Collation Cases Raw for Wills

7/27/2019 Collation Cases Raw for Wills

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NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO,JR., pet i t ioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OFMAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO andELIZA NAZARENO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision [1]of the Court of Appeals inCA-GR CV No. 39441 dated May 29, 1998 affirming with modifications the decision ofthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in an action for annulment of saleand damages.

The facts are as follows:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died onApril 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children,namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino,Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and hiswife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.

During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquiredproperties in Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some ofthese properties that is in question in this case.

It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in theCourt of First Instance of Cavite, Branch XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc.No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the courts in 1983, the case was transferred tothe Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of hisfathers estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents hadexecuted several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of hissister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedlysold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970 forthe total amount of P47,800.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale reads as follows:

DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, Filipino, married to Aurea Poblete-Nazareno, of

legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines,

- W I T N E S S E T H -
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That I am the absolute registered owner of six (6) parcels of land with the

improvements thereon situated in Quezon City, Philippines, which parcels of land are

herewith described and bounded as follows, to wit:

TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 140946

A parcel of land (Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-47404, being a portion of Lot

3, Block D-3 described on plan Bsd-10642, G.L.R.O. Record No.) situated in the

Quirino District, Quezon City. Bounded on the N., along line 1-2 by Lot 15, Block D-

3 of plan Bsd - 10642; along line 2-3 by Lot 4, Block D-3 of plan Bsd-10642; along

line 3-4 by Aurora Boulevard (Road Lot-1, Bsd-10642); and along line 4-1 by Lot 3-

D of the subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being S.29 deg.

26E., 1156.22 m. from B.L.L.M. 9, Quezon City,

thence N. 79 deg. 53E., 12.50 m. to point 2;

thence S. 10 deg. 07E., 40.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 79 deg. 53W., 12.50 m. to point 4;

thence N. 10 deg. 07W., 40.00 m. to the point

of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE METERS. All

points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as

follows:points 1 and 4 by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. bearings true; date of the

original survey, April 8-July 15, 1920 and that of the subdivision survey, March 25,1956.


A parcel of land (Lot 3, Block 93 of the subdivision plan Psd-57970 being a portion

of Lot 6, Pcs-4786, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917) situated in Quirino District Quezon

City. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by Lot 1, Block 93; on the NE., along line

2-3, by Road Lot 101; on the SE., along line 3-4, by Road Lot 100; on the SW., along

line 4-1, by Lot 4, Block 93; all of the subdivision plan. Beginning at point marked

1 on plan, being S.65 deg. 40 3339.92 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Marikina, Rizal;

thence N. 23 deg. 28 min. E., 11.70 m. to point 2;

thence S. 66 deg. 32 min. E., 18.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 23 deg. 28 min. W., 11.70 m. to point 4;


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thence N. 66 deg. 32. min. W., 18.00 m. to the point

of beginning; containing an area of TWO HUNDRED TEN SQUARE METERS

AND SIXTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (210.60). All points referred to are indicated

on the plan and are marked on the ground by B.L. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.;

bearings true; date of the original survey, Nov. 10, 1920 and Jan. 31-March 31, 1924and that of the subdivision survey, February 1 to September 30, 1954. Date approved -

March 9, 1962.


A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988,

being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos.

27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of

Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the

consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 11 of the consolidation andsubdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan;

and on the NW., by Lot No. 9 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at

a point marked 1 on the plan, being S. 7 deg. 26W., 4269.90 m. more or less from

B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;



thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m to point 4;

thence N. 64 deg. 59E., 29.99 m. to the point of

beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS

(360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground

are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg.

50E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the

consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.






consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 12 of the consolidation and


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subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan;

on the NW., by Lot No. 10 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a

point marked 1 on plan, being S. 79 deg. 07W., 4264.00 m. more or less from

B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;


thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m. to point 3;


thence S. 26 deg. 00E., 12.00 m. to the point of


(360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground,

are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg.50E.; date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the


A parcel of land (Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988,




consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 14, of the consolidation;

and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision

plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 12, of the consolidation and subdivisionplan. Beginning at the point marked 1 on plan, being S.78 deg. 48W., 4258.20 m.

more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;


thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m. to point 3;


thence S.25 deg. 00E., 12.00 m. to point of


(360, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground





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consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 15, of the consolidation

and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivisionplan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision

plan. Beginning at the point marked 1 on plan, being S.78 deg. 48W., 4258.20 m.

more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;




thence N.64 deg. 58E., 30.00 m. to the point of


(360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground




That for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS

(P43,000.00) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P.NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov.

of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire satisfaction, I

do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said

Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title, rights,

interests and participations to the abovedescribed parcels of land with the

improvements thereon, with the exception of LOT NO. 11 COVERED BY T.C.T.

NO. 118886, free of any and all liens and encumbrances; and

That for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED

PESOS (P4,800.00) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDADP. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic,

Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire

satisfaction, I do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto

the said Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title,

rights, interests and participations in and to Lot No. 11 covered by T.C.T. No. 118886

above-described, free of any and all liens and encumbrances, with the understanding


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that the title to be issued in relation hereto shall be separate and distinct from the title

to be issued in connection with Lots Nos. 13 and 14, although covered by the same

title.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this deed of absolute sale in the

City of Manila, Philippines, this 29th day of January, 1970.[2]

By virtue of this deed, transfer certificates of title were issued to Natividad, to wit:TCT No. 162738 (Lot 3-B),[3]TCT No. 162739 (Lot 3),[4]TCT No. 162735 (Lot 10),[5]TCTNo. 162736 (Lot 11),[6]and TCT No. 162737 (Lots 13 and 14),[7]all of the Register ofDeeds of Quezon City.

Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registeredunder TCT No. 140946. This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and byMaximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982to Maximino, Jr.,[8]for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. 293701 by the

Register of Deeds of Quezon City.[9]

When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino, Jr., he and his wifeEliza locked Maximino, Jr. out of the house. On August 4, 1983, Maximino, Jr. broughtan action for recovery ofpossession and damages with prayer for writs of preliminaryinjunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. OnDecember 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in favor of Maximino, Jr. In CA-G.R. CV No.12932, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.[10]

On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., thepresent case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino,Jr. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was docketed

as Civil Case No. 88-58.[11]

Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made onJanuary 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on theground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.

On March 1, 1990, Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint againstthe spouses Romeo and Eliza.[12]They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in theDeed of Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to Natividad, had been surreptitiouslyappropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No. 277968) in hisname.[13]They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza tothird persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and thecancellation of his title, the eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all personsclaiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment of damages.

The issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. Romeo presentedevidence to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lotsto Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. Hepresented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962 executed byMaximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who wasthen abroad and was represented by their mother, Aurea. By virtue of this deed, thenine lots subject of this Deed of Partition were assigned by raffle as follows:
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1. Romeo - Lot 25-L (642 m2)2. Natividad - Lots 23 (312 m2) and 24 (379 m2)3. Maximino, Jr. - Lots 6 (338 m 2) and 7 (338 m2)4. Pacifico - Lots 13 (360 m2) and 14 (360 m2)5. Jose - Lots 10 (360 m2) and 11 (360 m2)

Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L under his name,[14]while Maximino, Jr. receivedLots 6 and 7 through a Deed of Sale dated August 16, 1966 for the amountof P9,500.00.[15]Pacifico and Joses shares were allegedly given to Natividad, whoagreed to give Lots 10 and 11 to Jose, in the event the latter came back fromabroad. Natividads share, on the other hand, was sold to third persons [16]because sheallegedly did not like the location of the two lots. But, Romeo said, the money realizedfrom the sale was given to Natividad.

Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was bought for him by his father, while Lot 3 wassold to him for P7,000.00 by his parents on July 4, 1969.[17]However, he admitted that adocument was executed by his parents transferring six properties in Quezon

City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13, and 14, to Natividad. Romeo further testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in

their favor stated that the sale was for a consideration, they never really paid anyamount for the supposed sale. The transfer was made in this manner in order to avoidthe payment of inheritance taxes.[18]Romeo denied stealing Lot 3 from his sister butinstead claimed that the title to said lot was given to him by Natividad in 1981 after theirfather died.

Natividad and Maximino, Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distributionexecuted in 1962 was not really carried out. Instead, in December of 1969, their parentsoffered to sell to them the six lots in Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and

14. However, it was only Natividad who bought the six properties because she was theonly one financially able to do so. Natividad said she sold Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-AlvaMarketing Corp.[19]and Lot 3-B to Maximino, Jr. for P175,000.00.[20]Natividad admittedthat Romeo and the latters wife were occupying Lot 3-B at that time and that she didnot tell the latter about the sale she had made to Maximino, Jr.

Natividad said that she had the title to Lot 3 but it somehow got lost. She could notget an original copy of the said title because the records of the Registrar of Deeds hadbeen destroyed by fire. She claimed she was surprised to learn that Romeo was able toobtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.

Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale

dated January 29, 1970. She alleged that their parents had sold these properties to theirchildren instead of merely giving the same to them in order to impose on them the valueof hardwork.

Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after Romeo lost in theaction for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. Q-39018) which had been broughtagainst him by Maximino, Jr. It appears that before the case filed by Romeo could bedecided, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-GR CV No. 12932 affirmingthe trial courts decision in favor of Maximino, Jr.
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On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion ofwhich states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale

dated January 29, 1970. Except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to

third persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno towhom the same had been adjudicated. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is

directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 162735 and

162736 as a lien in the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.

The defendants counterclaim is dismissed. Likewise, the third-party complaint is

dismissed.

The defendants are hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum

of P30,000 as and for attorneys fees. Likewise, the third-party plaintiff is directed to

pay the third-party defendants attorneys fees ofP20,000.

All other claims by one party against the other are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, onOctober 14, 1992 the trial court modified its decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs Partial Motion for Reconsideration is hereby

granted. The judgment dated August 10, 1992 is hereby amended, such that the first

paragraph of its dispositive portion is correspondingly modified to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deeds of

Sale dated January 29, 1970 and July 31, 1982.

Except as to Lots 3, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third person, the defendant

Natividad shall hold the rest OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE DEED OF

SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (LOTS 10 and 11) in trust for Jose Nazareno to

whom the same had been adjudicated.

The Register ofDeeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on

Transfer Certificates of Title No. 162735 and 162736 as a lien on the titles of

Natividad P. Nazareno.

LIKEWISE, THE SAID REGISTER OF DEEDS IS DIRECTED TO CANCEL TCT

NO. 293701 (formerly 162705) OVER LOT 3-B AND RESTORE TCT NO. 140946

IN THE NAME OF MAXIMINO NAZARENO SR. AND AUREA POBLETE.[22]
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in thesense that titles to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name ofMaximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and orderedrestored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr. The dispositive portion of the decisiondated May 29, 1998 reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision and the order in question are

modified as follows:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 and the Deed of Absolute Sale

dated 31 July 1982 are hereby declared null and void;

2. Except as to Lots 13 and 14 ownership of which has passed on to third persons, it is

hereby declared that Lots 3, 3-B, 10 and 11 shall form part of the estate of the

deceased Maximino Nazareno, Sr.;

3. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to restore TCT No.

140946 (covering Lot 3-B), TCT No. 132019 (covering Lot 3), TCT No. 118885

(covering Lot 10), and TCT No. 118886 (covering Lot 11).[23]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution datedMay 27, 1999. Hence this petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATERESPONDENT ROMEO P. NAZARENO CAN DESTROY THE FULL FAITH AND

CREDIT ACCORDED TO NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS LIKE THE DEED OFABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (EXH. 1) EXECUTED BY THEDECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND AUREA POBLETEIN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATEDTHE FACTS OF THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE SAIDDEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (EXH. 1) IN THE LIGHTOF THE FOLLOWING:

A) THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, ALL OF WHICH ARE NOTARIZED,EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES DURING THEIR LIFETIMEINVOLVING SOME OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES.

B) THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION WITH WAIVER OFRIGHTS AND CONFIRMATION OF SALE DATED MAY 24, 1975 (EXH. 14A) OFTHE ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE BY THE DECEASED MAXIMINO A.NAZARENO, SR. AND THEIR CHILDREN INVOLVING THE ONLY REMAININGESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE THUS IMPLIEDLY ADMITTING THE VALIDITYOF PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS MADE BY SAID DECEASED SPOUSES ONTHEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, HALF OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BECOME

A PART OF AUREA POBLETES ESTATE UPON HER DEMISE.
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C) THE ADMISSION MADE BY MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. IN HISTESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT ON AUGUST 13, 1980 DURING HIS LIFETIMEIN CIVIL CASE NO. NC-712 (EXH. 81, 81B) THAT HE HAD SOLD CERTAINPROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO THUS BELYING THECLAIM OF ROMEO P. NAZARENO THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALEDATED JANUARY 29, 1970 IS ONE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS EXECUTED

BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES TO BE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.

D) THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY ROMEO P. NAZARENO HIMSELF CONTAINEDIN A FINAL DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IN CA-GR CV NO.12932 DATED AUGUST 31, 1992 AND AN ANNEX APPEARING IN HIS

ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-39018 (EXH. 11-B)INVOLVING LOT 3B, ONE OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION THAT THESAID PROPERTY IS OWNED BY PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.

E) THE PARTIAL PROJECT OF PARTITION DATED MAY 24, 1995 WHICH WASAPPROVED BY THE INTESTATE COURT IN SP. PROC. NO. NC-28 ANDEXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATTER COURTS FINAL ORDERDATED JULY 9, 1991 DETERMINING WHICH WERE THE REMAINING

PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND

AUREA POBLETE DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING THEIR CONJUGALPROPERTIES IS AN INDIVISIBLE CONTRACT? AND IF SO WHETHER OR NOTUPON THEIR DEATH, THE ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. ALONECAN SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF SAID SALE?

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF LOT 3 UNDER THE DEED OF ABSOLUTESALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P.NAZARENO, IS VALID CONSIDERING THAT AS PER THE ORDER OF THELOWER COURT DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1990. ROMEO NAZARENO ADMITTED

THAT HE DID NOT PAY THE CONSIDERATION STATED IN THE DEED OFABSOLUTE SALE DATED JULY 4, 1969 EXECUTED BY THE DECEASEDSPOUSES IN HIS FAVOR (EXH. M-2).

5. WHETHER OR NOT AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAMEOF ROMEO P. NAZARENO, TCT NO. 277968 (EXH. M) SHOULD BECANCELLED AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND A NEW ONE ISSUED INFAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO PURSUANT TO THE DEED OF

ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THE LATTERS FAVOR ON JANUARY 29, 1970BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES.[24]

We find the petition to be without merit.

First. Petitioners argue that the lone testimony of Romeo is insufficient to overcomethe presumption of validity accorded to a notarized document.

To begin with, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on theparties and carry even more weight when these coincide with the factual findings of thetrial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is ashowing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearlyerroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[25]The lone testimony of a
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witness, if credible, is sufficient. In this case, the testimony of Romeo that noconsideration was ever paid for the sale of the six lots to Natividad was found to becredible both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals and it has not beensuccessfully rebutted by petitioners. We, therefore, have no reason to overturn thefindings by the two courts giving credence to his testimony.

The fact that the deed of sale was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of itscontents. As held in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:[26]

Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the

presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public

to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have

any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and

always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.

Second. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which

was declared final by this Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld theright of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot 3-B. In that case, the Court of

Appeals held:

As shown in the preceding disquisition, Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property

in dispute by purchase in 1970. She was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.

162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.When her parents died, her mother

Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in 1980,

Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the property in

question. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid property could belong to the

estate of the spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere fact thatRomeo P. Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the properties of

the deceased Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect the ownership of

the said realty. Appellant Romeo P. Nazarenos suspicion that his parents had

entrusted all their assets under the care and in the name of Natividad P. Nazareno,

their eldest living sister who was still single, to be divided upon their demise to all the

compulsory heirs, has not progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced

allegation on the point not only is without any corroboration but is even belied by

documentary evidence. The deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B), being a public

document (Rule 132, Secs. 19 and 23, Revised Rules on Evidence), is entitled to great

weight; to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing andmore than merely preponderant (Yturralde vs. Aganon, 28 SCRA 407; Favor vs.

Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308).Defendants-appellants own conduct disproves

their claim of co-ownership over the property in question. Being themselves the

owner of a ten-unit apartment building along Stanford St., Cubao Quezon City,

defendants-appellants, in a letter of demand to vacate addressed to their tenants

(Exhibits P, P-1 and P-2) in said apartment, admitted that the house and lot
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located at No. 979 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City where they were residing did not

belong to them. Also, when they applied for a permit to repair the subject property in

1977, they stated that the property belonged to and was registered in the name of

Natividad P. Nazareno. Among the documents submitted to support their application

for a building permit was a copy of TCT No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of

Quezon City in the name of Natividad Nazareno (Exhibit O and submarkings; tsnMarch 15, 1985, pp. 4-5).[27]

To be sure, that case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo andEliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulmentof sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino, Jr., asdefendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-partycomplaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, thisthird-party complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.

The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of itsown.[28]Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latterhas a separate and distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GRCV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo andEliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recoverproperties which were wrongfully disposed.

Furthermore, Natividads title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In othe rwords, the title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issuein that case. If the first case resolved anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr.over Lot 3-B alone.

Third. Petitioners allege that, as shown by several deeds of sale executed byMaximino, Sr. and Aurea during their lifetime, the intention to dispose of their realproperties is clear.Consequently, they argue that the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970should also be deemed valid.

This is a non-sequitur. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by thespouses Maximino, Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Salemade on January 29, 1970 is valid.

Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale. Thequestion, however, is whether these sales were made for a consideration. The trial courtand the Court of Appeals found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties

to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.

Indeed, it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals thatNatividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale.

All these convince the Court that Natividad had no means to pay for all the lots she

purportedly purchased from her parents. What is more, Romeos admission that he did

not pay for the transfer to him of lots 3 and 25-L despite the considerations stated in
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the deed of sale is a declaration against interest and must ring with resounding

truth. The question is, why should Natividad be treated any differently, i.e., with

consideration for the sale to her, when she is admittedly the closest to her parents and

the one staying with them and managing their affairs? It just seems without

reason. Anyway, the Court is convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale dated

January 29, 1970 (Exh. A or 1) is simulated for lack of consideration, andtherefore ineffective and void.[29]

In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals said:

Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of

Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 void and of no effect. In the case of Suntay vs.

Court of Appeals (251 SCRA 430 [1995]), the Supreme Court held that badges of

simulation make a deed of sale null and void since parties thereto enter into a

transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound.

It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to make simulated transfers

of ownership of real properties to their children in order to avoid the payment of

inheritance taxes. Per the testimony of Romeo, he acquired Lot 25-L from his parents

through a fictitious or simulated sale wherein no consideration was paid by him. He

even truthfully admitted that the sale of Lot 3 to him on 04 July 1969 (Deed of

Absolute Sale, Records, Vol. II, p. 453) likewise had no consideration. This document

was signed by the spouses Max, Sr. and Aurea as vendors while defendant-appellant

Natividad signed as witness.[30]

Fourth. Petitioners argue further:

The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970 is an indivisible contract founded

on an indivisible obligation. As such, it being indivisible, it can not be annulled by

only one of them. And since this suit was filed only by the estate of Maximino A.

Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete, the present suit must

fail. The estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. can not cause its annulment while its

validity is sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete.[31]

An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever

may be the nature of the thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to theprestation and not to the object thereof.[32]In the present case, the Deed of Sale ofJanuary 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to Natividad. The obligation isclearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts,otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are thereforemistaken in basing the indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors.

In any case, if petitioners only point is that the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone cannotcontest the validity of the Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been
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settled, the argument would nonetheless be without merit. The validity of the contractcan be questioned by anyone affected by it.[33]A void contract is inexistent from thebeginning. Hence, even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone contests the validity of thesale, the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all.

Fifth. As to the third-party complaint concerning Lot 3, we find that this has been

passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As Romeo admitted, noconsideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of Sale. Therefore, the salewas void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired ownership over theproperty because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being withoutconsideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six QuezonCity lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale infavor of Natividad because the latter was the only female and the only unmarriedmember of the family.[34]She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of hersiblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the

event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in herfavor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states:

There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that

although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have

no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation inaccordance with Art. 1061 which states:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into

the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from thedecedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous

title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each

heir, and in the account of the partition.

As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp.on April 20, 1979[35]will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocentpurchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. The rule is settled that everyperson dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificateof title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate

to determine the condition of the property.

[36]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T.

SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, pet i t ioners, vs. THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD,

ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTOS. LUGOD, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is a petition forcertiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correctorders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectivelypassing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromiseagreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval ofthe trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?

The Case

These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition forreview on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision [1]ofthe Court of Appeals[2]in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled thedecision[3]of the trial court[4]and which declared the compromise agreement

among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial courtsapproval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the

instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the

subsequent orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and SET

ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 14,

1992 is made PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated October 30,

1969 as modified by the memorandum of agreement of April 13, 1970 is

DECLARED valid and binding upon herein parties. And Special Proceedings

No. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.[5]

The Antecedent Facts
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The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:

[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses

Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents]

Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate

children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia.[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all

surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.

Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967,

[herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a

petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the

estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility

(Annex B, Petition).

On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as administratrix

of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal ofthe real and personal estate of her late mother (Annex C, Petition).

Before the administration proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 44-M could

formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private

respondent] Rosalias father, died on October 21, 1968.

On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition

for letters of administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the intestate estate of

Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia.[6]

On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and

[herein petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a

compromise agreement (Annex D, Petition) wherein they agreed to divide

the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.

On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court],

and took her oath as the administratrix of her fathers intestate estate.

On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require

administratrix, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24

hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement (Annex E, Petition).Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein

petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which

modified the compromise agreement (Annex F. Petition)

On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru

counsel, a motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a
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new inventory and to render an accounting over properties not included in the

compromise agreement (Annex G, Petition). They likewise filed a motion to

defer the approval of the compromise agreement (Annex H,Ibid), in which

they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of

fraud.

On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to

withdraw his appearance and the two motions he filed, Annex G and H

(Annex I, Petition).

On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein

private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her

administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof, which prompted [herein

private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex K,

Petition).

On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion tochange administratrix (Annex L, Petition) to which [herein private

respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (AnnexM,Ibid).

The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position

papers, which they did (Annexes N and O, Petition). On September 14,

1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his re-appearance as

counsel for (herein petitioners).

On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this time

presided by Judge Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June 26,

1991, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by

declaring and ordering:

1.That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under Special

Proceedings No.44-M consists of all her paraphernal properties and one-half (1/2) of

the conjugal properties which must be divided equally between Rosalia Sanchez de

Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;

2.That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No.1022 consists of all his capital properties, one-half (1/2) from the conjugal partnership

of gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special

Proceedings No. 44-M;

3.That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez shall be inherited

by his only legitimate daughter, Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod while the other one-half


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(1/2) shall be inherited and be divided equally by, between and among the six (6)

illegitimate children, namely: Patricia Alburo, Maria Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando

Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T.

Sanchez;

4.That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. Sanchez and MariaVillafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod

and Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967 are all declared simulated

and fictitious and must be subject to collation and partition among all heirs;

5.That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod is

hereby ordered to prepare a project of partition of the intestate estate of Juan C.

Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 and distribute and deliver to all heirs

their corresponding shares. If she fails to do so within the said thirty (30) days, then a

Board of Commissioners is hereby constituted, who are all entitled to honorarium and

per diems and other necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to be paid byAdministratrix Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the Community Environment and

Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog City as members thereof, with the

task to prepare the project of partition and deliver to all heirs their respective shares

within ninety (90) days from the finality of said decision;

6.That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, Administratrix Rosalia

Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby ordered to submit two (2) separate certified true and

correct accounting, one for the income of all the properties of the entire intestate

estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M, and another for the

properties of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings

No. 1022 duly both signed by her and both verified by a Certified Public Accountant

and distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters in equal

shares, one -half (1/2) of the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez from October

21, 1968 up to the finality of this decision;

7.For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash advances to the

illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez during their minority and hour of need from

the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which adversely prejudiced their

social standing and pursuit of college education, (the trial court) hereby orders Rosalia

Sanchez Vda. de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters the sum of

Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages, and also the

sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos for attorneys fees;

8.Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should appeal be made, the

Register of Deeds and Assessors of the Provinces and Cities where the properties of

Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are located, are all ordered to register and


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annotate in the title and/or tax declarations, the dispositive portion of this decision for

the protection of all heirs and all those who may be concerned.

SO ORDERED.

[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration datedJuly 17, 1991 (Annex P, Petition) on August 6, 1991.

On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and

opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalias motion for reconsideration

(Annex Q, Petition).

On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex S,

Petition) declaring, among other things, that the decision at issue had become

final and executory.

[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration ofsaid Omnibus Order (Annex T, Petition). Said [herein private respondent]

was allowed to file a memorandum in support of her motion (Annex V,

Petition).

On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalias motion forreconsideration (Annex W, Petition).[7]

Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appealsvia a petition for certiorari and contended:

I

The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.

II

The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.

Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible.

III

The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutionalrights of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and

Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale between

the said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without affording them

their day in court.

IV
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[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and

entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.

V

[The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugodsright to appeal.[8]

For claritys sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromiseagreement[9]of the parties:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their mutual

desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations between and amongthemselves, for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of good will

and fair play, and, for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement, agree to

the following:

1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21, 1968 was

legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who predeceased her on September

29, 1967, out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor herein, was born,

thus making her the sole and only surviving legitimate heir of her deceased parents;

2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children, Intervenors-Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;

(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at Cebu

City, Philippines, to Emilia Alburo;

(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9, 1937 at

Gingoog, Misamis Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to Alberta

Ramoso;

(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,

(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,

(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950,and
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(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of

wedlock to Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City, Philippines.

3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:

I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ

NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE

(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot

No. 1041 C-2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded

on the North by Lot Nos. 1033, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040,

1042 & 1043; South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087 & 1084; East

by Lot Nos. 1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954, 1038,

1057 & 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY

THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183,

672) sq. ms. more or less.

P21,690.00

II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA

VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ

(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No.

2745, C-7 located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the

North by Lot Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by

Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741, containing an area of FOURTEENTHOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700) sq. ms. more or less.

P1,900.0

0

(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No.

3271 C-7 located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on

the North by Lot No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by

Panyangan River & F. Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by

Samay Creek, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FOURTHOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more or less.

P11,580.00


2319, Case 2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the


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North by Lot No. 1061; South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No.

1044; and West by Lot No. 1041, containing an area of THREE

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (3,225) sq. ms. more

or less.

(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No.3272, C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and

bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan

River; South by Panyangan River; and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271,

containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED

(55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Damian Querubin.

P2.370.00


3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on theNorth by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272;

East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an

area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.

P61,680.00


3273, C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and

bounded on the North by Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East byPanyangan River; and West by Lot No. 3270, contaning an area of

THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms.

more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.

P3,880.00


2806, Case 7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the

North by Agayayan River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo

Ramoso; and West by Restituto Baol, contaning an area of SIXTHOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or

less.

P380.00


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1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the NW.,

by Lot No. 1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207; East by National Highway;

and West by Lot No. 1207; containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND

FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4,513) sq. ms. more or less.

P740.00


5554, located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded on

the North by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot

No. 5555; and West by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms.

more or less.

P320.00


5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and bounded

on the North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by

Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488, 3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496;

and West by Lot No. 5554, containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN

THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77,776) sq. ms.

more or less.

P1,350.00

(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No.

61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and bounded on the

North by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos.

63, and 62; West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE

THOUSAND FORTY TWO (1,042) sq. ms. more or less.

P9,320.00

(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5,Block 2, located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North

by Lot No. 4, block 2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6,

block 2, West by Subdivision Road, containing an area of FOUR

HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or less.

P12,240.00


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(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-

A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by

Lot No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-

Road; West by Lot No. 8, PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol,

containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more

or less.

P1,050.00

(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No.

5157-C-7, located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on

the North by Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep Bank; East

by NW, by Lot No. 5158, Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY

SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms. more or less.

P3,370.00

III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)

NATURE AND

DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL

1. Fifty (50) shares of stock

Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.

at P100.00 per

share P5,000.00

2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock

with San Miguel

Corporation 400.00

4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated properties in

the following manner, to wit:

(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro T. Sanchez,

Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez, inequal pro-indiviso shares, considering not only their respective areas but

also the improvements existing thereon, to wit:

Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot

No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and

bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot


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Nos. 3271 and 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by

Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY

THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. and

assessed in the sum of P61,680.00.

(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties, both real andpersonal, enumerated above with the exception of the following:

(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation,

indicated in San Miguel Corporation Stock Certificate No. 30217,

which two shares she is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;

(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2 together

with the improvements thereon and identified as parcel No. II-12,

lot covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13

in the above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7 togetherwith the improvements thereon, which is identified as parcel No.

II-14 of the above-enumeration of properties, which said Rosalia

S. Lugod is likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando

Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez,

in equal pro-indiviso shares;

5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez

hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally in form of advances after

October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED

THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS;

6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the indebtedness

of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria Villafranca Sanchez to

the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum ofP43,064.99;

7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and

inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their respective shares as may be

determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be responsible for

the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective shares;

8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez, Florida

Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive, relinquish and

renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner that is absolute and irrevocable, all

their rights and interests, share and participation which they have or might have in all

the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown and/or which may not be

listed herein, or in excess of the areas listed or mentioned herein, and/or which might


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have been, at one time or another, owned by, registered or placed in the name of either

of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which

either one or both might have sold, ceded, transferred, or donated to any person or

persons or entity and which parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify together with

all the improvements thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof, and

particularly of the properties, real and personal listed herein, as well as demandableobligations due to the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of

the aforementioned spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in

favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;

9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorneys fees shall be borne

respectively by the parties hereto;

10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children,

namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, hereby declare

that she has no right, interest, share and participation whatsoever in the estate left byJuan C. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or both, and that she likewise

waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share, participation or interest

therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod;

11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other any

whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected with, and as a result of Special

Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,

Rosalia S. Lugod, warranting that the parcel of land ceded to the other parties herein

contains 48 hectares and 36 acres.

12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to

Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93 representing the indebtedness of the

estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the advances made to

Rolando Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna all surnamed Sanchez, mentioned in

paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof and, to give effect to this Agreement, the parties hereto

agree to have letters of administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any

bond.

That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of the

parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately after thesigning of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree among themselves to

have the said lot subdivided and partitioned immediately in accordance with the

proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and intervenor and that in the

meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet effected, the administrations of

said parcel of land shall be vested jointly with Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of

petitioners and Maria Ramoso, one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each


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petitioner and intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural

harvest made thereon.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise

agreement be approved.

Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD

Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor

(Sgd.)

MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY:

Intervenor-Oppositor

(Sgd.)

ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES

R-101-Navarro Bldg.

(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St.

REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City

Gingoog City

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ

Petitioner Petitioner

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ

Petitioner Petitioner

(Sgd.)

LAURETA TAMPUS

For herself and as Guardian

Ad-Litem of the minors

Florida Mierly, Alfredo, andMyrna, all surnamed Sanchez

ASSISTED BY:

TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.

Counsel for Petitioners


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Cagayan de Oro City

The Clerk of Court

Court of First InstanceBranch III, Medina, Mis. Or.

Greetings:

Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the

Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)

PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L.

FERNANDEZ

The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the partiesentered into with the assistance of their counsel, amended the abovecompromise. (It will be reproduced later in our discussion of the second issueraised by the petitioners.)

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution [10]dated September 4, 1992, initiallydismissed private respondents petition. Acting, however, on a motion forreconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration datedSeptember 14, 1992 and September 25, 1992, respectively,[11]Respondent

Court thereafter reinstated private respondents petition in a resolution [12]datedOctober 14, 1992.

In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered itsassailed Decision granting the petition, setting aside the trial courts decisionand declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.

Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issues

In this appeal, petitioners invite the Courts attention to the followingissues:

I

The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition forcertiorari under

Rule 65 considering that the special civil action ofcertiorari may not be
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availed of as a substitute for an appeal and that, in any event, the grounds

invoked in the petition are merely alleged errors of judgment which can no

longer be done in view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had long

become final and executory.

IIPrescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the

decision of the lower court for the reason that a compromise agreement or

partition, as the court construed the same to be, executed by the parties on

October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been

approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably

repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.

III

The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of

facts of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of real properties madeby the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca just before their death

in favor of their daughter and grandchildren, private respondents herein, are

tainted with fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.

IV

In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower courts

declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of

annulment.

V

The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate

proceedings even as the lower court had not made a final and enforceable

distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C. Sanchez.

VI

Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at

least directing respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight

(8) hectares due petitioners under the compromise agreement and

memorandum of agreement, and in not further directing her to include in the

inventory properties conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower

court to be part of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez.[13]

The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, theyare hereby consolidated into three main issues specifically dealing with thefollowing subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Courtof Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the
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presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of theproperties sold.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

First Issue: Propriety of CertiorariBefore the Court of Appeals

Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinaryappeal within the reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of

Appeals erred in allowing private respondents recourse to Rule 65 of theRules of Court. They contend that private respondents invocation of certiorariwas procedurally defective.[14]They further argue that private respondents, intheir petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial courtwhich, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were notcorrectable by certiorari.[15]This Court disagrees.

Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitutefor a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists severalexceptions to this rule, viz.: (1) where the appeal does not constitute a

speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil.77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a singleproceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIBvs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orderswere also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept.231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as public welfare or publicpolicy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. -16598, May 31, 1961 and the casescited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidencefor the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People

vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity(Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where thedecision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter MemorialPark, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975).[16]Even in a casewhere the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ ofcertiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its

jurisdiction,[17]as in the present case.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/108947.htm#_edn14


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A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriateand allowable when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directedagainst a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law.[18]After a thorough review of the case atbar, we are convinced that all these requirements were met.

As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when itissued its assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in theintestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to itslimited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. [19]It ishornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, thequestion of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot

resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force toan intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.[20]In the instant case, the trialcourt rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds ofabsolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchezand Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia SanchezLugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod andRoberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered bythe said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the CivilCode, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finalitythe ownership of the properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly

overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:

[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate

Collation Cases Raw for Wills

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