Commentary The ‘Hani Memorandum’ – introduced and annotated · Commentary The ‘Hani...

TRANSFORMATION 69 (2009) ISSN 0258-7696 106

Commentary

The ‘Hani Memorandum’ – introduced andannotated1

Hugh [email protected]

The ‘Hani Memorandum’, a document produced and signed by Chris Haniand six other members of the African National Congress (ANC)’s armed wingUmkhonto we Sizwe (MK) early in 1969, following the failure of the Wankieand Sipolilo campaigns, is frequently cited but there appears to be nocomplete copy in a public archive. It has been published only once and thatwas 30 years ago in an obscure exile journal without identification, date,context, or the names of the signatories – not surprisingly, it seems then tohave passed unnoticed.2 In his book ANC: A View from Moscow VladimirShubin (1999) provides an accurate summary of the memorandum’s contents,but the copy to which he had access in the Soviet archives seems to havebeen produced for circulation to the diplomatic community and containedno names and no signatures.3

The unavailability of the memorandum has not prevented its continuedcitation for political purposes and it is still influential 40 years after itsproduction. Speaking at the launch of the Chris Hani Municipality’s LiberationHeritage Route at Hani’s birthplace, Sabalele, near Cofimvaba in the EasternCape on April 10, 2008, the 15th anniversary of his death, the ANC’s thenrecently elected secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, who was also chairmanof the South African Communist Party (SACP), made intriguing use of theHegelian/Marxian dialectic – thesis, antithesis and synthesis – to link threemajor conferences in the history of the ANC: Morogoro (1969), Kabwe(1985), and Polokwane (2007). Drawing a parallel between the three, he saweach of them as coming after a period of dissatisfaction with the leadership,if not actual mutiny, as providing an opportunity to confront and to discussthe outstanding issues, and as heralding a period of reform and consolidation.

107

Debate: the ‘Hani Memorandum’

Mantashe acknowledged that it was the ‘Hani memorandum’, and indeedmutiny, that led directly to the Morogoro Conference.4 More recently, TerryBell cited the memorandum in an article in which he argued that the presentcrisis in the ANC had its roots in its exile history. Zola Skweyiya, thenminister of social welfare in South Africa, cited the memorandum in yetanother context, referring to the danger of Xhosa or Nguni dominance of theANC, and looking back to what was sometimes seen as a mutiny of ‘Capemen’.5

There are no precise figures, but about 50 MK men with a smaller numberof ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Political Union) combatants took part in theWankie campaign, which was launched across the Zambezi from nearLivingstone in western Zambia at the end of July 1967. The ANC’s LuthuliDetachment was divided into two main groups – the western group wasintended to move through Rhodesia to South Africa. A second group splitoff from the first in the Wankie Game Reserve and moved eastwards with theintention of establishing bases with ZAPU in northern and central Rhodesiaas part of a ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’ to South Africa. Five months later inDecember 1967 a second offensive, the Sipolilo campaign, was launchedfrom eastern Zambia – its objectives were not clear-cut. The MK membersof this ‘Pyramid Detachment’ suffered heavy casualties – 23 died. 6

Of the MK members who fought in the Wankie campaign about 25 werekilled in action, about a dozen were captured and served long prison termsin Rhodesia or South Africa, and the remainder, including a small groupunder the leadership of Chris Hani, a political commissar, made a strategicwithdrawal into Botswana where they were arrested, charged and imprisoned.A second group of MK and ZAPU men crossed into Botswana a few dayslater.7 As a result of pressure from various sources, including the OAU andits liberation committee, and of negotiations with the Zambian government,these men were deported to Zambia in 1968-9 after spending a year or morein prison in Gaborone. It is difficult to be precise about dates because, forsecurity reasons, prisoners who were deported from Botswana by air weregiven passports under false names – these were different from their MKnames - but Hani, who had been arrested in August 1967, probably returnedto Lusaka with a few others in the second half of December 1968.8

The drafting of the ‘Hani Memorandum’Although they were given a welcome-home party by Jack and Ray Simonsat their house at 250 Zambezi Road, Lusaka, they were shocked by the lack

108

Hugh Macmillan

of any kind of official welcome by the leadership and by its failure to debriefthem with a view to learning any lessons that could be drawn from thecampaign. Sometime in 1970 Hani – ‘Comrade Chris’ – told an internalcommission of enquiry into later incidents in Lusaka that ‘after leavingprison in Botswana he found the movement in a stalemate position. Therewas no longer any direction, there was general confusion or an unwillingnessto discuss the lessons of the revolution’.9

It was in this volatile situation that the document that came to be knownas ‘the Hani memorandum’ was produced, probably in January 1969. Accordingto a second memorandum, detailing the background of the first, and producedin March 1969 by Chris Hani and the other signatories, with the help of JackSimons, indicating their grounds of appeal against expulsion, they had notoriginally intended to write a memorandum at all. They had delegated threeof their number to interview the secretary-general, Duma Nokwe, 10 ‘with aview to arranging a discussion with members of the Executive’. Nokwe ‘tookup a hostile attitude, maintained that the issues we had raised were trivial,and proposed to interview us individually and not as a group. We consideredthis procedure to be un-political and refused to comply.’ Nokwe causedparticular offence by failing to recognise one member of the deputation,Jackson Mlenze, a Wankie veteran, and the commander of a unit that wasintended to reach the Transkei. They, on the other hand, incensed Nokweby their suggestion, repeated in the memorandum, that Amiran, an Israeliagricultural equipment company, for which his wife, Vuyiswa (Tiny), wasthen working was a front for Israeli intelligence.11 Nokwe ‘told ourrepresentatives to arrange a meeting with members of the Executive’.

The ‘Commissariat’ eventually sanctioned a meeting with the NEC and sixmembers were present when this took place. The delegates had prepared astatement and they were told to have this typed and to provide copies to allmembers of the executive who were then present. The memorandum, which‘made a political analysis and attributed all the weaknesses we complainedof to political and personal failings of some of our leaders’, was then ‘typed,stencilled and duplicated’ in the ANC office and copies were provided tomembers of the executive and to ‘selected members of MK’. The latter were‘cautioned to treat the matter as highly confidential and in no circumstancesto disclose its existence to people who did not belong to the organisation.’12

In addition to Hani, who signed as ‘M. T. Hani (Chris)’,13 the six othersignatories to the memorandum were Z.R. (Jeqe) Mbengwa,14 LeonardPitso,15 later a general in the South African National Defence Force,

109


Ntabenkosi Fipaza (Mbali),16 Wilmot Hempe,17 Tamana Gobozi (Mikza),18 andG. S. Mose (Jackson) Mlenze.19 Only two of the signatories, Hani and Mlenze,were members of the Luthuli Detachment who had fought in the Wankiecampaign and been imprisoned in Botswana. Two others had crossed theZambezi and entered Rhodesia in connection with the campaign – one of thelatter was Fipaza (Mbali) who served as a medical officer, the other may havebeen Leonard Pitso. The signatories were sometimes referred to as the ‘Capegroup’, implying a Xhosa identity, though at least two of them came fromother provinces – Mbengwa (Buthelezi) from Natal and Pitso from theTransvaal. According to Walter Msimang (Mavuso), the memorandum didnot have widespread support. He says that he was one among many whowere suspicious of what he says was the involvement of TennysonMakiwane20 in its composition, a suggestion that Makiwane denied.21 Major-General Gardner Sijake and Alfred Sipetho Willie take a different view. Theysay that the memorandum had widespread support and that the sevensignatories were chosen as representing a much larger group, includingthemselves.22

Chris Hani was staying at the time, at the request of the ANC leadership,in the house of Livingstone Mqotsi,23 a leading, though by then an ‘expelled’,member, of the Unity Movement – he had clashed with IB Tabata. It wasalleged that he too had a hand in the drafting of the memorandum, but herefutes that suggestion and says that he knew nothing about it until a copywas thrust into his hands by Mzwai Piliso,24 who came to see him one dayat midnight, and begged him to use his influence with Hani and ‘the boys’and persuade them to apologise for it.25 In his last interview, Hani tookpersonal responsibility for the writing of the memorandum and there is noreason to doubt that he was the primary, though not the sole, author.26

The reaction to the ‘Hani Memorandum’The signatories at their next meeting with the executive, following theproduction of the memorandum, discovered to their great surprise ‘thatmembers of the Military Headquarters and of the Military Regionaladministration were present’. They were told that these men had been calledin because they had ‘introduced a new factor by circulating copies of thememorandum to members of MK’. They protested that they had been givenan assurance that

their point of view would be dealt with only by the executive and thatthe first thing was to discuss the political content of the memorandum.The members of the military present threatened however to ‘deal with’

110

Hugh Macmillan

us for alleged violations of security and the oath. We urged that thealleged violations should be dealt with only after a full discussion of thepoints we had raised. Having rejected our point of view, the Chairmanof the meeting closed the meeting indefinitely.27

In their second memorandum, the signatories went on to say that:Orders were given for our arrest for alleged treachery. Dungeons weredug at Livingstone for our reception. We would probably have beenthrown into these dungeons but for the intervention of a leadingcomrade. The Acting President [Oliver Tambo] ordered the dungeonsto be closed, and convened a meeting of militants to consider our case.Yet the leaders had failed to discuss the memorandum with us, as we hadrequested and anticipated. The Acting President told the meeting thatthe memorandum was not our work, but that we were being used as toolsby certain persons unnamed. He appealed to the audience not to behostile towards us; and undertook to deal with the alleged instigators.He appealed for normalisation pending discussions by the NationalExecutive Conference.28

Meanwhile the signatories were suspended from their posts in MK and wereprevented from attending meetings. Hani and Mlenze were not even permittedto attend a meeting of the Wankie veterans. Eventually they were arraignedbefore a tribunal which consisted of five members, two of whom, JoeMatlou29 and Mzwai Piliso, were members of the national executive committee(NEC), and three of whom were members of the military command. It is notclear who all the latter were, but one of them is named as Jack Zeph, a manwho, the signatories alleged, had adopted a hostile attitude towards them atan earlier meeting.30 In their appeal document, the signatories say that theynever received the charges against them in writing, but that they werecharged with drafting and circulating a document without authority, and,secondly, with communicating ‘military information and classified materialto unauthorised persons’. They said that they had not been supplied withdetails of the charges, which they considered ‘vague and embarrassing’.According to a later and perhaps less reliable account by TennysonMakiwane, they were accused of bypassing the military headquarters,violating their MK oath of secrecy, and of ‘working with the enemy’.31

The signatories protested that they could not get a fair trial from a tribunalthat included members of the NEC, which was the main target of their critique,and that at least one member of the regional military headquarters who hadshown bias against them. They also protested that they were expected toappear before the tribunal individually though the memorandum had been

111


produced collectively. They were refused the right to appeal to the NEC overthese issues. They also claimed that the witnesses gave their evidence intheir absence and that they were not informed of the evidence against them.They do not themselves say so in their appeal, but Tennyson Makiwane saidthat they refused to appear before the tribunal. They were expelled from theANC by the tribunal in Lusaka on March, 25, 1969. Their expulsion wasconfirmed by ANC ‘headquarters’, presumably the NEC, on March 29, 1969.Their appeal was addressed to the ‘National Conference’, the MorogoroConference, which met on April 25, 1969.32

The signatories’ second memorandum does not tell the whole story andlater accounts, including one by Chris Hani himself, suggest that theydeliberately downplayed the real drama. The commander-in-chief, JoeModise, was, together with Duma Nokwe, the main target of the memorandum,and it was certainly he who was most angry about it. According to Hani’sown account, as told to Vladimir Shubin in early 1992, a majority of themembers of the tribunal voted for ‘the most severe punishment’, and it wasonly the determined intervention of Mzwai Piliso, later head of the securitydepartment, that ‘averted what would have been a tragedy’. It was widelybelieved in exile that Hani and the other signatories were sentenced to death,though there is no evidence to confirm this and the balance of probabilitysuggests that they were not. There is no doubt, however, that ‘dungeons’were dug for their incarceration on an ANC farm near Livingstone and thatthese were filled in on the instructions of Oliver Tambo. Major-GeneralGardner Sijake recalls that he and (General) Lambert Moloi found 11 freshly-dug and empty graves on the same Livingstone farm site and suggests thatsome members of the military leadership had more than the seven signatoriesmarked down for execution – their hit list may have included himself.33

Although the chronology is not entirely clear, there does seem to havebeen a plot to kill Hani, which may have been separate from the quasi-judicialtribunal. Livingstone Mqotsi says that Hani thanked him for saving his lifeafter he denied entry to his house, where Hani had been staying for severalmonths and where he was at that moment, to a group of MK men who camelooking for him at midnight. Ray Simons recalled that Govan ‘Dingo’ Hashecame to tell her at that time that there was a plot to kill Hani. In the absenceof Tambo, she summoned Thomas Nkobi, then chief representative of theANC in Zambia, and warned him of the dire consequences that would followshould anything happen to Hani. There were apparently meetings at theSimons’ house which helped to reduce the tension. Hani himself recalled that

112

Hugh Macmillan

Jack Simons was supportive of the signatories of the memorandum duringtheir period of ‘isolation’. He also mentioned the probably rather moreremote support of leading members of the SACP, specifically Yusuf Dadooand Joe Slovo.34

The general meeting of the ANC membership to which the signatoriesrefer took place at the Joshua Nkomo ZAPU camp west of Lusaka in February1969. Eyewitness accounts agree that Tambo defused the situation by takingpersonal responsibility for the failings of the ANC leadership. According toTennyson Makiwane, and eyewitnesses, Tambo suggested that thesignatories were being used ‘as brooms by which the leadership swept itsdirt’. According to a much later account by Joe Matthews, it was also at thismeeting, to which Joe Modise is said to have come with a pistol in his belt,that Tambo announced that a national consultative conference would takeplace at Morogoro at the end of April – that was in just over two months time.Tennyson Makiwane says that the idea of a national consultative conferencewas proposed by Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota) and that the decision tohold one was made at a meeting of the NEC in Lusaka.35

The Morogoro ConferenceThere can be no doubt that the calling of the conference at Morogoro wasa direct response to the ‘Hani Memorandum’. As a result of their expulsionfrom the ANC, the signatories were themselves unable to attend and to takepart in the political discussion of the issues that they had raised. They werenot, however, the only people who were suspended at this time andprevented from attending the meeting. Two members of the NEC, AmbroseMzimkhulu Makiwane,36 elder ‘brother’ (cousin) of Tennyson Makiwane,and Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota), 37 were suspended from the committee,initially for six months, in February or March 1969. According to TennysonMakiwane, with confirmation from Ambrose Makiwane, these suspensionswere related to the memorandum. An attempt was made to implicate bothMakiwanes and Kgokong in the drafting of the memorandum, and when thatcharge failed to stick, Ambrose Makiwane and Kgokong were suspended onthe grounds that they had defied orders to remain in Dar es Salaam and hadinsisted on travelling to Lusaka before a meeting of the NEC in Dar es Salaamat which the memorandum was to be discussed.38 A participant in a meetingwith Tambo a few months later was recorded by Tambo himself as saying:‘We were told Makiwane and Kgokong were involved in Memo’. He was notcontradicted.39

113


Although Hani and his comrades were not able to attend the MorogoroConference, it seems that as many as half of the 70 delegates who did attendwere representatives of MK. The memorandum was not specifically discussed,but their point of view was well represented, and the conference recommendeda pardon for the signatories and their reinstatement. As is well known,Tambo resigned during the conference and was unanimously re-elected asdeputy president. This vote of confidence, and the conference’s decisionto allow him, together with JB Marks40 and Moses Mabhida,41 as ‘president-in-council’, to select the members of a new, reduced NEC, considerablystrengthened his leadership position. The most conspicuous loser in thereshuffle of the leadership was Duma Nokwe who lost his position assecretary-general to Alfred Nzo and was also removed from the NEC. Therewas little doubt that he was paying the price for his mishandling of thememorandum issue, as well as for other weaknesses.42 Joe Modise, on theother hand, retained his title as commander-in-chief, at least for another threeyears, after which he became, for a while, ‘chief of operations’. The militaryheadquarters was, however, dissolved and he was elevated to membershipof the newly constituted Revolutionary Council. Separate regionalheadquarters, also called staff commands, for Zambia and Tanzania wereestablished under their own chiefs of staff. Although Modise was an ex-officio member of the Lusaka military HQ, he was removed from day-to-daycontrol of MK units in Lusaka – something that may have contributed to laterdiscontent among his supporters.43

The other major decision of the conference was to open membership ofthe ANC in exile to people of all races. This went some way towards resolvingthe anomaly that while membership of MK had been open to people of allraces, the ANC had not taken that step. It also facilitated the politicalintegration of MK into the ANC and brought MK back under the ANC’scontrol – the apparent independence of MK and the lack of political controlover it had been one of the main complaints of Hani and his fellow signatories.The conference did not, however, go so far as to allow non-Africanmembership of the ANC’s national executive committee. As a compromisesolution, a Revolutionary Council with open and non-racial membership wasestablished as a nominal sub-committee of the NEC.

In the long run the Morogoro Conference probably strengthened theANC in exile. Chris Hani himself said that ‘after Morogoro we never lookedback’. He said that the ‘Strategy and Tactics’ document that emerged fromthe conference became ‘the lodestar of the movement’ and that, with the

114

Hugh Macmillan

establishment of the Revolutionary Council there was a shift in emphasisaway from international solidarity and towards ‘building [the] ANC insideSouth Africa’.44 Five years later he was himself to be the first member of theexiled NEC to enter South Africa. But in the short term the consequences ofthe conference were not beneficial. The signatories of the memorandum werereinstated soon after the conference and it was hoped that this would solvethe problems of MK in Lusaka. It did not as their reinstatement prompted areaction from the so-called ‘Transvaal comrades’ – the supporters of JoeModise. At the same time, the ANC came under pressure from the governmentsof Zambia and Tanzania to close down their military camps in both countries.The Lusaka Manifesto, to which both countries subscribed in April 1969,indicated a strategic withdrawal from armed confrontation with South Africa– a further consequence of the failure of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns.The ANC also faced problems in London where the opening of theorganisation to ‘non-Africans’ prompted an Africanist backlash.45

There is not space here to offer an analysis of the contents of the ‘Hanimemorandum’. Readers will be able to do that for themselves. It is, however,a remarkable document and many of the issues that it raised in relation todemocratic decision making, accountability, class divisions within the ANC,nepotism, corruption, and draconian discipline, remained live issuesthroughout the exile period and are still relevant today.

The Memorandum Itself46

The ANC in Exile is in a deep crisis as a result of which a rot has set in. Frominformal discussions with the revolutionary members of M.K. we haveinferred that they have lost all confidence in the ANC leadership abroad.This they say openly and in fact show it. Such a situation is very serious andin fact a revolutionary movement has to sit down and analyse such aprevailing (sic) state of affairs.

The situation is further aggravated by the fact that accredited membersof the Organisation are no longer consulted or no longer participate in policymaking decisions of the Organisation – there have been two or threeconferences when the leaders met or did not consult or inform the membershipof the resolutions. The inference is that we are no longer consideredmembers of the ANC As the leading revolutionary core of the Organisationit is imperative for members of M.K. to participate in all matters affecting therevolutionary struggle in South Africa.

We raise the above points so as to arrest the present trend.

115


We, as genuine revolutionaries, are moved by the frightening depthsreached by the rot in the ANC and the disintegration of M.K. accompanyingthis rot and manifesting itself in the following way:

1. The ANC Leadership in Exile has created a machinery which has becomean end in itself. It is completely divorced from the situation in SouthAfrica. It is not in a position to give an account of the functioningbranches inside the country. There has never been an attempt to sendthe Leadership inside since the Rivonia Arrests. There has been an over-concentration of people in offices – this has become a fully fledgedactivity in itself, for eg, you get a Director of Youth who maintains noliaison with the home front. There are other departments, such as theTreasury Department which is to all intents and purposes catering foractivities outside, and whose functioning is only limited and known toa few people; the Department of the Secretary-General which has notfurnished any reports on political activities in the various regions in thecountry; the Department of Publicity which is giving out propagandageared only to external consumption. The quality of information is notrevolutionary and is out of step with the existing political situation insidethe country. Its material hardly gives a deep analysis of the prevalentsituation inside. We strongly feel that time has come that the departmentshould make every effort to reach the masses of our people by seeing toit that more and more of its revolutionary propaganda is written in thelanguage of our people.

2. We are disturbed by the careerism of the ANC Leadership Abroad whohave, in every sense, become professional politicians rather thanprofessional revolutionaries. We have been forced to draw the conclusionthat the payment of salaries to people working in offices is very detrimentalto the revolutionary outlook is of those who receive such monies. It iswithout doubt that such payments corrupt cadres at any level and havethe effect of making people perform their duties or fill offices because ofmoney inducement rather than dedication to the cause – they become ineffect merely salaried employees of the movement. It is high time that allmembers and cadres of the ANC, be they in M.K. or not, should receiveequal treatment and be judged only on the basis of their dedication andsacrifice to the cause we serve. The principle of thorough selection ofcadres should be on the basis of merit and such selection should neverbe delegated to an individual – this will prevent individuals owingallegiance to those who appoint them rather than to the Revolution.

116

Hugh Macmillan

3. The Leadership of the ANC abroad must be committed to a resolution andprogramme of going home to lead the struggle there, which resolutionand programme must be seen to be implemented. Presently there is aLeadership vacuum as all the leader’s are either locked up in Vorster’sprisons of are in exile. This has deprived the S.A. masses of leadershipwhich is so vital at this crucial moment of our Revolution. A situationwhere our people, because of this vacuum will be deceived by opportunistsof all shades is strongly developing. We feel that the number of leadersattending international conferences and other globetrotting activitiesshould be cut down to a reasonable few and the remainder should workaround the clock working on the home front.

4. There are certain symptoms which are very disturbing and dispiriting togenuine revolutionaries. These comprise the opening of mysteriousbusiness enterprises which to our knowledge have never been discussedby the leadership of the Organisation. For instance, in Lusaka a furnitureindustry is being run by the ANC.47 In Livingstone a bone factory whoseoriginal purpose was to provide cover for underground work in Botswanais now being used as a purely commercial undertaking. As a result ofthese enterprises more and more M.K. men are being diverted to them.And some of the people in charge of these enterprises are dubiouscharacters with shady political backgrounds. We are therefore compelledto conclude that there is no serious drive to return home and carry on thestruggle. This is disturbing because the very comrade, Thabo More,48

who is supposed to be planning, directing and leading the struggle inSouth Africa is fully involved in these enterprises. Now he has assumedcomplete responsibility for the running of these enterprises incollaboration with others and it is extremely doubtful that with hisattention so divided he can do justice to the armed struggle in SouthAfrica which should be his primary and absolute concern. The Leadershipof the ANC can’t but be blamed for this state of affairs.

5. An equally disturbing situation is that M.K. is being run completelyindependently of the Political Organisation. The Political LeadershipAbroad is not aware of the activities and plans of M.K. We therefore inferthat M.K. is separate from the ANC; that there is conflict between theANC and M.K.; that the ANC has lost control over M.K.; that there is noco-ordination between the ANC and the M.K. All this has brought abouta situation where the ANC is run single-handed by the Commander-in-Chief who appoints and dismisses arbitrarily – as a result there is a

117


tendency among members of the Headquarters to owe allegiance to theindividual who appoints and dismisses them and it takes a genuinerevolutionary to challenge him. We are compelled to blame the NationalExecutive for this anomalous situation.

6. The Security Department is internally directed. It is doing nothingagainst the enemy. It has achieved nothing of military importance. Thefailure of the so-called Security Department has been shown by itsinability to furnish the Organisation with the fate of our most dedicatedcomrades in Zimbabwe. Or how is it possible that so many comrades havebeen able to desert so successfully? In the prosecution of its internallydirected activities the Security Department has become notorious. Thosewho serve in it have the central task of suppressing and persecutingdedicated cadres of M.K. who have nothing to lose by participating inthe struggle except their chains.

There is no Security Dept in our Organisation. For instance the arrestof Msomi and Matthews was inevitable as the fact of their presence inSouth Africa was common knowledge; as well as of comrades bound forhome.49 This situation is tantamount to betrayal of comrades.

In Morogoro Joseph Cotton,50 Shadrack Tladi51 and Boy Otto52 areopenly flirting with the Peace Corps an international known C.I.A. Front,a counter-revolutionary and espionage organisation. The first two handlevital information as they are connected with the Radio transmissionservice relaying Organisation material. Boy Otto is moving betweenZambia and Tanzania transporting M.K. personnel and war material.Most disturbing is that a comrade raised this matter with the Secretary-General and Chief of Security of the ANC, Duma Nokwe, who agreed thatthe matter of the above comrades flirting with the Peace Corps was trueand that it should be furnished in writing, but no action was taken. Thisis very disturbing and discouraging to serious revolutionaries who knowfully well that these three comrades are close to the leading figures of theANC and M.K. For instance, Joseph Cotton is the son of Moses Kotanethe Treasurer-General of the ANC and General Secretary of the S.A.C.P.53Shadrack Tladi is relative of Thabo More who is C-in-C of M.K. andmember of the National Executive of the ANC Abroad. This has made usand many other comrades conclude that there is nepotism in the ANC

An equally perturbing fact is that Mrs V. Nokwe, the wife of theSecretary-General and Chief of Security of the ANC, Comrade D. Nokweis presently working for Amiran Israel, an internationally known Israeli

118

Hugh Macmillan

Intelligence Organisation operating under the cover of an Import-Exportfirm. This Amiran-Israel is a co-ordinating centre for Israeli IntelligenceServices (Shinbet) in Southern Africa, Central Africa including CongoBrazzaville and Congo Kinshasa. Israel is a nest of imperialism which isactively sabotaging the National Liberation. Presently it has colonisedparts of Arab territories and is maintaining close links with the mostreactionary and fascist governments, such as South Africa and therevanchist Federal Government of Germany. We demand an explanationfor this anomalous situation and we demand that we should cut links withthe counter-revolutionary organisation forthwith and should there beany other links with the Israel, the ANC should sever them in the interestsof our Revolution.

7. The tragedy of the Zimbabwe campaigns is the fact that we have beenunable to analyse our operations so as to be able to assess and drawlessons that would make it possible for us to formulate a correct strategyand tactics vis-à-vis the enemy.

8. It is a cause for serious concern that comrades who have come back fromthe battle front have not been accorded a comradely reception and thefact that there has been no re-appraisal of their combat experience.

We are shocked by the criminal neglect of our most dedicatedcomrades who have either fallen in battle, sentenced to death or servinglong term imprisonment in Zimbabwe. These men are heroes who haveperformed their revolutionary tasks gallantly without flinching. How canwe possibly keep quiet [about?] these valorous sons of South Africa?Is this not an indication of callousness and irresponsibility on the partof the leadership? The behaviour of the Secretary-General and Chief ofSecurity of the ANC D. Nokwe and his attitude towards Comrade J.Mlenze, when we petitioned for a meeting, disturbed us greatly. For himto have said he did not know, did not recognise Mlenze is a height ofindifference and cynicism and we are really very worried about it. Hereis a comrade from the battle front, a Commander of a unit, and a SecurityChief of a vital region, namely Transkei accorded this type of snub.

9. We are perturbed by the fact that certain members of M.K. are receivingpayments from the External Mission, eg the C-in-c and the C.P.O. who asa matter of fact are getting allowances and the fact that the C-in-C has aposh and militarily irrelevant car at his disposal. The fact that thesesoldiers are paid has a very demoralising effect on the otherrevolutionaries.

119


10. Individual leaders keep cars and run them and this coupled with the factthat they receive salaries alias allowances is in every way building themup as a middle class in our revolutionary organisation and in M.K.

11. A strange and alarming trend is developing whereby secret trials andsecret executions have been carried out. We are not against the executionand liquidation of traitors but we are against the veil of secrecy. We arehaving in mind the trials of Zola Zembe,54 Wellington Mbata,55

Phalanyane56 and Bopela.57

It is a shame that we should have been witnesses to the emergenceof extremely reactionary methods of punishment in M.K. There have beeninstances when offenders in M.K. have been dumped in dugouts filledwith several drums of water without blankets or any other protectivematerial for periods of up to about 22 days. The cases in point are thoseof Daphne Zwane,58 Tallman Ndlovu,59 Bob Zulu,60 Erends61 and JosephNdlovu.62 This type of punishment, among others, is, from any angle,criminal and inhuman, and must have been designed to break the physicaland moral integrity of victims.

12. The ANC is the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle in South Africaand it is strange that its leaders have not been obliged to take the M.K.oath. We strongly feel that there is no difference between the leaders ofthe ANC and men of M.K. who are obliged to take the oath, for such anoath might have dealt with J. Radebe’s63 desertion and will definitely dealwith any other leader harbouring right wing designs of sabotaging ourrevolution.

13. The development of the Revolution has necessitated a renewal andrejuvenation of those who are leading it. We must guard against thefossilization of the leadership as this is likely to hinder the progressivedevelopment of the Revolution. There has been a tendency to appointpeople to the National Executive outside. We would like to know whatis the yardstick for these appointments. After proper consultation withall the members of the ANC a method should be found of changingleadership and the fact that there have been no conferences involvingall our members at home should not be used as an excuse for not renewingthe leadership. We should not depend on mandates given at nationalconferences 10 or more years ago. We have been forced to conclude thata few individuals are monopolising posts in the Organisation. This hasbrought about a situation where members of the Planning Council arealso members of the National Executive.

120

Hugh Macmillan

14. It is very alarming that double standards as regards to health of themembers of the Organisation are maintained. Whenever leaders are sickarrangements are made for them to receive excellent medical attentionwithout delay but this sort of concern is hardly shown to the rank andfile of the movement. We maintain that all of us are important in so far asthe Revolution is concerned and should thus be accorded the sametreatment.

15. We consider the youth in M.K. as the most revolutionary. We stronglyfeel that we should be consulted on matters affecting the youth. Forinstance we must be informed about the revolutionary InternationalYouth gatherings and we should be given priority in the sending ofdelegates. The farce of the Bulgaria ANC Youth delegation should neverbe repeated and those responsible should acknowledge the mistake theymade. The Youth of South Africa is not located in London or in anyEuropean capital. We therefore take particular exception to theappointment of certain students as leaders of the ANC Youth. ThaboMbeki who went to London on a scholarship sponsored by NUSAS is aleader of ANC bogus Youth Organisation.64

We are convinced that the ANC leadership in Exile is according bettertreatment and attention to the students. This attitude and practice hashad a disastrous effect of diverting many would-be revolutionaries intothe academic field. We feel that it is high time that the M.K. personnelwhich is in fact the core of our Revolution should be given the besttreatment by virtue of having volunteered with their lives to give thesupreme sacrifice for the Revolution.

Another disturbing symptom is the glaring practice of nepotismwhere the leadership uses its position to promote their kith and kin andput them in positions where they will not be in any physical confrontationwith the enemy. The sending of virtually all the sons of the leaders touniversities in Europe is a sign that these people are being groomed forleadership positions after the M.K. cadres have overthrown the fascists.We have no doubt that these people will just wait in Europe and just comehome when everything has been made secure and comfortable for themplaying the typical role of the Bandas and others. As opposed to thetreatment of the students, we find complete indifference and apathy tothe heroes and martyrs of our Revolution who have fallen in South Africaand Zimbabwe. We have in mind the gallant sons of our country, whowithout doubt lay their lives in the struggle against imperialism. These

121


include among many Patric (sic) Mosedi65 one time President of theANCY.L. and former treason trialist, Benson Ntsele the tirelessCommissar,66 the young cream of our country Sparks Moloi,67 ChrisMampuru,68 James Masimini69 and Andries Motsepe.70 We have notforgotten those who have defiantly and stubbornly refused to befrightened by the hangman’s noose in Rhodesia following the heroicexample set by our murdered martyrs Vuyisile Mini,71 Zinakile Mkhaba,72

Diliza Khayingo,73 W. Bongco74 and others. These comrades are thededicated Alfred Mninzi known to many of us as James Harmanus,75

Tamane known as Zami, the son of that great revolutionary and women’sleader Dora Tamane,76 the young Rhodes Msuthu Ngamlana known tous as Charles Mhambi77 and Tula Bophela.78

16. We call for a full definition of the ANC-Z.A.P.U. alliance, its form andcontent.

We demand that a serious and genuine effort should be made towardsthe intensification of ways and means of going home. This should be oneactively involving the most dedicated members of M.K. and it should beon the basis of a correct strategy.

In conclusion all these problems must be resolved by a conferencebetween the ANC Leadership and members of M.K. and not just handpickedindividuals.

SignatoriesM.T. Hani (Chris), W. Hempe, Z.R. Mbengwa (Jeqe), Tamana Gobozi(Mikza), Leonard Pitso,G. S. Mose (Mlenze), Ntabenkosi Fipaza (Mbali)

Notes1. I am very grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for an award that has made possible

the work that I am currently doing in South Africa and Zambia on the historyof the ANC in exile in Zambia under the direction of Professor William Beinartat the African Studies Centre, Oxford University. I am also grateful to RhodesUniversity for the award of a Hugh Le May Visiting Fellowship which facilitatedwork in the ANC Archives at Fort Hare University. I am also very grateful toMosa Maamoe, the archivist there, for his unfailing help with this project, andto the staffs of the department of manuscripts and archives at Cape TownUniversity Library, and of the National Archives of Zambia, for their help. Iacknowledge the help of Alfred Sipetho Willie and major-general Gardner ‘Sandi’Sijake, both MK veterans, in the identification of MK members. I have also usedthe list of ANC members who died in exile, which is available on the ANCwebsite, for this purpose.

122

Hugh Macmillan

2. It was published in Ikwezi (a Journal of South African and Southern AfricanPolitical Analysis), June 1978: 3-6, 73-5 under the title ‘The Bankrupt, Corrupt,Degenerate Leadership of the ANC of South Africa’.

3. Vladimir Shubin (1999) ANC: A View from Moscow (Bellville: MayibuyeBooks): 84-8.Also information from Vladimir Shubin, August 2008.

4. Author’s notes of Mantashe’s speech at Sabalele and Queenstown on 10 April2008. The speech was in isiXhosa and English and I am grateful to VuyaniMqingwana for the translation of an isiXhosa word for ‘mutiny’. I am alsograteful to Jeff Peires for the invitation to attend.

5. Terry Bell, ‘ANC Crisis Rooted in its History’, Cape Times, 30 September 2008;Zola Skweyiya interviewed by Pule Tabane, Mail and Guardian, 8 November2008.

6. These and earlier quoted figures for casualties are from the official ‘List of ANCmembers who died in exile’, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/deathlst.html.

7. For Chris Hani’s own account of the Wankie campaign see ‘The WankieCampaign’, Dawn, Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, 25th anniversary number, nodate [1986], pp. 34-7. See also R.M. Ralinala, J. Sithole, G. Houston and B.Magubane, ‘The Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns’, in SADET (2004) The Roadto Democracy in South Africa, 1960-70, volume 1, (Johannesburg: Zebra Press),pp.479-539, and Nicole (Nicky) van Driel, The Wankie Campaign, MAdissertation, University of the Western Cape, http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/menu-index.htm.

8. National Archives of Zambia, FA1/114, ‘Relations with Botswana’. A numberof ZAPU, ANC and PAC prisoners were cleared for transit to Zambia between13 and 27 December 1968.

9. Simons Papers, University of Cape Town, interview with Ray Simons by ‘M.V.’ [male voice], 25 November 1997; ‘Conclusions of the Commission ofEnquiry into the incidents at Roma Township’, as quoted in ANC (AfricanNationalists) In Defence of the African Image and Heritage (Dar Es Salaam,February 1976), p 35. There does not appear to be a copy of the original reportin the ANC archives at Fort Hare. Only three copies were originally producedand the chairman John Pule Motshabi believed that the report, which may havebeen critical of Joe Modise, was deliberately suppressed.

10. Duma Nokwe (1927-78), advocate and ANC activist, Treason Trial, 1956, leftSouth Africa with Moses Kotane in 1963. ANC secretary-general, and head ofdepartments of information and publicity, and security, but removed from thesepositions and from the national executive committee, (NEC) at MorogoroConference in 1969. Later reinstated to NEC and appointed deputy secretary-general.

123


11. Vuyiswa Nokwe (circa 1930-2008), Fort Hare science graduate, 1951, marriedDuma Nokwe in 1955. She left South Africa in 1964. After working for Amiranin an unspecified capacity , she worked as a secondary school teacher in Zambiauntil 1991. There was until 1973 an Israeli embassy in Zambia. After that dateAmiran continued to function and was widely regarded as an Israeli embassy inall but name. There is little reason to doubt that it did have links with Israeliintelligence.

12. ‘Grounds of appeal and addendum thereto in the matter of expulsion from theAfrican National Congress of South Africa’ in Simons papers, University ofCape Town, and author’s notes of interviews with Ray Simons; Shubin (1999)ANC: A View from Moscow: 84-8; Padraig O’Malley (2007) Shades of Difference,Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa (New York: Viking): 186-8; notesof author’s interview with Gardner Sijake and Alfred Sipetho Willie, CapeTown, 5 April 2008.

13. Martin Thembisile Hani, also known as Chris Nkosana or Skosana (1942-93).Born Sabalele, Cofimvaba, Transkei, Fort Hare (Rhodes University) graduatein classics, left South Africa in 1962, while under a sentence of eighteen monthsimprisonment. A political commissar during the Wankie campaign – imprisonedin Botswana, 1967-8. Expelled from the ANC in March 1969. Reinstated to theANC in May/June 1969 and soon afterwards to the commissariat, though hesoon resigned from that position. He eventually became chief-of-staff of MKand general secretary of the SACP.

14. Z. R. (Jeqe) Mbengwa – MK name of Jeqe Buthelezi. He came from Natal andwas in the intelligence department. He did not fight in Wankie campaign but wasa member of the military headquarters with an intelligence role. He was expelledfrom the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated with Chris Hani in May/June 1969.He was alleged by Oliver Tambo to be under the influence of Ambrose Makiwaneand to be the leader of a breakaway faction of MK in 1970. He was expelled fromthe ANC for the second time, with about thirty others, in Lusaka in September1970.

15. Goitsimolimo Leonard (also known as Bruce) Pitso. Came from Transvaal. Maybe Fort Hare (Rhodes University) graduate. He did not serve in the Wankiecampaign. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. Later a Major-General in the South African National Defence Forceand South African ambassador to Vietnam.

16. Ntabenkosi Fipaza, MK name of Wilson Mbali. Was a male nurse and servedas a medical officer, entering Rhodesia in that capacity. He was expelled fromthe ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. He was expelled fromthe ANC for a second time in September 1970 with Jeqe Buthelezi and aboutthirty others who defied orders to move from Lusaka to a bush camp.

124

Hugh Macmillan

17. Wilmot Hempe did not fight in the Wankie campaign, but was a member of thepolitical commisariat. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 andreinstated in May/June 1969. He was then reappointed to the commissariat, butresigned after pressure from the ‘Transvaal comrades’.

18. Tamana Gobozi (Mikza) – also known as Alfred Khombisa – expelled from ANCin March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969.

19. G.S. Mose (Jackson) Mlenze, a veteran of the Wankie campaign, and a memberof the political commissariat. He was imprisoned in Botswana with Chris Hani,1967-8. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. He was also appointed to the Lusaka military headquarters soonafterwards, but resigned after protests from the ‘Transvaal comrades’. Heentered South Africa on a military mission with Gardner Sijake and others in June1972. He was arrested and was a state witness in the trial of AlexanderMoumbaris and five others in 1973.

20. Tennyson Xola Makiwane (1933-80), treason trialist, journalist, and NECmember. He was ANC chief representative in Zambia, 1965-8. Opposed theopening of the ANC to members of all races at Morogoro Conference in 1969.He was dropped from the NEC in that year and was expelled from the ANC asone of eight ANC (African Nationalists) in 1975. He was assassinated in Umtata,probably by a member of the ANC, in 1980.

21. Quoted in SADET (2004) The Road to Democracy in South Africa (Cape Town:Zebra Press), volume 1: 536-7. T. Makiwane, ‘The Bogus Letter of Expulsion’,typescript dated October 1975, copy in Simons papers, University of CapeTown. Makiwane also says that an attempt to implicate Ambrose Makiwaneand Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota) in the drafting of the memorandum at ameeting of the NEC in Dar Es Salaam before the Morogoro Conference failed.

22. Notes of interview with Major-General Gardner Sijake and Alfred SipethoWillie, Cape Town, 5 April 2008.

23. Livingstone Mqotsi (1921-) born Keiskammahoek, graduate of Fort Hare, 1948,secretary, Unity Movement, reached Zambia in 1964, expelled from the UnityMovement in 1966, moved to the United Kingdom in 1969. He was a secondaryschool headmaster. Returned to South Africa in 2002.

24. Mzwandile (Mzwai) Piliso (1923-96), then a member of the NEC, later head ofthe security department, 1979-86.

25. Author’s interview with Livingstone Mqotsi, East London, 25 May 2008; forthe allegation that the memorandum was instigated by Mqotsi see interview withRay Simons, 25 November 1997, as above.

26. Transcript of interview with Chris Hani by Wolfie Kodesh, I April 1993,Mayibuye Archives, University of Western Cape.

125


27. Undated, unsigned and untitled draft of addendum to ‘Grounds of appeal…inthe matter of expulsion from the African National Congress of South Africa’,Simons papers, University of Cape Town.

28. ‘Grounds of appeal and addendum thereto’.29. Jonas Dinous Matlou (1920-?), treason trialist, member of the NEC, expelled

from the ANC with seven other ANC (African Nationalists) in 1975.30. Jack Zeph, MK name, identity uncertain.31. ‘Grounds of appeal and addendum thereto’; Makiwane, ‘The bogus letter of

expulsion’.32. ‘Grounds of appeal and addendum thereto’.33. Shubin (1999) ANC: A View from Moscow, pp/87-8. Interview with Alfred

Sipetho Willie and Gardner Sijake, Cape Town, 5 April 2008.34. Notes of author’s interviews with Ray Simons and information from Johan

Simons; notes of author’s interview with Livingstone Mqotsi, East London, 25May 2008; transcript of Wolfie Kodesh’s taped interview with Chris Hani,Mayibuye Centre, Cape Town. In her interview with ‘M.V’, 25, 27 November1997, as above, Ray Simons suggests that these events took place in February1969, in which case the plot was contemporaneous with the first tribunal.

35. Author’s interview with Gardner Sijake and Alfred Sipetho Willie, Cape Town,5 April 2008; SADET (2004) South Africans Telling Their Stories, volume 1: 29;Makiwane, ‘The bogus letter of expulsion’.

36. Ambrose Mzimkhulu Makiwane (1921-circa 2005), Fort Hare graduate, memberof the NEC. He was suspended from the NEC in March 1969 and neverreinstated. He was expelled from the ANC as one of the eight ANC (AfricanNationalists) in 1975. He was readmitted to the ANC in the late 1980s and diedat Cala in the Transkei.

37. Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota) (1928-?), head of ANC department ofinformation and publicity, London, member of the NEC, suspended in March1969.. Expelled from the ANC in 1975 as one of the eight ANC (AfricanNationalists). He was readmitted to the ANC in the late 1980s.

38. Tennyson Makiwane, ‘The bogus letter of expulsion’; ANC Archives, LusakaMission, 1/14/55, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the National Executive held inLusaka from August, 27-31,1971’.

39. Tambo Papers, Box 4, undated and untitled notebook, ‘Comrade Modisane’, f.32. (The foliation is my own).

40. J. B. Marks (1903-72), a very senior and highly respected member of the ANCand the SACP. He became chairman of the SACP in 1969 and died in Moscowin 1972.

126

Hugh Macmillan

41. Moses Mabhida (1923-86), senior member of the ANC, SACP and SACTU(SouthAfrican Congress of Trade Unions), at this time was chief political commissarof MK and was based at Morogoro. He later became general secretary of theSACP.

42. ANC Archives, Lusaka 2/3/3, untitled manuscript notes of discussions atMorogoro Conference, 28 April to 1 May 1969, ff. 1-16.

43. Tambo Papers, Box 31, ‘Statement on the relationship between the ANC (SouthAfrica) and M. K.’, no signature and no date. From internal evidence the datemust be 1971 and the author is Tambo.

44. Mayibuye Centre, Cape Town, transcript of Wolfie Kodesh’s interview withChris Hani, 1 April 1993.

45. For more detail on the aftermath of the Morogoro Conference see HughMacmillan ‘After Morogoro: the Continuing Crisis in the African NationalCongress of South Africa in Zambia, 1969-71’, Social Dynamics, September 2009(forthcoming).

46. I am very grateful to Livingstone Mqotsi for supplying me with a copy of theMemorandum. I found a second copy of the Memorandum in the unsortedsection of the Simons papers. There are no differences in the text but there areslight differences in the style of the signatures.

47. The Star Furniture Company remained an ANC business in Lusaka until the endof the exile era.

48. umkhonto we sizwe (MK) name of Joe Modise (1929-2001); in Treason Trial,1956, left South Africa 1963, MK commander-in-chief from 1965, minister ofdefence, South Africa, 1994-9.

49. Probably Zwelinjavi Matthews and Otto Bafana Msomi – the nature of theincident in which they were involved is unknown to the author.

50. Joseph Cotton, MK name of a son of Moses Kotane, see below.51. Shadrack Tladi, MK name of a relative of Thabo More (Joe Modise).52. Boy Otto, MK name, real identity unknown – he was in Lusaka under this name

in 1970.53. Moses Kotane (1905-78), long-serving general secretary of the Communist

Party of South Africa and of the South African Communist Party (SACP), andtreasurer-general of the ANC.

54. Zola Zembe (1928-present), MK name of Archie Sibeko, MK commander andSouth African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) activist, author with JoyceLeeson of Freedom in Our Lifetime (2000). The reference is to his trial by atribunal at the instigation of Tennyson Makiwane for an alleged breach ofsecurity in Lusaka in 1968.

127


55. Wellington Mbata came from the Transvaal. The nature of the case in which hewas involved is not known, but he was one of about thirty members of the ANCand MK who were expelled in Lusaka in September 1970 for allegedly defyingorders to move from town to a bush camp. See also notes on Jeque Butheleziand Wilson Mbali below.

56. Johannes Phalanyane, the MK name of Jack Ramusi – according to TennysonMakiwane (The ‘bogus letter of expulsion’) this was a murder case.

57. Presumably Solomon Bophela, also known as Mkholiso Mukali, an MK memberwho returned to South Africa from Tanzania in 1965-6 and, after returning toZambia, was detained by the ANC in Lusaka with the help of ZAPU in October1967. He was tried as an alleged spy and sentenced to death by an ANC tribunalin Lilanda township, Lusaka. He was taken to Livingstone but escaped withseveral bullet wounds from a botched execution. He was handed over by villagersto the Zambian police who kept him under armed guard in Livingstone Hospital.He was later returned to South Africa. See file in National Archives of Zambia,Lusaka, MHA1/6/33.

58. Daphne Zwane, one of very few women in MK, was, after an alleged clash withJoe Modise, imprisoned in a ‘dugout’ filled with water for twenty-two days atKaluwa Camp near Lusaka early in 1969. Alfred Sipetho Willie says that he wasresponsible for her release. She later married Zolile Nqose, an MK commander,and died in London. This case seems to have been one of the immediate triggersfor the writing of the memorandum. (Notes of author’s interviews with AlfredSipetho Willie (MK name, Alfred Mfamana), Cape Town, 2008).

59. Tallman Ndlovu is believed to have left the ANC in Tanzania and may have beengranted political asylum in Sweden. (Information from Alfred Sipetho Willie, asabove.)

60. Bob Zulu, a member of the Lusaka-based military headquarters, was killed withFlag Boshielo and two others while crossing the Caprivi Strip in an ill-fatedattempt to ‘go home’ in August 1970.

61. Erends was in the Tanzanian camps but his full identity is unknown.62. Joseph Spoe Ndlovu was killed in an unknown battle during the Wankie

campaign in 1967.63. A reference to James Jobe Hadebe, chief representative of the ANC in East

Africa and a member of the NEC, who resigned from the ANC’s ‘externalmission’ in December 1967.

64. The word ‘bogus’ has been inserted in the same hand in both copies of theMemorandum to which I have had access. Thabo Mbeki (1942-present), afterstudying at Sussex University, 1962-6, on a scholarship provided by SACHED(South African Committee for Higher Education), which was set up by theNational Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Mbeki was was secretaryof the African Students Association inside South Africa before going into exile

128

Hugh Macmillan

and involved in the establishment of the ANC Youth and Students Section,, anon-racial organisation, in Europe in the later 1960s.

65. Patrick Mosedi (or Molawa), former president of the ANC Youth League, waskilled in action during the Sipolilo campaign on 18 March 1968.

66. Benson Ntsele was killed in action during the Sipolilo campaign on 21 March1968.

67. Sparks Moloi was killed in action during the second battle of the Wankiecampaign on 21 August 1968.

68. Christopher Mampuru was killed in action during the first battle of the Wankiecampaign on 13 August 1967.

69. James Masimini or Masimeni was killed in action during the first battle of theSipolilo campaign on 13 March 1968.

70. Andries Motsepe was killed in action during the first battle of the Wankiecampaign on 13 August 1968.

71. Vuyisile Mini (1920-64), singer, actor, composer of songs, trade unionist andearly member of MK in Port Elizabeth, was executed in 1964. For an accountof his life see ‘Vuyisile Mini’, Dawn, Journal of Mkhonto we Sizwe, 25th

anniversary number, no date [1986], p.19.,72. Zinakile Mkhaba (1929-64) was executed with Mini in 1964.73. Diliza Khayingo (Wilson Khayinga) (1926-64) was also executed with Mini in

1964.74. Washington Mpumelelo Bongco, head of MK in the Border Region, based in East

London, was tortured by Donald Card and executed in December 1964. For anaccount of his life see Steve Tshwete, ‘Washington Mpumelelo Bongco’, Dawn,Journal of Mkhonto we Sizwe, 25th anniversary number, no date [1986]: 30.

75. Alfred Mninzi (James Harmanus) left South Africa in 1962. He was capturedduring the first battle of the Wankie campaign in August 1967. He was sentencedto death in Rhodesia, reprieved, and released in 1980. He died after his returnto South Africa.

76. Bothwell (also known as Bottle) Tamana , son of Dora Tamana, was capturedduring the Wankie campaign, sentenced to death in Rhodesia, reprieved, andreleased in 1980. He died in exile in 1984.

77. Rhodes Msuthu Ngamlana (Charles Mhambi) was killed in action in the thirdbattle of the Wankie campaign on 22 August 1967. It is probable that the authorsof the memorandum were unaware of his death.

78. Thula Bopela (correct spelling) was captured during the Sipolilo campaign,sentenced to death in Rhodesia, reprieved, and released in 1980. He is the co-author, with Daluxolo Luthuli, of Umkhonto weSizwe: fighting for a dividedpeople (Alberton: Galago, 2005).

129


ReferencesANC (1978) ‘The Bankrupt, Corrupt, Degenerate Leadership of the ANC of South

Africa’, Ikwezi (a Journal of South African and Southern African PoliticalAnalysis), June: 3-6, 73-5.

‘The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: the Culture of Exile andthe Changing Relationship with Home, 1964-90’, Journal of Southern AfricanStudies 35(2), June 2009:303-29.

Bopela, Thula and Daluxolo Luthuli (2005) Umkhonto weSizwe: fighting for adivided people. Alberton: Galago.

Hani, Chris (1986) ‘The Wankie Campaign’, Dawn, Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe,25th anniversary number:34-7.

Macmillan, Hugh (2008) ‘After Wankie: the “Hani Memorandum” and itsrepercussions at Morogoro and on the ANC in Zambia, 1968-71’, paperpresented to Workshop on Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, Universityof Cape Town, September.

———— (2009) ‘The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: theCulture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964-90’, Journalof Southern African Studies 35(2), June: 303-29.

———— (2009) ‘After Morogoro: the Continuing Crisis in the African NationalCongress of South Africa in Zambia, 1969-71’, Social Dynamics, September(forthcoming).

Mini, Vuyisile (1986) ‘Vuyisile Mini’, Dawn, Journal of Mkhonto we Sizwe, 25th

anniversary number: 19.O’Malley, Padraig (2007) Shades of Difference, Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for

South Africa. New York: Viking: 186-8.Ralinala, RM, J Sithole, G Houston and B Magubane (2004) ‘The Wankie and

Sipolilo campaigns’, in SADET The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1960-70, volume 1, Johannesburg: Zebra Press: 479-539.

Shubin, Vladimir (1999) ANC: A View from Moscow. Bellville: Mayibuye Books:84-8.

Simons, Ray (1997) ‘Interview with Ray Simons by “MV” [male voice]’, November25; ‘Conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry into the incidents at RomaTownship’, as quoted in ANC (African Nationalists) In Defence of the AfricanImage and Heritage (Dar Es Salaam, February 1976): 35.

Tshwete, Steve (1986) ‘Washington Mpumelelo Bongco’, Dawn, Journal ofMkhonto we Sizwe, 25th anniversary number: 30.

Van Driel, Nicole (2003) ‘The Wankie Campaign’, MA dissertation, University ofthe Western Cape, http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/thesis/vandriel-thesis/menu-index.htm.

Commentary The ‘Hani Memorandum’ – introduced and annotated · Commentary The ‘Hani...

Documents

Transcript of Commentary The ‘Hani Memorandum’ – introduced and annotated · Commentary The ‘Hani...