Comments-to-Osvaldl-Guariglia’s...-García-Valverde

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C e n t r o d e I n v e s t i g a c i o n e s F i l o s ó f i c a s

ISSN 2250-8619 • Vol. II • Nº 2 • 2013 • Buenos Aires • Argentina

COMMENTS TO OSVALDO GUARIGLIA’S“DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE”

Facundo García Valverde



ISSN 2250-8619

Vol. II Nº 2 (2013) — pp. 1-9

Comments to osvaldo GuariGlia’s

“demoCraCy under sieGe”

Facundo GarcíaValVerde

National Research Council of Argentina

Buenos Aires University

Political Philosophy Group

Resumen

Estos comentarios examinan las instituciones democráticastransnacionales que, en un artículo publicado en este mismo volu-

men de la RLFP, Osvaldo Guariglia deende como orma de limitar

a los dos grupos oligárquicos que amenazan a las democracias con-temporáneas. Este examen plantea dudas sobre dos aspectos de esadeensa. En primer lugar, sobre su undamento conceptual –el dere-cho humano a la democracia– y, en segundo lugar, sobre su carácterdemocrático, especialmente cuando es evaluada desde una perspec-

tiva de democracia radical.

Palabras clave: Democracia – Justicia global – Participación política

AbstRAct

These comments analyze the transnational democratic institu-tions that, in an article published in this volume o RLFP, Guari-glia deends as a limit to the two oligarchic groups that menace thecontemporary democracies. This analysis raises doubts concerning

two eatures o Guariglia’s deense. First, it questions his conceptualoundations –the human right to democracy– and, second, it ques-tions its democratic nature, which is problematic when it is assessedrom the viewpoint o radical democrat views.

Key words: Democracy – Global justice – Political participation



2 F. G arcía V alVerde- Comments to Democracy… Comments to Democracy… - F. G arcía V alVerde 3 Vol. II Nº 2 (2013) Vol. II Nº 2 (2013)

In an article published in this volume o RLFP, Osvaldo

Guariglia begins with an acute diagnosis o the threats to

democracy posed by two oligarchic groups. On the one hand,

decentralized economic groups which have the immediate

capacity to endanger the stability o the policies chosen rom

a democratic government. On the other hand, populist sectors

and political parties which combine political realism, dogma-tism and a direct and conessional relation between the Lea-

der and the masses, in order to destroy the checks and balan-

ces that limit the permanent accumulation o power.

Facing this dismal diagnosis, Guariglia proposes that “the

cure or democracy is more democracy”. I agree with that.

However, I have some doubts that I would like to explore here

concerning this solution. First, I will analyze i the solution is

duly justied and second I will explore i that solution is really

democratic.

Concerning the conceptual issues, the argument is mainlysupported on the existence o a human right to democracy.

That human right is, according to the author, more deman-

ding and more enorceable in societies which already have a

democratic constitution. The reasons or the validity o this

human right are elements contained in the articles 1, 19 and

21 o the Declaration o Human Rights enacted by United

Nations and in a growing tendency to deend the priority o

the International Law over the domestic law.

Nevertheless, the issue is not so simple. The immediate

question ater this argument is how this priority is justied.

Guariglia would not be able to answer to this question by clai-

ming that International Law arms a set o rights which bet-

ter protects human rights as this would be question begging. I

think that Guariglia would argue, instead, that a human right

to democracy is a precondition or assuring human rights in

general. I this is his more undamental argument, he would

coner a privileged status to the human right to democracy

but that would have to be more ully justied.

Another conceptual doubt arises rom the distinction posed

by Joshua Cohen between the right to democracy as an ele-

ment o a just society and a right to democracy as a human

right. I this distinction is plausible, which I think it is, I

would like to ask what dierence this premise makes in terms

o his argument. In other words, my question is: how could

Guariglia deend democracy as a solution to the two oligarchic

menaces mentioned without endorsing Cohen’s view?I Guariglia ollowed Cohen´s strategy, he could not deend

the solution he opposes to the attack o economic and populist

oligarchies and his diagnosis would be even more obscure. The

solution that the author argues or is to create transnational

democratic institutions, proposed initially or regional blocs

such as Mercosur, Unasur, the European Community, and so

on, that should not become mere business clubs and political

leaders assemblies but remain bounded to common deliberati-

ve spaces and civic participation.

The human right to democracy premise seems to be neces-sary in order to exert democratic control on these transnatio-

nal institutions which should also be responsive to the citizens´

claims. In other words, i the human right to democracy did not

exist, these transnational institutions would neither need to

be responsive to democratic inputs nor to their democratically

elected leaders. The explicit problem with this is that even i

the limitation to oligarchic powers were one o the main public

and explicit goals o these institutions, nothing would assure

that that goal would be achieved without an extensive politi-

cal participation and especially without a genuine interest in

deliberative interaction. I think this argument that Guariglia

could potentially ormulate is interesting but at the same time

it sounds too instrumental. So, his oundation o the human

right to democracy seems to be incomplete.

In respect to the democratic character o Guariglia’s propo-

sal, I would like to explore now some tensions in it, but let me

rst use a real example o a transnational institution. Let us

consider, or instance, the newest transnational institution in

Latin America which Guariglia generously qualies as empty:




Unasur. The 14th article o its Constitutive Treaty states: “Poli-

tical consultation and coordination among the Member States

o UNASUR will be based on harmony and mutual respect,

strengthening regional stability and supporting the preserva-

tion o democratic values and the promotion o human rights.”

As we all know, one o leaders and ounders o Unasur,

Venezuela, has recently initiated the process o withdrawalrom the Inter-American Court o Human Rights, one o the

institutions that had more ample and benecial eects in the

history o the ght against the bloodiest dictatorships in the

continent and the eective exercise o human rights. No criti-

cal public declarations have been made so ar regarding this

issue, neither by Unasur itsel, nor by the Member States or

their presidents.

This constitutes, then, an example o a transnational ins-

titution which publicly recognizes human rights as well as

democratic values but in practice allows a state member toree itsel rom an important and recognized instrument or

the eective and transnational protection o human rights.

No doubt, we have to be prudent on this evaluation: Unasur

is a rising institution with little infuence and political impact

except or some political declarations and or the expulsion

o Paraguay ater the unair and speed trial to ex-president

Lugo. Venezuela’s decision can still be reversed and we still

do not know i it is not just a way o putting political pressure

on the Inter-American Court o Human Rights rather than a

move to ree the country rom its surveillance.

Guariglia could obviously say that this example conrms

his argument: when transnational institutions are not res-

ponsive to open and egalitarian deliberations rom citizens-

hip, they are ree to interpret the protection and promotion o

human rights in any way they want, even i these are clearly

opposed to a real protection.

However, an important tension arises in this argument and

I would like to explore it in some depth. Guariglia rmly belie-

ves in the republican principle o separation o powers as a

way to limit the accumulation o power. Thus, answering to

the actual existence o huge and concentrated powers –the

populist leader who ormally or inormally concentrates ull

public and economic power– Guariglia believes that the crea-

tion o new political agents is enough to control these powers.

Since most traditional nation-states are incapable o peror-

ming this task, these new agents should have enough powerand should also be transnational.

The problem illustrated by the UNASUR aair is, never-

theless, that the creation o transnational entities is not

sucient to deend a plural, air and deliberatively arranged

domestic democracy, nor to build a transnational communica-

tive power developed rom deliberative and inclusive proces-

ses or to secure the ulllment o human rights.

I this is so, the creation o these new transnational ins-

titutions may entail serous risks. The reason or this is that

the creation o these bureaucratic-political authorities mayinterpose even larger barriers to citizen inputs. It is known

that as long as political power concentrates in an institution,

an egalitarian distribution o power decreases; bigger insti-

tutions amount to a decrease in democratic control. Is it not

this the eld or populist leaders who pretend to speak in the

name o those excluded rom institutions? Isn’t it the same

risk oreseen by Kant when he condemned a world govern-

ment as necessarily despotic? In other words, I think this

solution to the menaces to democracy rightly identied by

Guariglia may show clear decits in terms o democratic con-

trol. In view o these considerations, let me ask: Who would

be in charge o controlling and monitoring these transnatio-

nal institutions?

Although Guariglia acknowledges that these institutions

should be responsive enough to the claims o citizens and to

their interests and that they should create the conditions

to the generation o a communicative transnational power,

his main solution is essentially institutional. But he never

explains how to build more powerul channels o interaction




between citizens and these institutions and how to empower

citizens.

Perhaps Guariglia could reply to this worry in the ollowing

way: it is much more realistic to build new transnational insti-

tutions than to build, maintain and be condent in the correct

unctioning o spread transnational channels or communica-

tive power. It is much more realistic to create new institutionsthan to change the citizens’ public practices. How could anyo-

ne, Guariglia may ask, realistically believe in the communica-

tive power o sincerely concerned citizens and in their capaci-

ty to control and limit the aceless corporative and economic

power or the single, unique and dogmatic populist leader? Be

this as it may, I would like to point out some radical democrat

proposals which I am sympathetic to and then consider i they

are compatible with Guariglia’s solution.

James Bohman distinguishes two kinds o reactions to

hyper-globalized societies (2007: 19-57). The rst, named gra-dualist, seeks the creation o institutions analogous to nation-

states and attempts to give them sucient power to enor-

ce the required laws. In last stance, gradualists pretend to

expand the demos constitutive o democracy. The second, dee-

med transformationalist, sees the challenges posed by demo-

cracy as requiring a deeper and structural transormation o

democracy, one which includes replacing the political subject

o demos or the more decentralized and transnational demoi.

James Bohman rejects gradualist proposals –I think Boh-

man would include Guariglia’s proposals within this class o

conceptions– on the basis that a deep social, structural and

cultural modication in the nature o the public sphere is

taking place. This modication in terms o the public sphere

allows new orms o publicity and the transnationalization o

communicative and deliberative power. While in the past the

public sphere was dened by national rontiers, now multiple

public and decentralized spaces seem to exist. This decentrali-

zed public spheres are not unied by a nation but agents who

engage in refexive and democratic activity; in being respon-

sive to others, participants must rst actively constitute and

maintain it as a public sphere. Bohman’s undamental claim is

that these transnational demoi should have enough capacity

to include subjects and concerns in the international political

agenda or –according to the conception deended by Dryzek-

to contest decisions the decisions o transnational institutions,

such as European Community and World Trade Organization(Dryzek 2005, 2006). In short, although this radical democrat

solution may allow and promote vigorous interactions among

new transnational demoi and ormal institutions, Guariglia

does not take this solution into account unless it is mediated

by his preerred transnational institutions.

In the same spirit, Regina Kreide (2012: 25-6) gives more

concrete steps in the specication o this kind o radical and

transnational democracy, arguing that the mere concept o

popular sovereignty should be redened to include eecti-

vely all the aected by a decision taken by transnational andinternational organisms and, at the same time, avoid its con-

nement to national borders. I just mention the three reorms

proposed by Kreide: to increase the ormal participation o

citizens in international organizations in order to convert

them into eectively representative organizations; to promote

institutional eorts to orce institutions acting at the inter-

national level (such as the WTO and the NATO) to be res-

ponsive to democratic decisions taken by nation-states; and,

lastly, to transnationally expand the existing legal guarantees

o rights, through which the equality o the deliberating part-

ners can be achieved independently o economic and political

bargaining power.

Given this very basic reconstruction o the radical approach, I

would now like to explore its compatibility with Guariglia’s pro-

posal. Let me rst distinguish among several radical democra-

tic positions. A demanding radical democratic position would

deend a strong connection between ormal institutions and

inormal spheres o communicative power. To this end it could,

or example, demand an equal vote or every aected citizen




in decisions taken by transnational institutions, or demand

eective and egalitarian participation o every aected per-

son in the deliberative transnational orums, or demand that

the leaders o transnational institutions (WTO, NATO, WHO,

etc.) be elected by every citizen in the world. Another radical

–albeit weaker– democrat proposal would require connecting

ormal institutions and inormal spheres o communication bydemanding a more direct interaction between citizens, groups

o interests, etc., and transnational institutions, and a more

inclusive and plural input to take political decisions. This pro-

posal is weaker in so ar as it preserves the actual priority

o transnational institutions over inormal publics; transna-

tional institutions and public transnational spheres remain

dierent, the ormer not limiting the latter.

Would any o these radical democratic strategies be compa-

tible with Guariglia’s proposal? I think that, given his concerns

regarding populism, he would nd the demanding position toodangerous. Ater all, what would preserve these transnational

institutions rom the menaces registered in domestic politics?

I this reasoning is correct, then Guariglia should be explicit

about which sense o the polysemous term “democracy” he is

using.

In conclusion, unless Guariglia provides an additional

argument to reject the stronger radical position, it is doubt-

ul that his transnational position could achieve the desired

balance between oligarchic and populist menaces. On one

side, i real participation rom citizens is not secured in that

transnational institutions, nothing prevents the creation o a

new transnational oligarchy, dierent but oligarchic at last.

On the other side, i that transnational institutions are not

responsive to democratic input, new elds or populist claims

are built.

In this comment, I have made two main points. First, I rai-

sed some doubts about the justication o the human right to

democracy and how Guariglia used it to deend transnatio-

nal institutions. Second, I have proven that the transnational

solution proposed by Guariglia in response to oligarchic and

populist menaces could be criticized by a demanding radical

democrat position.

reFerenCes

Bohman, J. (2007). Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to

Demoi. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dryzek, J. (2005). “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Socie-

ties”, Political Theory 33: 218-42

Dryzek, J. (2006). Deliberative Global Politics. Cambridge:

Polity Press.

Kreide, R. (2012). Repressed Democracy: Legitimacy Problems

in World Society. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía

Política 1: 1-34.

UNASUR (2008). Tratado Constitutivo, disponible en http:// www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=

article&id=290&Itemid=339

Received: October 30, 2012.

Accepted: February 24, 2013.

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