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MEMORANADUM FOR THE RECORD

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Event: Tom Kinton

Type: Interview

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan and Bill Johnstone

Team: 7

Date: November 6, 2003

Participants (non Commission): Tom Kinton, MASSPORT; Chris Moore, Counsel forrvIASSPORT; John Alteri, Counsel for MASSPORT

Participants (Commission): Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan

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Location: Goodwin Proctor LLP, 1 Exchange Place, Boston, MA

Background

[U] Kinton is Director of Aviation for Massport, which includes responsibility for LoganAirport, Hanscom Field and Worchester Regional Airport. He has been with Massportfor 27 Yz years, all in aviation. He served as the building control supervisor, manager ofbuilding maintenance, director of airport facilities, director of operations (1988 - 1992),and director of aviation (1993 - present). He was Acting CEO for the authority fromOctober 2001 till April 2002. He stepped up to this last post "with a lot of pride" in atime of need; "It was trying times."

[U] Massport is a-multipurpose port authority covering bridges, maritime facilities(including containerized cargo and cruise ships), several airports, and a developmentdepartment that handles properties around the waterfront. Those are the 4 primaryoperating departments managed by the authority (including legal, labor relations, andhuman resources staff), with a chief executive officer who reports to the Board ofDirectors. The Governor appoints the Board to 7 year terms (staggered). Kinton'simmediate supervisor is the CEO.

Security at Logan Airport Prior to 9/11

[U] Kinton reported that Logan met the federal standards (FAR, certificationrequirements) by which it was governed, and in many ways, exceeded those'requirements, which Kinton saw as a minimum standard. He cited as examples ofLogan's leadership its requirement for finger-printing for those seeking access badgesprior to the federal requirement for the same, its hiring of more canine teams (for

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detection of explosives) than required), and its development of a "laser" team of 5 or 6state police officers with a specific assignment to check airport security (via ill checks,SIDA challenges, door checks, etc.). This last was in place by 1999. Finally, thoughmore a safety than security matter, the fire department was required to have a volume offoam and water triple the federal standard and to able to get to the end of the furthestrunway in 2 minutes or less.

[U] Kinton and the other airport officials wanted to be leaders in the field, and to go overand beyond the minimum required by the federal government. He felt like he always hadgood support from the Executive Director and the Board to do so.

[U] Kinton reported he got along very well with Federal officials, including the CivilAviation Security Field Office (CASFO) at Logan, and the Federal Security Manager(FSM) at Logan. He was aware that there were some "issues" between certain CASFOofficials and the FSM.

Security Threats

[SSij Mr. Kinton reported receiving "broad based" threat reports, with nothing specific toLogan, or to a particular methodology or group. They developed "Go Teams" to learnlessons from specific safety and security incidents around the world, with a mandate to"picture the accident at Logan" and come back with recommendations. He indicated theysent a team to France after the Air France hijacking. Joe Lawless went on that trip tolearn as much as he could about storming the aircraft. For instance the stairs used to getin the plane must be adjusted depending on number of people in the plane and how muchfuel it has on board.

[U] Kinton indicated that the State Police, the FAA and sometimes the FBI were the mainsources of intelligence. The Director of Public Safety for the airport (Joe Lawless prior to9/11) oversaw the state police at the airport and anything that came to him from thatsource would be communicated to Kinton. FAA threat reporting came from variousintelligence sources, including the FBI but there were times the FBI approached Logan.directly. When something significant happened with respect to security, Kinton felt thathe wouldn't have to wait for a staff meeting or anything like that because Lawlessnotified him right away when it was something he needed to know.

[U] With respect to information on the terrorist threat, the FBI approached Massportabout members of Ham as and Hezbollah working at Logan for Massport and an airline,as well as about a cab driver at the Airport associated with the Cole bombing .

..'~. Kinton recalled that the FAA (in the form of the CASFO or FSM) came to him fiveor less times pre-9-11 and provided him with general threat information he had to read intheir presence and sign for. He assumed Joe Lawless was given the same information.None of it concerned specific threats, and it was mostly about overseas threats. Herecalled references to al Qaeda, but not to the possibilityof suicide hijackings or aircraftas weapons. He had no recollection of the 2000-2001 Pat McDonnell CD-ROM

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presentation on the terrorist threat to civil aviation. The FAA presentations didn't requireMassport to take any actions, but Kinton was told not to share the information. He wasconcerned because "information sharing is absolutely critical to the people on the frontline in the war on terrorism."

Security Vulnerabilities

[U] Kinton received reports on security vulnerabilities at Logan from Joe Lawless (andthrough him, the State Police), the CASFO, the FSM, occasional Joint VulnerabilityAssessments by the FBI and FAA, and possibly an assessment from the military sometime ago. The main issues generally involved insuring that\

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Checkpoint screening

[UJ Kinton was frustrated by headline reports in the Boston Globe in the late 1990s,based on FOIA filings for FAA checkpoint screening test results. He felt it was"ludicrous that we undress ourselves in the public arena" with respect to securityvulnerabilities. He had to go before the Boston media and explain that Massport was notin control of checkpoint security.

[U] After the Globe stories, Mr. Kinton recalled discussions with Joe Lawless aboutLawless's plan to test checkpoints. However, according to Kinton, the plan "never gotoff the ground." While Kinton thought it was worthy of further discussion, there wereconcerns, especially about Massport's lack of authority with respect to the checkpoints.The division of responsibilities was long-established and there were good reasons. Forexample, the airlines didn't need to know how much foam and water Massport hasarranged with the fire department to bring to the middle of the runway.

[U] Kinton indicated that he wasn't holding the conversations with the FAA about rollingout such a program of testing. That was being done by Lawless. Before the programcould proceed any further it needed the approval of Massport CEO Buckingham as wellas the Board. Prior to that, the Lawless plan was raised at a LAMeD meeting ofstakeholders at which both the air carriers and the FAA expressed objections.

[U] Shortly after the LAMeO meeting, the Lawless testing plan was discussed at aMassport senior staff meeting, which Kinton missed. He was represented by Ed Freniwho reported to him that the plan was not approved. Kinton understood that the programwas not necessarily rejected but that it was clear that the details needed to be worked out(including liability issues) before it could be seriously considered for im~lementation,Furthermore, the testing would have been fod ' ~ land not aboutthe kind of weapons used on 9/11. Apparently, there were no mmutes)p' 'en.

[U] Kinton recalled that Logan was to be involved with the FAA,.iri' a joint testing pilotprogram, but he didn't remember anyMOU on the subject.'

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Security Resource Issues

[U] Mr. Kinton thought that security camera coverage at the airport was important.Camera installation was included in many of the new construction projects at Logan. Thenewest garage had surveillance cameras installed as did the new international gateway.Kinton did not recall any details about surveillance camera proposals not being funded,nor a study of the need for such equipment. After 9-11 Massport "rushed out" and didthe checkpoints and the cameras have subsequently been used effectively to decidewhether or not to dump a concourse or go looking for a specific individual who hasbreached security. In Kinton's view, the cameras can also act as a deterrent. He didrecall a discussion of a CCTV program throughout the airport. This was a largerprogram, related to access issues, but it was not funded pre-9/11.

[U] Kinton stated that as of 9/11, Logan was in the midst of a $4 billion dollar rebuildingof the airport. He "absolutely" felt the airport got what it needed with respect tosecurity, such as more cruisers, K9 teams, and a weapons of mass destruction trainingprogram. There was never a period when security received inadequate support. Safetyand security was always at the top of the mission list.

[U] The airport had a five-year rolling capital improvements budget for majorinfrastructure, including such items as bomb trailers and robots, dive team truck, snowplows, and CCTV. There was also an annual operating budget, which funded securityitems like the Laser team, and travel for the Go Team. Lawless and the other seniorairport staff were given an annual performance appraisal which listed "5 or 6" prioritygoals and objectives for that year.

CTI Audits

[U] Kinton cited the CTI security audit as a good example of something in the budgetwhich was funded out of Lawless' department. Kinton didn't recall whose idea it was,but thought it was a smart thing to do. The purpose of the audit was to do a security riskanalysis at all Massport properties and to determine what could be done to improvesecurity. He recalled that pre-9111 Lawless shared with him a memo he sent toBuckingham on security threats. Kinton also saw the final CTI report on portals, whichhe thought thorough and professional, prior to 9/11, but he didn't have any interactionwith the larger CTI audit at that time.

[U] Kinton reported that he saw a "first draft" of the larger CTI security audit while hewas serving as Acting CEO after 9/11. He indicated that it was customary for suchreports to go through multiple drafts before the final version was produced. When he sawthe draft, he was "outraged." While approximately 52 pages (which constituted the bulkof the report) were done professionally, neither he, nor his deputy (Freni) nor CEOBuckingham had been interviewed or asked to participate and the editorializing by a"junior" CTI person was inflammatory and untrue. (Kinton never received anexplanation as to why he wasn't interviewed.) In consequence, Kinton took hiscomplaint to the president of CTI, stating "you can write what ever you want to write but

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you better talk to the right people." Subsequent drafts were produced and the final reportwas much more professional, in Kinton's view.

[U] A report by Israeli security expert Rafi Ron was done in conjunction with the CTIaudit. That report was designed to add the international angle (post-9-11) to cover allperspectives. The two reports are used as today as guides for Massport security efforts.After media accounts critical of the final CTI report appeared, Len Limmer, who hadworked previously with Rafi Ron, was brought in to provide an independent summary ofthe CTI audit and the process by which it was produced. Limmer produced a final threepage summation to satisfy the Board's concerns about what the press was saying.

[U] Kinton believes that the Lawless memo to Buckingham (on the security threat toLogan) was the basis for contracting with CTI for the security audit and the results of thataudit and the Rafi Ron report were the roadmap for the later improvements. Kinton alsofelt that the Carter Commission report recommendations were useful.

The Day of September 11,2001

[U] On 9/11, Kinton reported that he was in Montreal; at the Airport ConferenceInternational conference with most of his counterparts from the major airports. He was inthe exhibit hall that morning and at around 8:20 AM he spoke with his deputy, Ed Frenhi,who reported that everything was okay in Boston. While eating breakfast shortlythereafter he heard someone say that a small aircraft had hit a building in New York CityHe had Sam Slimor of his staff call Logan Operations, and Kinton was told that "theywant you right away." The report from Logan Tower was that "all hell's breaking loose;"a plane had hit the World trade Center and American Flight 11 from Logan had beenhij acked, but it was not clear whether it was the plane which hit the WTC.

[U] Kinton then called the office and Lawless was already there in the conference roomwith Frenhi and they were telling him what was going on. They were planning on callingthe FAA and Air Traffic Control to get any more available information. He didn't recallbeing told about any communications with American Airlines. He told them he wouldreturn right away. He went back to his hotel, where he saw the CNN footage of thesecond plane hitting the WTC. He was back on the phone to his office and his secretarytold him Logan was being closed down, so he rented a car to return. He spoke withLawless who confirmed that Flight #11 had hit the WTC, and Kinton then directedLawless to open the Emergency Operations Center. Subsequently, he got confirmationon UAL #175 and he heard reports on the radio about an aircraft heading toward theCapitol, the Pentagon being in flames, and that there may have been a third planehijacked out of Boston. His feeling was "we are under attack."

[U] He was met by a State trooper at the Vermont border and got an escort to Concord,New Hampshire from where he flew back to Boston. Shortly after crossing intoVermont, he heard reports that the suspect Delta fight had landed safely in Cleveland andthat the WTC had collapsed. He arrived in Boston at 1:45 PM and went immediately tothe Emergency Operations Center. Lawless and Freni gave him a briefing which

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included information on the discovery of Atta's rental car at Logan, and on the call fromthe American flight to a Supervisor in Boston which had reported that box cutters hadbeen used, that a passenger arid crew members had been stabbed, and that the aircraft wasflying too low and too fast over New York City. The call apparently had continued rightup to the point of impact. He also learned that an American crew member had made callsto Dallas, and that calls were made from UAL #175 to Chicago.

[U] Kinton learned that flight manuals and the Koran were found in Atta's bag that didn'tmake his flight from Portland. With regard to the Atta car, Kinton was informed that apassenger that left Logan in the morning had called back to report a suspicious incident inthe parking lot. This report led the airport authorities to the discovery of the car. Later inthe day he saw the manifest for AAL #11 and the names of the hijackers "jumped out atyou" in hindsight, especially the AAdvantage member who was in First Class.

The Hijackings and Terrorism

[U] With what he learned upon his return to Boston, Kinton could see that the day'sevents had redefined hijacking forever. He believes that the hijackings were the result ofa systems, rather than security, failure. He cited the systematic efforts of the hijackers(how they infiltrated the system, none of them had jobs, they were frequent travelers,some were in flight schools, some had traveled to Afghanistan) and the fact that somewere even chosen (by the CAPPS system) as selectees. He concluded, "They beat us inmany ways."

[U] During the summer of2001, Kinton didn't have a feeling ofa heightened threat.There was nothing that alanned him or made him more vigilant. He was not aware of the1998 action which reduced the consequences (to checked bag search only) for "selection"by CAPPS or its predecessor, but knowing the situation before 9-11, it wouldn't have "hithim." He recalled that before 9/11, it was all about keeping bombs off airplanes, andmany were still debating Lockerbie. That was why Boston moved so quickly on thechecked bags screening.

[U] Kinton stated that he was at ground zero of the investigation of the hijackings and hesees it differently than some others. He believes that terrorism is something that is veryhard to defend against. He cited the fact that Israel is recognized as the best in counter-terrorism, and he questioned if there is an investigation every time a bomb goes off overthere. In Kinton's view, we have got to get over pointing the finger of blame and cometogether to deal with the problem, because terrorism will be with us for the foreseeablefuture.

The Response to 9/11

[U] Mr. Kinton indicated that the Emergency Operations Center had practiced manytimes for crashes and accidents. There were over 60 positions staffed in it and he felt theoperation was second to none. It remained in operation for several weeks after 9/11.

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• [U] Dave Mackey (a Massport counsel) suggested the idea of searching every groundedairplane on 9/11, and Kinton agreed. Using the State Police, they started with searches ofwide-bodied aircraft that night and did it again and went through lockers, rest rooms andpublic areas. After the initial FAA Security Directive, they towed over 3000 cars. TheFBI was involved at this point.

[U].Kinton indicated that Massport received no directions from the FAA, FBI or anyoneelse about screening de-planing passengers or examining flight manifests. He recalled noevidence of further plots. Other than the discovery of the Atta car, he was not aware ofother instances of surveil1ance of Logan by the hijackers.

[U] Kinton recalled the September 19, 2001 charter flight to Logan to pick up Bin Laden[ami ly members. There was much confusion at that time with respect to air space and hewanted to make sure everyone that needed to know was involved (State Department, FBIand the State police). The FBI advised him to let the flight come. He remembered thatthe flight came out of Los Angeles going on to Orlando, Dallas, Boston, Gander andLondon, that a police officer got off in Boston, and that the FBI and Customs were thereto meet the airplane. He saw the manifest, and will provide a copy to the Commission.

•[U] Kinton stated that there were some flights he was concerned with coming out ofCanada in the immediate aftermath of9111, but nothing related to the Bin Laden family.He felt they needed to watch the Canadian border carefully because there had been manyoverseas flights grounded in Canada and he wanted to make sure individuals coming intothe U.S. from those flights were on the approved list to come in here.

Recommendations

1) [U]Based on the Israeli experience, Kinton believes we need a layered approachfor security, and not to rely on a single line of defense, such as checkpointscreening. Furthermore, the layers need to have some random elements in orderto defeat surveillance. Kinton cited I . 9/11 Closed by Statute Iwhich is currently done at Logan as an essential layer which should be donenationaJIy: "we need to look at eyes, not just screens."

2) [U] Kinton supports "hardening" of new facilities (minimizing flying glass,resisting building collapse, etc.) to minimize the impact of future terrorist strikes.

3) ~ Kinton advocates deployment of better technology. For example, Logan

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waiting for CAPPS II. Kinton believes that CAPP8.,II is headed in the rightdirection but he fears it will never be deployed because it is trying to do too much(criminals as well as terrorists). .

4) ¢Kinton supports expeditious deployment by all airpodiHe noted that Logan met the original deadline, even as other--a"'""irp-ort-s-w-e-re-- .....successfully petitioning Congress for a delay, because they didn't stop to makesure who was oin to a for it and the ot a waiver to allow Mass ort itself topay the bill.

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5) Kinton believes the country needs to "step up to the plate" on cargo. Technologyneeds to catch up to the need. If there is intel1igence that suggests the need toremove cargo on passenger planes (which the airlines depend on for revenue), hethinks the government should consider subsidizing the airlines for the lost revenueand putting it on a cargo-only carrier.

Current Security Concerns

[U] Kinton cited the following as his current chief concerns with respect to transportationsecurity:

1) Cargo2) Explosives in the aircraft cabin3) MANPADS - very hard to defend against4) Suicide bomber5) Containers - too late to scrutinize when they have arrivedin the U.S.; the

screen in needs to be moved to forei orts of ori6)~~ __ ~~ -. ~7) Rail- especial1y as a means 0 carrymg contamers8) General Aviation

[U] Kinton urged that the country not let its guard down. Once we put something inplace we need it to get stronger over time rather than weaker because experience hasshown that the terrorists can show great patience.

Secu rity Consortia

[U] Pre-9/11, Kinton believed that the model Massport adopted (LAMCO) was the rightvehicle at that time rather than the model suggested by the Gore Commission. Today,this has evolved where they "fill the room everyday, 7 days a week" with 20-25 peopletalking security. The Federal Security Director (FSD) and Kinton chair it. The airlinesare in the room, along with Customs, Air Marshals, state police, and senior Massportmanagement. He believes this approach results in problems getting solved, and herecommends it to other airports.

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TSA," ,: "'" "',-

rssrlWith regard to TSA operat'ions, Kinton Cited th~""~xperi~nce with box cutters.1)uri~g a recent morning rush-hour at Logan, TSA screeners at.the American Airl inescheckpoint found 4 within @'n hour. TSA takes the implement away from them and letsthem go. He asked TSA about it and had the airport security people review thevideotapes (using BPR }e'chniques) to insure that the persons weren't "suspicious looking.

[U] Kinton recalled re~ent TSA Infonnation Circulars abou~'l \, II ---- Ibut the Circulars contained-no guidance asto what specific steps should be taken. Unless the information is very specific, it isdifficult to respond. He believes that Security Directives and Information Circulars neednot only be warnings but also recommendations, giving guidance on what TSA intendsfor the airport to do. As an example, the Circular could recommend that suspect itemsshould be:5ubject to random selection for extra scrutiny (for example, every fifth1I r .....---[U] Prior to 9-11, on Security Directives there was a "Dissemination Guidance" as towhether the information "shall" or "may" be given to the airport directors, and the resultwas sometimes important information was withheld. After 9111, Kinton started seeing"everything" after 9-11. However, he worries that TSA is becoming more secretive as itevolves. Since the checkpoints have been federalized, TSA does not share informationon checkpoint screening performance and the Information Circulars seem to have lessinformation than before.

[U] Kinton stated that originally TSA put in place a "scientifically determined" screenerworkforce level, but have since (under Congressional pressure) arbitrarily reduced thatworkforce. However, he is not in favor of privatization of screening. Smaller airportscould be contracted out, under federal oversight.

General Aviation (GA)

[U] There is a lot of General Aviation at Hanscom and also at Logan. Massport isrequiring background checks and issuing ID's to pilots based out of Hanscom, in spite ofinitial push-back from industry. They are taking the Cat X (large passenger airport)approach to GA and are screening GA passengers out of Logan. Radio talk show hostDon Imus has mentioned it on his show. They screened a Saudi Flight with a sports team:"unless we get a letter from the State Department we are going to do it." Kintonsupported the ideas of having a security coordinator at each GA facility, and of requiringa special ID for GA pilots.

Customer Service (CS) Initiative

[U] Kinton indicated that the CS Initiative had nothing to do with security. It was aimedat opening up more screening lanes; it was a problem of lack of staffing. He stated that

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Massport didn't invent the standards, but used the ones set by the airlines themselves. Hebelieves TSA itself is providing inadequate staffing levels for screening at present, and asthe economy improves and flight levels increase, passengers will once again become veryfrustrated by the delays.

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