Nazrul, Anand Vadivelu and Hurshi, whose company I enjoyed during my stay at the institute. Special thanks are due Badri, Bikas, Sachi and Geetanjay who extended great help during the days of my thesis submission.
I thank my parents, father-in-law and mother-in-law for their support, constant encouragement and motivation to complete the work.
Last but not the least, I will not be doing justice with myself if I fail to acknowledge the contributions of my wife Pratyusna Patnaik, who has been the friend, philosopher and guide in my life. Without her support and encouragement, it would have been really difficult on my part to complete the work. I do hope she will keep up the good work.
Bangalore
October, 2005
Acknowledgement
List of Tables
Preface
CONTENTS
Chapter I: Common Property and Collective Action
1.1 Property Rights and Resource Management Regimes 1.2 Defining Common Pool Resources I .3 Types of Resource Management Regimes 1.4 Problems in Commons Management 1.5 Problems of Collective Action: Theoretical Approaches 1.6 Problems of Collection Action: Empirical Solutions
Chapter II: Dissecting the Community: Search for Impeccable
Characteristics for Collective Action
2.1 Community in Conservation and Management 2.2 Community Characteristics and Sustainable Collective Action 2.3 Images of the Community 2.4 Gaps in the Literature and the Research Question 2.5 Objectives 2.6 Methodology
Chapter III: Contexualising the Research Sites
3.1 The Orissa State 3.2 The Dhenkanal District 3.3 The Study Villages
Chapter IV: The Forestry Debate: Evolution and Functioning of
Joint Forest Management
4.1 Approaching the Forestry Debate in India 4.2 The history of Forest Management in Orissa and the Evolution of JFM
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8
51
86
97
Chapter V: Heterogeneity and the Capability of Local Communities
for Collective Action: Some Empirical Findings 140
5.1 Conceptual ising Heterogeneity 5.2 Contextualising Heterogeneity in the Field Settings 5.3 When, How and Why Heterogeneity Matters 5.4 Heterogeneity, Resource Dependency, Collective Action and Management
Outcomes: Finding a Linkage
Chapter VI: Collective Action Despite Heterogeneity: Revisiting the
Pre-Condition Debate
6.1 From Common Pool to Common Property: Establishing Institutional Arrangements in Forests
183
6.2 Managing the Common Property: Community Institution and Collective Action in the Forest
6.3 Heterogeneity Did Not Matter: Explaining the Reasons
Chapter VII: Summary and Conclusion
7.1 Recapitulating the Contexual Background 7.2 Summary of the Findings 7.3 Discussion of the Findings 7.4 Concluding Remarks
References
217
230
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1: Contrasting Common Pool with Private Goods and Pure Public Goods
Table 2.1: A Quick Survey Report on the 10 Villages
Table 4.1: Legal Status of Forests in Orissa in 1959
Table 4.2: Physical Area of the Forest in Orissa after Independence
Table 4.3: Deforestation in Orissa from 1947 to 1985
Table 4.4: Land Degradation in the Peripheries of Reservoirs of Multipurpose River Valley Projects in Orissa between 1972 and 1982
Table 4.5: Quality of the Forest Cover in Orissa, 1981 - 83 and 1993 - 95
Table 4.6: Formation and Working of Van a Ssmrakshyana Samiti in Orissa
Table 5.1: Caste and Tribes in the Study Villages
Table 5.2: Landholding Pattern in the Study Villages
Table 5.3: Housing Pattern in the Study Villages
Table 5.4: Occupation structure in the Study Villages
Table 5.5: Castes and land distribution: Nagiapasi
Table 5.6: Castes and Land Distribution: K. K. Pu{
Table 5.7: Castes and Occupation: Nagiapasi
Table 5.8: Castes and Occupation: K.K. Pur
Table 5.9: Dependency upon Forest for Fuelwood in the two Villages
Table 5.10: Dependency upon Forest for Fodder in the two Villages
Table 5.11: Castes and Dependency on forest for Fue1wood in Nagiapasi
Table 5.12: Castes and Dependency on forest for FUe1wood in K. K. Pur
Table 5.13: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in Nagiapasi
Table 5.14: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in K. K. Pur
Table 6.1: Categorisation of Rules
Preface
Contextual Background
The disappointing results of natural resource conservation policies in developing
countries and the subsequent depletion of forest and other natural resources over the
past few decades, have forced scholars, development practitioners, and bureaucrats to
shift their focus away from state-centred policies of conservation towards solutions at
the local level. The resource degradation in the last few decades has not only altered
the world ecology and environmental scenario at the global level, but has challenged
the livelihood security of thousands of indigenous population at the local level too.
The intrinsic relationship that the communities share with their local resources and
their inherent dependency upon those resources not undermining, it has been argued
that policies regarding sustainability of the resource cannot be designed without
integrating these communities in the management strategy.
The shift in the policy approaches towards resource management has always
been accompanied with renewed interest in the academia in studying local
communities as potential resource managers, and in tum, bringing the community to
the centre stage in development and resource management policies. Besides, the
state's failure in achieving desirable resource management outcomes, there are many
other reasons that are frequently cited for the worldwide shift to community-based
approach as an alternative strategy for resource management. Indigenous knowledge,
centuries old intrinsic relation and peaceful coexistence with natural environment,
dependence for livelihood, local customs and traditions favouring conservation,
efforts by civil society groups for greater autonomy and democratization are some
among several other justifications for such a paradigm shift.
The state's efforts for inclusion oflocal communities in the gambit of resource
management in India have coexisted with successful histories of community
initiatives in resource conservation and management. Recognition of people's efforts
for resource management by the state, and their further involvement in such activities
have taken various shapes depending upon the nature of the resource and the
management regIme. The present research poses questions relating to the forestry
sector and analyses such community initiatives in local forest resource management.
Community involvement in forest resource management have taken several forms,
ranging from complete control and management by the local communities to
partnerships with state and/or at times with other community-based local civil society
organisations. In the last one and half decade, the institutional arrangements to
involve communities as partners in forest management along with state have been
structured by the Joint Forest Management Programme of the Government of India,
where the state not only attempts for the inclusion of community in resource
management, but also acknowledges community's stake in such resources. Such state
community partnership through the national level Joint Forest Management
Programme forms the contextual background for the present study, from where the
research tries to go beyond the partnership and focuses much upon the community
characteristics and other underplaying factors, which contribute to the success or the
failure of the community in its efforts for such resource control and management. The
research has been carried out by taking two village communities from Orissa as cases
in point.
Statement of the Problem
Most of the natural resources, including forest resources, sutfer from problems like
over use, free-riding and degradation, because of their' common pool' characteristics
on the onc hand, and absence of institutional arrangements for strict adherence of
property rights on the other. Despite the state's exclusive claim of property rights over
all forest resources of the country, it faces challenges in restricting the resource from
being over accessed. The de jure state property, i.e., the forests, therefore, becomes
open access resources in de facto. Such free-riding and over use results in degradation
and denudation of forests, generating mattcrs of great concern. At such a juncture,
intervention of local communities is much desired towards establishing efficient
institutional arrangements, which reduces the incidents of free-riding and over use.
Recognition of the significance of community III conservation and
management activities of natural resources leaves us with a further question: do all
communities are equally capable of sustainable resource management? If returning
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back to the community is the preferred solution to the problems of over-use, free
riding and degradation of natural common pool resources, then why do communities
vary with respect to their capability in ensuring sustainability of the resource. The
popular response in the academia - by the scholars working on common property
and resource management - to several such questions, in the recent decades, has
been to point out towards social composition and size of the communities involved in
resource management. As a result, small and homogeneous communities have been
considered as ideal for resource management and 'homogeneity' has been accepted as
a pre-condition for achieving success in collective action for local resource
management. Challenging such straight forward responses and much accepted
hypothesis, the present research aims to analyse the ways and means of giving shape
to local level collective action initiatives in sharply heterogeneous communities.
Taking two heterogeneous communities - one successful and other a failure in
their endeavours in collective action - this research attempts to explain the contested
role of group heterogeneity in local level collective action for resource management.
The thesis examines the role of heterogeneity upon resource dependency and
management outcomes. The purposive selection of two heterogeneous villages (one
successful and the other a failure) paves the way for a contestation and comparison
between them, and gives an a priori understanding that heterogeneity is not always
negatively associated with collective action outcomes. The research, therefore, tries to
explain the factors and processes that mobilise di fferential interests, overcome
problems of heterogeneity and sustain collective action in a heterogeneous
community. Joint Forest Management in Orissa being the context for the research, it
becomes, therefore, essential to understand the historical background to various
approaches and policies of forest management of India, in general and Orissa, in
particular. Towards this end, the thesis attempts to historically analyse the process of
people's participation in forest management finally culminating in Joint Forest
Management in Orissa.
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Rationale of the Study
This piece of research has a great significance particularly in the context of global
paradigm shift in the approaches towards development, democratization and resource
managemcnt. The findings of the study reaffirm the capabilities of local communities
in playing a positive role in local resource management, and thereby, in paving a way
for their own empowerment and development. Besides being a crucial addition to the
existing theoretical and empirical knowledge on the subject, the research puts forth
several noteworthy arguments of both thcoretical and policy relevance. The findings
of the study call for additional attention to be paid to building up of institutional
arrangements at local levels, and developing the capacities of rural communities and
their leadership groups for sustainable resource management, rather than relying on
the framework that any given, small and homogeneous community will be suitable for
inclusion in resource management practices. The research, therefore, is of added
significance to both academia and policy makers.
Chapter Scheme
The dissertation is structured into seven chapters, excluding this preface. Setting up
the foundation for the research, Chapter I attempts to conceptually clarify the basic
concepts involved in resource management and community-based conservation. It
begins with a brief discussion of community-based resource management, and then
proceeds further in explaining the property rights structures and different resource
management regimes. The chapter attempts to clarify the key concept for the research,
i.e., 'common pool resources', by explaining its characteristic features, on the one
hand, and by juxtaposing it with other two kinds of goods, namely, pure public goods
and private goods. An effort is made here to distinguish 'common pool resources'
from 'common property' by drawing insights from property rights debate, and by
contextualising 'common property' in other resource management regimes, such as
'state property regime', 'private property regime' and 'open access regime'.
Proceeding further, the chapter analyses the basic problems related to commons
management, and tries to find out the ways and means to overcome such problems
both theoretically as well as empirically. The theoretical arguments are drawn from
'game theoretic approach', 'logic of collective action' and 'critical mass theory'.
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Empirical observations of successful resource management and the preconditions for
such success also find a place at the end of the chapter. Discussions made in this
chapter seem justified not only because they provide the context and lay the
foundation for the research, but also because they provide an insight into the larger
issues of resource degradation and point out the potentials of rural communities in
halting such degradation of natural resource base.
Chapter II provides a thorough review of relevant literature pertaining to
community-based resource management, common property, institutional aspects in
resourcc management, etc. Tracing the revivalist history of community in resource
management and development, and the reasons for such resurgence, the chapter then
moves forward and carries out a detailed review of the role of community
characteristics in successful collective action for local resource management. In the
process, the 'homogeneity and heterogeneity debate' in deciding the success or failure
of the collective action endeavours also finds its due place. Deconstructing the
structural-functionalist approach towards community as a 'shared understanding', the
chapter highlights the internal differentiations and heterogeneous aspects of the
community and their inherent potential to affect the collective action efforts at the
local level. Such elaborate discussions and reviews pave the way for finding out
several research gaps, and thus, towards the end, the chapter poses certain research
questions and statcs thc objectives of the study. The chapter ends with describing the
methodology adopted in selecting the two study villages from a quick survey of ten
villages concerned with forest protection and management. The tools and techniques
used for collection of data also find a place in this section.
Chapter III contextualises the research sites by sketching the position of the
two study villages in the Block (Taluka), district and finally in the state of Orissa.
This chapter presents a brief narration of the socio-economic and geographical
background to the study areas. It begins with a description of specific features of the
state of Orissa, and then proceeds further by highlighting such features of the district
to which both the villages fall. It concludes with a description of the location and
other basic information of the two study villages. Such narration of socio-economic,
geographical and other features seems justified not only because they give an idea of
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the research sites, but also because they help in conceptualising the present study by
linking the study villages into a wider context.
Dealing with the first objective of the dissertation, Chapter IV attempts to
analyse the historical background to the forest management practices in Orissa, and
sketches the evolution of community's inclusion in such practices finally culminating
in the State Joint Forest Management (JFM) Programme. Such an analysis, however,
will remain incomplete without looking back to the history of forest management in
India since pre-colonial period, and how the forestry debate has been shaped in our
country over the years. The chapter, therefore, is divided into two parts. The first part
deals with the historical development of 'scientific forestry' in the country starting
from the colonial period, and the second part deals with the specific data pertaining to
the state of Orissa for narrating the historical background, evolution and functioning
of the JFM in Orissa. For analytical purpose, the chapter draws insights from several
secondary sources such as government policies, enactments, reports and several other
published works on community's involvement in forestry activities.
In its efforts to assess the contested role of heterogeneity, which forms the key
question of the research, Chapter V tries to give an understanding of how
heterogeneity affects the capabilities of communities in use and management of their
local resources. To begin with, the chapter conceptualises 'heterogeneity' by
identifying several types such as 'socio-cultural heterogeneity', 'resource
heterogeneity', 'interest heterogeneity' and 'political heterogeneity'; and then tries to
contextualise them in the field setting. A theoretical discussion also finds a place in
the chapter to have a clear understanding of how, when and why heterogeneity
matters in collective action. Finally, drawing insights from the empirical data, the
chapter explores the role of heterogeneity in affecting a) the resource dependency, b)
collective action initiatives, and c) the resource management outcomes in the two
studied villages.
In order to understand the local common pool resource management in the
study villages, Chapter VI attempts to examine the process of collective action that
the community members had exhibited for successful management of their forest
resources. The first part of the chapter is devoted towards elucidating the process of
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collective action in the first village (Nagiapasi), where collective action has been
successful in ensuring sustainable resource management. The second part engages
itself with the main thrust of the dissertation, i.e. 'the issue of heterogeneity and
collective action'; and discusses the causative factors for success in the first village
(Nagiapasi) as well as failure in the second village (K. K. Pur) in their efforts towards
collective action for local resource management, given the situation that both are
heterogeneous communities. Towards the end, the chapter re-considers some of the
'pre-conditions of collective action' as frequently occur in the literature, by
highlighting upon leadership issues, institutional aspects and other non-economic
(incentives) aspects of collective action.
Finally, in Chapter VII, I present the summary of the findings of the study and
put forth several generalizations derived out of empirical observation. The chapter
recapitulates the background and research questions with which the research had
started. It then discusses the findings in the backdrop of theoretical and empirical
literature, and thereby highlights those areas of understanding, which the hitherto
existing literature on common property and resource management seems to have
neglected. In the conclusion, the chapter calls attention to the practical relevance of
the research, discussing the findings in the context of broader policy perspective.
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Chapter I
Common Property and Collective Action
The increasing depletion of India's forest resources over the last few decades has
made certain things amply clear. While on the one hand, it has brought into sharp
focus the inherent inadequacy of the conventional state-run system of forest
management, the inherent potential of traditional local communities to protect and
manage the forests effectively has emerged as a dominant paradigm on the other. The
poor outcomes of state-controlled resource management strategies and planned
development have compelled policy makers and scholars to seek fresh solutions to the
problem of conservation. One solution has been to reconsider the role of community
in it. It has been affirmed that forest conservation priorities cannot be determined by
isolating local communities, which depend so much on it for their day-to-day
livelihood.
In recent years, countries around the world have started giving greater rights,
responsibilities and powers to the local communities to sustainably manage their
immediate environment. In a departure from previous work on development and
resource management, which considered communities as hindrance to progress, social
change and resource conservation (e.g., Hardin, 1968), local communities have been
the center of attraction in most of the current writings; and their role in bringing about
decentralized and meaningful participation for sustainable use and management of
natural resources has been much discussed (c. f. Etzioni, 1996; Gadgil and lyer, 1991;
Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988; Bromley et aI., 1992). Previous policies on conservation
and the scholarly writings as well, consider local communities as an obstacle to
sustainable use of natural resource; and their capabilities in organising themselves for
resource protection were highly undermined. The rationale behind such an assumption
was that the interests of local communities in natural resource and their livelihood
requirements always clashed with the goals of conservation. Thus, conservation of
natural resources like forests, wildlife, pastures, fisheries and water resources required
protection from members of local communities, who depended upon these resources
for their livelihood and thus exploited them without restraint. Such justifications
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paved the way for conservation policies that supported either nationalisation or
privatisation of natural resources by excluding local communities from the scope of
its management (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).
Notwithstanding the persistence of such ideas among policy makers in certain
cases, most of the current ideas about community's role in natural resource
management have changed radically. Communities have now become the major thrust
of conservationist thinking and scholarly writings about natural resource management.
The limitations of the state to coerce its citizens to unpopular development and
conservation practices have been widely acknowledged, and national governments,
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international donor agencies are now
extending both financial and institutional supports towards community based
conservation. Further, with the spread of the idea of democratic decentralisation and
renewed interest in the concept of popular participation, unrepresentative
development and resource management practices with top-down approaches have
become unpopular and out of fashion. Resource management priorities now demand
participatory and democratic institutions at the community level, which can ensure
popular participation. sustainable use of the resource and equitable distribution of the
benefits that accrue from the resource.
Scholars supporting community based natural resource management argue that
local communities depend upon their immediate resource base near which they live
for their livelihood requirements and, thus, have a long term need for such resources.
The increasing resource scarcity due to deforestation and degradation of local forests
is not only a matter of concern for national government, but also a great threat to the
subsistence of local communities. Poffenberger ef at .. (1996: 45) observe that in
response to such resource scarcity and subsequent livelihood insecurity, 'many
communities in India have developed localised protection and management systems',
promoting community based natural resource management. Further, the traditional
and indigenous knowledge of local communities about these resources is also citcd as
a reason making them the best managers of their resources than potential actors from
elsewhere (Lynch and Talbot, 1995). Instances of resource degradation by local
communities themselves are also found when they are not involved in active resource
management and are kept outside the purvIew of conservation (Guha, 1989: 58;
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Western and Wright, 1994). The implicit assumption behind such arguments is that
'communities have incentives to use resources unsustainably when they are not
involved in resource management, and if they are involved in conservation, the
benetits they receive will create positive incentives for them to become good stewards
ofresourccs' (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 633).
One of the important points to note here is that such a community control of
India's forest resources implicitly involves a change in property rights and resource
management regimes. The shift of management responsibilities to the local
communities also involves a shift in property rights over the forestland. Forests,
which were state property under the state-controlled system of management, are now
managed as 'common property' under the community control. Thus, a detail
discussion of the concepts such as 'property rights' and 'resource management
regimes' are required to better understand the process of community's involvement in
forest management and the local level collective action required for such efforts.
1.1. Property Rights and Resource Management Regimes
In the literature on natural resource management and the policy formulations intended
to involve local community in its ambit, nothing is as misunderstood as the concept
'common property rcsource'. Partly, the confusion arises from the failure to
distinguish between two separate but indeed inter-related concepts, i.e. 'property' and
'resource'. While the nature of the resource is an inherent physical characteristic,
property refers to a social institution or a special kind of human intervention in the
resource.
'Resources' are mere physical phenomena, which are put to use to derive
benefits out of it, and may be either natural or man-made. Natural resources are often
defined as 'those components of an ecosystem which provides goods and services
useful to mankind' (Gibbs and Bromley, 1991: 22). While most of the earth's
resources, such as forests, water, land, fisheries, minerals etc., are used as raw
materials to produce several goods of human satisfaction, a majority of the world's
poor also directly use them as a source of their livelihood. Viewed in this sense,
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natural resources are regarded as useful only to the extent that they provide some
goods and services for human satisfaction. The usefulness of a resource in this sense
depends upon the market forces and the market determines the value of the resources.
However, such a narrow perspective of natural resource often undermines the
ecological value of the resource (see Grima and Berkes, 1991). Emphasising the
ecological value of natural resource, Grima and Berkes (1991: 35) cite the example of
a wetland with continuous water logging, which has little market value. However,
such resources serve extremely important ecological functions as 'water flow
regulation, flood control, etc'. In the past two to three decades, with the increasing
awareness about environment, there has been a radical rethinking concerning natural
resource, acknowledging its ecological importance.
Natural resources further are divided into non-renewable and renewable
resources. Non-renewable resources such as coals and minerals are also known as
'stock' resources, and physical amount available for such resources are more or less
fixed. In such resources, the physical quantity of resources used to day reduces the
amount available for future use. On the other hand, in the case of renewable
resources, the total physical amount of the resource changes over time and what is
used today may not necessarily reduce the amount that will be available tomorrow.
For example, in the case of complete renewable resources such as solar energy and
winds, the pattern of present use does not reduce the amount available for future use.
However, some renewable resources have a 'critical zone' beyond which any further
present depletion reduces the amount available for future use (Gibbs and Bromley,
1991: 24). Forests, pasture lands, inland water bodies, fisheries, etc. are examples of
renewable resources having a critical zone. A majority of the population of the
developing countries of the world also depend upon these resources directly for their
livelihood requirements. Such resources, if consumed rcstrictively with proper
management, can be expected to yield benefits sustainably.
'Property', on the other hand, refers to an institutional arrangement in the
resource or a special kind of human intervention, which defines individuals'
relationship with resources. The institution of property is the 'result of a secure claim
to a resource or the services that resources provide' (Gibbs and Bromley, 1991: 24).
Bromley (1992: 2) defines property as 'a benefit or income stream', and property
II
rights as 'a claim to a benefit stream that some higher body - usually the state -
will agree to protect through the assignment of duties to others, who may somehow
interfere with the benefit stream'. Thus, property is not the resource itself, rather a
social relation that defines the rights of the property holder to the resource in relation
to others who have a corresponding duty to respect that right. Viewed in this sense
one's right over a property also includes other's duty to respect that right. Thus,
property is a 'triadic social relation involving benefit stream, right holders and the
duty bearers' (Hallowell, 1943 cited in Bromley, 1992: 2).
1.2. Defining Common Pool Resources
Before going further in describing the property management regimes and common
property arrangements, it is essential to conceptually clarify the concept of common
pool resources. The basic distinction between resource and property makes the job of
defining common pool resources easy. One needs to distinguish several types of
goods to understand the position of common pool resources. Common pool resources
are those natural or man-made resources, from which it is difficult to exclude other
potential users from using the resource and such joint use by more than one user
involves subtractability (Berkes and Farvar, 1991; Ostrom, 1986a). Common pool
goods are distinguished from two other types of goods, i.e., pure public goods and
private goods. Such classification of goods is based on changes along two analytical
dimensions: exclusion of others from the resource and jointness of use.
In the case of pure public goods, such as TV broadcast, street light, light
house, etc., it becomes not only difficult but also sometimes impossible to cxclude the
resource from other co-users, but such joint use in the case of pure public goods does
not involve subtraction of the resource. For example while it is difficult to exclude
somebody from using the services provided by a street light, at the same time one's
use of such service does not necessarily affect other's use of the same service. On the
other hand, private goods can be easily excluded from outsiders, but if joint use of the
good begins then the resource starts to deplete. Thus, common pool resources exist in
between the pure public goods and private goods, and share the characteristics of
subtractability with the private good on the one hand, and the characteristics of non-
12
excludability with the pure public good, on the other (McKean, 2000) (see Table -
1.1 ).
The twin characteristics of 'subtractability' and 'non-excludability' make the
common pool resources a special kind of resources, in which it becomes difficult to
protect the resource from depletion if some mechanism to exclude the non
contributing users is not devised. Thus proper maintenance of common pool resources
requires some kind of institutional arrangements of property rights or resource
management regimes to exclude the non-members or non-contributors from availing
benefits from the resource. In the absence of such institutional mechanisms to address
the problems of exclusion and joint use, common pool resources become de facto
'open access resources' accessible to anyone.
Table 1.1: Contrasting Common Pool with Private Goods and Pure Public Goods
Exclusion Easy Exclusion Difficult
Subtractable (rivalrous in Private goods (all kinds of Common pool goods
consumption) pri vate property) (forest, pasture lands,
fisheries, inland water
bodies, etc)
Non-subtractable (non- Club or toll goods Pure public goods
rivalrous in consumption) (defence, TV broadcasting,
lighthouse, etc)
Source: MeKean, (2000: 29)
1.3. Types of Resource Management Regimes
Resource management regimes may be understood as a specific kind of institutional
arrangements of property right in the resource, which defines who will have rights to
access the resource and who will not. A resource management regime derives its
sib'Tlificance from 'the structure of rights and duties that characterise the relationship
of individuals to one another and to the objects of value or the particular resource in
question' (Bromley and Cemea, 1989: 5, Bromley, 1999: 86). The resource
management regime structures the relationships between two or more individuals (or
13
groups) in the sense that while, on the one hand, it ensures the interests of one party
over the resource by assigning 'rights' over that particular resource, it makes
obligatory on the part of the other party to respect that right by means of 'duties'
towards that secured claim or 'rights' on the other. In other words, resource
management regimes make one's claims over a property secure by establishing
'property rights arrangements', which is respected by those who are outside such
arrangement and also is protected by state or some higher authority oflaw.
One of the important things to point out m the context of resource
management regimes is to distinguish between the two concepts of 'resource' and
'regime'. The distinction between the resource and the regime under which it is held
or managed is important because a particular resource may be held (or managed)
under more than one regime. In many rural communities, certain resource may be
under the control of a particular household or group of households at particular
seasons in a year, while at other seasons the same resource becomes available for all
the members of the community to use. Take the case of a village common land or
pasture land; while the same piece of land is used by all members of the community
for grazing their cattle throughout the year, during the harvesting period particular
households use that as threshing floor. In other worlds, the access to such land
becomes restricted and certain households share among themselves the right to access
during the harvesting period, while in other seasons the access to the land is open for
all the members of the village. Even the private agricultural lands (mainly paddy
fields), in many rural communities, become open for every body to graze their cattle
after the harvest. However, such access ceases to operate once the next agricultural
reasons starts. Such explanations reveal the fact that while resource is a fixed
phenomenon, management regime is a dynamic concept, which changes depending
upon the relationship of individuals to one another and to the resource itself, and a
particular resource may be used under various regimes at different periods of time.
In general, four different types of management regimes are commonly
identified in common property literature (see Bromley, 1992, 1999; Bromley and
Cemea, 1989). They are:
I. State Property Regimes
2. Private Property Regimes
14
3. Common Property Regimes
4. Open Access Regimes (non-property regimes)
1.3.1. State Property Regimes
In a state property regime, ownership of the resource remains with the state, which
controls it by its agencies like government. However, private individuals or groups
may make use of the resource. but only with permission from the state. Examples of
resources under state property regimes include: state forests, national parks, and other
resources that are held under public domain over the which state has direct control.
The state has the discretion either to directly manage the state-owned natural
resources (say forests) through government agencies or to lease them to individuals or
groups to avail the usufruct rights over such resource for a specified period of time.
As it was pointed out earlier. shi ft of a resource from state property regimes to other
regimes and vice versa is quite possible. For example. the nationalisation of village
forest by the Nepalese government in 1957 converted a common property regime at
the village level into a state property regime. Likewise. the recent Joint Forest
Management efforts in India aim to establish common property regimes in state forest
resources. However. in such cases the communities are only given the usufruct rights
over thc torest produce. while the title to the land still remains in the hands of the
state.
One of the Imporlant characteristics of state properly regimes is the separation
of ownership and management from actual use of the resource. In many cases the
ownership resides with the population at large (or the state) and the management
resides at the hand of the agencies of the state or with a class of bureaucrats, while
common people arc the main users of the resource (Bromley, 1992: 10).
1.3.2. Private Property Regimes
The resources undcr private property regImes are owned, managed and used by
private individuals. However, in the case of corporate properties, which also come
under private property regimes (Bromley, 1999: 87), while the ownership rights
remain with the group or corporate members, the management responsibility rests
with certain core individuals, usually trained professionals, who take decisions on
15
behalf of the corporate members. All the private lands belonging to households and
private possessions are used and managed under private property regimes.
Private property regimes are considered to be more stable and supposed to be
well managed because 'they have the social and legal sanction to exclude other non
owner and resist unwanted intrusion, often through the power of the state' (Bromley
and Cernea, 1989: 13). In other words, in the case of private property, the owner can
easily exclude others from accessing the resource. The owners, in such cases, as they
enjoy exclusive property right over the resource, are completely free to do whatever
they wish to do with the resource. It should be pointed out here that such exclusive
property right over the resource in the case of private property is always accompanied
by a sensible 'duty' of others to respect that right and not to invade private property.
1.3.3. Common Property Regimes
In common property regimes the property rights over the resource is vested in a group
of individuals or members of a community who can be significantly distinguished
from the outside non-members. In this case the group or the community holds
property in common and share rights and duties towards the resource. The community
having rights ovcr common property may differ in size, nature or internal
organisation, but it is considered to be a social unit having common interests,
common social norms, internal authority structure, and definite membership and
boundaries.
Common property shares one important characteristic with private property -
exclusion of non-members or outsiders from accessing the resource. In this sense,
common property implies shared private property of the group or community, since
the community enjoys rights over the resource and hence, is expected to exclude all
outsiders of the community from accessing such resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup and
Bishop, 1975). Unlike Common Pool Resources, where exclusion of non-members is
very difficult, common property can be kept away from outsiders easily since the
group or community enjoys property rights over the resource. A small forest patch or
an irrigation system managed by a community serves as the best example of resources
managed under common property regimes. Here, there is a well-defined community
whose membership is more or less fixed, a resource to be managed (physical area of
16
the forest or irrigation system), a continuous benefit stream from the resource (notion
of property) and a requirement for group or community management (having
restrictions on the use of the resource and regular maintenance) to ensure the
sustained flow of benefits. Such community shares common norms (rules and
regulations towards the use and management of the resource) and interests, and is in a
position to restrict members of other communities from accessing the benefits from
the resource.
Crucial to any management regime is the 'authority structure', which ensures
the expectations of the right holders, in terms of first, establishing exclusive rights of
the members over the resource, and second, protecting the resource from possible
intrusion by other non-members (Bromley, 1992: 12). Private property is considered
to be durable and well-managed because of a strong authority system which can
exclude potential outsiders from invading the resource. Such authority system in the
case of private property is also given equal and often strong back up by the state.
Similar conditions apply to common property also. So far as the authority system in
the case of common property regime is strong and efficient enough to exclude non
members from sharing the benefits out of the resource, we can call it as a common
property regime. Once such authority system breaks down the common property
regime degenerates into open access and resource degradation becomes an obvious
phenomenon. Thus, Bromley (1992: 12) rightly points out 'it is not the property
regime that explains compliance and wise natural resource use. It is, instead, the
authority system that ensures that the particular regime is adhered to'.
Quite unmindful to the notion of property rights arrangement, the concept
common property seems to have entered social science literature not to refer to any
form of property at all, but rather to its absence (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Demsetz,
1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973 cited in McKean, 2000: 30). Common property in
social science has always been confused with open access; and what Hardin (1968)
had in his mind while analysing 'tragedy of the commons' was, in fact, open access
instead of common property. Contrary to common property arrangements, open
access is a situation where no property right arrangements exist over the resource and
in the absence of authority structure or property right arrangements to exclude non
members every one is free to access the resource. Thus, common property is not a
17
situation of access open to all, but access limited to a specified group or community
having a well-defined boundary, which holds its rights in common over the resource
(McKean, 2000; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Bromley, 1992, 1999; Bromley et
a1.1992; Runge, 1981, 1984, 1992).
There may be two inherent problems in common property regimes (see
Bromley, 1992: 12; Bromley and Cernea, 1989: 18 - 9). First, since common property
is controlled and managed by a group or collectivity, it becomes difficult to prevent
the breakdown in compliance by co-owners towards the resource. Changes in other
sphere of economy resulting in limited livelihood opportunities may have
considerable impacts upon the compliance of community members towards the rules
and norms of co-management, making resource overuse and degradation an obvious
phenomenon. Second, if the state fails in its duty to provide legal backup to the
community holding resource under common property regimes in protecting the
resource from external threat, then common property has the very chance of
degenerating into open access situation. Unlike private property, which has received
maximum state protection, most of the common property in developing countries has
recci ved lesser attention by the state and the larger population depending upon
common property is always perceived as a politically marginal category.
1.3.4. Open Access Regime
Open access is a situation where property rights arrangement does not exist and
hence, none (neither individualls nor community) can claim exclusive right over the
resource. In the absence of such property rights arrangements, it is illogical to say -
as is popularly said - that 'everybody's property is nobody's property'. Rather, it can
be only said as 'everybody's access is nobody's property' (Bromley, 1992: 13;
Bromley and Cernea, 1989: 19). Resources under open access regimes - whether
forests, fishing or grazing lands - always belong to the persons who first exercise
control over them. As it was pointed out in the previous section, open access
situations arise mainly because of the breakdown of the authority system, which can
design rules for proper management of the resource and which can prohibit outsiders
from entering into the resource.
18
The distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' is very much crucial for
understanding open access regimes (see, Bromley, 1978, 1989, 1999). A right of an
individual over a property is always accompanied by duty of all others to respect that
right. Thus, when one has a right over a property, slhe will have the expectation that
herlhis claim will be protected in the form of duties by the rest of the community. In
other words, one's right over a property is always accompanied by 'others' duty not to
invade in herlhis rights and see to it that slhe enjoys that right. On the other hand, in
situations of 'privileges' the notion of duty does not arise since none has any right.
One's privilege to use a resource is not accompanied by other's duty not to invade
upon the resource. In conditions of privilege, everyone is free to do as slhe wishes,
since neither party has any right over the resource.
The distinction between common property and open access regimes seems to
become clear when we look into the difference between rights and privileges. In
common property regimes, the co-users or co-owners of the resource enjoy collective
rights over the resource, and hence, as a matter of practice can keep others away from
invading the resource. In such situations, some have the right to use the resource and
others have the duty to keep them away from the resource. Contrarily, in situations of
open access, since none enjoys such exclusive rights over the resource, but all, at the
same time, have the privileges to use the resource, excluding anybody from accessing
the resource becomes difficult. Thus, unlike common property regimes, an open
access situation is 'one of mutual privileges and no rights' (Bromley, 1999: 86).
1.4. Problems in Commons Management
A substantial majority of world's population, especially the members of rural
communities, depends to a greater extent on common pool natural resources, like
grazing and fallow land, forest, water, fisheries, etc., for their survival. The basic
necessities of rural population like food, fuel wood, fodder and shelter are met out of
common pool resources. As per an estimation, nearly 80 per cent of world's
population depend upon commons for their existence (Bromley, 1986: I). Such being
the importance of common pool resources, it is essential to point out that common
19
pool resources face two important problems: the problem of overuse or degradation
and the problem of free-riding (Dietz et aI., 2002: 18).
The common pool resources face these two above-mentioned problems
because of its two inherent characteristics, such as subtractability and difficulty in
exclusion. The subtractable nature of common pool implies that one person's use of
the resource curtails the amount of the resource available for the rest of the
community to use. For example, one person's use of water, fish or forest produce
reduces from the total amount left for others to use. Such subtractability nature of
common pool creates an incentive for overuse of the resource, ultimately leading to its
degradation or what Hardin (1968) termed as 'tragedy of the commons'. The
excludability problem in common pool refers that once the good is provided, it is
difficult to protect it from outside non-members. Such a characteristic leads to free
rider problem where members start to overuse the resource without paying the cost of
its production. Since exclusion is difIicult in such a context free-rider problem
becomes inherent in common pools and this, in the long run, also leads to overuse and
degradation of the resource.
It is pertinent to point out that the problems of overuse and free-riding arise
because of 'lack of coordination' among the resource users, and thus, as Oakerson
points out, 'the key problem in commons is how to coordinate the action of individual
users in order to obtain an optimal rate of production or consumption (1992: 41).
Successful management of common pool resources requires proper coordination
among the resource users and collective action to come together and share the costs of
producing the resource. Thus, coordination problem or collective action problem is
very much crucial to common pool resources, which results in overuse and free
riding.
The success of community management of commons, therefore, involves the
problem of collective action, in which it becomes difficult on the part of self-seeking
rational individuals to come together for production of a collective good (the
resource). In a situation of collective action, each resource user tries to maximise
his/her individual gain, which, in tum, affects the total resource stock and also the
share of other resource users, resulting in what Hardin had called 'tragedy of the
20
commons' (Hardin, 1968). As the total amount of resource is always limited, resource
appropriation by anyone user to maximise hislher own gain seriously affects the
amount remaining for other appropriators. This 'free riding' obviously happens due to
lack of communication and binding agreement, which can determine how much
resource unit each user can appropriate from a resource system, keeping in view the
interest of all resource users and the resource system itself. For example, in the case
of irrigation, if the head-end farmers consume more water, the tail-end farmers may
end up without water for their fields or less water than the head-end farmers. Further,
nobody will be willing to contribute to the maintenance of the canal or tank as each
prefers to free ride at the cost of others. Whether a farmer contributes for maintenance
of the water resource or not, he can still use water from it since it is difficult to
exclude him from using the resource. However, if an agreement can be made between
them through some institutional arrangements all the farmers can have access to
water.
Before going further in discussing the problems of common pool resources
and the problems that resource users face in coordinating for their successful
management, we should look at the question as to why common pool resources
require collective action at all? The very nature of common pool resource, i.e.,
. subtract ability' and 'non-excludability' makes it necessary on the part of the resource
to be managed through collective action. To put it precisely, the management of CPRs
requires collective action at the community level owing to three factors. First, the
good is jointly produced, or else it would not require collective action at all. Common
property is such that they cannot be produced in isolation, by any single individual's
effort. Second, CPR confers benefits on all members of the group, making it
impossible or impracticable to exclude members who fail to contribute for the
production of CPR. Third, production of benefits in CPR involves cost, which should
come from all members of the community (Heckathorn, 1993: 331).
Having acknowledged the inherent problem of common pool resources and the
necessity of the process of collective action in the production of Common Property, I
now move forward to discuss the challenges that resource users face in such
processes. In any CPR situation, the resource users face two problems: provision
problem and appropriation problem (Ostrom, 1990, 200 I). Provision problem in CPR
21
focuses on investment for production and maintenance of the resource itself.
Production of benefits from CPRs often requires long-term investments for
construction of the resource and/or its proper maintenance, as in the case of village
woodlots, tanks or canals. Provision problem involves determining the type and level
of regular maintenance that will sustain the resource system over timet.
In regard to appropriation problem in CPR environment, the key focus is on
how to allocate a fixed amount of resource among resource users so as to avoid
conflicts over the assignment of rights2. In the absence of firm rule on who can
appropriate how much in a CPR environment, the situation becomes like a Prisoner's
Dilemma game and free-riding becomes inherent. In such cases none will have any
incentive to leave any portion of the resource for other user, which ultimately result in
degradation of the resource system as discussed above. However, if the access to the
CPR is limited and a well-defined !,'TOUp of users rely on the resource jointly, the
incentive of the users to appropriate will depend upon rules governing the nature of
appropriation, and its enforcement and monitoring.
Equitable distribution or allocation of benetits forms an important
appropriation problem in most CPR environments. The problem of equitable
distribution or appropriation of resources arises mostly because of the uncertain and
heterogeneous characteristics of the resource itself For example, in the case of water
resource, farmers extracting water from head"end of the irrigation system always have
the freedom to obtain more water than the farmers who are located at the tail-end.
This uncertain geo!,'Taphical characteristic of the resource often makes the
maintenance of the resource difficult. In such cases well-enforced rules to allocate
time, location and quantity of resource units to specitic user can reduce the risk of
I It should be pointed out here that in CPR investments are usually of long-term duration, where costs are incurred in present while the benefit. out of it are acquired in future, making it difticult for taking any decision for investment. When this difficult long-term problem is combined with free-riding of other resource users, maintenance of a resource system becomes a challenging task.
2 Resource appropriation in CPR means withdrawal of resource units by resource users from the whole resource system. Resource users may appropriate resource units for self consumption, for using it as an input for production process, e.g., water for agricultural development; or for the market (Ostrom, 200 I: 142)
22
inequitable distribution and enhance the chance of production and sustainability of the
resource.
To put it precisely, all the problems in common pool resource finally revolves
around the central problem of 'collective action,}, i.e., why and how people would
come together (coordinate) to manage their local common pool resources. Despite the
fact that free-riding and lack of coordination poses a serious threat to collective action
and results in over use or degradation of the resource, several scholars have pointed
out, from their theoretical as well as empirical research, the condition required for
successful collective action at the community level for effective management of
ePRs. The following sections make a review of such theoretical and empirical
arguments stressing the preconditions for successful collective action for managing
common property.
1.5. Problems of Collective Action: Theoretical Approaches
At a theoretical level. scholars have tried to answer the question as to why and how
people come together for a common cause and exhibit cooperative behaviour. For
analytical purposes such theoretical arguments are categorised into two separate
sections, though both deal with the same question of collective action.
1.5.1. A Game Theoretic Approach
In recent years, game theory is being used as an analytical tool for approaching the
collective action problem in common property. The theory provides an important
theoretical construct to analyse collective action. It has been widely used by various
scholars (Wagner, 1983; Axelrod, 1981 and Snidal, 1985 in the context of
International Relations and Runge, 1992; Seabright, 1993 and Rasmussen and
) The tenn 'collective action' in social science literature has been widely used by different scholars to understand different situations. However, the element, which is common to all, is 'mutual interest and the possibIlity of benefit from coordinated action'. Situations requiring collective action take several fonns, one of which is the management of common property resources like fisheries, forests and irrigation. Although sociological literature on the subject is relatively small and new (e.g. Heckathorn, I9RR, 19R9, 1990, 1991, 1992; Oliver, 19RO; Marwell and Oliver, 1984, 1993; Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira, 19R5), research on the subject by economists (e.g. Samuelson, 1954; Bator, 1958; Head, 1974, Olson, 1965), political scientists (e.g. Chamberlin, 1974; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1970; Hardin, 1971) and psychologists (Kelley and Grzelak, 1972; Bonacich el aI., 1976; Dawes, McTarish and Shaklee, 1977) is much too large and old.
23
Meinzen-Dick, 1995 in the context of Common Property Resources) to address the
question whether or not people are capable of cooperative behaviour and choose
chose to cooperate and organise voluntarily.
Many common pool problems have been formulated and analysed as
Prisoners' Dilemma (PO) Game. The core argument of PD model revolves round a
situation where two suspects are being interrogated separately for a jointly committed
crime. Cooperation or defection are the two dominant choices open to them. If both
cooperate with each other and do not confess, they will receive a minor punishment; if
one defects and confesses, he will be set free while the other will receive a heavy
prison sentence; ifboth defect and confess, each will be prosecuted. Such a situation
can be better understood in the following payoff matrix (see figure 1.1). Suppose
there are two players, A and B in the game, each having the choice either to cooperate
or defect. If both A and B cooperate with each other, they will receive 3 points each.
But if A chooses to defect (and B still cooperates) then he will gain a higher benefit
from what he had got last time when he had cooperated with B, because now he is not
paying the cost of collective action and enjoying free riding. In such a situation A will
receive 4 points and B, only 1 point. This payoff will similarly change when B
chooses defection strategy and A, cooperation. Both the players are gaining more,
individually, when they are choosing the defection choice. In such a situation,
defection is the dominant strategy and each has an incentive to defect, unmindful of
the other's move, to secure one's own interest and self-protection. Hence, the rational
decision of each player will individually make them worse off (Runge, 1992: 23) and
both wi 11 end up in having 2 points each.
Figure - 1.1
Player B
C n
Player A C 3, 3 1, 4
0 4, 1 2, 2
24
Thus, Prisoners' Dilemma analysis as applied to Common Property
management poses a situation, where there are a number of individual actors having
the choice either to cooperate for better management or defect for personal gain.
Available evidences suggest that the choice of defection will predominate in case of
the management of CPRs. The rational choice of each individual will instigate
himlher to take free-ride at the cost of others, finally leading to what Hardins has
summed up as 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968). According to Hardin, 'in the
case of community owned resources, each individual has the incentive to over-use the
resource, regardless of what others' do, thereby leading to destruction of those
resources (Hardin, 1968; cited in Nugent, 1993: 624). And the alternatives, which are
put forwarded to avoid such a situation are to have certain external coercive
regulations, either by nationalising the resources or by pri vatising it. This is based on
the argument that the original payoff structure in the Prisoner's Dilemma game can be
changed by the state in such a way that cooperation becomes a dominant strategy. It is
believed that regulations and penalties can create a new payoff structure that would
encourage people to cooperate (Ostrom, 1990: 8 - ll). Such a policy of nationalising
natural resource, such as, grazing land, fisheries, forests, etc., and bringing them into
centralised control and regulation, has been followed extensively, particularly in the
third world countries since colonial rule. This, however, assumes that the state has
proper motivation, sufficient knowledge and enforcement ability to provide optimal
resource management. It, thus, ignores the need for extensive local information for
monitoring and enforcing regulations, in which the state has no competitive advantage
(Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995: 19).
The structure and payoff of Prisoner's Dilemma game is often criticised as
highly artificial, and may not always represent the real life situation faced by
individuals in most natural resource management situations. Thus, a number of
alternative games have also been put forwarded by scholars who believe that the costs
and benefits of collective action on natural resources are often a kind which is more
favourable to the possibility of cooperation than what the original Prisoner's Dilemma
game predicts (Bardhan, 1993a: 634 - 35; Nugent, 1993: 624 - 26; Rasmussen and
Meinzen-Dick, 1995). Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, these games take into
account the interactions between individual members of the community managing the
natural resources. Scholars such as Axelrod (1981, 1984), Runge (1992), Nugent
25
(1993), and Taylor (1988) have argued that if certain conditions are present, the
players will face a payoff structure, which makes voluntary cooperation a possibility.
Taylor's (1988) chicken game provides a situation III which cooperation
becomes a favourable strategy. It describes a one-shot situation in which at least one
of the player will cooperate simply because both players want to avoid a dominant
strategy of defection, which is a least favourable strategy in terms of comparison of
costs and benefits (Taylor, 1988; cited in Bardhan, 1993a: 634). Suppose, in a
situation where two neighbouring families are pondering on the issue, who will
participate in fencing and maintenance work of a forest patch managed by the group.
Either of them can participate in the activity, but each can also prefer to 'free-ride' on
the work of others. But in the case of such vital common pool resources the
consequence of defection on the part of both agents may be so bad that either of them
rather prefer to do the work himselflherself if the other does not do so. The following
figure makes the situation clearer.
Player A c
D
Figure - 1.2 Player B
c D
3, 3 2,4
4,2 I, I.
As the figure (Figure 1.2) shows, if both A and B cooperate with each other
they get three points each. If one of them defects (whether A or B) while the other
cooperates, the one who defects gets four points and who cooperates gets two points.
However, ifboth the players defect, they end up in having only one point each, which
is the worst outcome. Here, as the figure shows defection - defection is not the
dominant strategy. Because, if one player assumes that the other is going to defect and
he also takes a defection strategy accordingly, he gets only I point; but, if he chooses
to cooperate even though the other prefers to defect, he gets 2 points, which is at least
better than the previous outcome.
Further, if we analyse the non-cooperative Prisoners' Dilemma Game, we can
find that non-cooperation or defection arises because of lack of coordination or
26
infonnation asymmetry among the players. The action of a player may change if slhe
could know in advance the action that the other player would take. Similarly, in a
common pool situation, if somebody knows that her/his neighbour would cooperate in
management of the resource, slhe may also undertake cooperative action instead of
free-riding. Therefore, the reasoning of Prisoner's Dilemma that each player is
individually better off if slhe takes a defection strategy unmindful of what the other
player does, may not apply in a continuous and recurrent situation, and where players
interact with each other for an indefinite number of times. If the players know that the
game will be repeatedly played, there is a possibility that the chances of cooperation
will emerge (Axelrod, 1981: 307). Once cooperation gets started, it will be
reciprocated (Nugent, 1993: 625), as each player plays whatever the previous player
had played or according to a strategy which Axelrod states as 'Tit for Tat' strategy (cf.
Axelrod, 1981: 311).
Here, the argument is that each player accumulates expenence of the
behaviour of his opponent since slhe meets herlhim personally at each round of the
game and is able to recall herlhis past moves (Baland and Platteau, 1996). And most
importantly, the players get time to rationally observe the behaviour of others and
adopt a choice of conditional cooperation, i.e., to cooperate first and only defect if
others do so. This is an 'assurance game', which captures a widely observed
phenomenon in the field studies: no body wants to be 'suckered', but one tends to be
cooperatives when others or at least a critical mass of others in a multi-persons' game
do so (Burdhan, 1993a: 634). According to Tit-for-Tat strategy, an organisation can
emerge and can be maintained if the group is small and stable; and there should be a
willingness to give cooperation a trial and a continuous interaction for a longer period
of time between the same members (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995: 22).
The other ways to overcome the problem posed by Prisoner's Dilemma model
are 'interdependency', 'mutual expectation' and 'degree of trust' of the actors involved
(Runge, 1984; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Here, the dominant strategy of defection
does not exist, and the individual decision to cooperate or not are not independent of
one another, but are outcomes of individual assessment of mutual expectations and
interests. Under these circumstances, the degree of communication between players
27
plays a crucial role in detennining the possibility of cooperation and organisation
(Runge, 1992).
The situation observed in prisoner's dilemma game can be analogous to many
situations that may be found in reality in the context of common pool resources. There
may be groups with divergent, and even conflicting opinions and interests in common
property. One group might not be in favour grazing in the forests, while the other
might be favouring it. Some might be in favour of cutting trees while others opposed
to it.
1.5.2. The Logic of Collective Action and The Critical Mass
Much theoretical and empirical work in the field of community management of
natural resources can be traced back to one theoretical framework, namely, the Logic
of Collective Action (Olson, 1965). The publication of Olson's (1965) 'The Logic of
Collective Action' challenged a much commonly held view that groups would tend to
fonn and take collective action whenever members jointly benefited from a resource.
Instead, Olson offered the negative assertion that rational, self-interested individuals
will not act to achieve their common group interests, unless the number of individuals
in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to
make individuals to act in their common interest.
Olson's (1965) 'The Logic of Collective Action' may be considered as a
starting point of collective action theorisation. Olson mainly focuses on the 'size of
the group' as a relevant theoretical construct to analyse collective action. Based upon
size, Olson distinguishes between small and large groups and analyses their capacity
to get collective action done. Olson holds the view that small groups can provide
themselves with collective goods without relying on coercion or any other positive
inducements apart from the collective good itself (1965: 33). This is because in a
small group the members find that personal benefits or gains which they achieve from
the collective action are more than the total costs which they have made to get the
collective action done; and secondly, each individual member is better off as a result
of the collective action, even slhe has to pay a substantial amount for it. The small
groups, Olson adds, are twice blessed for collective action, in the sense that, they have
not only economic incentives, but also perhaps social incentives, that lead their
28
members to work towards the achievement of collective goods (1965: 63). Generally,
social pressure and social incentives operate only in small groups, where people have
face-to-face contact with one another. Social incentives in the form of prestige,
respect, status and social acknowledgement often induce members of a group to act
towards group- oriented action.
Olson (1965) further distinguishes between 'exclusive groups' and 'inclusive
groups'. Where the benefits from collective goods are fixed on supply, there is a
tendency on the part of the group to reduce the size of their group, because any further
addition of members in their groups lessens the personal gain of each member. This
type of collective goods are called 'exclusive collective goods' and the group which
wants to reduce its size so that individual members gain more out of the collective
good is called the 'exclusive group'. On the contrary, in case of 'inclusive collective
goods' the supply of collective good automatically expands when the group expands.
By this distinction Olson tries to prove that in the case of 'exclusive collective goods'
(as in the case of most ePRs, where the physical amounts and the benefits from the
resources are always fixed), the smaller the size of the group, the better the chance of
collective action.
Analysing the capacity of the large groups for collective action, Olson (1965)
states that there are three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups from
furthering their own interests. First, in large groups, each member receives a very
small fraction of the total group benefits. Second, as each member gets a small
fraction of the total group benefits, the incentives to act towards any group-oriented
action are very low. Third, larger the number of members in a group, greater is the
organisation costs, and thus, higher the hurdle that must be jumped before any of the
collective good that can be obtained. For these reasons, Olson concludes that, 'larger
the group, farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply of collective goods,
and very large groups normally will not, in the absence of any coercion, or separate
and outside incentives, provide themselves with even minimal amounts of collective
goods' (1965: 48).
Having considered the size of the groups, Olson develops a classification of
groups based upon their capacity to achieve collective goods. In the small size range,
29
he further distinguishes between 'privileged groups' and 'intennediate groups'. In a
privileged group, each member has an incentive to see that the collective good IS
provided, even if slhe has to bear the full burden of providing it himseltihersclf. In
such a group, there is the presumption that collective good will be provided even
without any group organisation or coordination. In contrast to 'privileged l:,'TOUps·.
'intermediate group' is a group in which no single member gets a share of the benctit
sufficient to give him an incentive to work for obtaining collective good. But as the
size of such groups are small, the action of members, i.e. whether they are working
towards group-oriented action or not, is noticed by other members clearly. Thus,
Olson states that 'in such a group collective goods may, or equally well, may not be
obtained' (196S: SO). To obtain collective goods in such a group, what is required is
some group organisation or coordination. The third type of group developed by Olson
is the 'latent group', which is generally big in size. In a 'latent group' the action of
anyone member, i.e., either to help provide the collective good or not, does not
significantly affect other members of the group; and thus, none has any reason to
react. Thus an individual in a 'latent group' cannot make a noticeable contribution to
any group effort; and since hislher non-contribution does not affect any other
members, slhe has no incentive to contribute. However, collective good in such a
group can be provided, Olson (196S) mentions, only through a 'separate' and
'selective incentive' (196S: SI). A separate and selective incentive will stimulate a
rational individual in a 'latent group' to act in a group-oriented way. The incentives
must be selective in a way that those who do not join the organisation working for the
group's interest can be treated differently from those who do. These incentives can
either be positive, in the form of inducements offered to those who act in group
interest, or negative in the form of coercion to those who fail to bear an allocated
share of the costs of the group action. Such 'latent groups', which act in the collective
interest of the group, either through positive rewards or through coercion, Olson terms
as 'mobilised latent group' (196S: SI). Olson terms large groups as 'latent', because
they have a latent power or capacity for collective action, but such potential power
should be 'mobilised' only with the help of 'selective incentives'.
Although Olson is pessimistic about the success of collective action among
rational and self-interested individuals, yet he visualises apparent instances of
collective action whenever a 'separate and selective' outside incentive is present to
30
reward those who participate In it (1965: 51). Such an incentive will normally
stimulate rational individuals to act in a group oriented way. Moving beyond Olson in
collective action theorisation, we find that the dynamics of 'positive and negative
selective incentives' have been dealt much rigorously by Pamela Oliver (1980). She
identifies two extreme cases of payoff where the dynamics of selective incentives
become much apparent. In the first extreme, cooperation by a few people yields a high
payoff to every one and additional cooperation adds little. In the second extreme,
nearly everyone must cooperate for group members to achieve high payotfs, and any
one person's cooperation adds little to the payoff unless others too cooperate. Oliver
points out that while positive incentives are highly efficient in the case of former,
negative incentives yield better results in the latter (1980: 1364).
Positive incentives in the form of rewards and prestige induce individuals to
cooperate to get the collective action done. When the incentives have joint-ness of
supply, it is useless to limit the number of people who are rewarded. But if the cost of
using the incentives rises with the numbers who receive it, the incentive provider then
does want to limit the number ofrecipients. If the size of the contributions varies, it is
more efficient to induce a few 'large' contributors to cooperate than to induce many
'small' contributors to do so (Oliver, 1980: 1366). Thus, in a collective action
situation those few who take the initiative for collective action and give leadership are
more rewarded in terms of social prestige, honour and often also economic rewards
than the others.
Unlike positive incentives, negative selective incentives are cheaper to use
when they are more successful at inducing cooperation. When nearly unanimous
cooperation is required for collective action and if some positive resource is available
as positive selective incentives, its use is effectively the same as that of a negative
incentive. This is because, a person who defects in collective action and is denied an
expected reward feels punished. In this case rewards for cooperation enjoyed by
nearly everyone in a group are frequently taken as key requisites of group
membership, and their withdrawal is likely to be viewed as punishment. Thus, in such
cases, negative incentive does not require any extra cost except prohibiting those from
positive incentive who fail to cooperate (Oliver, 1980: 1368).
31
Theorisation in collective action has been further enhanced by scholars like
Oliver et at. (1985), Oliver (1980), Marwell et al. (1988), Heckathorn (1993). Unlike
Olson, these scholars analyse the possibility of collective action in big and
heterogeneous social groups. Oliver et at. (1985) analyse the role of production
function and conclude that in a heterogeneous social group, collective action usually
depends upon the development of a 'critical mass' - that behaves differently from
typical group members. For them a 'critical mass' means 'a small segment of
population that chooses to make big contribution to collective action, while the
majority do little or nothing' (1985: 524).
Based on the nature of collective action, Oliver et at. (1985) distinguish
between decelerating and accelerating production functions and analyse the potential
of collective action in both. In the case of decelerating production function, the first
few units of resource contribution have the biggest effects on collective action and
subsequent contributions yield progressively reducing results. The marginal gains
from contributions in such cases are decreasing and thus, each additional unit of
contribution produces a smaller amount of collective goods (see also Heckathorn,
1993: 330). On the contrary, in case of accelerating production function, successive
contributions generate progressively larger payoffs; thus, each contribution makes the
next one more likely. In such cases, initial contribution of resources have only
negligible effects on the collective action, and only after long start up costs have been
made, subsequent contributions do start to make a big difference in the collective
action.
Discussing the social composition of the group involved, Oliver et al.
distinguish between two types of heterogeneity that have significant effects on the
level of collective action expected from a given group. The first is heterogeneity in
terms of interest in the collective goods and the second, heterogeneity in terms of
alternative resource available to group members. One may recall here that the first
type of heterogeneity finds a place, though less prominently, in the works of Olson
(1965). Olson mentions about 'exploitation of the great by the small' (1965: 29), by
which he means the existence of two categories of people; first, those who have a
larger interest in the collective good; and second, those whose interest, though
positive, is relatively small. Since the former are so interested, Olson argues, they will
32
provide the good themselves, regardless of the actions of the less interested parties.
The later exploits the 'great' by not contributing at all, as they know that they will get
the good anyway provided by the great. However, heterogeneity of resources has
received less attention by scholars in collective action theorisation.
Focusing on the fonns of distribution in their analysis of heterogeneity, Oliver
et al. deduce that 'if an interest group is heterogeneous, there may be some highly
interested individuals or highly resourceful people available for a 'critical mass', even
when the mean interest or resource level is low (1985: 529). This 'critical mass'
initiates collective action, gives leadership to the group and sustains it by their
contribution, even in those periods of collective action when contributions from other
members are relatively low or non-existent. Interest heterogeneity, in particular, is
significant in both the types of production function, i.e., decelerating and accelerating,
as the critical mass born out of it contributes in the later and initial parts of the two
types of production functions respectively. However, resource heterogeneity is much
more significant when production function is accelerating.
Accelerating production function is marked by two of its important features:
on the negative side, the feasibility of collective action is a central problem because
collective action starts at a period of low returns as the initial contributions do not
yield the expected results. Therefore, collective action rarely begins in such situations.
On the positive side, each contribution makes the subsequent contribution more
likely, as the results become visible gradually with each subsequent contribution.
Thus, if somehow contributions begin, collective action tends to snowball, involving
more and more contributions until the good is provided. In such situations the
resolution of collective action dilemma become highly problematic, and it solely
depends on the rare circumstances of there being a critical mass of persons whose
combination of resource and interest should be high enough to overcome the
feasibility problem (Oliver et al., 1985: 542). Resource and interest heterogeneity,
they further add, are essential to resolve a collective action dilemma, for a
homogeneous group cannot contain a critical mass. It becomes obvious that a positive
correlation between interests and resources are highly favourable for collective action;
as it increases the probability of there being a 'critical mass' - a pool of highly
interested and highly resourceful individuals willing and able to contribute in the
33
initial regions of low return and provide the collective action for the everyone. This
subset of people or - critical mass - is needed to begin collective action, give shape
to it and sustain it for longer times in any given group.
The conceptualisation of 'critical mass' referred to by Oliver et at. (\985)
needs some further discussion. Despite the fact that Oliver et al.'s (1985) conclusion
that only heterogeneous groups can provide critical mass is highly questionable, the
critical mass definitely plays a crucial role in any collective action situation. If critical
mass is to be meant a small group of individualls within a community, which initiates
collective action, gives leadership to the community and sustains it, by their
comparatively larger contribution, then homogeneous groups may too have the chance
of possessing a critical mass. Whatever may be the size and/or composition of the
group, one fact is very much clear that critical mass plays a very important role in
getting the process of collective action initiated and giving it a sustainability.
One of the important facts that Oliver et at. (1985) seems to have missed is the
possible negative side of a critical mass. It is not necessary that a critical mass or a
leadership group would always playa positive role in collective action. It may quite
equally possible that a leadership group may act towards disrupting any efforts
towards collective action. Therefore, the role of critical mass in ensuring collective
action can be seen to varying - sometimes conducive and sometimes constraining
collective action - in actual field setting. Particularly in the Indian context, where the
society is tradition bound and hierarchical in nature, the appearance of critical mass
becomes more pertinent and often problematic also. The local leaders of the village
communities, whether traditional or otherwise, playa vital role in initiating collective
action and pursuing it at the village leveL While the majority of the members of the
community remain skeptical about the future of collective action, it is the
contributions of these leaders that become crucial for it. However, it is not appropriate
to accept the theorisation on the role of 'critical mass' in its totality in the Indian
context. Though the theory explains one possible way to solve the collective action
dilemma, yet it can be criticised in several respects.
First, as we go along understanding the crucial role played by the critical mass
in collective action, it becomes apparent that the true meaning of 'collective action' is
34
lost. If the collective good can be provided by a single individual or by a few
individuals of the whole group, then how can one call the action of these individuals
and the resultant goods as collective? Even though the critical mass is acting for the
benefit of the whole group, can we call the action of this small group as 'collective',
unmindful of the actions of the whole community. An action to be called as collective
should not only involve the collective efforts of the people, but also collective time
and energy of the members of the community. But, in this analysis, the rest of the
group members remain at the receiving end, who depend upon the critical mass to get
the collective action done for them, and thus, their action remains obscured and
unexplained.
Second, as collective action depends upon a single or a few individuals, there
is always a possibility that the results of collective action may become unstable or
unsustainable. What will happen if a critical mass itself becomes less interested in
collective action? Here, one needs to analyse the source of incentives of the critical
mass. As long as the incentives for the critical mass is drawn from the benefits of the
collective action, it may be rational on their part to be interested in it. But if they have
alternative sources of incentives, i.e., if they can get the same incentives from other
sources, their interest in collective action may become highly doubtful. For example,
if the critical mass enjoys the position of leadership and the benefits, which are
accrued from it by contributing to collective action, then they can be expected to stop
their contribution at any time if they can get the same benefits without contributing
for it. Equitable returns resulting from collective action through the role of critical
mass also becomes suspect, for the critical mass may even comer the benefits.
Third, from the analysis of Oliver et al. (1985), it is not clear how the rest of
the group members react or respond to the actions of critical mass. Even though it is
expected that the critical mass will act for the benefit of the group, but there is every
possibility that the critical mass may become ideologically Fascist in their dealings
with the rest of the community in the production of collective action. If the critical
mass enjoys maximum benefit out of collective action, it may just force the rest of the
community to join with them unmindful of the fact whether they are also gaining or
not from the collective action. To put it more precisely, it is not clear from the
analysis whether the rest of the community obeys and pays respect to critical mass
35
I SEC LIBRARY, BANGALORE Ace. No ..... J.1:t ... ~Q ...
because of its authoritarian attitude or because of its beneficial action for the whole
group.
To summanse, the analysis makes a successful attempt in explaining how
collective action will be possible in a heterogeneous community and why critical mass
will emerge in such a community only. But how such critical mass becomes
successful in mobilising people, how they overcome several sources of dif1erences
and sevcral conflicting interests inside the community, how they institutionalise their
leadership over the community remains unexplored in this analysis.
1.6. Problems of Collective Action: Empirical Solutions
Notwithstanding the pessImIsm of scholarly writings on commons (e.g., Hardin,
1968) and the persistent problems of free-riding and resource degradation as a result
of overuse and congestion, there has been no dearth of instances of collective action
by local communities to manage their immediate common pool resources successfully
(see, NRC, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1991; Bromley et aI., 1992). The case
studies depicting success stories of resource management by local communities have
challenged the notion that state control and privatisation are necessarily the only
preferred solutions to avoid the situation of tragedy, which is so intrinsic to common
pool resources. Consequently, community management of common pool resources
has been acknowledged as a third solution to commons' problems by scholars ranging
from various disciplines. Based upon their study of various common pool resources,
like forests, fisheries, grazing lands and irrigation systems scholars have attempted to
generalise the conditions required for successful collective action at the community
level for local resource management.
Elinor Ostrom (1990) terms these preconditions for successful collective
action as 'design principle', by which she means' an essential element or condition
that helps to account for the success of institutions in sustaining the common pool
resources and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators
to the rules in use' (1990: 90). Ostrom, however, emphasises that these principles are
not necessary conditions for successful resource management regimes. Yet, they
36
facilitate conditions favourable for people to come together and behave in a particular
way, which is conducive towards local management practices. As she mentions,
'these principles can affect incentives in such a way that appropriators will be willing
to commit themselves to conform to operational rules devised in systems, to monitor
each other's conformance, and to replicate the institutions across generational
boundaries' (1990: 91 ).
Most of the literatures on common poll resources engage themselves with the
factors behind the emergence of community action and its endurance in the
management of commons. A recent summary of literature by Arun Agrawal (2002)
mentions three major book-length works of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), and Baland
and Platteau (1996). Based upon the survey of literature, Agrawal (2002) identifies
four categories of factors that playa crucial role in the emergence of local institutions
for common poll resource management: characteristics of the resource, characteristics
of the users of commons, particular institutional regimes through which resources are
managed, and the nature of relationship between users groups and external forces and
authorities. In the following paragraphs, Agrawal's (2002) categorisation is followed
to discuss the factors essential behind community action for successful commons'
management.
1.6.1. Resource Characteristics
The physical aspects of the resource concerned often make it vulnerable for
community management. Two major resource characteristics are identified that help
community to organise for resource management. They are small size of the resource
(Wade, 1988) and more elearly defined boundaries (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988).
Clearly defined boundary of a resource is the first and foremost requirement for any
kind of collective use and management of the resource. In the absence of such
boundaries the resource turns into an open access situation where every one will
prefer to maximize herlhis own benefit. Further, prohibition of other non-contributors
from accessing the benefits from the resource also becomes difficult without clearly
defined boundary. Small size of the resource is emphasised, because, for larger size of
resources it becomes difficult to set the boundaries to prohibit access of others and
avoid a 'tragedy' situation.
37
Besides the twin characteristics of small size and clearly defined boundaries,
other resource characteristics like perceived benefits from the resource to be protected
and the perceived threat to livelihood in the scarcity of the resource are also important
factors to generate collective action for common pool resource management.
Livelihood insecurity and substantial risks of crop loss due to lack or irregular supply
of water, fodder unavailability in the absence of grazing land, and fuel wood scarcity
due to degradation of the local forest often provide incentives to community members
to sustain their local natural resource. To organise people into collectives to manage
local resources becomes easier 'when they feel their interests threatened than when
they wish to further interests they do not have' (Wade, 1988: 192). Resource scarcity
and high risk have been pointed out by scholars like Wade (1988) and Thomson et al.
(1992) as the roots for organised action in the villages for sustaining local resource.
Contrary to this, Varughese and Ostrom (200 I) from their study of 18 villages in
middle hills of Nepal find that the level of collective activity is strongly associated
with good resource conditions. In their studied locations, high level of collective
activity related to forest management is seen in a majority of the cases (83 %) where
forests are in an improving condition and subsequently, in majority of the cases (86
%) where forests are found to be deteriorating, the local community undertook little or
no collective activity (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001: 756).
From his study of several dry and wet villages of South India, Wade (1988)
concludes that delibcrately concerted action for resources management arises, first,
'when the net material benefits to be provided to all or most cultivators are high -
when without it all or most cultivators would face continual collision and substantial
risk of crop loss'; and second, 'that such unificd action is very likely when these risks
are high' (1988: 186). Varughese and Ostrom also mention that 'until modest levels of
scarcity are apparent to the users, little efforts will be invested in trying to change
local institutions' (2001: 748).
Kartar Singh (1994), from his study of a water cooperative society (Mohini
Water Cooperative Society) in Gujarat, emphasises on factors like, high private
benefits from the resource, which should be timely and assured, equitable distribution
of the benefits from the resource, for generating collective action for water resource
management. 'Water users' cooperatives can be organised and sustained', Singh
38
(1994: 201) states, 'only when each of the water users perceives his private benefits
from membership of the society to be substantially higher than his perceived private
costs of membership'. A predictable benefit from the resource to be conserved and a
clear understanding of such benefit often helps in collective action. 'A resource flow
that is highly predictable is much easier to understand and manage than one that is
erratic' (Ostrom, 1999: 5).
Blomquist et al. (l994) emphasise on two physical features of the resource,
I.e., 'stationarity' and . storage' , which have significant impact on its local
management. Stationarity refers to whether a resource is mobile and storage is related
to the extent to which it is possible to 'collect and hold the resources' (1994: 309). For
many common pool resource, such as fisheries, wildlife, water resource, etc., which
share these two characteristics, greater mobility and difficulties in storage often make
it more difficult for users to design institutions for their local management. Mobility
of the resource and difficulties in storage poses problems like 'their reliability and
high costs of information', which comes in the way of institutional solutions needed
for their collective management (Agrawal, 2002: 56).
1.6.2. Characteristics of the Community
Like the physical characteristics of the resource, small size of the user group with
clearly defined boundary have been much emphasised by scholars for promoting
collective action for local resource management. Much of the scholars on common
pool resources have supported the claim that collective action is more successful in
small user groups and have identified small size and homogeneous group composition
as the preconditions for collective action - a theme which was very much central to
Olson's (1965) seminal work 'The Logic of Collective Action'. Olson (1965: 33)
mentions that smaller groups are better endowed to provide themselves with
collective goods than bigger groups. Such a conclusion has been supported by works
of Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996). Smaller groups with homogeneous
members are considered to be more favourable for collective action since they share
face-to-face relation and have a better chance of organising themselves.
Joshi et al. (1997) from their survey of various literature (e.g. Douglas, 1976;
Doherty and Jodha, 1979; Esman and Uphoff, 1984) state that local organisations
39
need to be small in size for greater effectiveness. They favour smallness of local
organisation because of factors like lesser domination of any particular indi\Idual/s.
lesser conflicts, more satisfaction with proportion of benefits, b'TOUP cohesion etc.
However, Rimjhim Aggarwal (2000), from her study of group managed small
wells in two villages of Mahbubnagar District in Andhra Pradesh, comes out with
differential findings concerning smallness of the group involved in collective action.
Aggarwal makes a distinction between different group activities in collective action
for irrigation management and then finds out the potentials of small groups in
fulfilling these activities. She comes out with the finding that even a small group may
not succeed in all activities of collective action. To quote Aggarwal (2000: 1494),
'there are certain activities in which mechanisms of informal cooperation work well
and others where they do not, even when the group size is small and members are
family-related'. Even members of a small and homogeneous group are likely to work
better for those activities, 'which are of a repeated nature, require low contribution,
entail low risk and require close monitoring' (Aggarwal, 2000: 1494).
Along with smallness in size, if the boundary of the community IS well
defined, then it becomes easy for the community to distinguish itself from members of
other communities and thus, protect the resource from the latter. A clearly defined
community having exclusive possession of a clearly defined resource is often
regarded as a necessary condition to establish a 'common property regime' in a
resource and to avoid an open access situation (see, Ciciacy - Wantrup and Bishop,
1975).
Baland and Platteau (1996) have much emphasised on sociological features of
a community like past experience in collective action, shared norms, presence of
strong social capital, and a strong authority structure or leadership group as
facilitating conditions for successful collective action. Wade has also supported the
conditions of past experience and strong authority structure for successful collective
action. Shared norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are very much crucial for
collective action to begin with, since collective action 'evolves from drawing upon
such norms' (Ostrom, 2000: 149).
40
Successful past experience in collective action tends to breed further success
in collective action since 'it helps establish a reputation for cooperation that has the
effect of making other cooperative ventures easier to undertake and to sustain'
(Baland and Platteau, 1996: 325). In such a context cooperation spreads from one
domain of social life to another. Seabright (1997: 305) also puts forward similar claim
when he concludes that 'cooperation is indeed habit-forming to a degree'. Further,
'success or failure of cooperative action in the past can be expected to have a
signitlcant effect on the prospects for cooperative action in the future, by affecting the
degree of contldence or trust that individuals have in the likelihood that others will
play their part in a cooperative agreement' (1997: 304).
A good, strong and stable leadership is very much crucial for collective action.
Good leaders perform several critical functions in a collective action situation, such as
making people aware of the real challenge confronting them, convincing the members
of community about the expected benefits from collective action, mobilising people
for necessary collective efforts, ensuring impartiality and fairness in the designing and
enforcing rules for collective management, etc (Baland and Platteau, 1996: 345). In
any community action towards collective management of common pool resources,
traditional leaders do have a crucial role to play. Bardhan (1993a) mentions that
cooperative action in many rural communities have been sustained and enforced over
the years by traditional authority structure. 'While there may be ethics of sharing a
resource and its benetlt, the predominant social norm is that of an unequal patron
client system. In such a system the powerful tend to enjoy disproportionate benetlts
from the process of cooperation enforced by the rules of the game. For this very
reason they give effective support to 'solidaristic' efforts (I 993a: 638).
The importance of leadership in successful co-management has been observed
also by Jewitt (1998) from his study of Joint Forest Management in the Jharkhand
region of Bihar. In the two villages studied, forest conservation by local people was a
success in one owing to the leadership role played by the village elite. The absence of
such traditional leadership in another has resulted in deforestation by contractors and
by local people themselves.
41
Wade's pioneering study of fanners' managed irrigation systems in Andhra
Pradesh also suggests that a strong and traditional leadership is very much crucial for
successful collective action at the community level. Wade has examined the factor
commonly associated with successful collective action and effective co-management
of natural resources, which is the leadership role played by village elites, He
identi tied the higher economic benefit from a coordinated action as the primary
incentive for the leaders to generate and sustain collective action, Since the benefits of
co-management of irrigation systems are positively related to land area, the elites
have a disproportionately greater interest in effective regulation of water resources.
This greater benefits in proportion to their landholdings motivates the elites to take
the role ofleadership, which in tum, ensures successful collective action (1988: 190).
Besides economic incentives, the personality of village elites and the general
social atmosphere prevailing in the society also affects the management outcomes in a
heterogeneous social setting. Chand (1994) in his study of two hill irrigation systems
in Himachal Pradesh describes how the leadership role played by village elite has
ensured orderly and equitable distribution of water in one irrigation system in spite of
group heterogeneity. Of the two villages he studied, he found in one no specific rules
existing for inter and intra-village distribution of water which led to a state of quasi
anarchy and frequent disputes. However, in 1960, the local 'numberdar' (village
revenue gatherer) who was also one of the local landowners, mobilised the fanners to
frame a set of nonns for water distribution. The agreement reached among the
beneficiaries was recorded as a document which contained detailed infonnation on
days and timings of water supply to each of the six villages served by the tank in the
village. On the other hand, the absence of such leadership in another village resulted
in disproportionate allocation of water. The high caste fanners had greater and
frequent access to water even though a majority of them have their fields at the tail
end of the system. The opposite is also true of the lower caste members who did not
get frequent water despite their fields being located nearer to the channels.
The nature of leadership, traditional or otherwise, has been the main focus to
examine its role in successful co-management of natural resources. However, when it
comes to emphasising 'traditional' background of leadership, some scholars tend to
exaggerate its role, often underplaying the role of self-interest. For instance,
42
Jayraman's study of fanners' managed irrigation systems in two Gujrat villages show
how co-management was possible through etlective leadership by traditional
authorities. The leadership came from traditionally land owning and self-cultivating
class of Pate/so The past record of service to the village in the traditional caste
structure naturally helped the leaders to assume stewardship in irrigation
infrastructure maintenance. The villagers too seemed to have relied upon them. It is,
thus argued, the leadership in local resource management led by the traditional
leadership (made up of upper strata of community) was interested in the natural
resource not merely because they were rich, but also due to their traditionally held
leadership positions (Jayraman, 1981: A-97). Such an assertion makes one to believe
that the rich and upper strata of the community had no other incentive than merely a
traditional obligation or commitment to manage the local resource. Their economic
stakes thus got underplayed in the analysis. One may recall here Baland and Platteau
who observe that "the elites from the upper strata behave like good patrons and ensure
a situation in which a relatively egalitarian access to resources is guarantied to
everyone in the village, especially so if they are essential for survival of the lower
strata" (1996: 310).
Despite the fact that traditional leadership structure may offer considerable
advantages for collective action since they carry high social prestige and an authority
over the rest of the community, Baland and Platteau state that they (traditional
leaders) did not always possess all the required qualities to face the changing
circumstances of present day resource management regimes. Instead they propose,
'collective action is probably more satisfactory when it is led by relatively young,
literate persons who have been exposed to the outside world and who can find some
way of collaborating with traditional structures of authority and leadership (1996:
325).
1.6.3, Interaction Between Resource and Community Characteristics
The characteristics of the resource in combination with the characteristics of
community often generate certain conditions, which have significant potentials to
affect collective action. The much accepted resource characteristics of smallness in
size and well-defined boundaries may become problematic when the benefits out of
the resource as well as the community depending upon it are fluctuating and unstable.
43
In such a situation the size of the resource and its boundary must be flexible enough to
accommodate the increasing demands from the group and variations in benefits out of
the resource (Agrawal, 2002, McCarthey et al., 1999). Thus, instead of accepting
small resource systems with clearly defined boundaries as preconditions for collective
action, Agrawal (2002: 64) proposes that 'size and boundary of the resource system
should vary with group size and flow of benefits respective(v, and for larger resources,
authority relations within a group should be organised in a nested fashion (emphasis
added).
Based on the location of the community and the resource concerned both
Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996) argue that 'greater the overlap between
location of the common pool resource and the residence of the users, greater is the
chance of success in collective action. With residential proximity, it becomes easy for
resource users to notice any sort of free-riding and to monitor the violation of
designed rules. Chhetri and Pande (1992) from their study of forest user groups in
western Nepal state that people who live in a distance from the forest show less
interest in involving themselves in protection and management (cited in Varughese
and Ostrom, 2001: 753). However, Varughese and Ostrom (2001) from their study of
18 forest users villages in middle hills of Nepal come out with the conclusion that
locational differentials did not have any positive relation with organisation of
collective action. User groups staying at a distance from the resource had also shown
greater degree of collective behaviour for protection and management of forests in
Nepal (2001: 757).
Wade (1988: 215) has pointed out that if the users have a greater demand for
the resource and if the resource is vital for th" survival for the users then there is a
greater chance of collective action for resource management. However, Baland and
Platteau (1996: 344) have stressed that 'if the users are hard pressed by their survival
constraints and if the rehabilitation of the common pool resource entails a long
gestation period, then the immediate economic gains may come in way of protecting
the resource'. Agrawal (2002) also opines in favour of low levels of user demand for
successful collective action and sustainable resource management.
44
1.6.4. Institutional Arrangements
Before discussing further on what kind of institutional arrangements are favourable
for community action for local resource management, it is apt to have a clear
understanding of what institution means in the context of common pool resource and
how it has been conceptualised by scholars.
A study of institutions, in the context of CPR, focuses on the laws and
conventions of community that either directly allocate resources, or establish
processes and constraints for its members to make allocative decisions.
Notwithstanding the casual use of the term "institution' in our day-to-day life, it is
mostly used in reference to rules, regulation, and prescriptions to behave in a certain
way. It is often defined as rules about behaviour, 'especially about making decisions'
(Rinker, 1982: 4) and about 'individual expression and choice' (Pllott, 1979: 156).
However, focusing only on the term 'rules' does not serve the purpose of defining
institutions properly. In her attempt to define 'institutions', Ostrom distinguishes rules
from physical and behavioural laws and discusses the prescriptive nature of rules,
which refers to 'actions that are required, prohibited or permitted; and are commonly
known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent
relationships' (l986b: 5). The prescriptive nature of rules becomes visible from the
fact that people who foHow certain rules always know and internalise that if they
violate rules, other individuals will hold them accountable for that.
There has been considerable disagreement by scholars over the nature of rules.
Scholars like Ganz (1971) and Shimanoff (1980) limit the scope of prescriptive rules
to only 'obligation' and 'prohibition'; while on the contrary, V. Ostrom (1980) and
Commons (:957) include "permission' in their conception of rules (cited in Ostrom,
1986b). Such limitation of the scope of rules by these scholars, whether 'prohibition
or permission', arises from their very way of defining rules as prescribing a particular
action to be done. Instead, Ostrom considers rules as providing a set of outcomes or
actions, which they do in three ways: first, by forbidding certain action; second, by
permitting certain actions or outcomes; and third, by requiring a particular action or
outcome. The third type of rules expects individuals to perform a particular action and
is less used in everyday Iiie.
45
Ostrom defines institutions as 'a set of working rules that are used to
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed
or constrained, what aggregation of rules will be used, what procedure must be
followed, what information must or must not be provided, what payoff will be
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions' (Ostrom, 1990: 51). For Ostrom,
working rules may not necessarily represent, be a part of, or be backed by formal laws
that are designed by legislative regulations. However, this should not lead one to
conclude that working rules are always formed beyond the purview of formal laws.
Formal laws are important sources of working rules among several others4. When
formal laws are known to all the participants; actively enforced and its violations are
monitored, coercing those who violate them, they become working rules (Ostrom,
2001: 167 - 8). Thus, common knowledge, enforcement and monitoring are three
important features of working rules or institutions5.
North (1991) defines institutions as humanly devised systems that structure the
interaction of its members in social, economic and political arenas. As an organised
and well-detlned system, it constraints some behaviours and favours or facilitates
others. It enforces sanctions negatively in the form of punishments when, its
prescribed set of rules is violated, and positively in the form of rewards when such
rules are complied. Institutions exist both as formal entities through constitutions,
laws and well-detlned property rights; and as informal agents through customs,
traditions, norms, codes of conduct, social taboos etc.
Bromley (1989: 42) detlnes institutions in terns of 'conventions' and
'entitlements'. For Bromley, conventions are regularities in human behaviour, which
everyone prefers to comply on the expectation that all others will also GO the same.
Thus, conventions are structured set of expectations about behaviour, and of actual
behaviour, which evolve out of shared and dominant preferences for the ultimate
4 On certain occasions differences between formal laws and working rules arise. In such situations, working rules may provide de /aclo rights over a resource that are contrary to de jure rights provided by formal laws. The whole discourse of legal pluralism addresses these issues (see, Pradhan e/ al .. , 1997; Bruns and Menzen-Dick, 2000; Merry, 1988). However, Ostrom concentrates only on de/aclo rights that are actually used in CPR settings.
5 In fact, prior to Ostrom, Commons (1957) used the term 'rules in use' or 'working rules', which are those actually used, monitored and enforced when individuals make choices of taking certain actions.
4()
outcome'. Entitlements are 'socially recognised and sanctioned set of expectations for
everyone in society, which define the choice sets of individuals with respect to the
choice sets of others'. While driving motor vehicles on a particular side of the road
may be cited as an example of conventions, the concept of ownership of an object for
that of entitlement (see Challen, 2000: 14).
Institutions, thus, toml the basis for human interaction and relationship among
indiyiduals a within society, consisting of both formal and infonnal entities. They
provide a set of rules tor cooperation and competition and thereby adjust conflicting
claims of ditTerent members of community and of groups tor scarce resources.
For sustainable management of local common pool resources the rules for
access and use of the resource should be locally devised and should be simple and
easy to be understood by the community members (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Wade,
1988; Ostrom. 1990). [n locally devised rules, it becomes easier to accommodate the
changing circumstances and varying demands from the community. Besides,
participation of all the appropriators in designing and modifying the rules that would
affect their status of resource use is also important for sustainable resource
management.
Mere presence of good rules to regulate access and use of the resource,
however, does not entail sustainability of the resource system. The rules must be
complied by all the appropriators and there should be effective monitoring system to
regulate rule violation and free-riding. Ostrom (1990: 94) mentions that the monitors
who audit the appropriators' behaviour and resource systems to avoid free-riding
'should either be appropriators themselves or should be accountable to the
appropriators'. [n case of any deviant behaviour in complying the rules, there should
be 'graduated sanctions' to punish those who violate the rules (Wade, 1988 and
Ostrom, 1990). 'Loss of reputation' also functions as a t,'Taduated sanction in case of
monitoring any rule violation (Wade, 1988: 193).
Wade (1988:2 I 6) points out that easy 'noticeability' of the rule-breaking as a
facilitating condition for successful collective action. [f the violation of rules is easily
noticed by the appropriators or monitors of common pool resources, the chances of
47
success tn collective action for sustainable resource management is higher. Easy
noticeabilty is related to other variables like size of a resource system, locational
distance of the community from the resource to be protected and size of the
community. Larger size of the resource, greater distance from the resource to be
protected and bigger size of the community often makes the job of noticing rule
violation difficult.
Resolution of conflicts that arise in the process of resource management is
very much central to commons management. Ostrom (1990: 100) mentions that
appropriators of a resource system should have access to 'low cost adjudication
mechanisms to resolve the conflicts among the appropriators or between appropriators
and officials'.
1.6.5. External Factors
Despite the fact that community based collective action is very much central to
sustainable management of common property, external factors often influence the
collective action significantly. Both Ostrom (1990) and Wade (1988) strongly argue
in favour of minimal intervention from State in community's efforts towards self
governance of common pool resources. In most commons situations, the appropriators
design locally devised rules and form local organisations, which are very much
informal in nature and lack the backup of any legal sanctions. In such a situation, if
the state starts challenging or undermining the rights and authorities of the
appropriators to organise themselves for the management of the resource - which the
state considers of its own - then it becomes difficult on the part of the local resource
users to sustain the common for a longer period.
However, Baland and Platteau (1996) argue in favour of a strong and positive
role of the state in terms of financial aid, external assistance, subsidy, etc. Since
rehabilitation of some of the common pool resources are long term affairs,
conservation of these resources may come in the way of livelihood of the rural poor.
In such circumstances, external assistance or subsidies play a crucial role. 10dha
(1992: 46 - 8) mentions that in the absence of special economic incentives to the rural
poor from the state, 'they tend to adopt measures manifesting a high degree of
desperation, i.e., premature harvesting of commons products, increased frequency and
48
un seasonal lopping of tress, overcrowding of the commons, and the use of inferior
products that are possibly health-damaging' (cited in Baland and Platteau, 1996: 293).
Baland and Platteau conclude that even the rural populace are aware of the recent
conditions of resource depletion and degradation, they may not likely to participate in
conservation efforts 'if they do not receive external assistance to tide over the critical
period during which they must build up their resources to a steady-state level where it
can be optimally maintained (1996: 295).
From a study of 104 peasant cooperative institutions in Paraguay, Molinas
(1998: 421 - 2) concludes that external assistance often attempt to enhance the
prospects for successful cooperation by providing economic incentives to cooperation,
assisting in detection of defectors, educating local agents about their mutual
dependencies and providing organisational training'. However, Molinas (1998) also
warns of external assistance by highlighting some of its negative impacts arrived at by
other scholars. External intervention in community activities in the form of assistance,
Molinas mentions, 'may affect the local level cooperation since it can: a) exacerbate
asymmetries of interest and endowments among community members increasing the
levels of conflicts among them (Lam, 1994), b) crowd out informal networks (Evans,
1996), and c) destroy the conditions for associational autonomy that might help
organisational development' (Heller, 1996) (cited in Molinas, 1998: 416).
Agrawal (2002) emphasises 'articulation with market' as an important factor
affecting the chances of success of local level collective action for commons
management. A higher degree of market integration into the lives of local people
often makes the chances of organisation for collective outcomes at the local level
difficult. With better access to markets, which, in tum, brings with it cash exchanges,
the subsistence users tend to overuse and increase their rate of harvest from the
common pool resource in order to get higher profits from the market (Carrier, 1987;
Colchester, 1994 and Stocks, 1987 cited in Agrawal, 2002: 56 - 7). Such a process
makes the subsistence users as well as their use of the common pool resource market
oriented and thus, increases their demand, which the resource system may not be able
to provide.
49
Besides a higher economic return, market integration also affects local lc\cl
collective action by 'introducing new ways for resolving the risks that common
property institutions are designed to address' (Agrawal, 2002: 57). Common pool
resources are highly valued by local people since it addresses to a b'Teater extent the
problems like scarcity and risk in rural communities. However, with markct
penetration into rural communities such problems of scarcity and risk are taken carc
by the market with its mechanism of 'surplus exchange'. Since different people of thc
same community gain differently from market exchange, the existing incentivc
structure of the community members towards protecting common pool resources also
faces a change. The process of market integration also affects the local level collective
action by affecting the local power relations in the changing circumstances
(Fernandes el al., 1988; Jessup and Peluso, 1986; Peluso, 1992 cited in Agrawal,
2002: 57).
50
CHAPTER II
Dissecting the Community:
Search for Impeccable Characteristics for Collective Action
2.1. Community in Conservation and Management
The tenn 'community', in the last couple of decades, has emerged as a panacea to the
problems of under-development and natural resource degradation in the third world
countries; and has, thus, occupied the centre stage in policies promoting
'development', 'democratisation' and 'conservation'. A complete array of factors
have joined together to make community attractive to the policy makers, and bestow
on it the status that it enjoys today in the policy arena. A strong disillusionment with
the perfonnances of the state in delivering the fruits of development to the people,
coupled with market imperfections in distributing rewards equitably, are a few among
several other reasons that have resulted in looking forward to the communities for
solutions. Therefore, academicians, policy makers and development practitioners are
now of the opinion that resorting back to communities along with an increased
emphasis on popular local participation can help achieving broader goals, which,
otherwise, would have been difficult to achieve. However, a historical perspective on
the role of community in the policy arena may suggest otherwise. Traditionally,
communities have been out of place in developmental debate and did not enjoy the
kind of attention that now they seem to enjoy. The marginalisation of community in
almost all spheres of policy activities notwithstanding, in the following paragraphs, I
concentrate on the ore-emergence of community' in conservation and management of
local natural resources. Before that, it is apt to engage in a general understanding of
the history of the community in Indian developmental experience
2.1.1. Back to the Community
I have used the word ore-emergence' of communities, keeping in mind that
'panchayats', 'village republics' or governing councils of village elders have been in
existence, in some fonn or the other, since ancient times. These councils, sometimes
in the fonn of caste panchayats, have been responsible for managing the overall
51
affairs of the village communities. During the period prior to the British Conquest,
there have been instances of forests being owned and managed by self-sufficient
village communities with traditional practices and indigenous knowledge, though de
jure ownership of the forests were in the hands of the king, which resulted in the
effective conservation of Indian forests through religious sanctions and social
regulations (see, Guha, 1983; 1989). Many traditional Indian scriptures, including
Manusmriti. Kautilya's Arthasashtra. and the two great epics of Ramayalla and
Mahabharata. speak of the existence of such village level organisations to cater to the
needs of rural communities. The reliability of such traditional and religious scriptures
has been debated and has been modified by contemporary historians (see, Stein, 1980;
Thapar, 1984).
Perhaps the first modem attempt to note down the characteristics of village
communities was by Sir Charles Metcalfe, a nineteenth century British official, who
wrote about the village communities as 'little republics having nearly everything they
want within themselves and almost independent of foreign relations. They seem to
last where nothing else lasts' (Metcalfe, 1830: 331 - 32; cited in Vasavada et al.,
1999: 153). Despite the impression sounding to be extreme, it no doubt proves the
existence of independent community organisations at the village level during the pre
colonial period. Nehru's (1946) masterpiece, The Discovery of India. also makes a
reference to such independent village panchayats in the traditional India. The
existence of such village level organisations notwithstanding, scholars have opined
that 'they have been progressively undermined by the introduction of British legal
system, by British method of revenue collection and, outside the northern and parts of
central India, by the introduction ofzamindari and ryotwari land tenure systems' (see,
Vasavadaetal., 1999: 154).
During the time of independence, when the importance of communities had
already been relegated to a comer, India had two alternative models of development
and reconstruction: the Gandhian model of reviving the village economy as the basis
of development, and the Nehruvian model of development through rapid
industrialisation. While Gandhi visualised the village community to be the core of
developmental programmes and a platform from where to begin the process of
development of the nation, it was lawaharlal Nehru who envisioned a modem India
52
with rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. On 5th October 1945, Gandhi wrote a
letter to Nehru in which he outlined his dream of free India:
I believe that, if India is to attain tnle freedom, and through India the world as well, then sooner or later we will have to live in villages - in huts, not in palaces. A few billion people can never live happily and peacefully in cities and palaces ... my village exists today in my imagination ... Men and women in this imagined village will live freely, he prepared to face the world. The village will not know cholera, plague or smallpox. After all this, I can think of many things, which will have to be produced on large scale. May be there will be railways, so also post and telegraph. What it will have and what it will not, I do not know. Nor do I care. If I can maintain the essence. the rest will mean free facility to come and settle. And if / leave the essence, I leave everything ... (cited in Baviskar, 1995: 20).
Despite Gandhi's emphasis on returning back to communities as the centre
stage of development and progress, his ideas were discarded in independent India,
mostly by the ideas of nationalist leaders, such as Nehru, Patel and others. Nehru's
extraordinary reliance on industrial progress and new scienticism - partly influenced
by the West and above all by his exposure to a wider worldview - did not take into
consideration Gandhi's idea of self-reliance village communities. Responding to
Gandhi's letter he wrote:
It is many years since I read Hind Swarai and I have only a vague picture in my mind ... A village, normally speaking, is backward intellectually, culturally and no progress can be made from a bacbvard environment ... (cited in Baviskar, 1995. 21).
The then nationalist leaders and development planners believed that through
rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, and through creation of a strong nation state,
India could catch up with the West. It was believed that developmental outcomes
achieved through rapid industrialisation would trickle down to village communities,
and economic growth would automatically bring about socio-political development of
the Indian masses. In the process, the 'community' was further sidelined and the idea
of nationalism and national interest swayed over the interests of the community. The
reflection to it was visible in almost all sectors of development, more prominent being
in the natural resources, with nationalisation of forests, creation of reserved and
protected areas undermining the needs and requirements of the communities.
Communities were kept out of planning and management of natural resources, and
remained at the receiving end of government policies, which were so much state
centric in nature.
53
The relegation of the notion of community was further supported with the
advancement of new sociological theories of social change and development. The
sociologists of 19th and early 20lh century, such as Sir Henry Maine, Auguste Comte,
Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies, Karl Marx and Max Weber
tried to capture the ongoing changes that were happening during their period as
disappearance of communities and its replacement by a new form of social
organisation, which was more individualistic, impersonal and heterogeneous in
nature.6
These theorists described that members of the society of their time came to
relate each other in completely different terms than that of past. In this newer form of
interaction and society, 'status, tradition and religion gave way to equality, modernity
and a scientific temper' (Agrawal, 1999). The differential treatment to the processes
of change in the writings of these scholars notwithstanding, a factor, which was
common to all, was that the modem society was fundamentally different from
anything that had come before, and in this modem society there has been a decline in
the local forms of social organisation, namely, the community.
The modernisation theorists of mid 20lh century out-rightly rejected the notion
of the community and pitted it against marketisation, industrialisation and economic
growth. J The modernisation theorists visualised particularistic affiliation to religion,
traditions, and ethnicity as impediments to modernisation and economic development
and openly argued against community, which clung to such factors. Most importantly,
they saw the cultural, institutional and organisational features of poorer countries,
which revolved around community feelings, as roadblocks in their attempts to develop
and democratise (Roberts and Hite, 2000: 8 -9). Community was visualised as a
potential obstacle to modernity, growth and development, which were considered as
very much desirable. The effective way to modernise, grow and develop was,
therefore, visualised through eroding and/or doing away with the feelings and ties that
community encouraged.
6 For a detailed understanding of these theories see Aron, 1970; Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Roberts and Hite, 2000; Giddens, 1992. To understand the shifting position of the community in these theories of change and evolution, see, Agrawal, 1999, and Agrawal and Gibson, 1999.
7 See Huntington, 1971; Inkeles, 1969; Lerner, 1958; Rostow, 1971; McClelland, 1961 and Hoselitz, 1964 for a better understanding of the modernisation theory.
54
Drawing insights from some of these theories and OWIng to our own
developmental experience of first few years of independence, the concept
'community' became out of fashion from the lexicon of development and
conservation. With the adoption of Nehruvian economy of rapid economic growth
with large-scale industrialisation, people-based development lost its focus and
significance, and development became a state prerogative. Although the nced for
development of rural communities was acknowledged, it became the responsibility of
the state to deliver the fruits of development to the rural communities through top
down models of development. Thus, the engines to rural development such as
Panchayati Raj, Community Development Programmes, etc., all came under the direct
control of the state mechanism.
However, the situation began to change in the 1970s, when criticisms started
pouring against the dominant paradigms of mainstream development. 8 Disillusioned
by the developmental experience of previous two to two and half decades,
academicians and development practitioners became critical towards GNP-focused,
growth-centred development. The dismal results of state-centred development
coupled with the increasing cost to deliver development, forced the policy makers to
move towards a new approach to development, an approach, which visualiscd
people's participation, equity and sustainability to be the centre-stage of development
process. With such a changing approach to development, the community again
reemerged as the core of development and began taking the responsibility of
conservIng natural resources in its vicinity and empowering its members through
greater decentralisation.
Having gained a perspective on the historical reemergence of community, in
general, I now move forward to discuss how the community has been perceived in the
conservation and management of natural resources.
8 Fore a critique of mainstream development and the search for an alternative paradigm, see, Dube, 1988; Haq, 1976. The underdevelopment theories also pose a structural critique to modernised approach to development. For details, see, Santos, 1969; Baran, 1962; Frank, 1971.
55
2.1.2. Community in Conservation
The history of community in conservation, like in development, is also a revivalist
one. Prior to independence, it was the responsibility of the village communities to
look after their village tanks for irrigation and drinking water, forests for food, fodder
and fuel wood, village pasture land for common grazing, etc. The village communities
had autonomous institutions in this regard. However, with the passage of time such
institutions became defunct and as a result, the resources started degrading.
With the coming up of British Raj in India, the colonial administration tried to
consolidate the state power, and as a repercussion monopolised the natural resources
of the country.9 The colonial attitude to monopolise the natural resources was more
visible in the forestry sector. With the introduction of scientific forestry and
reservation of forest blocks, the communities became outsiders to resource
management, which became the sole responsibility of the colonial state. The
marginalised status of community could not see a positive attitude even after
independence. The policy of centralisation and monopolization of natural resources,
which was in vogue during the British Raj, was reinforced, intensified and extended
even after independence. The legal successor to the colonial state - the political and
economic elites of modem independent India - continued to rely on earlier colonial
legal usurpation of India's natural resources and reinforced the rights of the state to
exclusive control over such resources.
At the policy level also the scholarly writings concemmg conservation of
natural resources perceived communities as a threat to protection of precious natural
resources (see Hardin, 1968; Eckholm, 1976). It was perceived that conservation of
natural resources require their protection from human interference, whereas members
of local communities depend upon them for their daily livelihood and thus exploit
them without any restraint (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 631). Further, Hardin's (1968)
seminal work, The Tragedy oj' the Commons, theoretically proved that human
interference into natural resources would ultimately result in degradation of the
resource. Hardin's thesis concluded that co-users of a common pool natural resource
are trapped in a situation in which, in the absence of any regulated access to the
9 For an understanding of the ecological history of Indian and the colonial treatment to India's forests, see, Guha, 1989; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Grove, 1998.
56
resource, each rational user is motivated to consume/use more and more units of the
resource system till the resource is completely degraded. Thus, collective and
unregulated use of the resource would finally lead to its overuse and degradation, and
individual rationality of each user would not favour any coordinated action to regulate
the use of the resource. Such being the inherent problem, the solution, which was put
forth by Hardin and many other scholars, (Demsetz, 1967; Smith, 1981; Ophuls,
1973; Hardin, 1978) was either to nationalise or privatise the resource, wherever
feasible.
In either of the solutions to the problems of natural resources, the community
couldn't find a place for itself in the conservation activities of natural resources. It
should be pointed out, however, that while designing such solutions to the problems
of overuse and degradation of natural resources, the scholars had only in mind the
physical sustainability of the resource, undermining the needs and requirements of the
local population, who depended upon such resources for substantial part of their
livelihood. The scholars and policy makers arguing for nationalisation and/or
privatisation of natural resources failed to perceive the sheer presence of human
population inside the natural resources arena and the intrinsic relation between rural
communities and their immediate resource base. However, an one-sided approach to
the problem of natural resources couldn't succeed in conserving the natural resources.
Later studies on the effect of nationalisation of resource base made it clear that
nationalisation converted the common pool resource to a de jure state property, while
in reality degenerating it into de facto open access regime (Arnold, 1998; Arnold and
Stewart, 1991). The heavy hand of the state in monopolising and centralising the
natural resources in India, say forests, always coexisted, paradoxically, with
degradation of India's forest resources. Even though, the problem of deforestation has
been controlled to some extent, the real problem in India's forests has always
remained with 'degradation' of the quality of forests (Kumar et al., 1999).
The persistent degradation of India's natural resources despite strong policies
of centralisation and state control, in the last couple of decades, has questioned the
very premise of state's policies towards natural resource conservation. The
disillusionment with regard to the state-centred development, it is being perceived
now has also included in it dismal results of state-centred natural resource ,
57
management. The failure of the state-centric approach has proved that very few
alternatives other than community-based approach exist (see, Wells and Brandon,
1992; Gibson and Marks, 1995).
Besides the state-failure in conserving natural resources, despite strong
policies of centralisation, there are various other factors, which have contributed to
the reemergence of the community in conservation activities. Broadly speaking four
factors may be identified, that have compelled the policy makers to look upon the
community as the starting point of conservation.
First, failures of the prevIOus two and half developmental decades (1950s,
1960s and up to mid 1970s) have already made it clear in the early 1980s the
limitations of the state. It has been affirmed that the state is not the only agency for
development of the local people, and debates about the potentials of the community
have already begun. This, coupled with limitations of state in conserving natural
resources alone, again strengthened the positions of the community as potential
partners in the process of development and conservation.
Secondly, with the spread of popular democracy and decentralisation, and
above all with increasing demand on people's participation, the unrepresentative
policies of conservation came into criticism (see Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). The
reflections of policy changes at the larger level for deepening democracy, widening
development up to the grass-root level and empowering the indigenous population
also became visible in the natural resource sector. Empowering the local people and
accelerating their development process and allowing them a greater say in the policies
that affected their livelihood were perceived only through uplifting 'communities' and
giving them a share in natural resource conservation.
Thirdly, evolution of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) as an
intermediary in development, which relied more on community than state, also
contributed to the changing status of the community in the conservation debate today.
The efforts of the NGOs to amplify the voices of the local indigcnous population, and
build their capacity for collective action at the local level for their own development
have also helped the community in regaining its strength and being able to conserve
58
and manage its local natural resources. Further, the flow of heavy tinancial aids from
external donor agencies, who emphasise on local knowledge and people's
participation, boosted the communities to take the lead role in conservation activities
with the help oflocal NGOs.
Finally, the scholarly writings about the ecological histories,
environmentalism and success stories of communities managing their local resources
sustainably also strengthened the position of community. Historical ecologists
emphasised the 'anthropogenic' nature of forest and the inalienable history of
environments and human population (see Denevan, 1992; Anderson and Posey,
1989). Agrawal and Gibson (I 999: 632) summarising the works of ecological
historians state that, 'new revisionist ecological research began to question the two
main planks of coercive conservation. First was that pristine environments untouched
by human hands existed until the very recent past. The second was the belief that
indigenous and other local communities had been relati vel y isolated in the past, and
therefore, used their resources sustainably'. In the tropical areas the growing presence
of human population in the forested areas made creation of wildlife areas and
conservation parks without human interference a difficult proposition. Even the
Indian environmental historians (see, Gadgil and Guha, 1995; Guha and Martinez
Alier, 1997; Guha, 2000) have also pointed out that the peculiarity of southern
environmentalism, and Indian environmentalism in particular, lay in its inseparability
from human population. Unlike northern America, where a clear distinction between
natural landscape and human landscape exists, the Indian natural landscape has
always coexisted with human population. Under such conditions, it became clear that
any policy aiming at excluding local communities from conservation activities is
bound to be failed.
Adding to these historical writings, the current advancement of research In
common property has also glorified the capabilities of local communities In
sustainable management of its local natural resources (See Berkes, 1991; Bromley et
al., 1992; McKean, 1992; NRC, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). These works have
pointed towards community as a suitable alternative to nationalisation and
privatisation, highlighting the importance of local knowledge and local institutional
arrangements. The case studies depicting success stories of resource management by
59
local communities have challenged the notion that state control and privatisation are
necessarily the only preferred solutions to problems of natural resource management.
Consequently, community management of common pool natural resources has been
acknowledged as a third solution to commons problems by scholars from vanous
disciplines.
Recognition of the significance of community III conservation and
management activities of natural resources leaves us with a further question: do all
communities are equally capable of sustainable resource management? If returning
back to the community is the preferred solution to the problems of over-use, free
riding and degradation of natural common pool resources, then why do some
communities succeed in collective action for sustainable management of local natural
resources and some fail in this attempt? Or, as indeed the question, what are the
characteristic features of the community that support community-based conservation?
There are several characteristics of the community, which favour collective action
like, smallness in size, strong and effective leadership, successful past record of
collective action, shared norms and reciprocity, etc., which I have already discussed in
the previous chapter. In the following section, I therefore, make an attempt to review
various scholarly works pertaining to the nature of the community - in tenns of
homogeneity and heterogeneity -and its potential for collective action at the local
level for sustainable resource management.
2.2. Community Characteristics and Sustainable Collective Action
Notwithstanding the tact that scholars on community-based common pool resource
management seem to agree on facilitating or favourable conditions for successful
collective action at the community level to sustainably manage the local commonslO
,
there still persists ambiguity regarding the relationship between the nature of the
community and successful collective action. The twin issue of 'group size' and 'social
composition' of the group in terms of homogeneity or heterogeneity form an
10 For an understanding of these factors see, Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990 and Wade, 1988. An attempt has been made in the previous chapter t to summarise these pre-conditions for successful collective action.
60
important and ambiguous explanation among several others for answenng the
question as to what are the conducive factors for successful collective action.
Scholars, while attempting to answer such questions, vary from each other, both
theoretically and otherwise, in their explanation of the role played by the nature of the
community - in terms of homogeneity and heterogeneity - in achieving success in
any attempt for collective action. Broadly speaking, there seems to be at least two
schools of thought concerning the nature of community (heterogeneous vs.
homogeneous) and its potential for collective action for sustainable management of
natural resources. The first believes that homogeneous or small communities are more
capable or even a pre-condition for collective action or co-management. The other
argues that homogeneity of the community is not a precondition, and instead
heterogeneity can even be an instrument of collective action.
2.2.1. Explaining Heterogeneity
Before going further to discuss the positive or negative role played by heterogeneity
in local level collective action, it is appropriate to conceptualise the term
heterogeneity and mention what are the different types of heterogeneity that carry the
potential to affect collective action. Baland and Platteau (1996: 303 - 12) identify
three sources of heterogeneity, which may affect the capability or the motivation of
resource users to participate in collective action:
First, heterogeneity resulting from cultural divisions such as caste, race and ethnic
identity.
Second, heterogeneity originating from inter-village variations in critical endowments
such as skills, wealth, etc.
Finally, heterogeneity arising from differential interests of users in the resource and
for collective action.
The cultural heterogeneity, arising out of caste and ethnic differentiations, may
lead to differential interpretation of norms and often prohibit any effort based on
shared norms. The second source of heterogeneity arising out of variations of critical
endowments mainly pertains to 'economic inequality' of the resource users in a
community. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson identify several variants of economic
heterogeneity, such as a) inequality in wealth or income among the members of a
resource-user group, b) inequality in the sacrifices (contributions) community
61
members make in cooperating with commons-management regimes, c) inequalities in
the benefits they derive from such regimes, and d) inequalities In outside earning
opportunities, which increase the 'exit options' (2002: 88).
The differential interests of uses primarily arise because of their differential
use of the same resource system. Further, differential use of the resource may also
arise owing to factors like ones occupation, position in the caste hierarchy, gender etc.
Differential interests in common pool resource pose a problem to successful collective
action since it pits different users of the resource against each other. For example, the
interests of shepherds, who primarily depend upon forest for !,'Tazing their cattle, may
come in the way of the interest of the rest of the community, which advocates closure
of grazing for regeneration of the forest. In the case of water resource, Meinzen-Dick
and Jackson (1996) argue that differential use of the resource based upon gender
differentials often pitted the interests of women who needed water for cleaning and
cooking against the interests of men whose primary interest in water lay in irrigating
cash crops for increasing income.
To these sources of heterogeneity, Vedeld (2000) adds another type of
heterogeneity, i.e., 'political heterogeneity', which plays a significant role in deciding
the possibility of collective action for commons management. Political heterogeneity,
Vedeld argues, may significantly affect local efforts since it creates opportunities for
conflict among leadership groups leading ultimately to intra group rivalries.
Having discussed various types of heterogeneity, let me now tum to focus the
impact (whether positive or negative) of heterogeneity on commons management
outcomes from a review of works done by various scholars on different types of
commons.
2.2.2. Heterogeneity as a Favourable Condition
It has been pointed out earlier that scholars tend to divide into two camps in their
efforts to analyse the role of heterogeneity in collective action. The scholars who
favour heterogeneity to gain collective outcomes mostly derive their argument from
the theoretical work of Mancur Olson (1965), who stated that small groups with
62
considerable inequality have more chance of achieving collective goods. Olson (1965:
34) has explained that:
'in small groups marked by considerable degree of inequality, there is greatest likelihood that collective good will be provided, for the greater the interest ill collective good of any single members, the greater the likelihood that that member will get such a significant proportion of the total benefit from the collective good that he will gain from seeing that the good if provided, even if he has to pay all of the cost himself',
Olson's proposition suggests that heterogeneity is favourable for successful
collective action, since a heterogeneous group may possess certain members whose
interest in collective good is comparatively higher than the average members as they
gain from the collective good proportionately higher than the rest of the community I I.
Such an argument, which Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) term as 'Olson effect'
has been further explained empirically by various scholars working in the area of
farmer-managed irrigation systems, where the local elites have taken the
responsibility of providing assured and timely irrigation water to the community, from
which they gain proportionately higher, compared to other members of the
community.
Wade's pioneering study of farmer-managed irrigation systems in Andhra
Pradesh suggests that economic inequality was not necessarily an obstacle to co
management of resources. The South Indian villages studied by Wade are marked by
sharp inter-household differences in terms of landholding and wealth. In the
Kottapalle village, where Wade conducted his field work, holdings were typically
scattered and land owners had a plot close to an irrigation outlet and another plot
close to the tail-end of another outlet. For this reason, all land owners had a common
interest in establishing and enforcing a system of regulating access to water (1988:
185 - 90), Wade had examined, also, the leadership role played by the village elites,
a factor, which was commonly associated with successful collective action and
effective co-management of natural resources. He has found that economic inequality
II Further advancement to this argument has been done by scholars of critical mass, who argue that a heterogeneous group has more chance of success in collective action, since it possesses a 'critical mass' - a pool of highly resourceful and interested individuals·- who will provide the collective good for the rest of Ihe community (see, Heckathorn, 1993: Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Marwell et al., 1988; Oliver, 19RO and Oliver et ai., 1985),
63
provided the necessary impetus for playing a suitable leadership role. Since the
benefits of co-management of irrigation systems were positively related to land area,
the elites had a disproportionately greater interest in effective regulation of water
resources. This greater benefits in proportion to their landholdings motivated the elites
to take the role of leadership, which in tum, ensured successful collective action
(I988: 190). Similarly, Vaidyanathan (1986) has explored the historical importance of
local elites in promoting the emergence of irrigation management regimes in India,
China and Japan. 12
A few more studies have also found evidence of a non-negative role played by
heterogeneity of the community. Some of these studies are proven outside the
subcontinent. Based on his study in Mali, Vedeld concludes that small size and
homogeneous groups were not the general preconditions for greater ability to perform
collectively in stratified village society (2000: 125). Vedeld identifies five different
sources of heterogeneity, such as,
a) political heterogeneity (disagreement on the legitimacy of the leaders)
b) heterogeneity in endowment (unequal access to land and CPR)
c) heterogeneity in wealth or entitlement (large differentiation in crop production
income)
d) heterogeneity in economic interests (diversity in the type of use of CPR)
e) heterogeneity in cultures (large differences in level of education, values and life
orientation).
Out of these five sources of heterogeneity, according to Vedeld, heterogeneity
among leaders or political heterogeneity was crucial for collective action. In the two
villages studied by him, successful collective action was possible only in one due to
homogeneous leadership structure despite the presence of other sources of
heterogeneity. In the other village, the leaders were heterogeneous along most
dimensions. Thus, Vedeld has concluded that homogeneity among leadership and elite
groups enhanced the capacity for collective action in a social group even when there
was heterogeneity in other respects. Vedeld states 'a heterogeneous community is
capable of finding solutions to the collective action dilemma, as long as there is a
12 For arguments about the role of leadership in resource management, see, Chand, 1994; Jayraman, 1981 and Jewit, 1998.
64
reasonable degree of homogeneity among the leadership group' (2000: 125). He also
adds that capacity for collective action was particularly undennined or at risk when
hcterogeneity in economic interests between the elite groups intensified and coincided
with political, endowment, entitlement and cultural heterogeneity. Collective action is
enhanced by political elites and leaders being a bit better endowed (more CPRs or
lands) and a bit wealthier than the average community members, since the larger asset
owners are likely to benefit more and be willing to take on extra burdens in
maintenance and enforcing the regimes (2000: 125 - 26).
Varughese and Ostrom (200 I) from their study of 18 forest user groups in
Nepal, conclude that heterogeneity was not necessarily a strong predictor of local
level collective action. They have identified three sources of heterogeneity, i.e.
locational differential, wealth disparity and socio-cultural differentials of the forest
user groups. Out of the three sources, the first and the last source of heterogeneity
have negligible positive association with collective action, whereas wealth disparity
indicated a modest negative relation with the level of collective action. Thus,
Varughese and Ostrom argue that heterogeneity is a challenge that can be overcome
by crafting innovative institutional arrangements well matched to their local
circumstances (200 I: 762).
Ostrom and Gardner (1993), from their empirical analysis of several fanner
managed irrigation systems in Nepal, also acknowledge that asymmetries
(heterogeneities) among the participants of a common pool resource management
could present substantial barriers to equitable water distribution among head-end and
tail-end fanners. However, these asymmetries, they opine, 'are frequently overcome
in settings where fanners are made aware of their mutual dependencies' (1993: \09).
A clear perception of mutual dependency and assurance of cooperation help a
heterogeneous community to succeed in collective action dilemma. Ostrom and
Gardner (1993) mention that when the users of a resource expected to relate to one
another for a long tenn basis, such expectations of mutual dependency and assurance
of future cooperation became easy and they tended to design rules that lead to higher
yields and to a reduction in the asymmetry of results.
65
Drawing upon a survey of 104 peasant cooperative institutions in Paraguay,
Molinas (1998) has fond an inverted U shaped relationship between economic
heterogeneity and group performance for local level collective action. Molinas
mentions that 'in highly equal communities a coordination problem may arise because
nobody has a differentiated incentive to be the committee's organiser' (1998: 420). At
the same time, a high degree of inequality makes it difficult for committees to
organise effectively. Molinas has concluded that a moderate level of inequality was
related to high group performance. Contrary to this, Bardhan (2000) presents a model
of U shaped relationship between inequality and local level collective action for
harvesting in fishery. They argue that collective action can be successful either in low
or extreme high level of inequality.
2.2.3. Heterogeneity as an Impeding Condition
Several Scholars have also pointed out the negative role played by group
heterogeneity in local level collective action for commons management. Scholars who
argue in favour of negative impact of heterogeneity state that the members in a small
and homogeneous group have frequent and personalised relationships and thus,
consider the more indirect and long-term consequences of their choices instead of
immediate costs and benefits. Besides, close and face-to-face nature of these
relationships ensures that people are well informed about each other's actions and
preferences. Moreover, in small and homogeneous groups the incentives are more to
behave in a group-oriented way (Baland and Platteau, 1996: 298 - 99). Nugent (1993:
624) adds that in smaller and more closed groups the operational costs tend be lower
and the ability to observe any free riding by others would be greater.
The advocates of community based resource management, who argue for a
homogeneous community for successful resource management, thus, put forward a
conceptualisation of the community, which is territorially bounded, small sized and
homogeneous in nature. It implies that social inequality and heterogeneity of the
community structure is negatively associated with successful resource management
by the community. It is in such situations that the problem of free rider pose a severe
challenge to successful community management of local resources. The solution,
which is put forwarded, is to create homogeneous sub-groups, who have similar
interests within a larger village community. Wilson and Thompson, for example, in
66
their attempt to analyse the break down of 'ejidos' (the pastoral commons) in Mexico
argue that, "pastoral management at community level has proved a failure,
presumably owing to the excessive size of the group concerned, However, this failure
of group management, indeed, has led in a significant number of cases to the
formation of grazing- coalitions within smaller groups where cooperation is assured
and benefits are enjoyed under severe ecological conditions" (1993: 300), The most
etlcctive of these smaller grazing associations are, they claim, based upon the
extended family. In the field of irrigation too, available empirical evidence tends to
suggest that cooperation for successful management of irrigation systems work better
in relatively small groups (Bardhan, 2000: 851). Coward, likewise, points out that "for
the purpose of irrigation organisations the critical unit is the 'irrigation community',
composed of field neighbours, and not the village community composed of residential
neighbours" (Coward, 1980: 208; cited in Wade, 1988: 214). Dayton-Johnson (1999)
conducted a study in 49 community managed irrigation systems known as 'unidades
de riego' in the central Mexican state of Guanajuato. His study concludes that social
heterogeneity is consistently and significantly associated with lower levels of
infrastructure maintenance. Inequality in landholding has also a negative effect on
maintenance. From his study of 22 community irrigation systems in several countries,
Tang (1991) has reached the conclusion that even a slight variance in family income
among irrigators tended to be associated with variation in the extent to which rule
conformance and good maintenance occurred among the members.
Evidence found elsewhere is valid in Indian sub-continent as well as in regard
to the nature and size of the community and the success or otherwise of community
management of resources. Easter and Palanisami (1986) from their study of tank
irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu confirm that egalitarian social structure and uniform
land holding pattern encouraged collective action. The smaller the variation in farm
size, the I,Tfeater the likelihood that farmers would participate in decision making and
in the formation of Water Users' Association. Farmers believed that they would get
more or less equal benefits and had equal influence on the allocation of water
supplies. Likewise, Jayaraman (1981) notes in a study of surface water irrigation
projects in Gujarat, that relatively egalitarian structure of the community denoted by
size of the landholding and similar interests of members were significant factors
influencing the farmers' coming together to form Water Users' Association.
67
Some other scholars argue some degree of cultural homogeneity, in terms of
common set of beliefs and shared norms, is quite conducive for collective action;
since it substantially reduces the cost of negotiation and monitoring (Aggarwal,
2000). Shared norms are given priority in collective action, as they tend to combine
the user groups, even if they are diversified in several other aspects. Shared norms, in
a context of collective action for commons management, form the basis of binding
agreements (see Bardhan, 1993b; Ullman-Margailt, 1978).
Quiggin (1993), in his paper on 'Common Property, Equity and Development',
also argues the negative role played by group heterogeneity in arriving at a common
decision for common property management. He argues that collective decision
making process required for CPR management would work 'if the group of common
property owners is relatively homogeneous' (Quiggin, 1993: 1130). Contrarily,
diversity with respect to income or in other dimensions limits the likelihood of
emergence of a generally accepted pattern of resource use. John Quiggin particularly
stresses that 'equality in endowments is essential to the successful management of
common property institutions' (1993: 1129; also see Quiggin, 1988). One of the
negative impacts of endowment heterogeneity, which Quiggin mentions, is that
households with better endowments of land, labour and capital would be at an
advantageous position to comer or exploit the benefits of collective action, and
therefore, would receive a higher economic return. Platteau and Abraham (2002) also
point out such capture of a larger share of benefits from any coordinated action or . h . 13 developmental probJfamme III a eterogeneous commumty.
Perhaps, one of the systematic attempts to study the role of heterogeneity and
inequality of income distribution in cooperative behaviour for common property
management is by Ravi Kanbur (1992). Kanbur makes his argument by a review of
Jl The elites' capture of larger share of benefits from any developmental projects has been recognised now as the major dilemmas of decentralised development, where communities are traditional, hierarchical and heterogeneous in several aspects. Access to critical endowments like land, education and political positions puts the rural elites in a commanding position to take the leadership role on behalf of the community and, thereby, procure more benefits than average members of the community from any developmental project. For such elites' capture in decentralised development, see, Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999,2000; and Platteau and Abraham, 2002.
68
vanous scholarly works on common property, which includes works by Alexander
(1982), Cordell and McKean (1986), Coward (1979), Hariis (1977), Johnson and
Libecap (1982), Ostrom (1990), Schlager (1990), Tang (1992) and Wade (1986).
Based on a review of the work of above scholars, Kanbur concludes that 'greater
equity or greater homogeneity promotes greater efficiency in common property
management by facilitating the adoption of cooperative agreement' (1992: 21). He
further mentions that the existing agreements for common property management are
more likely to breakdown as the community becomes more heterogeneous.
The arguments of homogeneity versus heterogeneity and small versus big
notwithstanding, it has now been acknowledged that community plays a significant
role in conservation and management of local natural resources. Having recognised
such a claim, the question that remains is what makes a community? Or, which type
of community that the scholars of community-based natural resource management are
talking about. It seems from the arguments from advocates of community-based
conservation that a . distinct community exists', which should be made an integral part
of resource management activities. Having narrated the revival history of community
in general and its role in conservation and management of natural resources, in
particular, and having discussed the particular community characteristics that affect
- either positively or otherwise - I now move forward to discuss the nature of
community that we talk about in community-based conservation.
2.3. Images of the Community
Relatively a few concepts in social science literature have drawn the kind of attention,
as has community.14 And, in the changing circumstances of developmental discourse,
14 The communitarian-libertarian debate is very old in sociology. Unlike libertarians. who argue for greater individualism, individual liberty, individual choice, communitarians stress that individuals are not free-standmg agents, but members of the community. and give primacy to collectivity, community feeling and unselfishness and sacrificing characteristics of individuals. To understand this debate of communitarianism versus libertarianism see, Bell. 1993; Chatterjee, 1998; Phillips, 1993; and Selznick, 1992. Moving beyond this dichotomous distinction of communitarianism and libertarianism, Etzioni (1996) has coined the concept 'responsive community'. A responsive community is one, which does not always fix or set binding rules or norms for its members, but responds to the expressions of individual values. viewpoints and communications in refashioning its cultures and structure. For Etzioni. the central problem lies in the constant tension between centrifugal forces of autonomy and centripetal forces of community. Centrifugal forces lead individuals to set free and break out from community. dangerously reducing the social realm. And centripetal forces tend to collectivise the energies of members in the service of shared goals. and therefore. curb the individual freedom of
69
returning back to community has become the order of the day. However, the most
obvious notion that are juxtaposed to community in any discussion of it are 'small,
homogeneous, harmonious, territorially fixed, ascribed social units', having certain
common norms, in which there exists face to face interaction. Despite the current
writings on community-based conservation assert that community is central to
renewable resource management, they, however, seldom devote much attention to
analyse the concept of community or to explain precisely how the differential
elements of community affect the management outcomes.
Without paYIng much attention to the internal characteristics of the
community, the advocates of community-based conservation put forth the claim that
local communities have been existing in harmony with nature and thus, demonstrate
enduring patterns of sustainable, equitable and efficient use of the natural resource
(Berkes, 1991; Bromley and Cernia, 1989; Korten, 1986; McKay and Acheson, 1987).
Even the traditional, collective and inward looking characteristics of Eastern or third
world communities have been emphasised to strengthen the claim on behalf of
community. To quote Berkes and Farvar:
renewed interest in community is partly due to the new-found pride in traditional values and institutions. both in the Third World and in the West. Most cultures - certainly most of those in the Third World countries -emphasise responsibility to the community. rather than the unbridled individualism glorified in some Western industrial cultures. Communalism is an important mode of thinking and of managing resources through out the world. Fom nomads of Arabian peninsula to native Amerindian people. It is no accident that traditional resource-management systems are often community-based. .. (1991: 3-5).
Emphasising the traditional characteristics of communities, the scholars of
community-based conservation, often take resort to functionalist anthropological
approach, which envisions tradition as comprehensive set of binding rules that exists
for the welfare of the whole system (see Li, 1996). They further claim that such rules
guarantee livelihood security by providing 'access to vital natural resources, by
members (Etzioni, 1996: 304). [n such a circumstance, a responsive community tries to make a perfect balance between the two forces, resulting in the smooth functioning of the community. Also, see, Etzioni 1968 1991 for an understanding of the concept 'responsive community'. , ,
70
which, everyone in the community is assured of the opportunity to meet their basic
needs' (Berkes and Farvar, 1991: II).
Further, the advancement of research in game theory also emphasised the
small and bounded-ness characteristics of the community. Scholars focusing on
repeated games as a theoretical construct to avoid the problems of collective action
and free-riding, rely on concepts such as complete infonnation, face-to-face
interaction, trust, assurance, reciprocity, etc. which seem to present only on small,
egalitarian, homogeneous and territorially fixed communities (see Nugent, 1993;
Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Axelrod, 1981). Such conditions for successful
cooperation suggest that successful communities are small and homogeneous enough
to pass infonnation among its members, who interact with each other continuously on
a face-to-face basis over a longer period of time. Further, trust and reciprocity are
prone to exist in the context of small groups, primarily because, 'pre-play
communication, which is obviously easier to achieve when people are few, allows
individuals to reveal and signal their intended plans of action and to learn about
others' intentions' (Platteau and Abraham, 2002: 108).
Much of the literatures on community-based conservation emphasise upon
either cultural, - i.e., shared nonns, trust, reciprocity, face-to-face interaction - or
physical - i.e., smallness in size, territorial fixity, etc. - characteristics of the
community. Arun Agrawal sums up these two much emphasised characteristics of the
community as 'community - as - shared understanding' and/or 'community - as - social
organisation' (see, Agrawal, 1999; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).
Such a vision of the community as small, integrated entities using locally
evolved shared nonns and rules to manage resources sustainably and equitably is
powerful. It allows for contesting the dominant views, which advocates for either
nationalisation or privatisation of natural resources. Based upon such a vision of
community, scholars in recent years, have been successful in challenging the previous
dominant notions (see Li, 1996) such as: the tragedy of the commons and the
inevitability of private property in natural resources (e.g. Berkes, 1991; Acheson,
1989; Bromley and Cernia, 1989), and the perceived ignorance of peasants and
superiority of western knowledge, science and management (e.g. Chambers, 1983).
71
However, by viewing community as a unified organic whole, such an understanding
of community fails to capture the differences within communities and ignore how
these differences affect resource management out comes. To quote Agrawal and
Gibson:
'it also fails to reflect local politics and strategic interaction within commllnities as well as the possibility of layered alliances that can span mllitiple levels of politics" (1999: 633).
In reality, however, almost all communities, including the tribal ones, are
di\ided in itself. Besides the communities being hierarchical and conflict-ridden in
nature. the individuals within it are also caught up in over lapping circles of
relationship (see Sundar and Jeffery, 1999: 37). For instance, within one village
indi\idual may have links with other caste members within and outside the village,
with political parties, religious organisations, etc. Certain factors of community - such
as caste, race, religion, gender, etc. - may act as dividing lines within community.
Several scholars have countered such mythic view of community, as it is
usually (mis)representated in community-conservation debate. Agrawal (1999) finds
such static notion of community problematic both at representational and conceptual
levels. At the representational level it gave a wrong notion of the community, 'since
actual existing communities seldom correspond to the ideal of small, hannonious,
cooperati\e social entities', which the community-conservation debate imagined of
community to be. At the conceptual level it is problematic, since it is ditlicult to draw
any direct relationship between the shared understanding of community and its
physical characteristics of 'smallness' in size (A/,Tfawal, 1999: 101).
The notion of shared understanding and face-to-face relation that the
advocates of community-based conservation portray are also criticised in several
ways. Shared understanding, unanimity, homogeneity is as much a part of community
a~ divergent opinions, differences and heterogeneity. To quote Sabean, "what matters
is not that villagers share the same views, but that they share a language in which
those views can he discussed and disa/,Tfeements can be sorted out" (Sabean, 1988: 28;
cited in Sundar and Jeffery, 1999: 37). It is the negotiation of differential opinions
among the members of community, which is important from community-based
72
conservation point of view, rather than shared understanding itself. Further, the
smallness of a community also does not ensure that its members will interact
automatically and will share a common understanding. Shared understanding always
requires negotiation, renegotiation and frequent interaction among the members who
are prone to hold di fferential opinions. And such interaction does not occur
automatically, rather it requires some mediation, may be in the form of 'language,
expression, telephone, computer, touch, sight, or hearing (Agrawal, 1999: 104). 'Both
face-to-face and non face-to-face interactions" Young (1990: 314) points out, 'are
mediated relations and in both there is separation and miscommunication as there is
consensus and communication (cited in, Agrawal, 1999: 104).
2.4. Gaps in the literature and the Research Question
Situations requiring collective action may take several forms, one of which is the
system of managing Common Pool Natural Resources, such as fisheries, forests and
tank irrigation management. However, the present research tries to locate collective
action in the case of co-management of forests, and more specifically in the Joint
Forest Management programme in Orissa.
The extensive revIew of relevant literature carried out in two chapters
indicates several gaps in the research pertaining to our understanding of' community'
and its role in conservation and management of natural resources. To begin with, the
notion of community, as it is portrayed in community-conservation literature as a
simple, homogeneous and unified whole with shared understanding, is misleading.
Such an a priori understanding of community leads scholars to come up with a biased
finding that homogeneous communities are only suitable for collective action for local
resource management. And this further neglects the efforts of heterogeneous
communities to succeed in conservation activities.
A few questions may be raised in this regard. Communities do not always
remain homogeneous or does one find them be thus. Given the process of social and
economic change during the past 3-5 decades, different groups within a community
have responded varyingly to the source of such changes. And the already existing
heterogeneity, in terms of social differentials of caste, clan or tribe, has reproduced
73
itself in other spheres of activities. How, then, does one expect collective action to
succeed in such communities?
An acknowledgement of the intemal differentiations in the community
engaged in conservation of natural resources forces us to face several challenges.
Since the present research aims to explore the community's involvement in the case
of lorest resource, it is necessary to primarily pose the questions in the context of
community-based forest management. IndilTerence of scholars towards the internal
divisions of the community has resulted in lesser attention being paid to the question
as to how such internal dilTerentiations affect the management outcomes. Therefore,
an attempt has been made to answer a set of questions, such as how joint management
of forest takes shape in a stratified community; in what way the social differences
such as caste, class and differences in land ownership affect the forest management
outcomes; whether the management outcomes fulfill the desired interests of all the
sections of community or is it being influenced by a particular section of the
community; what is the nature of the community engaged in the joint management of
forests and how does this affect the management; from which section does the
leadership come; how the does the leaders manage to keep the balance between
different interests of different sections of society; etc.
A mere statement that heterogeneity has either positive or negative impact on
local level collective action, as has been the case with community-based conservation
literature, is not Justi fiable. On several accounts and through diverse sources, the
communities are heterogeneous, and the need to mobilise these ditlerences for
resource management remains a challenge. Even though the communities are
heterogeneous for several reasons, collective action for local resource management
requires crafting of institutions and rules of access and use, to which the members of
the community should exhibit consensus and comply with those rules collectively.
What is interesting to notc in such circumstances is how do the challenges that
heterogencity poses are overcome and consensus is built for crafting rules for resource
managemcnt. Or, in other words, the question that arises now is how do such
differences are negotiated and mediated with respect to, first, formulation of rules for
resource management, second, compliance of such rules, and third, monitor the
violation of such rules and provide for some kind of punishment for rule breakers.
74
How do such heterogeneous communities mobilise diverse groups, diverse opinions
and diverse interests to manage their resources, which becomes the major thrust of the
present research.
Since the research tries to explore the nature of the community and its
involvement in the forestry activities in Orissa, the dissertation also makes an attempt
to study the nature, evolution and functioning of Joint Forest Management of Orissa.
A journey to the history of several forest enactments and policies concerning forestry
in Orissa becomes an essential part of the thesis to explore the historical evolution of
people's participation in torcst conservation and management activities, finally
culminating in Joint Forest Management programme.
2.5. Objectives
This research primarily aims to explore the relationship between group heterogeneity
and local level collective action for management of local forest resources. In the
course of inquiry. the thesis makes an attempt to illustrate the factors and processes
that mobilise the differential interests and heterogeneous aspects of the community
and lead it towards a consensus in managing local forest resources through Joint
Forest Management Programme of Government of Orissa.
The specific objectives of the dissertation are as tollows:
, To historically analyse the process of people's participation in forest management finally culminating in Joint Forest Management in Orissa
, To examine the role of heterogeneity upon the pattern of dependency on forest and upon the management outcomes
, To explore the process of collective action for forest management III a heterogeneous community
, To explore the factors and processes that mobilise differential interests, overcome problems of heterogeneity and sustain collective action in a heterogeneous community
75
2.6. Methodology
2.6.1. The Research Design
The major thrust of the present research lies in exploring the factors that help
sustaining collective action in a heterogeneous social setting and to observe how such
heterogeneous aspects are mobilised to bring a consensus with regard to rule
formulation, rule compliance and monitoring rule violation. The study is exploratory
in nature. The empirical work for the study was carried out in two heterogeneous
village communities in Dhenkanal district of Orissa. Out of those, one has been
successful in managing its local forest resource through the Joint Forest Management
Programme of Govemment of Orissa, and the other has been a failure in its attempt to
do so. While the successful village has a one decade plus history of forest
conservation and management till the period when the field work was done, the
failure village was able to sustain its institution of Village Forest Protection
Committee only for five years - after which the institution as well as the attempt to
conserve forest broke down - making only a five year history in forest protection.
The reason behind such a selection was to facilitate the inquiry as to how one village
became successful in forest resource management, despite the fact that both were
heterogeneous in nature. And second, what factors and processes were present in the
successful village, which helped the community in negotiating the differences to bring
a consensus for local forest management.
2.6.2. Selection of the Study Area
The empirical work for the research was carried out in Orissa. Forests cover nearly 37
per cent of the total geographical arca of Orissa, spreading over 57,167 sq. Kms.
throughout the 28 Forest divisions in the state (Directorate of Forests and
Environment, Government of Orissa, 1997). The total percentage of forest cover is
comparatively high than that of India, which is 19.45 per cent. The state ranks fourth
in terms of forest area in India (Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Andhra
Pradesh being the first three states having 135,164; 68,621 and 147,112 sq. kms. of
forest cover respectively; see, Forest Survey of India, 1997).
The State of Orissa was taken for the purpose of the study as community's
involvement in conservation and management of local forest resources through locally
76
evolved institutions is very much prominent In rural Orissa. Such community
involvement in forestry activities has been structured by both community-initiated
institutions as well as by state sponsored institutions through the Joint Forest
Management Programme. Whether initiated by the community itself or created
through government initiation, a fact, which is clear for Orissa's forestry activities, is
that 'the community has played a significant role in protecting and conserving local
forest resources since long'. Out of the total forest area, 11,098 sq. kIns. (93,859 Ha.)
have been successfully managed by 1060 VSSs (Vana Samrakshyana Samiti, the
official forest protection committee created through JFM programme) throughout the
state as of January 1997 (Ori Forest. 1997). Orissa is the third state in India so far as
forest area managed by JFM is concerned, (M.P, Andhra Pradesh being first and
second in the order, having 38,468 and 15,243 sq. kIns. under JFM respectively, see,
Wastelands News, 15 (I): 67). Besides, the community management of forests has a
long history in Orissa, even though the state government passed the JFM resolution
giving the people a share in the management only in 1993. As per the data available,
Community Forest Management is practised in 15 districts of Orissa, where 5,402
self-initiated village Forest Protection Committees are protecting 3,09,750 Ha. of
forest land on their own.
In the state of Orissa, the district of Dhenkanal was chosen for empirical work.
Community's involvement in conservation and management of forest resources has a
long history in the district, dating back to the Prajameli (Peoples' Revolution) of
1937, when the local people agitated against the then colonial state for complete rights
over forest resources and abolition of forest tax (see, Mahapatra, 1999: 36). Secondly,
the social composition of the district is heterogeneous in nature as people of several
castes as well as tribes live in it. Besides, both community-initiated and state
sponsored institutions have structured the community's involvement in forest
protection in the district. The following paragraphs give the numerical data pertaining
to the functioning of JFM and CFM - Community Forest Management, through
locally evolvedlinitiated institutions - in the district.
The Dhenkanal district, which also constitutes a Forest Division - one among
28 administrative units or Forest Divisions of Forest Department of the state -
consists of five Forest Ranges, namely, i) Sarangi, ii) Kamakshya Nagar (East), iii)
77
Dhenkanal, iv) Kamakshya Nagar (West) and v) Hindol. There are, in total, 162 VSSs
functioning in all the 5 Ranges of the Division as on 15 th• March 2000. There are 18
VSSs in Sarangi Range, 51 VSSs in Kamakshya Nagar (East) Range, 50 VSSs in
Kamakshya Nagar (West) Range, 24 VSSs in Dhenkanal Range and 19 VSSs in the
Hindol Range.
In the Dhenkanal district, there are in all 732 self-initiated village Forest
Protection Committees protecting forests of their own. The villages involved in CFM
have come together in recent years to form a federation of Village Forest Committces
in the district. There is a apex Zilla Committee at the district level, which is ·further
divided into 8 Block Committees. The 8 Block Committees of Community Forest
Management in Dhenkanal District are i) Dhenkanal Sadar Committee, ii) Gondia
Block Committee, iii) Odapada Block Committee, iv) Hindol Block Committee, v)
Kamakshya Nagar Block Committee, vi) Bhuban Block Committee, vii) Parjang
Block Committee and viii) Kankada Hada Block Committee. Each Block Committee
is further divided into several Cluster Committees. There are in all 43 Cluster
Committees in the district, which falls under eight Block Committees. The Cluster
Committee comprises of several Village Forest Protection Committees in the locality.
Thus, the 732 Village Committees are further grouped into 43 Cluster Committees,
which further constitute eight Block Committees, and these eight Block Committees
are combined together to form the Dhcnkanal Zilla CFM Committee. The Zilla
Committccs of several districts have also joined together to form the apex state
committee, which is known as Orissa Janga/ Manch or Orissa Forest Forum. 15
2.6.3. Selection of the Villages (Sampling Procedure)
To study the underlying factors that help sustain collective action in heterogeneous
communities, it was decided to take two village communities for an in-depth study:
one where collective action is successful and the other where it is a failure. Besides
the above- mentioned basic criterion, the following additional criteria were identified
for selection of the villages:
• The social fabric of the villages should be heterogeneous in terms of caste, economic rewards, landholdings, use of the resources, etc.
• The villages should be proximate to the forest (in bctween 0 to 5 KMs)
J5 For details regarding institutional arrangements of Community Forest Management in Orissa, See, Mahapatra, 1999.
78
• The villagers should be dependent on the forest
The two study villages were chosen following a two stage sampling procedure.
First, a quick survey of 10 villages was made, which were selected randomly, in the
Dhenkanal Sadar Block of Dhenkanal district of Orissa. Brief information regarding
social composition of the members of the village community, their past history of
forest protection, and their degree of success in collective action in designing
institutions for effective management of local forest resources were collected. In each
village, during the short visit, the president of the village forest protection committee,
the headman of the village, a few elites and the common villagers whom the
researcher came across were contacted and interviewed.
To gauge the relative success of the villages in collective action, the existence
of village level institutions to design rules of access and use was taken into
consideration. The performance of villages in collective action was further divided
into three categories: None/Low - no local institution existing currently for forest
protection or the institution had collapsed, rules were not complied, monitoring was
not done. Moderate - local institution for forest protection existed, rules were
followed, monitoring was done to catch rule breakers, but not strong enough to
restrict the members of outside community. High - rules were followed, strong
monitoring system existed to catch rule breakers from both inside the community and
outside.
Social di fferentiation, in terms of caste and tribe were taken into account to
decide the heterogeneous status of the village. The villages, which comprised a single
caste or tribe were leveled as homogeneous at the first instance. Though it is an
accepted fact that those villages may have been heterogeneous in several other
respects, however, to distinguish these villages from the rest, which comprised
members belonging to several castes and/tribes, they were considered as
homogeneous, and were kept out. Further, it was not feasible from the short survey to
highlight the other sources of heterogeneity of the villages. Therefore, in the first
stage of the survey the villages having single caste/tribe were leveled as homogeneous
and vice-versa.
79
A brief analysis of the survey was done to choose two villages for an in-depth
study based upon their success or failure of collective action. The analysis can be
briefly summarised in the following table.
Table 2.1: A Quick Survey Report on the Ten Villages
Name of the Villages Social Since when Collective action composition protecting
Gandadhar Prasad Heterogeneous 16 years High lhankira Heterogeneous 40 years High Biradia Heterogeneous 1993 - 98 None Ambanali Heterogeneous 1993 - 98 None Kadua Homogeneous 1993 - 98 None Kruslma Kumar Pur Heterogeneous 1993 - 98 None (K.K Pur) Nagiapasi (NP) Heterogeneous 10 years High Korian Heterogeneous 5 years Moderate Krushna Prashad Heterogeneous IS years High Padmalav Pur Heterogeneous 15 years Moderate
As was mentioned earlier. the villages were divided into three categories based
upon their relative success in forest conservation activities. The following paragraphs
describe such categories briefly.
i) High Degree of Rule Compliance and Strong Monitoring System: Out of the ten
villages taken tor the quick survey in the first round, rules compliance and the
monitoring system to punish the rule breakers were found to be strong in tour
villages, namely, Gangadhar Prasad (G. Prasad), lhankira, Nagiapasi (N. Pasi), and
Krushna Prasad (K. Prasad). All these four villages were heterogeneous in nature,
constituting members from several castes and tribes.
These four villages were successful in crafting local institutions, which could
design rules regulating the access and use of the forest produces. And such rules were
backed by a strong monitoring system, which also included assigning punishments to
those who failed to comply with the rules. In three cases, such as in G. Prasad,
lhankira, and N. Pasi, the rules were written down in a register, below which the
heads of the households of the villages had put their signatures or thumb impressions.
RO
It made the point clear that rules that were created for regulating the access and use of
the forest in these villages were well circulated and the members of the communities
were all aware of them.
The village G. Prasad was found to be protecting its Village Forest of 177
acres since 1985 - 86, and now the village institution is a JFM Committee. In the
early 1980s, the village forest of G. Prasad was completely deserted and the forestland
was just like a barren hill track. Since that was a 'Village Forest' as per the legal
classifications, the state Forest Department had taken little efforts towards its
regeneration. Then, in mid 1980s, the villagers decided to regenerate the forest and
stopped allowing grazing inside the forest area. Later, the villagers undertook a
massive plantation programme and now the forest stands looking evergreen.
Similarly, the Jhankira village was also engaged in protecting its village forest for the
last 40 years. This village had the longest history of forest protection from among the
ten villages taken for quick survey, where the protection activity started in the 1960s.
Compared to these two villages, where protection activity had been carried out in the
Village Forest areas, the village N. Pasi and K. Prasad had taken the responsibility of
protecting Reserved Forests attached to their village through JFM programme. The
Reserved Forests of these two villages were highly degraded prior to the protection by
the communities, and with active efforts by these two villages the protected patch had
grown into thick forest during the time of fieldwork.
Protecting the forest from the free-riders, who violate the rules for personal
gain without contributing towards its protection, is detinitely a challenging task before
any community aiming to protect a forest patch. And the problem becomes more
serious when the free-rider belongs to another community. However, these four
villages had been successful in prohibiting both insiders and outside members of the
community from breaking rules created for forest protection. This was possible
because of the personal efforts that these community members had taken to patrol the
forest areas during night times. All the tour villages had developed a rotation system,
and accordingly, the responsibility of guarding forest was shared among the
households of the communities. Currently, N. Pasi and G. Prasad have appointed a
permanent forest guard from inside the village, whose responsibility is to check the
illegal entrance into the forest.
81
These four villages were categorised as 'High Collective Action' communities
smce, local institutions existed for making rules for forest protection; rules were
obeyed by the members of the community; and finally a strong monitoring system
existed to find out both insiders and outsiders, who tried to violate the rules.
ii) Strong Rules with a Weak Monitoring System: Korian and Padma Lav Pur (P.L.
Pur) were the two villages, among the ten, where there also existed local institutions
with strong rules for forest protection. 80th the villages were heterogeneous, in terms
of their caste composition, with a preponderance of Tribals in the P.L Pur village. In
the other village, the social composition included households belonging to several
castes and a few tribal households.
The efforts towards collective action for forest protection are a relatively new
phenomenon in the Korian vi llage, which started forest protection in the mid 1990s.
In the last five years, the village has been successful in crafting an efficient institution,
which could come out with strong rules for forest regeneration. The members of the
community also found to be very much sincere in complying the rules. However, the
village institution was not able to develop monitoring systems to restrict the free
riders, mostly members of outside community. The forest guards, that the Korian
Forest Protection Committee has appointed, have been able to minimize the
occurrences of free riding by members belonging to their own community. However,
the institution has not been successful in prohibiting members from neighbouring
villages from accessing the resource and using the forest without contributing
anything. In other words, the community has been facing challenges to establish a
common property regime inside the forest, since members from other communities
continue to access the forest, without paying anything for their use of the resource.
Similar has been the case with P.L Pur village. Although the P.L Pur Forest Protection
Committee has been able to design strong rules for forest protection and induce its
members to comply with those rules, monitoring has been a problem, especially with
the outside free riders. With their 15 years efforts in protection, the forest area has
regenerated substantially, which has become an attraction in the recent years for
outside non-members to free ride. However, monitoring the action of these outside
non-members has not been successful in P.L. Pur village.
82
These two villages were categoried as 'Moderate Collective Action' villages,
Since the communities were not successful enough in establishing a complete
common property regime inside their protected patch of forest, even though Forest
Protection Committees and strong protection rules.
iii) Non-existence of Institutions: In the remammg four communities, namely,
Biradaia, Ambanali, Kadua and Krushna Kuamr Pur (K.K Pur), no local institution
was found which could design rules for forest protection. In fact, all these four
communities belonged to one revenue village of Krushna Kumar Pur. Even though,
for the government records, these four were different hamlets of one single village,
yet the four communities were separate social entities having their own jajmani
system, around with the village economy/society revolved. The hamlet Kadua was a
completely Scheduled Tribes settlement, with 'Sabar' and 'Juanga' tribes inhabiting
in it. The rest three were heterogeneous so far as their social composition is
concerned.
All the four communities started protection activities separately in the forest
patches adjoining their hamlets in the year 1993. Initially, the original K.K. Pur
hamlet started the protection activity and inspired by its efforts, the other three
hamlets also established a Forest Protection Committee in their hamlets. However, in
the four communities the institutions created were not capable enough in bringing out
strong rules for regulating the members' activities concerning forest use. Whatever
rules the institutions created in the beginning, they were not followed strictly. Kadua
was the first hamlet where such institution became defunct due to non-conformity of
rules and non-existence of a monitoring system. Gradually, the remaining three also
followed the same path and within five years, the Village Forest Protection
Committee in these four hamlets had become non-existent, and along with it the
efforts towards forest protection.
These four communities were categoried under 'No Collective Action'
category, since these communities failed to establish a common property regime in
the forest and did not continue their efforts for forest protection.
83
After analysing the relative success of the ten villages in collective action for
forest protection and categorising them into None, Moderate and High, in the second
stage two villages were chosen keeping in mind the earlier mentioned criterion of
success and failure.
Thus, two village communities, namely, Nagiapasi and K.K Pur were finally
taken for the detailed case study. The village Nagiapasi was taken since collective
action for forest protection and management was successful in this village. At the
time, when the fieldwork was conducted, the village had a strong and efficient Forest
Protection Committee functioning to regulate people's access and use of the forest
resource in the village. The Forest Protection Committee was started in the village in
the early 1990s and is still functioning. Besides being a successful village in its efforts
for forest protection, there was an additional reason for choosing Nagiapasi village.
Since one of the objectives of the dissertation is to study the history and working of
JFM in the state, Nagiapasi village was chosen, which had registered itself with state
the JFM programme. The second village chosen for the detailed study was K.K Pur.
K.K Pur was the failure village, and the village had only 5 years' history of forest
protection.
2.6.4. Method and Tools Used for the Collection of Data
The fieldwork was carried out in two phases during the year 2001. In the first phase of
the fieldwork, the survey of ten villages was undertaken and the two villages, i.e.,
Nagiapasi and K.K. Pur were identified for a detailed field study. The second phase
involved a detailed observation of the two villages for a period of three months, i.e.,
from September to November in the year 2001.
A combination of participant observation, interview and focused group
discussion methods were used to elicit the relevant data from the two chosen villages.
A common interview guide was followed for both the villages while collecting the
required informations from the villages. Besides the socio-economic profile of the
households in the two villages, data pertaining to their dependency upon forest, type
of use and access into forest, efforts to initiate the protection measures, and the overall
history of collective action in the two villages were collected.
84
During the period of the stay in the villages for fieldwork, the evening hours
were spent in different village common rooms, where the villagers usually get
together to play cards or to gossip.16 Several rounds of discussions were made with
the villagers at these common rooms to understand the overall environment of the
village, the internal politics of the village and the perceptions of the villagers towards
access, use, dependency and efforts to protect the local forest resources.
16 There existed several village common rooms in these two villages. Such common rooms were called Kotha Ghara in the local language. The right to access these Kotha Ghara was found to be caste specific in Nagiapasi village, since specific caste groups had their own Kotha Ghara. For example, the SCs and STs did not go the Kotha Gharas belonging to the upper castes. In the Nagiapasi village, four such Kotha Ghara existed, while in K.K Pur, there was only one Kotha Ghara. The Kotha Gharas in Nagiapasi were quite old. The common rooms meant for SCs and STs in this village were Kachha buildings made up of mud and thatched roof. while the other two, meant for upper caste households were semi-pakka buildings made up of stones with tile roofs. However, the K.K Pur common room was relatively a new building, a pakka one, constructed outside the village settlement and was usually dominated by persons belonging to upper castes. Interestingly the SCs and STs were not prohibited from entering that common room.
85
CHAPTER - III
Contextualising the Research Locales
This study aims to explore the dynamics of collective action for the management of
local forest resources in heterogeneous social set ups. In the process, the research tries
to examine, first, the possibility of collective action in heterogeneous village
communities, and second, how the internal socio-economic and political
differentiations affect the community's endeavour towards successful collective
action. The empirical work for the study was carried out in two village communities
in the Dhenkanal District of Orissa. Before going further in analysing the specific
situation/conditions in the villages, which either facilitated or obstructed the processes
of collective action, it is apt to give a brief introduction to the study villages, as well
as the district and the State in which they are situated. Such a narration of socio
economic and geographical features will not only give an idea of the research sites,
but will also help in conceptualising the present study by linking it to a wider context.
3.1. The Orissa State
3.1.1. A Brief History
The present State of Orissa was famous in the mythology and ancient history in the
name of 'Kalinga' and in medieval history as 'Utkal', both of which corresponds to
the meaning of excellence in 'Kala' or arts. The 'Kalinga war', as is well known in
world history, is said to have converted king Ashoka to Buddhism and non-violence,
and it is considered as a major landmark in the politico-cultural evolution of ancient
India. King Kharavcla, who conquered Magadha to take revenge of Kalinga's defeat
to King Ashoka in the b'feat Kalinga war, established a mighty Kalinga empire in the
second century B.C. In the twelfth century A.D., the domain of Kalingan Empire was
extended from Ganga in the north to Godavari in the south by king Cholaganga Deva
of Ganga dynasty, who also built the famous Jagannath temple at Puri. Orissa was
annexed to Mughal Empire in 1552 A.D. by king Akbar and Marathhas occupied the
territory after the decline of the Moughals. Finally, the British took over the
administration of Orissa in 1803. Under the British administration, several parts of the
present day Orissa were under the control of then British Indian provinces of Madras,
86
Central Province and Bengal-Bihar Presidency. On April I, 1912, the Province of
Bihar and Orissa was created bringing together parts of Bengal Presidency and
Central Province. The modem Orissa took its present form on April I, 1936, by
separating Orissa from the combined State of Bihar-Orissa, and then combining it
with some of the Oriya-speaking areas of the then adjoining States of Madras
Presidency and Central Province. Orissa is considered as the first State in the country
to be formed on linguistic basis. After independence, in 1948, 25 feudatory States
merged with the territory of Orissa, and by August 1949, all the princely States,
including the big ones like Mayurbhanj, were a part of the state of Orissa.
3.1.2. Physical Setting and Location
Orissa is situated in the eastern coast of India. The state is surrounded by Andhra
Pradesh on the southeast, Madhya Pradesh on the west, Bihar in the north, West
Bengal in the north-east and Bay of Bengal in the east. It extends over an area of
155,707 sq. Kms. Orissa has a costal line of 250 miles along the Bay of Bengal. [t
constitutes 4.74 per cent of the land and 3.74 per cent of the population of India
(Census ofIndia, 1991).
The state may be broadly divided into four geographical regIOns, such as
'northern plateau', 'central river basin', 'the hills of Eastern Ghats', and 'coastal
plains'. The northern plateau, with its hill ranges and cultivated valleys stretches
across Bihar and West Bengal. About 45 per cent of this area is covered with forests,
and contains much of State's primary resources like coal, iron ore and hydro-power
(Sundar et aI., 2001: 77). The central river basin is well irrigated and produces good
crops of rice. The River Mahanadi crosses through this basin and creates a delta along
with River Brahrnini and Baitarani. A big dam is constructed in this region upon the
River Mahanadi at Hirakud in Sambalpur District, which is a major source of
irrigation for this area. The hills of the Eastern Ghats, situated in the southern parts of
Orissa, including the districts of Koraput, Ganjam and Phulbani, are characterised by
terrace rice cultivation and shifting cultivation. Several industries are being set up in
this region, which take advantage of the mineral reserves of this area. The coastal
plain along the eastern coast with its fertile alluvial soil is densely populated,
comprising of 64 per cent of the total population of the State (Sundar et aI., 2001).
This region has the little forest cover in the State, and agriculture is the primary
87
economic activity of the region. This area of Orissa grows several crops like cashew,
coconut, banana, rice, and thus is rightly recognised as the 'rice bowl' of the State.
The e1imate of Orissa is characterised by high temperature and medium to
high rainfall. The cropping pattern of the State may be broadly divided into three
seasons, namely, autumn, winter and summer, spreading from July to October,
November to February and March to June respectively. The State grows crops like
rice, maize, jawar, bajra, groundnut, black gram, horse gram, mustard, jute, etc.
3.1.3. Administrative Setup
At present, the State of Orissa constitutes 30 districts. There were 13 districts in
Orissa up to March 31, 1994, and it was only on April 1, 1994 - on the State
formation day - that 17 new districts were created by bifurcating the erstwhile 13
districts. The 30 districts are further subdivided into 58 subdivisions and 314
Community Development Blocks, out of which 118 are tribal Blocks. There are two
Municipality Corporations, namely, Bhubaneswar and Cuttack, 31 municipalities, 70
Notified Area Councils (NAC) and 124 towns in the state. Following the three-tier
local government system, Orissa has 30 Zilla Parishads, 314 Panchayati Samitis and
5,261 Gram Panchayats. There are in all 50,972 villages in the State of Orissa
(Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Orissa, 1999).
3.1.4. Demography
The population of the State was 31,659,736 as recorded in the 1991 census. As per the
1991 census, Orissa ranks eleventh in India in terms of population. Orissa continues
to be one of the least urbanised states, with only 4,234,983 (13.37 %) people living in
urban areas and 27,424,753 (86.63%) in rural areas. The density of population is 203
per sq. km. As per the 1991 census, out of the total population of 31,659,736, the
Scheduled Case population was 5,129,314, which was 16.2 per cent of the total
population. The Scheduled Tribe population of the state was 70,32,214, which
constituted 22.21 per cent of the total population.
The literacy rate of the state was 49.99 per cent as per 1991 census. The
literacy rate for males and females were 63.09 per cent and 34.68 per cent
respectively. The female literacy rate of Orissa (34.68 %) is quite less in comparison
88
to that of the female literacy rate of the country, which is 39.29 per cent. The literacy
rate for the rural areas in the state is 45.46 per cent, which is slightly higher than the
country's literacy rate for rural areas (44.69 %). The literacy rate for the urban areas
in the state is 71.99 per cent.
3.1.5. Forest cover
As per the Forest Department record of government of Orissa, the classified forests
spread across an area of 57,167 sq. km., which is nearly 37 per cent of the total
geographical area of the state. The per capita forest cover in the state is 0.15 hectares.
However, the spread of the forest area in the state is highly uneven, with districts like
Phulbani having 54 per cent of its land under forest cover, whereas districts like
Balasore has only 6 per cent (CPSW, 1994: 31). Notwithstanding the forest
department record of 37 per cent land under forest cover, the actual forest cover in the
state is very less owing to the degradation and denudation of the forest area. As per an
estimate, dense forest having a crown density of 40 per cent or more in the state is
only 26,101 sq. km. and open forest (having a crown density of 10 - 40 %) is 20,629
sq. km., and the remaining land is 'forest' only in the forest department records
without any tree cover (Sundar et al., 200 I: 17). The forests of Orissa are mostly sal
dominated (43 %), with some areas of mixed deciduous and teak forests in coastal
plains and Eastern Ghats, and mangroves along the coast (CPSW, 1994).
From the management perspective, the state forests have been divided into
three categories, namely, reserved forests, demarcated protected forests and un
demarcated protected forests. The reserved forests have been under the direct control
of the state forest department, which enjoys not only property rights over such forests
but also management responsibilities. But, in the case of protected forests, the
management rights and responsibilities are conferred on the forest department,
whereas the property rights on the land remain with the state revenue department.
89
3.2. The Dhenkanal District17
3.2.1 A Brief History
Dhen.l(anal was an erstwhile princely state, which was annexed to the Indian Union in
1947. Prior to its merger with independent India, it was ruled by several dynasties. As
per the Nasik Rock inscription, the oldest available record about the history of the
district, during 2nd Century A.D, Dhenkanal was a part of the Sattabahana Empire,
which became a part of the Gupta Empire in the 3'd & 4th Century. During the 6th &7'h
Century, the region remained under the sway of the Bhauma Karas, and during the 8th
and 9th Century the Sulki dynasty ruled over some part of the Dhenkanal state.
By 16th Century A.D, some portions of the region were being ruled by a
sahara chief named 'Dhenka'. However, the tribal chieftain was defeated and killed
by one Sridhar Bhanja, who named the region as 'Dhenkanal' after the sabara chief
'Dhenka'. In 1529 A.D, Gajapati Prataprudra Deva, the king of Orissa mainland,
instructed one of his commanders Hari Singh Vidyadhar to attack Dhenkanal. Hari
Singh defeated the Bhanja king and became the first ruler of Dhenkanal kingdom,
who also shifted its capital from Karamul to Dhenkapidha and ruled the kingdom tiII
1594 A.D. After Hari Singh Vidyadhar, 18 other kings ruled over the DhenkanaI
kingdom. Shankar Pratap Mohindra Bahadur, who ruled the state from 1918 to 1947,
was the last king to rule Dhenkanal.
3.2.2. Physical Setting and Location
Situated in the central part of Orissa, Dhenkanal district lies between 85° 58' to 86° 2'
East longitude and 20° 29' to 21 ° II' North latitude. The landlocked district of
Dhenkanal is surrounded by Keonjhar district in the North, Cuttack district in the
South, Jajpur district in the East and Angul district in the West. The Dhenkanal town
is situated on the National Highway 42, which runs from Cuttack to Sambalpur. The
district constitutes 2.95 per cent of the total geographical land and 3 per cent of the
total population of Orissa (Census of India, 1991).
17 The infonnation about the district was gathered from several secondary sources like District Census Handbook, District Gazetteer and official website of the district (www.dhenkanal.nic.in).
90
Geographically, the district can be divided into three natural divisions: the
southern hilly region, the river valley region with tribunals, and the northern hilly
region. The district has mainly five varieties of soil, namely, Alluvial soil, Red loam
soil, Sandy loam soil, Gravelly soil and Cleaving loam soil. Climate-wise, the district
is usually hot with high humidity during April and May, and cold during December
and January. The monsoon generally breaks during the month of June. The district has
a moist climate with two distinct climatic zones, i.e., the northern region, which is
comparatively less moist and the southern and south-eastern region which is more
moist and humid in nature. The climatic variation has influenced the formation of
different flora and fauna occurring in the region.
3.2.3. Administrative Setup
The presently existing Dhenkanal district was created on April I, 1994 by bifurcating
the erstwhile Dhenkanal district into two separate districts, namely, Angul and
Dhenkanal. The newly created district has 8 Blocks (talukas), namely, Dhenkanal
Sadar, Gondia, Odapada, Hindolo, Kamakshya Nagar, Bhubana, Parjang, and
Kankadahada. The district comprises 172 Gram Panchayats, 8 Panchayat Samitis
(Taluka Panchayat) and one Zilla Panchayat.
3.2.4. Demography
The population of Dhenkanal district was, 9,47,870 as per the 1991 Census. The
decadal growth rate of the population for 1991 - 200 I was recorded to be 12.46 per
cent, and thereby total population reached up to 10,65,983 by 2001. The Scheduled
Castes constituted nearly 16 per cent of the total population of the district numbering
a total of 1,51,914 as per the 1991 census. The district has a considerable number of
Scheduled Tribe concentration, which accounted for 13 per cent (1,20,226) of the
total population (Census of India, 1991). The density of population in Dhenkanal
district was recorded to be 206 per squire kilometer as per the 1991 census, which
increased to 239 by 2001. The district has an urban population of only 78,112 (8.25
%), while the major chunk of the population (91.75 %) live in rural areas.
3.2.5. Forest cover
The Dhenkanal Forest Division, one among the 28 Forest Divisions of Orissa,
constitutes five territorial Ranges located at Dhenkanal, Hindolo, Sarangi, Kamakshya
91
Nagar East and Kamakshya Nagar West. It also has one Wildlife Range, located at
Kapilas Zoo. The forest area of Dhenkanal region may be described as north Indian
tropical moist deciduous, which also includes good bamboo species in it. The forest is
further divided into several sub types, such as Northern tropical semi evergreen
forests, Late rite semi evergreen forests, North Indian Tropical moist deciduous
forests, North Indian tropical moist peninsular sal forests, Northern tropical dry
deciduous forests, Moist Bamboo forests, and Dry deciduous scrub. The dominating
species of the forest include: sal, teak. jam un, kasi, sunari, simi/i, etc.
3.3 The Study Villages
The empirical work for the research was carried out in two village communities,
namely, 'Nagiapasi' and 'Krushna Kumar Pur' (K.K. Pur), situated in the vicinity of
Kapilas Reserved Forest in the Dhenkanal Sadar Block of Dhenkanal district of
Orissa.
The Dhenkanal Sadar Block has a total population of 1,22,374, out of which
18,275 (\5 %) are Scheduled Castes and 17,382 (14.2 %) are Scheduled Tribes
(Census of India, 1991). The block comprises 357 wards, 23 Gram Panchayats and
one Panchayat Samiti.
The procedures and methods of selection of these two villages have been
discussed elaborately in the previous chapter. The villages are situated to the east of
Dhenkanal town, the district headquarters, at a distance of 5 kilometers from each
other. The following paragraphs attempt to introduce the villages by indicating their
location and other basic information. The following maps exhibit the location of the
study area, indicating also the Dhenkanal district's position in the state of Orissa.
92
Maps Locating the State, District, Block and the Study
Villages
j arkha "~"c, \ '-
&.i?ll"·-~lI"'1 'R~U~; \--i I " ", , ,'" '''~,< - ,
.~'
'i
A~ISTR CTKEONJHAR
The Study Block (Dhenkanal Sadar
Source: mapsofindia.com
93
Location of Study Villages in the Dhenkanal Sadar Block
Map of Dhenkanal Sadar Block •
I-L __ " __ _
.- ...... '-... - .,,,,,,-
--~ ---~"-... _--~----------- --. _ 0
• ,
w_ ----:~~ ': (~ ,n
t')\ ':e~-
/'
'-~~--. " ~./', -,";,\.
,
.. "
•
• c
• • •
•
Study Village 1 Nagiapasi
Study Village 2 K. K. Pur
KapiJas Reserved Forest
~~-,--. <$ y ...... ~ ........ ,.,.""'_ "'-llJOoo
--'~"I"""""_) ..... ~ ... ~~,"""-',, __ . >=--~_-:1 ---.. __ . -.~ !I._ ... _. -- ::::::::><=:::
~_ •. ___ ." ____ "-".""" ~O!r....._"T"""""'-_. _ .... _ ._-• ,0. __ --_", .. _'-<;._01
• +
•
Source: District Census Handbook, Dhenkanal
94
3.3.1. The Village 'Nagiapasi'
The Nagiapasi village, situated towards the east of Dhenkanal town, is one among
several other villages of the 'Beltikiri Gram Panchayat' of Dhenkanal Sadar Block.
The village is represented by 3 ward members in the Beltikiri Gram Panchayt. A
narrow pakka road, which runs from the district headquarters to Kapilas temple (Siva
Temple), is the only thoroughfare to get access to the village. After traveling nearly 30
kilometers on the Dhenkanal - Kapilas Road, one has to take a left diversion and
catch a kachha road, which runs amongst thorny bushes, and go further about 3
kilometers to reach Nagiapasi village. The village constitutes 155 households with a
total population of 1500 as per the 1991 census. The total land area of the village is
350 hectares, including village wasteland, gochar, forest and other non-agricultural
lands, as per the 1991 Census.
The settlement pattern is very much organised in Nagiapasi village, with
houses on both sides of village lanes. There are different colonies belonging to
different castes. The Scheduled Tribes colony existed in the beginning of the village,
and that of Scheduled Castes at the end. The housing pattern for Scheduled Tribes
were observed to be unsystematic and unorganized, with their huts scattered here and
there. Further, the newly built pakka houses, constructed under the Indira Awas
Yojana, were also not properly ordered. However, the Scheduled Castes colony was
observed to be organised, with houses situated in lanes. The Karana settlement had
the widest road in the village followed by Khandayat and Gopala settlement.
The village offers schooling up to 10'h standard, with a Primary, Middle and a
High School existing within it. Nagiapasi has two temples and a place of worship for
village goddess (Gram Devti). It also has four village common rooms (kotha ghara),
out of which Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes possess one each. These
common rooms are the gathering places for villagers, where they relax, play cards,
gossip and discuss about their day-to-day affairs and problems. The Scheduled Tribe
youths, particularly, also use their common room for sleeping during night times. The
village also has one Anganwadi Kendra, which, however, was not functioning at the
time of fieldwork.
95
3.3.2. The Village K. K. Pur
Situated to the east of Dhenkanal town, the village Krushna Kumar Pur (K. K. Pur) is
one among the other villages of Kaimati Gram Panchayat. The revenue village K. K.
Pur also consists of other three hamlets, namely Biradia, Ambanali, and Kadua.
However, for the present empirical purposes only the main K. K. Pur village was
taken into consideration. Despite the village consisting of four hamlets, including the
main K. K. Pur, however, in real practice they are all separate entities, having both
geographical as well as social distances. Each hamlet is considered to be a separate
social unit, with its own caste structure and jajmani relations. The village K. K. Pur is
positioned in the Dhenkanal - Kapilas Road, which also connects Nagiapasi village
with Dhenkanal, at a distance of nearly 25 kilometers. K. K. Pur constitutes 85
households making a total population of about 700. The total K. K. Pur revenue
village including three other hamlets mentioned above constitutes 649 hectares of
land including wastelands and forest as per 1991 Census.
Unlike Nagiapasi, the housing pattern in K. K. Pur is very much scattered in
nature. The Dhenkanal - Kapilas main road passes through the village and therefore,
one can find the colonies of the village on both sides ofthe road. The Scheduled Caste
households were observed to be dispersed and settled mostly on the two sides of the
main road. However, the Scheduled Tribe houses of the village were clustered, and
situated in close proximity to each other. The village K. K. Pur has a well organised
Brahmin colony, which consists of 15 households. Most of the houses in this colony
were pakka in nature.
The village contains only a Primary School, which provides education up to
class five. For high school education the children of K. K. Pur either go to Nagiapasi
or to Kaimati. A few others also travel to Beltikiri, the neighbouring Gram Panchat,
for such purpose. Community life in K. K. Pur was not that organised as in Nagiapasi.
Only the Scheduled Tribes have maintained their common room (community hall) in
the village. On further inquiry, it was revealed that the village had a few community
halls in the past, which were not maintained properly and thus became extinct. During
the time of fieldwork, the villagers were observed to be working forward to revive
such community halls in their village.
96
CHAPTER IV
The Forestry Debate:
Evolution and Functioning of the Joint Forest Management
An analysis of the Joint Forest Management programme - a participatory
programme in forestry sector, which evolved in the 1990s' - and the policies
concerning its evolution will be incomplete without looking back to the history of
forest management in India since the pre-colonial period, and how the forestry debate
has been shaped in the country over the years. Though the discipline of
'Environmental History' is in its nascent phase, yet, the scholars working on it have
much focused upon the social impacts of forest policies since the British period, and
have contributed towards an evolution of 'forestry debate' in India. 18 This chapter
alms to analyse the history of forest management in Orissa to see how people's
participation has emerged in the forestry sector, which finally took the shape of Joint
Forest Management (henceforth JFM) programme in the state. However, before
moving forward to the specific situation in the state of Orissa, I make an effort to
narrate the historiography of the forest management in the country.
The chapter has been divided into two parts. The first part deals with the
historical development of 'scientific forestry' in the country starting from the colonial
period and the second deals with the specific data pertaining to the state of Orissa,
where the empirical work for the dissertation has been carried out. However, the
analysis in this chapter concerning Orissa is limited to the secondary data, in which
several government policies, forest department notifications and several other
published works on Orissa's experiment with JFM have been reviewed.
18 The discipline of 'Social Ecology and Environmental History' mainly focused on the policies of conservation adopted during the British period and the subsequent social and ecological changes that occurred in the colonial India. Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha, as general editors, have produced a series of books on 'studies in social ecology and environmental history', published by Oxford University Press. For an understanding ofthe discipline see the pioneering works of Arnold and Guha, 1995; Baviskar, 1995; Gadgil, 1985; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Guha, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1994; Grove, 1995, 1998; Grove el. al., 1998; Rangarajan, 1994, 1996; Saberwal, 1999; Singh, 1998; and Sivramkrishna, 1999.
97
4.1. Approaching the 'Forestry Debate' in India
The characteristic features of 'scientific forestry', the consequent deforestation,
adoption of conservationist measures by the colonial rulers, and the socio-ecological
changes that were brought in as a result of new method of forest management have
figured much prominently in the 'forestry debate' in India. The forestry debate in
India, through an analysis of colonial and post colonial forest policies, have much
highlighted the impacts that the change and continuity of state forest policies since
colonial period had upon the life of the communities dependent upon the forest as
well as the physical condition of the forest itself. The analysis of forest policies,
particularly of the colonial period, reveals the fact as to how the community, which
has taken the centre stage in current decade's forestry policies, has been neglected and
marginalised throughout history. It unpacks the historical process, wherein by
introduction of a new method of forest management, development of forest policies
and legislations, the traditionally held rights of forest dependent communities have
been curtailed progressively. An analysis of broad features of the history of forest
management at an all India level will make the understanding of specific situations
pertaining to the state of Orissa much clear.
4.1.1. Forestry in Colonial India
Formal management of forests in India is one of the oldest in the tropical world,
dating back to 1860s, with the creation of Forest Service and appointment of Brandis
as the first Inspector General of Forests. During the period prior to the British
Conquest, forests were owned and managed by self-sufficient village communities
with traditional practices and indigenous knowledge, though the de jure ownership of
the forests were in the hands of the king. 19 The village communities residing near the
forest areas used to depend upon forest for their basic livelihood requirements, and
this dependence was institutionalised through a variety of cultural and religious
mechanisms. Madhav Gadgil in his seminal article on ecological history of India has
19 Guha (1983, 1989) from his research in Tehri-Garhwal area of sub-Himalayas confirms such a claim. To quote Guha (1983: 1883), "in Garhwal. for example. the waste and forest lands never attracted the attention of pre-British government. While the native kings did subject the produce of the forests .... ". Guha also mentions about such community control of forests in the pre-colonial period in the Madras province in south India.
98
mentioned about the existence of 'ecological prudence' in pre-colonial rural
communities of India. By 'ecological prudence' of pre-colonial rural communities,
Gadgil points out towards the 'exercise of restraint in the exploitation of natural
resources such that the yields realised from any resource are substantially increased in
the long run, even though that restraint implies foregoing some benefits at the present'
(Gadgil, 1985: 1909). Guha's (1983) and Gadgi\'s (1985) analysis of forestry
practices in pre-British India emphasises the sustainable way in which forest
rcsources were appropriated and protected by rural communities in pre-British India.
However, such a claim has been contested by several other scholars who point out the
ongoing process of deforestation in the pre-colonial India. Scholars like Richard
Grove (1995, 1998) insists that deforestation had assumed a significant proportion
even before the advent of colonialism, and the pre-British India was not a period of
harmony between needs of the forest dwellers and the physical conditions of the
forest. Rangarajan (1996) also highlights the process of deforestation that took place
during the Maratha and the Moughal period.
The contradictions of the scholars regarding the pattern of forest use during
the pre-colonial era notwithstanding, the beginning of colonial rule experienced a sea
change in the attitude of the state towards the forest resource and the pattern of forest
use and management in India. To understand the British attitude towards the forests,
their policies for forest use and management in India and the subsequent changes that
were brought about in colonial India, it is essential to examine the historical
background and the social changes that Britain was undergoing at the time of
colonisation. At the time when Europeans came to India, England was experiencing
far-reaching changes at home due to Industrial Revolution, which had serious bearing
on Indian forest use and management. First, there were changes in the pattern of
resource use from subsistence mode to industrial mode featured by domination and
transformation of resources for use as commodities. Secondly, the proportion of
population relying upon subsistence gathering, food production and agriculture
declined sharply, resulting in breakdown of cohesive local communities; and finally,
with the automisation of rural communities and manufacture and commerce becoming
the dominant activities, the resource exploitation using new technology became
unrestrained (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 115-16). With such a historical background the
99
British rulers perceived of forests as a raw material to be used for industrialisation and
in the process of production.
Similarly, Rangarajan (1996) mentions that the history of military and
agricultural revolution of Britain conditioned the negative attitude of the British
towards fixest resources in India. In the seventeenth century, much prior to the
establishment of the colonialism in India, the military troops in Ireland had to clear
the forest to deny cover to the Irish rebels who used to hide in the woods. Thus, the
British perception of the fixest was that of a 'abode of robbers, lawless squatters,
pO\erty-stncken, stubborn and uncivil" (Rangarajan: 1996: 17). Secondly, in the
context of a~'Tarian re\olution in England, the cutting of trees and the clearing of
wastelands for cuilivation were considered as a sign of progress.
Wllh such a history of negative and ditlerential attitude towards forests, the
colonial treatment of India's f(lrest had sih'llificant impacts upon the physical
condition of the forest as well as the socio-cultural Ii fe of forest dependent
commumties. ColonialIsm has been, thus, described as an 'ecological watershed' for
India and the colonial treatment of India's forests as an 'onslaught on forests' for the
destructl(ln of forests. which has been made to fulfill the strategic requirements of the
colonial state (Gadgil and Guha. 1992: 116-23: Guha, 1989: 37-43).
PrImarily. there were three factors or 'strategic requirements' of colonial state,
which had shaped the forest policies of the British India (Gadgil and Guha, 1992;
Guha, 1983. 1(89). First. the building up of railway network, which began in the
1850s, resulted in large-scale dct(lrestation to fulfill the requirement of huge
quantities of good quality timber. The early years of railway expansion resulted in an
unprecedented assault on India's t()rests 211 The second requircment came from British
Royal Navy, which m:cdcd hugc quantities of teak for ship building activities. The
dense forest resourccs of India acqUIred a fresh dimcnsion in the context of Anglo
French war. By the cnd of eighteenth century, as a result of heavy demand from the
Brillsh Royal Navy, there were hardly any oak trees in English royal forests, which
--'-- ------
llJ For dela,l. regarding the amoun! of dcll)rcsl"IHlIl becausc Df raIlway "xpansjon. see. Guha. 1983: 1883 - 84.
100
were much required for ship building activities (Rangarajan, 1996: 19). The Indian
Teak and Sal became the prime attraction of British Navy and ships building work
gained momentum in both east and west coasts of India. The Indian forests suffered
the most during the period of two world wars due to such timber extraction for ship
building activities. Thirdly, the British desire to consolidate their power by extending
cultivation had also its impact on Indian forest. The need for greater revenue from
agricultural land resulted in clearing off of forests and converting them into cultivable
land for taxation.
The above three processes resulted in large scale deforestation and the
immediate problem before the British was then as to how best to manage and control
the tree wealth, which no longer then had remained as an inexhaustible resource. Such
a situation finally resulted in the introduction of scientific management of forests in
India and the first ever Indian Forest Act, 1865. The 1865 Act adopted conservationist
measures to protect the forest resources from large-scale deforestation, by establishing
state control over the forestlands. The Act is rightly considered as 'the first step
towards rule of property for the forests of British India' (Rangarajan, 1996: 30). The
plans to complete state control of forestland and thereby reducing the customary
rights of forest dependent communities generated a conflicting response among the
then British officials. The responses varied from total state control of all forest and
wastelands to self-regulation of forest by village communities. In the then British
administration, on the one hand there were officials like B. H. Baden-Powel, who
intended to extend state control over all uncultivated lands, while, on the other,
another section of officials like Sir Henry Maine and Dalyell had criticised the very
idea of state control, and were of the opinion that expropriation of forest would
damage the tribal interests and rights to land and forest produces (Rangarajan, 1996:
30 - I).
However, the then Inspector General of Forests Dietrich Brandis, adopted a
middle path of 'selective annexation of those areas, which were vital for commercial,
strategic or climatic reasons' (Guha, 1990: 83 - 4), and accordingly, the Indian Forest
Act, 1865 was revised in 1878. The 1878 Forest Act ensured that the state could
demarcate and establish its monopoly control over valuable tracts of forest, needed
especially for strategic purposcs. The long-standing claims of local communities over
101
forests were curtailed and the state control over forest resources was marked by the
new forcst Act. The revised Forest Act of 1878 successfully established complete
state monopoly over country's forest resources and classified it into three categories,
namely, reserved forests, protected forests and village forests.
Keeping in mind various provisions of the earlier two Forest Acts, the colonial
government, as a part of its forest managcment initiatives, formulated a Forest Policy
in 1894 indicating various plans and priorities of the state in the forestry sector. The
forest policy of 1894 gave primacy to agriculture and provided for liberal diversion of
forestland and whenever required for the purpose of agriculture. The 1894 Forest
Policy broadly classified the forest into four categories, first, forests, the preservation
of which was essential on climatic grounds; second, forest, which afforded a supply of
valuable timber for commercial purposes; third, minor forest, which provided fuel and
fodder for local consumption; and fourth, pastures and grazing grounds (Rai and
Sharmah, 1998).
The main objective of the forest management during the colonial period, as
evident from the forest policy and the forest acts, was sustained production of
preferred timber species. Forests in India contained a large number of timbers species,
only a few of which were marketable having some commercial value. The rest trees,
shrubs and herbs, which did not have a commercial value at that point of time were
regarded as weeds and thus were removed mercilessly giving enough space to
preferred species to grow. The scientific management aimed at converting the mixed
forest crops into almost pure even-aged artificial entities consisting largely of
preferred species. This design was conceived mainly to simplify management and
ensure supply of equal quantity of timber to the industry year after year.
Besides the alarming deforestation as a result of railway expanSIOn, ship
building activities for Royal Navy and clearance of forest areas for agricultural
extension, the introduction of conservationist measures by the scientific management
of India's forests has had significant consequences upon the life of the people as a
whole and particularly those dependent upon forests for daily livelihood requirements.
102
To begin with, the commercial forestry introduced by the British transformed
the inexhaustible forest resource of India into one of limited resource. The age-old
relationship of mutuality between forest dwellers and forests was broken down,
lebelling the forest dwellers as intruders and destroyers of forests. The traditional
patterns of forest use and practices, and protection system also broke down as
indigenous rights declined. The social authority and religious sanction to control
access and protection of forest were lost (Poffenberger et at., 1996: 20). Further, the
Indian Forest Act 1878 ignored all communal ownerships and communal use of the
forest areas, and in certain case granted individual concessions to some forest
produces. Such a transition from collective to individual use of forest resulted in a
'functional damage to agrarian life and breaking down of a well established and
socially codified link between man and forest' (Guha, 1985: 1946).
The colonial forest policy, which recognised only individual rights of forest
use, initiated the process of fragmentation of the community and erosion of social
bonds. This erosion of social bonds, which had regulated the customary use of the
forests led to what Guha (1983, 1985, 1989) describes as an . alienation of man from
nature'. This alienation, when became extreme, resulted in people del,'Tading their
own surroundings in which they once lived in symbiosis (Guha, 1989: 58).
Secondly, the scientific forestry, which draws much of its influence from
earlier colonial forest policies, declared the production of a handful of timber species
as the goal of the forest management. Only those species with a commercial value,
were selected and taken care of, and the trees, shrubs and herbs, which did not have a
commercial value at that point of time, were regarded as weeds and were removed
creating space for marketable species (Guha, 1985, 1989). Thus began the dilution of
biodiversity, disturbing the balance among various ecological subsystems.21
Broadly speaking, the forestry debate of the colonial period revolved around
two schools of thought. On the one hand, there are scholars like Ramchandra Guha
and Madhav Gadgil, who describe the colonial period as an 'onslaught on India's
21 However, Rangarajan, 1996: 6 challenges such a claim of Guha of distinguishing commercially valuable trees vital to foresters and multi-species forest crucial for subsistence.
103
forests' and highlight the ever-increasing process of deforestation, which they opined
occurred to satisfy the strategic needs of the colonial state/government. According to
this school of thought, the negative attitude of the British towards the forest resource
- which they inherited from their historical experience - and the process of railway
and agricultural expansion and ship building activities led to large-scale deforestation
of India's forests, which forced the British government to adopt conservationist
measures, which had significant bearing upon the social life of agrarian and forest
dependent communities of colonial India.
The second school of thought of environmental history of India, represented
mainly by the works of Richard Grove, however, challenges the basic assumption
made by Guha regarding the character and chronology of colonial conservation.
Grove (1995, 1998), pointing towards the conservationist measures of colonial
government, states that colonial conservation has had much more wider reasons than
the narrow justification for fulfilling the strategic and commercial interests of the
empire in obtaining timber, a claim much popularly held by Guha and others.
Contrary to the first school of thought's claim of 'ecological prudence' (see,
Gadgil, 1985), Grove claims that deforestation had assumed significant proportion
even before the beginning of colonial rule. JustifYing the conservationist policies of
colonial state, Grove states that 'the fear of famine, climate change, and gross agrarian
failure, which were resultant features of ongoing deforestation, was a vital factor in
bringing about policies for forest, soil and water conservation' (Grove, 1998: 2). He
points out to the then prevailing ecological conditions, which emerged due to the
large-scale deforestation during the pre-colonial period, particularly in the Mughal
period, for which the colonial state has had to come out with conservation policies.
Two prominent ecological conditions, namely, soil erosion, which had become
prominent in India by 1920s, and the fear of widespread climate change, forced the
colonial state to comply with conservationist prescriptions. Colonial conservation,
may thus be understood, as Grove insists, 'as a state response to ecological crisis
emerged at the economic periphery rather than at the metropolitan centre' (Grove,
1998: 85).
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4.1. 2. Forestry in Independent India
The policy of commercialisation, which was at the centre of the forest management
during the Raj, was reinforced, intensified and extended even after independence. The
legal successor to the colonial state - the political and economic elites of modem
independent India - continued to rely on earlier colonial legal usurpation and
reinforced the rights of the state to exclusive control over forest protection and
management. Forest laws and policies were promulgated on the assumption that
national interest was best served by capitalising natural resources for consumer goods
and international market. That was the time when India was modernising its economy
through infrastructural and industrial developments. Forest based industries expanded
with the country's march towards modernisation; and handsome state subsidies were
given as incentives in the supply of forest raw materials to the pulp and rayon
industries (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 186; Guha, 1989).
Besides its social impacts that Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil point
out, colonial treatment of India's forest had significant impact upon the physical
conditions of the total forest cover of the country. India, after independence, inherited
forests over-exploited due to two World Wars. By the time of independence, 9 million
hectares of private forests had been devastated owing to merciless cutting by the
British for personal profit and greed (Shah, 1998: 432). The main thrust, therefore, of
the then Government of India was to rehabilitate the vast degraded forest areas and
also, at the same time, to increase the production of industrial wood to generate
greater revenue. It was in this context that the National Forest Policy of 1952, the first
of its kind in independent India, was enunciated and sustained production of industrial
timber was made the primary national goal.
4.1.2. a) The National Forest Policy, 1952
A new national forest policy was lunched in 1952 for proper management of India's
forest so as to derive maximum benefit from them. The policy stressed on maintaining
60 per cent of the geographical land in hilly regions and 20 per cent land in plain land
under forest cover. Unlike the previous Forest Policy of 1894, which gave primacy to
agriculture, the new policy discouraged indiscriminate extension of agricultural land
by clearing forest cover (Rai and Shannah, 1998). The policy gave primacy to
105
national interest and sustained yield of timber, even though there were provisions for
local communities to derive benefits from the local forest resource. To speak in a
nutshell, the basic tenets of the forest policy of 1952 were the following:
• To evolve a system of balanced and complementary land use, in which the land is to be allotted to that type of use, which will produce the most and deteriorate the least.
• To check the denudation of hilly areas to prevent soil erosion. • To establish tree-lands by affforestation measures for the amelioration of
physical and climatic conditions promoting the general well-being of people. • To ensure increased supply of fuel wood, fodder and small wood for
agricultural implements. • To ensure sustained supply of timber and other forest produces required for
defence, communication and industry. • To generate maximum annual revenue for the nation from the forest resources.
The 1952 Forest Policy has been criticised from two important angles. First,
the new policy document was based upon the principles of the earlier Forest Policy of
1894. In a similar fashion to the 1894 policy, the National Forest Policy of 1952 was
an 'explicit assertion of state monopoly right at the expense of the forest dependent
communities' (Guha, 1983: 1888). Such marginalisation of rights of forest dependent
communities was justified in the name of 'national interest', which was placed much
higher in comparison to secondary interest of any particular community. The policy
document stated that "the country as a whole should not be deprived of a "national
asset" by the mere accident of a village being situated closer to a forest area' (GOI,
1952). Thus acceptance of colonial norms with regard to establishment of state
monopoly in forest management practices, without questioning, characterised the first
ever forest policy of independent India.
Secondly, the basic objectives of the policy, as mentioned in the prevIOus
paragraph, were hardly compatible with one another. The sixth objective of realising
maximum revenue from the forestland could hardly be stated in compatible with the
other five objectives. Again the objective of sustained supply of timber for defence,
communication industry came in the way of increased supply of fuel, fodder and
small timber for agriculture to the forest dependent communities. Finally, there was
no clear-cut priority being assigned to the objectives in the policy document.
106
4.1.2 b) From Conservation-Oriented Forestry to Production Forestry
The attempt towards monopoly control of India's forest took a wider dimension in
1956, after the annexation of princely states into the Republic of India. The private
forests, which were earlier in the hands of big Zamindars and the princely states, came
under the jurisdiction of Government of India. Since then, organised efforts began in
real sense to manage India's forests with a strong administrative set up (Rawat, 1998:
367).
In a significant move, at around 1960, the Government of India appointed Dr.
Von Mon Roy, an expert of forest industries, to give an assessment of the country's
raw material situation. He strongly recommended creation of large-scale plantation of
quick growing species like 'Eucalyptus' (Shah, 1995: 9). The then forest officials
opined that "the extreme low productivity of India's forests was due to the
uneconomic and conservation-oriented approach that had characterised Indian
forestry, which has now to be shifted to policies based on the production of
economically attractive resources through plantation of quick growing and high
yielding tree species' (Guha, 1983: 1889). Thus was born the large-scale monoculture
plantation of Eucalyptus, creating a landmark in the history of forest management in
India. The strategy of the forest management in the early independence period was
production of more and more commercially valuable species and clear-cut the existing
forests and replace them with industrial wood, in as short a time as possible. Hence,
large-scale plantation of quick growing species like Eucalyptus and tropical-pine was
made.
The report of National Commission on Agriculture (1976) was another
landmark of change in forest management of post-independent India. Preoccupied
with the notion of development and industrial production it focused on conversion of
mixed miscellaneous types of forests, which contained highest biodiversity but little
commercial value, into man made forests of commercial species. NCA recommended
the 'Social Forestry' programme in its first mid-term report in 1972 on all wastelands.
The idea was to meet the needs of the people by creating resources at their doorstep,
on community land and with their involvement. It was also assumed that social
forestry would rescue traditional forest by reducing the pressure on them. The
107
plantation activity spread rapidly from 52,000 ha. planted in 1951-56 to 2,148,000 ha.
in 1979-84 (Shah, 1996: 24).
The evolution of the India's experience with 'social forestry' programme was
based on the rhetoric, which analysed the problem of deforestation being caused by
the actions of the rural poor (Agarwal, 1986; Blair, 1986; Saxena, 1991; Tewari,
1991). The alarming rate of deforestation in the early years of independent India was
thought to be generated by the increasing number of human and livestock population
in the rural areas. It was believed that the rural poor in search of their livelihood
engaged in deforestation and degradation of forest areas of the vicinity. This resulted
in environmental deterioration, drought and soil erosion (Tewari, 1991: 294). In such
a situation, social forestry was envisioned as a solution to fuel wood crisis and
environmental degradation. Social forestry was expected to reduce pressure from
natural forests by generating the resources at the door-steps of communities, for
which they depend and destroy the forest (NCA, 1976).
Broadly speaking, there were three factors, which had significant bearing upon
the forest management policies of independent India up to the period of 1980s. First
and foremost factor has been the soft attitude towards the process of industrialisation
and large-scale growth of wood based industries. Soon after independence a large
number of wood based industries grew up in consonance with India's march towards
industrial development. For example, the paper industry, which derived substantial
part of its raw material from the forest, has increased its production from 92,800
tonnes in 1948 to over one million tonnes in 1978 (Guha, 1983: 1888). Such growth
of paper and other wood based industries resulted in greater demand for raw material,
ultimately resulting in large-scale deforestation.
The second factor to characterise the early decades of forestry in independent
India was the changing strategy towards 'production forestry'. The expanding process
of industrialisation soon after independence required huge production ofraw material
in the shortest period and with a lowest possible cost. Being faced with the challenge
of greater fuel wood and raw material production to support the industries, the forest
management practice took a dynamic tum towards 'production forestry' in contrast to
the 'conservationist approach' of the colonial age. The National Commission of
lOR
Agriculture legitimised such an attempt of the then forests by outlining a new strategy
to forest management, whose first element 'should have to be production forestry for
industrial wood production' (NCA, 1976: 39).
Thirdly, the launching of 'Social Forestry' programme oflate 70s, had been an
important feature in the forest management in the early decade of independent India.
The programme was designed to rescue traditional forest by reducing the increasing
pressure on them. However, the great aims of social forestry programme had been
criticised by several scholars, who viewed social forestry as merely 'production
forestry in another name'. Out of its three components, i.e., Farm Forestry (plantation
in private plots), Village Woodlots (plantation in village common lands and
wastelands), and Street Plantation (plantation in roadsides and railway tracks); only
the first one was highly successful, which resulted in large scale eucalyptus plantation
in agricultural lands and supply of raw materials to wood based industries, though the
stated aim of Social Forestry were quite different, such as supplying fuel, fodder and
small timbcr to agriculturalists. The rich farmers took maximum advantages form the
social forestry scheme and converted their agricultural land into plantation of fast
growing species that could serve the wood based industry, thus generating maximum
profit and avoiding labour problem (Mukherji, 1995: 33). Social Forestry was, thus,
visualised by scholars as yet anothcr step towards the 'industrial orientation of Indian
forestry', which aimed at increasing supply of raw materials to the pulp and rayon
industries (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 189). Besides, the large-scale eucalyptus
plantation, through Social Forestry programme and more particularly through Farm
Forestry programme, had also been criticised for its role in rapid depletion of soil
nutrients, declining of food production, exhausting the ground water, etc.
4.1.3. Forestry in Pre-Independent and Independent India: A Comparison
There seems to be a continuity between the basic tenets of forest management
practices of the pre-independent India and that of independent India up to the period
of 1980s. This continuity may be located within the broader discourse of
'development', which had a continued feature in both colonial and independent India.
Even after independence, the state continued to be the sole mentor of delivering the
process of development and thereby capitalising the maximum benefit out of the
developmental process. The only difference cited between these two periods in the
109
context of development was that while the policies in the earlier period favoured the
British, later, it was the economic and political elites of modem India who were
successful in manipulating the policies in their favour (Baviskar, 1995).22
The establishment of state monopoly over the forest areas - a factor common
to both colonial and early decades of independent India - has always resulted in the
marginalisation of the interests of the forest dependent communities. The forest
policies, even after independence, were formulated in such a way as to best serve the
interests of the state and its allies. Reiterating the primacy of state interests over the
interests of the forest dependent communities, Guha states:
, The dominant interests behind the formation and execution of state policy have differed. While. before 1947 forests were a strategic raw material cl1lcial for imperial interests such railway expansion and world wars, in the post-independent period it has been the commercial and industrial interests who dictated forest policy. In both cases, however, the successful implementation of the policy has been achieved only at the expense of the forest communities and their life-support systems' (1983: 1892 - 3).
The forest management practices in independent India did not represent a
sharp departure from that of the colonial period. Whatever changes were made since
independence till the beginning of 1980s, were largely limited to modification and
additions, while the basic objective had remained the same. Guha (1983) identifies
another characteristic feature of continuity between the forest policies of the two
periods, i.e., the 'disjuncture between the theory and practice in the policies'. There
was a sharp distinction between policy formulation and its implementation in the
forest policies of India in both the periods. The populist measures of recognising the
needs and interest of forest dependent communities had always found a place in the
forest policies of our country. Even the Forest Policy of 1894 had included features
like 'promotion of general well-being of the country', 'fulfillment of the needs of the
people', etc., and in the 1952 policy in independent India, there were provisions for
ensuring increasing the supply of fuel wood, fodder and small wood for agricultural
implements of rural population (Rai and Sharmah, 1998). However, in their actual
implementation such objectives were strategically ignored.
22 For a critique of national development policies since independence and its continuity with the colonial period, see, Baviskar, 1995: chapter - 2.
ItO
4.1.4. Emergence of a Fresh Approach
The beginning of 1980s saw a paradigm shift in the forest policies of independent
India. Even the social forestry programme of 1970s could not achieve much success
with regard to solving the problems of degradation and deforestation of India's
forestlands. The increasing rates of deforestation, loss of biodiversity, recurrent
droughts and publication of research reports showing the degradation of forests by
several civil society and research organisations created a platform to reconsider the
forest policies and forest management practices of our country during the early
1980s.23 Further, the marginalisation of rights of the forest dependent communities
and the large-scale deforestation, which further curtailed their share of forestland, had
resulted in varying kinds of responses from the deprived communities - sometimes
limited to particular geographical locations and other times at a larger national level.
Organised protests and struggles in relation to exploitative policy of the Government
became manifest in many parts of the country. The most celebrated was the 'Chipko
Movement' in northern India, where local people embraced the trees targeted for
cutting by commercial loggers. Besides reveling the socio-environmental devastations
being wrought by Government policies, these movements brought into focus the
potential benefits of community management. 24 Taking all these matters into
consideration, a need was felt by the development planners and foresters for a revised
approach in forest management and policy. It was affirmed that Forest Department
had failed to improve the forests on its own, despite total control over the forestland.
The experience of scientific management of forests in India has made one
thing clear that neither people themselves nor the Forest Department alone can stop
degradation of the forests. As a consequence, it was felt necessary to combine the
efforts of the two to manage the forests efl'ectively for mutual benefit. The
Government of India realised this need and the revised National Forest Policy was
21 Perhaps the publication of 'The State of India's Environment: A citizens Report' in 1984 and 'The State of India's Environment: A Second Citizens Report' in 1985, by a Delhi based NGO Center for Science and Environment (CSE, 19R4, 1985), was the first organised attempt by any civil society organisation to publicise the degrading conditions of India's forest resources.
24 More than a protest against commercial forestry, the 'Chipko Movement' was viewed by some scholars as an assertion of community control over forest resources (Lynch and Talbot, 1995: 5-6). Even Guha considers the Chipko movement as local peasant protest against marginalisation of their source of livelihood and for having access to forests (see, Guha, 1989).
III
cnacted in 1988, prohibiting the clear cutting of well-stocked natural forests and
banning plantation of exotic species.
4.1.5. The National Forest Policy, 1988
One of the important factors, which distinguished the new policy from that of the
1952, is its approach towards sustainability. Unlike the previous policy of 1952,
which was primarily production oriented, the new policy has given much priority to
environmental stability, soil conservation, maintenance of ecological balance and
abovc all meeting the subsistence requirements of the local people. The policy set the
national goal of having one-third of the total geographical area under the forest cover.
The basic objectives of the National Forest Policy, 1988 may be stated as the
following (GOI, 1988):
• To maintain environmental stability through preservation and restoration of the ecological balance.
• To conserve the natural heritage of the country by preserving the remaining natural forests with vast variety of flora and fauna.
• To check soil erosion and denudation in the catchment areas of rivers, lakes, reservoirs in the interest of soil and water conservation, for mitigating floods and draughts and for the retardation of siltation of reservoirs.
• To increasc substantially the forest cover through massive afforestation and social forcstry programmes.
• To meeting the requirement of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce and small timber of the rural and tribal population.
• To increase the productivity of forests to meet the essential national needs. • To create a massive people's movement with the involvement of women, for
achieving these objectives and to minimise pressure on existing forests.
The revised policy strongly felt that people who were living in and around forests
must have a stake on the forests and the aspirations of such people must be met.
Further, environmental stability and maintenance of subsistence requirements of local
pcoplc were seen above earning revenue from the forests. Thus, mono-cultural
plantation was discouraged and mixed forests were preferred. With this the focus
shifted fonn 'commerce' and 'industry' to 'ecology' and satisfying the basic needs of
the people, providing fuel wood, fodder and strengthening forcst-tribal linkage.
[n the changing scenario, with the awakening of environmental awareness and
passing of the New Forest Policy of 1988, the tenn 'conservation' received a wider
112
connotation. The attention now shifted from 'preservation of forests' for industrial
and other commercial use to 'sustainable management of forests' through
conservation and sustainable utilisation, which could fulfill the present and future
needs of the local people and the national interests as well. While the earlier
conservationist policies debarred the local people from gaining access to forest lands,
the later management techniques created space for involvement of local people, local
knowledge and local wisdom in a wider range of activities such as preservation,
maintenance, sustainable utilisation, restoration and enhancement of forest resources.
4.1.6. Evolution of Joint Forest Management
The years following the launching of the National Forest Policy, 1988 have been a
period of great development in Indian forest history. Several attempts have been made
to come out with policy resolutions in conformity with the objectives of the new
forest policy, one of which is the implementation of the Joint Forest Management
(JFM) Programme. The historical ground for the JFM was prepared by the New
Forest Policy, 1988, which emphasised environmental protection, meeting the
requirements of fuel wood, fodder, minor forest produces (MFP) and small timber for
rural and tribal population; and creating massive people's movement with
involvement of women for achieving these objectives. On June 1, 1990, the
Government of India adopted a National Joint Forest Management Resolution, which
set guidelines for partnership between local communities and state Forest Department
for the protection and management of state owned forests through Forest Protection
Committees. In a radical departure from earlier focus on policing and protection of
state owned forests, the new approach emphasised the shared responsibility for
management and sharing of profits with the local communities.
The genesis of the JFM can be seen in two sources. On the one hand, it is
located in the efforts of some progressive Foresters to form forest protection
committees (FPCs), particularly in west Bengal. Here, the Arabari Project initiated by
Dr. Ajit Banerjee is widely cited as a classic example (see, Campbell, 1992). When
the Arabari experiment was successful in protecting forests by the FPCs, other forest
officers too adopted the approach widely leading to a rapid spread of JFM. On the
other hand, a growing body of research argued that JFM represented a spontaneous
reemergence of community forest management in the region, or a reassertion of tribal
113
autonomy movements, which had a long history in the regIOn (Deb, 1993 and
Poffenberger et al., 1996). Giving a subaltern approach to the origin of JFM, Deb
(1993) writes:
" ... a thread of the sense and intention of an community control of the forests seems to have been spun ji-om the popular spirit of indigenous peoples' movement in the region" (Deb, 1993: 371).
JFM represents a significant policy shift In the Indian forest management
system, which can be best illustrated by comparing it with earlier policies. Comparing
it with the earlier practices of forest management, Joshi (1998: 4 - 5) identifies the
following distinguishing features that sharply differ from the earlier policies.
• From production for commercial market and to generate revenue, to production for fulfilling the basic needs of the forest dependent people,
• From an exclusive focus on timber to focus on Non Timber Forest Products (NTFP) like fuel wood, fodder, etc. which are central to the livelihood of forest dependents,
• From monoculture to mixed forests that includes a diversity of tree species, • From plantation of similar age to plantation of diverse age for sustained supply of
timber and other forest products to meet the needs of the forest dependent, • From authoritarian administration through policing to participatory management
through sharing, • From dc-empowering people to empowerment of people.
In the new JFM model, people dependent on forests are to be consulted and
their views are to be taken as the basis to plan the management of forests. The
execution of management plan is to be done through Village Forest Committees,
which will be constituted by taking two members from each family (one male and one
female), maintaining complete transparency in all matters. The Forest Department is
to provide necessary funds for various activities in the forest to the village forest
committee and also essential technical guidance. Contractors are not to be brought for
execution of works. Species selection for planting is to be made only as per people's
preference. The people are entitled to take the usufruct right free of cost. They are
also entitled to take a share in timber and other major forest products when harvested
as per JFM plans (Mukherji, 1995: 35).
Having discussed the evolution of JFM in India from a historical perspective,
by tracing the history of forest management since the colonial rule, let me now move
114
forward to deal with the specific data pertaining to the state of Orissa. Though the
basic objective of forest management in both colonial and post-colonial periods in the
state of Orissa is not very much different from that of the all India situation, yet there
are some particular happenings in the state, which distinguishes it from the rest of
India. The remaining sections of the chapter attempts to historically analyse the
process of people's involvement in the forest management, which finally took the
shape of Joint Forest Management.
4.2. The History of Forest Management in Orissa and the Evolution of JFM
4.2.1. Forestry in Pre-Independent Orissa
The history of formation of Orissa as a separate State and the history of forest
management had coexisted in the pre-colonial period. Prior to being a separate State,
several parts of Orissa were under the then British Indian Provinces of Madras,
Central Province and Bengal and Bihar Presidency. On April I, 1912, the Province of
Bihar and Orissa was created bringing together parts of Bengal Presidency and
Central Province. It was only in April 1936, that the present State of Orissa was born
as a new Province of British-India by separating Orissa from the combined State of
Bihar and Orissa, and then combining with it some of the Oriya-speaking areas of the
then adjoining States of Madras Presidency and Central Province. Thus, an organised
attempt to manage the forests Statewide by establishing monopoly through reservation
of the forests started in 1936 with the creation of Orissa as a separate State.
Given the dispersed nature of Orissa under colonial rule, forest management
too had a varying origin. Forest management started in Orissa more than a century
ago during 1883 - 84, when it was a part of Bengal Presidency. For the first time, in
1884, the 'Orissa Forest Division' was constituted for both Bihar and Orissa at Angul
(Dhenkanal District) under the administrative control of the Conservator of Forest of
Bengal Presidency with the headquarters at Darjeeling; and forest blocks were
declared as Reserved Forests under the Indian Forest Act, 1878, with effect from
January I, 1884. The total area of Reserved Forests of Orissa Forest Division at Angul
was 692 sq. km. (Padhi, 1984: 180). Demarcation of forest areas for settlement and
reservation was the main focus of the then management strategy. Notifications were
liS
issued in this regard in Angul and Khurda. By 1888 - 89. there were a total of 968.6
sq. km. of Reserved Forests in Orissa Forest Division. In 1891 - 92. the Orissa Forest
Division was divided into two subdivisions, namely, Angul and Khurda. with
Reserved Forests of 725 and 303 sq. km respectively (RCDC. 1996: 3).
Out of the total of seven Forest Divisions of the newly formed Province \If
Bihar and Orissa, there were three Divisions in the Orissa part. namely. An/:,'lli. Pun
and Sambalpur, with a total of 1,920 sq. km of Reserved Forests and 2,769 sq. km of
Protected Forests under its administration (RCDC, 1996: 4). Before being a part of
Bihar-Orissa Province, Sambalpur was in Central Province, where the Sambalpur
Forest Division was already existing since 1887. The old Sambalpur Division had a
vast geographical area with scattered forest patches. Thus, the Division was bi furcated
into Sambalpur East and Sambalpur West with effect from April I, 1928 for efficient
management.
Forest management in the true sense, started in Orissa with the reorganisation
of the State as a separate Province on April I, 1936. In that year a Forest Department
was formed under a Conservator of Forests with headquarters at Angul. With the
merger of Ganjam district with the new Province, Ganjam and Parlakhemundi
Divisions were transferred to Orissa from Madras Presidency. Forest administration in
Ganjam started from 1885-86, and by 1906 almost all forest blocks were reserved
under the Madras Forest Act, 1882. In 1936, Sambalpur East and Sambalpur West
were renamed Sambalpur and Barapahar Division. In 1938, Ganjam and
Parlakhemundi Divisions were reorganised with effect from January 3, 1938, into four
divisions, namely, Russelkonda, Chhatrapur, Parlakhemundi and Baliguda. Later,
Russelkonda and Chhatrapur were renamed Ghumsor North and Ghumsor South with
effect from April I, 1941. In October 1945, Baliguda Division was divided into
Baliguda and Udayagiri Division. Thus, by the time India got independence, there
were nine Forest Divisions in Orissa, namely, Angul, Puri, Sambalpur, Barapahar,
Parlakhemundi, Ghumsor North, Ghumsor South, Baliguda and Udayagiri Divisions,
with Reserved Forests of 3,615.6 sq. km, Demarcated Protected Forests of 541.3 sq.
km and Reserved land of 3,286.7 sq. km, making a total of 7443.6 sq. km forest area
(RCDC, 1996: 4).
116
4.2.2 The Post-Independence Period
4.2.2. a) The Period of State Monopoly (1947 - 85)
The major factors affecting forest administration and management in post
independence Orissa have been merger of ex-princely and ex-zamindari areas with the
State, the enactment of Orissa Forest Act, 1972, and several other Government
resolutions. Several feudatory States were merged with the State of Orissa with
independence, as a result of which the forest areas under their control also came into
the hands of the Orissa Government. To prevent these rulers of ex-princely Statcs
from destroying or selling away the forestlands in their territory, two important Acts
were passed soon after independence - the 'Orissa Preservation of Private Forests
Act' in 1947, which prohibited the owners (mainly rulers of princely States) of any
forest 'to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise alienate whole or any portion of the forest
area'; and the 'Orissa Communal Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation)
Act' in 1948, which came into force with effect from February 5, 1948. This Act
prohibited any landlord 'to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise assign or alienate or
convert any communal forest or private lands into Raiya/i land or create occupancy
right there in'.
In 1948, 25 feudatory States merged with Orissa and the extent of forest area
under the control of Government increased. After the merger of the princely State of
Mayurbhanj in January 1949, the Reserved Forest areas including the Demarcated
Protected Forests and Reserved lands totalled 26,332.5 sq. km. In this year, the
headquarters of Forest Department shifted from Angul to Cuttack, the then State
capital. Before being a part of Orissa State, these ex-States had their own separate
forest administration under their respective kings. In some of the big ex-States like
Mayurbhanj and Bolangir-Patna, there were full-fledged Forest Department with rules
and regulations for management of forests almost similar to those in vogue in the
British-Indian Provinces. These princely States belonged to a political group called
'Eastern States Agency of Orissa and Chhatisgarh Districts' under a political agent
with headquarters at Sambalpur. A Conservator of Forests was posted at Sambalpur,
who was acting as Forest Advisor to princely States except Mayurbhanj.
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In the mid-fifties, another important event took place in the history of forest
management of the State. With the abolition of the Zamindari system in 1952, the
forest areas under the Zamindars came under the direct control of the Government.
Though most of the Zamindars vested in the Government of Orissa since November
27, 1952, the management of forest areas under these Zamindaris continued to be
under Allchal Sasall (regional administration) till November 14, 1957. From
November IS, 1957 these forests were transferred to the Forest Department,
Government of Orissa. With the merger of ex-princely and ex-Zamindari areas into
the State of Orissa, the total forest area increased from 7,443.6 sq. km to 65,677.76 sq.
km by 1959.
Even though Orissa became a separate State in 1936, there was no single
unified forest management practice in the State. The independent State Government
also did not pay any attention in this regard. It was only in 1959, that the State
Government appointed a Forest Enquiry Committee, which in its report observed that
the total forest area was 65,677.7 sq. kms, constituting about 42 per cent of the total
land area of the State. Thus, for the first time in 1959, the legal status of different
types of forests under the administration of the State of Orissa as a whole came into
the picture (see Table 4.1 below).
Table 4.1: Legal Status of Forests in Orissa in 1959
Type of Forest Area (in sq. km) Reserved Forest (A Class) 20,619.09 Reserved Forest (8 Class) 1,865.44 Reserved Land 2,495.02 Demarcated Protected Forest 537.83 Un-demarcated Protected Forest, unreserved 19,840.25 lands, Khesra Forest and un-classed Forests Ex-zamindari Forest 20,132.45 Private Forests 187.64 Total 65,677.72
Source: (Padhi. 1984)
However, most of the areas under un-Reserved, Khesra Forests, un
Demarcated Protected Forests, un-Reserved Lands and open forests including those of
the ex-Zamindari areas were only barren land and hills without vegetation, although
they were called 'forests' under the law.
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One of the important recommendations of the Forest Enquiry Committee was
the passing of a unified Forest Act to be applied to the whole State of Orissa. In the
absence of a single Forest Act for the whole State, there were two Forest Acts
applicable to the State till 1972. The Madras Forest Act, 1882 was in force in the
districts of Ganjam, Koraput, Baliguda and some areas of Kandhamal district,
whereas Indian Forest Act, 1927 was applicable to the rest of the State. Under Madras
Forest Act, 1882, there were two categories of forests: Reserved Forests and
Unreserved Forests. Different princely States and ex-Zamindari areas in the above
mentioned districts framed their own rules under the Madras Forest Act, 1882. Under
the Indian Forest Act, 1927, there were three categories of forests: Reserved Forests,
Village Forests and Protected Forests. However, in practice, no Village Forest was
formed in Orissa till 1972. Protected areas were managed differently in different areas
by rules framed under Indian Forest Act, 1927. For example, while there were
demarcated Protected Forests in Angul and Khurda, no such forests existed in
Sambalpur.
The existence of two different Acts within a State often created confusion and
administrative difficulties. It imposed extra strain on the Governrnent machinery.
Thus, it was felt that this could be avoided by one unified Forest Act. Consequently,
Orissa Forest Bill was introduced in the State Legislative Assembly in 1942.
However, owing to certain controversies, the Bill was dropped. Finally, in 1954, the
Indian Forest Act (Orissa Amendment) was passed as a follow-up of the Indian Forest
Act, 1927, as applicable to Orissa. Before the enactment of the Orissa Amendment
Act, 1954, there were Reserved Forests under both Madras Forest Act, 1882 and
Indian Forest Act, 1927; Reserved Lands and Unreserved Lands under Madras Forest
Act and Demarcated Protected Forests and Un-demarcated Protected Forests under
Indian Forest Act, 1927. Recall that in the princely States there were A and B type
Reserved Forests and Khesra Forests. The Khesra Forests were named differently in
different localities, e.g., Sadharan Forests. Katra. Krisi. Gramya lungle. etc; which
were meant for the fulfillment of requirements of the local people. However, with the
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amendment of Indian Forest Act in 1954, all Reserved Forests, whether A or B,
became Reserved Forests and the Khesra Forests were declared as Protected Forests.25
In a similar fashion to the all India situation, where the policy of
commercialisation in forestry sector continued even after independence, the Orissa
government continued to rely on the earlier colonial legal framework, thus reinforcing
the rights of the State to exclusive control over forest protection and management.
The 1954 Orissa Amendment of Indian Forest Act brought more and more forest
areas under Reserved category, depriving a large number of local communities of the
usufruct rights and concessions that they enjoyed earlier. Moreover, by declaring
Khesra Forests as Protected Forests, the rights and concessions of local people were
further curtailed. Though there were provisions for Village Forests in the Indian
Forest Act, 1927, they were only on paper, as is evident from the report of the Forest
Enquiry Committee, 1959, which did not recognise any existence of such Village
Forests in Orissa.
Though the Forest Enquiry Committee, 1959, recommended a unified forest
Act, it took thirteen years for the Orissa Government to materialise the Act, when in
1972 Orissa Forest Act was passed. But the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 did not have any
new promise for the forest-dependent communities of Orissa, rather it re-established
the colonial legacy. The forest areas that were already declared as Reserved Forests
and Protected Forests under the Indian Forest Act and the Madras Forest Act
remained the same under the new Act. The draft bill of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972
had freely drawn from the Madras Forest Act and other existing State Forest Acts and
followed the sequence of Indian Forest Act, 1927.
For administrative convenience, the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 had divided the
total forest area into three categories, such as Reserved Forests, Village Forests and
Protected Forests. Chapter II of the Act was devoted to the Reserved Forests,
25 Property rights over the forestland detennine the difference between different types of forests, such as Reserved, Protected or Village. While in the case of Reserved Forest, the Forest Department enjoys property rights over the forestland, in Protected Forests, the management rights and responsibilities of the forest are conferred on Forest Department. whereas the property rights on land remain with the Revenue Department.
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according to which the State Government was conferred with the power to declare
any land as Reserved Forest, in lands which were the property of Government or over
which the Government had property rights. Once declared as Reserved Forest, the
Government enjoyed monopoly rights not only on the physical area of the forest, but
also on the trees and other forest produce therein. The sheer monopoly of rights was
visible from the fact that under Section 26 of the Act, a Divisional Forest Officer was
empowered to close any public or private way or watercourse or stop use of water by
any people inside a Rescrve Forest without the previous sanction of the State
Government. Although there was a provision in thc same section that such an action
could be taken, if a substitute arrangement for the similar already existed, it was the
State Government, which had to be reasonably convinced about such alternatives, not
the common people, who are the real users of the resource. Entering into the forest
area, which was declared as reserved, grazing cattle in it and/or using any forest
produce was also regardcd as an offence, punishable under section 27 of the Act.
Chapter III of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 was devoted to 'Village Forests'
with only three sections in it (Section 30 - 32). Even though the Act spoke of the
formation of Village Forests and vested the responsibility of management of such
forests with the village communities, it was silent about the details of such
management by them. The details pertaining to how the Village Forest Protection
Committee would be constituted, their rights, duties and responsibilities or how it
would share benefits from such forestland were also not dealt within the Act. Instead,
the State was given powers to declare all or any provisions of the rules for Reserved
Forests as being applicable to the Village Forest, thereby extending its rights to
Village Forests also.
The legislation regarding 'Protected Forests' was dealt with in Chapter IV of
the Orissa Forest Act, 1972. Under Section 33 of the Act, the State Government was
vested with power to declare any land that was not included in the Reserved Forests,
but which was the property of the Government or over which Govemment enjoyed
property rights as 'Protected Forests'. Whcreas in the case of Reserved Forests, the
forestland was reserved by the Government, in Protected Forests, the Government
was given the power to issue notifications to declarc any 'trees or class of trees in a
Protected Forests' as reservcd. Unlike the case of Reserved Forests, where the Forcst
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Department enjoyed property rights over the land, in Protected Forests the
management rights and responsibilities of the forests (mainly trees and forest
produces) was conferred to the Forest Department, whereas the property rights of the
land remained with the Revenue Department. Section 36 of the Act empowered the
State Government to make rules to control and regulate certain matters like cutting,
sawing, conversion and removal of trees and collection of any forest produce from the
Protected Forests. The provisions regarding punishing those who enter into a forest
area and collect any forest produce, as was in vogue for Reserved Forests, were also
made applicable for Protected Forests.
4.2.2. b) Beginning of a New Era: Involving Local People in Forest Management
(1985 -)
The 1980s have been an important decade for India from the developmental point of
view. That was the time when concepts and approaches like 'people's participation',
'indigenous rights and practices', 'bottom-up approach', 'community-based resource
management', etc. were gaining momentum not only among academicians but also
among development practitioners and policy makers. The decade-long debate on
poverty and environmental degradation also influenced policy makers to recognise
people's requirements and rights on environment. The large-scale deforestation and
resource degradation had made it amply clear that conservation of natural resources
without the involvement of people is hard to accomplish and cannot ensure
sustainability. As a consequence, the Government of India came out with its
resolution on National Forest Policy in 1988, which treated 'the requirements of
fuel wood, fodder and small timber such as house building materials for tribals and
other villagers living in and around forest area as the first charge on forest produce'.
The changes that took place at the national level had, in fact, already begun to
emerge in several States. In keeping with these changes in approach, the situation in
Orissa too began to change. A new era may be Stated to have begun in Orissa's forest
history during the mid-80s with the declaration of the 'Orissa Village Forest Rules,
1985'. Orissa was one step ahead of the rest of the country by implementing the
Orissa Village Forest Rules in 1985, three years earlier than the National Policy. It
was, indeed, the first Government resolution to involve people in forest management.
Though the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 under Section 30 - 32 (Chapter - III) had dealt
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with the fonnation of the Village Forests, the modalities regarding the process of such
management had to wait till 1985.
As per the 1985 Rules, the management of every village forest was vested
with a committee comprising the sarpanch of the gram panchayat concerned, and its
ward members, the Forester, Revenue Inspector and the village-level workers and
such other persons of the community as may be nominated by the village. The total
number of members of the committee was limited to eight. The Rules also called for
representation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Women and Landless persons.
It now became the duty of the committee, and therefore, of the community to protect
and ensure preservation of plantations and report to the nearest local forest office or
police station in the event of any injury to such plantations. The proper distribution of
forest produce among the members of the community became the responsibility of the
committee, which was empowered to fonnulate principles for that purpose.
The first step towards the involvement of local people in protection and
conservation of Reserved Forest was taken in the 1988 Government resolution. 26 This
stated that:
"the question of involving village communities for effective protection and conservation of Reserved Forests was, for sometime past, under the active consideration of the Government. After careful appraisal, the Government is of the view that the task of protecting forests is so urgent and so enormous that the rural community should be fully and actively involved in it. Accordingly. it has been decided that the scheme of involving rural community will be implemented in the State ".
As per this resolution, the villagers were assigned specific roles in the
protection of Reserved Forests adjoining their villages and in return were granted
certain concessions in the matter of meeting their bonafide requirements of firewood
and small timber for house construction and agriculture.
26 Through Resolution No lOF (Pron) -47/88/17240 FFAH dated August I, 1988 of Govemment of Orissa in Forest Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Department, which came into force on October 2, 1988.
123
The resolution stated that it would be the duty of the Divisional Forester
concerned to assign peripheral Reserved Forests to adjoining villages and constitute
Forest Protection Committees for each assigned village. The committee comprised the
sarpanch of the gram panchayat concerned, the ward members belonging to the
village, the local Forester, Revenue Inspector, V.L.W. and such other persons of the
said village not exceeding three as may be nominated by the gram panciJayat
concerned. It was mentioned in the resolution that the sarpallch of the gram
panchayat and the local Forester would be the chairman and convener of the
committee respectively; and that care would be taken to ensure that the committee
included persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, women and
landless categories, as far as possible. The villagers were instructed to furnish an
undertaking to the Divisional Forest Officer concerned through the committee for
proper upkeep and maintenance of the assigned Reserved Forest areas. This resolution
was amended in October 198827 and as per this new amendment the committee need
to be constituted in consultation with local villagers and the non-official members of
the Forest Protection Committee should be selected by convening a meeting of the
villagers concerned. However, the sarpanch of the gram pallchayat and the local
Forester continued to be the chairman and the convener of the committee respectively.
By another Resolution in December 199028, the Protected Forests were also included
for assignment to the adjoining villages.
It can be pointed out from the review of Government attempts to involve local
people in forest management in the State that the endeavour to give people access
over the forest resource and a voice in management had come in a phased manner,
depending upon the legal classification of the forest. One of the major drawbacks of
these policies was that it made the Forest Protection Committees of the villages a
political body by making the president of the gram panchayat its chairman. Several
intricacies were overlooked by making the panchayat president as the head of the
village Forest Protection Committee. While the gram panchayat was a political unit,
which constituted more than one village, Forest Protection Committees were confined
27 Vide Resolution No. - 10F (Pron) 47/88 - 23638 dated October 13, 1988 of Government of Orissa, Forest, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Department.
28 Resolution No. lOF (Pron) 4/90/29525/FF AH dated December II, 1990 of Government of Orissa.
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to particular villages and/or in certain cases to a segment of a village. In actual
practice, one sarpanch was to take care of several Forest Protection Committees
falling within his/her panchayat, which obviously was a difficult task. Besides, the
sarpanch coming from a different village might not be truly committed to the cause of
forest protection for an alien village.
4.2.2. c) Evolution ofJFM in Orissa
At the national level, the ground for Joint Forest Management was prepared by the
New National Forest Policy, 1988, which emphasised creating a massive people's
movement with involvement of women for achieving its objectives. On June I, 1990,
the Government of India adopted a National Joint Forest Management Resolution,
which set guidelines for partnership between local communities and the State Forest
Department for the protection and management of State owned forests through Forest
Protection Committees.
In response to the Government of India Resolution and to make the
involvement of local people in forest protection more effective and transparent, the
Government of Orissa issued a Resolution29 to implement the Joint Forest
Management programme in the State. This marked the beginning of JFM as is
understood today, in Orissa. It dealt with exhaustively the involvement of the local
community in the protection of adjoining forests, formation of Vana Samrakshana
Committees, and the constitution, function, duties and responsibilities of such
committees. It also provided for the constitution of a State-level steering committee
chaired by the Minister of Forest to monitor and guide the implementation of this
scheme.
The Joint Forest Management Resolution of the Govemment of Orissa entrusts
the gram panchayat with the duty of convening a general meeting of all adults living
in the selected village on the suggestion of the D.F.O/Range Officer/Forester, where
the forest officialls will explain the scheme of Joint Forest Management to the
villagers. Based on the response, motivation and willingness of the villagers and after
taking account of other related factors facilitating the community protection of the
29 Bearing No. 16700 - 10F (Pron) 20/93 F & E dated July 3, 1993.
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forest, the D.F.O will recommend the establishment of Vana Samrakshana Samiti
(VSS) of the village. According to the resolution, the VSS should include two adults.
including a woman member of every household living in the village as its members.
Under this new Joint Management Plan, the protection and management
responsibility of the forest patch is wholly entrusted to the members of the forest
protection committee. It shall be the duty of the members to prevent forest offences
and pass on relevant information and intelligence in this regard to the forest
department officials. The management activities of the forest are to be carried out by
the executive committee of the VSS. Each VSS should have its own executive
committee comprising ten to fifteen members, which should include Ward Members
representing the village, six to eight representatives selected/elected by the villagers,
the Forester and Forest Guard concerned, and nominee of an NGO functioning in the
local area to be selected by the D.F.O. The Forester of the locality concerned and the
Naib Sarpanch (Vice-President of the gram panchayat) will be the convener and
chairperson of the executive committee respectively. It is stated in the Joint
Management Plan that usufructs like leaves, fodder, grass, thatch grass, broom grass,
thorny fencing materials, brushwood and fallen lops and tops and twigs used as
fuel wood shall be available to the members of the VSS free of cost. It shall be the
duty of the executive committee of the VSS to ensure equal distribution of all
intermediate yields in the shape of small wood poles, firewood, etc., as may be
obtained in periodical clearance of the forest. However, the timbers and poles, as may
be obtained from a major harvest or final felling, shall be shared between the Forest
Department and the VSS in equal shares.
4.2.3. Analysis of Forest Policies in Orissa
The forest policies of the country since independence can be summarised in three
points, which also influence the forest management practices in Orissa. First. during
the early colonial period, there was large-scale deforestation, which later led to the
introduction of scientific management of forests in India and the first ever Indian
Forest Act, 1865. Though specific data for such a period are not available for Orissa,
the situation of the country was no different from that of Orissa at that time. Second,
during the late colonial and early independence period, the State strengthened its
monopoly over the forests and adopted the policy of conservation, whereby more and
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more forestland was put under the category of 'Reserved Forest', and access to such
forests was denied to common people. Third, being unsuccessful in its attempts to
increase the forest cover by creating a monopoly over it, the State adopted
'participatory policies', and is making efforts to involve people in the protection and
management of forests.
The scientific management of Orissa's forests has had significant
conscquences for the lives of those who depend upon forests for their daily livelihood
as well as the physical area of the forest itself. The State's monopoly over forest
resources by putting more forestland under 'Reserved' categories has deprived a large
number of people of the usufruct rights and concessions enjoyed before. It was
perceived that people's interference inside the forest area, even if for their livelihood,
would result in a decrease in forest resources. Thus, the policy of the state monopoly
was adopted tor greater enhancement of forest resources itself. But an analysis of the
physical area of the forests after independence reveals that deforestation has
continued in spite of tough policies to keep the local people away from the forests.
Table 4.2: PhYSical Area of the Forest in Orissa after Independence (Area in Sq. Kms.)
Year Reserved Demarcated Un-demarcated Total Forest Protected Forest Protected Forest
1948 3,615.6 541.3 3,286.7 7,443.6 1959 24,979 538 39,973 65,490 1969 24,166 562 42,733 67,461 1979 - - - 60,223 1985 28,311 19,625 7,848 55,784 1993 27,087 16,133 13,967 57,167
Source: RCDC 1996 & CPSW, 1994
It can be pointed out from Table 4.2 that the forest area had suddenly
increased soon after independence from 7,443.6 sq. km. in 1948 to 65, 490 sq. km. in
1959 and on till 1969. The inclusion of ex-zamindari and ex-princely forest into the
State of Orissa might be cited as two major factors behind such an increase in forest
area after independence. In the year 1960 - 61, ex-zamindari forests of 1,500 sq. km.,
which were initially under the control of the State revenue department, were
transferred to the State forest department (CPSW, 1994: 32). From 1969 till 1985, the
127
I
physical area of the forest had decreased, increasing slightly in 1993. Despite this
total decrease in forest cover, there has been an increase in forest area in the
'reserved' category from 24, 166 sq. km. in 1969 to 28, 311 sq. km. in 1985. This
clearly reveals that the Government policy of putting more forest areas in the
'reserved' category, thereby denying local people of access to the forest did not serve
the desired result of increasing forest cover in the State. This calls for an analysis of
the cause of deforestation in the State elsewhere rather than putting the blame on the
forest-dependent communities. Deforestation in the State from independence till 1985
amounted to 2,073.97 sq. km. according to forest department records, out of which
542.79 sq. km. were reserved forests, 308.64 sq. km. were demarcated protected
forests and 1,222.54 sq. km. were un-demarcated protected forests (see, Table 4.3).
These included multipurpose river valley projects and subsequent resettlement of
displaced people besides several other purposes like railways, roads, minor irrigation
projects, etc.
Table 4,3: Deforestation in Orissa from 1947 to 1985 (Area in sq. kms.)
Purpose of Deforestation Reserved Demarcated Un- Total Forests Protected demarcated
Forests Protected Forests
. River valley projects and 397.52 288.08 1,170.16 1,855.76 : resettlement of displaced
people Industrial purposes 31.49 2.84 0.15 34.48 Capital conservation 7.79 13.14 - 20.93 Railways 24.1 0.1 - 24.2 Minor irrigation projects 11.3 - 0.11 11.41 Public purposes 30.57 0.2 49.47 80.24 Roads 0.23 - - 0.23 Miscellaneous purposes 39.79 4.28 2.65 46.72 Total 542.79 308.64 1,222.54 2,073.97
SOllrce: Status o/Orissa's Environment. 1994. CPS1¥. Bhubaneswar.
Of the total area deforested, 1,855.76 sq. km. (89.47 per cent) was attributed to
river valley projects as per Government records. However, in real practice, once a
river valley project came up, it not only submerged a few sq. km. of forests, but
caused massive deforestation in its periphery. For instance, during 1930 - 75, more
than 45 per cent of the forests were lost around Sambalpur and Jharsuguda in a radius
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of 20 miles because of the Hirakud Dam Project (CPSW, 1994: 46). Table 4.4 reveals
the actual land area lost due to various multipurpose river valley projects in Orissa.
Table 4.4: Land Degradation in the Peripheries of Reservoirs of Multipurpose River Valley Projects in Orissa between 1972 and 82 (Area in sq. kms.)
Name of the Open Closed Total Area without Total Project Degraded Forest Forest Forest Area
Forest Lost Vegetation Lost Hirakud 765 1,290 2,055 39 2,094 Machkund 988 1,491 2,479 61 2,540 Rengali 469 LI43 1,612 88 1,700 Salandi 722 1,930 2,652 64 2,716 Total 2,944 5,854 8)98 252 9,050
Source: Status of Orissa's Environment, 1994, CPSW, Bhubaneswar.
Diversion of forest areas for non-forest purposes, including agriculture,
constituted another potential source of deforestation in Orissa. During 1972, the
Orissa Government decided to provide land for agriculture to the landless poor in the
name of 'Land Distribution Fair,.30 As a result, the Tehsildars not only distributed
land from Un-demarcated Protected Forests to the landless, but also regularised all
sorts of earlier encroachments over these lands (RCDC, 1996: 16).
The Government polices concerning forestry, whether regulatory in the initial
years of independence or participatory since the mid-1980s', have always targeted
increased forest cover in terms of more trees. This emphasis on quantity of forest
cover has neglected the issue of quality of our forests. The National Forest Policy of
1988 also envisaged a target of 33 per cent of national forest cover. From the State's
point of view increased forest cover had always been the end (motive) of the forest
department, and the community's involvement in forestry activities either through
Social Forestry Projects or JFM had been perceived as a means to that end. A quick
look at the physical status of the forest cover in Orissa during 1981 - 83 and 1993 -
95 reveals that though the total forest cover had not changed as per the forest
department records, there was a substantial decrease in the quality of the forest (see,
10 Through Resolution No.I6419-IOF - M - 149172 (FMI Dt. 16- 12 -72).
129
Table 4.5).31 However, the recent World Bank study (Kumar et at. 1999) emphasised
quality of our forests, and given priority to the problem of 'degradation' rather than to
that of' deforestation'. 32
Table 4.5: Quality of the Forest Cover in Orissa, 1981 - 83 and 1993 - 95 (Area in sq. kms)
Period Dense Forest (40 Open Forest (10 - Total Forest % or More Crown 40 % Crown Land cover Cover)
1981 - 83 28,573 24,391 59,555 1993 - 95 26,1 0\ 20,629 59,555
SOllrce: SlIndar el al .. 2001: 17
The continuous decrease in forest cover of the State since 1969 has been of
great concern from the policy perspective; and has resulted in the enactment of
several policy resolutions restricting the access of local people to the forests. An
analysis of the Forest Policies in the State of Orissa reveals that merely blaming the
people for deforestation and thereby gradually decreasing their use rights over the
resource had not resulted in increased forest cover. With the failure of the
Government mechanism to protect its forest resources, on the one hand, and the
growing demand from the local people for h'Teater rights over the resource, on the
other, and above all with the paradigm shift in academia over the discourses of
development and participation, the focus of the forest management shifted from a
kind of regulatory administration to a participatory one, involving local people in
management.
A striking feature of forestry activities In Orissa is that the Government's
policy of involving communities in protection and management of forests has come
much later than the actual efforts by the communities themselves. The traditional
village governance system of forest resources both by tribal and non-tribal
communities had existed strongly in Orissa much before the enactment of State
) I The total forestland in this table also includes degraded forests with less than IO per cent crown cover and thus is more than the added forest area of dense and open forests .
. 12 For a detailed discussion of 'quantity vs. quality' debate in Indian forestry, see, Sundar el aI., 200 I: 15 - 20.
130
policies of involving them in forest management. Unlike in other States where
policies were framed to involve local people in forest management, forest policies in
Orissa may be viewed as an attempt to give an official shape to the efforts of the local
people to protect their forest and to bring them into an umbrella policy of the state
government. As per an estimate, by the late 1980s, there were 3,000 - 4,000 village
communities protecting 10 per cent of Orissa's forest area (Kant, 1990 in
Poffenberger and McGean, 1996: 34). By the end of \993, with the State Government
order of JFM, the area under community protection in Orissa had increased to 27 per
cent (Poffenberger and McGean, 1996: 34 - 5).
Several reasons are cited for such community control of forests in the State of
Orissa. Increasing resource scarcity due to deforestation and degradation of local
forestland and the resulting livelihood insecurity is identified as a dominant reason for
community's involvement in forest protection in Orissa (cf. Poffenberger et al. \996).
Inadequate livelihood alternatives due to limited urbanisation and industrialisation in
the State are also cited as reasons for compelling villagers to preserve their local
resources for livelihood security (Raju et at. 1993; cited in Sundar et al. 2001: 79).
The existence of village-level local institutions, often parallcl to gram
panchayats, has also played a crucial role in community control of forest resources in
Orissa. Sashi Kant observes that (1990) the formation of bigger gram panchayats,
which in some cases spanned several villages, had created a space for local
organisations at the community level to retain their functions of fulfilling the needs of
single communities in a less politicised manner. While the panchayats functioned as
political institutions of the locality with active party politics, village-level institutions
were engaged in activities like management of village ponds, temples, schools and
other common resources. Such institutions in many cases included traditional village
organisations with the village head as its leader, emerging youth clubs, women's
organisations, etc.
Sundar et al. (200 I), from their study of JFM in four Indian States including
Orissa, also point out the important role played by village youth clubs in the
protection of local forest resources in Sambalpur and Koraput districts of Orissa.
Complementary to these village-level organisations, several NGOs at the State level
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have also tried to promote participatory forestry at the community level. Several
State-kvel NGOs like Regional Cooperation and Development Council (RCDC),
Vasundhara, Bruksha 0 Jeevara Bandhu Parishad (BOJBP) have created mass
campaigns for community forestry and have facilitated the formation of federation of
Village Forest Protection Committees at the State level (see, Mohapatra, 1999).
State intervention in forestry activities starting from colonial days, which
threatened the livelihood security of the local people dependent upon forests, is also
treated as a reason for community's involvement in it in certain cases. A few studies
outside the state of Orissa are worth mentioning here. Agrawal (2000) from his study
of Van Panchayats in Kumaon, Uttar Pradesh, states that sustained protest by the
communities against the State's monopoly of forest resources resulted in the origin of
the community's involvement in forest protection. 'The incessant, often violent,
protests forced the then British Government to appoint the Kumaon Forest Grievances
Committee to look into the local disaffection', which, in tum, recommended the
formation of Forest Councils and empowering them to control their local forests
(Agrawal, 2000: 60).33 In another context, Sivaramakrishna (1999) mentions that in
colonial west-Bengal there were large forested areas, which had remained beyond the
direct control of colonial Government - 'zones of anomaly' as he phrases it (1999:
30) - and it was these areas in which community forest management revived.
Contrary to this, Sundar et al. (200 I: 31) argue that community management of forest
resources had not been 'a sphere of non-intervention, but a different type of
intervention'. Now, reverting to the discussion in the context of Orissa, it can be
observed that the different management strategies to Reserved Forests and Protected
Forests by the Government authorities also contributed to some extent to the
resurgence of community forestry in Orissa. While the Reserved Forests are directly
controlled and managed by the Forest Department of the State, Forest Department has
limited control over Protected Forests, since the ownership of the land lies with the
Revenue Department. Saxena (1997: 60) argues that this 'ambiguous status of the
protected forests' had created a space for community initiatives in forestry. The
limited control of the Forest Department over Protected Forests is further revealed by
the fact that in some of the Protected Forests in Orissa, 'villagers had even the rights
.\l See (Guha, 1989: chapter 4 and 5) for a detailed description of such protests against the State's monopoly over the forcst resources in Tehri Garwal area of Uttar Pradesh.
132
to cultivate (with pennission from the revenue department). in addition to access to
forest produce' (Orissa Forest Enquiry Committee. 1959: cited in Sundar ct al. 200 I:
80).)4 Weak control and poor management practices by the forest department is also
cited as a reason by Saxena (1997) for community initiatives in the Reserved Forests
of Orissa.
It is very difficult, however, to isolate any particular reason for the emergence
of community's involvement in forestry activities in Orissa and its quick spread even
before the enactment of State policy resolutions in this regard. Degradation of local
forest resources and the consequent livelihood insecurities because of it. existence of
prior institutional arrangements at the community level to look after common village
affairs, loose and complex forest rules, active efforts by several leading NGOs, etc.,
are among several reasons for the rapid spread of community's involvement in forest
protection in Orissa. Once a village community assumes the responsibility of forest
protection, its demonstration effects have often led to similar initiatives by the
neighbouring villages, which, in tum, had led to the quick spread of community
protection. Whatever be the reasons for community protection, it is an accepted fact
that in Orissa, the Forest Department has played a limited role in involving people in
forest protection and management, even long after the passing of the State resolution
concerning JFM. Owing to several factors like this, people' s involvement in forest
protection in Orissa is more appropriately tenned 'Comrnunity Forest Management'
(CFM) or 'Community Forestry' (CF) than 'Joint Forest Management'J5
4.2.4. Functioning of JFM in Orissa
The working of the JFM in Orissa can be best understood, when viewed from an
institutional perspective. Joint Forest Management is an institutional alternative to
involve the local communities in the protection and management activities of the
forest resource. In order to understand the functioning of such institutions in Orissa.
we have to look at the overall institutional arrangements that exists in different parts
of Orissa to involve people in protection and management activities of the forests.
34 It should be mentioned here that Protected Forests in Orissa constitute 52.6 per cent of the total forest cover of the State compared with the all India figure of 29.2 per cent (Sundar el al. 200 I: 80) .
. 15 For details regarding Community Forest Management Practices in Orissa. see. Human and Pattanaik, 2000; Sundar et at. 200 I.
133
4.2.4. a) The JFM - CFM Ambiguity
It is worth mentioning that people's involvement in forest protection and management
in Orissa is an age-old phenomenon. In other words, JFM is not the only institution to
involve local people in forestry activities. In fact, initiatives for people's involvement
in forestry have begun in the state much earlier to the formal announcement of such
policies by the government. Several village communities in Orissa have been
protecting the forest attached to their village on their own initiatives for long. There
are also instances of village institutions with more than century's old history of forest
protection in Orissa (see, Sundar et. al., 1996).
Over the years, three different types of community institutions have emerged
to give shape to people's initiatives in forestry activities. The first type of institution
has evolved out of people's initiatives where the community manages the forest on its
own without any coordination with the State or voluntary organisations. Though there
is no comprehensive information about this practice of Community Forest
Management (CFM) in the State, an NGO report is, perhaps, the only systematic
attempt to count these cases. It says, 5,402 villages are protecting some 309,750
hectares of forest area in fifteen out of thirty districts of Orissa (for details, see Down
to Earth. Vol. 8, No.9).
The second type of institution developed as a result of the Social Forestry
Project of the Government of Orissa, where several villages are involved in plantation
activities in both forest and non-forest areas. As per the available data, 9,055 Village
Forest Protection Committees are protecting some 78,646 hectares of land, including
village wastelands, under Social Forestry Project in fifteen districts of Orissa (for
details, see, Ori-Forest, Jan. - March, 1997).
The third type of institution emerged under the JFM programme in which both
the village community and the Forest Department share the responsibility of forest
protection and management. There are some 6,768 Vana Samrakshana Samitis
protecting 645,176.64 hectares of forests as of April I, 1999.
134
Out of these three institutions, the former and the latter are engaged in
involving local people in the management of forests in forest-fringed villages, and the
institutions have emerged out of social forestry programme in developing forests in
village wastelands or village commons. The existence of these three types of
institutions often creates confusions and the state government is yet to prioratise these
three. Further, most of these institutions only exist in pen and paper without
functioning properly. Even in the JFM programme, the state Forest Department, in
order to increase the number of committees, formed VSSs in several villages. But it
hardly paid any attention whether the committees were functioning or not. For several
committees the department did not even sign the Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU), and the number of committees, where the Micro Plan for JFM was prepared
was even much lower. As the government record shows, while the total number of
JFM committees formed in Orissa was 6,768 as of April 1, 1999, the number of
committees where the Micro Plan was prepared for joint management was just 172
(see, Table 4.6). It clearly indicates the seriousness of the state Forest Department
towards the implementation and sharing joint responsibility with the village
communities in protection and management of local forest resources. Further, no
serious attempt has been made so far by the state government to coordinate all the
three types of institutions that are engaged in a common endeavour of involving rural
communities in forest conservation.
135
Table 4.6: Formation and Working orVana Samrakshyana Samiti in Orissa (As on April 1, 1999)
SL Name of the No.ofVSS Area No.ofVSS NO.ofVSS NO.ofVSS No. Division fonned assigned where where where
for Executive MoU Micro Plan protection Committee signed prepared (in Heel.) fonned
I. Angul 256 37,586.18 256 I 17 2. Athagarh 77 7,349.59 77 70 2 3. Athamallik 84 7,017.36 84 66 2 4. Dhenkanal 112 13,774.98 112 101 9 5. Keonjhar 201 16,322.14 152 113 10 6. Baliguda 206 10,378.00 184 174 8 7. Boudh 162 52,222.60 40 40 12 8. Ghumusur (N) 22 702 23 4 2 9. Ghumusur (S) 85 13,489.30 85 51 2 10. Nayagarh 5 585 5 5 4 II. Parlakhemundi 518 46,639.00 402 402 22 12. Phulbani 473 29,504.04 473 473 10 13. Puri 28 5,580.00 28 5 3 14. Bolangir 325 36,882.31 68 - 2 IS. Jeypore 466 27,628.24 22 22 6 16. Kalahandi 669 52,840.00 - III 2 17. Khariar 270 21,268.00 18 - 6 18. Nabarangpur 371 31,995.06 56 - 4 19. Rayagada 748 48.133.55 14 14 6 20. . Badarama - - - - -21. Bamra 258 25,664.26 223 223 6 22. Bonai 119 8,496.45 114 114 6 23. Deogarh 143 11,633.44 143 6 6 24. Rairakhol 97 9,676.00 - - 2 25. Sambalpur 423 58,941.00 423 45 6 26. Sundargarh 437 46,881.57 437 437 6 27. Baripada 191 21,822.37 191 120 6 28. Karanjia 22 2164.20 21 21 5 Total 6768 645,176.64 3651 2618 172
Source: Forest Department, Government of Orissa
4.2.4. b) The Problem of Boundary
One of the major shortcomings of JFM in the state of Orissa, or for that matter in
India, is the conflict arising from boundary issues. Resolution of conflicts that arise in
the process of management is the major challenge before any community protecting
forests. Sarin (1996) identifies four potential sources of conflict in community based
forest management, i.e. first, contlict among the community institution's members;
136
second, conflict with neighbouring non-members; third, conflict with other external
commercial and industrial agents; and finally, conflict with the State, primarily with
the Forest Department. A Forest Protection Committee under the JFM programme
may be efficient enough to resolve the contlicts arising among its own members by
frequent negotiations and meetings among themselves. However, conflict with the
neighbouring villages poses a serious challenge for a community protecting forests
though Joint Forest Management plans. Contlict with neighbouring villagers arises
mainly because of the weak and controversial legal and organisational framework of
the State Joint Forest Management policy. In many cases, communities living in
distant areas also have use rights on the forest over generations. When the same forest
patch is given to the adjacent community for protection according to the Joint Forest
Management programme, the rights of the community that was earlier dependent
upon the forest for its livelihood get curtailed, as it does not share the protection
responsibility. The protccting community usually never allows other communities to
access its patch of forests. Thus, here arises a contlict between the community that
protects the forest and other communities that do not protect it but depend upon it for
their Iivelihood 36
4.1.4. c) The Legal Challenges in JFM
Conflict over boundaries, as discussed above, may chietly be attributed to the
ambiguous legal status of the village forest protection committees under JFM. The
State Government resolution declares the Van a Samrakshana Samitis only as
functional groups. However, these committees have no legal or statutory ground, and
thus, it becomes difficult for them to manage resources on a long-term basis. Though
the 2000 JFM resolution of Government of India spells out the legal backup of the
Vana Samrakshana Samitis, the details have not been worked out in the State. Thus,
whenever a forest protection committee catches a forest offence, it has to be handed
over either to the police or to the Forest Department. The forest protection
committees, as formed under the state government JFM resolution, do not have any
power to solve the case at their level. Moreover, if a protection committee awards
punishment to anyone on this issue of forest offence, it can be challenged in a court of
law, as the committee does not have any legal power in this regard.
\(, See. Rout, 2003 for a detailed case study of a boundary conflict in JFM between two neighbouring communities in the state of Orissa.
137
4.1.4 d) Problem of Attitude in JFM
The problem of attitude, especially of the Foresters, presses another challenge to the
working of Joint Forest Management in the state of Orissa. The authoritarian attitude
of forest bureaucracy finds no place in the Joint Forest Management agreement. The
foresters have to give up their narrow attitude and share the responsibility of
management with the people. The Arabari experiment in West Bengal became
successful only because of progressive bureaucracy. The forest officials should not
think that the forest area belongs to them and that people have no business in it. The
Forest Department has its own style of functioning and it has to be satisfied before it
signs the JFM agreement. Such an antipathy towards the capability of the people to
protect the forest and to the process of involvement of local people in forest
management on the part of forest department officials often poses a real challenge for
the success of Joint Forest Management in the State.
To conclude, the success of any co-management regime depends upon the
genuine participation of its stakeholders. Both the partners in JFM, the local
community and the Forest Department or the State need to work together for the
success of the programme. Challenges in JFM can emerge from both sides. If the
Forest Department does not become serious in the agreement, people will gradually
lose interest in forest protection. The opposite also holds true in many cases. The
major thrust of . Joint Forest Management' lies in its 'jointness' or the developing
partnership between community and forest department on equal terms, which suffers
the most in the case of Orissa.37 Since several institutions that have emerged in
different periods are in existence for community's involvement in forest protection,
and Government's role in establishment and functioning of these institutions has been
limited, a healthy partnership on equal terms between communities and forest
department has become a misnomer in the context of Orissa. It is, of course, true that
unlike several other States like Andhra Pradesh and Kamataka, where the programme
is being implemented with heavy outside funding, JFM in Orissa has been
implemented with State Government funds. There has not been any sincere attempt by
the State forest department to implement JFM in the true sense of the term. Moreover,
17 For a critique of 'jointness' in Joint Forest Management, see, Lele, 1998; Sundar, 2000; Sundar el
al,2001.
138
the recent Supreme Court orders concerning eviction from forest areas and formation
of Central Empowerment Committees to look after these issues has put a question
mark on the Government's attitude towards real participatory forestry involving
forest-dependent communities. Besides, several communities engaged in forest
protection in Orissa also do not want to come under the State JFM programme, since
they have to share the woodlots, which they have created and maintained out of their
own efforts since long (see, Mahapatra, 1999). Thus, in such a context, what is
required is commitment and trust on the part of both the partners of JFM, i.e.,
communities and forest department to make the JFM a truly participatory programme
in the State.
139
CHAPTER V
Heterogeneity and the Capability of Local
Communities for Collective Action:
Some Empirical Findings
The theoretical and empirical reviews in the previous chapters suggest that social
composition of the community, in terms of heterogeneity or otherwise, playa crucial
role in shaping the capabilities of the local communities for collective action for
natural resource use and management. Further, heterogeneity, in the context of local
resource management, assumes special significance owing to the fact that a
heterogeneous community produces different dynamics, which, in tum, not only
affects the process of collective action, but also leaves its impression upon the
resource itself. In order to assess the contested role of heterogeneity in collective
action for natural resource management, it is important to conceptualise
'heterogeneity' and then contextualise it in the empirical situation.
With a view to assess the contested role of heterogeneity, the present chapter
attempts to understand how heterogeneity affects the capabilities of communities in
use and management of their local forest resources. This chapter begins with a
conceptualisation of heterogeneity for the purpose of empirical research and then
contextualises it in field settings. In the process, a theoretical discussion is also
undertaken to understand how, when and why heterogeneity affects the collective
action initiatives of local communities. Finally, based upon the findings of the two
study villages, the chapter explores how heterogeneity has affected a) the resource
dependency, b) the collective action initiatives, and c) the resource management
outcomes in the two studied communities.
5.1. Conceptualising Heterogeneity
There are mainly two major sources or types of heterogeneity, which are much
discussed in collective action literature having the potential to affect collective action
at the local level. They are, first, heterogeneity of interest in the collective good itself
140
and secondly, heterogeneity of resources available to the members of the commumty
to contribute towards production of such collective good. Explanation of
heterogeneity of interest can be traced, though less prominently, in Olson's (1965)
seminal work "The Logic of Collective Action" in which he mentions about
'exploitation of the great by the small' (1965: 29). By such an explanation, Olson
means the existence of two categories of people; first, those who have a larger interest
in the collective good; and second, those whose interest, though positive, is relatively
small. Since the former are so interested, Olson argues, they will provide the good
themselves, regardless of the actions of the less interested parties. The later exploits
the' great' by not contributing at all, as they know that they will get the good anyway
provided by the great.
Heterogeneity of (alternative) resources available to the group members has
been much discussed by Oliver et al. (1985), Heckathorn (1993), Molinas (1998).
Resource heterogeneity refers to the fact that all the members in a group are not
equally endowed, and thus, their capacity to contribute for the production of collective
good is different. While economically endowed members have all the resources
available to contribute for production of collective good and hence, are expected to
participate in collective action, the expectation from less endowed members to
participate in such action is less. To these two types of heterogeneity, Baland and
Platteau (1996) adds one more, i.e., socio-cultural differentials of a community.
Further, another important type of heterogeneity, i.e., political heterogeneity, has also
been mentioned by Trond Vedeld (2000) from his study of two Fulani village
societies of Mali.
Out of the three sources of heterogeneity that Baland and Platteau (1996)
discuss, they are of the opinion that only cultural differences and differential interests
have potentially serious negative impacts on collective action. And the third source of
heterogeneity, i.e., differential endowments, according to Baland and Platteau, docs
not always pose potential dangers to collective action for natural resource
management. They even go further to acknowledge resource heterogeneity to be
compatible for collective action. This is because, even though individuals vary on the
basis of possession of land or any other economic assets, they may have a common
141
interest in regulating the use of resources, and thus, as a matter of principle can be
expected to participate in collective action (1996: 302 - 05).
It should, however, be pointed out that the above three sources of
heterogeneity, as propounded by Baland and Platteau (1996) are not necessarily
independent from one another. It is, therefore, ambiguous to say that one source is
conducive to collective action and the others are not. The cultural division of society,
such as in terms of caste, class and ethnic groups often lead to differential
endowments among people. They may, in turn, generate different interests among
resource users. Thus, to say that differential endowments are conducive for collective
action and the other two are not, is self-contradictory as these three sources are linked
with each other. Instead of dealing these three types of heterogeneities as separate
entities, an attempt has been made in the present work to analyse them as interrelated
entities, so as to see how one source generates and, in turn, is being generated from
other.
Drawing from the works of above scholars, the thesis attempts to explore four
different types of heterogeneity in the context of collective action for local forest
resource management in two village communities of Orissa. They are:
i) Socio-Cultural Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity resulting from
race, caste and other types of cultural divisions of communities.
ii) Resource Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity originating from
variations in intra-village economic resources.
iii) Interest Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity arising from differential
interests in the use of the forest resource (the collective good itself).
iv) Political Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity resulting from existing
differentiation and factionalism among the leadership groups in the
villages.
5.2. Contextualising Heterogeneity in the Field Settings
5.2.1. Socio-Cultural Heterogeneity
Intra-community social and cultural differentiation has been acknowledged as one of
the potential sources heterogeneity by scholars. Among several other factors that
142
generate socio-cultural differentiations within a community, caste occupies a
prominent position, particularly in the Indian rural context. Further, the presence of
one or more tribes/tribal group(s) in a community, divided along caste lines, makes
the situation more critical. In order to assess the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the
study villages, existence of several caste and tribal groups has been taken into
consideration.
Caste has been recognised as the most important source of social
differentiation in the Indian society, which stratifies the society into various segments.
Now, turning the analysis back to empirical settings, it can be observed that both
Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur villages are heterogeneous so far as the above-mentioned
sources of heterogeneity are concerned. The villages are multi caste in composition,
with each caste having its own religious and socio-cultural festivals. Caste continues
to be an important source of heterogeneity in the villages, which divides the villagers
into various segments and imposes certain restriction upon particular castes.
The population of Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur, which compnse 155 and 85
households respectively, is divided into eleven caste groups and three tribal
communities. The caste and sub-caste groups found in the villages are Brahmin
(traditional priest), Khandayat (traditional warrior caste), Karana (record keeper),
Gopala (milkman), Teli (oil presser), Gudia (Sweet maker), Dhoba (washer man),
Barika (barber), Tanti (weaver), Hadi and Pana (both are Scheduled Castes).
'Juanga', 'Sabara' and 'Dehuri' are the three tribal groups, that reside in the two
study villages. Out of the eleven above mentioned caste groups, Brahmin, Khandayat
and Karana are the three upper castes and occupy a higher ritual status in the overall
caste hierarchy. The Hadi and Pana castes, which are the untouchable castes in the
villages, enjoy the lowest status in the caste hierarchy. The remaining castes are
service castes or 'backward castes', who have some or the other traditional occupation
attached to their castes. The relative position among these castes in the hierarchy is an
ambiguous one. Among these service castes, Dhoba and Barika are included in the
Scheduled Caste category (see Table 5.1).
Though the Scheduled Tribes are not a part of the caste system, generally, but
in these two villages, as both castes and tribes coexist, tribals are looked down in the
143
general social hierarchy. To distinguish between tribals and non-tribals, the higher
caste settlements in the villages are called 'Bhadraloka Sahi' in local language, which
can be translated as 'gentlemen's settlement' into English. However, the Scheduled
Castes' settlements do not come under this Bhadraloka Sahi. The SCs and STs almost
enjoy similar social status in the villages and also have their settlements adjacent to
each other.
The Khandayat caste is the numerically dominant caste in the two villages
constituting more than 40 per cent of the total households. Among the three upper
castes, Karanas are next to Khandayat in the Nagiapasi village (with 6.4 % of the total
households), whereas Brahmins occupies second position with 17.7 per cent of the
total households in K. K. Pur (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Castes and Tribes in the Study Villages
Castes and Tribal Groups Nagiapasi K. K. Pur UPPER Brahmin I (0.6 %) 15 (17.7 %) CASTES Khandayat (Warrior Caste) 66 (42.6 %) 40 (47 %)
Karana (Record Keeper) 10(6.4%) 1(1.2 %) MIDDLE Gopala (Milk Man) 29(18.7%) 4 (4.7) (Service/Back Teli (Oil Presser) 3 (1.9 %) -ward) Gudia (Sweet Maker) 6 (3.9 %) -CASTES Dhoba (Washer Man) 8 (5.2 %) -
Barika (Barber) 2(1.3%) -Tanti (Weavel) - I (1.2 %)
LOWER Hadi 9 (5.8 %) -(Untouchable) Pana 4 (2.6 %) 4 (4.7 %) CASTES SCHEDULE Juanga 17(11%) 6 (7 %) DTRIBES Sabara - 12(14.1 %)
Dehuri - 2 (2.4 %) Total 155(100%) 85 (100 %)
The social inequality, in terms of caste and tribal divisions, is quite visible
from various socio-cultural ceremonies of the villages. Though the institution of
untouchability does not exist, as it was earlier, yet, the reminiscence of it can be felt if
one deeply observes the socio-cultural lives of the villagers. On occasions of village
festivals and ceremonies, when the villagers arrange community lunches or dinners
for the whole village, the Scheduled Castes and Tribes are given food separately.
144
Though inter-caste dining exists in the villages on such occasions, the members trom
the Brahmin family sit separately from others keeping some distance, or prefer to take
food either in the beginning or in the last to mentain their ritual superiority trom the
other caste people. Two implications can be derived from such a situation. While on
the one hand such community lunches and dinners foster a sense of unity among
villagers, which, in tum, act as a platform for further collective action. on the other it
perpetuate inequality among castes and continuity of untouchability. though in a
di fferent sense.
The tribal popUlation in the village has maintained their ethnic identity
through their unique language and customs. Besides partaking in common village
functions, they also observe their own festivals. Usually members trom other castes
do not attend these festivals. However, tribal people trom neighbouring villages take
part in these as invited guests. The Scheduled Castes of the village, in order to
maintain their distinct identity, also celebrate similar occasions and invite people of
their own caste trom the neighbouring villages.
The socio-cultural heterogeneity, based upon caste and tribal group divisions,
is also reflected in the overall village social life. The imprints of such social divisions
make themselves visible on the way in which villagers interact with each other and
pass their leisure time. Usually the members of lower caste groups address the upper
caste members as 'babll' and interact with them with great respect. Age, which
normally carries respect with it while in any communication, doesn't seem to make
any difference in a communication between lower caste and upper caste members. For
example, even if an old man belonging to the lower caste groups has to interact with a
small boy of higher castes, he has to communicate with great respect, which is not
vice versa. However, the upper castes maintain mutual respect in interaction between
themselves.
Entertainment, merry making and passing leisure time amongst the villagers
are also found to have influenced by the caste divisions. The villagers usually play
cards, gossip and get together during the evening times and also during the day times
in the non-agricultural periods. Spending time at house during evening times was not
found to be a norm for rural men folk, since they club together into different groups
145
and pass their time either by gossiping or playing cards. However, such gossip groups
are formed on caste lines, and it is rare to find a lower caste member passing time
among the upper caste members.
5.2.2. Resource Heterogeneity (Arising from Variations in Intra-village
Economic Resources
The second source of heterogeneity having potential to affcct collective action
initiatives at the local level is the differential endowments among the members or
variations in intra-village economic resources. To analyse the heterogeneity in terms
of critical resources among the members of the community, somc of the major
endowments of the households, such as land, cattle, and housing pattern were studied.
Land. being an important resource for rural (agrarian) communities, deserves a special
attention here. Along with land, the occupation pattern of the villagers, from which
the source of livelihood (income) is derived, was also taken into consideration.
The landholding pattern in the two villages is very much scattered in nature,
with predominance of marginal farmers having land less than 2.5 acres, who
constitute 54.2 per cent and 48.3 per cent of all households respectively in Nagiapasi
and K. K. Pur. The skewed nature of distribution of landholding pattern is visible
from the fact that in the Nagiapasi village, while 11.6 per cent of the households own
44.7 percent of the total land of the village, 78.1 per cent of the households own only
33.2 per cent of the village land. out of which 23.9 per cent households do not have
any land of their own. Similar is also the case with K. K. pur. Viewed household wise,
whereas 37 and 24 households are landless respectively in Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur,
only seven households possess land varying from 7.5 to 10 acres in Nagiapasi, and
four households possess land varying from 5 to 7.5 acres in K. K. Pur. The average
landholding per household is 1.8 acres in Nagiapasi and more than three-fourth of the
households are below land size of the total household average. Similar picture is also
visible in K. K. Pur village where the over all average landholding size per household
is 1.64 acres and only 23.5 percent of the households posses an average land more
than that (see Table 5.2).
146
Table 5.2: Landholding Pattern in the Study Villages (Area in Acres)
Landhold Nagiapasi K.K. Pur ing Size No.ofHH Area (in Average No.ofHH Area (in Average
Acres) land owned Acres) land owned perHH per IIll
Landless 37 - - 24 - -(23.9 %) (28.2 %)
0.01 - 2.5 84 93.25 1.11 41 56 1.36 (54.2) (33.2 %) (48.3 %) (40 %)
2.51 - 5 16 62 3.87 16 61 3.81 (10.3 %) (22.1 %) (18.8 %) (43.5 %)
5.01-7.5 1 1 67 6.1 4 23 5.75 (7.1%) (24 %) (4.7 %) (16.5 %)
7.51-10 7 58 8.28 - - -(4.5 %) (20.7 %)
Total 155 280.25 1.8 85 140 1.64 (100 %) (100 %) (l00 %) (l00 %)
The housing pattern of the villages is also very mueh divergent in nature. Only
13 per cent of the households in Nagiapasi and 14.1 per cent in K. K. Pur possess
pakka house. A majority of the houses in both the villages (66.4 % and 62.4 %
respectively) are kaccha house made up of thatched roof and mud wall. Such houses
are very much vulnerable to natural calamities and the roof materials of the house
have to be changed every year. A moderate number of households (20.6 % and 23.5
respectively) have semi-pakka house (see Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Housing Pattern in the Study Villages
Type of House Nagiapasi K. K. Pur Kacha 103 (66.4 %) 53 (62.4 %) Semi-Pakka 32 (20.6 %) 20 (23.5 %) Pakka 20(13%) 12 (14.1 %) Total 155 (100 %) 85 (100 %)
The occupation structure of the villages has to be looked in, since the income
of the households springs from the occupation that they adhere. Cultivation is found
to be the main source of income for a majority (63.2 % and 53 respectively) of the
households in both the villages. In Nagiapasi village, only a scant number of houses
(5.2 %) have lucrative occupations like, business, contractorship and government
service. The fib'llrc for the same is slightly high (12.9 %) in the case of the second
village. Considerable number of households in both villages (30.9 % and 31.7 %
147
respectively) adhere to low Income earning occupations like daily labour and
artisanship (See Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: Occupation structure in the Study Villages
Occupation Na2iapasi K. K. Pur Cultivation 98 (63.2 %) 45 (53 %) Business 5 (3.2 %) 4 (4.7 %) Contractor-ship 2(1.3%) 3 (3.5 %) Daily Labour 41 (26.4%) 23 (27 %) Artisan 7 (4.5 %) 4 (4.7 %) Govt. Service I (0.7 %) 4 (4.7 %) Shepherd I (0.7 %) 2 (2.4 %) Total 155(100%) 85 (100 %)
The above two sources of heterogeneity are not separate entities independent
from each other. As, in deed, discussed earlier, there exists a perfect blend between
these two sources of heterogeneity. The three higher castes of the villages, i.e.
Brahmin, Khandayat and Karana, not only enjoy higher social status and prestige in
the village, but also possess a substantial amount of important resources like land and
cattle. In the Nagiapasi village, these three castes put together possess to an extent of
three-fourth of the total land area of the village. The Khandayat caste, in this village,
alone occupies nearly 60 per cent of the total land. While only 15 per cent of the
landless households fall in these three castes, a majority of the landless families
(nearly 48 per cent) come from Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (see Table
5.5).
Similar picture can also be observed in K. K. Pur, where the three higher
castes, which constitute around 65 per cent of the total households, possess 95 per
cent of the total land area of the village. The Khandayat caste, in this village also,
occupies nearly 60 per cent of the total land area. So far as landless households in this
village are concerned, more than 66 per cent of them come from SC and ST
households (See Table 5.6). One more important observation is that the three castes in
both the villages not only posses greater amount of the total village land, but the
average landholding per household for these three castes is also highest in the
villages.
148
Table 5.5: Castes and Land Distribution: Nagiapasi (Area in Acres)
Caste Landless %of 0.1 2.5 2.51 - 5 5.01-7.5 7.51 - to landless No. Area No (to each
Area No. Area No
caste's total)
Bralunin - - - - - - I Khanda)'at 5 7.6 40 47.25 7 25 9 54 5
(13.5 %) Karana I to 3 3.5 4 17 I 7 I
(2.7 %) Gopala 7 24.2 16 13.25 5 20 I 6 -
(19 %)
Other 4 21.05 15 21.75 - - -
Castes • (10.8 %)
SCs II 84.6 2 2 - - -(29.7 %)
ST 9 52.3 8 5.5 - - -(24.3 %)
Total 37 84 16 II 7 (100 %)
* Other castes mclude 3 reb, 6 Gluba, 8 Dhoba, and 2 Banka households. ** SCs include 9 Ha<ii and 4 Palla households
Table 5.6: Caste and Land Distribution: K. K. Pur (Area in Acres)
Area
10 40
8
-
Total
No. Area
I 10 66 166.25
to 35.5
29 39.25
19 21.75
13 2
17 5.5
155 280.25
Caste Land % of landless 0.1 -2.5 2.51 - 5 5.01-7.5 Total -less HH (to each No. Area No. Area No. Area No.
caste's total) Bralunin 3 20 2 4.5 8 32.5 2 11.5 15 Khandayata 3 7.5 27 42.75 8 28.5 2 11.5 40 Karana 0 - I 2.5 - - - - I Other 2 66.6 3 3 - - - - 5 Castes •
SCs 3 75 I 0.25 - - - - 4 STs 13 65 7 3 - - - - 20 Total 24 - 41 16 4 85
* Other Caste mcludes 4 Gopala (mIlk-man) and one Tanti (Weaver) households ** STs include 6 JlIanga, 12 Dehllri and 2 Sabara households
Area
48.5 82.75
2.5 3
0.25 3
140
Table 5.5 shows that all the big landowners, i.e., land falling in between 7.5 to
10 acres, in the Nagiapasi village come from three higher castes of Brahmin,
Khandayat and Karana. None of the Scheduled caste, Scheduled Tribe and other
service Caste households have land more than 2.5 acres. While a minimal number of
households from Khandayat and Karana caste are landless, a substantial majority
(84.6 %) of the Scheduled Castes and more than half of the Scheduled Tribe
households are landless. Table 5.6 also presents a similar picture for K. K. pur village,
149
where only Brahmin and Khandayat households possess land more than 2.5 acres in
the village.
Apart from a few Scheduled Caste and Tribe households, who own less than
one acre of land, most are landless in both the villages, and run their family by
working as wage labourers (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8). Some of the scheduled caste
tiunilies are attached to particular higher caste households as servants. They work in
their tields during agricultural seasons as attached labourers and look after their cattle
and do other works like guarding their fruit trees etc. during non-agricultural seasons.
In both the villages, persons having good income earning occupations like govt.
se("\ice and contractorship come from the higher castes of the village. All the
Scheduled Caste households in K. K. Pur and a majority of them (53.8 %) in
Nagiapasi are artisans, engaged in basket weaving activities. They weave baskets of
ditTerent sizes and other kinds of pots made up of bamboo sticks, which the villagers
use for agricultural and other household purposes. Generally, the women members
and children of the family do such activities. while the male go out for wage
labouring. However, during weeding and harvesting seasons, when the demand for
labourers increases. the women members of such families also go out for work.
Table 5.7: Castes and Occupation: Nagiapasi
Caste CuJtiva Business Contra Daily Artisan Gov!. Shepherd Total -tion -ctor Labour Service
Brahmin 1 - - - - - - I ( 100%) (100%)
Khandayat 55 I - 10 - - - 66 (83.3%) ( 15%) (15.2 %) (100%)
Karana 6 - 2 I - I - 10 (60%) (20%) (10 %) (10%) (100%)
Gopala 21 2 - 5 - - I 29 (72.4%) (6.9%) (17.2 %) (35%) (100%)
Other 10 2 - 7 - - - 19 Castes (52.6%) (10.5%) (36.9 %) (100%) SCs 2 - - 4 7 - - 13
( 15.4%) (30.8 %) (53.8%) (100%) Juanga 3 - . 14 - - - 17
( 17.6%) (82.4 %) (100%) Total 98 5 2 41 7 I I 155
150
Table 5.8: Castes and Occupation: K.K. Pur
Caste Cultiva- Busi-ness Contra- Daily Artisan GoV!. Shepherd Total tion ctor Labour Service
Brahmin g 2 2 - - 3 - 15 (53.4 %) (13.3 'Yo) (13.3 %) (20 %) (l00 %)
Khandayat 33 2 4 - I - 40 (82.5 %) (5 'Yo) (10 'Yo) (2.5 %) (100 %)
Karana I I (100 'Yo) (100 'Yo)
Other I 2 2 5 Castes (20 'Yo) (40 'Yo) (40 'Yo) (100 'Yo)
SCs 4 4 (l00 'Yo) (100 'Yo)
STs 3 17 20 (15 'Yo) (85 %) (l00 'Yo)
Total 45 4 3 23 4 4 2 85
5.2.3. Interest Heterogeneity
The third and important source of heterogeneity among the villagers is the differential
interests of the users in the resource itself. It should be clarified here that the
differential interests in the forest resource arise out of their differential use of the
same. As different sections of society depend and use the same forest for different
reasons they develop differential interest in it.
Interest heterogeneity of the resource users has been analysed taking into
consideration both horizontal and vertical differences in the use of forest produces by
the cummunity members.
5.2 3. a) Horizontal Differences
The horizontal differences in forest use by the community members correspond to
several user-groups depending upon the same forest area for different forest produces,
without involving any kind of hierarchy. To begin with, there are three (one in
Nagiapasi and two in K. K. Pur) shepherd households in the villages, whose primary
interest in forest is fodder. These households possess a flock of sheep and goats of
their own, which they take to the forest almost everyday for grazing. Further, they
also take the cattle of other members of the community for grazing, for which they are
paid either in cash or kind. Often, they also gather green leaves and grass in head
loads from the forest, which they use for feeding their cattle. These households are
151
fully dependent upon forest for their livelihood, and most importantly, they look upon
the forest onl y for the fodder requirements.
The second user group having a particular interest in forest is the basket
weaving households, who look forward to forest for raw material like bamboo. Such
households constitute seven out of 13 (53.8 %) Scheduled Caste households in
Nagiapasi and all the 4 Scheduled Caste households in K. K. Pur.
The third user group in this category is the tribal households who collect non
timber forest produces like Sal leaves and Sal seeds, which is used to prepare leaf
plates and Sal oil respectively. Usually the women members belonging to these
households are involved in such collection. These households along with the basket
weaving households depend minimally upon the forest for fodder requirements, since
they hardly possess any cattle of their own.
The agrarian households of the villages may be considered the fourth user
group having specific interest in forest, who collect small timber from the forest for
making a!,'licultural equipments. This category constitutes the majority of the
households in both the villages.
It is important to point out that though these interests do not involve any
hierarchies of scale, yet they often clash with each other. For example, the interest of
the shepherds came into conflict with rest of the community, when the communities
started protecting the forest and stopped allowing !,'fazing inside the forest for quick
regeneration in the initial years. Similarly, in the initial years the Scheduled castes
were also prohibited from taking bamboo from inside the forest, who complained
against no restriction for upper caste agrarian households in collecting small timber
from forest for making agricultural equipments.
5.13. b) Vertical Differences
A part from the speci tic dependencies upon forest, as mentioned above, it is found that
people mostly use forest for two important requirements such as fuel and fodder. An
analysis of the people's dependence upon forest for these two purposes revels the fact
that dependency varies a lot among the households in the village and all the
152
households are not equally dependent upon forest for such purposes. To analyse the
differential use of the forest with regard to purposes like fuelwood and fodder in the
villages, the households were asked to give their opinion on a five-point scale with
options ranging from 'do not depend' to 'fully dependent'.
Based on the information on the amount of fuelwood collection by households
in both villages, it is observed that a majority of the households (65.1 %) in Nagiapasi
and nearly half (47 %) of the households in K. K. Pur depend fully on forest for their
fuelwood requirements. Relatively fewer households in Nagiapasi (2.6 %) and K. K.
Pur (1.2 %) do not depend upon forest at all for their fuelwood requirements. These
households are found to be relying upon alternative sources of fuel wood like LPG
gas, electric stoves, etc. Substantial proportion of households in both villages (14.2 %
in N agiapasi and 30.6 % in K. K. Pur) collect only minimal to half of the amount of
total fuel wood requirement of their households from the forest (see Table 5.9).
Besides forest, these households also look forward to some other sources like crop
residues, cow dung cakes, and dry leaves and other materials from their own land to
fulfill their fuel wood requirements.
Table 5.9: Dependency upon Forest for Fuelwood in the two Villages
Tvpe of Dependencv Nagiapasi K. K. Pur Do not depend 4 (2.6 %) I (1.2 %) Less than hal f 13 (8.4 %) 5 (5.9 %) Half 9 (5.8 %) 21 (24.7 %) More than Hal f 28 (18.1 %) 18(21.2%) Fully Dependent 101 (65.1 %) 40 (47 %) Total 155 (100 %) 85(100%)
To gauge the relatively differential interest in forest use with respect to fodder
collection from forest, the households were asked to express their opinion in a five
point-scale as to how much of fodder they collected from nearby forest. It is observed
that there existed a differential interest so far as people's fodder collection from the
forest. Substantial number of households in both villages (23.9 % in Nagiapasi and 13
% in K. K. Pur) do not have any fodder requirements at all, since they do not have any
cattle of their own. Notwithstanding the fact that these households are depending
upon forest for so many other reasons, they never look forward to the forest for fodder
153
requirements. Even the cattle owning households in both villages vary in their opinion
about their dependency upon forest for fodder, and such dependency is, thus,
observed to be scattered in the villages. The dependency of 12.9 per cent households
in Nagiapasi and 32.9 per cent households in K. K. Pur ranges from half to less than
half respectively. Unlike fuel wood, for which a majority of the households in both
villages relied totally upon forest, only 36.8 per cent of the households in Nagiapasi
and 23.5 per cent households in K. K. Pur arc fully dependent upon forest for fodder
(See Table 5.10). The alternative sources of fodder, for those households who collect
minimal to less than half of total required fodder from the forest, were found to be
crop residues, grass and weeds from own land, fodder purchased from market etc.
Table 5.10: Dependency upon Forest for Fodder in the Two Villages
Type of Dependency N a!!.iapasi K. K. Pur Do not HH without cattle 37 (23.9 %) 11(13%) depend H H with cattle I (0.6 %) -Less than hal f I (0.6 %) 3 (3.5 %) Half 19(12.3%) 25 (29.4 %) More than half 40 (25.8 %) 26 (30.6 %) Fully depend 57 (36.8 %) 20 (23.5 %) Total 155 (100 %) 85(100%)
Thc horizontal and vertical differences of forest use mentioncd above depict
the existing heterogeneities of interest with respect to the use of resource among the
community members. Based upon these, three different types of dependency and use
of the forest resource can be identified in the two villages.
1. High depmdency: The Scheduled Castes and Tribes of the villages use the forest
resource the most in the village. They depend upon forest for several reasons.
Forest produces have become a source of livelihood for them, as a majority of the
people of these two communities arc landless. The members of the tribal
community collect various Non Timber Forest Produces (NTFP) such as, Sal
leaves, Tendu leaves, Sal seeds, Rope making materials, Broom making materials,
etc, from the forest. They earn their livelihood out of these NTFPs. All the
Scheduled Caste households in K. K. Pur and a majority of them (53.8 %) in
Nagiapasi are engaged in basket weaving activities. Bamboo is used as raw
154
material for this, which they collect from the forest38 The Tribals also use some of
the fruits and roots from the forest as their food. Besides, these two communities
also depend upon forest for fuelwood, fodder, house building materials, etc.
Certain households from middle and upper castes, who do not possess any land,
can also be included in this category.
1. Moderate depe1lde1lcy: The landed middle and uppcr caste households in both
villages, though very much depend upon the forest, yet, their dependency is not as
severe as the former category. One of the major distinctions between the two is
that while the former depends upon the forest for fulfilling their livelihood, the
latter depends for supplementing it as they derive their livelihood from
agriculture. People in this category collect small timber from the forest for making
their agricultural equipments39• Besides, they also collect fuel wood, fodder and
house building materials from the forest. However, the amount of fuelwood and
fodder they collect is comparatively less than that of the previous category.
Agriculture being the primary occupation of these households, their fodder and
fuel wood needs are fulfilled to a certain extent by erop residues and cow dung
respectively. Cowdung, in fact, forms one of the important sources of fuel wood
for rural landed households40. Some of the households also depend upon their own
lands and backyards for fuel wood and fodder requirements. In other words,
families falling into this category manage to find an alternative to fuel wood and
fodder, and thus, depend less on forest for such requirements.
3. Low depende1lcy: A few rich families in both the villages, whose livelihood is
derived from sources like, government service, business, contractor-ship, etc., use
38 There also exists a gender differential in the forest use by these two communities. While almost all the tribal women go to the forest for NTFP collection, barring a few, it is the duty of the Scheduled Caste men to get bamboo from the forest. Women members from the Scheduled Caste families generally do the basket-weaving job.
39 The villagers each year celebrate 'Akshya Trutia', an agrarian festival, after which they begin their sowing activities. As a customary practice, each cultivating household makes new agricultural equipments for this festival. The well-off families usually make ploughs on such occasions, while the poor families manage with spades, sickles, etc. however, all depend upon forest for this purpose .
• 0 This does not mean that landless families do not possess any cattle at all. Ownership of cattle population also varies depending upon landholding. While the landless families keep more goats and sheep, landed households own more bullocks and cows, since they need them for their agricultural works. Thus, landed households use more cow dung as fuelwood than landless households do.
ISS
forest less frequently than others. These families use alternative sources for
fuel wood like electric heater, kerosene stoves, bio-gas, etc. A few households also
use LPG gas. The dependency upon forest fuel wood is almost minimal for this
section of population. Requirements like fodder and small timber for agricultural
equipments are also negligible, as most of the families in this category do not
posses any cattle at all and depend upon sources other than agriculture for
livelihood.
5.2.4. Political Heterogeneity
Political heterogeneity is identified as the fourth source of heterogeneity having
potential to affect collective action. Political differentials (heterogeneity) or political
unity (homogeneity) directly corresponds to the kind of leadership pattern and the
authority structure that exists in the communities to give shape to collective action
initiatives by the members of the community. By political homogeneity, Baland and
Platteau (1995) indicate the extent of agreement by the members of community 'about
the authority structure, about the way in which the leaders make and implement rules
and allocate property rights (also see Vedeld, 2000). Viewed in this sense, political
homogeneity means greater support, faith, trust and confidence in the authority
structure, or to put it in nutshell 'agreement over the leadership'. Political
heterogeneity, in contrast, implies situations where there is limited agreement, faith
and confidence in the leaderls of the community. Further, political heterogeneity also
means a fragmented leadership group, without having any internal understanding and
agreement among themselves.
With a view to gaugue the political heterogeneity of the villages, the authority
structure of both villages has been taken into consideration. The authority structure of
the villages is analysed probing into the questions of first, agreement over leadership
and second, decision making arrangements in both villagcs.
Agreement over the authority of the leader is found to follow from his
(leader's) capabilities to fulfill the expectations of the villagers. When the villagers
have confidence over the capabilities of the leader, the agreement over his authority is
found to be morc. To access the degree of agreement over leadership of both the
156
villages, two questions were asked to the villagers during the course of group
discussion with them, namely,
1. What are the important characteristics that a leader should have for forest protection?
2. Do you think your leader has these characteristics?
While the opinions of both the villagers are quite similar for the tirst question,
they differ among themselves concerning the second. Honesty, transparency, capacity
to ensure equity, having resource, interest and time for forest protection, etc. are
found to be the preferred answers to the question of leadership traits. Most of the
members of the tlrst village (Nagiapasi) agree over the issue that their leader do
possess these qualities and thus is acknowledged by all the villagers. On the contrary,
it is a popular opinion among the members of the second village (K. K. Pur) that none
of their tiveleaders of Forest Protection Committee has all these qualities.
Most of the forest users with high dependency being Scheduled Tribes and
Scheduled Castes, who are conventionally marginalised sections in village societies,
ensuring equity to them forms an important challenge in ITont of leaders in Forest
Protection. Special emphasis has been given to understand the perception of these
marginalised groups regarding the capabilities of their leaders in ensuring equity. It is
observed that persons belonging to these sections in K. K. Pur are more discontent
with their leaders than their counterparts in Nagiapasi. The Scheduled Castes and
Tribes of Nagiapasi village are found to be satistled with their leader and state that
they are treated on par with any other upper caste household in the village so far as
benetlt sharing from the forest produce is concerned, even though inequality on the
basis of caste still remains in many other spheres in the village.
To further highlight upon the political heterogeneity of the two villages, the
leadership group, which has devoted its time, energy and commitment for the cause of
forest protection in two villages has been observed. Authority structure in the
Nagiapasi village was found to be quite uni-polar with a single leader throughout its
history of past one decade of forest protection. Since its inception there has been one
leader of Nagiapasi Vana Samrakshana Samiti (VSS). The president of the Committee
comes from Karana Caste, one of the traditional dominant castes of Orissa. The
157
authority of the family from which the present president comes has been respected by
the villagers from generations. The leadcrship of the president of the VSS is not
confined to management of the forest resource alone. He is the overall headman of the
village and takes the initiative in almost all viII age affairs. The leadership structure in
the Nagiapasi village has originated from the social field and has been extended to all
fields including political.
Unlike the Nagiapasi village, the leadership groups in K. K. Pur are fairly
heterogeneous and divided in most directions. The leadership structure in the village
is very much segmental in nature. There are several structures or layers of leadership
in the village. The overall structure ofleadership has been compartmentalised and it is
observed that different sets of people oblige different persons for leadership. The
person who was the president at the time of formation of the Forest Protection
Committee had so many other interests other than forest protection. Mention has to be
made here that in the five year history of forest protection, the village has seen five
different presidents of Forest Protection Committee. Each one of them were changed
either due to allegations of incapability or development interest in some other
activities other than forest. Besides this, there are also inter-personal rivalries among
the leaders in K. K. Pur. Since all the leaders derive their authority from the members
of the same village, there has always been a competition to attract the followers. Such
a process has resulted in antagonism between the folIowers, who are members of the
same village community. The personal qualities of the leaders have not been that
much strong, as in the case with the other viII age, to withstand the anomic situations
in the vilIage.
The second criterion to gauge the political heterogeneity of the two villages is
the decision making process. An attempt has been made to explore the decision
making process and the arrangements for it in both the villages to understand how it
influences the overall political structure of the villages as well as the initiatives for
forest protection. The process of arriving at a decision very well depends upon the
physical and political structures that facilitate the process. Decision-making has been
found to be more consensual in nature in Nagiapasi compared to K. K. Pur. The
structural arrangements for arriving at decisions too vary between the two villages.
Even though there is uni-polar leadership in the first village, most of the caste groups
158
or colonies have their own leaders and common rooms41, where they decide about
their own caste groups. Before any decision is taken it is discussed and debated
among the members in those common rooms. Sometimes, the discussions reach a
positive end, while at other times it does not. Once such process is over, then, it
comes to the overall village meeting and people from other castes, who are not even
concerned with the decision to be taken, are given a chance to express their opinion.
Finally, after much negotiation the meeting tries to arrive at a conclusion, which is
acceptable to the majority of the community. Such a process of arrangements to arrive
at decisions is found to be missing in K. K. Pur village. Only Scheduled Tribes are
observed to have their common room in the village. On further query about the
absence of such common places for other caste people of the village it is found that
they used to exist long back in the village. But due to lack of proper care and unity in
the village, they do not exist today.
To have a further understanding of the system, data on how the villagers
selected their last Panchayat (ward) members was collected. While in K. K. Pur they
were selected through general panchayat elections where several members contested,
in the first village, the members were elected unopposed. There was only election for
the Panchayat president at Nagiapasi village. The people of the concerned wards (the
lowest layer of the decentralised govcrnment) decided among themselves whom they
should select as their candidates, and finally it was decided at the village meeting.
The above discussion should not lead one to conclude that decision-making is
very much formal in Nagiapasi. The discussions that take place between them over
the issue of decision-making, are very much informal in nature and are often carried
forward to the fields, forests, or the roads. Since the villagers meet each other every
day in their day-to-day life, discussions made are very much spontaneous and
informal in nature.
41 Four village common rooms (Kotha Ghara in local language) are found in the village, which are mostly used for playing cards. gossiping, relaxing, etc. Besides Scheduled Castes and Tribes who have their own common rooms and a, a practice do not go to other's, the remaining two are mostly used by members belonging to other castes. These common rooms are found to be the hot bed of politics in the village and all the decisions that are taken are debated and discussed in it.
159
Discussions, debate, negotiation and renegotiation are found to be popular
ways through which decisions are taken in the first village. Even though the leader
takes decisions himself sometimes, yet, people in the village are informed about it and
their opinions are heard. The major reason for the discontent among the members of
the K. K. Pur about their leaders have been that they were not consulted even for
those decisions that affect their use of forest. Such processes of decision making
retkct the style ofleadership in both villages.
Based upon the assessment of the degree of agreement upon the authority
structure and the decision-making process in both villages, K. K. Pur is found to be
more heterogeneous politically than Nagiapasi. In Nagiapasi, the members of the
community seem to have greater agreement over the authority structure and greater
confidence upon their leader and the ways in which the leaders implement rules and
allocate benefits. On the contrary, authority structure in K. K. Pur is less agreed upon
having limited trust and confidence from the members of the community.
5.3. When, How and Why Heterogeneity Matters
5.3.1. Towards a Theoretical Understanding
There is little agreement over the possible effects of heterogeneity on people's
cooperative behaviours. Yet, the omnipresence nature of heterogeneity among
resource users generates the questio!1 of when, how and why they matter in the
process of resource use and the initiatives for collective action. One answer to such a
question may be that - it affects the capacity of the members to contribute or invest
for collective action. While some members in a community possess relatively large
amount of production factors (resources) required to produce collective goods; they
may have better access to collective goods than others. Heterogeneity also matters in
collective action when it affects the payoff the actors receive from different outcomes
(Schlager and Blomquist, 1998). The outcomes in a collective action may distribute
rewards and benefits differently across the resource users, leading to conflicts over
determining an equal allocation for all. Now, the question arises why there is
differential rewards or benefits In collective action outcomes? The differential
rewards and benefits arise because of differences in the possession of valuable
resources (or as Baland and Platteau call it differentials endowments) among resource
160
users. For example, some resource users (better-endowed individuals) may have
invested more heavily than others, and hence, may expect their additional investments
recognised and receive more benefits and rewards. They may, therefore, support an
outcome structure, which allocates benefits unevenly among resource users.
The success of any collective action etTorts requIres effective and proper
communication and mutual trust among the resource users. While equal share of
benefits requires effective communication and proper dissemination of information
across the members of the group, the outcome structure, which supports uneven
distribution of rewards and benefits reqUIres strategic and opportunistic
communication and withholding of available information (Scharpf, 1997).
Heterogeneity among actors in terms of available resources may generate information
asymmetry and mistrust among resource users, which can have a powerful and
negative effect on collcctive action outcomes. Information asymmetries, further, can
contribute in creating an atmosphere of distrust and deception discouraging
individuals from working together for a common cause. Boyce (\988) extends the
argument as to how resource heterogeneity creates an atmosphere of distrust, thereby
affecting collective action outcomes negatively. Acknowledging the fact that resource
heterogeneity leads to an outcome structure which favours unequal allocation of
benefits and rewards, Boyce argues that inequality may increase the scope for a
powerful minority to impose rules of the game that benefit them at the cost of large
majority in the community. Anticipating opportunistic behaviour from the powerful
and better-endowed minority, the weak and less endowed members may not trust
them and thus, might refuse to cooperate with them.
When collective action involves active steps to conserve a resource, costs are
usually incurred in the beginning while the benefits out of it come later. Thus,
variations in the availability of resources to the members of a group may have impact
upon the initial contributions or costs that has to be incurred for the production of
collective goods, thereby decreasing its chance of beginning. Such a variation may
impact collective action either through the intervention of survival constraints or
through the availability of outside economic opportunities (Baland and Platteau, 1999:
774). In a community having potential resource heterogeneity, the level of wealth of
the poorer members may be so low that their participation in collective action violates
161
their survival constraint. This constraint automatically reduces their participation,
since they are forced to attach considerable importance to their present income. It
ultimately results in their unwillingness to undertake collective action measures and
invest for production of collective goods, even though such actions would increase
their future permanent income. Secondly, in a heterogeneous community some may
have better access to outside economic opportunities than other, the future income
from collective action for them may fall below than the alternative income available.
As they always have the chance of shifting to an alternative income, which is, of
course, more than that of income from collective action, they will have an incentive
for not investing in collective action and exploiting the depleting the collective good.
On the other hand, members deprived of such outside income opportunities attach a
higher value to the future income from the collective action.
Implementation of rules and regulations is very much central to the success of
collective action, especially in the case of common property. To achieve superior
outcomes in collective action, agreements must be faithfully implemented. Ostrom
(1990:44) divides implementation into two parts - commitment and monitoring. Once
an agreement is reached, the members must still commit themselves to follow the
rules and abide by the agreement; and there has to be some system of monitoring to
impose sanctions upon those who violates those rules. Heterogeneity may have
negative impacts both upon the twin processes of commitment and monitoring.
Commitment to mutually agreed rules, to some extent, revolves around interpersonal
trust among community members. Individuals are more likely to be committed to a set
of regulations if they know that enough others are also committed (cf. Axelrod, 1981).
As has been discussed earlier, heterogeneity may affect the mutuality of trust that
members have upon each other and thus, deteriorate the probability of collective
action. Resource heterogeneity and socio-cultural heterogeneities often induce
members to break mutual trust, commitment and agreed set of rules. In such
circumstances, few members perceive that the only ones who would be affected by
such violation of rules are those from the other group or those who are wealthy.
Commitment problem, to a large extent, is solved through monitoring.
Monitoring individual actions for violating rules and imposing sanctions against those
who do such activities, provides resource users the assurance they need to remain
162
committed to a set of rules. Monitoring is crucial for commitment, and commitment is
crucial for the supply of rules that allow individuals to achieve better outcomes
(Ostrom, 1990: 45). Heterogeneity among resource users can affect monitoring of the
agreement. Some resource users because of their greater access to resources rcquired
for harvesting of benefits from collective action can violate the agreed rules and
harvest more than what is allocated to them without easily being caught (Schlager and
Blomquist, 1998: 8).
Heterogeneity in terms of socio-cultural differential can too have a negative
impact upon collective action. Socio-cultural differentials within a community may
create different interpretations of the agreed rules enforced for implementation,
different views about who should enforce them and different perceptions of social
customs, convcntions and norms supporting cooperation (Baland and Platteau, 1996:
302).
Baland and Platteau (1996: 303) explains that in contrast to socio-cultural and
cconomic heterogeneity, heterogeneity of interest has the maximum potential for
threatening collective action aimed at resource conservation. When uscrs have
different interests in the management of a resource, designing a common objective for
regulating the commons is problematic. Such differential interests become more
complex when users have alternative income earning opportunities and if they reside
outside the area where the resource is located. Heterogeneity of interest is often
combined with gender differentials. Or in other words, contlict between men and
women regarding the use of village commons can also be regarded as contlict of
differential interest. The interests of men and women in the management of a resource
may vary due to their differential relations with the resource. Folbre (1994) points out
that the concepts of self-interest may be highly gendered, partly as a by-product of the
social organisation of childrearing, the process of socialisation and the cultural
construction of gender roles. Women may have a less bounded concept of themselves
than men, a greatcr propensity for interdependent utilities and even altruism (Folbre,
1994: 26 in Molinas, 1998: 415). These behaviour differences may induce different
attitude towards cooperation by gender.
163
The above explanation of the negative impact of ditft:n:nt types of
heterogeneities, however, may not necessarily lead one to think that heterogeneity
always has such impacts on the process of collective action. Several scholars have
pointed out the non-negative impact of heterogeneity on collective action for the
management of natural resources. Some have also suggested ways in which
heterogeneity can even act as a positive factor leading to successful collective action.
For Baland and Platteau, resource heterogeneity or "differential endowments"
may not have any negative impact upon collective action as they may have a common
interest in regulating the use of the resource. As a matter of fact, they can be expected
to participate in collective action despite their variations in income and other valued
resources (1996: 305). They further point out that unless and until the less endowed
members of the group are excluded from the benefits and rewards of collective action,
they are equally likely to contribute for resource regulation. When economic
inequalities do not generate differential interests in the resource, it can even be proved
as a favourable factor for collective agreement 'if the rich members can assume the
leadership roles'. Wade (1988) has explained such a situation where economic
inequality generates necessary incentives for the rich to assume leadership roles from
his study of the Kottapalli village in Andhra Pradesh. Wade mentions that, since the
benefits of unified action are positively related to land area, the elites have a
disproportionately great interest in the effective regulation of water resources and this
helps ensure that the required collective organisation is started and efTectively run.
Along with leadership roles, the elites also provide the authority structure
required for proper enforcement and implementation of regulatory rules. In this
regard, Wade writes that 'many who might be tempted to free-ride are socially
subordinate to others in the user group, and are checked from doing so by sanctions
which derive from wider order of caste and property without the irrigation council to
use its own authority (1988, 193). Elaborating such idea of assuming authority
structure by the rural elites, Bardhan states that 'in many local communities some
rudimentary forms of cooperation have been sustained and enforced over the years by
traditional authority structure. While there may have been some bit of sharing ethic,
the predominant social norm was often that of an unequal patron client system, in
which the powerful who might enjoy disproportionate benefits from institutions of
164
cooperation enforced the rules of the game and gave leadership to solidaristic efforts
(1993a: 638).
5.3.2. Heterogeneity in the Context of Collective Action for Natural Resource
Management: Empirical Findings
The above theoretical discussion forms a framework to empirically analyse how
heterogeneity plays a role in the context of collective action for natural resource
management. An explanation of the effects of heterogeneity on collective action
initiatives for local resource management requires a-priori understanding of how it
affects the dependency structure of the community. Since the type of forest use and
dependency is crucial for its successful management, the impact of heterogeneity
upon the dependency pattern of the communities becomes essential to understand how
heterogeneity affects the initiatives for its protection (collective action) and the final
management outcomes. Keeping this in mind, an attempt has been made to understand
how heterogeneity affects the forest dependency pattern in two villages, or in other
words, how the forest dependency varies along with variations in one's social and
economic conditions. Since fuel wood and fodder form the two major forest use in the
two villages, dependency of the community members on these two forest produces
has been assessed in the context of social and economic differentials.
5.3.2 a) Intra-Community Heterogeneity and its Impact on Resource Dependency
Broadly speaking, two different types of forest dependencies have been observed in
the two villages. The first type of forest use is the 'household specific' forest
use/dependency. As mentioned in the above section, there are certain households who
depend upon forest for particular purposes. Such type of forest use is invariably
related to their occupational patterns and livelihood options. These differential forest
uses has been discussed in the section under the heading of 'horizontal differences'.
A deeper understanding of forest use by the communities reveals the fact that
this horizontal difference in forest use is constructed along with intra-community
socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities. For instance, it is only households from
Scheduled Caste category, who look forward to the forest for bamboo as a raw
material to their basket weaving activities. None of the non-Scheduled Caste
households have been observed to involve in such type of forest use. Further, with
165
the passmg on of the occupation from one generation to the other, the forest
dependency also passes to the next generation in the same household. Such type of
forest use is directly related to their occupation pattern, which, in tum, is related to or
derived from one's caste position. Therefore, both socio-cultural heterogeneity (in
tenns of caste divisions) and economic heterogeneity (in tenns occupational
differences) have been observed to playa crucial role in detennining one's forest use
and dependency.
Similar argument can also be extended to other types of 'household specific'
forest dependencies such as NTFP collection by tribal women, dependency for small
timber by upper caste agrarian households, etc. In each of these dependencies,
occupational pattern (economic situation) and one's caste position (social status) act
as measures deciding factors in forest use and dependency.
Thc sccond category of forest use and dependency is that for fuel wood and
fodder, for which substantial number of households are looking forward to the forest.
Notwithstanding the differences in degrees about the community members'
dependency upon forest for these two purposes, almost all households are depending
upon forest for fuelwood and fodder. In order to gauge the impact of heterogeneity
upon forest use for these two types of forest produccs, the differential dependencies
of various members of the community has been analysed in the backdrop of their
social and economic position in the community.
It is observed that dependency upon forest for fuel wood has been constructed
on the lines of both the earlier two mentioned sources of heterogeneity, i.e. socio
cultural and economic. Fuelwood collection from the forest in both the villages is
related to caste positions of the households and their landholding pattern in a
structured way. Higher a household's position in caste hierarchy, the lower is its
dependency on forest for fuel wood. Almost all the Scheduled Caste and Tribe
households in both villages collect the required fuelwood for their household
consumption entirely from the forest. However, a considerable number of households
from higher castes collect half to minimal amount of fuel wood from the forest. There
are a few households in both the villages, which do not depend at all upon the forest
for their fuel wood requirements (see Tables 5.11 & 5.12).
166
Since the upper caste households are agrarian households, with agriculture
being their primary source of livelihood, they somehow manage to fulfill certain
portion of their fuelwood requirement from crop residues, cow-dung cakes, fuel wood
from own land, etc. In other words, these households always have an alternative
choice with respect to their fuel wood requirement. Such an alternative option reduce
their degree of dependency upon forest for fuelwood. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 depict the
fuel wood dependency of community members belonging to different caste groups in
both the villages.
Table 5.11: Castes and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in Nagiapasi
Do not Less than Half More than Fully Depend half half Depend
Brahmin - 1(100%) - - -
Khandayat - 9(13.6%) 5 (7.6%) 16 (24.2%) 36 (54.6%) Karana 4 (40%) 3 (30%) 1(10%) 1(10%) I (10%) Gopala - - 3 (10.3%) 4 (13.8%) 22 (75.9%) Other Castes - - - 6 (31.5%) 13 (68.5%) SCs - - - - 13 (100%) luanga (ST) - - - I (5.9%) 16 (94.1 %) Total 4 13 9 28 101
* Other castes mclude 3 Telt, 6 Gudw, 8 Dhoba, and 2 Banka households. * * SCs include 9 Hadi and 4 Pana households
Total
1(100%) 66 (100%) 10 (100%) 29 (100%) 19 (100%) 13 (100%) 17 (100%)
155
Table 5.12: Castes and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in K. K. Pur
Do not Less than Half More than Fully Depend half half Depend
Brahmin I (6.6 %) 4 (26.7 %) 6 (40 %) 4 (26.7 %) -
Khandayat - I (2.5 %) 14 (35 %) 12 (30 %) 13 (32.5 %)
Karana - - 1(100%) - -Other Castes 2 (40 %) 3 (60 %)
SCs 4(100%)
STs 20 (100 %)
Total I 5 21 18 40
* Other Caste mcludes 4 Gopala (milk-man) and one Tantl (Weaver) households * * STs include 6 luanga, 12 Dehuri and 2 Sabara households
Total
15 (100%) 40(100%) I (100 %) 5 (100 %) 4 (100 %) 20(100%)
85
The resource dependency of the two communities with respect to fuelwood
has also been compared with the landholding pattern of the villages to understand
how possession of an important resource like land (economic heterogeneity) affects
the forest use and dependency.
167
The size of the landholding and dependency for fuel wood are perfectly
correlated with each other in the sense that with an increase in the size in the holding
the dependency upon forest for fuel wood shows a gradual decrease. While all the
landless households (except one in each community) depend fully upon forest for
their fuelwood requirements, such entire dependency upon forest for fuel wood is
limited among landed households. The single landless household in the K. K. Pur,
which does not depend at all upon forest for fuel wood, is the well-off Brahmin
household of the village. A substantial number of households in both villages having
land above 5 acres collect only minimal to less than half of their needed fuel wood
from the torest and barring one in Nagiapasi none depend fully upon the forest for it
(see Tables 5.13 & 5.14). The fuelwood dependency of various households having
different landholding sizes is given below in Tables 5.13 and 5.14.
Table 5.13: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in Nagiapasi (Land in Acres)
Do not Less than Half More than Fully Total Depend half half Depend
Landless - - - I (2.7%) 36 (97.3%) 37 (100%) 0.01 2.5 1(1.2%) 3 (3.5%) 4 (4.8%) 13 (15.5%) 63 (75%) 84 (100%) 2.51 - 5 2 (12.5%) - 4 (25%) 9 (56.2%) 1(6.3%) 16(100%) 5.01 -7.5 1(9.1%) 4 (36.4 %) 1(9.1%) 4 (36.3%) 1(9.1%) II (100%) 7.51 10 - 6 (85.7 %) - I (14.3%) - 7(100%) Total 4 13 9 28 101 155
Table 5.14: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in K. K. Pur (Land in Acres)
Do not Less than Half More than Fully Total depend half half
Landless I (42 %) - 2 (8.3 %) - 21 (87.5 %) 24 (100 %) 0.01 - 2.5 9 (22 %) 13(31.7%) 19 (46.3 %) 41 (100 %) 2.51 - 5 2 (12.5 %) 9 (56.2 %) 5 (31.3 %) - 16(100%) 5.01 -7.5 3 (75 %) I (25 %) 4(100%) Total I 5 21 18 40 85
In a similar fashion, the dependency on forest for fodder is significantly
affected by caste divisions and landholding pattern in two study villages, with limited
dependency of households belonging to higher castes and possessing relatively high
landholding size for such purpose. The study, therefore, reveals that socio-cultural
heterogeneity and economic heterogeneity do have a significant impact on resource
dependency of the community members. The resource dependency pattern changes
168
with variations III households' caste position and economic status. However, no
relationships can be established between political heterogeneity and resource
dependency pattern of the communities.
Having gained an understanding of how heterogeneity affects the resource
dependency pattern in the communities, the subsequent sections of the chapter
engage with the explanation of how heterogeneity affects the collective action
initiatives of the members of the community and the resource management outcomes.
5.3.2. b) I/ltra-Commullity Heterogelleity a/ld Its Impact 011 Collective Actio/l alld
IUallageme/lt outcomes
Community based common pool resource management presupposes that a well
defined resource base exists out there, for the effective management of which the
community should collectively act upon. With a given resource base, the problem
that a community faces is its sustainable maintenance, so that benefits from the
resource can be derived on an cnduring basis. Efforts towards sustainable
maintenance are often eroded because of the urge towards free-riding, where each
resource user tries to achieve maximum gain from the resource unmindful of the
resource needs of the other users and the physical availability of the resource for
them. Therefore, the collective action dilemma for common pool resource
management revolves around two central problems: provision problem and
appropriation problem (Ostrom, 1990, 200 I).
Provision problem in a CPR situation focuses on the cost that the resource
users invest to ensure up-keeping and maintenance of the resource, or, in other
words, providing the resource themselves on a sustained basis. Appropriation
problem, on the other hand, is related to allocating the fixed benefits of the resource
cquitable among resource users to avoid free-riding as well as conflicts over resource
sharing. These two problems are inter-twined with each other and any failure in
solving one of them affects the success of the other. For example, if the provision
problem is solved and adequate investment is ensured for the maintenance of the
resource without designing appropriate rules for equitable resource allocation, the
users will lose the incentive to further contribute towards the resource. The opposite
also holds true in the sense that well-designed rules for resource allocation will not
169
succeed in the absence of assured contributions for the maintenance of the resource.
These problems in the context of CPR management is solved by a robust institution
with we\l-designed provision and appropriation rules, credible commitment on the
part of the resource users to those designed rules and a strong monitoring system to
reduce the violation of such commitment.
Based upon this theoretical approach to the co\lective action problem in the
CPR situation, an attempt has been made to understand how the two communities
worked towards solving these problems and how the above-discussed heterogeneities
atTected the etTorts of the communities in solving these problems.
5.3.1. b) L Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Provisioning of the Resource
Being situated in the vicinity of Kapilas Reserved Forest, the two village
communities are highly dependent upon the forest for their day-to-day livelihood
issues. In the beginning of 1990s, when the two communities thought of initiating
co\lective action measures for protection and maintenance of the forest patch
adjoining their vi\lages, the physical condition of the forests was in a degraded
situation owing to several factors like forest theft, excessive grazmg, poor
maintenance by the state forest department, etc.
The problems that the communities faced at the time of initiating the eo\lective
action measures were two fold: property right problem and second free-riding
problem. The property rights for the both the forest patches were highly i\l defined,
with no clear-cut use and ownership rights. Since the forest patches were under the
Reserved Forest category, theoretica\ly the State forest department was supposed to
be the sole right holder over the resource. However, in practical terms the resources
were being used by members belonging to several communities for their livelihood
requirements. In the absence of any 'secured claim to the resource' (see Bromley,
1992) and institutional arrangements to regulate the use, the resources were used
under' open access regime'. Being an open access resource, free-riding was intrinsic
to it, which formed the second cha\lenge before the community members at the time
of beginning of forest protection. There was no contro\led use of the resource among
the community members, and the uninterrupted access of other communities had
made the situation more critical.
170
Therefore, the immediate task for Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur was to establish a
common property regime over the resource, and thereby regulate the use of the
resource by insiders of the community, deny access to outsides and design a well
defined property right structure with proper negotiation with the State Forest
Department. In these regards, institutions were established in both the villages. With
a given resource to protect, the next problem that members faced was that of
'provisioning of the resource'. Since the resource base for both villages was in a
highly degraded condition, it required definite investments to be incurred on it for
availing benefits of it. The investments that were required in the beginning were both
economic and non-economic costs in nature. The economic cost required was in
terms of cash contributions by all the households for meeting the expenses towards
initiating the process, arranging meetings with the Forest Department officials, and
appointing a guard to patrol the forest area to control forest thefts. The non-economic
costs involved voluntary labour donation to demarcate the forest area taken by the
community for protection, clearing of weeds, and some plantation activity where
required. The third form of initial investment also included closure of grazing
activities for some initial years to facilitate natural regeneration of the forest. Both
the communities formed almost similar rules in these regard to solve the provision
problem of the resource. The rules included collection of rupees five per month per
household towards forest protection, voluntary labour donation by each household on
a rotational basis and imposing a self-restriction on grazing activities inside the
forest.
Having discussed the 'provision problem' with respect to CPR situation in
both the communities and the rules that were designed to tackle such a situation, let
us move forward to discuss what role heterogeneity played in the whole process.42
Both the communities went hand in hand with each other so far as establishment of
the institutions and formation of rules to solve the provision problem were concerned.
However, the situation differed in the villages with respect to the commitment and
monitoring of those designed rules.
" It should be made clear beforehand that since collective action was negatively affected and was a failure in K. K. Pur, the discussions carried out in this section focuses mostly upon that village.
171
Commitment to the designed rules with regard to the efforts towards solving
provision problem became problematic in the K. K Pur village since different socio
economic groups behaved differently. While almost near total conformity to designed
rules was shown in Nagiapasi, such credible commitment was found to be absent in
the K. K. Pur village. The community members in this village responded positively in
the initial year and the collective activity of forest protection began with a nice start.
However, trom the second year onwards, the ground rule of paying rupees five per
month per household was not properly confirmed by all the member households of
the institution. The Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste households, who
constituted more than one-fourth of the population (28.2 %), were the first ones to
violate the rules of payment towards forest conservation. There were several reasons
for this non-conformity of rules in K. K. Pur village. The important concern was that
of poor monitoring by the Village Forest Protection Committee, the community
institution established for the purpose. The committee failed to collect the
contributions each month and asked the households for payment of the 'Forest Fee' at
the end of the year for the whole of 12 months. The SC and ST households, majority
of whom wcre poor and were managing their household budget by means of wage
labouring, found it difficult to pay Rupees 60 at once.
The above observation of non-commitment of rules by SC and ST households
paves the way to understand how socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities form
an obstacle in the way of collective action for local common pool resource
management. Some of the landed, agrarian, upper caste households made the
payment in terms of kind (paddy) soon after their harvest. But, since the SCs and STs
were deprived of landed property and were adhering mainly to non-agricultural
occupations, such type of contribution in terms of kind was also not possible on their
part. The above analysis doesn't, however, mean that all the SC and ST households
retrained trom making monetary contributions towards forest protection. There were
few SC and ST households who did contribute their share. However, a majority of
the defaulters were from this socio-economic category, along with poor households
of other castes. It, therefore, becomes clear that it is not only socio-cultural divisions
(heterogeneity) that mattered in commitment to rules, the economic heterogeneity
had also played its role in the process. Poverty, non-lucrative and low-earning
172
occupations of few households came in the way of efforts towards a collective and
community activity.
However, the situation was different with respect to non-economIC
contributions for solving the provision problem. The well off, high caste households
behavcd differently from that of lower caste, poor households when it came to
donating voluntary labour for forest protection activities. The upper caste households
of K. K. Pur, particularly those belonging to the Brahmin caste, (which constituted
17.7 % of the total households) lagged behind others with respect to voluntary labour
donation. Other caste groups of the village, including the Khandayat households,
accepted this rule positively and contributed their part for it. Some of the Brahmin
households, particularly those whose livelihood was derived from occupations like
business, contractors hip and government service, were the first ones to violate this
rule. Besides social prestige, lack of time due to their tight scheduled occupation
were some of the reasons given for their non-confirmity of rule of voluntary labour
donation.
Besides socio-cultural and economIc heterogeneities, interest heterogeneity
also affected the collective efforts to some extent in K. K. Pur. Differential interests
in the resource came in the way of commitment to the rule of limited grazing during
the beginning of forest protection. In fact, in both the villages there were oppositions
to this rule from certain sections of society. When the institutions crafted the rule of
closing grazing activities to facilitate natural regeneration, the few shepherd
households in both the villages along with other cattle holding landless households
expressed their disagreement towards the rule. However, the situation could be
controlled in Nagiapasi, since the village followed a strong monitoring system to
catch the rule breakers. Besides, the village had enough common wastelands, where
such households continued their b'Tazing activity. On the contrary, K. K. Pur lacked
both enough common lands to provide as an alternative to the forest for grazing, as
well as a strong monitoring system, which could ensure rule conformity. Since forest
was the only source for them to feed their cattle, showing commitment to the rule
again carne in the way of their livelihood and this rule was also violated.
173
5.3.2. b) ii. Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Appropriating of the Resollrce
The appropriation problem in CPR situation relates to distribution of benefits from the
resource in an equitable and sustainable manner. The communitics under study,
designed several rules to ensure equity of the distribution of benefits and
sustainability of the resource system. Since free-riding was the major problem at hand
during the time of forest protection, the communities tried to put a regulation upon the
use of the resource, by denying access to the members of other communities and
controlling the use by insiders. Fuelwood being an important element of forest use,
the first rule concerning appropriation of the resource was that of putting a restriction
on fuel wood collection from the forest. Accordingly, both the institutions came out
with following rules for effective appropriation:
• Fuelwood collection from the forest will be allowed only through head-load.
• None will be allowed to collect fuel wood through bullock cart or bicycle.
• None will be allowed to enter the forest with an axe. Only sickle and other
small instruments will be allowed.
To these rules, the Nagiapasi added one more rule of paying a small token
amount of 50 paise per head-load of fuel wood collected from the forest. The forest
protection committees of both the villages also put a regulation on other forms of
forest use, like collecting timber and bamboo for house construction andlor repairing,
bamboo for using as raw material for basket weaving, etc.
K. K. Pur again faced challenges from different sections of the community so
far as conforming to these rules for effective distribution of benefits for forest
resource. The basket weaving SC households, to begin with, complained of paying for
the bamboo, which they used to collect from the forest free of cost before. The
complaint was also targeted against landholding upper caste agrarian households, who
didn't have to pay anything for collecting small timber for making agricultural
equipments. The committee, however, tried to justify this inequality in the rule
formation by the reason that upper caste landed households collect small timber very
rarely, since making agricultural equipments was not an everyday affair, whereas the
basket weaving households required bamboo on a regular and large scale basis.
174
Some of the ST households, who earlier used to collect fuel wood from the
forest and sell them in the nearby market, also found it difficult to commit to the
newly designed rules. Collection of fuel wood in head-load was enough for self
sufficiency, but was insufficient for selling in market. Thus, committing to rules again
came in the way of their livelihood.
The differential approach to the rules of the game in the K.K. Pur village with
respect to forest protection and management, created a situation of 'mistrust' among
members belonging to different 'socio-cultural' and 'economic' forest user groups.
Therefore, heterogeneities not only directly affected the process of collective action,
by di fferential treatment to the designed rules and commitment to those rules, but also
indirectly affected the collective action efforts by hampering 'trust' and 'assurance'
among different forest use groups. Such erosion of trust and assurance among
members belonging to different socio-economic groups made it more difficult on the
part of the community to come together and exhibit collective behaviour for local
resource management.
Besides socio-cultural, economIc and interest heterogeneity, the political
heterogeneity of K. K. Pur village also played a crucial role in the process of
collective action for local forest management. However, it is important to point out
that, while the former three sources of heterogeneity affected the 'commitment of the
community to the designed rules', political heterogeneity affected most the
'monitoring' part of collective action process. Credible commitment and a strong
monitoring system are two important elements that are required to avoid a situation of
tragedy in a CPR situation. Since every resource user is better off individually by not
committing to the rules, it is only through a strong monitoring system that
commitment can be brought about to the designed rules. While the whole community
is expected to commit to a set of designed rules, it is only a small group of
individuals, who do the monitoring job. The institution and more particularly the
leadership of the institution should be strong enough to ensure a proper monitoring
system.
The political heterogcneity of the K. K. Pur village resulted in a weak
institution without proper monitoring of the rule violation. The broader conflicting
175
characteristics ofleadership group of the K. K. Pur got reflected in institution building
for forest resource management in the village. The opposing leaders were always busy
in search of finding faults with each other so as to take privileges out of it. Therefore,
the political heterogeneity, which couldn't establish a robust institution and strong
monitoring system, was crucial one in affecting collective action in K. K. Pur village.
Thc role of political heterogeneity in the failure of collective action of K. K. Pur will
be describcd in detail in the next session, which tries to find a link between different
sources of heterogeneity, resource depcndency and success or otherwise of collective
action.
In the absence of a robust institution and a strong system of monitoring the
situation that prevailed in K. K. Pur with respect to forest use was that of a Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, where defection to the designed rules became the dominant strategy.
The average resource users couldn't foresee a success in collective action measures
and futurc benefits out of it owing to the conflict among the leadership groups, which
led to a weak institution and monitoring system. Therefore, it became rational on their
behalf to gain maximum benefit possible from the resource system without
contributing towards its maintenance. Further, trust and assurance could also not be
built among different socio-economic groups, which resulted in further non
commitment to the rules.
5.4. Heterogeneity, Resource Dependency, Collective Action
and Management Outcomes: Finding a Linkage
The relationship between group heterogeneity and collective action initiatives for
positive and sustainable resource management has been an ambiguous one. In other
words it becomes difficult to come out with elear-cut conclusions that would reveal ,
either a positive or a negative relationship. However, as the present study finds out,
heterogeneity does playa crucial role in the whole process. When, how and where it
makes a difference depend upon several factors, including the institutional
arrangements, monitoring system and the nature of leadership. For example, despite
several similar conditions, the members of Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur have acted
differently towards certain factors. The socio-cultural and economic heterogeneity
176
have been able to generate interest heterogeneity in the village, however, they have
failed to atTect the commitment towards designed rules.
Several generalisations can be derived from the findings of the present study.
To begin with, the socio-cultural heterogeneity and economic heterogeneity are
always inter-related, and combined they generate differential interests among
community members towards the resource. Interest heterogeneity in most occasions is
an outcome of socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities. However, there exist an
impL1rtant difference between interest of the community members for the resource and
interest of the members in the process of collective action. The poor and those
belonging to the lower strata in the socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities are
relatively more dependent upon the resource, and therefore has a greater interest in the
resource than upper caste landed households. However, their interest in the process of
collective action has been found to be limited, since participating in the process
generates survival constraint for them. Participating in the collective action or leading
the process of collective actIOn is found to be the responsibility of the upper caste
landed members. The second generalisation that can be derived from the empirical
observations is that several sources of heterogeneity affect the collective action
process in different ways. The analysis of how several sources of heterogeneity affect
the collective action process and resource management outcomes has been made clear
in the following tigure.
Figure - 5.1
r
Socio-cultural COLLECTIVE ACTION lI~teroR·neity I. Provisioning of the Resource
~ U Differential 2. Appropriation of the Resource Dependency
f--- --(Interest
~ "ctcrogcn~ity)
Economic H~t~roRen~ity
MANAGEMENT OUTCOMES I. Availability of the Resource 2. Sustainability of the Resource
Political lIet~roRen~ity
177
Figure 5.1 depicts the framework to find out the relationship between different
sources of heterogeneity, resource dependency and the process of collective action.
As the figure shows, the socio-cultural heterogeneity and economic heterogeneity are
always inter-related - one generates the other and in the process is generated by the
other. The socio-cultural heterogeneity of the communities generates a system in
which, certain sections of society enjoy a definite status in the economIc
heterogeneity, and the vice-versa holds true also. And the combination of these two
produces a definite pattern of resource dependency. As the empiric observation
reveals, the resource dependency of the two communities has been found to be
profoundly determined by the above two mentioned sources of heterogeneity. Even
though these two sources of heterogeneities do not have any definite impact upon the
process of collective action in the Nagiapasi village; however, they successfully affect
the resource dependency pattern of the village. Therefore, intra-community
heterogeneity necessarily generates differential dependency, but differential
dependency doesn't always necessarily generate differential management outcomes.
This generalisation is substantiated by the fact that while socio-cultural and economic
heterogeneity have been successful in generating differential resource dependency
pattern in both the villages, such heterogeneities have been successful in affecting
management outcomes and collective action process only in K. K. Pur village. The
collective action process and resource management outcomes in Nagiapasi village
have remained untouched from the impacts of heterogeneity, despite the fact that the
resource dependency has been affected. Therefore, the relation between these two
sources of heterogeneity and (differential) resource dependency is shown in clear
arrow, whereas the relation between (differential) resource dependency and
management outcomes is shown in broken arrow.
The socio-cultural and economIc heterogeneities affect the management
outcomes in two ways. First, it directly affects the resource management outcomes,
since the different members behave differently towards the rules of the game. In the
K. K. Pur village, different segments of community committed themselves differently
to the designed rules and therefore affected the collective action process negatively,
which further affected the management outcomes. Secondly, these heterogeneities
178
also affect the management outcomes indirectly through the interest heterogeneity. On
occasions, the interest heterogeneity, created by the socio-cultural and economic
diversity of the community, affect the management outcomes. For example, the
ditlerent segments of community in K. K. Pur having both vertical and horizontal
differential interest in the forest approached the collective action problem differently.
Political heterogeneity, which has been the crucial factor in determining the
management outcomes in both villages, on the contrary, is found to act independent of
other factors. Political heterogeneity has affected the process of collective action and
resource management outcomes in both villages differently, by creating a difference
in the monitoring system. The political homogeneous environment in Nagiapasi
Village is solely responsible to establish a strong system of monitoring of rules. The
intluence of such political homogeneity and leadership roles upon management
outcomes in the Nagiapasi village forms the subject of analysis of the next chapter.
On the contrary, the heterogeneous political culture and structure of K. K. Pur has
generated a leadership structure, which is more engaged in conflicting with each other
and monitoring each other's behaviour rather than the collective action process.
The extent of the existence of political heterogeneity in both the communities
has already been discussed in the previous section. The broad observation was that
politically K. K. Pur was more heterogeneous than Nagiapasi, with intra-community
factionalism characterising the political front of the village. Now let me explain how
the political heterogeneity of the community plays its role in the collective action
initiative of the village, including crafting of the institution (forest protection
committee), designing of the rules (to counter provision and appropriation problem),
commitment and monitoring of the rules and finally the management outcomes in
terms of availability and sustainability of the resource.
Before stepping further in exploring the role of heterogeneous political
environment in the collective action process for local forest management in the K. K.
Pur village, it is apt to have a further insight into the political atmosphere of the
village and its factional politics. The fragmented and heterogeneous nature of political
environment of K. K. Pur village has been more affected by the party politics, which
has also made the situation more difficult for forest protection in the village. The
179
overall political front of the village is divided into three factions belonging to
ditTerent political parties. The first group belongs to the Congress party. Its leader,
who is a Brahmin by caste, is a temporary resident of the village, since he also owns a
house in the nearby Ohenkanal town. Having a residence in the Ohenkanal town
(which is the district headquarter) has facilitated him in developing good rapport with
the higher party leaders and other government officials. Such an outside linkage with
political authorities and government machineries has helped in having more followers
back in the village and strengthening his position as a community leader. The leader
of the second faction belongs to a regional party called 8iju lanata Oal (810). He was
Khandayat by caste, and had a strong base in the village. And a person belonging to
Teli (oil presser) caste headed the third faction. Even though this leader is not
politically active like his two counterparts, yet he is an influential man in the village
and had good relations with government official as well as members of different
political parties.
With this brief idea about the village politics and factionalism of K. K. Pur, let
me now explain how they matter in the process of crafting of the community
institution for forest protection. The idea of forest protection and formation of a JFM
committee in the village was first initiated by the leader belonging to the first faction,
who was from the Congress party. Since he was staying in Ohcnkanal town, the
district headquarters and had contact with the forest officials, he took the initiative in
forest protection activities and started mobilising people back in the village. But the
other leaders of the village complained that a non resident of the village can not have
proper understanding of the requirements of the villagers and, thus lacked confidence
in his attempt towards forest protection. It should be made clear that the opponent
leaders, who resisted the process, were not against the idea of forest protection or
mobilising people for that purpose. It's only that they didn't want the leader of the
first faction to take political advantage from the situation. However, they could not
halt the process of committee formation as the idea of forming committees for
protection of local forest resource was a popular idea in the locality by then, and
further the people were also very much enthusiastic about it. When the forest
protection committee was formed, the leader who had taken initiative was made the
president of the forest protection committee.
180
With the fonnation of forest protection committee, the political opponents of
the president of the forest protection committee also became antagonist towards the
efforts of forest protection and the committee as well. Since the president of the
committee was staying outside the village, it was not possible on his part to look after
each and every matters related to forest protection in particular and village affairs in
general. This became a clue for other leaders in the village to take advantage, who
wanted to remove him out of the committee and were successful in their attempt in
the ground that he (the president) stays outside the village and thus is not able to give
leadership to protection activities. The leader of the second faction was very much
active in the process of dislocating the first leader, who then became the president of
the forest protection committee.
With the change of leadership in K. K. Pur forest protection committee, the
first president who had taken initiative for such activities in the beginning became
passive towards the village forest protection measures and advised his followers back
in the village to keep themselves away from such a committee. The forest protection
committee of K. K. Pur could not withstand such conflicts among the leadership
group and village factionalism, and ultimately broke down before getting the approval
from the forest department.
The political heterogeneity of K. K. Pur intluenced the collective action
process and resource management outcomes in the village by affecting the
participation of the community members. As the name itself suggests participation is
very much central to any collective action initiative. The community members
participated differently in K. K Pur village, which fonned an obstacle in the process
of crafting of the institution, desil,TJling of effective rules and commitment to those
rules. The process of monitoring suffered the most in K. K. Pur because of the
unstable leadership and weak institution. Monitoring IS one of the important
responsibilities of the leadership, which represents the community members in the
institution. However, the frequent changing and non-serious leadership of the village
institution at K. K. Pur failed to establish an strong monitoring system, which could at
least restrict the violation of rules in the village.
181
Such a depiction of village politics and factionalism makes one thing clear
that, whether positive or negative, the rural elites/village leaders playa significant role
in any collective activity for resource management. The village elites or local leaders
form the 'critical mass' (see, Marwell et. aI., 1988; Oliver, 1988; Oliver et ai., 1985)
of rural communities and possess the potential either to make or mar collective action.
When critical mass is united, it takes initiative for collective action, and sustains it
with its able leadership and efficient authority. But when critical mass is divided, a
faction of critical mass may initiate the idea of collective action, but it becomes
difticult for that faction to sustain it in the midst of factionalism with other groups of
critical mass. The role of such critical mass in success or otherwise of collective
action initiatives and management outcomes will be discussed in detail in the next
chapter.
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Chapter VI
Collective Action Despite Heterogeneity:
Revisiting the 'Pre-Condition' Debate
It has now been an acknowledged fact in the natural resource management literature
that communities, who are the prime users of the resources, can best manage common
pool resources at the local level with collective participation. The two important
features of common pool resources, i.e., 'subtractability' and 'non-excludability',
often put the resources at a vulnerable condition in the hands of private or public
management, and hence, demand for a collective management by the local
communities. The collective management of common pool resources requires above
all robust institutional arrangements and well designed collective action at the local
level, or else the resources have the chance of becoming open access with free-riding
by its users, ultimately leading to the situation, which Garrett Hardin (1968) has
pointed out as 'tragedy of the commons'.
In its effort to understand how the local common pool resource is managed in
the study villages, the present chapter attempts to examine the process of collective
action that the community members exhibited for successful management of their
forest resources. lt has been pointed out earlier while introducing the study villages
that collective action has been successful only in Nagiapasi village, whereas, attempts
towards it had failed in K. K. PUr.43 The first part of the chapter is devoted towards
elucidating the process of collective action of the members of the Nagiapasi village
community for the protection of their local forest resources. The second part of the
chapter engages itself with the main thrust of the thesis, i.e., the 'issue of
heterogeneity and collective action'. It discusses the causative factors responsible for
the success of Nagiapasi as well as the failure of K. K. Pur in their efforts towards
collective action for local forest management, given the situation that both are
.) The relative success or failure in collective action has been discussed in detail in the methodology section in chapter - [1. To recapitulate, the success of collective action of Nagiapasi in forest protection comes from the existence and functioning of the village level institution meant for the purpose, which is characterised with high degree of rule compliance and a strong monitoring system. The absence of these account for the failure of collective action in K. K. Pur.
183
heterogeneous communities. In the process, the chapter re-considers some of the 'pre
conditions of collective action' as frequently mentioned in the literature, by looking at
leadership issues, institutional factors and non-economic (incentive) aspects of
collective action.
6.1. From Common Pool to Common Property: Establishing
Institutional Arrangements in Forests
6.1.1. Explaining Forest Dependency
Both the study villages are situated adjacent to the Kapilas Reserved Forest of the
Dhenkanal district having a distance of five kilometres from each other. The adjacent
forest areas have been an important source of livelihood for a majority of the
population of the villages. Collecting fuel wood and fodder has been observed to be a
daily routine for most of the households of both the communities. Whether they
collect directly or otherwise, almost all households in the two villages use the produce
from the forest in their day-to-day livings. An example to substantiate this may be the
fuel wood dependency of the villagers - the poor people, mainly tribals and other
lower caste people collect the fuel wood themselves, whereas the rich employ others
to collect fuel wood for them on payment basis. Some households also buy fuel wood
for their household requirements. The farmers collect small timbers from the forest to
build agricultural equipments. There are certain agrarian festivals in which the
farmers go to forest for collecting small timber to build new equipments.
Collection of forest produce has been the sole source of livelihood for certain
families. Particularly members from the scheduled tribes collect Sal leaves, Sal seeds,
mahua flowers, rope making material, fuel wood and several other forest produce
from which their daily expenditure comes. There are certain basket-maker families
from among the Scheduled Castes who depend upon the forest for bamboo to be used
as raw material in basket making. While the male members of the family collect
bamboo from the forest, it is the female members who make baskets out of it. A
majority of the households belonging to all castes in both villages depend upon forest
at the time of annual repairing of the house. As most of the houses are kacha houses
with thatched roofs, people have to depend upon forest for bamboos, ropes and other
things that are required at the time of annual maintenance.
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6.1.2. Forest as Common Pool Resource
The important position, which forest holds as a resource in the lives of the members
of both the study villages is self explanatory from the ubiquitous dependency on
forest. Such being the importance of the forest, it is apt to assess the physical quality
of the resource in both the villages. The physical quality of the forest patches of both
villages can be best described as that of a 'common pool resource'.
The access to adjacent forest patches of both the villages was unregulated in
the beginning, in the absence of any proper institutional arrangements. Since the
forest patches were of 'Reserved' categories, the official control over them was with
the State forest department. However, the state forest department was having only the
de jure rights over the resource, as it was unsuccessful in controlling the free-ride
over the resource. The community members, without any exclusive property rights
over the resource, also faced the same problem of excluding others from accessing the
resource. Therefore, for both the village communities it was very difficult to exclude
the non-members from accessing the resource and establish any kind of property right
regime over it. Combined with this characteristic, i.e., difficulty of exclusion, the
physical quality of the forest patch of both the villages also possessed the other
characteristic of 'subtractability'. Since the physical quantity of the forest was limited,
the joint use of the resource involved its subtraction. In fact, before the establishment
of the forest protection committee in Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur, there was severe
competition among the community members and also with members of other
community to gain the maximum benefit out of the resource. Such a condition of the
physical quality of the resource obviously generated a situation of free-riding and over
use in both villages and also affected the quantity of the resource.
6.1.3. Establishing a Management Regime: Crafting Institutional Arrangements
in the Forest
The common pool characteristics of the forest patches adjacent to both study villages
exposed them to the vulnerability of over-exploitation and degradation. In the absence
of any well-defined property rights arrangements, the management regime, which was
prevailing before the establishment of Village Forest Protection Committees in
Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur was that of an 'open access'. It was open access primarily
185
because neither of the village communities possessed any rights over the resource,
whereas everyone including several members from outside the two communities were
also using the resource for their requirements. Therefore, in such a situation it could
be said that every one, including the non-members, enjoyed 'privileges' over the
physical resources, none having any rights over it (see Bromley, 1989, 1999).
In such a regime of 'privileges' and 'umestricted access', the incentives,
which the community members of both villages as well as the non-members faced,
were that of the 'non-cooperative Prisons' Dilemma'; where each resource user was
better off by free-riding (see Runge, 1992). None of the members paid any attention
towards the conservation of the resource and the physical condition of the forests
deteriorated with time. The obvious result was depletion of the resource base. The
barren hill slopes and deforested and degraded forest patches of both communities
gradually started affecting the livelihood options of the community members. Sooner
or later scarcities in fuel wood, fodder and other raw materials for household
requirements became prominent in the village life.
The group discussions with the women members of SCs and STs of both the
villages revealed the fact that people had to travel miles in search of fuelwood and
fodder. The worst sufferers were the women in both the villages, since collecting fuel
wood was their responsibility. The poor and weaker sections of the both villages were
the people to be affected the most because of the depleting condition of the forest. The
household economy of the SC households who were engaged in basket making and
rope making activities suffered a lot due to non-availability of the raw materials.
Several factors like these forced the community members to re-think about their way
of using the resource in an uncontrolled manner. Arguing in a similar tone, McKean
(2000) also observes that common property regimes had evolved in situations, where
the demand on a resource had become too great to tolerate open access use any
longer, so that property rights in the resource had to be created. Besides the resource
scarcity and the livelihood difficulties that followed it, the already existing success
stories of community forestry in several villages of Orissa also provided a sort of
moral boost to the community members to think about forest protection activities in
their communities also.
186
Grappled with the problem of livelihood insecurity and resource degradation.
the members of both village communities pondered over the idea of establishing
proper institutional arrangement over their local forest resource for its protection hom
near degradation and for ensuring the livelihood requirements that used to spring hom
the resource. From here began the history of forest protection and institution building
over the forest resource in the communities. Disillusioned with its prior efforts of
establishing a state property regime over the forest and the consequent failures, the
state forest department of government of Orissa also came forward to support the
newly generated interest of village communities for establishing a new kind of
management regime over the forest, i.e., 'common property'.
Resource protection has been a matter of village affairs a decade ago. Both the
villages started protecting the forest patch near to their village in the beginning of
1990s. That was the period when community forestry was gaining momentum in
Orissa both at the community level as well as at the administrative level. The
government of Orissa had passed its Village Forest Rules in 1985 giving the
responsibility of village Forests to local communities. By 1990, the Orissa
government has passed several resolutions regarding giving a share to local
communities in management of protected forests. Finally, in 1993, the government of
Orissa came out with its Joint Forest Management programme. Encouraged by these
efforts of the government and owing to their own requirements these two villages
formed Forest Protection Committees to manage their patch of forests as 'common
property' .
The Nagiapasi village was the first to materialise its community members'
efforts for forest protection and K. K. Pur followed the path in a couple of years. The
forest protection committee started in N agiapasi in 1991, and by 1993 the village K.
K. Pur formed such a committee. The self-initiated protection committee of Nagiapasi
got recognition hom the local DFO's office in 1994 and in 1999 it was registered with
the Joint Forest Management programme of the government of Orissa. However, the
enthusiasm, which was shown by the members of the K. K. Pur village in the initial
years of forest protection, could not sustain itself and the villagers neither showed any
interest nor worked towards establishing a co-management system with the state
forest department. The village continued to work on its own in forest protection
187
without collaborating with the government. But, around \998, the Forest Protection
Committee became defunct in the K. K. Pur village. The leadership of the village
could not stand in the face of internal conflicts among the villagers and thus, the
committee broke down. The efforts towards forest protection and the institutional
arrangements designed for it could only sustain for 5 years in K. K. Pur village. On
the other hand, the protection committee in the Nagiapasi village is functioning till
date, and during the course of fieldwork it is observed that the village institution (the
committee) had established clear set of rules and regulations to regulate the use and
management of the forest.
With the formation of Protection committees In two villages, the forests,
which were 'open access common pool resources', became 'common property' of the
community, with clear set of rules about who should enjoy the benefits from the
resources and who should not. The fist step, which the communities adopted for
establishing the common property regime, was to decide on the boundary of the forest
area to be protected by them. The villagers in a meeting organised for the purpose of
forest protection decided the physical area to be protected by their community, and in
an effort to make it known to non-members of the community, the decided upon area
was marked with stone pillars, bamboo, etc. Several other natural elements like
particular trees were also used as markers to distinguish the would-be protected area
of villages. In order to avoid legal complications and also to get government
permission, the two villages approached the local forest officials and conveyed the
forest department their intention of forest protection and the physical area of the forest
to be protected by them.
After deciding upon the physical area to be protected, the second step which
the communities took in establishing common property regime, was to protect the
resource from free-riding by non-members by restricting the entrance of outsiders into
the forest. It is worth mentioning here that prohibiting the entrance of outsiders into
the marked forest area decided for protection was not an easy task for the
communities. The open access nature of the forest areas before the idea of community
protection had several intruders into it, including forest thieves, wood smugglers, and
common people from neighbouring villages, from whom now the forests required
protection. Given this situation, the communities had to really work hard in terms of
188
patrolling inside the forest area day and night to check any kind of forest offences.
However, the community institution in K. K. Pur was not strong enough in this aspect.
The institution could successfully decide upon the area to be protected, however,
when it came to protect that area from outsiders, it could not efficiently handle the
situation in comparison to Nagiapasi. As a result, the forest again went back to the
open access regime in K. K. Pur with free-riding and over-exploitation being the
characteristic phenomenon. Therefore, the remaining part of the chapter depicts the
success story of Nagiapasi Village Forest Protection Committee by explaining the
property right arrangements in the new regime, as well as the process of collective
action exhibited by the members of the community for protection and management of
their local forest resource.
Before explaining the process of collective action III the village for local
resource management, it is appropriate to focus upon the property rights arrangements
in the newly established common property regime in the forest area protected by
Nagiapasi village.
6.1.4 Establishing a Management Regime: The Property Rights Arrangements in
the Forest
Property right is one of the most important institutions in natural resource use and
management, which not only decides who will have access to the resource, but also
determines the incentive structure that people gain from the resource. Property rights
over natural resources are, in fact, social relation in the resource that defines the rights
of the property holder to the resource in relation to other who have a corresponding
duty to respect that right. It, therefore, provides the resource user or the owner a
'secured claim to the resource or the services that resources provide' (Gibbs and
Bromley, 1991: 24). As Benda-Beckmannn et al. (1996) argue that 'property right is
an 'umbrella concept', which goes beyond the unitary concept of ownership and
includes several types of rights to different forms and use of resources. Property rights
over natural resource may be defined as authority to control and undertake particular
actions on it, which are recognised as legitimate by a larger collective and are
protected through rules (Commons, 1968; Wiber, 1992; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify four categories of property rights over natural
resource management, such as access and withdrawal, management, exclusion, and
189
alienation. These rights may be divided into three broad categories as use rights,
ownership rights and decision-making rights.
Mostly in the case of natural resources, the property rights institutions vary,
with use right and ownership right as two end points upon which the decisions are
taken. With the creation of common property regime in the forest area adjacent to
Nagiapasi, the property right arrangement therein also took a dynamic tum. In the
erstwhile open access regime the property right arrangements were very much
ambiguous in nature. Since the forest patch was under the 'Reserve Forest' category,
the state was the sole right holder of the resource, possessing both use and ownership
rights. Therefore, the state also possessed the right to make decisions on both use and
ownership aspects. However, such a claim of the state was only de jure in nature,
since it was the local people who were observed to have the de facto use rights.
Notwithstanding the sole ownership of the forest being at the hand of the forest
department of the government of Orissa, it was, indeed, the local people who were
using the forest for their day-to-day requirements. But such a de facto use right of the
people was not accompanied with the decision making rights.
The property rights arrangements were reshuffled after the establishment of
common property regime in Nagiapasi forest. Since the new management regime was
created under the auspices of the State Joint Forest Management programme, the state
also became a stakeholder in the whole process, and the community shared the
property rights with it. After the creation of the Village Forest Protection Committee
in Nagiapasi, the community claimed to have the ownership right and the decision
making right over the resource, and thus, by dint of which, decided to restrict the
access of non-members to the forest area. Such a kind of rights was found to be absent
in the community, while the resource was an open access one.
It has been mentioned earlier that a secure claim of rights over a resource
depends upon the recognition of such rights by a wider collectivity and accompanied
back up by proper rules and regulations. When the Village Forest Protection
Committee got the recognition from the local forester as a potential Joint Forest
Management Committee, the claims of the Nagiapasi to have rights over the resource
also got wider acknowledgement. Finally, when the community signed the
190
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of the Joint Forest Management Programme
with the State Forest Department and became a formal JFM Committee the claims of ,
the community to have rights over use, ownership and decision-making affairs of the
forest got a legal back up. The state acknowledged the use and decision making rights
of the community and granted limited ownership rights to the community.
It is not enough to distinguish only between use rights and ownership rights
and the decisions taken on them in the case of the newly created regime in Nagiapasi
forest. The renewable characteristic of forest as a natural resource demands for
another kind of distinction, i.e. between the 'stock' and 'flow' of the resource, in
order to have a better understanding of the property rights arrangement in Nagiapasi.
Renewable natural resources are often distinguished between 'resource systems' and
'resource units' (Ostrom, 1990,2001). Resource systems are the stock variables of the
resource, which have the capability of producing maximum quantity of resource units
or resource flows, without damaging the stock or the resource system itself. While the
physical area of the forest and the number of trees therein are the resource systems,
the numerous forest produces that users appropriate from the forest are the resource
units. In the case of forestry, a controlled and regulated appropriation of the resource
units does not necessarily pose a danger to the resource system:
If we focus our attention on the property rights arrangements in the above
mentioned distinctions, we may observe that the state retained with it the ownership
rights of the resource system and shared decision making rights over it with the
communities. However, when it came to the resource units, the community enjoyed
all the three property rights, i.e., use, ownership and decision making, over it. In the
new management regime, the community possessed both the use and ownership rights
over the resource units or different forest produces that were to be appropriated from
the resource system, and was free to take decision for their controlled, regulated and
equitable appropriation. Such rights over the resource units were both de facto and de
jure.
191
6.2 Managing the Common Property: Community Institution
and Collective Action in the Forest
The tenn 'collective action' in social sCience literature has been widely used by
different scholars to understand different situations. However, the element, which is
common to all, is 'mutual interest and the possibility of benefit from coordinated
action'. Situations requiring collective action take several fonns, one of which is the
management of common pool resources like fisheries, forests and irrigation. As has
been pointed out repeatedly, the very nature of common pool resource, i.e.,
'subtractability' and 'non-excludability' makes it necessary on the part of the resource
to be managed through collective action. To put it precisely, the management ofCPRs
requires collective action at the community level owing to three factors. First, the
good is jointly produced, or else it does not require collective action at all. Common
property is such that they cannot be produced in isolation by any single individual's
effort. Second, CPR confers benefits on all members of the group, making it
impossible or impracticable to exclude members who fail to contribute for production
of CPR. Third, production of benefits in CPR involves cost, which should come from
all the members of the community (Heckathorn, 1993: 331).
Collective action for protection and management of a renewable resource like
forest becomes crucial because of several factors. First, in such a case the collective
action should be regarded as a process. In other words, in order to ensure the
sustainability of the resource, the efforts towards collective action first should be a
sustainable one. The desired goals of forest protection and its sustainability can be
achieved only with regular and constant collective efforts towards it. Second,
collective action in the case of forest protection is a long-tenn affair, where there
always exists a gap period between beginning of the process and appropriating
outcomes from it. These factors and many more like this make the role of institution a
significant one in the process of collective action. Therefore, the success story of
collective action of Nagiapasi village has been studied by focusing upon first, the
institution, which was designed at the time of setting the agenda for the process,
second, the actual process of collective action, and third, the outcomes of the process.
192
6.2.1. Setting the Agenda for Collective Action: Designing the Community
Institution
Institution in the natural resource management literature is often described as rules,
regulations and prescriptions of using the resource in certain particular ways (Ostrom,
1990, 2001, Bromley, 1989). These rules and regulations affect the behaviour of
individuals in a group (North, 1991); and determine the interaction pattern among
them and with the resource as well.
Therefore, in the context of natural resource management, the institutions refer
to rules about who can use what resource, when, where and how. The complete array
of this rule structure is known as 'institutional arrangements', which determine the
way of resource appropriation. Institutional arrangements in forestry are not a static
concept. They evolve over a period of time and changes with the change in
management regime. For example, the institutional arrangements (rules for resource
appropriation), which were present in Nagiapasi when the resource was under open
access regime became different when the common property regime was created in the
resource. Different institutional arrangements created different incentive structures for
resource users, which determine the fate of the resource.
When the idea of forest protection and management was floating in the
Nagiapasi village, the first challenge in front of the community members was to create
an institution for the purpose, which could guide and monitor the process of collective
action. The villagers gathered together for the purpose and formed the Village Forest
Protection Committee of the village. Creation of a community institution for the
purpose of managing natural resources may take two broad forms. First, the institution
may be a completely newly created one designed for that particular purpose. These
newly created institutions may be internal to the community or may be an external
one or thrusted upon the community by external agents like state or civil society
organisations. Second, the already existing institutions may be used for the purpose
with or without modifications on it. Often, the traditional institutions of caste and
kinship system provide the base for it.
Nagiapasi adopted the second type of institution formation, where the existing
traditional institution acted as the base for designing institutional arrangement for the
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newly created common property regime in forest. This became obvious from the fact
that it was the traditional headman of the village, who called such a meeting to
consider about the idea of forest protection and facilitate the process. This headman of
the village, who became the president of the Village Forest Protection Committee,
brought with him the traditional obligations, compliances and the trust of the people,
which he used to enjoy in the community. Such a structural arrangement made the
functional aspect of the institution easy.
If the creation or starting up of the institution forms the organisational or
structural aspect of institution building, how the institution performs becomes it
functional aspect. The functional aspect of the institution is represented by the rules
and regulations, which it prescribes for its members. A study of the community
institution of Nagiapasi for forest protection and management, therefore, should focus
upon the rules and regulations which the institution designed and how these rules
determined the incentive structure of the resource users. The institutional rules are
often distinguished between two lines, i.e. formal and non-formal, and working and
non-working (See Ostrom, 1990, 200 I; Thomson and Frcudenberger, 1997). While
the formal rules are codified laws and regulations, non-formal rules are mostly
unwritten ones, derived from customs and practices. The distinction between working
and non-working rules depends upon its actual enforcement. While the working rules
are actually enforced and affect the way people behave towards the resource, non
working rules are neither enforced not monitored. Working rules are, therefore, most
important in any kind of institutional arrangements and are defined as 'common
knowledge, that are enforced and monitored' (Ostrom, 2001: 167 - 8). Further,
working rules may be also of different kinds, such as operational, collective decision
making, and constitutional (See Ostrom, 1990, 200 I; Thomson and Freudenberger,
1997). The following Table (Table - 6.1) captures the distinctions between formal and
non-formal and working and non-working rules.
Table 6.1: Categorisation of Rules
WORKING NON-WORKING
FORMAL Codified texts that are Codified texts that are not enforced enforced
NON-FORMAL Customs and unwritten rules Unwritten rules that are not that are en forced enforced
Source: Thomson and Freudenberger, 1997: 63
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6.2.1. a) Types of Rules at Work in Nagiapasi
Formal and Non-formal Rules: Both fonnal and non-fonnal rules are found to be
regulating the behaviour of the appropriators towards the resource base in Nagiapasi.
The very fact of Nagiapasi being a JFM village, where the state was also involved as a
stakeholder, brought to the village various fonnal rules, which, once at place,
continued to afTect the behaviour of the community members. The first and foremost
rule of granting the members of the Nagiapasi the exclusive access rights to the forest
area, which was crucial in establishing the Common Property Regime, was observed
to be a fonnal rule written down in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
between the Nagiapasi Village Forest Protection Committee and the Forest
Department, government of Orissa and endorsed by the local Forest Officer.
Similarly, several other fonnal rules were found to be operating in the Nagiapasi,
whose sources were either the MoU of JFM with the Forest Department or the JFM
resolution of the government of Orissa. A few examples of such fonnal rules include
the following:
• That the Forest Protection Committee should include two adults, including a woman
member from every household living in the village as its members.
• That the responsibility of the protection and management of the forest patch shall be
entrusted with the community institution.
• That the usufructs like leaves. fodder, grass, thatch grass, broom grass, thorny fencing
materials, brushwood and fallen lops and tops and twigs used as fuel wood shall be
available to the members of the community free of cost.
Besides fonnal rules, several non-fonnal rules were also observed in the
Nagiapasi village, which were detennining the manner of forest use in the village.
These non-fonnal rules were mostly unwritten and had the consensus of the
community members over their nature. Some of the non-fonnal rules were customary
in nature and were being practised since generations. For example, it is an accepted
nonn in the locality that fruit-bearing trees should not be cut or tampered with during
their harvesting seasons. The non-fonnal rules were mostly evolved out of common
practices, conventions and agreement of the community members over the issue of
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forest use and management. Following are the examples of a few non-formal rules in
operation in Nagiapasi.
•
•
That every household should contribute a fixed amount decided by the Forest
Protection Committee towards managing the expenditure of forest protection.
That none will be allowed to appropriate fuel wood from the forest either through
bullock carts or cycles and only head-load collection will be allowed.
If we examine these two types of rules carefully, we can observe that while
most of the formal rules concerned with the provisioning of the resource, the non
formal ones deal with the resource appropriation. The formal rules, which were very
often the outcomes of the policy prescriptions of lFM provided the resource to the
community and thus, facilitated the community to have gainful access over the
resource. However, it was the responsibility of the community to design non-formal
rules, whether by ways of convention, consensus or common practices, for
appropriation of the resource in a sustainable manner ensuring equity to its members.
Working and Non-Working Rules: Enforcement, compliance and monitoring are
three important factors, which distinguish working rules from non-working rules. The
working rules are always enforced and monitored by some authority. And the
members also exhibit their compliance towards these kinds of rules. On the contrary,
non-working rules are neither enforced nor monitored. Working rules were found to
be more dominating and prominent in Nagiapasi than non-working rules, which had
both written and unwritten sources. It is a mistake to assume that all the formal rules
of the community were working rules. The matters concerning involvement of
women, which was clearly written down in the government document with regard to
lFM, was not observed to be a working rule in the community. Even though they
were members of the general body of the Village Forest Protection Committee in
record, but, in actual practice, they had very minimal role to play while it came to
making decisions regarding the manner of forest use and protection. There were
several such formal written rules which were hardly acknowledged and enforced by
the community, and therefore, could not become working rules of forest protection.
It is important to point out that the source of rules is not important in making a
rule working or non-working. Collective acceptance of the rules and near conformity
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to them are deciding factors in making a rule working. People have accepted some of
the formal rules, have developed consensus over them, and have enforced them with
proper monitoring, which, in turn, have become working ones.
6.2.1. b) MUltiple Levels of Rules in Nagiapasi
Having acknowledged the importance of rules in resource management and being able
to identify the type of rules and their characteristics that were existing in Nagiapasi
village, we are left with one more aspect of rules analysis, i.e., their level of ordering.
Based upon the nature and who formulates them, rules in use are stratified into three
hierarchical orderings: operational, collective-decision making and constitutional
(Ostrom, 1990, 200 I; Thomson and Freudenberger, 1997). The analysis in the
following sections tries to identify and examine the hierarchical ordering of rules at
these three levels.
Operational Rules: Operational rules in resource management are the most
immediate and obvious ones that directly determine the behaviour of community
members' concerning access and use of the resource. Operational rules attempt to
solve both the provision and appropriation problems of resource management. On the
provision side, such rules point to basic issues like who can get access to the resource
and who will be restricted from using the resource. On the appropriation side,
operational rules define the ways of resource use, and concern with matters like how
much resource unit can be harvested, when, where and using what tools.
Several operational rules were identified in Nagiapasi village, which affected
the incentive structure of members to use the resource. To begin with, the government
directives regarding transfer of the forest area to the village community within the
JFM framework formed the first operational rule, which excluded members of other
communities from accessing the resource, and entrusted Nagiapasi with exclusive
(property) rights over the resource. Further, the community designed several other
rules regarding how much forest produce one can harvest from the resource using
what types of instrument, who should contribute how much, etc. For example, the
Forest Protection Committee of the village instructed that only head loads of fuel
wood collection using tools like sickles will be allowed, and the committee strictly
pointed out that fuel wood collection in cycles, bullock carts or any other vehicles
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using instruments like axes or saws would be not permitted in the village. Several
such operational rules have been will be described in the following pages. while
dealing with the process of collective action in the village.
Operational rules in a resource management context are dynamic in nature.
Such rules change over time based upon emergence of fresh needs of the community
and its adaptation to new conditions. For example, in the initIal years of forest
protection, the Committee restricted grazing activities inside the forest area and
strictly monitored the entrance of outsiders into the resource. However, after a couple
of years, when the forest started regenerating, the grazing restrictions were lifted out.
The strict monitoring of outside entrance, which included patrolling the forest are
during the night time also reduced with time, when the community got social
recognition from neighbouring communities about its exclusive property rights over
the resource.
Collective Decision-Making Rules: Collective decision-making rules exist at the
second level, and can be described as procedures or guidelines for designing
operational rules, which directly affect the resource use and management pattern.
Thus, collective decision-making rules are responsible for creation of operational
rules and their effective enforcement. These rules determine the agency or individual,
who can make, modify and revoke operational rules in the field. In other words,
collective decision-making rules facilitate the way and prepare the condition for
evolution of operational rules.
The sources of collective decision-making rules may be formal or non-formal.
The government resolutions of JFM, which specifies rules regarding formation of
Forest Protection Committee in the village to look after the forest management affairs,
are examples of formal collective decision-making rules in Nagiapasi. Likewise, there
were several collective decision-making rules, which were non-formal in nature. The
community has long evolved village level institution or council with traditional
village headman as its president, which is entrusted with the responsibility of
managing village affairs. Such village council also reserves the right to make rules
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Three related issues, i.e., who makes decisions (regarding operational rules),
who participates in making decisions and how decisions are made, are of great
importance in analysing collective decision-making rules. The President of the Forest
Protection Committee, who was also the village headman, was observed to central
point in all decision concerning formulation of operational choice rules in Nagiapasi.
The president was assisted by other committee member, as chosen by the village
council during its formation. The key decision makers were always the important
persons of the village, who enjoyed higher status in the community either because of
their access to higher amount of land, higher education, or being from a higher caste.
The State is another agency which makes rules at the collective decision making level.
The Government's resolution concerning Joint Forest Management specifies the
procedures and entrusts with particular persons or groups with the responsibility of
making operational rules.
The group, which participated in rule making in Nagiapasi, was more
inclusive compared to group that actually made rules. For example, the elderly people
of backward and lower caste groups, certain women members of the community, were
also part of the group, which was responsible for making operational rules. But they
had minimal role in actual making of rules. Further, there were also few individuals,
for example, State Forest Department officials, the village school teacher and eminent
persons from the neighbouring communities, who participated in making operational
rules in the capacity of advisors.
Constitutional Rules: Constitutional rules in the context of resource management
exist at the third level, and determine the membership of the collective decision
making unit. These rules define the boundaries of the community and decide upon the
office bearers who can make decision on behalf of the community, and entrust the ,
decision-making unity with desired power and authority. Constitutional rules also
reserve the right to change the collective decision-making rules at the local level.
The State is the dominant agent in making constitutional rules, although the
community enjoys limited rights with regard to the formulation of such rules. The
most important constitutional rule that was observed in the Nagiapasi village was the
State Forest Policies, more particularly the resolutions concerning JFM. Both the
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national as well as the State government's resolutions on JFM clearly delineated the
procedures for formation of Forest Protection Committee. Such constitutional rules
prescribed the rules regarding membership of the cornmittee and details pertaining to
the formation of the executive body responsible for making decisions at the local
level. For example, the decision to include one woman member from each household
in the general body of the committee and equitable representation from all sections of
society, including SCs, STs and women, in the executive body was a rule at the
constitutional level.
Having dealt with the issue of institution formulation and discussing the rules
at work at different levels, the discussions that are carried out in the following
sections focus upon the process of collective action efforts and its outcomes in the
Nagiapasi village.
6.2.2. Sustaining Community Institution: Collective Action as a Process
In order to explain the relative success of the process of collective action in both the
villages for forest management, two crucial elements of collective choice rights have
been identified: i) Access Regulation, and ii) Internal Use Regulation.
Access Regulation by way of norms determines who will have the rights to
access the resource and who will be excluded. The Internal Use Regulation concerns
management and regulation of the use of the resource among insiders of the
community or co-users of a resource, i.e., not merely access, but norms governing
how the resources should be used. To study Internal Use Regulation, five factors have
been identified: Rule Compliance, Contributions for Collective Action, Resource
Maintenance, Resource Sharing, and Conflict Resolution.
6.1.1. a) Access Regulation
Compared to the village K. K. Pur, where protection committee does not exit today,
access regulation was very much strong in the Nagiapasi village. In this village,
members of other community are prohibited to enter inside their protected patch of
forest. The Village Forest Protection Committee has demarcated its boundary for
protection. Even though it has not been possible to separate the protected patch by
fencing it, yet, no doubt there exists a social fencing inside the forest area. The
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members of the community know how much forestland has been entrusted to them for
management and regeneration. Further, the community has put stone pillars to mark
the protected patch from the rest.
Before the formation of protection committees, forests were 'open access
resources' in both the villages. Merely a decade ago, when the protection committees
were not in existence in any of the villages, the forests attached to these villages were
the main source of attraction for wood contractors. People from nearby localities were
also using the forest for their personal gains enormously. In fact, there was a
competition at that time to deplete forest resources, as depletion by one user was
curtailing the chance of another to do so. However, with the formation of protection
committees, both the villages were able to exclude others from entering into their
forests. They kept a constant eye upon the forest thefts and illegal use by other
communities. In a couple of years the use of the resource was regulated and only the
members of the community upon which the management responsibility was entrusted
became the sole users of the resource.
However, around 1998, when the protection committee became extinct in the
K. K. Pur village, the situation became grim as members from other villages started
accessing the resource. It took no time to revert to the earlier situation, as was in
practice before the formation of the committee. The forest became again a source of
income for wood contractors. Even the villagers themselves were found to cut trees
heavily from the forest areas in the night times. When the forest guards of the locality
were asked about the situation of the forest in this village, they answered that the
forest area was so vast that they were unable to control the forest theft. The Forest
Department and the community members are found to be playing a game of shifting
the blame to each other. The department officials put the blame upon the villagers for
illegal cutting of trees. They were of the opinion that the wood contractors had
liaisons with the local people and thus it became difficult to catch them. But the
picture from the community's point was found to be totally different. They blamed the
local Divisional Forest Officer for wood thefts and believe that contractors cut trees
with prior knowledge of the Forest Department. They held the opinion that Forest
Department itself was cutting all the trees, so what's wrong if they cut trees for their
household budget.
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6.2.2. b) Internal Use Regulation
There is no internal use regulation III the K. K. Pur village, as forest protection
committee no longer exists in this village. The analysis in this section is, therefore,
confined to the Nagiapasi village, where village level collective action has been a
successful one in the management of local forest resources.
Rule Compliance: The Forest Protection Committee or the Vana Samrakshana
Samiti (VSS), as it is known in the local language, is the general body of the
community for forest protection. The VSS is formed by taking two adult members,
which includes one female member, from every household. All the members have an
equal share in the benefits that come as a result of forest protection. There are certain
widows and extremely poor households in the village who are not the members of the
committee, as they find it difficult to make monthly contributions regularly to the
committee. However, as a member of the village community they too enjoy benetits
from the forest.
The VSS has its own executive body, which set of rules and regulation to be
applied to all the villages for regulating the use of the forest resource. The executive
body consists of 13 members, including a President, one treasurer, eight members
selected from among the community, the concerned Forester, Forest Guard, and
nominee of a local NGO. Weaker sections of society, such as Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and women are properly represented in the executive body. Out of
the eight members, who are selected from among the community, four members are
women, which include one Scheduled Caste and one Scheduled Tribe woman. The
remaining four members consist two non-Scheduled Caste males and one Scheduled
Caste male and Scheduled Tribe male. The headman of the village is the president of
the executive committee. A vice-president has been chosen from among the eight
members. The local school teacher acts as the treasurer.
Some of the rules formed by the committee were clearly defined and were
written down in the village forest notebook in local language, i.e., Oriya. All the
villagers obeyed these rules framed by the committee. There were also provisions for
punishment for those who violated the rules. The punishment varied from payment of
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tines in cash to prohibition from use of the forest produces. Usually none violated the
rules as confonnity to rules brought them a share in forest produces. The benefits
from the forest have been a major incentive to obey the rules of the committee.
However. it is not appropriate to conclude that only economic incentives compelled
the villagers to abide by the rules and contribute to the committee for forest
protection. Often. the social obligations and the feeling of being together prompted
the villagers to pay for forest protection.
Contribution for Collective Action: Any collective action can only be sustaining till
members contribute towards it. [n the present context, collective action for
community management of forests would not have been possible without active
contribution of the members. The day-to-day management of the forest requires funds
raised through the contributions by the members. However, one should not limit the
meaning of the tenn contribution to merely financial contribution. Members of the
community contributed both in tenns of cash and kind for the purpose of
management. They provide free labour whenever necessary for the maintenance of the
resource. Besides. each household contributes rupees five per month, which IS
invested in protection activities. The monthly contribution for forest protection IS
collected twice a year. [t is observed that contribution for the forest is associated with
other contributions required for observing various festivals in the village, to ensure
that the villagers pay for it without fail. The committee also collects a minor charge of
50 paisa from those who collect a head load of fuel wood from the forests. Only a
head-load of fuel wood is allowed in return of minor payment to the committee and
none is allowed to collect fuel wood in bullock carts, or for that matter in any other
vehicles.
Resource Maintenance: The Van a Samrakshana Samiti of the village is primarily
responsible for protection and maintenance of the forest patch assigned to it under
Joint Forest Management prol,'fammc. One of the important things to ensure resource
maintenance is to check thefts and illegal cntrances into the forest. As discussed
earlier the committee has well defined rules in this regard to check forest thefts ,
among the members of the community. Although the committee keeps vigilance over
these matters, it faces the challenge of preventing people from neighbouring villages
violating the nonns.
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Protecting the forest from outside non-members is very much crucial since it
creates a common property regime in the forest. Once a village starts protecting a
patch of forest and starts regenerating it, the forest becomes an attraction of others to
access. Thus, the community members have to practise severe monitoring to prohibit
the outsiders from entering into the forest. For this purpose, the villagers in Nagiapasi
are practising Ihenga pali in the beginning and guarding the forest by rotation among
themselves.44
The committee has appointed a permanent forest guard from the village
later who is paid rupees one thousand per month. The monthly salary of the guard is
derived from the contributions that each household made for forest protection.
Resource Sharing: The executive body of the Nagiapasi VSS takes utmost care to
ensure that the benetits from the resource are distributed equitably among the
villagers. With prior permission from the committee, the villagers are allowed to
collect bamboo and minor timbers for house construction or for the maintenance of
rooftops of the house. The prices of these items are determined according to the
economic status and need of the user. By thus varying the prices, the committee
insures affordability by different sections. Its compliance by all is also an indication
of people's commitment to the process of participative management of forest in
Orissa. Each household was has been equal share from the resource pool. At the time
of the construction of a new house. people get the required bamboo and small timber
from the forest.
Conflict Resolution: Resolution of conflicts that arise at the time of management is
the major challenge ahead of any community protecting forests.45
In Nagiapasi
... thengu puli (whIch can be translated as stick rotation in English), a voluntary monitoring system, in which a wooden stick. then};a, their symbol of protection, is passed on from house to house making a symbolic transfer of responslhility of forest protection. Every household after fulfilling the task of watching, passes on the stick to the next household, whose tum it is to watch the forest the followmg night. The household that receives the stick is responsible for getting members of the other four households to join them when they proceed to the forest.
4S There are mainly four potential sources of conflict that may arise in any community, managing its local forests: i) conflict among the community members, ii) conflict with nelghbounng non-members, iii) conflict with other external commercial and industrial agents, and finally, conflIct WIth the state, primarily with the forest department (Sarin, 1996).
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village, the committee is observed to be efficient enough to resolve the conflicts
among themselves. None of the cases of forest offences by the members of the
community has ever gone either to the court or to the Forest Department in the past
one decade of forest protection by the community. The villagers try to resolve the
case within the village through the committee and impose fine on the offender, which
is also acceptable to the rest of the community. However, the community faces
challenges in dealing with the forest offences by the neighbouring non-members and
commercial interests, as it does not have either social or juristic control over them.
Such cases are usually refereed to the Forest Department.
6.2.3. Collective Action Succeeds: Explaining the Outcomes
The outcomes of collective action have been analysed taking into consideration the
forest regeneration, availability of fuel ,,"ood, fodder and other non-timber forest
produces and the time and distance covered in collection of these articles. These
outcomes or indicators of success have been further analysed in tenns of economic
efficiency, equity and sustainability.
The forest condition of both the villages were in a similar condition a decade
ago prior to protection, since both patches of forest belonged to the same Kapilas
Reserved Forest. As per the opinion of the members of both villages, the forest was
significantly degraded before protection and was giving the look of a barren hill. The
statement was also con finned from the discussion that was held with the local
foresters concerned. As a first step, the Nagiapasi Village Forest Protection
Committee fonnulated a rule to stop grazing inside the torest area. During this period,
the villagers continued the grazing operation in the village common land and the
forest guards of the village strictly monitored the process. With a closure to grazing,
the forest area started to regenerate after a few monsoons. Further, the Committee also
put a restriction on the collection of fuel wood. Only dry leaves and branches were
allowed to be collected as fuel wood. Collection of fuel wood through bullock carts
and cycles were discouraged and fuel wood in head-loads was only allowed. At the
time of fieldwork, a visible distinction had been marked between the forest areas of
both the villages. The forest area attached to Nagiapasi was lush green, whereas the
K.K. Pur side of the forest was highly degraded with a few trees here and there.
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The outcomes of collective action and forest regeneration also become explicit
if one takes an account of the time spent and distance covered for fuel wood
collection. During the group discussion with the members belonging to Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe of Nagiapasi, it was learnt that people had to spend less
time and travel less distance in search of fuel wood as a result of forest protection.
Particularly, women members belonging to the Scheduled Tribes in the village were
of the opinion that they were much benefited from the collective action effort of the
village, since they didn't have to go miles in search for fuelwood and other forest
produces. Further, since the forest was regenerated owing to closure to grazing in the
initial years, they now get plenty of dry Sal leaves as fuelwood. Increase in
availability of fuel wood to the villagers may, therefore, be considered as one of the
important achievements of forest protection in the village. In contrast, such a situation
was not observed in the second village whose nearby forest was highly degraded and
the tribal and other lower caste woman had to cover a great distance to get fuel wood.
The agricultural families of the village were also benefited from forest protection in
terms of getting small wood for building of agricultural equipments. In this way,
forest protection may be said to have increased the economic efficiency of the
community members.
Nagiapasi Forest Protection Committee almost followed an equitable pattern
so far as distribution of benefits of collective action was concerned. The executive
body of the VSS took utmost care to ensure that the benefits from the resource are
shared equitably among the villagers. With the prior permission from the committee,
the villagers were allowed to collect bamboo and minor timbers for house
construction or for the maintenance of rooftops of the house. Each household was
given equal share from the resource pool. At the time of the construction of a new
house, people got the required bamboo and small timber from the forest. Access to
forest resource and forest produces were need-based. In other words, forest protection
activities in the village and the method of resource appropriation fulfilled the different
requirements of all sections of society. Further, in matters of common dependency
such as for fuel wood and fodder, equal rules were applicable to all the members of the
community.
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Besides increasing economic efficiency and ensuring social equity in its
efforts of collective management of local forest resource, the Forest Protection
Committee of Nagiapasi also paid attention to sustainability of the resource in
question. Sustainable resource use requires constraints and restrictions on the current
resource use pattern, so that the resource can be protected from being degraded and
the requirements of future generations can be ensured. The operational rules that were
at work in Nagiapasi and the way of its resource management - including its rule
formation, rule compliance and monitoring - showed testimony to efforts towards
sustainability of the Village Forest Protection Committee. To begin with, the
committee put a restriction on grazing activities inside forest during the initial years to
allow regeneration of the forest. Further, any kind of resource appropriation from the
forest in Nagiapasi village was subjected to some restrictions. Cutting trees, either for
commercial or personal purposes, were totally prohibited in the village. Forest use in
terms of fuel wood collection, raw materials to be used for making different finished
products, like bamboo-basket, paper plates, etc. was heavily restricted; and the
community institution had a strong monitoring over these kinds of forest use patterns.
By putting restrictions on their resource use pattern, the community has exhibited its
commitment towards maintaining sustainability of the resource.
6.3. Heterogeneity Did Not Matter: Explaining the Reasons
The success of Nagiapasi in collective action efforts for local resource management
definitely poses a rationale to re-consider the pre-condition debate in collective action.
The success of collective action within intra-community heterogeneity, therefore
forces us to focus upon other factors instead of levelling homogeneous nature of
community as a pre-condition. In the present case, three other factors were discussed
which seems to be more important for success or otherwise of collective action rather
than just being a homogeneous community. They are i) the role of leadership, ii)
institution-leadership nexus, and iii) importance of past history.
6.3.1. The Role of Leadership in Natural Resource Management
The mainstream debate on collective action and community based (common pool)
resource management mostly revolves around on issues like size of the community in
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tenns of big or small and the nature of the community in tenns of homogeneity or
heterogeneity. There are also studies on institutional aspects depicting the role of the
institutions in collective action for community based natural resource management.
However, the issue of leadership has mostly been neglected. 46 In sociological
literature, leadership has been studied largely in the context of organizational
management, and has generated much response. Leadership is often considered as 'a
group process through which individuals initiate activities for achieving common
objectives of group or community by working together, stimulating each other,
supplementing abilities and resources, and evolving an effective organisational and
hierarchical pattern' (Chakrabortty and Bhattacharyya, 1993: 15). Scholars, therefore,
emphasise upon exploring leadership structure by looking at the social processes
which generate it rather than identifying persons (e.g., Wood, 1960).
Nevertheless there exists many vIews on what constitutes leadership; it is
usually accepted as 'a process of persuasion or example by which an individual or
leadership team induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared and
his or her followers' (Gardner, 1990: I). Leadership role should not be confused with
social status, official position and/or power, even though a leader may use one or all
three to maintain and exercise hislher position. While studying leadership structure in
the community context, one has to keep in mind two of its aspects, i.e., leadership
traits and leadership tasks. Leadership traits that originate from physical and mental
endurance, intellectual ability and maturity of social skills are linked with leadership
tasks that motivate, guide and manage the followers (Davar, 1996; Gardner, 1990;
Lala, 1986). Leadership traits have been differently emphasised by different scholars.
For example, while Gardner (1990) emphasises upon physical vitality and stamina,
intelligence and judgement in action, willingness to take responsibilities among
several other leadership traits; Davar (1996) emphasises upon traits like, creativity
and vision, decisiveness and initiative, flexibility, etc. Further, Lala (1986) points out
communication, competence, compassion, humility and integrity as important traits of
leadership.
46 For an exception, see, Wade (1988) and Ba1and and Platteau (1996).
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Leadership traits are often thought as a matter of birth. This 'Great Man'
theory of leadership sees power and leadership skills as being vested in a limited
number of people whose inheritance and destiny make them leaders (see, e.g.,
Premchander and Chidambaranathan, 2004). Here, leadership skills or traits are
identified with ascribed status, and such a view considers that leaders are born as
leaders. However, this view is replaced by the 'Big Bang' notion, which considers
that great events make leaders of otherwise ordinary people (Bennis and Nanus,
1985). According to this notion, leadership traits can be developed, and someone's
acceptance as leader of the group depends upon his or her possession of these
leadership traits.
Leadership is considered as a strong agency for bringing out societal change
because of its capacity to motivate people, increase people's confidence and organise
people for the purposes (Premchander and Chidambaranathan, 2004). Such leadership
tasks combined with the traits that the leaders possess are of great importance in the
arena of natural resource management too. The role of leadership in the context of
community based natural resource management assumes significance owing to
seyeral factors. Based upon their study of Cooperatives, Singh and Ballabh (1994)
broadly identify seven critical roles that leaders play in a community's efforts towards
management of natural resources. They are first, generation of idea; second,
motivation and inspiration of people to implement the idea and enlisting their
participation; third, acquisition of resource around which an organisation is to be
established; fourth, holding negotiation with government and non-governmental
organisations; fifth, mobilization of resources; sixth, development of management
systems; and seventh, conflict resolution. However, these overlapping functions can
be summarised into three in a context of community based forest management, such
as initiating the process of collective action for forest protection, giving continuity to
the process and resolving conflicts that come in the process of forest management.
Now, focusing upon our field observations, we can deduce that the differential
leadership structure and political atmosphere in both the villages have definitely
played a role behind success of one and failure of the other community in collective
action. The role of leadership in collective action has been studied by looking into
three aspects: initiating the process of forest protection, giving continuity to the
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process and resolving conflicts that come in the process of forest management. The
leadership structure in both the villages varies from each other in these criteria too.
While the leadership in both villages had equally greater interest in initiating the idea
of forest protection, when it came to sustaining the process of forest protection and
resolving conflicts that cropped up in between, a difference could be found between
them. It is important to mention here that failure in resolving the conflicts between
members of the community resulted in non-continuity of the process of forest
protection in the K. K. Pur village.
The issue of leadership also becomes crucial in collective action since any
collective action effort presupposes that there is a vision which is felt by one or a
group of people for a desired action, and which, in turn, has to be shared by the
collectivity. In the context of community's involvement in forestry, the vision may be
the expected benefits from forest protection or regeneration, which acts as an
incentive or the imagined hardship due to resource scarcity, or in occasions both. In
either case, the vision has to be first perceived and then shared by the whole
community for any collective effort. Indeed, when there is an absence of such a
shared value, as we observed in K. K. Pur, we do find people acting differently, often
contrary to the goals of a common action, despite the negative results of such
di fferentiated action.
Agreement over leadership has been one among several factors that has led
Nagiapasi village to succeed in collective action. There exists a little disagreement
over the authority of the leader in the village. In other words, almost all the villagers
pay their allegiance to one leader, a phenomenon, which is completely absent in K. K.
Pur. The disagreement of the members of K. K. Pur village community and the
internal conflict among the leaders, which was discussed in detail in the last chapter,
is sufficient enough to understand the role the political divisions of the village played
in collective action endeavours of the community.
6.3.2. Leadership Group as 'Critical Mass' in Collective Action
The 'Critical Mass' is generally understood or portrayed as a group of people who are
tirst and foremost stakeholders and, therefore, have a (positive or negative) role to
play in the movement. They are the people who first realize the need of a coordinated
210
action and then whose job is to mobilize the collectivity in accordance of the common
goal. The role of critical mass becomes more significance in the context of collective
action for community based natural resource management owing to the long-term
projects of natural resource management. In other words, the critical mass not only
becomes instrumental in beginning a collective action, but also in giving it continuity
and making the process sustainable.
The above role may not lead one to conclude that the leaders, or critical mass
as I call it, always necessarily play positive role in collective action. They can very
well play a negative role too. Particularly if the leader is opposed to the idea of
collective action, s/he may mobilize the people against it. The situation becomes more
critical when the leaders of a community are divided and work against each other. In
such a case, when one leader starts a collective action effort, the leaders opposed to
herlhim also become opposed to the collective action process. The empirical data
from my second village makes the point much more explicit.
The descriptions of village politics in the previous chapter and their role in the
process of forest protection, makes one thing clear that, whether positive or negative,
the rural elites/village leaders play a significant role in any collective activity for
resource management. The village elites or local leaders form the 'critical mass' of
rural communities and possess the potential either to make or mar collective action.
When critical mass is united, it takes initiative for collective action, and sustains it
with its able leadership and efficient authority. But when critical mass is divided, a
faction of critical mass may initiate the idea of collective action, but it becomes
di fficult for that faction to sustain it in the midst of factionalism with other groups of
critical mass, who always want to divert the process. Therefore, for a collective action
effort to succeed, what is needed is a 'positive critical mass', who can begin the
process and sustain it by eliminating the conflicting interests of the community.
6.3.3. The Critical Mass: Leadership or Domination
The question of 'leadership' and/or 'domination' in the context of Natural Resource
Management needs an understanding of the social base in which both are embedded.
Central to the question of leadership and domination is the notion of power, which the
leaders possess and make use of to consolidate their position of leadership and/or
211
exercise dominance. And such 'power' may follow either from one's membership in
particular caste, possession of particular resource, access to certain positions, personal
charisma or political authority through institutionalized structures. The notion of
leadership in rural communities, since independence, has undergone a radical change
to the extent that often the old or erstwhile seats of power and authority are no longer
taken cognizance because of the new seats of them created by a democratic system of
governance through institutionalized structures. Consequently, the new seats of power
and authority in rural communities tend to be co-terminus with the term of office
whether as a Panchayat president or member. Yet, there are also situations in which
the new seats of power are held also by those who held it in the old regime of
conventional leaders.
For the analytical purpose I prefer to distinguish the rural leadership structure
into three categories. First, the traditional leadership, who hardly keep any interest in
the present village (political) matters. The non interference in village politics may
result either because of their incapability to cope up with the new situations of politics
or due to their being questioned and rejected by the emerging, new, modem
leadership that are built upon on political lines. Such leaders usually come from
higher caste/class of the village community. The second category belongs to the new,
emerging and young leaders who take an active role in the village politics and playa
decisive role in the modem institutions of democratic governance. The third category
belongs to the group of traditional conventional leaders, who have been successful to
cope up with the modem situation and try to function as per the requirements of the
time. Such leaders try to control the emerging leaders and the modem seats of
institutionalized power either directly or indirectly and try to consolidate their
position.
The field data from the tlrst village indicate the prevalence of the third type, in
which the lone leader is more or less accepted by the community and is the prime
mover of all community activities. He has been successful in controlling the younger
gcneration of leadership in the village. Though he doesn't take an active role in
village politics, particularly concerning the Village Panchayat matters, still his
opinion in selecting the right candidates from the village is taken into account. Such
control of young leaders, who actually hold power, may not be confused with
'dominance' in the sense that the leader takes the decisions himself without involving
212
people in it. The decisions about the fonnation of a Forest Protection Committee , arriving at commonly agreeable rules and finding means and ways to monitor the
violation of the rules were taken in the village meeting after discussion with other
important persons in the village. However, in all such meetings the leader has played
a decisive role, while taking the opinion of others in to account. Since the leader
belongs to the third type of the above categorization, his traditional means of
domination - i.e. higher caste status, ritual superiority, high landholding - has been
refonnulated to cope up with the requirements of the time. However, his traditional
position has always acted as an added advantage in consolidation of his power in the
village.
In contrast, the second village represents a typical scenano of the second
category, in which not only is the old seats of power constantly questioned and
challenged, the new ones also have several competitors. As a result, any attempt for a
common good in this village has to sunnount the obstacles from the others who
challenge the ones who may moot a colIective action. In such situations, success of
one group in achieving a common goal may to that extent act as an obstacle for other
groups to demonstrate a greater community interest.
6.3.4. Institution - Leadership Nexus
Besides a strong and positive critical mass, past record of togetherness, a third factor,
which may be regarded as the key to success of Nagiapasi forest protection activities
is the presence of a strong and robust community institution. The importance of
institutional factors in collective action for local resource management has been much
discussed in common property literature (Ostrom, 1990,2001, Wade, 1988; Bromley,
\989; Baland and Platteau, 1990, etc.). In most cases, institution has been used to
understand humanly systems of rules that once created goes beyond the individuals
and regulate the interaction and behaviour among the individuals. However, this may
not be the case always. Institutions may go beyond individuals in a highly democratic
and egalitarian context, where the office bearers of the institution function only as
incumbents of office. However, in a rural social context, where the primordial
loyalties, traditional obligations of kinship and personalities matter more than just
positions of office, it is difficult to think that institutions will always go beyond
individuals to regulate their behaviour and interaction. Therefore, in such
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circumstances, a combination of the institution and its leader as an individual both ,
function as the deciding factor. A strong leadership in Nagiapasi has resulted in
building a strong institution there, whereas the weak and conflicting leadership
structure in K. K. Pur has acted towards decaying of the community institution.
6.3.5. Past Record of Togetherness and Collective Action
Apart from a homogeneous leadership structure there are several other factors
contributing to the success of collective action in the Nagiapasi village. The overall
history of togetherness and we-feeling has played a significant role in this regard.
Though the village has a short history of forest protection, which dates back only to a
decade, different variations of collective action has existed in the village since long.
However, such common occasion to celebrate was found to be missing in the second
village these days. Whatever common occasions have existed in the K. K. Pur village
in the past, they have also been affected by village factionalism and conflict among
leadership groups.
The socio-religious festivals of the village, maintenance of the village temple,
school, club, etc., have played a crucial role in the success of the first village in
collective action. Karrikeswar farm is celebrated every year in the village since long.
Though there have been changes in the way in which the fatm is celebrated over a
period of time, yet the spirit remains the same. Earlier, it was a simple one-day affair,
in which the villagers were worshiping Lord Kartikeya (son of Lord Shiva ill Hindu
mythology). In the evening the villagers were gathering together for chanting and
singing religious songs. The Scheduled Castes were not so much a part of the festival.
The priests were performing the worshiping job on their behalf. They were allowed to
stand outside the temple and collect their offerings after the priest finished
worshiping. But, for the last 15 to 20 years, there has been a tremendous change in the
way of observing the occasion. It has become a three-day occasion now with various
entertainment programmes. The participation of Scheduled Castes has also taken a
new dimension. Though they are not allowed inside the temple still now, yet they
have become an integral part of the entertainment and other programmes. They are
214
also contributing for it and taking some responsibilities47 . This has developed in them
a sense of oneness among them and has fostered a feeling of getting involved in
community affairs.
However, the above description of oneness does not mean that the villagers do
not have any difference of opinion regarding the function, in particular, and other
things in general. Rather, the way in which the ditlerences are overcome becomes
important. Villagers are engaged in various rounds of group discussion before the
festival to mitigate the difference of opinions between different groups. Finally, all the
villagers gather near one evening before the occasion and everybody are allowed to
express his48 voice of dissent. The elderly persons and other leaders try to
compromise the issue if they can. Often, fines are also imposed on families found
guilty on such occasions. Despite all these, if the disagreement still persists, the
villagers try to persuade the discontent party to settle the issue for the sake of the
festival. Usually the disagreements are settled before the festival or otherwise the
disagreeing parties remain silent and participate in the festival keeping their
discontent at the personal level.
Let me now turn to describe why I am depicting such soeio-religious festivals
and what link it has with forest protection. Such festivals have generated a sense of
responsibility towards the community among the individuals. Through occasions like
this the younger generation inculcate the process of acting together for a common
goal from which everybody derives benefits. For every successful group action what
is required is organisation. And one may find the root of the organised body for forest
protection in festivals like this. When the villagers thought of protecting the forest, the
same platform was used for it. In fact, it was not difficult for the villagers to organise
for the purpose of forest protection, as they were already a part of an organised body.
The choice they faced that time was not whether to join the group, rather they had the
option of not joining the group of which they were already members by virtue of their
47 One can also find discrimination in the way in which responsibilities are distributed for the Jatra. While the upper caste people assume important tasks like collecting money, arranging lunch, etc, the Scheduled Castes people are given less important charges like getting fuel wood from forest for cooking, banana leaves for dining, helping in decoration activities, etc.
48 I am using the word 'his', since the village meetings are usually male dominated affairs.
215
birth in the village4Q
• Their calculus at that time was not about the cost of joining the
group, but it was about how expensive it would be not to join. Agrawal (2000) too has
come out with similar findings from his study of Van Panchayats of Kumayun while
describing the potentials of large groups in collective action rejecting the popularly
held notion that only small groups can succeed in such action. The same organisation,
leadership positions and even the meeting ground were used to decide about the rules
of forest use and management in the village.
Secondly, the annual meetings before the festival are also used as a forum to
resolve the conflicts over the issue of forest protection. Such meetings make the job of
forest protection easy in the village. Thus, collective action for the management of
local forest resource in the village does not exist in isolation of other activities of the
village. It is a part of overall village affairs and very well depends upon other
common activities of the village. It is important to note here that such
interdependence and interconnected-ness of various group actions makes the
community management of forests sustainable over a period of time. Such
interdependence reduces the chance of seizing of forest protection committee in the
village. If any dispute arises over the issue of forest protection and if the Forest
Protection Committee fails to resolve it, there is at least another forum to resolve such
conflicts and ensure the sustainability of forest protection.
49 This is in contrast to the popular economic notion that at the time of collect~ve ac~on the ind:ivid~s face the choice of whether to join the group or not and calculate how much mcentlve they WIll get If
they join the group.
216
Chapter VII
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter on summary and conclusion is divided into three sections. The first
section recapitulates the background to the research and brings out the questions with
which the research had been undertaken. The second section presents a summary of
the findings. The third section analyses the observations and links the findings to the
thcoretical and empirical literature. Finally, the chapter highlights the policy relevance
of the research in the broader framework of development and resource management
discourse.
7.1 Recapitulating the Contextual Background
Ever since independence, Indian rural communities have become virtual laboratories
to test several developmental programmes, which were implemented with different
approaches and resulting in varying degrees of success. Grappled with the immediate
economic problems of underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment, the Indian
state planned for rapid economic growth with heavy hand of state, through the
policies of industrialisation and modernisation. For quite a long time, development
was considered only as the capacity of the economy to generate and sustain an
increased annual rate of growth. And economic growth was conceptualised in terms
of capital accumulation, growth of labour force and technological progress, which
were regarded as principal components of economic growth (see, Dube, 1988). The
industrial march of Indian economy got further boost from Nehruvian policy of
economic development, which considered industries and factories as temples of
modem India. This approach to development was strengthened further with research
on modernisation theory, which relied more on state and market, and postulated
modernisation through a powerful state intervention as the only path to development.
This approach had to have several consequences. To begin with, the ever
increasing dominating role of the state in economic development resulted in shrinking
the space of local communities. Development, therefore, became the prerogative of
217
the state, the fruits of which, however, hardly trickled down. The consequences were
also visible in the natural resource sector. Nationalisation and state control of natural
resources were justified in the name of national development and national importance.
Forests and other natural resources were declared as national property, meant for
revenue generation and fulfillment of national interest. And the local interests and
local needs had to be sacrificed in the face of such larger issues. Further, the market
orientation of the modern state also relied on privatisation as another models of
resource use, in the process leaving hardly any space for local communities in such
activities.
Such policies of development and approaches towards natural resources were
bound to fail, owing to their non-representative character. A shift in paradigm at the
global level, therefore, began to emerge from the 1970s. The demonstrated
deticiencies of state directed development and the inability of the market to promote
sustainable use of natural resources, paved the way for local institutions to playa role
in the process. Thus emerged an era of community-based approaches towards
development as well as resource management. In the forestry sector, particularly,
several policies were adopted and resolutions were made from mid 1980s onwards to
involve local communities in protection and management of the forest resources. In
the process, the government of India adopted its Joint Forest Management Policy in
1990, and the same policy, with certain amendments were made applicable to the state
of Orissa in 1993. Keeping these changes at policy level in the background, the
present research has aimed at exploring the community initiatives for local forest
resource management. Emphasis was given to narrate the history of forest
management in the country and in the state of Orissa; and the evolution of community
participation in forest management practices. The dissertation has ... lIrried out an
elaborate discussion of the 'homogeneity - heterogeneity' debate in the collective
action, and their potential to affect the collective action outcomes.
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7.2. Summary of the Findings
7.2.1 History of Forest Management and the Emergence of Community
Initiatives
The review of the forest policies and management practices in our country reveals that
soon after independence, India not only inherited forests over exploited due to two
world wars, railway building network, etc., but also the colonial approach of
commercialisation and state monopoly towards forest resources. The results were
enactment of forest policies and laws that strengthened the state control over forest
resources, marginalised the interests of the local communities and undermined their
dependency upon the resource for livelihood. Such an approach, paradoxically also
coexisted with deforestation and degradation of the forest resources of our country. A
fresh approach emerged in the forestry sector in India during mid 1980s, and the New
Forest Policy of 1988 recognised the needs and demands of local communities in
forest resources. As a corollary, the National loint Forest Management Resolution
was passed in June I, 1990.
The situation in the state of Orissa was similar to that of the country. However,
efforts by the government to involve people in forest management started little early
in Orissa, with the enactment of Orissa Village Forest Rules, 1985; and several other
resolutions to involve local communities in management of reserved and protected
forests in 1988. Finally, in 1993, the state government came with the loint Forest
Management Programme to develop a partnership with the communities for forest
protection and management.
A striking feature about the forestry activities in the state of Orissa was that
the state intervention to involve communities in protection and management of forests
had come much later than the actual efforts by the communities themselves. In certain
regions of Orissa, communities had already demonstrated considerable potential to
manage their local resources sustainably much before the government policies to
involve them in such activities. The analysis highlighted several factors for such an
evolution of community initiative in forestry activities in Orissa. Among other factors,
degradation oflocal forest resources and the consequent livelihood insecurities arising
219
out of it, existence of prior institutional arrangements at the community level to look
after common village affairs, loose and complex forest rules, active effort by several
leading NGOs, etc., comprised the justification for the evolution of community
initiatives in the forestry activities in Orissa. Thus, the analysis considered
government policies in Orissa to involve local people in forest protection as an
attempt to recognise and give an official shape to the efforts of these local
communities.
The analysis has pointed out several challenges that community's involvement
in forestry in Orissa faces today. To begin with, there seems to exist institutional
ambiguity between those in which the community is a partner along with the state
government under its JFM programme and the other in which communities
themselves have come forward to protect their local resources, and are not partners of
the state forest department. Secondly, the unclear legal status of JFM committees
makes the situation more critical. Further, the dominating and authoritarian attitude of
the forest bureaucracy also creates bottleneck for the successful functioning of JFM in
the state.
7.2.2 Heterogeneities and Their Impact upon Capabilities of Communities for
Collective Action
Moving away from the analysis of government policies and historical aspects of forest
management, Chapter V has analysed the empirical data from the two villages and has
explored the role of heterogeneity in affecting collective action. Four different types
of heterogeneity were identified: Socio-political heterogeneity, resource
heterogeneity, interest heterogeneity, and political heterogeneity. The field data from
the two villages were structured according to the above mentioned ones. It was
observed that socio-cultural heterogeneity and resource heterogeneity coincided with
each other. Two different kinds of interest heterogeneity were observed in the study
villages: horizontal differences and vertical differences in forest use. Horizontal
differences pointed out interests in several different types of forest use by the
members of the community in two villages, without involving any hierarchy of scale
among them. The study identified four such different forest user groups in the two
villages, namely, the shepherds, the basket-weaving Scheduled Castes, the non-timber
forest produce colleting tribal households, and the agrarian households who depend
220
upon the forest for small timber for making agricultural equipments. Though these
different interests in the forest did not involve any hierarchy, yet, they clashed with
each other on occasions. The vertical differences in the forest explored the degrees of
dependency upon forest for two most important forest uses: fuel wood and fodder.
Based upon the vertical and horizontal differences, three different types of forest use
and dependency were identified: a) high dependency, where dependency was directly
related to the livelihood; b) moderate dependency, where dependency served as a
supplement to the livelihood; and, c) low dependency, where the livelihood existed
independent of forest use and dependency.
To assess the political heterogeneity, the authority structure, agreement over
leadership and the decision-making arrangements were taken into consideration. The
villagers were asked about the leadership traits that they expect from their leader and
the actual presence of those traits in their leaders. While members from both the
village communities agreed upon the expected leadership traits, they varied on actual
presence of those traits in their leaders. The leadership groups in the second village,
which was a failure in local resource management, could not match with the
expectations of their community members. On the contrary, the members of the first
village, where collective action has been a successful one, were quite content with the
performance of their leaders and opined that their leaders possessed the expected
traits. Besides, the overall villager factionalism was also observed to have an
understanding of the political heterogeneity in both the villages.
It was observed that both the villages exhibited the first three types of
heterogeneity, i.e., socia-cultural, resource and interest heterogeneity. However,
political heterogeneity in terms of disagreement over leadership and decision-making
was observed only in the failed village.
The thesis has also examined the impact of heterogeneity on resource
dependency, collective action and management outcomes. The socia-cultural and
resource heterogeneity have significantly affected the resource dependency patterns in
both the villages. For example, fuel wood collection from the forest was directly
related to the households' position in caste hierarchy and possession of critical
221
resource such as land. These two types of heterogeneity generated differences of
interest in the forest, and thereby differential use of the same.
To study the impact of heterogeneity on collective action and management
outcomes, an attempt was made to see how different sources of heterogeneity affected
provisioning as well as appropriation of the resource. Socio-cultural heterogeneity
affected provisioning of the resource by generative differences in the commitment to
the designcd rules of the institution. Commitment to rules became a problem, since
different socio-economic groups behaved differently towards the rules. Interest
heterogeneity also played its (negative) role in showing commitment to rules.
Different forest user groups showed non-commitment at different points of time.
Heterogeneities also created problems for the appropriation of the resource.
Differential approach to rules created a situation of mistrust among different forcst
user groups. Therefore, heterogeneities not only affected the process of collective
action directly by differential treatment to rules, but also they affected indirectly by
hampering 'trust" and 'assurance' among different forest user groups. Problems of
commitment created by these sources of heterogeneity could have been solved with a
strong monitoring system. However, political heterogeneity contributed towards
hampering the monitoring process. Political heterogeneity affected collective action
initiative by coming in the way of a) crafting of the institution, b) designing of the
rules to counter provision and appropriation problems, c) commitment and monitoring
of the rules, and finally, the management outcomes in terms of availability and
sustainability of the resource.
The analysis has tried to find a linkage between heterogeneity, resource
dependency and successful collective action in the context of natural resource
management. It was observed that socio-cultural and resource (economic)
heterogeneity are always inter-related - one generates the other, and in the process is
generated by the other. And the combination of these two produces a definite pattern
of forest dependency. The empirical evidences suggest how these two sources of
heterogeneity affected the forest use pattern in both the villages. However, such
capacity to affect the collective action process is not universal. Out of the two villages
taken for study, collective action efforts were observed to be affected only in one (K.
K. Pur) by these two sources of heterogeneity. In other words, intra-community
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heterogeneity necessarily generates differential dependency, but differential
dependency does not always generate differential management outcomes.
7.2.3. Successful Collective Action and the Non-Negative Role of Heterogeneity
Notwithstanding the existing heterogeneities in the two communities, and their
potential to affect resource use pattern and dependency in both communities;
collective action for local resource management was observed to be a success in one
village. Such an observation challenges the established notion in common property
literature that homogeneity of the community forms a pre-condition for success in
collective action. In Chapter VI, I have attempted to discuss the successful effort of
Nagiapasi village for local forest protection and have explained the reasons behind
such success. Collective action was regarded as a process in the successful village,
and the community achieved success in it by a) crafting robust institutional
arrangements through strong rules and monitoring systems, and b) establishing
'common property' regimes out of an 'open access' through reshuffling the property
rights arrangements.
The factors that accounted for such successful institutional performance were
efficient leadership, decision-making arrangements and management procedures that
allowed for negotiation and bargaining, previous communitarian approach of the
village, etc. In the newly established management regime, the state retained the
ownership rights of the resource system (resource stock) and sharcd the decision
making rights with the communities. However, when it came to resource units
(resource flow), the community enjoyed all three property rights, namely, use,
ownership and decision-making. And such rights over the resources units of the
community were observed to be both defacto and dejure in nature.
The successful outcome of the collective action was analysed taking into
consideration a) the forest regeneration, b) availability of fuelwood, fodder and other
non-timber forest produces, and c) the time and distance covered in the collection of
these produces. Increase in the availability of fuel wood and fodder to the community
members in was considered to be one of the important criteria of success for
Nagiapasi. Forest protection committee of the village had designed efficient rules for
223
restricted use of the resource, and by doing so, had, in tum, shown its commitments
towards sustainability of the resource.
The analysis of the success of collective action in one village (Nagiapasi) -
characterized by 'non-negative' aspects of heterogeneity - took into consideration
several causative factors. The community in Nagiapasi, despite its heterogeneity, had
several factors enabling collective action. First, the leadership in the village was quite
strong. The leaders could command respect and compliance from all sections of the
community. Second, and following from the role of leadership, was the creation and
functioning of a robust institution, namely, Nagiapasi Vana Samrakshyana Samiti
(VSS). This institution was capable of ensuring a fair and uniform commitment from
all direct and indirect stakeholders, namely, the shepherds and basket weavers, who
were completely dependent upon forest for their livelihood, and the other agrarian
upper and middle caste households, who supplemented their livelihood by depending
upon the forest. The rules and procedures too were quite transparent, and such that
there was little scope for breaking them. Thirdly, as evident from the two above, there
prevailed a near-perfect nexus between leadership and the institution. Even after
several years of its formation, the institution has had a smooth functioning, with the
leaders upholding the values and commitment for forest protection in the village.
7.3. Discussion of the Findings
The analysis of the data raIses several issues for discussion. As is evident, the
leadership structure - or the 'critical mass' as [ call it - playa crucial role in
making collective action successful or otherwise. The role of he 'critical mass' in
generating the idea of forest protection, mobilisation of the people for the purpose,
and giving the process an efficient direction, etc., account for the success in any
collective action endeavour.
Much of the literatures, both theoretical and empirical, however, have pointed
out towards 'perceived benefits' from the resource as important incentive to
participate in collective action efforts. While saying so, they emphasise the rational
behaviour of community members and take recourse to game theoretical approach so
224
as to substantiate the claim. The game theoretic approach anal yses the rational
decisions of individuals, where decisions are taken comparing contributions for the
action and the perceived benefits from it. In such a situation, if the members realize
that their 'perceived benefits' from participation in the action would be greater than
contributions, they come forward to participate in the collective action. Having said
that, the analysis of the study tend to take a different direction and highlight the role
of the 'critical mass', which possesses equal potential to make people understand as
wel1 as misunderstand those 'benefits'. The analysis has pointed out how the real
interests of the stakeholders are often manipulated, who, therefore, fail to perceive
any interest from coordinated action.
The 'critical mass' does possess the potential to manipulate the interest of
the community members to such an extent that their real interest often gets merged
with those of the critical mass. The empirical observations from the failure village of
our study substantiate such a point. Recapitulate the factional politics of the failure
vil1age, and its role in collective action process for forest management: when there
was a change in leadership in the K. K. Pur Vil1age Forest Protection Committee, the
ex-president, who incidentally had initiated such a process in the village in the
beginning, became passive towards forest protection measures, and most importantly,
persuaded his fol1owers to keep themselves away from such a committee. A few years
back, the same group had taken great interest in establishing the community
institution, and had mobilized people to join the institution to receive future benefits
out of it. However, when the leader backed off from the process, so did his followers,
without rationally thinking what they would have received from forest protection, if
they had worked for it. The community members in such a case failed to perceive
their future benefits from forest protection, and did not join in the col1ective action.
The literature on the subject while highlighting the rational decision derived out of
perceived future benefits, however, fails to understand the mobilizing and/or
manipulating role ofthe critical mass in the process.
Contrary to the case of manipulation, the observations of the successful village
(Nagiapasi) depict how the village leader and president of the Forest Protection
Committee mobilized the interests of the community members, and directed the
community towards success in forest protection. The analysis of the study pointed out
225
that the role of 'critical mass' in making pcople realize, and therefore, perceive the
future benefits from collective action should not to be undermined while approaching
a question like what promotes participation in a collective action situation. In a
successful case, the critical mass mobilizes the people to establish a stake in the future
benefits, as a result of which they are expected to come to a bargaining or negotiation,
where they contribute something and expect to enjoy some benefits at the end. Once
the stakes are clear, people despite having differences among them, become ready for
a negotiation or bargaining for collective action.
A 'positive critical mass' in the context of collective action acts as the
visionary, who first foresee the vision, and then whose job is to share that vision with
the community. It should always be prepared to accept new ideas and values, which
could bring benefits to the general members of the community. Such a position of
critical mass makes it respectable, as well as acceptable, by the rest of the community.
Voluntarism, which is very much central to any collective action efforts, turns into a
popular norm in the community, if the critical mass induces and inculcate it in the
minds of the members of the community. It can do so by pointing out the future, but
hidden benefits of voluntarism. On the contrary, if the critical mass turns 'negative'
and/or divided among themselves, such voluntarism fail to become a nonn in the
community. In the situation of a divided critical mass, even if a section of it may
begin collective action by mobilizing people, but may not sustain it in the presence of
constant disorientation and manipulation of interests of the members of the
community by the other faction.
The second issue, which needs further discussion, is about the presence or
absence of institution. In their efforts to establish a precondition for successful
collective action, the literature emphasizes much on the size and social composition of
the community, and smallness of the community and its homogeneous characteristics.
Notwithstanding this, some scholars also point out towards non-negative role of
heterogeneity. Heterogeneity obviously stands in the way of successful collective
action and creates challenges for it. In such a situation, the presence or absence of
strong institutional mechanisms is of great importance. The findings of the present
study have also pointed out the significance of institutions in making the collective
efforts successful. The scholarly works, which have subscribed to the institutional
226
thinking, however, try to conceptualise institutions in a objective manner, where the
institution seems to exist outside the flesh and blood of the community, and are thus
expected to go above individuals and control their behaviours. While widely
acknowledging the crucial role that the institutions play in the success of any
collective action, the analysis of the present study, however, differ from such a
conceptualization of institution.
Any analysis of institution designed for collective action for local resource
management must highlight the social embeddedness of the institution. The
community institutions, whether created for a particular purpose or evolved, are
always embedded in the social structure of the community, and therefore, do not
function independent of it. The phenomenon of independent institutions operative
beyond social structure and or social relations may become a possibility in a
indi vidualistic, impersonal and modem context, where the leader of the institution
functions only as the incumbent of the office, and interacts with members as someone
who is only responsible to fulfill the obligations of the office. However, in a
traditional and rural community, that we have in India, where the leader has to fulfill
several other obligations to the members than just that of a president of the Village
Forest Protection Committee, such a phenomenon of 'independent institutions'
becomes an ambiguous one. One may recall the Weberian distinction of 'legal
rational authority' and 'traditional authority' to understand the above point explicitly.
This social embeddedness of the institution creates a space for the 'critical
mass' to playa role in contributing towards either success or failure of the institution.
'Wnen the critical mass mobilizes people and work towards the establishment and
maintenance of the institution, the community exhibits a successful institutional
performance and the collective action achieves success in the process. The opposite
also holds true, as is evident from the empirical observation of the failure village,
where the critical mass disoriented people for collective action and came in the way of
successful institutional performance.
227
7.4. Concluding Remarks
The findings of the study prompt us to acknowledge that the success of a community
in collective action for local resource management is not to be located in its social
composition in terms of homogeneity or heterogeneity. Communities with sharp
internal differentiations do possess the similar potential to manage resources as the
homogeneous ones. However, since collective action requires consensus to be built
over the issue of compliance to the designed rules, there should be some mechanism
to negotiate the ditTerences and reduce the negative impacts of heterogeneity.
As evident from the findings of the study, what is most important from
resource management perspective is the existence of a 'positive critical mass' and
'strong institutional arrangements', which can design rules, ensure commitment from
the community members and carry out effective monitoring to reduce the possibilities
of breach of such rules. For any success in resource management, it is required that
the community and the institution designed for the purpose should always interact,
and move in a back and forth manner. For example, once the institution designs rules
for the purpose of forest use and management, it then becomes the responsibility of
the community to react towards those rules by way of showing commitment to them;
and again the institution is required to monitor those commitments. Therefore, a
community may be heterogeneous and different in other respects, but its members
should try to negotiate those di fferences and show consensus to those rules and have a
common approach towards them.
A challenge, therefore, before any heterogeneous community protecting its
local resources is how to build that consensus despite several other sources of
differences that divide them apart. In such a case, the potential of the existing
mechanism to discuss the differences, negotiate and re-negotiate them becomes
important. That existing mechanism may be the traditional leadership structures,
patron-client relations of rural communities, newly emerging and energetic youth
associations or may be any democratically elected political structure. Therefore, if a
community possesses such mechanisms, which can negotiate the differences and build
consensus, then that community has the potential to succeed in collective action
initiatives despite intra-group heterogeneities. To put it precisely, while searching for
pre-requisites for successful collective action for resource management, it is not
228
important to judge whether a community is homogeneous or not; rather it becomes
important to see whether that community has the common platform to negotiate
ditTerentials and overcome problems of heterogeneity. Heterogeneity, therefore,
creates a challenge for successful collective action, which can be overcome with a
positive critical mass and/or committed leadership, strong institutional arrangements,
and with a certain past record of consensus building and togetherness.
In conclusion, it is worthy to emphasise some of the practical relevance of the
research. The findings portrayed by the research become significant in the wake of
most recent trends in the forest policies of a number of countries that are attempting to
take resort to the community-based conservation, in an effort to depart from the
centralised exclusionary policies that have dominated for quite a long period of time,
and which now seem to have failed. These new Joint Forest Management plans
constitute a break from the colonial policies that had continued in our country with
little change, even after independence. However, without local mechanisms to build
consensus and proper institutional arrangements to design management practices, it
seems unlikely that such proposed cooperation and partnership between state and
local communities will be fruitful.
From a policy perspective, the state, therefore, should vigorously work
towards strengthening the communities institutionally and building capacity in them
to breed suitable institutions and leadership, before implementing any policies of
community-based resource management with or without channeling any fund for
such. Further, such institution building and strengthening of rural communities not to
be understood as forming committees only in government records by taking a few
community members including women, sometimes even without visiting the location.
As a first step, the forest bureaucracy should be sensitised towards the needs,
requirements and livelihood options of rural communities; and should be oriented
towards the global paradigm shift In approaches towards development,
democratisation and resourcc management. Finally, the presence of a vigilant, active
and progressive civil society becomes most crucial, implying that through
enhancement of education and mass awareness-building campaigns, the communities
come to know their rights as well as feel empowered to organize, and build
institutional arrangements required for successful and sustainable resource
management.
229
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