ilable at ScienceDirect

Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 571–591

Contents lists ava

Electoral Studies

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/e lectstud

Notes on Recent Elections

Colombia’s 2010 presidential and legislative elections

Erika Moreno*

Department of Political Science and International Relations, 2500 California Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 15 September 2010Accepted 11 May 2011

* Tel.: þ1 402 280 2388; fax: þ1 402 280 4731.E-mail address: erikamoreno@creighton.edu.

0261-3794/$ – see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd

Colombia conducts national legislative and presidential events have long-term implications for the direction of the

elections every four years. The elections to the bicamerallegislature occurred in March, just two months shy of thefirst round of the presidential contest. Since Colombiaregularly elects representatives to the legislative and exec-utive branches during the same year, it is not surprising thatthe elections often affect each other and contribute toa single electoral narrative.

This election cycle was notable for several importantdevelopments. First, the 2010 electoral contest representedthe official end of President Alvaro Uribe’’s tenure in office.After having sought an unprecedented third term in office,the Colombian Supreme Court rejected any further termsfor the incumbent in February. The result of this decisionwas to increase the level of uncertainty regarding presi-dential candidacies, just months before the elections. Theelections also unfolded under the backdrop of Colombia’’shalf-century of internal armed conflict, which naturallytinges the political dialog. Second, this is only the secondtime that Colombians elected their legislators in preferen-tial voting contests, the implications for the developingparty system are myriad.

The results of both elections suggest continued andstrong support for many of the policies undertaken underthe Uribe administration. Former President Alvaro Uribe’’sparty, Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional orParty of Social and National Unity), won significant victoriesin both legislative houses. Uribe’’s successor, Juan ManuelSantos, also captured the presidency. Ultimately, these

. All rights reserved.

country.

1. Background

Colombia is a nation of sharp contrasts, it has boasteda relatively long history of electoral and party politics, withsome of the oldest political parties in the region (Liberaland Conservative parties). The National Front pact1 thatgave way to democratic practices in the late 1950’’sproduced stable electoral outcomes and a centrist twoparty system, unlike most of its neighbors. In recent years,the electoral landscape has changed from a deeplyentrenched two party system to a potentially more volatilesystem and a host of new players, including Uribe’’s Partidode la U. Despite the entrée of new actors political contes-tation retains a strong degree of regularity in Colombia.

Yet, regularly scheduled elections occur with a backdropof frequent expressions of violence. In Colombia’’s tri-cornered conflict, armed actors from the left and right anddrug traffickers challenge the state for political influence.The conflict has dragged on for well over half a century.Thus, along with boasting some of the Latin America’’soldest political parties, Colombia also hails some of theoldest armed insurgents in the region, including the FARC(Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia or Armed Forces of Colombia)guerrillas. Right wing paramilitary groups along with the

1 The National Front (1958–1974) was a pacted agreement betweenLiberals and Conservatives, which required parity in congress andgovernment offices and alternation for the presidency. Thus, electionsdetermined which representatives of each party were permitted to havea seat at thepre-divided Liberal–Conservative only table (seeHoskin,1971).

Table 1Results of the March 2010 Chamber of Deputies Election in Colombia (Lower house).

Party acronym Party name Votes Vote (%) Seats

Partido de la ‘U’b Partido Social de Unidad Nacional 2,486,824 25.9% 47PSCb Partido Conservador de Colombia 2,057,849 21.4% 38PL Partido Liberal de Colombia 1,856068 19.3% 37CRb Partido Cambio Radical de Colombiano 743,758 7.7% 15PINb Partido de Integración Nacional 714,476 7.4% 12Polo Partido Polo Democratico Alternativo 563,555 5.9% 4

Movimiento de Renovación Absoluta 284,244 3% 3Partido Verde 283,293 3% 3Apertura Liberal 117,871 1.2% 2

ASI Movimiento Alianza Social Indigena 182,515 1.9% 1Alternativa Liberal 171,090 1.8% 1

MOIR Movimiento de Integracion Regional 5.045 .1% 1Others 143,883 1.5% 0

Total 9,610,471 164Turnout 32.19%

aTurnout includes valid votes over potential votes.b Parties that formed a coalition with Alvaro Uribe’’s Partido de la ‘U’ prior to the 2010 contest. Source: Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil, Colombia

(www.registraduria.gov.co).

2 This refers to the scheduling of congressional (upper and lowerhouse) races two months prior to the first round of the presidential race.

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 571–591572

presence of drug cartels also pose a serious challenge to thestate. It is against this backdrop of armed actors, insecurityand violence that Colombians travel to the polls to cast theirballots every four years. Not surprisingly, the armed conflictlooms large in the political discourse leading up to everynational election. The 2010 legislative and presidentialcontests were no exception to this rule.

2. Legislative elections

Elections for Colombia’’s bicameral legislature occurredon March 14, along with the Conservative (PSC) party’’spresidential primary. The Chamber of Representativeselected 166 members in multi-seat districts. Since 1991 theColombian Senate elects 100 members in a single-nationwide district. Two additional seats for indigenoussenators are elected in a separate district. For the secondtime in Colombian history, political parties were requiredto submit no more than one list per district.

The 2010 legislative electionsmark only the second timethat Colombians elected their representatives using singleparty lists and a preferential voting system that allowsparties to choose between open and closed list contests.The current electoral regime requires parties to submita single list of candidates, while allowing voters to selectindividuals within those lists to represent them. Thissystem promised to make parties more cohesive and, ulti-mately, more accountable than the highly atomized partiesthat existed under the prior electoral regime.

The 2010 legislative elections took place as severalissues, including looming scandals, gained momentum inthe national discussion. Concerns about the influence ofarmed actors in the policy making process have been fan-ned by the emergence of political actors like the PIN (Par-tido de Integracion Nacional or Party of National Integration)party. The PIN party emerged prior to the election amidallegations of ties to organized crime (drug cartels) andright wing paramilitary groups. Despite having a very shorttrajectory and populated mainly by friends and familymembers of disgraced and jailed lawmakers the PIN gained12 seats in the lower housewith 7.4% of the vote and 9 seats

in the Senate with 8.4% of the vote (see Tables 1 and 2).While it is hard to ascertain where the PIN will be in 2014,its presence is, formany, symbolic of the reach of right wingand criminal organizations in the electoral process.

Amid the concerns about the influence of armed actorsin politics, the falso positivo (or false positive) scandal alsogained momentum. Allegations surrounding the killing ofcivilians who were dressed up and ‘counted’ as extermi-nated guerrillas touched some of the highest-ranking offi-cials in Colombia’’s security apparatus. In addition toprovoking new concerns about human rights abusesstemming from the armed conflict this scandal providedcritics of President Uribe’’s tenure in office with newaccusations of state complicity. While President Uribe hasbeen credited with an increase in security and successfulmoves against leftist guerrilla groups many have faulted hisadministration with failing to police right wing para-military groups and provoking more human rights abuses.

A third, and equally important issue was the loomingpresidential race. Colombia’’s ‘counter-honeymoon’ races(see Shugart and Carey, 1992)2 play an important rolein narrowing down the field of presidential candi-dates. In the months leading up to the legislative races,incumbent President Uribe (Partido de la U) and formerMedellin Mayor Sergio Fajardo (Compromiso Cuidadanopor Colombia or Civic Compromise), were among theleading candidates.

Amidst these pressing issues, 9,610,471 Colombiancitizens turned out to vote on March 14, 2010 (or 32.19% ofregistered voters) in the nation’’s legislative elections (seeTable 1). Results from the Chamber of Deputies (lowerhouse) contests place the Partido de la U (or Alvaro Uribe’’selectoral vehicle) in first place among the parties thatcompeted. The Partido de la U gained 47 seats with 25.9% ofthe votes. Following closely behind was the Conservativeparty (PSC) with 38 seats (21.4% of the vote) and the Liberalparty (PL) with 37 seats (and 19.3% of the vote). Other

Table 2Results of the March 2010 Senate Election in Colombia (Upper house).

Party acronym Party name Votes Vote (%) Seats

Partido de la ‘U’c Partido Social de Unidad Nacional 2,804,123 25.8% 28PSCc Partido Conservador de Colombia 2,298,748 21.2% 22PL Partido Liberal de Colombia 1,763,908 16.3% 17PINc Partido de Integración Nacional 907,468 8.4% 9CRc Partido Cambio Radical Colombiano 888,851 8.2% 8Polo Partido Polo Democratico Alternativo 848,905 7.8% 8Verde Partido Verde 531,293 4.9% 5Mira Movimiento ‘MIRA’ 298,862 2.8% 2

Compromiso Cuidadano por Colombia 182,286 1.7% 1Others 326,763 3% 0

Total 10,851,207 100b

Turnout 36.3%a

a Turnout includes valid votes over potential votes.b Three (3) additional seats for indigenous representatives to the Senate are not reflected in these totals.c Parties that formed a coalition with Alvaro Uribe’’s Partido de la ‘U’ prior to the 2010 contest.Source: Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil, Colombia

(www.registraduria.gov.co).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 571–591 573

notable finishes include the Polo Democrático, the leftistcoalition party, which gained 4 seats and finished justbehind the PIN party.

That same day Colombians selected their representa-tives to the upper house (or Senate) (see Table 2). A total of10,851,207 ballots were cast on behalf of Senate candidates(or 36.3% of all registered voters.) As with the lower housecontests, the Partido de la U, Conservative and Liberalparties finished in the top three positions. The Partido de laU gained 28 seats (with 25.8% of the votes), while the PSCgained 22 seats (with 21.2% of the votes), and the PL gained17 seats (with 16.3% of the votes).

Uribe’’s Partido de la U has been known to ally itself withCambio Radical (Radical Change) in the past as well as vastsegments of the PL (Partido Liberal). Thus, if youwere to addin support from allied parties, the Partido de la U’’s agendahas substantial support in both the lower and upperhouses. While these parties cannot be expected to agreeupon all major issues facing the nation, they do sharea certain affinity for Uribe’’s policies on security and trade.Support for using military force against guerrilla insur-gency has not waned among these parties, despite the ‘falsopositivo’ scandal.

Although Compromiso Civico’’s poor performance endedSergio Fajardo’’s presidential aspirations, the congressionalcontests have helped to consolidate the presence of otheractors. For instance, AICO (Autoridades Indigenas deColombiaor Indigenous Authorities of Colombia), continues tomaintain a presence in Colombian politics since the 1990’’swhen it was created. Another party that had a notableshowing was the Partido Verde (Green Party),3 headed byformer Bogota mayor, Antanas Mockus Sivickus. Althoughthe party is new, formed just prior to the 2010 elections,Mockus has a long trajectory inpublic service and theMarchelections made him a viable presidential contender.

3 The Partido Verde has placed a strong focus on anti-corruption andsecurity, topics that are a staple in the Colombian arena, while stillgarnering credibility as an independent actor.

3. Presidential elections

The first round of the presidential race was held on May30, followed by a second round run-off on June 20. Initially,the presidential race lacked both an incumbent or a clearalternative since both Alvaro Uribe and his loudest critic,Sergio Fajardo, saw their fortunes change dramatically justmonths prior to the first round.

Former Defense Minister, Juan Manual Santos Calderon,was the most logical choice to succeed Uribe. As Minster ofDefense, Santos campaigned on his expertise in carryingout Uribista security measures and an improvement inliving standards. While it is not surprising that Uribe’’schosen successor would campaign on a platform of conti-nuity (or continuismo), it is worth noting that this wasa strategy taken up by several of the top presidentialcontenders this cycle.

Uribe’’s security policies paved the way for the state toregain control of sections of the country that had been lostin prior decades. High profile raids that resulted in thedetention and killing of high-ranking guerrilla leaders aswell as the release of many notable Colombian citizens, likeIngrid Betancourt4 also helped the incumbent party. Inspite of accusations that Uribe turned a blind-eye to para-military forces, his security policies were popular so it is notsurprising that presidential candidates, of varying stripes,would campaign on a platform of continuismo.

While the issue of security in conflict-ravaged Colombiaseems like a natural electoral issue, several other issuesassociated with the conflict were also important. Forinstance, the growing scandal of the falsos positivosconsumed a significant portion of Santos’’ campaignmessage. The scandal metastisized in the year prior to thepresidential race and involved a number of military andpublic officials in efforts to cover up civilian deaths.

The presidential contest also raised many importantissues regarding the standard of living in the country andeconomic progress, especially in light of the ongoingworldwide recession. While Santos was able to capitalize

4 Former Green party legislator and presidential candidate.

Table 3Results of the May 2010 Presidential Election in Colombia (Round 1).

Party Candidate Votes Votes (%)

Round 1Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (Partido de la “U”) Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (Angelino Garzón) 6,802,043 47.4%Partido Verde Antanas Mockus Sivickas (Sergio Fajardo Valderrama) 3,134,222 21.8%Cambio Radical Germán Vargas Lleras (Elsa Margarita Noguera de la Espriella) 1,473,627 10.3%Polo Democratico Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego 1,331,267 9.3%Partido Conservador COlombiano Martha Nohemi Sanín (Luis Ernesto Mejia Castro) 893,819 6.2%Partido Liberal Colombiano Rafael Pardo Rueda (Aníbal Gaviria Correa) 638,302 4.4%Movimiento La Voz de la Conciencia Robinson Devia González (Olga Lucía Laborda Colorado) 31,338 .22%Apertura Liberal Jairo Enrique Calderón Carrera (Jobanny Burbano Caardona) 29,151 .20%Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA) Jaime Araujo Rentería (Ana Maria Cabal Molina) 14,847 .10%Total 14,348,616Round 2Partido Social de Unidad Nacional Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (Angelino Garzón) 9,004,221 71.5%Partido Verde Antanas Mockus Sivickas (Sergio Fajardo Valderrama) 3,588,819 28.5%Total 12,593,040 100%

Source: Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil, Colombia (www.registraduria.gov.co).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 571–591574

on some of Uribe’’s gains, including increasing trade andinvestment with its neighbors and the U.S.A, high levels ofincome inequality, even by Latin American standards, anda growing divide between rich and poor gave othercandidates a platform on which to campaign.

Among the six presidential candidates that entered thefray were a few familiar faces. Former senator GermanVargas Lleras (Partido Liberal), who had campaigned withan emphasis on continued security and economic growth,was no stranger to national politics. Noemi Sanin (PartidoConservador), former Minster of Foreign Affairs during theGaviria administration (1991–1994) was also a contender.In addition to being the only female presidential candidatein the race, Sanin was nominated in a primary vote heldduring the March elections with a long list of experience inthe executive branch. Antanas Mockus Sivickas (PartidoVerde), former president of the National University (1991–1993) and two-term mayor of Bogota (1995–1997; 2001–2003), was another familiar face in presidential politicswith one previous unsuccessful candidacy in 1998. Whilethese faces were not necessarily new, they all representednew directions in Colombian politics. Newer faces emergedamong many of the remaining parties, including the PoloAlternativo Democratico’’s (Democratic Alternative) GustavoPetro, a former M-19 guerrilla turned Senator. Unhinderedby the two party hegemony that characterized prior elec-tions, Liberal and Conservative candidates were forced tore-brand themselves in light of eight years of Partido de laU’’s substantial control over government. Results from theMarch legislative elections further cemented Partido de laU’’s stamp on politics and presaged support for Santos.

Within a few weeks of the March legislative contests,polls suggested that Santos might be forced into a secondround run-off with a growing tide of support backing theunconventional Mockus. Mockus’’s Partido Verde gaineda great deal of coverage for addressing a broad array ofissues, including a platform on ending corruption withingovernment and increasing transparency. Mockus, likemany of the presidential candidates, campaigned on secu-rity issues and expanded on the gains made in previousadministration. The first round predictions were not as direfor Santos as initially thought, but he was forced to

participate in a run-off after only gaining 47.4% of the vote,insufficient to surpass the 51% required to win outright inthe first round (see Table 3).

The second round of the election was hotly contestedbetween Mockus and Santos and was conducted on June20, nearly one month after the first round. While bothcampaigns hit familiar themes regarding security, Santoswas better able to capitalize on this theme. While theConservative party was unable to gain traction in eitherround, prominent Liberal party members endorsed Santosover Mockus. The second round saw a resounding victoryfor Santos with 71.5% of the votes, compared to Mockus’’28.5% support. In a contest where a sizeable proportionof the electorate sought a continuation of many of theprevious administration’’s policies, Mockus stood littlechance of beating out Santos.

4. Outlook

In the wake of Colombia’’s most recent election cycle,two important points are apparent. First, the primary issueof security has been, so far, best co-opted by the upstartPartido de la U. Although Alvaro Uribe was not on the ballot,his party was able to capitalize on gains made during histenure in office. Although the PL and PSC are still involved inthe governing process, it is clear that the Colombian partysystem is undergoing a major transformation. At the legis-lative level, in spite of scandals and concerns about livingconditions, the Partido de la U and its allies have fared verywell. At the presidential level, it is clear that Santos hopes tolive up to the Uribe legacy. Time will tell, of course, whereSantos may find it advantageous to part with the past.

Second, the elections have underscored shifts inColombia’’s party system. Some actors may prove far morecontroversial than others, like the PIN party. Still more arepopulated with faces that have copious experience indifferent areas of public service. Yet, these new players areresonating with the public in ways that the formerly hege-monic parties, PL and PSC, are unable to. As the Colombianparty system continues to adapt and possibly create newhegemonic parties, we can expect to see more change.

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 571–591 575

References

Hoskin, G., 1971. “Dimensions of representation in the Colombian nationallegislature.” In: Agor, Weston (Ed.), Latin American Legislatures: Their

* Tel.: þ44 7984421832.E-mail address: m.qvortrup@cranfield.ac.uk.

Role and Influence Analyses for Nine Countries. Praeger Publishers,New York.

Shugart, M.S., Carey, J.M., 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: ConstitutionalDesign and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.05.002

The Parlamentary elections in Trinidad and Tobago on 24th May 2010

Matt Qvortrup*

Cranfield University Wellington Hall, Swindon, Oxfordshire SN6 8LA, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 24 March 2011Accepted 28 March 2011

Thegeneralelection inTrinidadandTobagoon24thofMay2010 marked a turning point in the Caribbean country’’shistory. The defeat of the incumbent Patrick Manning ofthe People’’s National Movement (PNM) to the challenger, theleader of the opposition party United National Congress, the58 year old Kamla Persad-Bissessar, not only meant that Tri-nidadandTobagohadelected itsfirst femalePrimeMinister, italso marked the end of an era dominated by the PNM.

1. Background

With an ethnically divided population (40 percent are ofIndian origin and 59 percent are of African origin), politics inTrinidad and Tobago (often abbreviated T&T), has alwaysbeen shaped by ethnic cleavages, though there have beenfew examples of violent ethnic strife. The only exceptionbeing the 1990 incident, when members of Jamaat alMuslimeen stormed Parliament and took the primeministerand his Cabinet hostage in a rebellion that killed 24 people –the only Islamic revolt in the Western Hemisphere.

The People’’s National Congress – founded by the inde-pendence hero Dr Eric Williams in 1955 (the year beforeindependence) – has always represented the Trinidadians ofAfrican origin, whereas the United National Congress (estab-lished by Basdeo Panday in 1989) by and large has repre-sented the largest minority of ethnic Indians. The smallerisland of Tobago has an almost entirely African populationand has traditionally been a stronghold of the PNM.

Yet the antagonisms between the two population groupshas been somewhat modified by the presence of cross-cutting cleavages, most notably that of religion. While themajority of the Indians are Hindus, a sizable minority –

roughly forty percent – belong to Christian denominations.

This presence of cross-cutting cleavages has – as predictedby political theorists from Madison to Dahl (Dahl, 1956,104)– somewhat tempered thepotential animositiesbetweenthe two dominant ethnic groups. Nevertheless, reinforced bymajoritarian political institutions - in Lijphart’’s sense of theterm (Lijphart,1999), above all a strong First Chamber and theFirst-Past the-Post electoral system – politics on the islandshave characterised by a strongly adversarial nature.

Further, personal dislike betweenManning and hismainrival Basdeo Panday (Prime Minister from 1995 to 2001)has been a constant feature of T&T politics since themid1990s. Having served as Prime Minister from 1991,Manning called an early election in 1995, which he lost toPanday, who was able to form a coalition government withNational Alliance for Reconstruction (a multiethnic break-awaygroup from the PNM). In the subsequent three generalManning challenged Panday unsuccessfully, before hefinally won a majority of seats in 2002.

Subsequent to this, Panday – a former trade unionofficial– was charged and convicted of fraud in 2005. Theconviction led to demands from within UNC that Pandayresigned. However, after an internal ballot in the same year,Panday won support and remained chairman of the partyand, hence, Leader of the Opposition.

The opposition to Panday within the UNC led to furtherdisquiet and intense internal feuding within the party. In2006, Winston Dookeran, a former governor of the Bankof Trinidad and Tobago, who had been selected as leader ofUNC by Panday, left and formed the party Congress of thePeople (COP).

The result of the split was that PatrickManning – thoughunpopular in large sections of society for alleged abuse ofpower – won the 2007 general election. Mainly due to themajoritarian system, the PNM won an overwhelmingmajority of the seats – 26 out of 41 (64 percent), althoughhaving polled less than 46 percent of the votes. UNCwon 15seats having polled 29.7 percent of the votes. Dookeran’’s