Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012)

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NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL DIGEST 95 Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012) CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: BETH NICOLL I. Procedural History A grand jury indicted the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offense, for second-degree murder on two separate occasions. 1 The Superior Court judge dismissed the indictment on both occasions: first, because the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence impaired the grand jury proceeding, 2 and second, for lack of sufficient evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) granted the Commonwealth’s application for direct appellate review of the second dismissal. The SJC held that the evidence was sufficient to support the indictment, but a four-justice majority upheld the dismissal on the alternative ground that the grand jury should have been instructed on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances in juvenile cases. II. Facts The grand jury heard evidence that the defendant, who was sixteen at the time of the offense, stabbed the victim in the midst of a scuffle that began when the victim tried to rob the defendant. At the indictment stage, the grand jury was not given instructions on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses. III. Issue Presented Whether prosecutors should instruct grand juries on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses when the prospective defendant is a juvenile. 1 Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 810 (2012) (Lenk, J., concurring). 2 Id. at 810-811.

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A grand jury indicted the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offense, for second-degree murder on two separate occasions. The Superior Court judge dismissed the indictment on both occasions: first, because the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence impaired the grand jury proceeding, and second, for lack of sufficient evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) granted the Commonwealth’s application for direct appellate review of the second dismissal. The SJC held that the evidence was sufficient to support the indictment, but a four-justice majority upheld the dismissal on the alternative ground that the grand jury should have been instructed on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances in juvenile cases.

Transcript of Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012)

Page 1: Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012)

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL DIGEST

95

Commonwealth v. Walczak,

463 Mass. 808 (2012)

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: BETH NICOLL

I. Procedural History

A grand jury indicted the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offense, for second-degree murder on two separate occasions.1 The Superior Court judge dismissed the indictment on both occasions: first,

because the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence impaired the grand jury proceeding,2 and second, for lack of sufficient evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) granted the Commonwealth’s application for direct appellate review of the second dismissal. The SJC held that the evidence was sufficient to support the indictment, but a four-justice majority upheld the dismissal on the alternative ground that the grand jury

should have been instructed on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances in juvenile cases.

II. Facts

The grand jury heard evidence that the defendant, who was sixteen at

the time of the offense, stabbed the victim in the midst of a scuffle that began when the victim tried to rob the defendant. At the indictment stage, the grand jury was not given instructions on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses.

III. Issue Presented

Whether prosecutors should instruct grand juries on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses when the prospective defendant is a juvenile.

1 Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 810 (2012) (Lenk, J., concurring). 2 Id. at 810-811.

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IV. Holdings and Reasoning

When the potential defendant in a murder case is a juvenile, the grand

jury should be instructed on the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses raised by the evidence.3 In such cases, voluntary manslaughter proceedings would be held in the Juvenile Court, where the Juvenile would be given protections beyond those afforded him in the Superior Court. In contrast, murder trials are held in the Superior Court, so the Juvenile would be treated as an adult.4 “In the unique instance of

juvenile defendants whom the prosecutor seeks to charge with murder, the grand jury not only serve[s] as [a] shield against unfounded accusation, but in recent years [has] become the sole gatekeeper between the adult and juvenile justice systems.”5 There are significant differences between the two systems: the juvenile system is designed to be rehabilitative, rather than punitive; proceedings in the juvenile court are not even classified as

“criminal,” but rather ask questions of “delinquency.”6 Additionally, the maximum penalty for a juvenile tried for voluntary manslaughter as a youthful offender in the Juvenile Court is a maximum penalty of twenty years. A juvenile tried as an adult for second-degree murder in the Superior Court faces a mandatory life sentence.7 In these cases, grand juries should be given an instruction informing them that murder indictments

will cause the juvenile to be tried in Superior Court.8 The recent line of United States Supreme Court cases finding mandatory application of the most severe penalties to juveniles unconstitutional demonstrates the importance of taking a juvenile’s youth into account before subjecting him to adult proceedings or punishments and supports this reasoning.9

3 Id. at 822-824. 4 Id. at 822. 5 Id. at 824. 6 Id. at 827. 7 Commonwealth v. Walczak, supra at 829, citing G. L. c. 119, § 72B; G. L. c. 265, §§ 2, 13. 8 Id. at 830. 9 Id. at 830-831.