Colombian Ministry of Defence FARC Operation Christmas Reaching the Softside[1]

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Colombian Ministry of Defence: FARC Operation Christmas - Reaching the soft-side of hard-core guerrillas Juan Pablo Garcia Account Planning Group - (UK) Grand Prix; Best channel strategy; Best use of research, Creative Strategy Awards, 2011

Transcript of Colombian Ministry of Defence FARC Operation Christmas Reaching the Softside[1]

  Colombian Ministry of Defence: FARC Operation Christmas - Reaching the soft-side of hard-core guerrillas

Juan Pablo Garcia

Account Planning Group - (UK)

Grand Prix; Best channel strategy; Best use of research, Creative Strategy Awards, 2011

 

 

Colombian Ministry of Defence: FARC Operation Christmas - Reaching the soft-side of hard-core guerrillas

Juan Pablo Garcia

SSP3 Colombia

In memory of Captain Valdez, military leader of Operation Christmas.

Killed in combat, March 2011, during an infiltration operation by FARC at La Macarena

SUMMARY

This entry is about Colombia’s 60 year struggle against the world’s oldest guerrilla group, FARC, which commits a terrorist act

once every 3 days.

We were asked to create an idea to demobilise them. Inviting them to rediscover their lives and their freedom.

Going back to basics and conducting interviews with 200 ex-guerrillas revealed a powerful insight - that Christmas time is the

   Title: Colombian Ministry of Defence: FARC Operation Christmas - Reaching the soft-side of hard-core guerrillas

   Author(s): Juan Pablo Garcia

   Source: Account Planning Group - (UK)

   Issue: Grand Prix; Best channel strategy; Best use of research, Creative Strategy Awards, 2011

 

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most sensitive period for guerrillas. The interviews also reinforced how difficult it would be to communicate with a target

audience who in the main are beyond the reach of conventional media.

Consequently we created something extraordinary: OPERATION CHRISTMAS. Two professional anti-guerrilla contingents,

2,000 LED lights, and 2 Black Hawk helicopters travelled into the jungle to find and cover giant trees with Christmas lights.

Placed alongside the guerrillas strategic walking paths the lights would come on when they approached, with banners

exhorting them to lay down their arms becoming visible too.

The powerful, timely and well-located messaging encouraged 331 FARC guerrillas to demobilise and re-enter society - a 30%

uplift on the previous year.

In challenging circumstances, planning drew together powerful insights to create a core, successful, thought – taking the spirit

of Christmas to the guerrilla strongholds.

INTRODUCTION

This entry is about Colombia’s 60 years of struggle against the oldest guerrilla group in the world, FARC. It is the story of how

communications can act as a powerful yet fundamentally peaceful weapon in war. It is the story of how planning can draw

together crucial insights to shape both message and media to astonishing and positive effect.

BACKGROUND

Sixty Years of Armed Struggle

The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), also known by the acronym

of FARC, is a revolutionary organization based in Colombia1 It is the largest and oldest (60 years old) insurgent group in the

Americas with an estimated 8,000 current members.2 FARC’s stated goal is to overthrow the current democratic government of

Colombia. As such it is denoted as a violent non-state actor (VNSA) and considered a terrorist group by the Colombian

government, the United States Department of State and the European Union.3 From 1999 to 2008 the FARC, together with the

associated ELN guerrilla group, was estimated to control between 30 and 40% of the territory in Colombia, an area bigger than

the size of England.

FARC primarily funds itself principally through ransom, kidnappings, extortion and taxation of the illegal drug trade. It has been

estimated that FARC supplies more than 50% of the world’s cocaine4. Since 1996, Free Country Foundation has registered

more than 3.000 kidnaps committed by FARC and sister organisation ELN.

Colombia’s guerrilla war has caused more than 40,000 deaths since 1990, most of them civilians.5 On average FARC commit

a terrorist act once every 3 days.6 As a result of FARC activity Colombia now has more landmines than any other country in

 

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the world, maiming on average three Colombians each day.7 The largest concentrations of FARC guerrillas are believed to be

located throughout the south-eastern parts of Colombia's 500,000 square kilometres of jungle and plains.

Laying Down Arms – the Demobilisation Programme

Since 2002, the PAHD (the Colombian Ministry of Defence’s Programme of Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised) has

been striving to promote the demobilisation of guerrillas and enable them to return to a conventional, civilian life.

Efforts during 2002-10 have included Government advertising campaigns broadcasting appeals on radio and television.

Recognising the attraction of football in particular these appeals were often broadcast during big matches and PAHD was a

major sponsor of the 2010 World Cup. The appeals relied on testimonials from demobilised FARC members to encourage their

former comrades to lay down their arms.

Alongside this messaging, in a process known as “reinsertion", the Government has been offering amnesty and trying to

reintegrate into society many of these battle-hardened guerrillas. Former members of outlawed guerrilla and militia groups are

being re-educated in schools and colleges. Practical job training and psychological support are also available8.

2010 – the Need for New Ideas

Whilst FARC numbers have fallen during 2002-10, reducing to a hard-core of around 8,000, the chart below illustrates how

recent efforts have yielded diminishing returns and the rate of demobilisations has fallen:

Demobilisations have become more difficult to achieve. Firstly, the remaining guerrillas tend to be those with higher ideological

convictions. Secondly, FARC have been responding to the PAHD communication tactics by locating in more isolated rural

areas and reducing their internal communications (e.g. banning the use of personal radios except by commanders).

Consequently there was an emerging need during 2010 to reinvigorate the demobilisation effort and take it to this increasingly

hard to reach audience.

STRATEGY AND PLANNING

The strategic challenge

Due to the sensitive nature of the subject and the constantly changing landscape, the PAHD has never set numeric targets for

demobilisations. However, their strategic challenge – and therefore the campaign challenge – was to stem the recent

slowdown in demobilisations and reach an increasingly hard to reach – and hard to convert – audience.

The brief was therefore to build a message for demobilisation in this context and to make sure that the guerrillas received it.

 

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The difficulties involved in this challenge cannot be underestimated and fall into four main areas:

1. The campaign needed to resonate extraordinarily strongly, in order to generate a change in behaviour amongst hard-core

individuals who may have held particular views for years, even decades;

2. The campaign needed to touch an audience who by definition are incredibly hard to reach and outside the access of

conventional media channels;

3. The campaign needed to operate successfully in highly dangerous locations and a fragile situation; and,

4. Having invested heavily in sponsorship of the 2010 football World Cup, the client had a very limited budget for the

remainder of the year.

Generating Insight – Getting into the Head of A Terrorist

In order to determine the most effective way of re-energising the demobilisation campaign, the team went back to basics and

the people who could advise them the best – the guerrillas themselves. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with

more than 200 recently demobilised ex-FARC members. Interviewees were of varying ages and drawn from right across the

country.

Interviews and focus groups

Participants were asked about motivating factors, potential trigger-points and what forms of communication were accessible

and credible in the jungle. In addition the data on demobilisations was examined to see if there were any patterns – particular

peaks and troughs – that could be exploited.

Key finding – Christmas is a particularly acute time for FARC members

The seasonal pattern of demobilisations illustrated that numbers tended to rise around the end of the calendar year. Delving

deeper through the interviews conducted we were able to ascertain that rather than the weather or any other factor it was the

 

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approach of Christmas and its sentiment towards family and home that impacted on guerrillas. The major theme that emerged

was that in this highly-religious Catholic society, Christmas is the time when many guerrillas begin to think about the idea of

quitting. They feel too far removed from their homes, families and children. The awareness of Christmas even being close,

with carols and fireworks, makes them feel nostalgic.

Communicating with guerrillas is increasingly difficult

The interviews with ex-guerrillas also brought home how difficult it would be reach FARC members. They highlighted the

media restrictions imposed by FARC leaders as well as the guerrillas’ tendency to move more frequently and to increasingly

remote locations.

Strategic solution

The insights identified above led to the strategy of utilising Christmas and its powerful sentiment to encourage FARC members

to demobilise. We also decided not to merely broadcast the message. Rather we would go to the heart of FARC’s jungle

strongholds in order to leave it.

OPERATION CHRISTMAS

Lowe-SSP3 therefore created Operation Christmas. The operation ran for 4 days in December 2010 in the Macarena, Meta

region of Colombia, where 52% of the guerrillas are based. The first step was for military intelligence to identify paths used by

the guerrillas to transport food, clothes and medicine. Then the military would fly over the jungle to spot large (75 foot-plus)

trees adjacent to these strategic guerrilla walking paths.

 

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The next step, with the help of 2 professional anti-guerrilla contingents and 2 Black Hawk helicopters, was to cover the

selected tree with 2,000 Christmas lights. Adjacent to the tree, military light mechanisms were put in place that detected

people’s movements and thus lit the trees as guerrillas approached. Finally, beside the tree, large banners were held with our

emotive message: “IF CHRISTMAS CAN COME TO THE JUNGLE, YOU CAN COME HOME. DEMOBILISE. AT CHRISTMAS

EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE".

It should be noted that in order to make the programme work, the Colombian Army ceased all other activity in the zone being

utilised. Military actions against FARC stopped and it was agreed that Operation Christmas would not be used to identify and

attack guerrillas, only to invite them to demobilise.

Initially the operation looked to light one tree but its success – in terms of demobilisations and media coverage – led to the

operation being extended to cover a further 9 trees.

 

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The success also led to a TV commercial being produced of the operation activity, subsequently broadcast on prime time

television during Christmas. Although media access amongst guerrillas is limited, TV remains the most common form of media

used by guerrillas and the coverage would also be seen by their families, who in turn would exert some pressure for their

demobilisation.

Television commercial

 

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RESULTS

331 demobilisations

From campaign launch in December 2010 until January 25th of 2011, 331 guerrillas demobilised, a 30% uplift on the same

period the previous year. This uplift is against the trend which saw an annual 24% reduction for demobilisations in 2009.

Changing lives, saving lives

Most importantly of all, guerrillas themselves report that the campaign had a considerable impact on them, consequently

changing both their own lives and those of ordinary Colombians around them:

A shift in context

Operation Christmas touched the hearts of the entire country and was shown all over the world. International and national

media broadcasted the operation. The campaign, and all of the press and social media coverage, had a unique, broader

‘humanising’ effect on the conflict:

1. The guerrillas increasingly feel they are still part of society – it makes them feel wanted and nostalgic;

2. Crucially, it raises the military’s disposition to welcome the demobilised “enemy” by reminding them that these combatants

are as human as they are; and,

3. By touching the hearts of ordinary Colombians, it helps smooth the ‘reinsertion’ process by destroying some of the

barriers that society has against accepting demobilised guerrillas back in workplaces or neighbourhoods.

International and national media covered the operation

 

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Over 60,000 views on YouTube in two days

 

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More than 2 million links referred to the project

 

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More than 400 links on Facebook and Twitter appeared

 

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WHAT DID PLANNING ACHIEVE?

In extraordinarily difficult circumstances, trying to communicate to a resistant audience, in remote jungle warzones, planning

was critical. It identified a powerful insight – the susceptibility of guerrillas at Christmas-time – to create the core thought of

taking the spirit of Christmas to the guerrilla strongholds.

This represented a step-change in thinking and implementation, tapping into the guerrillas’ soft-side and desire for love and

belonging, freedom and hope.

FOOTNOTES

1 FARC are not the only guerrilla group operating in Colombia, nor are they the only group invited to demobilise. The Ejército 

de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) are the other major groups who often operate 

alongside FARC. For the purposes of this paper we refer to FARC as they were the key target for this campaign.

2 Colombian government estimate cited by BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7217817.stm).

3 FARC is on both the US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations as well as the EU list of terrorist groups.

4 US Department of Justice, 2006 (http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr032206a.html).

5 UN estimate reported by Reuters, April 4 2007.

6 A compendium of 557 terrorist acts during 2002-7 attributed to FARC and reported in the foreign press.

7 International Landmine Monitor report that up to 100,000 landmines have been buried in Colombian soil.

8 The Independent, March 2010 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/after-the-revolution-why-are-farcs-

young-soldiers-laying-down-their-guns-1922847.html).

 

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