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Issue No. 2 (July 1987)Contents PageRichard' Norris: Selfhood - The Options .................~ u r d o~acdonald The Centre of Psychology. . .. . . . .l4Richard Gunn: Notes on 'Class' ........................ 5Filio Diamanti: "Class" in Marx's Thought and beyond . . . 6Olga Taxidou: Performance or Bodily Rhetoric ........... 2Nigel Gunn: Democracy of a wholly new Type? ........... 2Keith Anderson: A Consideration of Perpetual Motion.... 4Richard Gunn: Marxism and Mediation .................... 7Werner Bonefeld: Marxism and the Concept of Mediation..67

Free University of Glasgow: The Free University:A Background .....................................73

Interwiew with Hans Magnus Enzenberger ................ 6The third issue of Common Sense will appear in August1987, during the Edinburgh Festival.Notes for contributers: send articles in clean typescript,single-space or space-and-a-half (not double-space).Leave wide margins on both sides.Contact address: Richard Gunn, c/o Department of Politics,University of Edinburgh, 31 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh.Telephone: 031 667 1011 ect. 6660 or (home no.) 031 55631111


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WHY COMMON SENSE?In the 18th century, Scottish philosophy understood commonsense to mean (a) public or shared sense (sensus communis) and

also (b) an as-it-were "sixth" sense which establishes relationsand distinctions between the data supplied by the other five.What is exciting in this philosophy is its thesis that these twomeanings of common sense by no means exclude, but on the contraryimply, one another. On the one hand, I can achieve a coherenttotalisation of my experience only in and through interactionwith other people; and, on the other hand, it is only as atotalised (an autonomous) individual that I can authenticallyinteract. Thus selfhood and society form a unity. So too dotheory and practice, since I can theorise my experience trulyonly where social and practical conditions making for a freeinteraction obtain. Theorising, in short, both summons andpresupposes what Hegel terms 'mutual recognition': an interest intruth and in social emancipation go hand in hand.

For the Scottish philosophers, common sense enters crisis ina-society where a social division of labour exists. In theHegelian and Marxian traditions, this becomes the thesis that truthcan appear only once existing alienations have been set at naught.The journal Common Sense draws the conclusion: wherever it enterscrisis, common sense can go forward only as critique.In keeping with its inspiration, the procedures of CommonSense are wholly novel. Material submitted is photocopied,stapled and distributed on a non-profitmaking basis bp a non-existing editorial board. Only boring - which is to say unthinkinglyconformist - material counts as non-commonsensical inasmuch as suchmaterial merely reproduces the categories which underwrite existingalienations, i.e., the existing order of social things.In this way, the hegemany of the division of labour as betweentheory and practice, between readership and contributors andbetween contributors and editors is thrown to the winds. So too is

the division of labour between academia and the outside world (adivision which academia itself, like any closed monopoly orcorporation, seeks always to keep in play). Thereby, through adetonation of existing boundaries, a space is cleared in whichcommon sense in its two-fold meaning can authentically come to be.

Common Sense is thus as much an idea as a journal: start yourown, on the same minimalist basis, and let discussion proliferateoutwith the confines which orthodox academia, always respectful ofauthority, adopts as its favoured own.

Note: If you would be interested in participating in discussion ofany issue raised in Common Sense, please contact us. A discussion-meeting on 'Mediation' is planned for September: details in CS 3.-Further note: donations towards our production-costs will alwaysbe more than welcome!


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T h e f o l l o w i n g i s a r e p r i n t o f t h e i n i t i a lannouncement (carried in Edinburgh Re viewNo. 76) of the idea underlying CommonSense.

A Journalof awholly new typeProblems of production, of sales/distribution and of editorial policy seem intrinsicto the publication of any journal, whether mainstream or alternative; theseproblems have stood in the way of the emergence of new alternative journalsespecially of a theoretical and therefore a relatively non-popular kind. Theconsequence of this is that universities and professional-academic journals retaintheir fateful monopoly on the life of the mind. In a period of recession, withuniversities becoming more restrictive and bureaucratic and with (as a result)increasing numbers of people being driven away from universities, whether intounemployment or non-academic employment, this monopoly seems even morevicious than i t was before. A non-university based theoretical journal has thus asound political point.In order to minimise the problems of productioddistributiodediting, such ajournal must be of a wholly novel type. In fact, these problems can almost entirelybe avoided if journal-production is thought of in a fresh way.~echnology, word-processing, xeroGng, etc.) is incr&singly on our side.Contributors to such a iournal would submit their work in readable (which means:attractively readable) t$pescript, A4, single spaced, so that artides are not retypedbut merely photocopied; the resulting bundle of different articles can then bestapled together and put between simple folded covers (a different colour for eachissue, perhaps, but retain the same foknat each time in order to keep production-costs down). The only tasks confronting the production-group would then bephotocopying, stapling and distributing. An editorial policy could virtually kdispensed with since there would be no fixed limit on the number of artides a givenissue might contain; for the same reason, articles could be short or long. Thejournal could be published occasionally rather than regularly depending onmaterial to hand. It would be sold at more or less cost price.Initially, its circulation could be minimal: today, a readership of half a dozenand tomorrow the world . . . .Back-issues could be reproduced either as a wholeor in part, depending on demand, simply by xemxing a mastercopy. Startingsmall would to keep initial costs very low; we could build up a readership bymeans of a 'network' of personal contacts depending solely on the quality of thematerial carried; there could also be some local sales. Thereby, problems ofdistribution could be avoided no less than the other problems mentioned above.Finqncial risks would be minimal, and we would need to aim onIy at producing a'readable-attractive' as opposed to a 'commercial-attractive' publication since i twould only be the quality and interest of our contents that was germane.The attraction of the scheme is its anarchism: it ignores all problems, allcommerce, all professional boundaries, all academic establishments, all editorialanxieties. We could publish matter which was esoteric, heterodox, inflamatoryand beyond every pale. Artides on anarchist collectives would sit side by sidewith articles on aesthetic theory; medieval theology could be juxtaposed withvenemous political attacks. There would be absolutely no need to write in apopular or accessible way, and yet there would be no need to write in anacademically respectable fashion either. The only material to be anathematizedwould be material which was boring. Through a minimalist approach to journal-production, we solve all problems by ignoring them and circumvent all authorityby attacking it, not head-on, but from behind its back.


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'I'D t a lk s k m t ' ccr ,cc~t ' f the s e l f ray rict ke a c c d stark. G.hzt i 5 t3eself i s sc;:-et?-;ins kc t i s perc ievcl rath er 5:a.n ccr.ceivc?? Pafk..er thanc?isc~ss i~ic ;"!ifferer,t ccn cs~ t io ns er?:a.?s t l ~ e uesticri s b u l ~ ~ c sr ~dif rerent i r , teqre tz t ic r is . C,r. the cther hm.Z ml-ke -the selfr' shculc? !:ec?.aracterisccl as a c c ~ s t r u c t c. t 3 a t f r m the cu tce t the sc l f i s viev:d asarchitecture. A ccnstructe6 self is a s e lf deniecl a lz s i c zuthenticity, k u trenders ?iscussicn atcut t? 're!,igious' s e l f c r a ' ~ c l i t i c z l ' e l f muck n creirrrr.cdi;;tely i l l t e l l i ~ i ~ l e .o c_.cfurther c;culc7 ke t c t a lk abet the variccs' lacjuz~esl cf the s ~ lso that the mrrect acla-a~lec?~er?ents r:zc?e a t th e:.c~ir,ninc_ l ~ te ' s e l f ' i s k i n 2 t rea ted ae a Cisccu-se ra the r than as a!:rute f r ~ c t . CL^ ever, if it CZSI 'cc $enie? th a t the se lf e x is ts p ~ ~ ~ . l ys 2'kr~:tefzc t ' (ar.2 ? - , c ~ e fu ly t h i s i s th e case c t h c n d s ~ here t ~ i l k.e ilotllirigfur ther t c ? iscuss ) , c ? t scre ~ o i n t l l o ~ . ~ c es t lc inac'e for tkerncic~ztict1a?;ler.x.!edincyof s~.j;jc;ctivit.,*h s t i s ~a rt 1- y ntailec' . i r , tl:e icaezcf selfriccc?.Tc s;:ez..l-. cf tke self i s t c at tcxp t to rcnc2er s ck jec tiv ity ~!:~jectivt.,=c:3 ereic.r? startin5 cf i r i sccl: 9 co1ltrac7ictory T t g ~ yecessi ta tes t!: ~ tl ~ e r ci s i~ c l e a r clean Ic~!;.in~inc_.Ile li.crd 'ccriceyt' 1 , i l l hcve to IG s a ten:: Gconvenicr.cc, arlii thc < i f i cc l i c s ir.vol VE.Z in =y cF.arz~ cterieaticr?.f t i ?eself as ' ~ c r ~ c e ~ t ' ,~e rcq : t ' , 'cor.st ruc tl , ' lanc _~ :a~ e ' ,r ir?i;2tcver e l s eZ C ~ ~ En nipcl.

'.JE r el st ic n sl il; t e t \ , e ~ n h ~~;+irer zn6 'rclficc2' m.2 tl c rc1a t i~ r~sh . i ;?ct~ ;ecr: he ~ u e s t cr au t1 ;entic ity arf! ~ t z l , ? - d ,:csit


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' ; ~ s u i t - ~ u r s c ~ r - ~ u r s u ~ - i ~i s e;2t the r-cticr; ~f tl:e s e l f as c se t , s tableenti ty i s rcjcctec ' in f i v c u of a se lf ccnsis t inc of a s ct of relat icnshirstilat rutual ' l?; inte rac t, anc I-zytecven el i r i n a t c one another.

The (Iistinction cf sel,'i:ccd aric? otl~erness eers tc be m in@scy:25leccnstituelit cf ~cnscicusr~ess.:e b s i c i te r of selfl?c& i s thediffe ren tiatic n ketbcen 're'm?. 'net-fie', arc? the prccess cf thisin c re as in ~ listincti.cn is seen as t l ,c process of rriturntion e.s. tile Frcccssof a kaky kccorrlir~a chile' 2nd a cFilc! kcccrrinc an aCult. Inscfzr as E:eii s ti n c ti c t, s e w s t c break &rm, consciousr,ess scms t o cease; as in ?eeysleep !bhevcr even .hen in ? e q s l e q ? it ~mcli . !s e a a t l eas t t l-ot t l.ere i ss t il l existence tcti: s ~ kect ive l y CL jecti vely . 'illere i s S& j ~ c t i v eexistence ir.sofar as :J,cn o n e ~~ ,d . e so a mnscicus r eaf fim atic n ofexist2rice t71e yeri& of 2ee:: z l e q i s inserted int c cne's l i ~e ar-ti i-ecccce: ticr:. Objec tive ly t3.e s l e e ~ e r x is ts s k p l y by tk.e f zc t ti ia t sue?! as l e e ~ e r an Le o'cserv&. This [mint i s i;ei~iq as e tc mderscore tkeckservz ticn t1,at t,.li i i 1 s t the -a1 f/other Gichotccy s ew s t c ke a liecessaqrccnetitucnt cf conscicusnesc, it Zces r o t sem, t c Ye s. necessary constitceritc csistcr.ce. TkLust l l e z b l i t i c n c,= the szl f/o tl-e r dic? ctcl y lca2 t oe i ther dcatl-L or er?li;ktement.Selfl-cc2 axc] ct1ien1ess n y sea: ea si l y dis t inc t kut tilcre are ,rr~Ller:~s, ti:i n terns of i ie nt i t y an2 cr',ccjiment. I f t ilere !;ere nc yr&ler--.S cf selfhorn-;id i.arcness, Z b t r ,evertl;cless l~cztcdi n tk e 1-reserit tense. Scch a s e lf c o ~ s i s t s f Zoth a cc,nscious self mc? a:~x;ccnscicuss e l f , c r- i~rture.f trans,arer?cy and c;:acit-. Cr: the c;tker ilxd,s e l 3i-i t rascer-2s a s i r p l e s p tr ic a l re la ti on sl ~i r i t l cthcmess when ite ~ c c l ~ t e r sk. .I n tire th e self cEn stmC outsiCc cf itself ( 'I sec riy self c'cillr, sosc') a d t e cm e alienatec' f ra i t s e l f ( ' I l-a te :>-self fc r ,.d!at I lif i') . I tcm alsc: ?c cl iscr ient~ted y scch a se;~ration ( 'I X. r.ct ~ryself d s y ' ) . Int h e tile zelf no lcr,c;er contains the sense of in-ediacy aRfiur3.t:- it llas i r ,i t s cnccmter wit31 s ~ a c e .Ctliemess can rean the irirrdiate world wt.ic1: i zriot s e lf (sycce) 'cut c a a lso rzan '&sent t ~ n s e ' tYie p s t mc7 the futcre.Ij;t,,~vvcr,t~ all^^^ fh e ' p s t s e l f ' a--


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leaves ar;. remzi~iiri$ oncefiticn cf selfk..ccS, stra2ec? i n the yreserit,cor!fine? t o the awarer,ess of in:.ediate senscr; ex,;erience as discussec2pxviously. I f selfl;ccC i s a1 owec' t o erbracc a1l three tenses C-,en thedmarca ticn k t~ re en e l f other b r ~ a k s bhn ven f~lrt i ler.The a t t a y , t t cot_'~ectiLC;Il?e s e l f i s essent ia l , fcr the se l f i s rcrc tkiar. suLjectivc,imediatc cxpericnce. Cnce irrmdiate sukjectivity starts t o ,:resent af u t ~ r e e l f o r p as t s e l f t o i t s e l f a s an o i j ec t cf ref lect ion it o t j cc t i f i e si t s e l f f o r it ccne I=eyor,d i t s cb11 imec?iate s ~ b j e c t i v it y . ?lc a t t a x t t cc t f~ c t i 5 ~ .k j t c t i v i t y enccUtcrs tir;-c, fc r C-rou ~hi r e the s e l f i scbjectifie? just as +iIirouc$~pec t he se l f iz cln jec t i f ied thrcccjhe-d-ir.-ent (ky ff .us I rc fe r t o the exrcrience of the kc4y as an ok ect i r ,spacc ~71:ongstotFer srat ial okjects, exyerience *at sees teycndirt.~xr:inc_the Fcdy as purely a '1-cuse cf s&j cc t i v i t y ' . )P u s tFe sel f i s cbjecti fiec? tI-!muyh erkcdbent mc? t r p r a l i Q - ( S ~ C C,C?t i r r~ ) . - lt crna tivcly, S,-~ce r4d t i r c are r 4 i a t e S f iuour_?~he szlf. ??lespa ti a l a -> alq -y f otl-enless 'surrcundir,c_' tl,o s e lf i s scr~~cstl -.cly tl.esurrow:i:in~ of the er ,ld ie r? s e lf tqr the ;-hysical a ~ r l c ? . f El is 1-ict~iresreversed, so Uiat otkerness i s surrom2ec' ky i t s selfl :cc~. it nzy 9ive mir,sk:.t intc t1:c ncture cf ' r r a l i s s t i cn ' arc! zlienction. 'Kcalisaticr, ' i-ayke t he e q ~-'cnceof the structcre cf tllc s e lf wkracinr; a l l , vWk.erea:;z l cnat icn r ay Sx t he ~ x~ mr i encef otllemess iitkiin a1l. Ar;:r via:;, I hcye t~sl CV? hat tlc sir-1 e v isicn cf a s2 l f surroundc? by ctherness brea1.s ?ownC ~ ~ C El reletiar,r;?:ip cf s e l f and tb z i s ccnsic'cred, fc r t"irocc;:? t h e tFcic7cr,tit;rc he scl f loses i t s essent ial uni ty i n the ;_rres~nt ,ul? t1;rcu~F;w-crl; an? ox,rcctation it kccores mch intenoven :lit0 tl-ectherness ofthc c,crld.'ExL'CC,SL cr TIC 3m'2.e only tense that an i i c i i a t e s ~ l ;j c c ti v it y ~ a s ccess t o i s t lLe resent,it i s sllut cff f r m the y ~ s tc?. the future. Traces of the ~ a s t s n,ercri,z1c2 kc,ces arid Tcars fcr the Euture 2s m t i c i ~ a t i o n ,ccrkrast : i i t i l the -ex~erience f the resent. The r c s t cthmcn c1iarzcterisatic:l of time i slir,ear contiruity i.e.

The srccess cf tir,,:cC--us c'ecictec? F.c:s RO c'e-rarcations ketvsen tl:e t e ~ s c s ,a ~ dlius 2ces not accor? wi t ; ? the se lf 's experience of ti re . This i s k ~ c a u s ~i n cx?crience tlie texses are di s t inc t a& r,ot ccntinucus, t ha t i ~ ,hey Ccfiat flow in to each ether. Liriear t b r broken uy. i n t ~ istinct tenses 1~0::slil.;t. this ~ a s t ?resent future

ibwever i n ~ r Z e r c r th e continuous l in e r n t ~ rc1;en up in tc stagcs t o 1:avel es cr ir -t iv e v ~ l u ehe present tense m c ld have t o envisaged as a rrovir.9i-xint alcns the l i ce - thus a t cne 'tk ze ' the present v.culd Le in the yas ta t c.i?otker i n the ~ r e s e n t

! \/ I4 I

s n l a t another i n t h e f u t u e


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lbvcver the r d e l t rcQ;s 2cv.n kecause the rresent tcnse i s Ze~ icted s thoth ir .9 ~ t o ~ c e , ~ a r t i t i c n n6 a rovinc ifiirit. 'Illis i s a l l t o say t l a t asubject Zces not txperier.ce t i r e 2s a lin cz r ccntiniritr,, t c t as three ter-sesraclically sl:ut cf f f r m each otl-Er. The unit- ' of tl?e t m L p r a l se lf i sszcrifiiccZ t c t ? i s seraration cf tY.e ter;ses, i.l!ich i s rnct ler boy cf sq-irirtk.at the ' f ~ t u r e e l f ' anG t5e 'past s e l f ' car never LT rrescrlt , m-c 7therefore the self can mver s e l f-containe?. Of cGurse the pa st s e l f cmbe l reserrt i n t he f cm c f i*mry, the future self can ke resent i n tilef o r , of a n t i c i ~ a t i c n , u t tfic f ab ri c of Loth i s i ~ t e n o v e c n t h the r c a l i t li r ? ~ d ~ i c ht i s placed. Tt;e past se l f an? the fu tu re se l f c m o t k e rcccveredi n tllcir 6istinctiver,ess, f ~ rhe F E T : C ~ cf th e r ~ s ts the r-w-crycfcvents, a d he m t i c i p t i c n c f t3e fu tu re i s a l so the s ri tici ra tion ofcvents. \+?;at ol lc ~: s s t irzt -the s e lf i s only dis tin ct a t t lLevar~isl-iiqp i n t c tFc present nnrent. clisc_r~3-;-aticallykct.~:as

9-1his v i e ~ il-:e presen t tense c.f tile =e l f i s nct a par t i t ion cf time, buttl-!cp i n t of c m ta c t btw een 1.ant and futu re, Y,u t y e t past future cm1:ever reet . ?"ye & p i a t t bhicll the pas t arid future tense :'otIi ari? do notr e e t ir: the 'v an is hi n~ 0 i r . t ' f tY,e present-rcrent s e lf the c&; cf?-eth t s c ' i s t in c t i v c ~ e s ~r~c', cb li te ra ti cn . :iowver cn ly by sacrificinc,i t s e l f t o the intmiroven i1e5 of eventr c m tY,e s e lf have e x is te ~ c e tha ti s , rove 'ce;;ofic; imct'Ziate sei:scry a\a re nes s) h ~ tuch e x i s t e ~ c e s kcc5'tn t tk;c >rice c.f t s f i st inct ivcces r.31is i-cex~sk;ia:;irlg alxut tl-;cs e l f as a c':_;narr.ic:pvc~entetcy-eeri tile tensesc . 9 tlie ;resent m.c7 t h e f ~ t u r e .Die 'lcrsuit of the s e l f ' i s t1.e ~ ~ a r s u i t3- f u t m e se l f a [:reseRt s e l f . 2 - i s pu rsc it carl kc envisa2d i r i eitllerq ? F r i t ~ a l r ra te r i a l terns . Exarples ivoul? k aApcalypt icCl ; r i s t iu i ty arc'I:xxisr-:. A lte rna tiv ely i n L ~ c l c 2 ~ i s ~he se l f ~ e & s i t s m,;r, k l i s s f u lz i i i l i i l a t i cn b;; m t e r i r ~l-ic- preserit rrment - the 'e te rn al ncv;'. Tie s e l f i~alierlatez insofcr as it i s shct cc t cf the e te rna l p r e s e ~ t Rf. confirled t othe otl;er ttr;o tenses i n t k e f o r : of r.eri,ory and expectaticn. T!!e cw:kis;ati.mcf r.'a.c,z-y ard exyectatior-, ;?rci!~ce


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rov W e~ ;t, he rciq c l cwinr_ auton-7 t c the rrcvz:.efit f r c r fu ture t c yr reec tas well as t o tkc yresc-nt-l;lccc? resl-crse. ??E cct-yet se l f i s then a~;autcnurr;cs ro v e ~ c n t r c i the f u t u e bkicl: enccmters t?.e frrcserit, i sa l so t 3 ~ :espnsc to that encounter; ff-~emvm ent cf return f r m the presentintc, the future.

I n s c f ~ r s the celf scehs r-ear:inc, in i t s quest :or au tl.clitic selfliccc: it I L\ , e l l anl:ihila te i t se l f . T r u t ? ? as external t o z~1fl:ccdezsily lesc-ls tc thec x t i r c t i c ~ l 5 t h e self . Cftcn this is ex pl ic i t ly rcccc ,n ise~ n re l ic ,ic r ,i2lcrc tl-E. ' f ~ l s e e l f ' i s ari cks tac le t c t k e rea lis at i on of trutl. , an? the' " ~ c e e l f ' i s ,I r i r ror L?ar_c, c r re fl ec tic n, cf Zivize crdcr. 'Ihe izcc zf accrres;-cr,ler,ce a l s o cccura ir. 1-hilcsc_cl~y.5. ::zral l e l s ?etv,een tl?e cc1f all


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c o s r . c l ~ i c ; l l s 1 .\,I-; i s t l ; c autoncr-ous s e l f a scvrce of ,ms s i t i l i t y as orr;osec3 to s vel-iclecf ~c te r i t i z l i ty ? nsofa r as a s e l f i s c c n s t i t u t d c -ctentihl it i s n a tself-cletenr.inec', for it ca rsct decic'c! f o r i t s e l f vyi.!iatt is , t u t i s i r , fzc ta vellicle for the ~ ~ ~ f c l c l i r ~ ~ ,f circm,stances yrcve pm ~ it io u s,of a ?re-detsn?ir,cc: se t c1 at t r i t i : tes . A s i t s ~ x t e n t i a l s :-re-civer, mc? not a rat terfcr the self 's om chcice, i t s a u t c n q i s c?enix'. If the rrGs~ects tiiefuture selE are :_?cn& CS ;xss ik i l t i e s t11a-i i t s au toncq i s reservec cl,althcvc'? the ;rck ler entere? then i s oce of ccntrcl , fc)r unless the s c lf i sm. arem


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elseL,l?ere here .,=S z r~arenessof tYAe rutual vu 1n erak il it; r cf thc 5 d s cnc!the p l i t i c a l a cth critic s. I f the i?ea of a r t i t r a y s p ir i tu a l r c l e i schal ler,c_cd, so xust the idea of arkitrar; y o li t i ca l ru le ke inevitzLlych- heciutcr,cm~ls elf to finZ a? cscare route i s to ccr ,s tmct '&a1 c n tc lc ~ ie s '~ l l e r she miverse i s ccnstrccted cn one princi~le d kmar,ity cn an~ther.Such dual o n t ~ l ~ i e snaklc it tc 'disccver' ob je cti ve l a ~ ~ sn the universe~d h i l s t r e se rv in ~ d i s t inc t ive a rem cf hm.ar, f r ~ e d a ior invcr'ticn. Theyaradisn G sn th ro~ccen t ric r ec kc i n a rreckir-iistic m r l d has recently teer.u-,


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Ti;e tr a d it ic n a l yre-rrc2ern idea of the s e l f corresimnds t o tlie cosr.mlcr,icals e l f . I t i s dminant i n a1l re-rrdcrr, r e l i ~ i o u s n< ~ k i l c s o ~ h i c a lys tu i ,~ .aLtcnmous self as a ~ o l i t i c a l alue i s rcCcrn, an2 ex is t s in t;;c1 ~ s t e n : c l i t i c a l theories cf likeralisrc m C sccial isr : , a l c l ~ l i i l o ~ ~ ~ lyin ex is tcn t ia l is r : sr,c! c cr e c-encral y i n secular t-!wx.isr;.,I;oc.jever tl eautor~crious e l f i s m cbj ect cf criticisrr; .rm the ciaiJsof ea r ly re l ig kn ,d;ic > st;ct;s i t s e l f as not c.caF,are of the distincticn, ar.C attac1.s crl tlieauto~.;crrous e l f cm a l s o ke :out2 i n t h e c!ialques lxtween Pl a tc and the2o:;t.lists. Frorr: tht l cosm l q i c n l view the f r e e c : ~ ~ ~f a u t ~ n m ~e ~ r e s e n t senSlaver.:cu~t c the values of the wcrld. True freedat; i s seen as lik era tic nfron: the v;orlS. of tl-:e senses ad!crresimrlCincjly as entry irito a hi!;Iierrea lp :!.c. the Luddklist iZea of L;irvana a s pure freec'm,. ::ere zk.solute t n t l 1and freecm are seer, as ccr~,ieI??entary, t as a ccntrhdicticn. !21ch are l i$ icus se l f can i : ~ een a s F.avin5 a twcrfc l l s t ruc ture -

hic_her self (2,;irit) tnit'r:se l f - o r e lf ( ~ C C i l l ~ : s i ~ n

i cstclm values of autonary x,i freedcar are seen as fzlse i f th i s invc~ lvessu? rcliraticn cf s1,irit (hiyher s e l f ) t~ec,c ( lav~cr elf). rrccl'or CS av ~ l u c,m 'ce trce or fzlse, 2e::endinc; or: bhicl: ,-.art cf t't- s e l 2 e n j q r s t l -efreedcl-.2~ Flarxist ccnce;:tion cf the s e l f i n s m ~ays appro xi~ate s c E lis vie\; i l isc far as it ,msits 'f z ls e consciousness' or any idea cf false ifitereet. Thc1:rcfcrence cf t?*e l ~ w re l f r u s t nct ';c rristzi:en fc r the i ~ t e r e s t f I3,ere al c r 'licker s e lf in re1ic; icn s~ii! n bTar:tisrr tliere i s E? s L ~ i2r2 iz t i n c t i ~ n f in te res t al.tl;ccch it ice s r,ot ycstulatc a 'l-;ic::er s c l f ' .Li::rrali..-, I-m;ever, a t l e a s t i n i t s r u e s t o r le a s t unac!ulteratec? fcnr ( i fit i s a t 2 1 1 ~ c s s i i ; l c o t z l f : cf such a thir.c;) C w s n c t rccu;r!isc a p s c i k l ecol?-;lict of i n t e r c s t w ith ip t h e s e l f , a t l c c s t i n t c m s of autl~entici ty .IJtl-ou$ diere ra> ;,e ccr,Elictins yrefera:ces *.c sc l f i s seer, as thc~ 1 t i : ~ t eereree c ir,ci cc t3e s ta te? reference i s t&en c t face value. n'iicf ~ n - . u l ao lvcs tl:e zroblan of attrikutinc;. in te re st s contrar; t o exi-resse2~-refcrenc .3~,ut a t the price of icnorins t l ic yrcl-la!. c the ' ; i ~ g p ~lave'.I t i s r;c nc ral ly ck-.aractcristic of lil:eralicr: t ha t it regircls t?:e s e l f azsA~r.cr,yr,,cusith tl:E unitary in2ividual.A ~ rc k le r rof the sclf mcou~lterc? n kct?? re l ig icus p l i t i c a l i 2 e a ~ silct.~c, ccn ce~ tual ise ke selZ i n scch a h-.zy th at account i s t,ll;en of ic tL1. t l ,e kasic inte


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m,(: on;! of reli;i cn tliat a~?y&als o a s c i r i t u a l essence in *.e s e l fayat mxy actua ll cy--erztea ~ a i n s t aticnzli ty- . In certzin scir i tual schenesrz t iona l i ty i s p resent& z~s s t ~ b l i r ~ c ;locl; t o f u l l ;?trzcrlal re alis atic n,I i n the utterances of Jesus in the 1%~:Testarent but a l s ~rec ec tly re-disccvere? i n tk.c itest i n tl:e fcnr! of ~en), . ,here raticmlit-- i sx i i~ s t r-men ta s e l f-interested rz tic na li t y ( t5c -err, ra t i c m l agent), cadsuch rcascninq q : p s e s enlis1:terment. -11e rna t ive ly, *.ere i s tlie view thatrecscn, .-il lils t nct m ir:gt+.irent, ne ve rthe le ss cannot take t>e se l f t kev,hale ~ x - ,o e t a t the s e l f , 11avir.c~ ead-lei the of reascr;, td~.es the' l e ap c? f a i t h ' t c et t o t he o t t ~ e r id e.Civen t ? ~xcsss of ir ra ti ol ia lit y tllat i s often Zisclayed i nLehilviour, tlie raticnal actor thecjrist n,a-;l wish to p s i t tllc concept of avu l t ip l e s e l f i n orckr t o save the p s r - i t i l i t l j of a raticnal ex~jlanatior,.Alterz~ativel;l,re1ir;ious and p sy ck ca a lt ic v i m s 1.0~12 rcsue f or a s e l fp r t l y c ~ n ce a le d r m i t s e l f , and S& ject t o unccnsciccs ra tic na lrctivaticns. Such s striclien s e l f t:oclc? nee2 extern al I - .~ lp n crdel- t t oresolve the prci:ler~, and such external help i s clvai lzhle *rc~;F: Craycr, tl:er. sy d-i at ri st s ccuch, or finS.irc; the ric;ht sum. Inscfar as the d.isease cfthe se lf is 2. soc ic ta l Z i ~e ase e lp cmes in tlie f o n cf raCical p l i t i c sari2 revclutic~n,air;.ecl h t re a li si n s ci.rocp rea lis ati cr, ar,< ~ i~ u tu a lemr_niticr,.Cr, C;c ct1:er i;md t'le sicjness : E the elf I T E ~ e c7ue t o toc, rnuci:' i :e~~l iss iveness '? rapid sc ,c ia l chance. T1:e urichecked a p p l i c ~ t i o n fraticnalis~:: c t31c scc ia l st ru ctur e irzy lezcl t o c'ncxie wit'::in the s e l f ,y.:bich fie& a c er ta in l e v e l of secure f a ~ i l i a r i w . I:cn irckLed of sucl~secure fx .i il ia ri ty , t?:e s e l f acquires tkie ur:ent ncccl to re st o re sc~i-ethinc_.tF.at is 'kmtm', m 2 suc5 an at tm pt , 5einz intir m tely lirrkcc! kiith c:error--,lezds to the recreaticn of p s t anC ~ a s talues as t l e cn ly sa lva t iv efcr the anxiety an2 insecurity suffered by livir.5 i n tlie present. Iri suci-12.hay L l c ;=st t d i e ~ n a nev; life, refashioned 2s a scc.t?;inc~ lte rn zt iv e t cthe !-.resent a n C used t o lc;itinise the ' ~ c ~ u T I ~ 'c Fast s~ u r io us a lues( ' s ~ : u r i o ~ s 'kcausc Fcy have Peen invented tk xc u~ ll ea r cf the pressfit zric?t i~en lmkcc? bk-ith tlie f a l s e l q i t i r a c y of tk e ; - ~ s t . ) uch c?eceit ray hzvci t s uses i f it rq-resents tl:r:e l a s t r e so r t :er a fraq-erite2 aid m ~ -, ic e lfr,o lcr.c_erak le t c t e a r the ;-.zir,cf l iv ins i n g - e s t z t e cf mntinui:::mccrtai::ty t'ii~ts tl c ~ x e s e n t ense. I:awver Z G C ~ surrender a1r:ostccrtair:ly clces invclve the atdicaticll of reason 2nd a re tr e a t frorr: theI r n W 2 ~ 2 o kc: ' ..l siicilar zc,rt cf cscapisr; car, '2 clari< n encl.?mtrrent, t?;e s~?: ject of c a i yfclk talcs. :;ere the s e l f ' f o r ~ e t s ' t s e l f e ith er tllrocck, a s z e l l c r t o ta lZevction t o sccethinc; c r scrieo~e lse. r?,e attrxticri cf enc1iantr:tnt rzLprecisely ke t 1 e l c s s cf s e l f m? the r e l i e f t h a t it kri1x;s. Ttle rrokle r. i sthat it clces nct usual l> a s t , k u t ihen it enck, tlie !.-&eninc; a drediscoveq- cf the sc l f i s usually just a s ruch, a reLief z.s the i n i t i a ler,chm.tr,ent ( i n a difir 'crent co~tcxt lris ex;lair,s *.c sr53ilr;uity f e l t overthe disenck~ru;trentof t1.e worl? by science). ?".X Sanser of enchmtrer-it i st l a t it i s a f a ls e sc lu t ion t c 'Jle Lxc blerof the se lf , for the se lf i snever re a l l y los t , jus t fc rc ~t ten . ??ea ~ c e a l f er~chillltrent s tillat it i san imitaticn of ti,e real G,inc, f ~ rhe fcra3cstZesire cf tke s e l f i s s c l f -nec;aticn, fc r kctk the autonaous self an? the c ~ s ~ m l c q i c a le l f \:is11 t e ~ckeicn2 the s e l f ancl tllus riesate th.e se l f , a l t11o~:~hc r S if fercn t enc:s. Cxtau tl~ent ic clZliocd csnriot Ye won a t the pri ce cf te rp ra r, : cr,ck..antrent,hc!,~verenjclnhle it m y 'ke, m(? herefore ;:art cf the price cf attainin2authezt ic s e l f l~ ca ' s tea rins at..a-1 the ve i l s of enchantrent an5 entcrinc the2isenchanttd ~ n r? . Eot1-l the ccs:.mlqica l s c lf xL6 lie autonmcus self kaveto uc 3e r~ o iscnchantrrent as 1-art of th ei r jccm gr.


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The cosnc1oc;ical s e l f and ti:c clutcna~cus elf have servs2 as a startinsp i n t Icr a discussion of t l ~ e e l f . E ar l ie r l:c'c.;ever, th c pz in t vias rradethe c ~ s i m l ~ j i c z le l f rrzy rrc,re 1: rc ~ er ly c s ty le2 tEle ' n i i~c t ic ' e l f i nviev of i t s b i t a t i v e furiction. Ect can t ? ~ c inetic self ke rrcre :;rol:orlyrecjardei a s Gne as1;ect of c o s ~ m l q i c ~ le l f? In ny view it cai. T h e i6eacf the cosr;clm;ical s e l f i s "chat it sees a unity ' ietwen i t s e l f ar-c?thecosccs. A tree cnity ~mu12nct irc,zly th a t t he se l f p lay& a purely k i t a t iv e;:art, fcr th is & lac es ca much stress on c!etcm!inim:. 'I?;erc has alc;a--7s k ~ c na place i n r~ i c~ icns nd ccsr.-clcc,.ical scl~emes or th e creat ive a idexpress ive freedcm of Vie se l f ( i n Ckx istianity this i s tlie teachin2 tkatCcc;! has civen Free b:il l t o the limafi race). If truth m d frce(3.a; arc 11ctlccatec! ir; a c ~ s fi os h a t s t m d s a y i n s t tFie s e l f , kut in s cosn.os thatexists tlirouy1; and i n th e se l f , where se l - r e f le c t i~ n s kotk~a ~ z r o ~ e r t yf3 :e s e l f at;(: he universe k e c m i n ~ elf-a m re, t?-ien the ccsnc;lor,icnl selfa l i l ( . J . ke s t y l d the ' cc s~ ic ' e l f . I:cw fa r i s r imet ic se l f ioc l an aspiraticntcoiar2s ccsric selfiocc!, and lu3w f a r i s it a Llcckec! mc?mutant mm cfmsr;:ic selC.lccci?*.c c?utor,cr.ousse l f too , rz-- be m;;os& cf contrz2ictory elcrcnts. F.cascni s G ~ , r i r . : ~ ~ .rycrtancc fcr the autcnoi~nczs e l f , &?cl yet the cver-reliancec,n r-ascn can lea:?cci17 ar e l at i o n t c the ccsr~s. ot2: ccm -cet err? the arerla of cm uit-- , c\itlic?lczn1-~t vievve2as a si;liere of ~ - . L - I L Y ~r~cZcn. r as ~;.:~.diatictlcet~.;~ene l f an203srrcs. T'~. l ter~at ively ,Y:e in ?i vi Z ua lis t autc.r,cmus s e l f can view theCcrr:rr,it\:2s s; tf-xeut t c ix rzcnal EreeZor;: (c.2. Lil:eralisc*., Finarcl~isr-.),th e c c s r o l q i c a l se1.f tax tc l:laceci ir, c5 ~x ;cit icri o t2-!e ~ ~ i ~ ~ . i t y.:]i


15/80

Tr

11.c ac cncrc ~ sc l f ?CELL l i v e i n an autcncr ous msr;cs cr c c l ~ ~ . ' ; u c tC L I G ~cntc;10-2. L iC ,er v a A 7 kmm e::istence becm es rcC ic;ll ly 'c&er,-ecdci'. ?l;crec?:! ?X nc ficcil t n t 5 s , rc ,r als , ac:tkctics, zr16iric_s.Zecausc tl-c i d e ~ fi .~mir:c s veq: nuch in sc ri te tl i n t ~k,e ic'ea G prr.cse, a pr,-cszlesscosi~cs s e.re;.,teneC w i f f , i x i c ~ n e xi rig lc s s ccscos. ~ c e z rceCcxL ontixuet c hzve a value in fliese c i r c ~ ~ s t ~ c e s ,r (:G xe r l c - t ask \i?.etkler ir. cr; i z r , i n ~e r s . a r l C f r e ~ i c ~ ~s no t ms.r,inc,J zss tee? Sircilarly, cm *ere ttE".-~ resl autIL&r,t ic i tyl ? s. ccsmloc;ical !,crld!U.at Genies ,'rcec:cx~ Zcr thesa1.1-.of trctl~?Lees n c t c t,crlZ c:c.;rived of 'r~mzr, rcelcr: Lccw


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The Centre of PsychologyPsychology is a science in which the object of study can be the same sort of thingas the studier. "I study human beings", or, more radically: "I, a self, study the self."As psychology tends on the one hand to biology and on the other to sociology,things are more straightforward, studied and studier are clearly differentiated: "I, aself, study genes" or "I, a self, study groups." Both genes and groups may berelated to selves, but they are not selves. The problems come when you say: "I, aself, study selves." It is not that objectivity is impossible, it is that empathy andobjectivity cannot be distinguished. This is, at one and the same time, the essenceof psychology and the most difficult area of psychological study. And it is, ofcourse, the area which arouses most passion in psychology. Freud recognised itsimportance and welcomed it. Eysenk recognises its importance by responding to itas a threat.It is both important and difficult to think scientifically about this subject. Thisparadox is not surprising when we note that we are attempting to grasp the natureof the thing that does the grasping, but we have no direct (e.g. sensory)information about it, as we would have if we were examining the hand or the eye.In addition our language is used by this self (or is this self) to illuminate otherthings: it has no obvious use as a way of illuminating the self itself. Even theidentification "self" risks the false hypostatisation against which Craik cautions us.We must try to avoid giving substance (in its literal sense) to something to whichthe idea of substance is inappropriate. The problems of language here are evidentin my use of the word "thing". Literally, I risk reification. I am, however, comfortedby my dictionary which gives as i ts first definitions of "thing", an assembly,parliament, court, council. This at least stops one using words ("thing", "reification")uncritically and reminds one that definition is no simple business and shouldperhaps be ignored except in a rough-and-ready sense.Note that this key area of psychology: (a) is disregarded by most psychologists(not recognised as important) (b) has not yet been properly examined (those whohave examined it are peripheralised) (c) is difficult to exmamine.Psychologists must both encourage research in this area, and also, crucially, beaware of the central importance of this area of study for the coherence of thesubject as a whole. Without "the study of the self by the self" we have nopsychology. All we have are separate sub-disciplines which seem to have somesort of affinity, without anyone quite knowing why.Murdo Macdonald


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NOTES ON 'CLASS'

Richard Gunn

1. It is much easier to say what, according to Marxism, class2not than to say what class is. A class is not a group of-individuals, specified by what they have in common (their income-level or life-style, their 'source of revenue' , their relationto the means of production, etc.). The proletariat, for example,is not to be defined as a group 'as against capital1 (Marx 1969 p.173). Nor is class a structurally or relationally specified "place"(or "position") in the social landscape (a place which individuals

Imay occupy" or.in which, as individuals, they may be 'interpolated',etc. . The difference between "empiricist" and "structuralist"Marxisms, which respectively treat classes as groups of individualsand as "places", is in this regard a trivial one. For want of a moreconvenient term I shall refer to the view which treats classeseither as groups or as places as the 'sociological1 conception ofclass.

2. Marxism regards class as, like capital itself (Marx 1965 p. 766),a social relation. That which is a relation cannot be a group, evena relationally specified group; nor can it be a position or place(a relationally specified place) in which a group may be constituted,or may stand. Setting aside such views, we can say that class is therelation itself (for example, the capital-labour relation) and, morespecifically, a relation of strupgle. The terms 'class' and 'class-relation' are interchangeable, and 'a1 class is a class-relation ofsome historically particular kind.

3. Class relations are production relations, but care is needful ifthis seemingly straightforward statement is to be understood.According to Marx - and in contradistinction to the "Man1' of thedeterministic 1859 Preface - relations of production are not onespecies or subset of the social relations (e.g. the "economic"subset) but rather the social relations as such and as a whole. 'Therelations of production in their totality constitute what are calledthe social relations, society, and, specifically, a society at adefinite stage of historical development' (Marx 1952 p. 28). Thisbeing so, it may seem tempting to construe class relations as one


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species of the production relations. I propose that, on the contrary,class relations just are the social relations (i.e. the totality ofthe social relations) grasped as production relations: the stake inclass struggle is the power - understanding "power", here, in somethinglike the sense given to it by Foucault (cf. Foucault 1979) - inscribedwithin the social production process, and every aspect of everyindividual's social existence is of relevance to this struggle, is boundup within it and is affected by its outcome. As will become clearerlater on, the concept of class throws the notion of society as a totalityinto relief.

4. So also does it throw the notion of society as a mediated articulationof agency and struggle into relief (cf. Gunn 1987). It is not thatclasses, as socially (or structurally) pre-given entities, enter intostruggle. Rather - holding fast to the conception of class relations asrelations of struggle - we should think of class struggle as thefundamental premise of class. Better still: class struggle is classitself. (This is how Marx himself introduces 'class' in the openingsentences of the Communist Manifesto: we learn first of all of historyas the history of class struggles and only subsequently of the specificclass relations of 'freeman and slave, patrician and plebian', etc. Theorder of presentation is all-important.) That 'class struggle' isintrisic to 'class' is Marx's point when he stresses that existence 'foritself' - i.e. oppositional, struggling existence - is intrinsic to theexistence of class (Marx 1969 p. 173). The primacy of class struggle inthe definition of class corresponds to the primacy which Marxconsistently accords to active over passive (institutional or structural)categories: for example private property is the 'consequence' ofalienated labour rather than vice versa (Marx 1959 p. 76). This primacyof class struggle is Marx's rendition of the Hegelian thesis that asocial world 'is not a dead essence, but is actual and alive' (Hegel1977 p. 264).

5. I shall refer to the conception of class as a relation (a relationof struggle) as the 'Marxist' conception of class: here, more thanconvenience dictates the terminological choice. Notoriously, what Ihave called the sociological conception of class faces the embarassmentthat not all individuals in bourgeois society can be fitted, tidily,into the groups which it labels 'capitalists' and 'proletarians'. Thisembarassment is produced by the conception of classes as groups orplaces, and to escape the embarassment sociological Marxism has recourse


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to categories like 'the middle classes', the 'middle strata', etc.:such categories are residual or catch-all groups and, in short,theoretical figments generated by an impoverished conceptual scheme.The Marxist conception of class, on the contrary, faces no suchdifficulties: it regards the class relation (say, the capital-labourrelation) as structuring the lives of different individuals in differentways. It allows the line of class division to fall through, and notmerely between, the individuals concerned. The contrast in this regardbetween the Marxist and the sociological conceptions of class can beillustrated, very roughly, as follows:

THEMARXISTWEW-

p mm . I - w ~ - - w L I - w ~ -THE PURE" ' MIDDLECUSSES, ' 'PURESOCldLOGICM. ~DDL&STRA'A,EIZ. WII;(L:ww- II 1t ; CtASSL--...----.I-I)---I( 'U

Not least, this illustration is rough because the difference in the waysin which the capital-labour relation structures the lives ofindividuals in bourgeois society is as much qualitative as quantitative:a spatial diagram can only be "undialectical", abstracting not onlyfrom qualitative distinctions but also from the 'sheer unrest of life'(Hegel 1977 p. 27) - the unrest of struggle - which characterises theclass-relation in any given case. (The model for such spatial diagramsis the Figurae of Joachim of Fiore, which become redundant once thespiritual intelligence they summon has come into its own: cf. Reeves1976 p. 13.)

6. What qualitative forms can the structuring of our lives by the capital-labour relation (once again, a relation always of struggle) take? The


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form to which Marx especially attends is that of expropriation/appropraition. Other forms include inclusion/exclusion (Foucault),identity/nonidentity and universality/particularity (Adorno), conservat--ion/expenditure and homogeneitylheterogeneity (Bataille) andincorporation/ref sa1 (Tronti, Marcuse) : the list is phenomenologicallyrich, and open-ended. At once praxis and process, class is both thestructuring of our lives through struggle and the structuring of thissame struggle by the patterns hitherto imposed - imposed through struggle- upon our lives. In this way, although class struggle is alwaysI'spontaneous" (in virtue of the primacy of action over structure), asheerly immediate spontaneity is a contradiction in terms. What classstruggle does is place at issue, in struggle, the mediations which giveto that struggle its characteristic form or forms.

7. One difference between the Marxist and the sociological views, asillustrated in para. 5, above, is that on the Marxist view the 'pure'worker, situated on the extreme left-hand side of the diagram, whosesocial being falls entirely under the heading 'labour' and who is (unlikeall the intermediate figures) in no way divided in and against himself orherself, is in no way methodologically priviledged. Neither is the 'pure'capitalist. Both, rather, are merely limiting cases and, as such, theyare seen only as figures commingled with others is a diversely-structuredcrowd. The sociological view, on the other hand, treats the 'pure'worker and the 'pure' capitalist as methodological pillars between whichthe web of intermediate classes is slung.

8. This difference is important because, according to Marx, the 'pure'worker does not exist. This isnot at all because of a relative declinein the numbers of the "traditional working class" (however this ttheoretically suspect group may be defined). On the contrary, it is

1becuase the wage-relation itself is a bourgeois and mystifying form(Marx 1965 Part IV): whoever lives under its sign - even, and especially,the fully-employed producer of surplus-value - lives a life divided inand against itself. So to say, his or her feet remain mired in explotationeven while his or her head (which is thereby tempted to construeexploitation in terms not of surplus-value but of ''low wages", i.e., interms which are mystified) breathes in bourgeois ideological clouds.Accordingly the line of class struggle runs not alongside, but through,the individual by whom surplus-value is produced (as with, say, thefigure standing second-to-the-left in the diagram). Here, again, thereis no embarassment for the Marxist conception of class which is interested 1


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in the specific ways in which the capital-labour relation structures,antagonistically and self-anatagonistically, particular lives. But thenon-existence of a proletariat in all its purity deprives sociologicalMarxism of a needful methodological pillar and so can only bring thesociological conception of class to the ground.

9. A further evident difference between the two schemes is that theMarxist one speaks of a single class-relation (the capital-labourrealtion) as obtaining in existing society whereas the sociologicalscheme acknowledges as many such relations as there are possiblecombinations of social places or groups. For this reason the'sociologists' accuse the 'Marxists' of reductionism. In fact, it isagainst the sociologists themselves that the charge of reductionismmay properly be brought. The sociologists want to situate eachindividual, unequivocally and without remainder, in one or other of thespecified groups or places: a "cross-categorial" individual cannot beallowed to appear in the picture which the sociologists draw. The pointof the sociological proliferation of middle classes, middle strata, newpetty bourgoisies, etc., is to find some pigeon-hole to which eachindividual may be unequivocally assigned. Hence precisely the ways inwhich, in class terms, individuals are divided in and against themselves- the numerous and complex ways in which the geological fracture-line ofclass struggle runs not merely between, but through, individuals - enterstheoretical eclipse. In this fashion, the 'pigeon-holing process' of thenon-dialectical understanding (Hegel 1977 p. 32) falsifies the experienceand the praxis of struggle itself. The Marxist conception of class, bycontrast, avoids any such reductionism and brings the experientialrichness of individuals' (self-)contradictory life-texture into fulltheoretical and phenomenological light. The banal charge that Marxismreduces the lived experience of individual subjectivity to a play ofimpesonal and sheerly objective "class for~es''~s least of allapplicable when 'class' is understood in its authentically Marxistsense.

10. A related point is that the Marxist conception, unlike that of thesociologists, does not construe class in terms of the bearing pg thisor that social role. From his early essay 'On the Jewish Question'onwards, Marx castigates, as alienated and unfree, any society whereinrole-definitions (or a "social division of labour") obtain. Far fromtaking on board role-definitions as a methodological principle, theMarxian view depicts the individual as the site of a struggle - of his


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or her own struggle - which brings not merely the "universal1' (role-bearing and socially homogeneous) but also the "particular" (uniqueand socially heterogeneous) dimensions of individuality into politicaland theoretical play. Neither in theory nor in practice do role-definitions such as "proletarian" or ''bourgeois'' (or indeed "man" orT Vwoman" or "citizen") represent Marx's solution; on the contrary, theyfigure as one among the problems which 'class' in its Marxistdesignation is intended to resolve.

11. What form might such a resolution take? Here, only the briefest ofindications can be given. Social roles are mediations of class struggle,i.e. they are modes of existence of class struggle (cf. Gunn 1987): asmediated in terms of roles, class struggle exists in the mode of beingdenied. This is so because, quite regardless of their character orcontent, role-definitions abstract from the class relation and from thestruggle in which that relation consists. Even the role-definitions of11bourgeois" or "proletarian" or "capitalist" or "worker" make thisabstraction inasmuch as they substitute 'sociological' for 'Marxist'views. In this sense, something quite like class in its sociologicalmeaning does indeed exist in capitalist society, but only asl Iappearance" or in other words as an aspect of the fetishism to whichMarxism stands opposed. Like vulgar political economy, sociologicalMarxism takes appearances at their face value and casts itself upon themercy of the existing order of things.

12 . Hence it is no surprise that, as between the Marxist and thesociological conceptions of class, yet another area of difference ispolitical. The sociological view advertises a politics of alliancesas between classes and class-reactions (or rather between theirrepresentatives, these representatives being located more or lesshierarchical organisations since, without hierarchy and authoritativeleadership, the notion of "alliances1' makes little sense): moreoverit ascribes to the 'pure' working class a priviledged - a leading orhegemonic - political role. No question of such alliances arises onthe Marxist view. Nor, on the Marxist view, does the 'pure' workingclass (e.g. the employed as opposed to the unemployed, the "direct"as opposed to the "indirect" producers of surplus-value, theproletariat as opposed to the lumpenproletariat, those whose labour


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as opposed to "declining" classes a monopoly of revolutionary interestof force: such specifications only make sense when classes are seeenas places or as groups. Finally, the whole notion of a vanguard party(together with its diluted variants) is overturned since thedistinction between "advanced1' and "backward1' class-elements disappearsalong with the sociological conception of class itself. In sum: whathas traditionally passed as 'Marxist' politics is in fact sociological,and authentically Marxist politics amounts to politics in an anarchisticmode.

13. Inherently, the forms of such a politics cannot be determined inadvance. If classes are not groups or places but relations of struggle,then insofar as revolutionary conflict takes the form of a conflictbertween groups (but it does this always imperfectly and impurely) thishas to be understood as the result of class struggle itself. It is notto be understood sociologically as, for example, an emergence of pre-given classes - at last! - into their no-less pre-given theoretical andpractical "truth". The question before the individual is not on whoseside, but rather on which side (which side of the class-relation), heor she stands; and even this latter question is not to be understood interms of a choice between socially pre-existing places or roles. Notonly quantitatively, but also qualitatively, class struggle remainsinherently unpredictable and "surprising". The Marxian conception ofclass focusses sharply the issue of choice with which class struggleconfronts us, and in doing so it disallows appeal to any role or placeor group in which (according to sociology) we already stand prior towhatever commitment we choose to make. It disallows this not leastbecause it depicts us as torn by the force of the class struggle inwhich, in a class society, we are always-already consciously orunconsciously engaged.

14. A final area of difference as between the Marxist and thesociological conceptions of class can be indicated. The sociologicalconception, whenever it seeks to establish Marxist credentials, alwaysbecomes economic-determinist. This is so because the only "indicator"of class-membership (class, here, being viewed sociologically) whichMarx's writings even remotely supply is that of a common relation to themeans of production. Besides being related to the means of production,however, individuals who are class-members (or who are class-interpolated) find themselves related to the state and to "ideology"to say nothing of their local church or football team or pub. Hence, at


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once, the sociological conception of class generates a schema ofdiscrete social 'levels' or 'practices' or 'instances' (Althusser) andmust address the question of how these levels are related. The answeris well-known: in the last instance 'the economic movement...assertsitself as ne~essary'.~n the last instance, in other words,sociological Marxism amounts to an economic determinism with, to besure, long and complex rather than short and simple deterministic (i.e.causal) strings. To claim, as Althusser does, that such a theory is(becuase of its complexity) no longer deterministic is like claimingthat a machine is no longer a machine in virtue of the number ofcogwheels its motor drives.15. With the Marxist conception of class, everything is different.Marx's distinction between class 'in itself' and 'for itself' is to betaken as distinguishing, not between societal 'levels' (cf. footnote 4,above) but between the sociological and the Marxist conceptions ofclass themselves: if a class only becomes such when it is 'for itself'then political struggle with all its unpredictable ramifications anddevelopments and expenditures is already built into what sociologicalMarxism treats as the economic ''base". Whereas sociological Marxismattempts to unite levels which it assumes to be discrete, and on thebasis of this starting-point and problem can only fall back uponcausalist and external relations of however 'structural' (Althusser)a kind, Marxist Marxism moves in the opposite direction and drawsdistinctions within a contradictory totality, i.e., within aninternally and antagonistically related whole: 'The concrete is theconcrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, henceunity of the diverse' (Marx 1973 p. 101). As the diagram in para. 5makes clear, the totality of the class-relation which is specific to,for example, bourgeois society (the capital-labour relation) is present- wholly present, though in qualitatively different ways - in each ofthe individuals who form that society's moments or parts. Conversely,inasmuch as class relations qua relations of production encompassthe social relations and not merely, for example, economic relations(supposing these latter to be capable of independent abstraction), allaspects of individual existence - and not for example merely theeconomic aspect - are class-relevant and class-concerned. The essentialthing was said long ago by the early Lukhcs: 'It is not the primacy ofeconomic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisived-ifference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view


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16. Along with 'the point of view of totality', and in accordancewith the Marxist acknowledgement of all aspects of individualexistence as class-relevant, a wholly novel conception of classpolitics is brought into play. Once "politics" is seen (as it is bythe sociologists) as a discrete social level the litmus test of theexistence of class 'for itself' becomes the formation of a politicalparty of a more or less conventional - which means: a bourgeois -kind. Seen thus, even a vanguard party amounts to a variation on abourgeois theme. However it is not Marx, but rather bourgeois society,which distinguishes (again as a mediation of class struggle) betweenthe levels of political state and civil society - cf. 'On the JewishQuestion' - and which prescribes the former as the arena wherein socialgroupings in their maturity (which is to say: in their conformity) maycompete. The Marxist conception of class, or in other words 'the pointof view of totality', rejects precisely the narrowness of theconception of politics which the sociological conception of classentails. On the Marxist view, the category of "politics" becomesCO-extensive with individuals' experiential existence and as wide asthe forms which class struggle unpredictably takes. Not merely is noissue excluded from the political agaenda; the notion of politicalagendas is itself excluded since any such agenda (the stock-in-tradeof alliance-forming heirarchical parties) excludes and marginaliseswhatever does not fall within some theoretically pre-establishedpolitical domain.

17. All this said, it is to be conceded and indeed emphasised thatwhomsover so wishes can derive 'sociological' wisdom from Marx'stexts. Certainly, and especially in his so-called political writings,Marx was not always a Marxist. Nonetheless, unless the Marxistconception of class were in fact Marx's, the circumstance that Marxwrote Capital would be unintelligible. It was Marx himself who, longbefore his critics and revisionists, pointed out that as capitalismdeveloped the numbers of the 'middle classses' could be expected togrow (Marx 1968 pp. 562, 573); and yet he writes a book, entitledCapital, in which a single class relation (the capital-labourrelation) is the theoretical "object" addressed. This conundrum canbe resolved only by taking his remark about the middle classes to besociological, and by reading the main argument of Capital as Marxistin the above-specfied sense.

18. The above notes claim neither to completeness nor to the provisionof a defence at all points of the conception of class which they have


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attempted, schematically, to restate. Their sole aim has been to makeclear some of the issues which a Marxist understanding of classentails. As regards evaluation of this understanding: the suggestionmay be hazarded that the line of critical questioning which seemsmost fertile is that which asks whether the class relation (in existingsociety, the capital-labour relation) is the sole relation of strugglewhich, in all its righness, structures our lives. And here there can beno question of supplanting Marx: other such relations - sexual and racialrelations, for example - are mediated through the capital relation justas, for its part, it is mediated through them. (For brief comment, seeGunn 1987.) Inquiry as to which such relation is "dominant" remainsscholastic if one tries to pursue it on a methodological and a prioriconceptual terrain: rather, it can be pursued only in concretelypolitical (which is also to say phenomenological) terms. Both politicallyand methodologically, the great superiority of the Marxist over thesociological view of class is that it frees Marxism from every taint ofthe determinism which Marx castigated as amongst the most murderousfeatures of capitalism - the tyranny of 'dead' over 'living' labour, orin other words of the past (as in all determinist schemes) over thepresent and the future - and to which from start to finish his bestthinking stands implacably opposed. This is so because the single themeof Marxian "class analysis" is the finely-textured and continually andunpredictably developing struggle which, for Marx, is the existence ofclass per se.

AcknowledgementsThis paper, an earlier version of which was presented at the PanteiosSchool of Political Science, Athens, and at the Fordism seminar in theDepartment of Politics, University of Edinburgh, owes much toconversation with John Holloway. Filio Diamanti made me realise that myunderstanding of 'class' required clarification before discussion ofit could even begin.

Notes1. This much at least is clear from the final, fragmentary, chapter


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Marcuse (1968); Tronti (1979).4. The view that the "ideological" mystification inherent in the wage-form leaves the class-purity of the worker uncontaminated dependson treating production and ideology as discrete social 'levels' or

instances, as does the reading of the class in-itself/for-itselfdistinction criticized at paras. 15-16, below. On 'levels', seeparas. 14-15. In passing, it is worth noting that the conception ofideology as a discrete level (however specified) remains whollymysterious, if only because social existence without remainder -for example gender distinctions, architecture, work-discipline andscientific knowledge - carries with it an ideological charge.5. For a refutation of this charge see Sartre (1963).6. Engels to J Bloch, September 21-22 1890 (Marx/Engels n.d. p. 498).Althusser's distinction between 'determining' and 'dominant'instances amounts to a permutation of the same theme.

ReferencesAdorno T W (1973) Negative Dialectics (Routledge and Kegan Paul)Althusser L (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New LeftBooks)Bataille G (1985) Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939(Manchester University Press)Foucault M (1979) Discipline and Punish (Penguin Books)Gunn R (1987) 'Marxism and Mediation' Common Sense No. 2Hegel G W F (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press)Lukhcs G (1971) History and Class Consciousness (Merlin Press)Marcuse H (1968) One-Dimensional Man (Sphere Books)Marx K (1952) Wage Labour and Capital (Progress Publishers)Marx K (1959) Ecouomic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (ProgressPublishers)Marx K (1965) Capital Vol. I (Progress Publishers)Marx K (1968) Theories of Surplus Value Part I (Lawrence and Wishart)Marx K (1969) The Poverty of Philosophy (International Publishers)Marx K (1971) Capital Vol. I11 (Progress Publishers)Marx K (1973) Grundrisse (Penguin Books)Marx K and Engels F (n.d.) Selected Correspondence (~awrence nd Wishart)Reeves M (1976) Joachim of Fiore and the Prophetic Future (SPCK)Sartre J-P (1963) The Problem of Method (Methuen)Tronti M (1979) 'The Strategy of Refusal' in Working Class Autonomyand the Crisis (CSE Books/Red Notes)


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P i l i o Diamanti

"Class" i n Marx's thought and beyond

To define what class r e a l l y is s t i l l remains t he main problem ofmarxist p01 i t i c a l thought. If th e problem was one of pu re ly "academic"discussion there would no t t o be a problem a t al1 ,bu t on t he contrary the"identification" of what class is ref lects a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s andconfl icts . This is s o because,if we ar e ab le to def in e th e concept then wew i l l have a gre ater degree of succes ful implementation of a c t i v e po li t i c s, agreater understanding of how the c l a s s s t r u g g l e -i n i ts own f r u i t f u l forms -develops, of how the s t a t e re ac ts - to the exten t th at is a cl a s s st at e- of h01i t gains legitimacy,of the r o l e of the po l i t i ca l par t ies ,of why there is a necf or c l a s s a 1l ances-if there is one-of what "hegemony" is and why it isimportant and so on.

I n s i ~o r t , e w i l l be ab le t o def ine the power re l a t io ns wnicn ar i s e f r athe cl a s s divided society,and t o expl ain t he s t a t e power that is based on thi:div isi on ,because c l a s s re la t io ns ar e always power rel at io ns t o th e extentth at t he meaning of c l a s s shows the e ff ec ts of th e st ru ct ur e over th e c l a s spr ac tic es and th e meaning of power th e re s u l t s of th e st ru ct ur e over th ere la t ions of the c la ss pract ic es of the c lasse s i n s t ruggle.

W e w i l l s t a r t our discussion by giving some definitions of what classmeant i n Marx's thought and i n st r u c t u r a l i s t marxisn a s w e l l .

Marx's ident if icat ion of social class:- concept and its t h eo r e t i c a l basis

The key words i n Marx's own a na ly s is of c l a s s a r e a s fol lows:

ownership of the means of productionco nt ro l over t h e means of productiondivis ion of l aw urproduction of su rpl us valuerelations of productionforces of production

and the thre e necessary elements of which c l a s s i n i t s ex is t ence "for i t s e l l f 'consists:

c m u n i ynat ional associat ion

pol i t ica l organizat ion


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-27-and of course the unified essence of the concept is :the c l a s s s tr u gg l ewhich shapes the class relations between the different classes and withinthe class.

"Class" has been defined objectively and subjectively by Marx.Objectively we have the "class in itself" (Klasse an sich),subjectively the"class for itself" (Klasse fur sich) the main difference is that the secondconcept brings into the discussion the notion of "class consciousness" (seeGyorgy Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness). That is the class is aware ofits own interests and it has been organissd into a political organisation inorder to fignt for its" imnediate" or llfundamental" r" ultimate" interests .

The concept of class in Marx's thought is one of a single verticalrelation between the ideal capitalist and the ideal worker only in abstracttheoretical terms. In real terms the relation betwsen the capitalist classand tne working class shaps a wnole spsctruin of class relations including theintermediate classes which are either "remainders" of the simple commodity modeof production i.e,the old petite bourgeoisie, (small shopkeepers, artisans etc)and the peasantry. Or they are new fractions that arise within the capitalistmode of production and which,because of their positlon in the social andtechnical division of labourtare either capitalists nor pro1etarians:i.e. thenew petty bourgeoisie wnich consists of managerials, professional workers etc-in shorttunproductive abour-.The existence of all these "intermediate layers"is mediated by the dominant capi tal-labour relation.

According to Marx the capitalist mode of production is characterised bythe polarisation of the two main c1asses:on tne one hand,the bourgeoisie and onthe other hand the new class which arises from the depths of indusrtial societythat is, tne proletariat.

But Marx's polarised notion of class does not exclude wnat ne cal led"ideological classes" as Kapi tall 0l.l~p.420) or the "middle classes"- infact he talked aDout tne expansion of them (Theories of Surplus Value) - whichhe believed played a distinctive role in the reproduction of dcmination(reproduction of the relations of production) especially the petty bourgeoisie.'Which "...has been formed fluctuating between the proletariat and bourgeoisieand ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois ~ociety'~,(Manifesto of the Comnunist Partyt1971,p.63). The bureauracy and thereactionary peasantry. The latter does not constitute a class according toMarx (see,The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte).

Marx used the word llclasslls a term for structural ly generated groupsthat engage in conflicts over existing arrangements of social structure.These classes are distinguished from each other by the difference of theirrespective posit ions in the economy. Since a social class is constituted


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-28-by the function which its members perform in the process of production,thequestion arises why the organization of production is the determinant ofsocial class. Marx's answer is contained in the early writings on philosophyespecially in his theory of the division of labour.

Who belongs to the "working class1'? or What Marx meant by nproletariatl'

Objectively according to Marx W can define as "working class" theindustrial proletariat,that is,the manual workers who are directly involvedin the process of production and exploited by capitallthose hose own propertyin tneir labour power which they sell as "free and equal individuals" in thelabour market. Labour power is a peculiar cmodity because it is the only onethat produces more than its maintenance cost. That is,surplus value,which isthe main theme of capitalist production,is being expropriated by thecapitalists. We have to say that the production of surplus labour is not tnespecific characteristic of the capitalist mode of production:the specific oneis that this (absolute or relative) surplus value which arises from surpluslabour is being exploited for the sake of capital.

This is the economic definition of the working class or the proletariat:absence of private property, absence of control over the means of production,continous pauperisation (see,Manifestot1971,p.79)

On the other hand the bourgoisie has the ownership and control over themeans of production,and private propertry as a result of the a1 ienatedlabour.(see Manifestot197l,p.79)

Objectively tnose ideal types form the two antagonistic classes ofcapitalist society but what about the subjective definition?

A class becomes a class for itself when its members realise theirdifferent mode of existence (separate mode of life, interests and culture). Buthis is only the first step,and we should stress tnatthis realisation comesthrough the process of class struggle which might not have the form of ageneral social upheaval but of some particular form of class con ict. Thesecond step is the formation of a political organisation which represents itsspcific and particular class interests because for Marx tne hiynest form ofstruggle was the political one ,in his words:"...... the conquest of politicalpower by the proletariat" (see,karl ~arx/~ried3ich ngels,The Manifesto of theCmunist Partyt1971,p.50). This was one of his main disagreements with theanarchists like E3akunin wno insisted on the primacy of the econoinic struggle,i.e.of struggle over wages.(see,Mikhail Bakunin, The Paris C m u n e of 1871 and


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the Idea of the State,Anti-Authoritatian Socialism,Bakunin on Anarchy).Of course in order for the class to be organised, first of all it should

have a community of interests,a national association and a poiiticalorganisation.

Marx stresses the importance of these elements in "The EighteenthBrunaire of Louis Bonaparte," with reference to the peasantry: "that is formedby simple addition of homologous magnitudes, tmch as potatoes in a sack forma sack of potatoesl'.In so far as mil lions of farnil ies l ive under economicconditions of existence that separate their mode of life,thelr---pinterests and their culture from those of the other classes, and putthem in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far asthere is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants andthe identity of their interests begets no cxmnamity, no national bord and- --o political organisation anong -,they do not foxm a class. They are- ----pconsequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name,whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot representtnemselves,tney must be represented. Karl Marx,The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte,in Marx/Engels,Selected Works,Vol.l,Moscow, 1962,p.335,emphasisadded).This is an example of a supporting class.

There is no problem with the definition of the proletariat or with sayingtnat the manual workers objectively belong to the working class. The problemarises with the "ideological1* lasses or the "intermdiate layers" whostand between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat because of the differentpositions they occuppy in the social and technical division of labour. Marxused different categories to define tnese different positions between andwithin the class(es). Marx refered to the luinpenproletariat as "social strata",he also used the term "fractions"to indicate the different sections within thebourgeoisie i.e.,the financial, cmercial capital etc. These fractions ofcourse belong to the bourgeoisie and they do not constitute a distinct class.They only have different functions but operate within the capitalist class. InMarx 'S own words:"..ITYle same conditions, he same antagonism,tne sane interestsnecessarily cal led forth on the whole similar customs everywhere. Thebourgeoisie itself, with its conditions, develops only gradual ly, splitsaccording to the division of labour into various fractions....." (KarMarx,Friedrich Engels,The German Ideology,Part I & I1 I Lawrence and Wishar t,London, 1938,p.48) . Marx also used the term social categories ,i.e for thebureaucracy, or tne intellectuals.

Nicos Foulantzas in his book "Classes in Contemporary Gspitalisn"discusses the importance of these definitions. He refers to the marxist conceptof - social formation" which comprises more than one mode of production so


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-30-we can define more than two classes involved altnough tne main antagonlslnalways lays between the two dcrninant classes which in the case of thecapitalist mode of production are the bourgeoisie and tne proletariat.~ccording o him :"The marxist theory of social classes further distinguishesfractions and strata of a class, according to the various classes, onthe basis of differentiations in the economic sphere, and of the role,a quiteparticular one in these cases, of political and ideological relations. Thetheory also distinguishes social categories, defined principally by theirplace in the political and ideological relations: these include the statebureaucracy, defined by its relation to the state apparatuses, and theintellectuals, defined by their role in elamrating and deploying ideology.These differentiation~~forhich reference to political and ideologicalrelations is always indispensable,are of great importance; these fractions,strata and categories may oftenfin suitable concrete conjuctures, ass- therule of relatively autonomous social forces.

" It is none the less the case that we are not confronted here with'social groups' external, or above classes. The fractions are class fractions:the corronercial bourgeoisie for example is a fraction of the bourgeoisie;similarly, tne la~our ristocracy is a fraction of the working class. Evensocial categories have a class membership, their agents generally belonging toseveral different social classes.

" This is one of the particular and basic points of difference betweenthe Marxist theory and the various ideologies of social stratification thatdominate present-day sociology." ( Nicos Poulantzas: Classes in ContemporaryCapitalism,NLB,LondonIl975,pp.23-24)

Having these in mind we can proceed with the analysis of the"intermediate layers" whicn play an important role in the reproduction of therelations of production.

Which are these "intermediate layers"?


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NEW P R OURGEOISIE

"It can never be sufficiently stressed that the distinction betweeenstructural class determination and class position is not a distinction betweeenan economic determination and a political/ideological position. Classdetermination involves objective political and ideological places just as muchas class position involves conjuctures of econanic strugglen.(ibid,p.2k18)

Poulantzas uses primarily two concepts to define class position. The first --one is the distinction between productive and unproductive labour and thesecond one is the divison between mental and manual labour (in the sense of whoholds the knowledge as power,and who does not.

Also he uses the marxist term social and technical division of labour andsupervised and unsupervised labour. SO the key words in Poulantzas analysisare as follows:

mental/manual labourproductive/unproductive labourdirect/indirect producers

supervised/unsupervised laboursoclal division of laourtechnical division of labour

social formationpolitical scene

relations of domination/exploitationstructural deterininat ion

con ucture

According to him social classes are defined as in the lengntly quotationbelow - which also serves the purpose of a good summary of his views-:

l 1.l'hey are groupings of social agents,defined,principally but notexclusively by their place in the production process,i.e. in the econanicsphere. The econmic place of the social agents has a principal role indetermining social classes. But from that cannot conclude that this econanicplace is sufficient to determine social classes. Marxism states tnat theeconmic does indeed have the determinant role in a mode of production or asocial formtion;but the political and the ideological (tne superstructure)also have a very important role.

l 2. For Marxisin, social classes involve in one and tne same process botn


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-32-class contradictions and class strugg1e;social classes do not firstly exist asuch and only then enter into a class struggle. Social classes coincide withclass practices,i.e. the class struggle, and are only defined in their mutualopposition.

"3. The class determination, while it coincides with tne practices(struggle) of classes and includes political and ideological relations,designates certain objectives places occupied by the social .agents in thesocial division of 1abour;places which are independent of the will of theseagents.

"It m y thus said that a social class is defined by its place in theensemble of social practices,i.e. by its place in the social division oflabour as a whole.This includes political and ideological relations.Socia1class, in this sense, is a concept which denotes the effects of thestructure within the social division of labour (social relations and socialpractices).This place thus corresponds to what I shall refer to as thestructural determination of class, i.e. to the existence within classpractices of determination by the structure -by the relations of production,and by the places of political and ideological domination/subordination.Q;ASSES EXIST ONLY IN THE CLASS

I' 4.Tne structural determination of classes,which exists only as theclass struggle, must however be distingusihed from class position in eachspecific conjucture-the focal point of the always unique historicindividuality of a social formationtin ther words the concrete situation ofthe class struggle. In stressing the importance of political and ideologicalrelations in determining social classes, and the fact that social classesonly exist in the form of class struggle and practices,class determinationmust not be reduced ,in a voluntarist fashion, to class position.Theilnportance of this lies in those cases in which a distance arises betweenthe structural determination of classes and the class positions in thecon ucture." (~icos oulantzas Classes in Contemporary Capital ism,NLB,London,1977,~~.4-15)


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-33-Table --PHACTICES/CLASS STRUGGLE

STRUCTURAL DETERMINATION/CLASS PLACES

CONJUCTURECLASS POSITIONS

IDEOLOGY

m ro U ideological struggle2. f i 2(D P, HV) V) 0)g POLITICS

V) ZL, relations of politicalT v

p. 60 0tl C political strugglecn 33--rr7 ECONOMICSP, relations of production

relations of exploitationeconomic struggle

Concepts of strategysocial forcespower ~ l o c'(peopl "

What does Poulantzas mean by "unproductive labour"?

Ccmwrcial employees are an example. He wr ites:I10f co~rse,thesewage -earners are themselves exploited,and their wages correspond to thereproduction of the labour-power... The cmercial worker....adds to thecapitalist's income by helping him to reduce the cost of realizing surplusvaluetinasmuch as he performs partly unpaid labor... Surplus labor is thusextorted from wage-earners in cmerse,but these are not directly exploited inthe form of the dominant capitalist relation of exploitation,the creation ofsurplus val ue.I1(ibid ,p.212). E.O. Wright states Polantzas'views as 01 1ows:"Theworking class is defined by the fundamental antagonism within capitalismbetween direct producers,who are separated from the means of production andproduce the social surplus product in the form of surplus value, and the


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-34-bourgeoisie, wno own the means of production and who appropriates surplus valucUnproductive wage earners ,while clearly not members of the bourgeoisie,do notcontribute to the production of surplus productland are thus not directlyexploited l1 (Wright,Erik Olin,Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of ClassStructure,Pol tics and Society,Vol.9,no 3, 1980) 323-37(6,p.345)

But Poulantzas also insists that class positions cannot be definedsimply at tne level of economic re1ations;political and ideological formsmust be taken into account as well.

"Eblitical relations" is a determinant of class position especial lywhen these are concerned with relations of supervision and auhtority:I1~hework of management and supervision under capitalism is the direct reproduction,within the process of production itself, of the political relations betwseenthe capitalist class and the working class." (Poulantzastibid.,p.227). Theseindividuals,or better,class members should be placed in the new pettybourgeoisie even if they engaged in productive labour in the productionprocess.

"Ideological relations" are used by Poulantzas mainly to refer to thestatus division between mental and manual labour. To him the importance isnot who is a white-collar or who is a blue -collar worker but who holds tneknowledge and who is excluded frcm that. Thus,for example, a white collartechnician occupies a position of ideological domination of the working classbecause of the ideological role of "expertise" within capitalist society. Theimportant thing for the reproduction of the capitalist relations of productionis that the working class should be persuaded that it is incapable oforganizing the production process on its own and is always in need of the"experts",the "mental" labourers. So Poulantzas argues that even if theseexperts do not supervise anyone, and even if they are productive ~ ~ D O U K ~ Kmental labourers should still be placed in the new petty bourgeoisie.

The distinction between the working class and the new petty bourgeoisieis defined primarily by the distinction between productive and unproductivelabour and secondarily by the relations of political and, ideologicaldomination and subordination.~he ivision between the petty bourgeoisie andthe capitalist class is analyzed pri~narily n terms of the relations ofownership and the possession of the means of production. Here what is importantis not legal ownership or possession but ownersnip and possession, that is,tnecapacity to exercise the rights arising from these relations.

The resemblance between the old petty bourgeoisie and the new pettybourgeoisie that makes both of them to constitute a class is the same"pertinent" effects that their economic relations have at tne level ofideology: anti-capitalism of the status quo, belief in upward social mobility,


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-35-indi~idualism~desireor pomr. As Poulantzas writes:" The traditional pettybourgeoisie has its economic basis in smal -scale production and/or smal -scale ownership but is not directly involved in exploiting wage-labourtincontrast the new petty bourgeoisie comprises non-productive salariedemployees. The latter are not directly producers of capitalist camnodltiesbut they are involved in reproducing the conditions of surplus-valueproduction in their capacities as circulation workers,engineers,civil servants,teachers,etc." (Nicos Poulantzas,Fascism and Dictatorship,NLB,London,1974,pp,279). But its (petty bourgeoisie as a whole) unity is expressed not at the -level of the economic relations but "to the extent that the different economicentrances of its different functions produce the distinctive results at thepolitical and ideological levels."

Poulantzas' analysis of social classes which are defined according tothe marxist tradition primarily by their position in the relations ofproduction, and most important through the "class relevant effects" ofpolitical and ideological practices as elements in a system of classdomination, is very important because it does not leave space for tnereductionist notion that everything depends on terms of revenue ordistributional categories (i.e., the wage-earners) , the wage-earning classon the one hand and the capitalist class on the other handfa mystificationbecause this "wage-earning" class is treated as being a homogeneous totalhich is equally exploited and shares the same ideological view of the world.(see,Bob Jessop,Nicos Poulantzas,Marxist Theory and Political Strategy,MacMi1lan,Hampshire,~ondon, 985)

It is also important because it helps us to understand the role ofideology and the way the coercive state apparatus gains legitimacy by using itsideological mechanisms (through real persons, .e. ,the "experts" who executethis task by reproducing the ideological relations of domination at thepoint of production for example),and also the role of political struggle whichfor Marx himself was the important thing (see, The Capita1,Vol 1, and hisanalysis of the Factory Laws and also his statement in the ComnunistManifesto that "Every class struggle is a political struggle").

Poulantzas' analysis also explains the role of the party as theorganisational form of a class. A class comes to the field of politicalstruggle when it passes tnrough the stage of trade-unionism into its politicalorganisation stage: that is, the working class party puts forward the interestsand demands of the class and organises it . Of course his notion of the partymight be criticised from apostles of the l'spontaneous organisation" but theimportant thing is not to be "nominalists'',who merely consider words andnames, but to look between the lines. m e olitical party represents the


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-36-Machiavellian "Prince" in Gramsci's thought,the "vanguard" in Lenin's thoughtbut we have to ask whether a non-hierarchically organised party would not bethe real organisational form for this modern capitalist society . Beyond"spontaneity",organisation of some kind is still necessary because we stillexist within an antagonistic society and a "non-partp party,non-hierarchically organised is still necessary.The question of class alliances is stressed by Poulantzas. According tohim class alliances are first of all different from the a1 liance within thepower block; secondly they are necessary in tne class struggle because theyprevent the isolation of the working class from the other progressive forces insociety especially under conditions of emergency (i.e.a dictatorship); last butnot least the working class should always have the primacy (see his critique ofthe 5th Conference of Cominter in:"Fascism and Dictatorship" and his ideas forthe United Front ).

There is no embarassment in talking about class a1 l iances and even more inadopting the idea as right; Marx himself was not against it. His only worry waswho will have the primacy,or if the alliance was of the right kind inaccordance with the partners involved, and how the working class could benefitfrom that partnershipttlTneommunists fignt for the attainment of tile i~rmediataims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; butin the movement of the present,they also represent and take care of tne futureof that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with theSocial-Democrats ...... eserving ... he right to take critical positlon inregard to phrases and il l usions.... (~anifesto,971,p72) they (theCommunists) labour everywhere for tne union and agreement of the democraticparties of all countries."(Manifesto,l97l,p.74. See also The class Struggl~in France, The Civil War in France, The Eighteenth Brunaire of Louis Bonaparteand Bakunin's accusation of the "authoritarian" cmunists who believed in thefurther developement and organization of political power through an alliance ofthe proletariat in the towns with bourgeois radicalism: see,Bakunin, ~nti-Authoritarian Socialism).


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Having in mind the above marxist analysis which does not claim the Pope's"infallibility" let% see the "authentic" marxists' interpretation whlch on thecontrary regards itself as the only existing true "understanding" of Marx'sown thougnt.

We will pick up few points from tne ocean of its "true" knowledgelinorder to show that does not hold any charismatic priviledge at all.

It is much easier to say what,according to "authentic" Marxists', classis not than to say what class is because the former is their explanationwhich comes after an analysis based on individualistic anarcnism illuminatedwith a Hegel ian phenomenological l ight.We will agree with them that a class is a relation of struggle whicn cantake different conflictual forms but we have to stress that the important thingis the relational group which forms the material basis of the class.

We will disagree with their reductionist notion that a class is a relationitself because this seems to be a relation witnout a subject. Relations do notfight,concrete individuals are the ones who struggle,who make their own historyin Marx's sense.

We will disagree with the notion that there are no pregiven structurallyconstructed places within the relation because as Marx said men make their ownhistory but not as they like because they react within pregiven conditions. Ofcourse there are not pre-given entities entering into struggle but on thecontrary class members occupying different places in the social division oflabour and different positions in the technical division of labour. Classmembers c me, tnrough tne process of class struggle,to the realisation of tneirparticular interests and through that to their particular class existence. Marxdefines this notion in "The German Ideology": separate individuals forma class only in so far as they have to carry on a ccmnon battle againstanother c1ass;otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other ascmpetitors. On the other hand,the class in its turn achieves an independentexistence over against th

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