Communication Strategies for Rural Development - A Case Study of the Use of Campaigns in Lesotho

8/12/2019 Communication Strategies for Rural Development - A Case Study of the Use of Campaigns in Lesotho

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Communication strategies for rural

development: a case study of the use of

campaigns in Lesotho

Produced by:Natural Resources Management and Environment Department.

Author: Gary ColdevinYear:1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Preface

Communication strategies for rural development

Background

Overview of Campaigns Used in the Third-World

A methodology for campaign design

Setting the framework for multi-channel campaigns in Lesotho

The National Setting

The Agricultural Information Service (AIS)

FAO Assistance in Designing, Implementing, Monitoring, and

Evaluating Multi-Channel Communication Campaigns

Campaign exercise I - increasing maize production, reducing post-harvest losses
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Setting the Objectives and Target Area

Conducting the Baseline Survey

Designing the Campaign Strategy

Production of Materials and Campaign Delivery

Field Evaluation Procedures

Results

Campaign exercise II - increasing sorghum production, reducing post-harvest losses

Setting the Objectives

Strategy Development

The Campaign in Action

Post-Campaign Impact Survey

Results

Lessons learned as feed-forward for new campaigns

References

Appendix I

Appendix II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author, who is Dr. Gary Coldevin of Concordia University, Montreal, wishes toacknowledge and commend the ground breaking efforts in mounting communicationcampaigns undertaken by the Lesotho Agriculture Information Service, under theguidance of the Director of Field Services, within the Ministry of Agriculture,Cooperatives and Marketing. A sincere note of appreciation is also extended toHeadquarters staff of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations(FAO) involved for their support, advice and guidance as the projects were implemented.

Any errors in this Case Study are the author's responsibility and the opinions expressed init are his; they do not necessarily reflect those of FAO.

PREFACE

This case study, like others in the series produced by the Development SupportCommunication (DSC) Branch of FAO's Information Division, is intended to shed lighton outstanding examples concerning the use of communication to support rural
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development. In this instance the setting is Lesotho, a small, rugged, mountainouscountry in southern Africa, completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Thecase study per se derives from two FAO/ Technical Cooperation Programme projects(TCPs) carried out by the DSC Branch over a period of eighteen months, during 1987 and1988. The overriding goal beginning in the first TOP and carrying on into the second was

to prepare staff of the Agricultural Information Service (AIS) to design, implement, andevaluate multi-channel communication campaigns, one of the most effective strategies inthe arsenal of DSC delivery mechanisms.

In order to set a framework for the activities carried out in the combined projects, thismonograph first examines the types of communication strategies used in ruraldevelopment, and, in particular, the role of campaigns as catalysts to spur action in areasof high development priority. A sweep is then made of the range of campaigns used in avariety of Third-World development settings as background to outlining the DSC processmodel used in the Lesotho and other FAO projects. A description follows of the day-to-

day experiences encountered as the normally headquarters-based AIS staff took to thefield to conduct media presentations at the village level. Particular emphasis is given tothe results of the evaluations carried out before and after each exercise in terms of levelsof information gain and changes toward adopting recommended practices. Finally, thecampaign methodology used is reexamined in terms of where weaknesses might bestrengthened and successes underscored in the continuing quest to provide transferablelessons to other developing countries planning or already undertaking similarcommunication activities. The document is directed at project planners and government-level decision makers with the aim of describing, and promoting, this relatively new andexciting strategy for improving the lives of rural people.

COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

BACKGROUND

During the past two decades the purposeful application of media and communicationsupport has assumed an increasingly important role in many facets of rural development.Much of it has been subsumed under the larger movement normally referred to asDevelopment Support Communication (DSC), or more recently, DevelopmentCommunication. Broadly defined by the U.S. AID, the process refers to "The applicationof existing communication technologies and media to the problems of development"

(AID, 1984, p. i). FAO more precisely delimits DSC as"The systematic utilisation ofappropriate communication channels and techniques to Increase people's

participation In development and to Inform, motivate, and train rural populations,

mainly at the grassroots level"(Coldevin, 1987, p. 4). DSC sections are currently foundin most international development agencies (although they may be subsumed underdifferent titles), with spheres of project support ranging across agriculture, forestry,


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fisheries, health, nutrition and population activities, to women in development andfunctional literacy.

The idea of using media to assist Third-World development grew out of relativelyconsistent research findings demonstrating that focussed, receiver oriented

communication strategies could play a significant role in accelerating the rate oftechnology transfer, whether it be process or product - or both. Thus, as communicationtechnologies improved, became easier to use, and costs lowered, broadcasting and avariety of "small media" were increasingly harnessed to reach people at the village level.Prior to this, the main vehicle for linking scientific advances in agriculture, health andnutrition between researchers and rural adopters was the extension worker. Historically,however, their singular efforts have been limited by the thin spread of front line agentsavailable in relation to the volume of people requiring information and training.Transportation difficulties have also tended to impede their outreach. In addition,effective communication with predominantly illiterate farmers was hampered by poor

training in face-to-face communication techniques. Against this background, the use ofmedia could accelerate awareness of, and adoption rates toward, recommendedtechnologies through targeted information, motivational messages and training.

Nowadays in rural development, it is common to talk about media categorieswhich aretaken to include broadcast(television and especially radio), group (video, tape-slides,sound film-strips, audio-cassettes, overhead projections, flip-charts, posters, pamphlets,and leaflets; as well, traditional folk media such as puppets and live-theatre may beincluded), and Interpersonalchannels(community leaders, contact farmers, extensionworkers). And DSC delivery strategies have been hierarchically ranked, in terms of

complexity, from interpersonal communicationthrough radioand televisionbroadcasting, and group media, to multi-channel campaigns. This ranking alsosubsumes the notion that each strategy can be made more effective by incorporating thatwhich precedes it. Radio broadcasts, for example, have much more impact if they arebackstopped with authoritative, village based interpersonal sources, and group media canbenefit from both radio and interpersonal communication support. Well designedcommunication campaigns usually involve broadcasting, village based group media, andintensively trained field workers. The general rule of thumb emerging from two decadesof field experience is to use multiple channels, wherever possible, so that each mediumreinforces and multiplies the importance of the others in an integrated network.

While there is no proven formula for selecting media for rural development, certainguidelines have emerged from practice. We know for instance that radio is particularlygood at reaching a mass audience, quickly, with simple messages; print media likeposters and pamphlets are good reminders or reinforcers of broadcasts, and interpersonalsources who provide opportunities for discussing information inputs are most useful foradding credibility to media content, shifting attitudes and prompting behavioural practicechanges. Group media combinations have proven strikingly productive at the grassroots


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level. The advantage of this strategy is the establishment of a two-way flow ofinformation with an audience and the possibility for immediate feedback as thepresentation unfolds. Central points can be reemphasized, remedial information providedwhere needed, and discussions started with a view toward putting the recommendedchanges into practice. Particularly effective use has been made of small format video

combined with simple, well illustrated pamphlets and field worker support for directtraining of farmers and participatory community development (Fraser, 1987a; 1987b).

As mentioned earlier, all delivery strategies come to bear in the design of communicationcampaigns. In contrast to its founding "members" comprising field workers,broadcasting, and group media - which would normally function as part of an ongoingdevelopment support methodology - campaigns are usually carried out at a national orregional level, extend over a short time period, focus upon a specific topic of highdevelopment priority, and have a limited set of objectives. Most take advantage of multi-media impact and intensively trained extensionists. Other devices such as jackets, and T-

shirts bearing campaign symbols are sometimes added. Often these campaigns are kickedoff by the President or Prime Minister of the country.

The primary purpose of most campaigns is to stimulate action on problems requiringshort-term or simple solutions which in turn often serve as the thin-end of the wedgetoward embarking on broader, long term development goals. As such, they are normallyinformation-intense with messages being repeated over and over in thigh frequency"advertising fashion, using a diversity of channel formats from radio spots and jingles tofield worker demonstrations. An important feature of the campaign is to ensure that itproceeds hand in glove with the availability of field inputs associated with the

technological product or process being advocated. Without this essential component, notonly will the credibility of an on-going campaign be damaged, but in all likelihoodattitudes to regular rural communication services will be affected as well.

OVERVIEW OF CAMPAIGNS USED IN THE THIRD-WORLD

Campaigns have been used in virtually every facet of rural development. All of the betterreported projects have used radio as the primary mass medium. Among the more strikingnon-agricultural examples occurring during the late 60's and 70's have been the nutritioncampaigns in Nicaragua, Tunisia, the Philippines and Tanzania, breast feeding inTrinidad and Tobago, family planning in Colombia, Honduras, Iran, Pakistan and

Taiwan, and health in Tanzania (American Public Health Association, 1982). Currently,probably the most frequent application of this DSC delivery strategy is carried out byUNICEF in creating awareness of, and motivation to participate in, its Global ChildImmunization Programmes.

Certainly among the best documented campaign examples were those launched inTanzania during the 70's, namely, the 1973 health campaign, Man is Health, which ran


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for a 12 week period, and the 1975 nutrition campaign, Food Is Life, which extendedover an 18 week period (for an extensive description and analysis of these campaigns seeColdevin, 1979; and Hall and Dodds, 1978). Both campaigns, conducted on a nationallevel, were built around organized, village-based study groups. About 70 000 suchgroups, with 15 people in each, were targeted in the first campaign and 75 000 in the

second. Basic elements included a weekly half-hour radio broadcast, an accompanyingtext book with a specific chapter reinforcing each radio lesson, and trained group leaderssupplied with study guide manuals. Radio was also used in a variety of ways toencourage enrolment. Songs written especially for the campaigns were promoted (onewritten for the health campaign quickly climbed to the top ten in the national hit parade),and catchy commercials were aired frequently. Several speeches were carried by thePrime Minister calling for full participation. Additional promotion materials includedposters, press releases, and T-shirts and dresses bearing the campaign logos.

The target for the first campaign was one million participants, and 1.5 million for the

second. Both campaigns exceeded these targets with some 2 million initially showing upfor the sessions. As a result, a number of problems arose which were not initiallyforeseen. Chief among these were the supplies of both study texts and group leadermanuals; and because of the burgeoning numbers, some of the group leaders which hadto be quickly pressed into service were inadequately trained. Some critics have alsoquestioned the length of each campaign as being too short to expect many behaviouralchanges, with the length of time between campaigns, i.e., two years, dissipating theeffects of one before the next began. And while positive results were recorded during thefirst campaign, in terms of knowledge of causes and prevention of common diseases andimprovement in some health practices, no Before-after' impact evaluation studies were

conducted in the second. The more compelling legacies of these campaigns thus rested inthe guidelines they provided for orchestrating action on a national level to improve thequality of rural life, and lessons for doing it better.

A number of successful campaigns have also been undertaken in agriculture. Adhikaryaand Posamentier (1987) for example, documented a rat control campaign in Bangladeshduring 1983 which raised the adoption of rat control practices among targeted wheatfarmers from 10 to 32%, resulting in an average harvest gain of 54 kg/hectare in treatedfields. Perhaps the best known campaign, however, was that associated with the"Masagana 99" project in the Philippines during 1973 which catapulted the countrytoward adopting high yielding rice cultivation. "Masagana" translates as bountiful harvest

with "99" referring to the project objective of achieving 99 sacks (50 kilos per sack) ofunmilled rice per hectare.

The project was built around three main elements: 1) availability of high yielding seeds,fertilisers, and a simplified 16 step cultivation process; 2) credit assistance; and 3) amulti-channel mass information campaign extending over three months. The channel mixincluded radio broadcasting, a variety of print (bulletins, newspaper stories and posters),


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and intensively trained farm technologists in the 16 step methodology of rice production.Radio was used in three ways during the media intensive portion of the campaign toprovide: a) motivation (jingles and spot messages were broadcast up to 20 times per day);b) information (daily 30 minute farm programme); and c) instruction (short courses wereoffered through the existing Farmers' University of the Air; registrants received printed

materials to use with the broadcasts). In addition, television was used to kick off thecampaign and to report on its progress. After completion of the campaign, the daily farmprogrammes were intended to provide follow-up reinforcement.

By 1973, as a result of particularly poor harvests in the two prior years, the Philippineshad to import a substantial part of its rice supplies to meet national requirements.Following the campaign in 1974, rice yields had increased by 28%, and by 1976 a 40%rise was registered over 1973 levels. By 1977 national requirements were more than metand the country began exporting its excess harvest. The project was later to be criticised,principally because of farmers' low repayment of loans (Rosario-Braid, 1983). Overall,

however, "Masagana 99" was declared a considerable success (Sison, 1985), one inwhich the multi-media campaign played a significant role.

A final example which should be mentioned in this section is a recent FAO supportedcampaign carried out in Sierra Leone during 1984 (Coldevin, 1986). Following a baselinesurvey which assessed information levels, perceived information needs, and media accessamong a sampling of the intended farmer target audience, an information campaign wasbuilt around the urgent priority to expand rice production through increased cultivation ofswamp farms. The two month campaign, which was carried out by the AgriculturalCommunication Unit, involved a mix of dedicated radio broadcasts and village based

slide-tape presentations, supplemented by posters and pamphlets. Extension workersfielded questions during the group media presentations.

Post-campaign results showed that, on average, farmers involved in the exercise hadincreased their knowledge levels by almost 60% over baseline scores. The highest gainswere noted among solely dryland, or non-rice farmers whose after-campaign scores werethree times higher (307%) than baseline levels. There was also a significant, positive shiftin their declared intention to develop a swamp rice operation. An additional interestingfinding was that, overall, farmers who tuned in regularly to the campaign radiobroadcasts exhibited almost twice the amount of information gained when compared withsporadic listeners. Perhaps most important, the project aptly demonstrated the ability of a

regularly functioning, agricultural media unit to carry out an effective multi-channelcommunication campaign based upon expressed information needs of the target audience.

A METHODOLOGY FOR CAMPAIGN DESIGN

In addition to the success rates associated with technology transfer, a positivecontribution of previous projects has been in the continual refinement of a methodology


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for planning, implementing and evaluating development support communication. The"learning by doing" approach has currently evolved into a comprehensive DSC ProcessModel developed by FAO during 1987 which, while being flexible enough toaccommodate most types of Rural communication activities, is particularly appropriatefor multi-media campaigns. Broken down into its essential elements, the systematic

approach comprises four stages as follows:

1. Needs assessment / information gathering

Determine key development priorities through field surveys, community consensus,interviews with field specialists and subject matter specialists; assess media channelsavailable to potential target groups; ascertain whether technology transfer inputs arereadily available.

2. Decision making / strategy development

Prioritise needs, select most important and establish development or project objectives tobe addressed; identify target groups, carry out baseline knowledge, attitudes, practices(KAP) survey, conduct focus group sessions, set specific communication campaignobjectives, determine multi-media mix and message design strategies.

3. Implementation

Draw up action plan, produce and field test samples of media materials, revise andfinalise materials, train field staff in content and use of materials, distribute materials, andmonitor campaign as it unfolds.

4. Evaluation

Carry out small scale field evaluations at strategic points during campaign to suggestwhere "in-course" changes may be warranted; conduct full scale post-campaign impactevaluation survey and use as feed-forward for future campaigns.

The components of the model were initially tested in Sierra Leone and formed the basisfor the series of campaigns in Lesotho. Its applicability is intended to range across avariety of rural development themes within agriculture, fisheries and forestry as well as

several FAO executed projects for UNFPA which involve information/communicationfor population activities.

An important point to be stressed in the model is that it begins with a field generated,"bottom-up" needs analysis with potential target beneficiaries; setting specificdevelopment or project goals is thus made on the basis of direct input from those whowill be directly involved. The implicit understanding here is that communication support


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is most effective when it is included as part of early project planning, rather than beingdrawn into the operation as an Add feature at some point during the implementationphase. Formulating specific goals on the basis of information about people's real needs,and building in receiver oriented communication as a project unfolds, are proveningredients in technology transfer success stories. In this participative process, rural

people become not only recipients, but partners in development.

The most difficult, and at the same time one of the most important of all activities in thecommunication support process, is the target audience analysis (KAP or knowledge-attitudespractices indices; literacy levels; access to, use of, and preferred communicationchannels) since this serves both production and training objectives. At the outset it setsthe baseline for establishing "success indicators" and later validation of the project'sachievements. It also provides valuable guidelines for initial production and pre-testing ofmaterials in terms of print and visual literacy levels; the choice of medium or mediacombination which is likely to produce the best results; and the identification of weak

levels of knowledge, negative attitudes, and inappropriate practices. Briefing or trainingsessions for field workers can also be focussed on real information needs and specificcharacteristics of the intended target audiences, rather than formulating workshop goalsand contents based upon the best judgements of an urban planning team. As the campaignunfolds, monitoring and small scale field evaluations can accurately point to whereemphasis should be redirected, or where content units need reinforcement. Finally, post-campaign impact evaluations can focus on both quantitative and qualitative results forcomparison with before-campaign or baseline data, and as such, function as accurate"feedforward" for sustaining the effects of a given campaign, or planning for carrying outnew ones.

The campaign methodology advocated by FAO also includes both a "Management Plan"and a "Staff Training Plan" . Reference will be made to these components in describingthe Lesotho campaigns, but our main focus will be on the DSC Process Model as it wasapplied over the 18 months of the case study.

(Appendix I includes a more detailed summary of the Process Model as backgroundreference for DSC practitioners.)

SETTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS IN

LESOTHO

THE NATIONAL SETTING

Because of its geographical position and mountainous features, the Kingdom of Lesothohas attracted a number of colourful descriptors. It is not unusual, for example, to hear ofit referred to as "The Switzerland of Africa", or "The Mountain Kingdom". Certainly forthe first time visitor arriving during the winter months, well-travelled Africa hand that he


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or she might be, the initial impression of snow-capped mountains in a tropical continentis awe-inspiring; and even after some time the feeling persists that, aside from the racialmakeup of its people and indigenous language, one could as easily be high in the Andesin South America. Lesotho is also affectionately known as "The Roof of Africa" or "TheKingdom in the Sky" because of its spectacular height above sea level. Indeed, it has the

distinction of being not only the highest country in Africa, but in the whole world for itslowest point is higher than the lowest point of any other country. Its entire land mass isover 1 388 metres above sea level.

Lesotho was established as a nation by King Moshoeshoe the Great in 1857, largely as aresult of his leading a large portion of the Basutho people away from numericallysuperior, warring Southern African tribes into the environmentally inhospitable, but moreeasily protected territory.

Approximately 20 years later, as a result of increasing pressure from white South African

settlers, overtures made to Queen Victoria were favourably received such that the BritishCrown Colony of Basutoland was created in 1868. Masenu became the capital in 1869,one year after the British assumed responsibility for the administration and protection ofthe country. The Kingdom of Lesotho was created when the country came toindependence in 1966, initially functioning under the aegis of a Westminster styleparliamentary constitution. Currently, the country is governed by a national assemblyunder the leadership of a Military Council.

The land left to the descendants of the followers of Moshoeshoe I consists largely of arange of mountains, the "Malutis", which occupy over two-thirds of the country. Thefoothills descend to a narrow plateau along the western border of the country andcomprise most of the 13% of land suitable for cultivation. Only a small portion of a,however, is good farming land and severe erosion over the years has reduced the amountof productive soil even further. All land in Lesotho has continued to remain the propertyof the nation, held in trust by the Head of State - currently King Moshoeshoe II - and onlythe right to use it is granted to individuals. Typically, a male head of household wouldhave entitlement to a given number of plots for life, after which it is passed down to hisheirs. Being allocated a piece of land was formerly considered a right but with growingpopulation pressures, coupled with erosion estimated to be depleting up to 2% of arableland each year, there is simply not enough to go around. Indeed, the proportion of ruralhouseholds without land steadily increased from 1~2.7% in 1970 to 25.4% in 1986

(Ministry of Agriculture, 1987). This doubling of Endlessness has taken place in thecontext of a country where almost 85% of its citizenry is rural based, where currentannual population increases are registered at 2.8%, and where the estimated 1990population of 1.8 million people will double in 24 years (Haub & Kent, 1990).

THE AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SERVICE (AIS)


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The AIS began as operations during the mid-1960's and like many of its sister agencies inAfrica initially functioned as a public relations service for the Ministry, with mediadistribution primarily confined to press releases, the public radio service, and somemobile film showings. From rather modest beginnings, it currently offers a wide range ofinformation services. The staff component of about 40 people operates under the

direction of the Chief Information Officer in eight sections comprising radiobroadcasting, audio-vi-qua, aids, press and publications, graphics, library, stores,technical/maintenance, and accounts and administration. The variety of visual and printmaterials produced by the service encompasses posters, slide presentations, photographs,handouts, flyers, flip-charts, and a quarterly magazine. Small format video has also beenrecently added to the roster of media capability. By far the largest activity of AIS,however, is in radio production. Operating under the banner of "Re Bitsa Lehoai" orCalling All Farmers", eleven programmes per week are broadcast for a total of 210minutes of air time. The regular schedule includes a Monday through Saturday15minute,earlymorning broadcast(5.45-6.00a.m.), and an evening session beginning at

6.15 p.m. - which varies between 15 and 30 minutes - from Monday through Saturday,except for Thursday. Field interviews with progressive farmers and subject matterspecialists are intermixed with traditional music, weather and market reports, and livelydramatic sequences on topics of seasonal interest.

The AIS is in an excellent position to exploit the use of broadcasting and a variety ofprint media. For a start, the country has a unified language, Sesotho, which, aside fromEnglish being used in parallel in the capital city of Maseru, is common to all Basutho, theindigenous people of Lesotho. As well, the literacy rate of those reading Sesotho iscomparatively high among the adult population with estimates ranging between 65 and

70%. Lesotho's relatively small size and cultural homogeneity also greatly facilitates thetransmission of messages for a mass audience.

AIS material is broadcast through "Radio Lesotho" which covers the lowland regions ofthe country well but has severe Shadows" in the mountain areas. Still, overall, a relativelyhigh proportion of the rural population own radio sets. A recent survey (Lesotho DistanceTeaching Centre, 1987) showed a nation-wide radio ownership proportion of over 62%,with the greatest concentration occurring in the arable lowlands (69%) and the lowest inthe mountains (51%). Eighty percent of those with radios reported that they were inworking order; and of those without sets of their own, or with sets not working, abouthalf said they listened at a friend's or relative's house. The general radio audience is thus

in the neighbourhood of 75% nationally, and almost 80% in the lowlands where the bulkof the population resides. It should be emphasised that radio is the only mass medium inLesotho since no national television production and transmission facilities as yet exist.Television viewing fare is readily available in Maseru and larger lowland centres,however, from two South African channels but to date has made no inroads at the villagelevel.


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A large portion of AlS's efforts are directed toward aiding the Ministry's ExtensionService. Administratively, the country is divided into ten districts, each having a DistrictAgriculture Officer (DAO), a District Extension Officer (DEO), several Subject MatterSpecialists (SMSs), and approximately ten Extension Workers (EAs). The SMSs are eacha specialist in a particular area (e.g., crops, livestock, conservation and forestry) and,

while based at district headquarters, serve as technical backstopping to extension agentsin the field. Other field based personnel benefiting from AIS materials are nutritionagents who are also technically assisted from their District Headquarters. As well, AIS isfrequently called upon to produce audio-visual support materials for workshopsorganized in six Farmer Training Centres distributed throughout the country. Followingthe FAO projects, the Service is also now in a position to effectively carry out multi-media campaigns and to progressively add video to as range of media-mix combinations.The roster of activities and capabilities is thus extensive and indicative of a growingreliance of the Ministry on AIS to provide timely information directly to the jammingcommunity, and to support farmer training exercises at both the village and training

centre level.

FAO ASSISTANCE IN DESIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, MONITORING, AND

EVALUATING MULTI-CHANNEL COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

Prior to FAO involvement, it was apparent that although the AIS was performing anincreasingly valuable function, most of as staff were formally untrained in mediaproduction for a multi-channel communication strategy. Many were recruited directlyfrom the ranks of Certificate or Diploma graduates of the Lesotho Agricultural Collegeand some were seconded from other sections of the Ministry,. In order to prepare the

Service for undertaking campaigns, the first FAO project kicked off with a six weekcombined workshop in radio/audio-cassette and slide production methods conducted bytwo FAO consultants. This was followed by the first exercise in communicationcampaigns, under the guidance of an FAO field communication consultant. The follow-up project included an FAO campaign production management consultancy, videoproduction workshops, and guidance in designing and evaluating the second campaignexercise. A detailed description of how the campaigns evolved, and affected their targetaudiences, follows.


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CAMPAIGN EXERCISE 1: INCREASING MAIZE PRODUCTION,REDUCING

POST-HARVEST LOSSES

SETTING THE OBJECTIVES AND TARGET AREA

Two districts had been selected by the Ministry for initial campaign concentration, one inthe "lowlands" of the Northern Region of the country (Butha Buthe), and the other in theMountainous interior (Thaba Tseka). In both districts it was decided that the DistrictAgricultural Officers (DOAs) and Subject Matter Specialists (SMSs) should carry out theneeds assessments and prioritise the key development objectives to be supported bycommunication campaigns. The initial meetings with the AIS planning team at the pilotDistrict Headquarters were thus spent in firming up, and setting into a communicationcontext, the decisions taken. Coincidentally, the themes selected in both districts revolvedaround maize production, in the case of Butha Buthe to increase maize yields throughadoption of high yielding seed varieties and recommended cultivation practices, and for

the mountain district to increase the supply of an early maturing, high yielding, singlestrain highland maize variety found only in that area (seed multiplication). Reducingpost-harvest losses through the construction of stone and cement silos would be acommon aim for both districts.

The focus on maize production coincided well with the development priorities of theMinistry of Agriculture. Maize is the staple food in Lesotho but the nation has beenunable to produce even half of its domestic annual requirements. In 1986, for example,only 43% of national consumption was locally grown leaving 57% to be imported fromother countries. With this perspective in view, the broad goal of the campaign was tocontribute toward the national development priority of achieving self-sufficiency inmaize production. Specific communication objectives evolving from the goal would be 1)to significantly increase knowledge levels where warranted, and 2) to meet farmers'expressed information needs with respect to recommended seed varieties and methods ofmaize production, and reducing post-harvest losses. Content emphasis for both objectiveswould be set forth following the results of a baseline survey.

The campaign was set for the 1987-1988 cropping season which runs roughly fromSeptember through April. With the FAO Field Communication Consultant's arrival inLesotho during the first week in July, this meant that the planning and preparation periodprior to kicking off the first campaign presentations in mid-September would be restricted

to about eight to ten weeks.

CONDUCTING THE BASELINE SURVEY

The immediate priority of the planning team was to determine the specific informationunits to be concentrated upon, which would form the basis for assessing target audienceinformation levels through the baseline survey. The AIS team responsible for producing


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media materials again met with the crop specialists in the target districts. Furtherdiscussions were held with maize specialists in Maseru, and relevant research literatureon the topic was examined. Out of this content research, nine specific maize productionoperations were delineated:

Land Preparation Choosing Certified, High Yielding Seeds Planting Methods Use of Fertilizers (Basic & Top Dressing) Weeding Methods Disease Control Pest Control Knowing When to Harvest Reducing Post-Harvest Losses

With the content units in view, a baseline questionnaire was developed whichconcentrated on knowledge levels - practices - and felt Information needs. The rationalefor this line of questioning was to determine where areas of knowledge were weak, whichpractices should be changed, and perhaps most important, to provide a framework forcommunication inputs based directly upon the target audience's expressed informationneeds. Since up to 70% of Lesotho farms are run by women in the absence of theirhusbands seeking employment in the mines of South Africa, we were also interested indetermining if they made individual decisions such as seed selection, fertiliserapplications, and hiring outside plowing and planting operators. A concluding section ofthe questionnaire assessed media access, frequency of exposure to agricultural radio

broadcasts, predominant listening times, and farmers' perceptions of the most useful of allavailable sources of information. (Appendix II includes a copy of the Questionnaire.)

By the end of the third week in July, the questionnaire was ready to be taken to the field.Initially, we had planned to survey the interior mountain district first before movingdown to the lowland area. Unfortunately, the timing coincided with a severe snow stormwhich blocked the mountain roads for virtually a whole week. Because of schedulepressures, we thus decided to concentrate our baseline survey efforts on the northerndistrict of Butha Buthe.

The primary target area within the district consisted of ten villages spread out over a

length of about ten miles along a secondary road. Four of these villages were randomlyselected for head of household interviews. Our strategy was to interview about twentypeople in each village chosen on the basis of 1) indication that they would be plantingmaize during the forthcoming season, and 2) their wish to take part in listening to andviewing audio-visual presentations which would come to their village over a seven monthperiod, as well as tune in to a weekly radio broadcast dedicated to their area. Questionswere given in Sesotho with responses simultaneously recorded in English. Altogether, 71


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farmers were included in the baseline survey (65% female, 35% male) which wasundertaken over a three day period. The interviews were conducted by four staffmembers from the Planning Department of the Ministry of Agriculture as well as theCampaign Director and his assistant.

The results of the survey were tabulated during the fifth and sixth weeks and groupedaccording to each of the sections of the planned campaign. Thus, for each maizeproduction operation, the results indicated which information points needed particularreinforcement, where recommended practices were weak, and what specific informationpoints were requested by respondents. Interestingly, a strong correlation was notedbetween areas where knowledge levels were low and specific requests for information.Content guidelines units were then developed for media producers as to where emphasisshould be placed in each of the information units to achieve maximum effectiveness inthe campaign.

Of further specific interest to the campaign planners was the size of the general radiolistening audience, which the survey revealed to be about 90% of the sample. About 65%tuned in to agricultural broadcasts; and among the listeners, 72% said they tuned in toonly the evening broadcasts, with 19% listening to both morning and eveningprogrammes and 9% to morning programmes only. Clearly, the evening slot would be themost favoured for campaign broadcasts. Agricultural radio was also named as the mostimportant of all available sources of information.

DESIGNING THE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

With the baseline survey complete, the sixth week of the FAO Field CommunicationConsultant's mission was spent in planning the content of the campaign in detail andfixing the presentation schedules. Initial planning suggested that the campaign shouldunfold in a timely manner with presentations coinciding with decision points in theseasonal calendar. Thus the first presentation during mid-September, for example, shouldconcentrate on land preparation and the choice of recommended, certified, high yieldingseeds. This would be followed in mid-October with proper use of fertilisers, in mid-November by weeding methods, disease and pest control, and finally in mid-March byharvesting techniques and methods to reduce post-harvest losses. As well, it was decidedthat the campaign would revolve around two delivery approaches, what we termed amulti-media Intensive strategy and an audiocassette listening group strategy. The multi-

media intensive approach would centre on ten villages in the primary target areas in bothButha Buthe, the lowland district and Thaba Tseka, the mountain district. Presentationteams would move out in Land Cruiser vans from AIS headquarters in Maseru on a two-week-out, two-week-return basis. One village would be covered each working day duringthe two-week-out period; listening/viewing groups of between fifteen-twenty farmerswould be organized per village. Additional media support would include posters changedevery four weeks to support each presentation, handouts to participants covering the


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essential points of each session, and radio broadcasts dedicated to each of the districtsover the duration of the campaign. At least one evening broadcast per week per districtwould be aired on Radio Lesotho.

The audio-cassette listening group strategy was intended to cover the remainder of the

districts in villages serviced by extension agents and provide a campaign multipliereffect. During the time the exercise was undertaken, there were about ten extensionworkers per pilot district. The eight or nine extension agents in each district not involvedin the full campaign would be supplied with radio/audio-cassette players, the rationalebeing that listening groups of about 15 to 20 farmers would be set up in clusters of eightvillages per extension agent. The presentation format would follow the AIS Introduction -Playback - Discussion - Demonstration format suggested for the multi-media intensiveportion of the campaign. Similarly, posters and handouts would support the sessions andradio would target both areas once per week. New topics would be introduced every othertwo weeks. All materials would be produced and/or assembled for distribution at AIS

headquarters.

The final week of the seven week baseline survey and planning phase was given over toproviding a field communication orientation for the extension agents and crop specialistswho would be involved in the campaign. Two and one-half day workshops wereorganized in each of the two pilot districts. The content ranged from an overview of therole of communication in rural development to a detailed explanation of all facets of thecampaign, including a discussion of the results of the baseline survey. In addition, oneafternoon was devoted to a village based demonstration of how to set up and conduct anaudio-cassette listening group session.

While at one of these sessions, the true value of the practical exercise was dramaticallyrevealed. The content of the audio-cassette demonstration centred on seed bedpreparation and correct methods of ploughing. At the end of the play-back one of thelisteners in the group jumped up and ran off in what appeared to be an agitated state.Rather than being offended, however, he returned minutes later carrying a plough andenthusiastically asked for more specific instructions on correct settings! (See Photo #1)

During the closing day of the workshop, the extension agents were taken through adetailed explanation of methods of keeping attendance at the listening group sessions,and asking for comments from participating farmers on sequences of high or low interest,

understanding of the main points of the presentation, and whether or not they intended tocard, out the recommended practices. These "monitoring" information sheets would thenbe fed back to the AIS production team on a monthly basis to allow feedback on theeffectiveness of production strategies used and where changes might be warranted.


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Photo 1: Ploughing demonstration following cassette listening group exercise.

PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS AND CAMPAIGN DELIVERY

Even though the AIS production team had a vent, short lead time of only one month toprepare the first group media session, the campaign kicked off as planned in mid-September. Four presentations were scheduled to cover the first half of the campaign,namely, the September to December portion, with the one remaining presentation onharvesting to be delivered later during April. In order of appearance, they were:

1. Land Preparation;2. Seed Selection, Disease Control, Planting Methods, and Basic FertilizerApplication;

3. Weeding Methods and Cutworm Control;4. Top Dressing Application and Stalkborer Control;5. Harvesting and Reducing Post-Harvest Losses.

Due to gaps in the availability of appropriate visuals, however, only the first twopresentations included a slide-tape presentation. The remaining three presentations wereprimarily conducted with audio-cassettes and support print materials. All were reinforced

by a dedicated radio broadcast each week with 15 minutes allotted to Butha Buthe and 15minutes to Thaba Tseka on the Thursday evening programme.


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Photo 2: AlS-organized cassette-listening group.

All audio-cassettes were designed along the following format:

Voice-Piece Introduction to Topic by Subject Matter Specialists (SMSs); Interviews with Farmers by AIS Radio Producers or District Extension Officers; Drama Sequence (Produced in AIS Maseru Studio).

The primary purpose of the audio-cassette programme was to introduce the presentationtopic and provide recommendations (SMS voice-piece), discuss the 'pros and cons' of the

recommendations with farmers, and then to show through a drama sequence how therecommendations fit into the existing village farm system (Photo #2). Each cassettewould then be followed by a discussion, and where practical, a field demonstration by theextension agent (Photo #3).

The multi-media intensive portion of the campaign was carried out by two AIS teamsusing mobile vans to deliver the village based group media presentations. A typicalsession would involve the van moving into a village at a time previously agreed uponwith both the area and village chiefs. With traditional music blaring from its two loudspeakers, the presence of the van could be heard throughout the village, even though it

might be spread out over a half-kilometre or more. A "gathering time" would then followin which the intended target group would begin to arrive in the village square, or what istermed a "pitso" in Lesotho. Often, this would involve several of the members dancing tothe music and in general having a good time. Overall, at least one hour and sometimes upto two would be taken up with assembling the group. Once gathered, a welcome addresswould be given by the village or area chief. Again, this might go on for some time, butgenerally at least one-half hour was planned for. The order of presentation then normallyincluded the following sequence:


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Photo 3: Field demonstration by extension agent.

Introduction to Presentation by AIS Team; Audio-Cassette Playback; Discussion of Material by SMS and/or Extension Agent; Slide-Tape Presentation in Evening; Discussion led by SMS and/or Extension Agent.

Problems were experienced in keeping to the original schedule almost from the start,however, because of highly unusual heavy rains which blanketed the lowlands for two

months. And in the interior the situation was particularly severe in Thaba Tseka whichexperienced heavy snowfalls, resulting in the death of several draught animals and smalllivestock. In the face of these constraints some presentations had to be cancelled; andmost had to be pushed ahead to correspond to the shift in the agricultural calendar.

In spite of the delay, the original target of ten villages was adhered to in Butha Buthe andexpanded to thirteen in Thaba Tseka. Correspondingly, the extension agents in bothdistricts not involved in the intensive area were to set up and conduct organized listeninggroups on an eight village per agent basis. Reports compiled by the AIS suggest thatbecause of transport problems and battery supplies for the cassette players, an average of

five villages per agent would be a more accurate estimate of the number actually covered.

FIELD EVALUATION PROCEDURES

Two impact evaluations were undertaken. The first, or mid-term exercise in December1987 provided an excellent opportunity to not only gather quantitative data on knowledgegains and changes in practices early in the campaign, but also to gain a broad range ofimpressions from front line extension workers at the field level. It was carried out in the


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same four villages as the baseline data collection, and attempted to reinterview as manyof the original respondents as possible, provided that they had attended the presentations.All interviews during this round were undertaken by the Campaign Manager (see Photo#4), and two newly appointed production assistants. For the Manager, the exercise wasinvaluable in providing first hand impressions of the effectiveness of the campaign to that

point. And for the production assistants, the process allowed them to sharpen theirinterviewing skills with regard to asking focussed questions and probing for additionalinformation, techniques they could transfer to radio production. The additional benefitinherent in using media producers to undertake surveys was the direct experience ingetting to know their farming community radio audience. While admitting to thepossibility of a certain bias entering into a given interview with a member of the targetgroup, the positive benefits of using production staff to conduct field evaluations wouldseem to far outweigh any negative consequences. Certainly, in the case of Lesotho therewas general concern on the part of materials producers to faithfully record the commentsof farmers, even if they reflected unkindly on the media contents per se or the way in

which the campaign was conducted. Altogether, three days were spent in the field to re-interview 37 respondents representing 52% of the baseline population; 35% of these weremale, and 65% female, a ratio which matched perfectly that generated in the originalsurvey.

Photo 4: Post maize-campaign interview with participating farmer.

Immediately following the mid-term field survey, a two day evaluation workshop washeld in Maseru which assembled the extension workers from both pilot districts. Eighteenextension personnel were able to attend, with the ratio split evenly between the DEO andeight extension agents from each district. As well, two AIS officers participated asobservers. The FAO Field Communication Consultant was aided in the conduct of theworkshop by the AIS Campaign Manager, and by a DSC Officer from FAO Headquarters


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Figure 2: Comparison of pre-campaign maize production knowledge base with mid-termand post-campaign levels.

Closer inspection of Figure 1 shows that solid gains were made in knowledge of - andPreparation Techniques, Use of Fertilizers, Disease and Pest Control, and Reducing Post-Harvest Losses. Also impressive was the learning acquired with regard to recommendedWeeding Methods which all respondents demonstrated after attending the campaignpresentation, an observation also mentioned in extension agent reports.

Another interesting finding was noted in comparing those who listened regularly to the

radio broadcasts dedicated to the maize campaign and those who did not. In the mid-termsurvey, for example, 76% of the respondents were radio listeners. Their information levelwas raised from 21% in the baseline survey to 41% in the mid-term evaluation for arelative gain of 98%. Non-listeners on the other hand went from a baseline level of 22%to 32% at midterm for a relative gain of 42%. The more than doubling of relativeinformation gains made by the listening group forcibly demonstrates the influence ofradio to reinforce reaming from group media presentations and to rightfully take its placeas a powerful component in a campaign media mix.

An attempt was made to gauge the level of practice changes, if any, made during the

short time-frame of the campaign. By and large, we noted a very large increase in the useof ploughing for seed bed preparation (from 15 respondents in the baseline survey to 29at mid-term) and in the application of top-dressing fertiliser (from a baseline of 15 to 26at midterm). Perhaps the most impressive of all the campaign initiatives, however, was inthe promotion of stone and cement silos to reduce post-harvest losses. In the baselinesurvey 12, or 50%, of farmers said they would like to build a silo; this had increased to23, or 95%, in the post-campaign survey. And out of the 23 expressing interest, 21 said


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they planned to build a silo as soon as circumstances permitted. As tangible evidence ofthis expression, one farmer had already built a silo during the campaign period capable ofstoring 4 200 kilograms (60 x 70 kg. bags) of maize for a total cash outlay of 100 Maluti,or about US$45 at the time. The structure stands as a model for other villagers to copy(Photo #5). It even attracted the attention of the Minister of Agriculture who travelled to

the village for a close-up inspection of the silo.

The campaign was not, however, without a variety of constraints. Some of these were dueto natural causes; others resulted from scheduling conflicts and delays in inputs from theMinistry, or supplies from cooperatives. During the early portion, as noted earlier, heavydownpours of rain delayed both village visits and planting of maize. And when thecampaign was fully underway, on more than one occasion the team would arrive in avillage only to discover that the village chief had thought that the visit was scheduled foranother day! At times extension workers would be assigned to duties in villages outsidethe campaign area; and some male heads of households who were chosen as part of the

original listening groups left the area to work in the mines of South Africa. This situationwas particularly difficult for the evaluation team who wanted to compare before and aftercampaign results with the same people.

The more serious of all constraints occurred in one of the four villages chosen for thebaseline and impact surveys. The context involved the preparation of land for maizeseeding, most of which is hired out to private tractor owners or undertaken by the tractoroperations section of the Ministry of Agriculture. In this case, the village had opted forMinistry ploughing.

Photo 5: Stone and cement silo promoted during maize campaign.


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After experiencing numerous delays in the arrival of the tractor, the end result was thatthe maize planting period was exceeded and farmers were forced to opt for shorter seasoncrops, such as beans. When the AIS team showed up to conduct the mid-term evaluationthey were met with less than hospitable villagers who assumed that, since the team wasfrom the Ministry of Agriculture, they were part and parcel of the reason for their being

unable to plant maize. No amount of reasoning would persuade them otherwise and theyrefused to participate further. They were thus reluctantly dropped from the group ofcampaign target villages. This incident served to confirm, as emphasised in the first stageof our communication process model, the importance of technology inputs and servicesarriving in a timely manner.

For the most part, however, the anecdotal comments and impressions garnered from theAIS campaign team and extension agents were highly positive. In spite of the numerousproblems encountered in the initial three month phase, the post-campaign evaluation teamvisited the target area when record maize yields had been gathered and when the majority

of villagers were contemplating not only sufficient food for the coming year, but incomegenerated from selling portions of the harvest as well. Demonstrably, farmers were onlytoo pleased to show us their harvest piled high in rondavels or covered with plastic sheetsnext to their homes (Photo #6). Similar reports were forthcoming from the mountaindistrict. Much of this success must be shared with plentiful rain, and good weather duringharvesting, but certainly the AIS team could be pleased with their first efforts inmounting a multi-channel communication campaign.

In the wake of the maize campaign, discussions were held with the District AgriculturalOfficer concerning possible topics for further concentration. Based upon suggestions

given by farmers during the post-campaign survey, and the fact that a full 97% of themexpressed a desire to see more village based presentations, H was decided to redo themedia intensive maize campaign in Butha Buthe district, but in a new area. The tenvillages included in the previous area would revert to cassette-listening groups organizedby the local extension agents. And in Thaba Tseka, where the emphasis on seedmultiplication had been successfully moved along, the theme for campaign continuationchanged to livestock rearing and range management, topics of high priority for this partof the counts.


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Photo 6: Sample of maize harvest after the campaign

While the two original pilot districts were planning their second year of operation (1988-89), a third district was added to the roster for FAO assistance to further improve AlS'scapacity to undertake field based communication campaigns. In preparation, an FAOconsultant with expertise in campaign production management spent three months withthe AIS during the June through August planning period. Additional field playbackequipment was purchased (Public Address sound system, radio/cassette recorders) as wellas a Toyota Land Cruiser. Video would be added later to the AIS range of mediaproduction with training workshops organized during the September through Novemberperiod, not early enough to be included in the new pilot district, but certainly to beconsidered in later campaigns. Finally, the same FAO Field Communication Consultantinvolved in designing and evaluating the first campaign exercise moved directly toassisting the AIS team with the background target audience KAP survey necessary tocoherently plan the production, delivery, monitoring and evaluation of the campaign inthe new pilot area.


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CAMPAIGN EXERCISE 2: INCREASING SORGHUM PRODUCTION,

REDUCING POST-HARVEST LOSSES

SETTING THE OBJECTIVES

Given that the object of FAO assistance in the second TOP was to consolidate AlS'sCommunication Campaign Strategies, we decided to replicate as far as possible thoseelements that had worked well in the first campaign exercise, and to try to improve uponareas of weakness. The over-riding factor, in essence, was to refine the DevelopmentSupport Communication Process Model in a new setting, and 'consolidate' a practicalapproach to carrying out multi-channel communication campaigns.

The new pilot district selected, Mohale's Hoek, is in the southern region of the countryand in general is characterised as an arid area. Several internationally sponsored irrigationschemes are on-going as well as "water harvesting" projects. As in the previous pilot

districts, the theme of the campaign in Mohale's Hoek was determined by the DAO incollaboration with the DEO and various Subject Matter Specialists. The topic of highpriority decided upon, in line wan the dry nature of the region, was to increase sorghumproduction, a drought resistant crop. Correspondingly, an area in the district with highpotential for expanded sorghum cropping was selected for the multi-media intensiveportion of the campaign.

The specific objectives of the campaign were to 1) significantly increase knowledgelevels where warranted, and 2) to meet farmers' expressed information needs with respectto recommended seed varieties and methods of sorghum production, and reducingpostharvest losses. Preliminary information supplied by the SMS also suggested thatsorghum was primarily used for making soft porridge and 'joala', a local beer. If this wereborne out by the target audience baseline survey, additional objectives of the campaignwould be to promote a variety of nutritional dishes which could be made from sorghum,and to change attitudes toward its perceived, more limited, 'traditional' uses.

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

As opposed to the previous campaigns which were designed to run for a full croppingcycle, because of the timing of the FAO project which was due to come to an end inDecember, H was decided to run the entire set of campaign materials over a three and

one-half month period. With a start-up date of mid-August, this would mean acompletion date at the end of November with the impact survey to follow-up inDecember.

Essentially, the same design and materials delivery strategy was to be used as in theprevious exercises. And since the production of sorghum is closely related to maize, wewere able to quickly adapt both the baseline survey methodology questionnaire used in


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the earlier campaign. Again the same content modules were decided upon, with theexception of knowing when to harvest. This section was eliminated from the baselinesurvey, but others added (e.g., perceived advantages, disadvantages and uses of sorghumas compared with other grain crops, and safety measures when using pesticides) in orderto provide a better information context for media production. The survey team in this

case consisted of the campaign supervisor and four production assistants who would beinvolved in preparing campaign materials (Photo #7) . The exercise thus familiarisedthem with their target farming audience in the southern part of the country.

Photo 7: Baseline survey team for sorghum campaign.

The media intensive target area within the district was a group of ten villages; four ofthese were selected for the baseline survey, three at random and the fourth because of thelocation of the Area Chief. The intention was to sample twenty-five heads of householdin each. Our basic criteria for selecting a particular farmer was that he or she wasplanning on sowing sorghum during the forthcoming season, and was willing to take partin listening to and viewing audio-visual presentations over a three month period, as wellas tune in to weekly radio broadcasts on sorghum dedicated to their area. Altogether 99respondents were sampled in the four villages.

One of the weaknesses of the former maize campaign evaluation procedure was in notincluding a "non-campaign" group with which to compare the before-and-after results ofthe target group's exposure to the multi-media materials and field demonstrations. Thistype of sample is normally called a 'control group' in the evaluation literature and ideallywould be composed of farmers having the same ecological conditions and farmingpatterns as the campaign group; equality in pre-campaign levels of knowledge, attitudes,and practices would also be desirable. In responding to the same pre and post campaignquestionnaires as the target group, the control group is designed to control for, or


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THE CAMPAIGN IN ACTION

The campaign began as anticipated on August 15th, with the first presentation devoted tocooking demonstrations of sorghum and explanations of as nutritional value. Only oneweek was slotted for this activity, and rather than cramming all ten villages in the target

area into a five day period, in-depth presentations were given in four villages with peoplefrom surrounding villages invited to attend. Leaflets outlining the various recipes weregiven out after the demonstrations.

The multi-media intensive portion of the campaign began directly after the cookingdemonstrations and more or less followed the schedule outlined in the planning stages.As a result of the slightly delayed start, the final presentation on prevention of post-harvest losses coincided with the impact evaluation mission during early December, andinterviews with farmers included in the four village baseline survey were literallyconducted one step behind the AIS presentation team!

Similar to the earlier campaigns which also had a short lead time between the baselinesurvey analysis and the first presentation, all group media sessions did not have the fullcomplement of audio-cassettes, slide-tapes, posters and handouts. Indeed, like the maizecampaign in Butha Buthe, only the first two sorghum production modules were mediacomplete; the latter two were made up of audio-cassettes only with posters and handouts.All, however, had radio broadcast support (10 minutes dedicated to the area eachThursday evening), and excellent cooperation from the campaign area extension agent.

Again, problems cropped up in scheduling conflicts, and in some cases poor turn-outs,because of insufficient advertising on the part of village organisers. In one instance, thedeath of a Chief's wife forced the cancellation of a presentation. With the tight touringsequence in place, the cancellation of a particular visit meant that a given village wouldhave to wait for the next campaign module presentation a month down the road.

Serious constraints were evident as well in what was originally planned as the "secondwave" of the campaign and the organisation of cassette listening groups by the extensionworkers not involved in the media intensive villages. In the first instance, theradio/cassette players arrived late and were not distributed until after the campaign wasunder way. As a result, all extension agents who were to be involved in the second wavewere assigned other duties and consequently had little time to devote exclusively to the

campaign. Where possible, however, some did hold listening sessions but they werelargely uncoordinated and certainly not in step with the schedule originally envisaged.This was further complicated by a haphazard distribution of audio-cassettes by theDistrict Office and sufficient batted sets to enable at least eight playback sessions over atwo week period. Consequently, very few monitoring reports were received from thefield. To alleviate this problem in the future, AIS has proposed to place one staff member


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in each of the three campaign districts to take charge of all matters related to localproduction and distribution of materials at the field level.

A number of natural problems, impossible to predict in advance, were also experiencedby farmers involved in the campaign. The most serious of these was a massive outbreak

of cutworms which necessitated re-seeding of sorghum fields, sometimes as many as twoor three times. In the end, one quarter of the campaign area farmers included in thebaseline sample were forced to move from seeding sorghum to quick yielding varieties ofmaize, beans and potatoes. And among those who did manage to re-seed successfully,many were forced to revert to locally grown seeds after having started with arecommended, certified variety. Correspondingly, basic fertiliser applications were alsomuch lower in the second and third round of planting. These deviations were well beyondthe control of the campaign organisers and perhaps more than anything else re-emphasised Murphy's Law that ``Anything that can go wrong, will"! Farmers of courseknow this maxim only too well, and the example graphically suggested to campaign

organisers the need to exercise patience in the face of natural diversities.

POST-CAMPAIGN IMPACT SURVEY

Against the formerly described backdrop, H became apparent that the main focus forassessing the effectiveness of the campaign would have to be on as informational Impactsince the only place we could expect any changes in practices would be in the use of topdressing fertilisers and attitudes toward building silos. With this perspective in view, theevaluation team took to the field, as mentioned earlier, during the last week of thecampaign. In order to give as much advance time as possible for completion of the villagepresentations, the team - consisting of five AIS media producers - decided to start withthe resampling of the non-campaign, control group. Out of the original 62 farmers, we re-interviewed 44 over a two day period (Photo #8). Interestingly, we found that 26 out ofthis number had not listened to the sorghum campaign broadcasts dedicated to Mohale'sHoek during the previous three and one-half months, while 18 had. As well, no extensionworker had visited either village in the period intervening between the baseline andsecond survey. It was thus decided to designate the 26 non-listeners as the control or non-campaign group, and the remaining 18 as a radio listening group to assess the effects ofradio alone on levels of information gained during the campaign.


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Photo 8: Post-Campaign Survey (Control Group Village).

Three days were required to complete the reinterviewing in the four villages initiallysampled in the media intensive campaign area. Out of the original 99, we were able toresample 57 respondents who had attended the presentations. The retention rate of 58%for Mohale's Hoek compares with figures of 52% for the mid-term impact in ButhaButhe, and 69% for the post-campaign survey. Thus, on average, based on the Lesothoexperience one can look for 60% participant retention rates over the duration of acampaign.

RESULTS

Figure 3 presents the before-and-after information levels by individual sorghumproduction operation for the full campaign group. As can be readily noted, a clear patternis discernable with impressive gains between pre and post campaign knowledge levels.At least a doubling in knowledge levels for all production operations was noted exceptfor knowledge of Disease Control (smut and oust). Even with these gains, some areasrequire further attention since the end results are relatively low; knowledge of certified,high yielding sorghum seed varieties, and pest and disease control are specific exampleswhere either the audio-visual presentations might be revised, or run again for increasedeffect.

Figure 4 shows the clear trend in knowledge acquisition levels between pre-campaignscores and actual gains made individually among the full campaign, radio only, andcontrol group, the latter having no exposure to campaign materials during the period. Theknowledge levels are based upon a maximum total score of 65 for both the baseline andpost-campaign surveys. Figure 5, in turn, is perhaps the more interesting of all the graphssince H shows 1) virtually no difference in average baseline knowledge levels among all


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groups (18.5% for control group, 18.8% for the radio only group, and 18.2% for the fullcampaign group), and 2) a relative gain of 128% for the full campaign group, 71% for theradio group, and 21% for the control group. These results bring into sharp relief thepower of the combined multi-channel strategy and the wisdom of, wherever possible,using a mutually reinforcing media-mix backed up with interpersonal support at the

village level. At the same time, the effects attributed to radio alone in the absence of anyextension agent assistance forcibly demonstrate the strength of this ubiquitous, rural massmedium in carrying Us weight in any multi-media combination designed to boost levelsof awareness and specific information gains. As well, the "spin-off" or secondary effectsof radio can be inferred from the information gains, although small, made by the controlgroup. Since both the radio and control group respondents resided in the same villages, Hcan logically be assumed that the gains made by the latter group were throughinterpersonal conversations with those listening to radio. Again, this is only anassumption since a "pure" control group was not available. The singular value of radiodemonstrated in both the Lesotho campaigns supports similar trends noted in other Third-

World studies. Recent reports from India, for example, suggest that a new variety of so-called Radio rice" is widely used in many parts of the country!

Figure 3: Pre and post-campaign knowledge levels by sorghum production operation -

full campaign group


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Figure 4: Pre and post-campaign knowledge levels by individual groups

Figure 5: Comparison of pre-campaign, post-campaign and relative gains in knowledgelevels by groups sampled.

Another interesting area presented in this campaign for the first time was a section onsafety methods when using pesticides. Practices such as wearing protective clothing andface masks, spraying down wind, washing immediately if pesticide comes in contact withskin, and proper cleaning-up procedures were explained. Interestingly, all three groupsshowed significant information gains in this section of the questionnaire: the fullcampaign control group went from a pre-campaign low of 5% to a post-campaign scoreof 56%, the radio group from an initial base of 14% to a post-campaign score of 50%,and the control group from 10% to 25%. Indeed, the relative gain made by the full


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campaign group makes this section by far the most successful of all the units included inthe four module presentations. Certainly, the AIS team can be satisfied with their initialefforts in promoting good safety practices in this potentially dangerous stage of pestcontrol.

The overall results conclusively demonstrate that a successful campaign was waged interms of information delivery but, as we noted earlier, a number of natural calamitiescombined to thwart changes in practicesper se. In a short campaign of three and one-halfmonths even with normal growing conditions one should not expect to see a lot ofchanges, but in this case we actually had a retrograde movement in some instances.Mention has already been made of the cutworm outbreak which forced at least 25% ofthe campaign group to abandon sorghum production altogether for the season afteralready seeding two and sometimes three times. Others, who had started out withrecommended high yielding seed varieties, were forced to revert to locally grown seedsbecause of the expenses involved. Similar responses were evident with respect to the

application of basic fertilisers, individual supplies of which were already used in previousplantings. Indeed, the only "timely" change in practices we found was in the applicationof top dressing fertiliser wherein among the 42 farmers who had stayed with plantingsorghum, from a base of 4 (10%) who said they would use it in the pre-campaign survey,15 or 38% planned to use H after the campaign. And as an additional post-campaignbenefit, most farmers (94%) said they would like to build a silo and four said theyplanned to do so. For the most part, however, the report card on translating the largeknowledge gains into practices remains to be completed and at least one more "normal"season is required before the ultimate value of the campaign can be properly assessed.


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LESSONS LEARNED AS FEED-FORWARD FOR NEW CAMPAIGNS

By and large, the general conclusion supported by the results sections is that thecampaigns worked relatively well in the face of unusual weather conditions and otherunanticipated obstacles. Most assuredly, they left little doubt that as a development

communication strategy, intense multi-channel campaigns over a short period of time arecapable of inducing significant surges in levels of awareness and specific knowledgegains. Less certain is their capacity to galvanize knowledge gains into recommendedpractice changes, but the outcomes from the maize campaign point to optimism in thisregard. And as pilot exercises in this new approach by the AIS, they offer severalguidelines for improving the weaknesses detected and strengthening future projects.

The most obvious constraint inherent in all the campaigns conducted was the short lead-in time for materials preparation and detailed planning. Indeed, the hiatus between theconducting and analysis of the baseline target audience surveys and the actual launch of

the first presentations in all three campaigns was less than two months. The end productas we noted was that only the first two presentations were media complete, that is to say,they included the full complement of radio broadcasts, audio-cassettes, slide-tapepresentations, posters and hand-outs. Slide-tape screenings were missing from the secondhalf of each campaign since there was simply not enough time to produce them.

Associated with the lack of sufficient time for production was an almost total absence ofmaterials pre-testing which we consider to be an integral part of the DSC Process Model.Indeed, it can be well hypothesised that the "lows" in knowledge levels in some of themaize and sorghum cultivation operations could have been improved through pre-testingthe understanding of media presentation content and appropriateness of technicalproduction factors such as pacing, length of presentations, and attention holding power ofthe approaches used. Normally, in chronological order of increasing effectiveness of pre-testing materials with various groups, the scale runs as follows:

Individual Producers or Other Production Teams Subject Matter Experts Extension Workers Individual Members of Target Audience (also called one-on-one evaluation) Small Groups of Target Audience (10 to 20 people) Larger Group of Target Audience (about 30 recommended; also referred to as

Field Trial)

As the foregoing classification clearly shows, the further removed from the targetaudience, the less certain that a producer can be of the appropriateness of the materialsdeveloped. In the case of all campaigns, only the first two categories were used, withsome input from the extension workers during the field communication workshops. Thegeneral rule of thumb in development communication, however, is that no matter how


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standardised reactions are to a given set of materials by producers, subject matter expertsand field workers, the proof of their effectiveness lies in reactions by the intended targetgroup. In practice, this translates into testing a cross section of the materials with eitherindividual members or small groups of the target audience. The importance of thisactivity lies in its potential for detection of

errors in production design, and the opportunity to correct them before going into fullscale operation. The field trial then becomes a test of the campaign in action and often isa validation of how thoroughly the smaller scale pre-testing was carried out. All thingsconsidered, we would suggest a minimum of six months for materials pre-testing andpreparation - after the baseline target audience KAP survey has been conducted andanalysed - for future campaigns of this order.

Another pre-delivery suggestion to improve the conduct of future projects would be tothoroughly brief the extension staff involved on all aspects of the campaign contentper

seso as to standardise message delivery and responses 10 questions put by farmers.This would pre-empt the possibility of competing - or incorrect - information beingdisseminated and better prepare the interpersonal component for solid reinforcement ofthe media-mix. Again, because of time constraints, the pre-campaign workshops whichwere conducted for extension agents in our Lesotho examples concentrated primarily onorganisational aspects of setting up cassette-listening groups, with little reference toactual content details.

As for the ten village, two-week-out, two-week-in delivery strategy used in the mediaintensive target area, more flexibility would seem to be warranted. Notable mention hasbeen made earlier of campaign presentations having to be cancelled because of weatherconditions, scheduling mix-ups, poor advance notice, deaths of prominent people, andcompeting events during the designated timing for a particular presentation.Unfortunately, the rigid one village per day schedule over a ten day period did not allowrepeat visits. Discussions with the AIS presentation team lead to suggesting about a 20%flexibility ratio, that is to say, allowing twelve days to cover 10 villages, with the twoextra days available for revisiting villages in the event of cancellations.

Future campaigns should as well incorporate the most flexible, and powerful of all groupmedia, namely, video. As H currently stands, small format video production equipmenthas been provided for each of the three campaign pilot districts, in addition to AIS

headquarters, and an FAO training programme was carried out over a three month period.In addition, playback facilities have been set-up in three farmer training centres. Whilethere is no question that these will be useful for a number of training exercises, movingvideo playback opportunities directly to the village level as part of group media sessionswould greatly enhance the effectiveness, and popularity, of campaign presentations.


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Agency for International Development (1984). Development Communications, PolicyDetermination Paper # 10. Washington, AID.

American Public Health Association (1982). Using Radio for Primary Health Care.Washington: American Public Health Association.

Coldevin, Gary (1979). Broadcasting development and research in Tanzania. Journal

Communication Strategies for Rural Development - A Case Study of the Use of Campaigns in Lesotho

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