UNTIL
AROCK
1
to.
CLý,I5I0D By -
z- 'ý=-
CIL ASSI--I--
1970 Command History (RCS
SEE
DISTRIBUTION
1. The USMACV 1970 Command History is promulgated in response to CINCPAC Instruction
5000. 5C, 9 Ma r 71, subject: Historical Reports from Unified Commands in the Pacific Command.
2. This document contains information
affecting the security of
meaning
Sections 793 and 794. Transmission or
revelation of its
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
The
material contained within this document is to be treated with the utmost discretion. Under no
circumstances shall
possession thereof be transferred, or the information contained therein be
imparted to personnel other than those whose duties specifically require
knowledge
thereof.
Information
provided
duties.
3. The overall classification of the Command History is TOP SECRET - NOT RELEASABLE
TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. The Security classification of this volume is SECRET - NOT
RELEASABLE TO
the
USMACV
Command
History is prohibited except with the permission of COMUSMACV or higher
authority.
transported, stored, safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with
instructions contained in the current edition of the security regulation s for handling classified
matter
W;-t JATI ",R
..
of events in the Vietnam conflict during 1970. as in
prior
years,
will
events
unique
Under
Worshwia, Jr
(UISAP. vabooualn
A. Smn•ih
A. Manur
Yt41 Leroy
f.
Lttic WUSN); SN,#Hohbb V. Howard (US?), Charlos E_ Kno~ta
(USA), Larry A. St#aW (USA).
Kenneth
Ituy M. WickwOt
SA).'
and Miss
Chret~it
C&AiiOhew
MilitAry lHistory'
lranch Libnartsa.
Tehistoarians ac;knwle~dj-e the~ir indebtvedtwss to tha' or'jigiAl aathjors of soretnS'1n
ota•kpajprs,.
Althovtgh tAhcttmititimla mtay t iot havo bocn recordd,. this hbltory
stands as a rthoro of
afomplilh•oiett.
11-
..................
.. . . . . ..
............
.i-247
ntkntad Relations ps
for Cmurpowcatnmaat ......... . ... IV-4
US Army
Rkedepleymont* -*V1
US Nary it.rdeployntot*
"GvnvrI .........................
Alke
Airlit i
S~ ~~~~~~Airperationsi tia MRl 4 . . . . . . . . . tI
t*W
. .
VII-57
......... ..................
Improvement and Modernization
General ........ .....
F.VNAF Sensor Program ................. ................ Vll-ll5
Viznamization of Project Delta .................
. ......
...............
... ............
...
TO RVNAF ........ IX-35
Turnover
.. IX-52
Upgrade
Program
..... .............. ... IX-71
RVNAF Food Suý.llernent
. . IX-89
Single Integrated
....
...... .. X101
(Out-of-Countryl ......... . IX-103
509th
Radio
and
Research
Field
Advisors ..........
.. IX-113
Budget
OVERVIEW .....................
General.......................................................X-22
PWs..................X-26
Inte rrogation..................................................X-30
XI-3
...
THIM)
XII-6
Currency
Controls. ...........
(Volume 11
-*,.*~.(Volume
IV) .
. R E W F X R E N C E 5
URCES
H-. ..
operation. Ye t
and
development
were and still are the keystones of the GVN's political
and military operations, crucial to
the
catalyst allowing
70 goals,
number of US casualties, withdraw US
Forces on
settlement
of
the
war. All four goals were interrelated. As the US redeployed
units and turned over areas
of
role. And
Vietnamization, the casualty
evident even before
the Cambodian campaign.
(U) Most important,
to the Nixon
countries to
the US wa s pursuing a suc-
cessful strategy which
various
paci-
the
in which
to develop.
the
be
cultivated
to
assure
the
the RVN's political system. rhe challenges oi 1971 --
the need to stabilize the
economy,
,estoring
are crucial to the existence of the GVN. In this
sense the definitive
cation, will be in 19 71.
(C) Military operations
Cambodian sanctuary
Ngai, and
Quang Nam
literally hundreds of small unit actions extending security from consolidation zones,
the
GVN
"Here the effective and proven (pacification) technique was applied, entering
"inforce
the
population, opening roads, establishing markets .... (1)
(C) Because of the success of allied tactics and the pressure on his sanctuaries, the
enemy
economy-of 4orce operations which he
had previously outlined in COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14. The targets of VC/NVA
efforts
were
Glossary.
 
(C) The most telling blow against the enemy of the year, if not the war,
was
the
cross-
enemy was greater
or
activity
as
The impact must
the R•N. The large
numbers of
created within the enemy's
of the RVNAF in its
capability to wage a successful campaign against
the ellemy, the ability of the
RF/PF to assume responsibility for
security
people
in their government and armed forces protided a set of conditions which
could assure tl~e
(S) The
co.rrbined operations
in Cambodia
the
and
tha
Tuail through seuthern Laos
enemy perforce
shifted to
made even muore important.
interdiction campaign was
heavy rainfall and the interdiction pro-
gram
MARXET TIM)d, the naval barrier patrol of RVN
t.rritorial waters.
sensors, watez
(C) Thus allied operations in Southeast Asia advanced the
security
possible for pacification and
development programs to progress.
(C) While combat operations
in
fication campa;gn sought
Development
that a serious
appeas
in
the Hiild of internal security this challenge would be met through
strengthened PHUNG
measured in several
ways. The Hamlet Evaluation
System (HES) ABQ ratings (those hamlets in a relatively secure status) showed
imnprovemenet.
rating was 87.9 percentj
cent.
moved from 69. S percent to $4. 6 percent over
the
same
period.
As Ainbameador Co&by *aid, "Pacification, like golf. becvmes mrte difficult t* improve
the better it gets, and consequently the rage
of progress was less than that of 1969.
Iny
end-
,. ecember,
howe-zer,
37,800 population, or 0.2 percent
of the natiowal total," (2)
THIS
~ ~ ~ ~ & - - 4 i:: 'J.••'.,"' " ""•
and in the PcDF were other indi-
cations of
889.
2,894,
to the
exceeded its
original goal
neutralizations. By the end of
the year a tot.al of 21, 700 VC I had been
sientenced,
rallied
or
killed.
(C)
persisted, despite t-he success of programs such as PHUNG HOANG.
The
the
enemy
Cambodian incursion
guerrilla warfa.re. The entire year showed an
actual
the
total
number of incidents by 50 percent during the year. The internal
security struggle wus
its progress in promoting
internal security and thus
deep-rooted Commitment and support of the
people.
As
one
te the GVN and have no
real sense
to the govern~ment.
areas in
itself and its programs. Twice during the
year the OVN
effectively
local
consulted
of
ideaitifying
the
bill.
a
planted a"d
882, 19
end
planted it a crop yield up to five ximes
gre&We
of this to the fArmer and the
G YN economy were
plasters resulting f ei foreign trade iinbaai~ces.
Import duties
P or
Tax
to tncrease reveyuei.
make fuads
for lan~d owitership arid buolues# at-tterprises. Pezhips nio4 significaut
f ~
tRA4MNCASSISED
Nigqf.*~
T13
$VN 275 per $U S I MPG.
The immediate
effect was
Even with
these problem areas will
threat to the
will have to be
reduced. RVN imported goods
12 million).
on outside
the Vietnamese econ-
not production, of goods
to secure urban
and sanitation
capacities of
demonstrations on
for solution of
of the biggest
successes of 1970,
Vietnamese forces.
AlU tactical
of the Vietnemese side of the campaign
were
Vietnamese.
all
elements
North Vietnamese and
way toward prosecuting the war on its own.
(U) During
responsibility for pro-
3 and 4 which formerly depended for
security on
zation (I&M) program: the territorial forces would take responsibility
for
countryside
security,
leaving
undertake large-scale operations into remaining enemy enclaves.
In most areas the
(S) Under
the I& M program, the RVNAF force structure reached its 1970 authorised
strength
the force
I million.
is beat illustrated by comparison with
the US. A
the assumption
of the
soldiers, sailors
and airmen
units of the
irureased force structure
and to provide
With
this
the
year,
sorties
Iof Div, 26th
9th Inf
December
the
4th
RVN.
In
MR
and in southwestorn
to
include
property.
During
transfers
LOCs remained
a major effort during the year with 40 percent of US
engineer troop
effort
roads were completed
roads was necessary
during the year
progress there
to RVNAF
and evident
and
NCOs,
NCO instructuis andI cadre at training schools and training centers
were
in
thousand for all
(U) One
over the burden
rated
redeployment,
US
morale
problems
increased.
There
were
to examine all aspects
return
The morale-boosting
(U) The Paris
place, the
prisoner exchanges. At the end of the year Hanoi
still had not made
evidenice of
The
1970
RVNAF
and the
While
the
while other FWMAF
71, Subj: Status of Pacification--Look-
ing Back
Colby's
(U),
Gp-Not
stated.
3.
UNCLASSIFIED
I-?
objective in Vietnam
continued to be:
nation of South
and regionally.
were
identified and established as a basis for the
issuance of strategic guidance, the development of strategic plans, and the management of the
resources--necessary steps
the immediate
of reasonable security had
a realistic
of South Viet-
Nam (GVN) and the people to proceed with building a free
and independent nation. Emphasis
the close of 1970, the inter-
mediate
objective,
Expanded areas of
out
national
solidified basis for the
GV N and its
environment for beneficial
FOR SOUTH VIETNAM
(C) To further US objectives, the US military mission in South Vietnam was to assist the
Vietnamese Government in reestablishing
its
security
and police
could maintain security for its own people. 3 )In 1970
the
GVN achieved a significant degree of stability and a substantial expansion
of its armed forces.
ment
of
a
free,
independent
the "one war" concept in their
efforts to defeat enemy. Promulgated by COMUSMACV in 1969, the war" or
"area security" concept
continued to emphasize:
war
of
big
territorial security. It
resources
areas. Priority of effort
the people. (
primary concern the provision of effective security for
the
people
end:
(FWMAF)(including
US)
would
concentrate
installations
to the less
-- Territorial
elements in neutralizing
to
tribes people
Asia
Nixon
along with South Vietnamese
(SECDEF)
provided guidance for further development of SEA to include an FY71 Cambodian
The
guidance
continued
Plan was implemented by CVN plans coordinated with MACV. Two
documents, the GVN 1970
ed 1970 operations.
GVN 1970 Pacification
and Development Plan
(C) The GVN
P&D plan as a continua-
tion of
document on pacification
to sign
illustrated the
coordinated
execution.
1. Territorial Security.
Provide
a B level of security to 90 percent of the population
and
ratings. ) Reduce
law and
and
Local Administration. Complete the elections and staffir. of all village,
ha-nlet,
municipal,
for all goals in
Place greater emphasis
the ralliers, e. g., high
and middle-ranking
Improve and normalize the lives of the refugees,
veterans, and
8.
by increasing the means
expedite land reforms; organize
the
people
desire.
)
(C) The GV N 1970 P&D Plan is discussed in more detail
in Chapter VIII, Pacification and
Development.
That
70, which
provided the impetus to complete all the goals established for 1970 and to prepare for the
1971
Community
to implement the
covering
the
was prepared jointly by
Staff (JOS) and the FWMAF. The single, bilingual
document
was
the basic plan for the conduct of all military operation In RVN during 1970. The
GV N P&D Plan and the Combined Campaign Plan
complemented one another.
145, was based on two assumptions regarding Vietnarnization: first,
that FWMAF (which
included US ) would be reduced to a level consistent with progress of RVNAF
improvement and modernization, pacification and development,
and the level of enemy activity;
and second, that the accelerated program of expansion, imprn vement, and modernization
of
RVNAF
areas, to a security
NP and PSDF,
assumed an increasingly important role. While supporting the government P&D
program, these forces woulc conduct operations to prevent enemy Infiltration, attacks, and
harassment of populated
bases, and vital LOC#.
the
Planm That in
was eilinificant. Whereas the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan called for
support of pacification and development, the 1970 plan called for participation. That objective
was
(VC/NVA) forces. Supporting tb.a two basic objectives were related tasks:
THIS PAGE REGRADED
8141334
U-4
l!P l DI ii il nlllnl i1 n i i1
,W m m , w m BlllllD
 
and combined mobile
conduct a continuous air
offensive to neutralize enemy forces, BAs, and logistic systems in RV N
and in authorized
land
and
water
maintain air supremacy and
naval superiority within and
and coastal surveillance, cross-
psychological
operations
operations.
2.
Participate in the P&D Plan throughout RVN. The related
tasks
conduct operations
areas adjacent to
in the identification
V and neutralization of the VCI; conduct military operations to secure
areas for pacification;
both secure areas and consolidation zones; assist in
the devel-
efforts; participate in population and resources control programs; support the
Chieu Hoi
military
RVNAF forces in providing
had
ing the major
Plan, with its
c. People's Self
g. People's information
h. Prosperity for
to achieve a maximnum state of
combat effectiveness,
and capabilities.
'4.
Replace,
on a selective basis, regular-force units assigned to pacification and static
territorial security milesions with Ry.
I THI' %AG E REGRAOEO UNCLASSIFIED
""wOr"m kAniy By DAIM per
"'."' . '
  . ",
.::<
5. Inflict more casualties on the enemy than he could
replace.
logistical
the
enemy.
greatest extent
consolidation zones.
of natural resources to the maximum
extent possible.
concept of operations was based on JGS recognition of concept
of
FWMvA
F:
1. A transition from the existing security system to a
security
system that ultimately
would not require the current level of participation by combat forces of the RVN.
2.
RVNAF
combined
forced
requirement for FWMAF
would be reduced,
to be provided
areas, while
emphasized.
FWMAF
an d logistical
(DMZ). Laotian
and Cambodian
incursions
Into
consolidation
be continued in the
use
for
intor-
dittion
operations and neutrulisation of onerny facilities an d
forces. Riveritie operations
0 w M M
air forces were to be reinforced
by heavy strike forces with continued emphasis on quick reaction capabilities. Aerial rec3nnais-
4";
concentrations.
FWMAF were to be
with
military
cause them to participate
in national programs including
for their welfare; and destroy
enemy
(S)
coordination of military
sector
the GV N 1970
P&D Plan. The
attention
neutralizing
the
VCI
activity. Sector
which me t the
assist
refugees; and assist in the organization, training, equipping and employment of the PSDF.
2.
be continuous,
PSDF, had the responsibility for village and hamlet security, and
they were to cooperate fully with the police
in neutralizing the VCI. The PF were also
assigned
the task of maintaining
law and order and eliminating criminal elements in the villages and
hamlets where
be
to exploit
tollberate
to provide maximum
security, Efforts were
concealment, and
consolidation zones. The enemy was to be
driven
from
those
plan stressed operatlins which required regular forces to concentrate on operations
outside
matter of emphasis. Those operations would
include reciprocal general and direct support, coordinated
artillery and ai r support, and com-
bleed
high population
defense activities
peruonnel and equipment into
were to be increased with
emphasis
and PF , were to be improved
through
logistics management
and equipment. Combined training to improve
the combat effectiveness of
namese
people
stressed.
The
plan definitely recognized the assumption of a greater share of
the
war
effort by the RVNAF as objectives were achieved and provided
for
under the "one
were
to mobile operations against
in I CTZ and other enemy forces which might
invade across the DMZ
or Laotian border. Emphasis was to be placed by territorial forces on
maintaining security in secure areas and improving
security in consolidation zones. Military
participation in
to be
and 9,
high
priority.
II
CTZ. Regular forces would be committed primarily to mobile operations against
enemy forces,
BAs, LOGs,
and logistical
might
invade across
the Laotian or Cambodian borders. Emphasis was to be placed by terri-
torial forces on
zones. Military
LOCs,
arid
21,
primarily to mobile operations
CTZ,
might invade across the
Opening
particularly Routes 1,
channel,
to
mobile
operations
against
logistical systems in IV CTZ, and other enemy forces which
might invade across the Cambodian border. Emphasis was placed by territorial forces on
maintaining security
improving securltv in consolidation zones. Military
participation in the government P&D plan was to be intensified. Opening and protecting vital
road and water LOGs, particularly
Routes
4
waterways,
outpost defensive system was
to
be
strength-
ened and improved to effectively counter all enemy ground and fire attacks. ( 9
Planning-for 1971
(S)
On 31 Oct 70 the Combined Campaign Plan, 1971, t B 14 6 (U)
was
distributed
the Vietnamese people- participation
FWMAF redeployed.
and participation in
1970,
to
the
field.
Thus
message
promulgated
Initially selected
operational objectives.
The overall
duration,
units were not authorized to operate beyond 30 km from the RVN border,
and
all
US
see Anney
Military
Region#
wouiW 6a
imurn
pressure
to be on aggressive ot~duct
of operaktions
in-cou.rtry
enemy
that area.
would reduce
CTZ. Support of pacific-
security,
on
neutralization
from the Cambodian operation was
to be
security
of
RVNAF in preventing the enemy from
reestablish-
intensifying efforts
main forces and BAs
RVN.
to:
of the
VC/NVA system
the security of RVN;
rmes Nationale Khmer (WANK)
and
operational
Vietnam (ARVN)
to onhantce idontifirlio of the populace with the GVN;
and
traditional ronghold.
c•oktet
well as supportitlg GVN
air iteordiction
BA s and
ceorriplith
for
IS Oct 70; ettouraigo
and second
an conduct seol
issued a Fall Campaign
Plan providing guidance for
rnisulrsn.
.N.
Rd81i
13j
•. . . . . . ':, .•' .b
Cambodia (contingent upon
the extension of
US Forces were to complement RVNAF operating in the clearing
zone, by providing
main-
area and
clearing zones.
continue, where
such operations
were clearly
as
to
of a
viable logistics system by the enemy. US support of those operations was governed by the
authorities
mobile operations
and hamlets in
accordance with GVN 1970 P&D Plan and Supplemental 1970 P&D Plan. Secure
areas were to
be the responsibility
the
PF.
Priority
(S) Concerning
pacification,
emphasis was to be placed on supporting and assisting the GVN
in achieving the goals and objectives called
for in the GVN Supplemental P&D Plan with
priority
to territorial security, the reduction of incidents of terrorism, and increasing the effectiveness
of the territorial forces.
(S)
Psychological operations were to place primary emphasis on the neutralization of the
VCI. Priority was to be given to the exercise of influence by all commanders and senior
advisors
People's Information Program.
(S) Improvement of the RVNAF during the fall campaign was to be achieved by providing an
environment
which
erated.
The
to become self-sufficient in order to replace US and
other
in
assuming
campaign, the probable courses
be
increased military activity in MR 1 for the balance of
the
year
In
to maintain
a strong presence In the populatedareas relying heavily on the local forces and the
auerrillas.
could be
expected to
the
coastal
to Cam
in Laos
secure a logistics corridor through Cambodia. His ultiniate goal in
SEA remained complete
domination of RVN.
(S) To moet
related to
special interest in the tasking directive were two policies:
1. Standd own of US combat units designated for redeployment was to be staggered
throughout the period, consistent with operational requirements. Standdown time could be
extendied to
XXIV,
1. CG , XXIV Corps/Senior Advisor
MR 1:
secure
LOCs;
b. Support
Quang Tin, and Quang Ngal Provinces.
(1) Support RY and PF training programs.
(2)
Coordinate
Coordination
Center
Maximum mutual exchange of intelligence
was desired.
air interdiction of Khe Sanh Plain, Da Krong Basin,
and
2. CC , IFFORCEV/Senior
ate VC/NVA forces; neutralize
BA s 202, 226,
229, 236, 238, and
b.
efforts with emphasis on Binh
Dinh,
(1)
Support
senior US advisors. Max-
was desired.
increase
$4i
.inh
border
and
FWMAF,
conduct
combat
operations
to
eliminate
VC/NVA
Zones C
with emphasis on Bien
b. Support GVN Supplemental 1970 P&D Plan
with emphasis on Chong Thien, Vinh
Binh,
coordination with RVNAF.
forces.
(7AF)/Senior Advisor Vietnamese
Air Force (VNAF);
and approved
and FW
VNAF
pacification operations
(VNN) in its conduct of
coastal surveillance and riverine interdiction
operations.
VNN
in
and other contingency operations in the Gulf of Thailand.
d. Continue to provide
in support of US
combat service
Supplement.
(S)
manpower and logistic support,
responsibility for
operations, particularly
which formerly had been
a supporting-role
responsibility for providing
route security, plus area security and reconnaissance over broad areas. The
desired
effect
was
or
Supplement.
Short Title
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J20F 3 Feb 70 Cl/8 Jul 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN
THIS
841339
UF.19
Ho Ch i Minh
which
included:
consolidation
unification
prob-
lem,
Hanoi's
objective
in
the
rather
support of the
war in the
of the Confucian/Mandarin
of
social
con-
flet
w ar between the north
and south.
(S) Hanoi's
libera-
M-
"HS
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Order
Sec
Army
 
political structure to organize the resource base of its adversary for
its
own
shadow political structure for supplies, men,
com-
successful in the south until the scenario was significantly altered
in 1965
forces.
broke with theoretical conceptions of a war of liberation. First,
Hanoi dispatched large numbers of NVN troops to RVN.
This constituted a major resource
com-
The
of the strong.
(S) Secondly, with the commitment of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, Hanoi adopted
a
strategy of general offensi%.es based on main-force units from the north. Not only did the
main-
force
units
the support
favt c.upled with
family
to
to support an
external logistics system. As the traditional sea supply routes and then Sihanouk-
ville/Kompong Som were closed, Hanoi
had
logistics system.
exogenous
to Hanoi's own decision making, tc.jk place in 1968 and had
a significant effect on Hanoi's strategy. This was the initiati'.n in
RVN of
the
areas
over what once were
insurgent domains and resources. The programs took the strategic initiative away from the Viet
Cong
the
rural
areas.
(S) The failure of the general offensives, the manpow.r drain from the north, the effective-
ness of the
Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program in cutting the resource base in the
south, and
the need
level,
ware
all
The
first public announcement of
this change was made in Le Duan's 2 Feb 70 speech to the party cadre on the occasion of the
party's
Duan called for a "two track" policy of building socialism
in the north
policy was reaffirmed by
Troung Chinh
in May and by Premier Pham Vee Dong on 2 Sep. The change in priorities connoted
a reallocation of economic resources, specifically the
apportionment
the objectives oa liberation of the south
and unification of
of the original
In terms
of Hanoi's
that the enemy was
internal contradictions
of the allies.
(S) The shift in NVN's national priorities was reflected in Hanoi's strategy
throughout Indo-
geared
of
forces,
base
areas (BAs), and efforts to strengthen the guerrilla and political strut-
turea. To see
best
southern
Office for South
the B-5 Front and
(See Figure 111-1.)
(S) The war
in northern Laos
place
bombing in the panhandle,
existed on Hanoi's
(LOCs) aud harass
existing LOCi
north from Cambodia
fore,
-,%.,
the COSVN :,r.
were varied
but all
in Phnom
THIS'PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Order
to
ways. First, organize a Khmer
infrastructure in the rural areas.
This infrastructure would be used to siphon off Cambodian
economic reb,,irces,
major
shadow government
effort. The Khr,'ier Rouge
Route 4 and south of
Route 6. It was believed that only
atout one-third
of these
units were rather well-equipped,
increased four to five
assumed that they
were not highly trained and that their numbers, even if accurate,
were not to
to tie FANK's forces into static positions. As
operations
in
Cambodia
continued,
the
and
would try to cripple
issued tinder
Resolutions
9
and
These documents
base of the in#urgency.
Small
unit
stressod over
dom.
for
a
number
of th•
g•uerrilla uits,
Popular Forces
(RFIPF) and
fragmented
wa s
in the t.VN
of its ba•talions
the
third
to
Khanh
during this
same time
and
Phu Yen these tactics
scale.
The tactics used in Phu Yen were not positive in
nature.
over
the enemy
inhibited a peasant's commitment to the Saigon government. Whether these tactics actually in-
creased
period.
The tactics
(S) The B-5 Front
B-3 Front were different situations
and the
their
strategy.
(VCI)
because of the short supply
routes from
guaranteed so that the NVA did not reap a pay-
chological
mainly into a
strategic logistical base.
The fact that the NV A had 6 percent of their combat
maneuver
stiength
in
B-3
clusion.
Enemy
combat
tions at all
premier
for In-
for all functional purposes,
peak.
into military, para-
civilian
laborers
who
the
stage
for
and People's Revolutionary Committees.
(C) As has been stated, the Civilian Proselyting Section attempted organize the
population
emphasizing
the wickedness
of the
GVN and
and monitored
its quality.
civil administration.
In practice,
it resulted
in village
itself.
In
given area were usually
the
party
the civil government by
instances the party
Large
rallies
and
maintain
the
committees),
committee
(except
except for
region (SR). Precincts 2, 4, 7, and
8 reported to
Saigon, such as tax
opera-
tions,
on the
For example, coordination and operating
committees
were
other large military operations
cities
city sections' efforts.
functional
struggle movements,
similar section at
personally
less important
in Vietnam. The
and
operating cells that moved in and out of Saigon from subregion
subsections. There
were some
party committee
civil affairs units, secret youth groups, and different types of
penetration
as progress
was made
ow n
support, with the precinct
specialized
cells
performed
incite
riots,
propaganda. They were
aAsigned to a
their
specific
person
temporary unit
"UNCLASSIFIED
.111-13
"N
functions, such
as civilian
reconnaissance, were the
the GVN
individual
cadre
however, were pre arranged and appeared to be of a
rather permanent
five or six alternates always de-
pended on the
hours
in
who seemed to have
by
person who
or other important
the fields
peace
was to have its own "party committee."
Pro-
fessional
members with legal status were to attempt
to obtain mem-
A typical penetration
and
a
full-scale
induce-
the cities
(U) The VC often
leadership
commo-liaison routes
and methods were very important to successful city operations. ( 5
UNCLASSIFIED
IU-
14
Vietnam
under
this struggle had
stealing the people
the population. He sought to achieve
that
specific methods. One
intensive communication efforts:
propaganda.
to the system. Each program of the party organiza-
tions included terror. However, that did
not mean a system in
which terror was dominant,
terms: viciousness for
Communists were presented
in moral but
terror
advantage he
had over
making
insecurity:
derstood
in establishing
control con-
terrorist
elimination of key
officials and the totality of power. The resulting weakness was the single most important
gain.
manpower but also
source,
and
an
The
his
followers
saw himself as alone, belea-
UNCLASSIFIED
•i
and executed strike against a
well-armed,
because the
again proven.
assassination
security. The
strength from
only himself. Each
individual searched
desperately to assure his own safety. Thus, the third objective was served through
the terrorist
act itself. (
targets of
were:
1. Enemy personnel in fields of espionage, police, public security, special forces psy-
chological warfare,
be-
3. Members of enemy military and
paramilitary organizations.
6.
Memberi
propaganda, and
press establislunent.
of religious organizations still deeply superstitious (e. g.,
Catholic 6).
8. Thieves,
fortune tellers.
autotatic
having
cadre or
12.
Relatives of persons engaged in enemy espionage, security, special forces or
PSYWAR organizations; relatives of important members or leaders
of reactionary
political parties
above
officials from
the
revolution
subsequently
the revolution
for spying.
14. Deserters or AWOLs who returned to the revolution but without clear explanation
(i. e., who may be government
penetration
agents. )
(U)
total at least 3 million people. That
probably was what
Hoi C
(Communist) blood
or threat of
influence
of terrorism was
the use of
in
a
way
to
avoid
and certain classes of individuals; detonation of mines in
the path of persons or vehicles; deliberate assassinations;
and kidnapping of government officials
and other groups of
used and
overpower. It
could beý directed at any
kind of target and casualtiex might or might not result. Harassment was
used to describe the destruction of property
or
crops,
population do-
(C) Kidnapping was
and Included
both govern-
one
or
more
civilians
was Applied to the killing of non-military
personnel through random causes such
as
ket
was used to deavribe the deliberate killing
of a specific individual or small
group of individuals and
killed
specifically assigned to
within
-,
. .
Propaganda
Value
to circumvent GV N
institutions.
ostensibly under GVN
to protect them,
the VC would lose the concealment and local logistical support necessary for guerrilla
warfare.
the VC
to demonstrate
the fragility
(C) The VC won
few converts through acts of terrorism, but they hoped the acts would cause
the
people
The
provide
or a higher
standard of living.
Schools, health clinics, market places, and polls were often the target of
terrorist
activities.
irreparable dumage to
of the local VC forces. Even
more significant were the detrimental effects of the incident on the
VC's
Propaganda
tactics and assumed
their proselyting efforts.
the mass
the average
method.
poetry readings
to
make
Vietnamese
a
team consisted of about 20 members and
most
teams
concealed
to
propaganda
methods. The very presence of the team had a great
psychological
ease with which they
could move within GVN
of
"to create public
enthusiastic
geared their appeal
"Voice of
the NFLSVN.
" Th e
(U)
Liberation
the
"official
news
41
VC
provinces.
(C) The mission of the LPA was to procure information and news items, and
then distill the
indlividual VC agencies and units; a consolidated report
all VC agencies
and units; one
Giai Phong and
be centrally
(U) Another
the leaflet. Leaflets
allied forces in
inducing
desertions,
or causing them to press for an end to the war. Ar ex-
panded form of
the leaflet was
commonly
an
containing
a
short
not widespread. Fi lm was
both produced
and imported
by the
"liberated" areas
hero. Films had
the advantage of easily holding the viewers' attention and made a lasting
im-
pression.
However,
( 12
appeals
ethnic,
in SVN.
appeals
greatly increased.
The primary
Quang Buddhists, disable
a
students were typical attempts aimed at
special
interest
a
Saigon.
The
unqualified public support
of the militant student leaders. The Communists portrayed every GV N gesture of reconciliation
toward the students as evidence of the political power of the student
movement. Students were
anti-GVN
to be
more effective to alienate special interest groups from the GV N than to
recruit groups' members
into the Communist
time
international efforts was to
world's populace. Their hope
(U) Naturally,
and Russian Communist
support from those
African and Arab
governmonts that identified
their own anti-colonial efforts. Intornational
pressure groups
to
tries. Those
many
instances the V% ; realirted more than just moral support when large monetary contributions
were donated as the result of mass protests.
They also rel''ed on statements by American dil-
oident elements and anti-war congressmen
to boost the sagging morale of their war-weary
people.
not
for
to
the
international audience. One of their featured themos was the purported American
war crimes.
accopterl as valid by the international audience nortnally
receptive to all Conummunist propaganda. The publicity given the alleged massacre at
Son
My provided them with a credibility with segments of the international audience normally
UNCLASSIFIED
US
waged
Propaganda Aimed at US Soldiers
(U) The Communists
for
appeals
leaflets and English
than originally intended.
the
movements
the
Negro
for
black
ser-
They felt it
on the type media
presented without
interpretation or
comment. The
more personal
appeals were
frequently couched
in the
imprecise or archaic,
desert his unit and seek the
protection
pains
had
opinions
Proselyting
(U) The VC put increased emphasis on recruiting persons from all levels of the GVN's
military and civilian bureaucracies to the side of the revolution. As the "third
prong" of the
equal status with the other
military
and political activities constituting the first two prongs of their
strategic
received
major
organizational
including formal entertainment
concentrated on
sons, brothers, or husbands to persuade
them to
target groups, i. e., officers
were
approached
differently
phasis on appeals
gaining strength day
struggle
or hlu bren
to
have a difficult time recruiting in RVN. The ability to recruit
depended
in
(C) The
Vietnam
completion of a course of study, the
youths were returned
in the
Communist organizational
groups. The first
secondary
between
the
ages
17 and 30 who underwent a more technically-slanted course of study aimed at
raising
their
field.
at COSVN level where quotas were assigned to the military
regions and provinces. The quotas were passed
to the districts
on the eligible
headquarters where the
revolution.
precluded the use of force. Children
were mostly
also
wanted
iheir
children
ser-
(C) Once in North Vietnam,
the
or being boarded with
the children was gcxierally tih same as for North
Vietnamese
ing after completing
children were sent abroad
the
INTELLIGENCE
NETWORK
I I T R O M I N I T E L R G E C
INELOCFPEAIN
jobs
Some remained
in the
VCI. The program was considered an in-
tegral part of the protracted war policy. Further, the program provided
educational service to
Intelligence, Security, and Counterintelligence
against the RVN. They were:
the
North
Vietnamese
Ministry
force
directly from Hanoi,
intelligence and
intelligence units. (see
for maintaining internal security, public order,
and party discipline throughout
Security Section
elements in SV N were
called security sections and they
existed in every party committee
from
the
a multiple command channel. The MPS communicated
directly with security
sections at province
level and above.
above; and conducting counterintelligence and espionage
operations in VC and GV N
controlled areas.
having a chief, at
the major
policy decisions, supervised the more important aspects of administration, and handled
the financial and personnel actions
of the subordinate subsections. The
following functional
ministrative support.
areas
by developing
and dlsseminating intelligence about allied forces, and a Judicial element which administered per-
manant courts in
VC controlled areas,
papers
UI-7
message
transmission,
and
interpersonnel
contact
capability.
training
of security sections and
strikes
military espionage
intelligence
on
other
of NVA troops.
by courier or
CN C placed emphasis on the collection
of
intelligence
domestic and unskilled employees as
low-level infor-
through the intercept
wore known to
direct agent
Affairs
throughout
information in direct support of VC/NVA military
operationa:
COSVN. It was a
CNC headquarters which coordinated CNC operations in SVN. Tlbe service
was
intelligence. It operated
similar to
the MPS apparatus, it differed in that its targets and the
elements it protected
Counterespionage operations,
of
announced
activities.
CQSVN. It controlled m~ilitary proselyting
activity at every
Its function was to undermine the will of and affect
desertions
among allied forces in the south. Information collected as a by-product was forwarded through
party channels
the insertion of
agents as penetrants within the GVN military agencies. was probable this
activity was coordinated with and supervised by the Military
Security Service at
units,
known
tar-
geted against US and South Vietnamese communications networks. The units usually were deployed
immediately
and intentions.
were set up to react immediately to COMI1NT derived US and
ARVN
tactical
beginning
of
munist
troops
assigned
to integral COMINT units in direct support of field units. Their inventory
included several thousand
US tactical and
($) The effectiveness and the
strated
Co overran and captured io December 1969,ý a
complete
tercept station in Be n
Suc in Binh Duong, Province (see p 1&11-13 . Vo l 1.
1949 MACIV Command
collttction was direct
hers
ments made
skillful use of mo~bile and fixed observation posts nroar friendly
position*
t
4
OC
a.
(S)
I'he
usea of woman, children, And old men a* collectorto was favorod for lowA-level
ob-
used
about their
draft status. Itinotent-appearing childretu had a chance ItAiniag to areas~ since
those
under 15 weor nost requiredi to have idontification eards anid therefore,
were no t subject to
document
Where installations bordtired
to
(S) The0 enerny'o large 4".1 imprestive intalligetwe effort had the advantaga
of operating in
se-vral
pe r
warning of
inexperienced
also
a stumbling block to the enemy. Finally, the enemy practice of using
terror
and
apparatus
Free
organization,
a
planning
for
in I and IV
CTZs. In both those
had been redeployed
to IV CTZ.
"s.hattering"
the
GVN
pacification
program.
Urban
arezas
posved
the
most
difficult
problem
for
btlts
and military proselyting to
any post-
conflict preparatioas.
were appointed to responsible
to
mubilAla
economic policies,
The issue
of peace
I1!CTZ was oignificant. ' he
may
to a cease-fire served
r
4133
4
propaganda themes, including demands for a
complete
In IV CTZ, vivid details of
the
Additional propaganda
and peoples
warned
of
threatening
villagers to build bunkers and store a
month's supply of food.
lages in SVN."
On the diplomatic
10-Point Peace
of the
among the "progressive" peoples
of the world. Having
nearer than ever
RF/
program
presented.
ognition and
rice
shortage
CTZ. In IV CTZ, there was
an intensification
of revenue
units into
establishing road
"tax points"
influence. The residents were
made
of strong VC influence.
of $VN for NVN
or PRG currency would
provide the VC with
confine commercial
pacifi,'ation
cadre, members of the National Police and PSDF, and lower-level GV N
officials. The
Intensive sapper
per
- .13,34
the
high
tempo of activity that preceded the TET holidays. VC political efforts continued to be targeted
at the 1GVN pacification program. Extensive preparation for the post-.conflict struggle remained
in evidence.
had abounded ill January and early February,
the
to
missions for the Spring
casualties on US troops; thwart the enemy's
Accelerated Pacification Program; consolidate administration
in
the
B- 3 Front, indications of an offensive persisted. Enemy propaganda warned of attacks on Kontum
and
Ban
manifested by
rorist activities anld assassinations of GV N low-level administrative officers
throughout the high-
for training continued.
and 14.
the month. In addition to the lower-level party
cadre, femnale cadre
on. In VC Phu Yen Province, an I8 Feb PRP
report
ordered
of
13
GVN. The abductees were
the GVN return husbands
the draft;
the GVN;, campaigns to mrotivate
the people to supply
money to the VC and to assist military operation~s:
and
appeals
ing
stay
reporting the
1170 goalsi
tion and Viettnartizatioti programs. In
VC B~inh
Dinh Pro'vitice. Conitunitit
the Thieu-Ky Gove~rnment. In W: Tuyen lIck
Prtlvirnce. the- Ctlriinit-ist called
oetmnt ana
often repeated algtrstlot. the
chemical warfare in the
tillwaklly
1
pigsi for
;lso claiimeod that numerexi* cuty-Wito 'I E"I
trUceD vitoAt~ng
p~~.elficatioit~~
m il ry
pr;)oelytlnig to thwart thos~ rnas Thes (rctive Alito ealled for tighter control ýof thek
lwpuis.
their cnitrol. Proisclytlin Of thnic
Camn-
bodioAns in IV CTZ
vcottiotued during the- nwnth. A re~port trottn IV CTIZ Atatea
that
thu Cambodlians over
 
was
in directives to
Quang Nam
In
IV
CTZ,
province showed an
(C) Even though the targets of terrorism remained
the same as last month, innocent GV N
civilians
random violence.
An increase
was
abductions
to collect food
2 gave an insight
into the VCI's own
security and the re-
The basic means
the intercept of allied radio
communications.
to 6 hours for
air strikes. Given such
themselves and reassert
was over. 24 1
any event since-the issuance COSVN Resolution 1 in
July 1969. or the TET
Offensive
of
February
April
Resolution
especially
active
context of political
through
a massive torrorism cawpa4ign and took initial steps to avert fkture QV N
pacificati:n gains
fron- the
intersot groups
in Saigon and by ag-
gravatina the inflatiotary trends which wert an iniportant cause of many
problemt which plaguod
nausea gas in
fontinue
thie war crimv motif, and lt discredit Presiden Nivofl*s Npv
6',) dioavnwal "f the Useý -%
lo-
logical
Warfare. NV U Vico
Prstideont Nguyoh Duy Trinh in a Parti* interview. depigted the US
as
int"noifyivn the wa r and as respoesIble for the failure of
the Paris
Peacv Talks.
stated
aimtd at ARVN draftees ,:taxlnned oear
the. DMZ. The
mat it they rallied
to
or secrot
monks in VC MA I *as rtrtcld thb-nih
there Wa ,
•PAGE REGRALIED!
3334 \
ll-i'* ...... . .
in
tax
increase in armed
not
sell
under consideration
also expected to aggravate
deal with
Province
program
of abductions
using
a relatively
intense
reorientation
and
reeducation.
The
abduction-indoctrination
they wanted
A directive
from the
security section
keep them
out of
had caused
areas,
and
agents.
could
VC I efforts to
and
villages
directive
stated:
The student struggles in Saigon, Hue, and My Tho have reached
an unprecedented high point. Coupled with the (RVNAF) war invalids'
(protest
Ky-Khiem clique into
us to
groups and to stage anti-GVN demonstrations.
In
Danang,
the
VCI
of
student
namese
in Cambodia, the closing of all schools and universities in Saigon, and
the demonstrations
for
stating
from
bill would turn the RVN peasants into tenant farmers for a group of landowners, government
officials, and army officers. Propaganda was also directed at other
special interest groups in an
attempt to exploit existing social
disquiet, thereby disrupting the
context of political stability
strongly supported the student strikes against the
GV N in Saigon and Hue. A Hanoi broadcast
in response to the grievances
of
veterans
supports
a victim of the dirty and
cruel
of
the
Hanoi the formation of the Indochinese Peoples' United Front. The
front
had
ference of the Indochinese
announcement
that
drew
namization, using Vietnamese
and Cambodia,
forces in
withdrawals. The
was to
in
of
reminding
Catholics
of
their family members in the north and to help them write letters to
thei-
personnel.
stepping up of
the morale
emphasis on the recruiting
proselyting
people to remain
areas.
attempted
to
aggravate
the
inflation
within RVN whenever possible. Finance and economy sections subordinate to VC
MR
3 were
directed to
tell the population that it wa s better to increase spending than to
hoard money, and
and food
soon be devalued. spending
up prices, and the hoarding of rice would
drive up food prices in urban areas. The introduction of counterfeit money would also contribute
to local price increases. Th e political grievances which would result from
further
the cost of rice could easily be exploited by the
VCI. Unrest of the veterans and
other
groups
would compound, and the VCI could organize anti-GVN demonstrations in
the cities and towns.
to a PR G currency would be increased to the
degree that their confidence
PR G
currency, even
the PRG's claim
finance and economy activity,
to increase VC food production in an effort to alleviate
recurring food short-
ages. A captured document gave three reasons for the shortages:
reduction in the area of culti-
vated' land; intensive
allied pacification and
us e of defoliants. A
captured document from MR 5 directed that a large quantity of
food should be stored to carry out
the
projected
campaign of pacification disruption. Th e mission was to solve supply problems by
practicing thrift,
to collect
taxes.
Subordinate
units were directed to produce or collect 50 percent of their food and- 40 percent of their cash re -
quirements.
Finance and Economy Section, se t new guidelines
for the collection of
al l
armed escorts.
(C) Terrorist activity continued to be highlighted by abductions and
there was a general
associated with the first phase of "Campaign X."
The abduction campaign experienced in VC Phu Yen Province in early Februa ry, spread into
GVN
Pleiku,
GVN Phu Bon, GVN Binh Dinh, VC Binh Thuan, and VC Tuyen Duc Provinces.
Several captured documents, including COSVN Resolution 14, called for the dispersion of al l
troop units into small elements and stressed the
importance of building up the guerrilla force.
These documents provided a context within which the increased enemy reliance on terrorism and
sapper activity
could be
the tightening of security
practices. In MR 5,
check
document
the
to tighten security and eliminate violations of party
regulations.
in Cambodia,
of
and VC Kontum Provinces. The enemy
would have
to facilitate local support of
forces through intensified tax collection both
in money and in
pected to increase. The establishment of an
infrastructure
organization was
from Cambodia.
and prolonging
Indochinese.
May were centered around
student unrest and the
war
and
of another
country. The
promising i-i the 1968 election cam-
paign
villagers of the attacks and told them to
prepare to aid
area from US and GV N forces. In the MR
10 area,
rice
soldiers.
(C) The student and veteran unrest also presented an opportunity to intensify proselyting
activities.
Demonstrations
Ngai
encouraged to volunteer
for duty with the VC in Cambodia. Volunteets _were told they
would be
(C) The Cambodian cross-border operations
made
tion
NV A
platoons were to coordinate with the local
VC forces
to contribute agricultural taxes. In the B-3 Front, reports indicated
that the
to
produce
one-half
for
were noted in GVN Phu Yen,
Binh
Thuan,
Quang
Nam,
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Order
of the allied operations in Cambodia were largely as assessed
in
activities.
During
elections and continued to sustain high levels
of
terrorism.
Jun
The
broad-
cast
also
chided
President
Nixon because in his speech he "did not mention the so-called Commu-
nist headquarters in
Cambodia, the main target of the aggression, " and further for trying to sup-
port
number
actual or planned introduction of
a NLF or PRG currency in SVN. Reports identified GVN Quang
Nam
the
areas
(C)
by a
Binh Duong, Quang Tri, Binh Dinh, Ninh Thuan, Phong Dinh,
and Kien Hoa Provinces. In addition to revealing
inadequacies
in
some abducted youth were sent to Laos for military and
political
the VCI reportedly abducted persons for ransom in VC Binh
Thuan
and
GV N Pleiku Provinces. Finally, the VCI appeared to be abducting their own false ralliers and
legal agents
(C)
and organizations
1970.
Hamlet and village security forces were to be con-
solidated and they were to motivate the population to participate in a program to
eliminate and re-
of security
above.
Poor
positions and to a lack of knowledge of their job.
Political re-
cadre with
the
(C) Enemy plans to disrupt the provincial
elections included the same techniques they had
planned to use in the March-April
elections.
However,
recognizing the
provincial council. One new
for
local forces to tell the villagers that, if they voted, their
lives
First,
for the VCI. Second, the operations
THIS P'(,.
to
VCI. Finally, the cross-border
VCI was in the midst of reorganizing its finance
and economy, civil
political struggle as
dif-
ficulties involved in such reorganization may have hampered the ability of the VCI to respond to
difficulties created by
(C)
Communist
propaganda,
surrounding
the
Island
prison condition6
in RVN. An SVNLA directive instructed subordinate echelons to collect US and
GV N toxic chemical devices for transmittal to the Chemical Office, Military Staff Department,
SVNLA.
on US use of
chemical warfare and nausea gas in the RVN, arguing that during
"Nixon's first year in
rapidly increased, equaling one-
rural to urban population
their old homes.
(C) In finance and economy activity, evidence was received of the introduction of enemy cur-
rency into three
provinces. That brought
curre,,cy had been
that NVN currency
irn VC Ben Tre,
Long, and
Ca Mau.
Introduction of
enemy currencies
potential
Villagers agree-
the VCI
with negotiable
all commercial transactions in
in one area
the money rather than
areas of VCI influence
have a significant
the area
stamps
The slackening
rate
noted
in
Mr. Nixon narrowed
the scope of
US and western
of
readily.
since January, declining further from the
lull noted
in July.
Ac=ording
directed VC
either by
use of
explosives and
"legal"
and engaging
were:
infiltra-
tingthe
Chieu
Hoi
program;
intensified. He
A
cap-
GVN ID
ward the recruitment of people having legal
status
who
already
sions, worked in
in cities. The
activities the people,
once recruited as "legal" cadre. were to participate in were
summarized
used to
increase those political struggles against the GV N which could be legally carried out in the cities
and
in motivating
their
former
others to support
units
to
the gathering of intelligence
the
telligence
on
the
activities
of
potential
targets
for
terrorism.
35
September
of the NLF's 10-point
focused
create legal cadre through the false rallier
pro-
gram.
(C) Finance and economy activity was at a nationwide 'igh level
during the month to coincide
with
the
"tax"
damaged central
the number
divert
for
the percentage finding
level.
and perhaps
government's
unrest. The "tax"
VCI. The drive was characterized by a
marked
increase
the
popula-
of non-cooperation
on the
If the
be-
greater
damage
than
decline
pacification
gains
signal the
month,
then
declined
gradually.
Terrorism
The
to have been concentrated
August
Conference
of
status at the Conference.
The PRG was represented
elaboration
principal elements
30 Jun 71.
the US
agreed to a withdrawal, the enemy would agree to refrain from
attack-
ing the withdrawing US Forces, and would discuss the question of releasing prisoners of war.
Second,
coaliton
would
re-
ligious
groups
will
highlighted by
offensive"
(C) Communist
ctable negative
in and
campaign, claiming
of a number
of hooligans and prostitutes wa s only "for form's sake, ' and an,
attempt to
of broadcasts were
result in a considerable
increase in the us e of US green dollars since
the beginning of
in the country-
which disrupted
the Cambodian border,
put a greater
by forcing VC political
essential commodities.
Second, pacification
of foodstuffs and GVN currency from the populace more difficult.
Those
conditions
of US dollars were
which did not arouse much
notice or suspicion.
dollars to $VN offered
means for
making inroads
into legitimate business. Those large profits could be used to induce businessmen
to accommodate the VC by providing them
with either access to the urban
markets or transport for
devaluation,
and currency change rumors plaguing the SVN. Due to its
stability,
which outlined the
by
the purpose
areas of SVN.
Finally,
to gain support of the Vietnamese middle class. In sum, the eight-point proposal, as
explained by COSVN. wa s more a "diplomatic offensive" than a "peace initiative."
Further, "this
on
not designed to
conflict between the anemy
mainly on
battlefield when
Per
111-43
enemy political and
and formation of
reports, it
cease-fire,
future. It was doubt-
was
on 17 Sep
withdrawals, the
of the
on
political pres-
the level of
decrease political
election upcoming in
such as General
leverage
As
Sir
Rcbert
however,
from
preferable for the VC/NVA merely to fade away, For that
reason, the
enemy was
dependent
upon
events
harvest was
flowing to
from the
operations.
(C)
Dong Party, in COSVN, and In the PRG,
the question
in Paris
putttng for-
at a peace initiative.
the Thieti-Ky-Khiem
some
THIS PAGE REGRADED
per
8411334
111-44
light of
demanding
cadre.
On
peace. On the other hand, they were told to exploit
the eight-point proposal
(C ) In an environment in which speculation concerning a cease-fire
wa s prevalent, many
interpreted by both political cadre
and allied analysts as
or
deter-
RVN which the PRG stated would follow a cease-
fire and formation
of a coaliflon
might
a
in itself an indication that a cease-fire wa s
im-
minent.
to
concerning a possible cease-fire wa s bolstered by a number
of reports that
which would be flown
the extent of enemy control
with
in VC Quang Nam, VC Quang Ngai,
VC Binh Dinh, VC Binh Long, GV N
Binh Hoa. VC Tay Ninh,
SRI, SR6, GVN
of the reports suggested,
and display flags served
flags
cease-fire situation,
it wa s also possible that flag production wa s encouraged
as a
Day
ed
effort to display NL F flags on 20 Dec in celebration
of the 10th an~iversary of the offi-iml
for-
mation
of the NLF.
It could be questioned how likoily the of the flag were,
given
before a voast-$ire.
Nevertheless it was possible that the VC could realistically expect sympathizers to display NLF
flags in thoroughly
VC-controlled areas, on special occasions, to build morale, anti demonstrate
solidarity.
It would probably be a mistake to conclude that a coase-fire
was inmminont irinply
captured
probably a COSVN direc.tive, provided Instructions for a campaign motivate
the
native lands in order to incrvat.e farm production
and form local combat groups. Fo r a long time
the VCI had
to the VCI the Ipoplation bWaL required
for
to leave resettlement c'enters antd to return to their native
lands wore reported
rather, a formalixation of policies implemented locally for oone time.
The
document
was,
however,
the
the
theme
of motivating refugees
to return to their native land*, and at such, reflected acute COSVN
concern
elections.
to pressutire
"military
the
Communist
among
(C) In finance and economy activity, reports of region-wide
food
in
MR
from
Phuoc Long Province.
Most of the ralliers cited food shortages as the primary reason
for rallying. The villages not
only
had
to farm
under adverse conditions, but the VC exerted increased pressure on them
to
severe blow to the enemy's self-sufficiency
program. In
of the 82d Rear Service Group (RSG) were observed in
Phuoc Binh and Phuoc
Province,
lsvied during
200
rounds
month.
VC were
equivalent amount of ammunition.
set up
were to
have auditing,
cotnterintelligence, and other "watchdog" functions. Significantly,
!hey were to be outside the
party chain of commnand at all echelons. but were to report
directly to
been thte pmtterr of
yearsi.
This
of to tactotrs: one, la*ck of favorable resuilts an
the battl(fi•ld, and two., the l4'mitA-
tion of available resources. Thre wast a growing roealirtion that large VC /NVA utnits ould not
oprt'atv in $V N beca4use of g~row-ing AkVN\ strength -And continuetd U$ tacftical
isupport. Th e awagre-
ne#s of that fact was nmanite-itetl In C'OSVN qcsohlutlQn I4. weeping reapp.aMsal 4ý he *ar
oti-
e tactico enu
stlb-
lesit•
anti a
bilities or tho onvircoment in which he iound himtirlf
operating. The paolitital asipects of
the
situation
Were nI-¢sotgnored either, in fact, there wAst a call for a general awaroenes af the growing
importance
The tiltallity tormi of the new pollcy conslsted of the
downgrading. of enemy
subordinate parts
the major
unitsA.
opter-
sting
saper
units.
1t
integrity
third, utilization
pacification such
as RD cadre who might be attacked by the military, but rather the people them-
selves.
The
first, the military proselyting
proselyting
activity
aimed at destroying GVN gains in the people. A large portion of the
program
documentation
for VC/VGI cadre. In some cases it was achieved by allowing
"false
rallying"
rela-
military offenses. They
pass through the Chieu Hoi screening and processing and within
120 day& became legally
documented. They would, of course, be under the surveillance of the
police for awhile, but
--se to the VC.
In the case of cadre
known by the National Police, who would be subject to long
prison sentc:nces even if they
took
could
(C)
In early 1970 , the enemy initiated portions of that new military
and political
was
to counter
country, particularly VC MR 5 and the COSVN area with
the exception of the delta. in
the
latter area, the tei-rain ,tnd scat-tered population centers had long n~ecessitated
a strong
on sr.all-.unit, gkierrilla tactics. Mary of the new units were
created with
doubtedly intended
for use
something
of a VC I laboratory for new programs, an extensive abduction campaign began in Jan-.
uary. Elements of the 10th NVA Regiment
were
r-ýquh
o rdinated
to provincial control in VC Khanh Hoa and VC Phu Yen p.eovinces. Elements assigned
to Phu Yon wore in turn incorporated into the 96th LF Battalion. During the period, I Feb to 30
Junt there were
taking place in
divided
the program was
COSVN throughout its adminigtrative
of
control. Raourcos
those of the villages.
Theortitically, th* best
VC~ pteraonnel In An ariea wo'uld comnbine their efforts to significantly re-
duc-, the aff ctivoreesb
(.C) (it those
ef~ort~i. thet abduction campaign in Pinu Yon and the
experimental village
pto-a it
now offort*
for
w.dor imlo~~meitotion during the rernaitider j( 1470, Thug, while COSVN was calling
for the dis-
plant,
for
military
"tuitsholaing
Isack
fui'thor
ovodlins GVIN poitical
techniques. The
to the VC in maintaining a logistical base in Cambodia.
Because
he
grading of his units
of supplies,
he would have been in 1969.
The measured reduction in the size of tactical units was already *underway;
the
smaller
independent
units
found
it much easier to survive in the face of diminishing supply pools than
their larger
While the
VCI after
major
headquarters,
the
(C) Enemy activity, which was very low following the cross-border
operation,
was in the
last few months of 1970 characterized by efforts to regain lost
momentum
9,
apparatus together again. Directives
25 and 26 pointed
Directive 26 stressed
many of the
pacification and RF/PF forces,
the number
of cadre
especially in
the Saigon
their
self-sufficiency,
VC MRs 5 and 6, self-sufficiency
was
being
pushed.
That
service
with and less
the regular
legal RVN business firms,
in
expan-
sion both in physical size and in importance of the shadow supply
system.
south in the period following the cross-border operation
appeared to fall
Thus,
While
infiltration
themselves
greatly
understrength,
merely
changed
manpower
situation.
house in order was COSVN's concern
for reestablishing
called
fo: iocal initiative in solving control
problems. The largest reorganization
MRs
principally of establishing new
elons
ordinate elen.ents to
headquarters.
That
commanded; it also reduced,
ters.
they took all
the next low-
that echelon of direct responsibility. Thus, several
villages, rather than having
echelons
reduced
one echelon,
number of military commanders while
increasing the
a similar
chains of command,
between existing
use of military
were directed
preparation for
1971 had
or directives cap-
The Cambodian
of supplies and men
southern
reduced the possibil-
within
into SVN from a new logistical base in the
tri-
lines
for the enemy
and 4.
While
the
enemy
in GV N
and northern parts of the country. Military
activity was possible in
in B-3 Front and MR 10. These areas were also
hurt
by
the
lack of
Long Province in the south to VC Konturn Province
in the north, made it easy for the enemy to hide larger units
or move them
toward the coastal
plains and the
VC Phu Yen Province was chosen for the abduction campaign
in
in most
the enemy would like
ver/ '!uch to separate
had
Z and 3. It was feasible
that such
tem-
porary
insurmountable
was a
was a drive
for as
would
the
coastal plains;
VC's own cadre
cease-fire
military
be to
much
with regard to the elections, Cambodia, or the US with-
drawals. It was
1971,
the policy
the use of military
his course following
tiated coaliton
might attempt
one last military effort to conclude the struggle. There still remained
problems
associated
with
(C) In many ways, 1971
would be
Or~r$e~
Ara~yDALAOS~
which contained
training
logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution
of medicine, ordnance, food, petroleum, oil,
and lubricants
site used by combat units to rest,
regroup,
a BA : transshipnment and
While all BA s
performed each of those functions to a limited extent, areas
with the
major function of staging
tended to be in RV N and some in Cambodia. Logistical resupply areas were found both within
and outside RVN, and infiltration areas were located
out of country. An exception to that pattern
occurred in MR 2 where a band
of
of the MR. Those
areas served as transshipment
supplies
toward
of
Front
supporting units
all of
the VC
traffic froin the
west. Route# used
by elerment. of
valley
of
the
shipment to
of the BA .
was used by units
operating in southern Quang
inchldinpn dispensary.
area,
tary
NV A Regt
regularly used the
nurthern section of
12 9 was activated during the 3d Qtr to reflect
the
616 and 922 lead
nutmerout
storage areas were reported. The BA provided logistical and command and control support for
THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
Divs operated
from NVN. Ele-
ments of the 559th Transportation Group traditionally used this BA.
(C) BA 607. This
(C) BA
a major
612. while the eastern portion provided support for units
in western Qvang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This BA was historically used
as an
AO for
storage
troop
infiltration route into SVN. Supplies were transported from here into BA
414
area.
(C) RA 614. This -3A served as a logistics staging area for enemy
forces
re-established
during
sat astride
am infqtration and logistics rctute extending from BA 614 tit Laos.
The aroa
grouptl
the route. It wa# also identified as a possibla al.ernate
location
kegt and
wao
the
A•A. Moot eneiny activity
in
rv:snpply artia and
96th
F
"!"S PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIJFID
was a
and resupply point for enemy units operating in
southern Binh Thuan Province and
northeastern Binh Tuy Province in MR
3.
an important support
1loa
Province.
Supplies
by elements of the 250th NVA Trans Regt along
logistical routes originating in the vicinity of BA
740. The 95th NVA Arty Bn and the 407th VC
MF Sapper
installations at
the
transshipment area and entry point for enemy
personnel infiltrating into RVN and Cambodia.
This
BA
many of its
major support
Kontur, and
6th NVA Trans Bn were ra-
ported in this
and resupply area.
Cambodia.
(C)
BA, 740. This BA was used 6y the 250th NVA
Trans
transshipment point
SVN frot
DA 34)2 into the
(C) |)A _0
art& or operations into Bien
Hoa. Loog
74th Arty
t*is base.
JC. 2LA0. This BA wa s established during the 3d Otr when
elements,
of
The
90th
JoIley
T14IS
PAGE
REGRADE)
UNCLASSIFIED
-S
%B4,_13V
3
4
staging area for attacks on ARVN units
operating
along
QL22
HQ.
for
operations
against
NVA
this area.
(C)
BA 355. This BA served as a staging area for enemy operations
in the Michelin
utilizing
from this BA .
with War Zone "D,"
Roads. The
enemy units operating
Tuy
Province.
The
Saigon River person-
tactical activity in
re,.onfzgured and redesignated
Qtr. The 7th NV A Div had made
extensive use of this
" as
(C)
formed
the
bheginning
of the 5th
this BA ,
10 ) PAT 1.1, was used for politicAl And military training, for
Uttit. operating in Hag.
looliotivs lnfilyihtlor.
VC
base here.
10) 8lAfl
B104*$0 W-as ani enemy stronghold And centeor of Activlly. Sipplitts
and ntrsennel1
to utlits In
UA s 470
DTI
UA.
-IsISPAU
order
see
Aftb
Wt'
T:
.itt-sq
in this
and the
roads and water-
the
Ben
Hai
GDRS.
It
priorities
ertablished
-r
MRTTH
Figure 111-19 for
the geographical location
MPs). From there, the variov,4 regiments Ln d divisions furnished
transportation
Grp had the following
the
however, very
to
CL
station
the 55)th Trans
559th maintained
strength of the group
was between 16, 000 and 30 , 000. Parenthetically, one of the rea-
sons
for
typical
BT
included
engineer
battalions,
Laos,
Cam-
bodia,
and
RVN.
provide bivouac sites for the infiltration groups.
2. Provide a guide to lead the groups from one station to the
next.
3.
subsequent infiltration
A
study of access routes to the valley and Route 548,
the main infiltration corridor
by-passed due
which allowed nearly unimpeded travel within
the
moved east from BA 607 along Route 614
or paralleling
the Laos/RVN border and Route 966 to
BA 614 (see Figure 111-12 and the
"Be.se Area"
BA through
a
Laotian
border
in
Thua Thien Province. The valley was a natural avenue of movement through
a region sparsely
settled and physically
(C) In the early and mid-1960s,
three
special
valley and the
He built a complex of interlocking
roads, trails,
supply depots,
he was relatively free from allied intervention.
(C) The operations
in the A Shau were an integral part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system.
separate
the
1968
the A Shau pipeline
the valley
interdiction points repet-
into Thua Thien
forced
the time necessary
important
rainy
season.
and central
of several thousand
Route 548,
in 1969
of the enemy's
in
The conflict in
centration of allied military and
GVN pacification personnel in the lowlands. That left the sparsely
settled
enemy. There he operated with
considerable freedom establishing arms
October 1969
through
March 1970, estimates said he moved nearly 7, 000 tons of supplies
into BA
Quang Nam Provinces.
considerations emphasized the value of the A Shau to the
enemy. It
eastern Laos. Peaks reached above 6, 000 feet to the
west, and lesser
from Laos, it was to the enemy's advantage to utilize
the existing routes approaching or entering RVN.
(C) Routes 9, 926, and 921 in northern
MR
1
966 and 16 5
offered access to Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The short-
es t
Quang
last two, 922's advantage was clearly evident, if
Route 548 through the A Shau was open. Once
inside
RVN,
supplies
Movement
material
routes. The B-3 Front controlled troop move-
ment down the trail and
along
four primary
BAs 701
the per-
moved southeast through Pleiku Province and
on to Phu
movement into southern MR 2. The
250th
and
and the
four major
BA 351, located in
Long Province, infiltrated men
through
into
ince into Long Khanh Province. rrom that area, where
the two roads seemed to merge, the 81st
RSG continued to move personnel and supplies through
Long
Bien Hoa, and Binh
THIS
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Order
Sec
Ari'y
ay
Province, provided personnel transport
of
the northern
area of Cambodia.
border northwest of
the 82d RSG.
area
Province
where
D5 Trans Bns, Available
(C) There
were a
operating in
the RSGs in
MR 3 were
( 55
thichar'.
(C)
Prior
PW reports
and captured
In early
1970. the
August.
Infiltration Rates of Suii.es and Materiel to RVN
(S) The• major development in the movement of supplies and materiel into RVN from January
, 4..Jta 1970 was th, crash
logisticd
program
LOCs in Cambodi=
the VC NVA.
Thuthe increased flow
designed
to
back to NVN during
did
'CS) From Jawnary through March the
principal avenues
and northern
Evidence
and sodthern
MR 2.
late March
*
no
supplies
were moved through Cambodia. Requirements for MRs 3, 4, and southern MR 2
were probably met from
4.
felt the enemy anticipated the probability of cross-border
operatione and displaced some of his stockpiles from the border area.
Since VC INVA supply
supplies
available.
choose between a lower
tactical activity or accept the risks inherent in further reducing
his
operating
stocks
by
MRs 3.
met from exietin8
activity and movtment on
the rainy season.
IS) Tbrough October, the rainy season seriously limited logistical activity
and the movement
I
and
activity and
movement of materiel through the IAn Panhandle was noted. Even so. esney forces in MR and
northern
(S) After the
were believed to
have been imported Into Cambodia through Kompon" Som in support of enemy forces it •outheor
MR 2
and MRs 3 and 4. However. aoemy control over tarte portions
of northeastern Cambodia
soothern RVN.
( )
supported, force
1
.-74
11111"1P1
I !
I
,C) The enemy's
that of out-country
in two significant
respects. First, the
truck-park network. Secondly,
was not surprising
and techniques
different from
about one-third of his food, and 25 percent of
his
were often obtained from
and food were purchased
either on the open markets or taxed and extorted from
the
both VC/NVA units. Mlost
the VC under
VC/NVA party network
MRt, 1
and 2.
was
rear service
the forward
the
over-all
and
two
political
organizations
sometimes
performed
on the military; that
the
labor for transportation
programs, fund drives, and borrowing
and lending schemes were managed
by the section. It might have also managed local VC business
establishments and operated
council, com-
council
the efforts
as porters
purchased on
carried
support units, assisted by rear service sections from the combat
units themselves,
recruited or impressed
the
resources
reached RVN via a complicated out-count, y infiltration system, and
at or near
stored in the several BAs the
enemy
were ready
(C) Prior to early 1969, the enemy made some use
of trucks inside the country,
primarily
in
northern
eastward toward Hue.
"C" in northern
a traditional
and extension of government control all
but elimi-
Shau Valley.
(C) He
primitive, but
form. Throughout
NVA, were assigned to transportation units.
They were
augmented during
Special rein-
carts or
the use of sampans
cover
from
detection, the enemy improved his trails. He used bamboo rods to create crude, but
ef-
fective
streams.
were
DMZ
place.
Other
and to BAs
farther sout!. Supplies
and moved to caches
operating in southern MR 1 were the 220th, 230th,
240th,
Regt moved supplies from the Quang Nam/Laotian border
in the
-
to
eastern
operating in
Laotian border to Quang
the
throughout Quang
Ngai and
battalions of Front 4 and
MRTTH transported supplies from the Laotion border down to line units
and
In addition to those
routes emanating from
Cambodian/RVN border. Moving
by allied operations, elements of the 240th
Trans
Regt
border into Binh
D7 Trans
supplies into northern, central, and southern MR
2, as well as down the Ho Chi Minh trail on the
Cambodian/RVN border. The
moved supplies
coast. Provincial supply
corridors
Adams Road were trail complexes in Phuoc Long Province. The
Serges
Jungle
The
the
of trails, stream segments,
Ba
Thu
Province. Other shorter shuttle
111-15).
(C)
groups ranging in size from 300 to 4, 000 men,
with total
RVN
supplies, but also were charged with procurement, production, maintenance of hospital facilities,
and
evacuation
(C) A trail system discovered in
War Zone "C" of northwestern RVN MR 3 in 1968 provided
a goo