Colombia Quarterly Update Q3 2016
26
COLOMBIA Quarterly Economics Update – Q3 2016 Christian von Canstein, CFA, MSc
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Transcript of Colombia Quarterly Update Q3 2016
COLOMBIA
Quarterly Economics Update – Q3 2016
Christian von Canstein, CFA, MSc
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016
Colombia’s growth rate has slowed down to a level not seen since the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Compared to many of its regional peers, Latin America’s third largest economy is holding steady nevertheless. In spite of having gone through a massive macroeconomic shock over the last two years, growth is still positive and there is currently no reason to believe that the country could fall into a recession in the near future.
Like for many commodity exporters in the region, Colombia’s slowdown can be attributed to the drastic fall in commodity prices, especially oil, over the last two years. This has led to a sharp drop in the value of its exports which was only partly offset by the massive currency depreciation the country experienced during the same period.
Over the course of this year, the situation seemed to have turned in Colombia’s favor, at least temporarily.
First of all, commodity prices, including oil, recovered. The recent agreement by OPEC to curb production could help stabilizing prices at higher levels even though US shale gas producers are providing a natural cap on how much prices can rise . Should the oil price remain at the current level, this would be a welcome relief for Colombia’s oil dependent economy.
Second, the feared cycle of interest rate increases by the Federal Reserves seems to have lost momentum, which has bolstered the Peso and could mean that Colombia’s hawkish central bank might have less to worry about imported inflation. Amid the uncertainty after the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, the Federal Reserve has slowed the pace in rate increases– if at all, only one of the planned four interest rate increases is expected to materialize in December. For the Colombian Peso, this is a much needed relief.
2
Overview
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Real GDP Growth (annualized moving average)
GDP growth fell to 2.00% in the first two quarters of 2016, the lowest rate since the country emerged from the global financial crisis in 2009.
This comes after Colombia’s economy grew by 3.1% in 2015, a weaker growth rate than in 2014 (4.4%) but still decent amid the adverse macroeconomic environment.
During the second quarter, sharp increases in manufacturing, finance and insurance was offset by falling output from mining and internal trade. Increased manufacturing output was helped by oil refining and beverage production. There are hopes Colombia is gradually diversifying its economy away from the overreliance on commodity exports.
Should the Peso remain close to current levels, Colombian manufacturing could benefit, as import prices have risen considerably; products whose inputs can be substituted locally should benefit, not only for domestic consumption but also for export markets.
The surprise referendum result led to a temporary correction in Colombian markets but is unlikely to have a long-term impact on the country’s economy.
If at all, it was a sign of constitutional strength as the vote seemed to be fair and the opposition was allowed to win. Colombians have voted against an amnesty and political representation for a terrorist group accused of war crimes and involved in drug-trafficking which could have set a dangerous precedent by fundamentally questioning the rule of law and offering incentives to other criminal organizations such as the ELN to push for similar terms.
Economy slows further in the first two quarter of 2016 after decent growth in 2015
3
Real GDP Growth0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
7.90%
3.10%
2.00% 2.00%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016CPI Inflation (year on year basis)
As at end of September 2016, annualized CPI inflation had reached around 7.3%, still above Colombia’s central bank inflation target of 3%. However, inflation seems to be finally receding.
The main drivers throughout the year were the weakening Peso and food prices, especially fruits and vegetables. This was exacerbated by a nationwide strike by truck drivers.
Upwards pressure in prices can partly be explained by the massive devaluation of the Peso over the past year; the currency fell by more than 50% against the US Dollar and has only recovered slightly over the year. The price of imports has therefore risen in Peso terms. No matter if sold directly or used as inputs, higher import prices are mostly passed on to the consumer, depending on the price elasticity for each product.
Another driver of inflation has been the adverse impact of the “El Niño” weather pattern on food crops. As food is a heavy component of Colombia’s shopping basket used to calculate CPI inflation, this had a major impact on overall CPI inflation.
If inflation remains at elevated levels, it could have a dampening effect on consumer spending, as wages are unlikely to rise commensurately, given weak productivity growth, persistent high unemployment and cost pressures companies are already facing amid the current slowdown.
Still, compared to Brazil (8.5% p.a.), Argentina (estimated 40% p.a.) or Venezuela (estimated >180% p.a.), Colombian CPI inflation appears to be relatively manageable.
The Central Bank has already responded by hiking rates by 300 basis points since last year. Inflation is expected to stabilize over the coming year and fall back to 4%.
Inflation is still high but has started to stabilize
4
CPI Inflation0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
10.00%
3.73%
5.35%
8.60%
7.27%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Unemployment
Unemployment has risen to almost 9% as at the end of September 2016, slightly higher than last year but still low at a historical basis.
According to the national statistics department (DANE) ,the employment rate is close to 59% with a participation rate of 65%, the highest in 16 years.
However, the unemployment rate remains far too high for a rapidly growing emerging economy and is one of the highest in Latin America. Naturally, direct comparisons are not always appropriate due to different methodologies applied and the reliability of official data can sometimes be questioned (especially for the case of Venezuela).
Still, the current level of unemployment suggests that Colombia’s economy is still struggling to create sufficient jobs for its growing labor force, even though it seems to be improving.
This might be partly due to onerous and inflexible labor regulations which place large burdens on employers. This becomes a disincentive to hire and encourages mechanization as well as offshoring of production. The fact that wage growth has exceeded productivity growth over the last 15 years (refer to slide 24) might have added to that.
Another problem might be the skills gap: employers are struggling to find qualified personal for highly skilled positions due to shortcomings in the country’s education system. To make matters worse, such positions often support lower-skilled jobs.
The labor market remains one of Colombia’s weakest spots. Liberalization combined with improvements in education and encouraging the creation of apprenticeship schemes will be necessary to reduce unemployment permanently.
Despite recent improvements, unemployment remains high
5
Unemployment8.40%
8.60%
8.80%
9.00%
9.20%
9.40%
9.60%
9.80%
10.00%
9.74%
8.98%
8.88%
8.99%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Business Confidence
Colombian business has slowed a bit over the quarter while consumer confidence is still at negative levels, albeit improving.
It remains to be seen what the impact of the unexpected referendum outcome will be on both indicators.
In spite of the current slowdown, Colombia’s economy remains one of the green shoots of Latin America. The impact of oil is important but somehow exaggerated, given that the economy is not as much driven by exports as many of its peers. At the same time, opportunities that the depreciation of the Peso brings in terms of competitiveness of Colombian products in foreign markets are largely underestimated.
Concerns about potentially increasing tax burden on business are certainly justified; exits over the last two years of multinational companies like Bayer, Michelin, Mondelez and Apex Tools Group from Colombia is partly attributed to these factors.
Now that the agreement with the FARC was voted down, it is uncertain whether the tax reform in its current form will be pushed through; both consumer and business are hoping that the feared tax increases will not materialize in the end.
Therefore, some reasons exist to be a bit pessimistic but Colombia’s fundamentals are far better than many Colombians want to believe.
Consumer confidence picks up but remains low
6
Consumer Confidence
Business Confidence-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.006.10
-0.20
5.20
4.10
30/09/2011
30/09/2015
30/06/2016
30/09/2016
Consumer Confidence
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
23.10
4.30
-11.30
-6.60
30/09/2011
30/09/2015
30/06/2016
30/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Fiscal Balance
Even if falling oil prices are a popular excuse by the current administration to justify the deteriorating budget deficit, the long term trajectory of Colombia’s fiscal position (slide 15) shows that the country has not managed to balance its budget for almost 15 years – independent from the business cycle and the level of oil prices. Even if debt to GDP remains at a manageable 38% as at the end of 2015, the country must permanently improve its fiscal position so that debt does not accumulate and reach unsustainable levels as has happened in many parts of the “developed” world. Spending will have to be adjusted at some stage which implies politically difficult choices. Whatever the ultimate outcome of ending the insurgency by the FARC will be, public spending will be required to implement the demobilization, invest in affected regions and reintegrate the former insurgents, once they have laid down their arms. At the same time, funds required for the fight against large criminal gangs that are taking over the drug trade from the FARC might offset the savings in defense spending after ending the conflict.
The 10 year yield has fallen over the quarter and is now 147 basis points lower than a year ago. Even if public finances have deteriorated a bit and plugging the gap amid low oil prices remains challenging, Colombia certainly remains one of the countries with the highest credit standing in Latin America – only Chile has currently a higher credit rating.
Amid the uncertainty in the aftermath of the referendum, the risk of a downgrade from its current BBB has increased, as debt investors had been very keen on seeing the tax reform through, which is now in doubt. S&P and Fitch had Colombia on a negative outlook before the vote while Moody’s has the country still on a stable outlook, subject to the final outcome of the tax reform.
More work to do on the fiscal front
7
10 Year Yield Colombia is still among the most credit-worthy borrowers in the region
Fiscal Balance
-3.50%
-3.00%
-2.50%
-2.00%
-1.50%
-1.00%
-0.50%
0.00%
-1.43%
-2.75%
-3.22% -3.22%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
10 Year Yield0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
7.60%
8.47%
7.59%7.00%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Policy Rate
Compared to last year, the policy rate is by 300 basis points higher after Colombia’s central bank surprised markets by hiking rates by another 25 basis points during the second quarter. In the light of recent economic performance, this looks still like a sensible approach; Colombia is still far from a recession but inflation has been edging up recently and the trend is set to continue, amid the “El Niño” effects on food prices, exacerbated by strikes by truck drivers and the weak Peso. Inflation is rising at the fastest pace in two decades. With a policy rate of 7.75%, the central bank will have plenty of firepower to support its economy going forward, should this become necessary. This compares favorably to the situation of many “developed” world central banks who have little to offer in case of a new recession, as their policy rates are pretty close to zero already.
For business, credit conditions have been getting worse over the year. This has certainly to do with the current tightening cycle. At the same time, the spread between the average business loan rate and the risk-free policy rate remains high. Increased default risks amid a slowdown might explain part of this. Another factor, however, is that markets still demand a significant risk premium to lend to companies. One explanation is Colombia’s reliance on bank financing for business loans. The Colombian banking system lacks competition and there is a lack of alternative forms of debt financing for companies. Persistent government deficits also push up the interest rate both business and consumers have to pay; borrowing by the government increases the demand for loanable funds which leads to upward pressure on interest rates until a new equilibrium rate that matches supply and demand is reached.
Colombia goes through a tightening cycle
8
Business Loan Rate Business loans remain expensive in Colombia
Policy Rate0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
4.50% 4.75%
7.50% 7.75%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
Business Loan Rate0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
10.31%11.12%
14.52% 14.85%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Current Account
Colombia’s weakest spot is its external balance. The current account has improved a bit over the year but the deficit has almost doubled over the last five years. This implies that Colombia is unable to fully pay for its imports with exports of equivalent value. Slide 15 shows that the country has always run a deficit, both in times of low- and high oil prices. Being thus reliant on foreign capital to plug the gap, this has become a strong headwind. If foreign investors become less willing to fund the deficit, the current account has to be brought back into balance via lower imports and more exports. The Peso might thus see a further plunge on top of what has already occurred over the past year. This would also push up inflation higher, due to rising import prices, and restrict the Central Bank’s wiggle room to support the slowing economy. This would occur at an inopportune moment; as slide 7 shows, Colombia cannot keep running its fiscal deficit forever and will need to implement budget consolidation measures at some stage. A combination of fiscal consolidation and tight monetary conditions during an economic slowdown can have recessionary effects, as the experience of some countries in the Eurozone over the last few years has shown.
Without much that can be done now, one must hope that Colombia’s economy manages to weather the storm. Policymakers should keep pursuing the goal of helping export business to rebalance the country’s external sector by cutting burdensome regulations and opening the country to global trade via more free trade agreements like the one implemented in 2013. Moreover, heavy investment in infrastructure is necessary to bring down the high transport costs and thus enable producers to bring their merchandise to global markets at competitive prices.
Colombia’s Achilles heel
9
Exchange Rate (COP/USD)
Current Account
-8.00%
-7.00%
-6.00%
-5.00%
-4.00%
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
-2.94%
-7.13%
-5.74% -5.74%
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
Exchange Rate (COP/USD)0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1931.98
3087.442920.35 2882.06
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Equity Market
The Colcap index shows the 20 most liquid Colombian stocks , weighted by adjusted market capitalization.
In line with emerging markets, Colombian stocks joined the recovery rally over the first half of the year and were up by 10% compared to last year.
Within the index, variation was considerable.
The greatest losers over the year was Pacific Rubiales (trading suspended since April 2016), Cemex and Ecopetrol.
Other companies that had fallen out of favor such as Almacenes Exito and Avianca came back over the year but are still much lower than three years and five years ago.
Canacol Energy and Interconexión Eléctrica were the big winners over the year. One factor that might have contributed to this is the perceived market-friendliness of Colombia’s government and its willingness to reduce the role of government in this sector, as the privatization of Isagén has shown.
On a valuation basis, Colombian stocks have become more expensive with the exception of the banking sector. The P/E ratio of the Colcap is back at 20, in line with its historical average.
Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, Banco de Bogota and Avianca seem especially attractive (P/E ratio close to or below 10) but investors might want to look at the respective fundamentals to understand the reasons for the low valuations.
Stock markets rally over first half of 2016 but remain flat on a year on year basis
10
Colcap Equity Index0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1584.75
1218.82
1313.18 1338.83
30/09/201130/09/201530/06/201630/09/2016
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Relevant events over the quarter
11
• Against expectations, a popular referendum ended in a vote against the government’s draft agreement to end the conflict with the illegal armed group FARC. Turnout was low and the ‘no’ vote won by a narrow margin. A sell-off of Colombian assets ensued, as investors had been positioned for an approval. The outcome has created a political limbo as no plans had been made for this scenario. The main critique of the proposed agreement was the impunity that was offered in spite of the FARC having undermined the rule of law and its involvement in large scale drug trafficking. On top, automatic political representation in Congress would have been offered to former members of a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization.
• In the week following the referendum, President Santos was given the Nobel Peace Prize. It was notable that no credit was given to former President Uribe whose administration turned the tide in favor of Colombia through a military campaign that turned the FARC from military threat into a group of outlaws at the country’s periphery.
• The long awaited tax reform has been drafted and is expected to be voted on in Congress shortly. The reform is criticized for its disproportionate reliance on the income of natural persons and introducing taxes on dividends, penalizing the provision of equity capital to companies which underwrites risks. Even if the reform tries to reduce the tax burden on corporations, the shift to income taxes means that the burden on small business taxed via the owner’s income taxes increases. This will not contribute help to increase competition in Colombia’s often oligopolistic markets. One positive impact of the tax reform is to broaden the tax base in order to lower headline taxes. Currently, Colombia’s tax base is narrow and its tax code is riddled with exemptions; this leads to very high headline tax rates.
APPENDIX: LONG-TERM STATISTICS
12
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016The slowdown is obvious and related to oil prices but growth is still sustained as Colombia’s economy is not only based on oil
13
3/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Oil Prices and GDP Growth
Oil Price (LHS)GDP Growth (RHS)
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Inflation is receding but underemployment and unemployment still remain far too high, given Colombia’s growth potential
14
3/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Inflation, Underemployment and Unemployment
CPI InflationUnemploymentUnderemployment
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016The twin deficit is Colombia’s Achilles Heel and imbalances seem to be structural
15
3/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Current Account and Budget Deficits
Current AccountFiscal Balance
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016The recent rebound notwithstanding, the Peso is only marginally below its weakest point in almost 15 years
16
3/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
3600
Exchange Rate (COP/USD)
Exchange Rate (COP/USD)
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016The Peso also has weakened against other currencies
17
3/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
50
70
90
110
130
Exchange Rate (Broad Basket vs COP)
Exchange Rate (Broad Basket)
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016The 10 year yield has recently fallen and the sovereign credit standing remains strong
10 Year Government Yield
18
12/31/10
3/31/1
1
7/1/11
10/1/11
1/1/12
4/1/12
7/1/12
10/1/12
1/1/13
4/1/13
7/1/13
10/1/13
1/1/14
4/1/14
7/1/14
10/1/14
1/1/15
4/1/15
7/1/15
10/1/15
1/1/16
4/1/16
7/1/16
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10 Year Government Yield
10 Year Yield
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Credit conditions are stable but cost of capital remains high for Colombian business and consumers
19
3/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
0123456789
10111213141516171819202122232425262728293031
Credit Conditions
Business Loan RateConsumer Loan RatePolicy Rate
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Non-performing loans (nominal) reach historical high – the next crisis in waiting?
203/31/0
2
10/1/02
4/1/03
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Nonperforming Loans (COP Billion)
Nonperforming Loans (COP Billion)
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Colombian equity markets have made a comeback but are still lower than five years ago
21
3/31/0
3
10/1/03
4/1/04
10/1/04
4/1/05
10/1/05
4/1/06
10/1/06
4/1/07
10/1/07
4/1/08
10/1/08
4/1/09
10/1/09
4/1/10
10/1/10
4/1/11
10/1/11
4/1/12
10/1/12
4/1/13
10/1/13
4/1/14
10/1/14
4/1/15
10/1/15
4/1/16
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
Colcap Equity Index
Colcap Equity Index
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016
22
Colcap Equity Index – Constituents
Trading in the shares of Pacific Rubiales has been suspended since 19 April 2016.
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016
23
Colcap Equity Index - Sectors
4%
17%
50%
1%
10%
17%
ServicesCapital GoodsFinancialTransportationEnergyUtilities
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Gap between wage growth and productivity has taken toll on competitiveness
24
1/1/02
6/1/02
11/1/02
4/1/03
9/1/03
2/1/04
7/1/04
12/1/04
5/1/05
10/1/05
3/1/06
8/1/06
1/1/07
6/1/07
11/1/07
4/1/08
9/1/08
2/1/09
7/1/09
12/1/09
5/1/10
10/1/10
3/1/11
8/1/11
1/1/12
6/1/12
11/1/12
4/1/13
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
Labor Productivity vs Wages (discontinued since April 2013)
Labor Productivity Wages
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Industrial production
25
12/31/01
7/1/02
1/1/03
7/1/03
1/1/04
7/1/04
1/1/05
7/1/05
1/1/06
7/1/06
1/1/07
7/1/07
1/1/08
7/1/08
1/1/09
7/1/09
1/1/10
7/1/10
1/1/11
7/1/11
1/1/12
7/1/12
1/1/13
7/1/13
1/1/14
7/1/14
1/1/15
7/1/15
90
110
130
150
Industrial Production (discontinued since December 2015)
Industrial Production
COLO
MBIA – Q
UARTERLY ECON
OM
ICS UPDATE – Q
3 2016Contact & Disclaimer
26
In preparing this report, I have relied upon publicly available data supplied by third parties. Although reasonable care has been taken to gauge the reliability of this data, this report carries no guarantee of the accuracy or completeness and I cannot be held accountable for misrepresentation of data by third parties involved. This report is an opinion piece and for private information and is for discussion purpose only. This report does not constitute financial advice and should therefore not be used as a basis to make any decisions. This report is based on data and information available at the date of the report and takes no account of subsequent developments after that date. It may not be modified without my prior written permission. Under no circumstances do I accept responsibility for any consequences arising from any third party relying on this report or the opinions expressed therein. This report is not intended to form a basis of any decision by a third party to do or omit to do anything.
This report has been written in private capacity and any opinions expressed therein should not be associated in any way with my current or previous employers or any professional organizations I belong to.
If you have any questions or comments on this report, please feel free to contact me.
Third Party sources that have been used are Asociacion Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI), Bloomberg, Banco de la Republica, Bank for International Settlements, Departamento Nacional de Estadisticas (DANE), Fedesarrollo and Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia.
Christian von Canstein, CFA, MSc
Email: [email protected]
