Col. Rudel 1 - Interview at Anti-Tank Seminar Oct 1976

8/9/2019 Col. Rudel 1 - Interview at Anti-Tank Seminar Oct 1976

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NTIT NK W RF R

S MIN R

14 15

October

1976

ashington D.C.

T R A N S C R IP T


2/117

P RT

NGLISH T XT


3/117

P RT TR NSL TORS

M r P M Sp rey

i Tash

Capt

L 0

Rat ley I I I


4/117

NOTES

TO

THE READER

This;docxament

is

d iv ided

i n t o two p a r t s . The first

is a t r a n s c r i p t o f th e q ue st io ns

asked Col . Rudel and

th e

a n sw e r s

a ^

translated

f r om the

German a n s w e r s . Th e

s e c

ond

pa r t o f

th e

work i s

a

t r an s c r i p t only

o f th e

mate r ia l

t h a t was a sked

and answered

i n th e

German o r i g i n a l .

The re

a re s l i gh t

d i f f e r ence s

in

P RT

the t r an s l a t i on s as

ren

de r ed at t h e

c o n f e r e n c e and

PART II wh ich was t r a n s l a t e d

l a t e r

from a r e co rd i ng o f

th e

en t i r e con f e r en ce . If

th e

r eade r

has

a

pa r t i c u l a r

i n t e r e s t

in

any

a rea covered in

P RT I , he she shou ld

a l so

r e f e r to

th e

t r a n s l a t e d

Ger

man o r i g i n a l

in P RT

II The s l i g h t d i f f e r ence s a re due

t o th e l o s s o f a

c e r t a i n

po r t i o n

a t

th e German o r i g i n a l

du ri ng s imu lt an eou s t r an s l a t i on s as opposed to

no t

hav

ing

any

t ime l im i t when working with re co rd ed mater ia l .

Due to th e poo r q ua li ty o f th e

t ape

r ecorde r used ,

some

o f th e ma te r i a l

is

un i n t e l l i g i b l e

and is

so

in d ic ate d in

the text

11


5/117

V

BSTR CT

This document

is a transcript of a conference held

in Washington D.C.

on

14 15

October 1976 with various

representatives of

the

U.S. Armed

Services

and

Industry

and Colonel

Hans Ulrich

Rudel. Col. Rudel was the most

highly

decorated member

of

the

German Armed

Services

in

World

War Two.

Col. Rudel

was

a

JU 87

Stuka Lagtwai^e

pilot

and

his most notable achievement was the destruct

ion of

519

Soviet tanks with his JU 87 G Stuka

which

was fitted

with

two 37 mm

antitank cannons

The

U.S.

interest

in Col

Rudel

was

stimulated in

the

past

by

the situation confronting TO today of a

massive Warsaw Pact advantage in armored vehicles

especially tanks The information obtained

from Col.

Rudel at this conference

and

recent studies on air to

ground

antitank warfare tend to support the thesis

that a

tremendous

resevoir of information is available

from Laitiuaiie. antitank experience that is directly

applicable

to

the NATO/Warsaw Pact

situation in

Europe

t od y


6/117

TAPE I

SIDE

I

INTRODUCTION

CHAIRMAN:

I would like

to

introduce Capt Lon Ratley who

will give

a

brief

rundown of

the

war on

the

Eastern

Front as fought through the

German

eyes Capt

Lon

Ratley

is

assigned

to FIT

unintelligible , but he is going to

Postgraduate

School in

Monterey,

California

with the

Navy His

thesis

subject was Close Air Support and he

is

trying to draw analogies i think quite successfully

between

the

war

of the

MOs

and

the possible

war

in

the

near future;

or in

the next 10 to 15 years. In

his

research he did go to Germany he speaks fluent Geannan

and he

did

examine the

Archives

and spoke to German

Generals.

He was

fortunate

enough to be

able

to find

Col Rudel and spend a delightful time interviewing him

for

his

research paper.

i t

was the outgrowth of

that

effort

that has

led to

where

we are today.

What d

l ike to

do

is

have Capt. Ratley give a

brief overview of the war on the Eastern Front give you

background on Col Rudel himself, and then

we

will go

into a seminar session. In order to make

i t reasonable,

we will try to res t r ic t

the

participants

to those

people tha t

are

s i t t ing a t the table .

Then,

we wil l

go into the

question

and answer

period.

will

le t

the

topics flow

as they may.


7/117

T A P E I

S I D E

I

C o l .

R u d e l , I a s s u r e

you w i l l be

t r u e

t o h i s word.

H e l l

be c a n d i d

and

f r a n k w i t h

h i s answers and

when they

h u r t

a n d

a r e

n o t

q u i t e

wha t

we

w a n t

t o

h e a r ,

w e l l

be

f o r t u

n a t e enough

t o h e a r

th em anyway. Tha t

i s

t h e purpose

o f

t h i s m e e t i n g .

L e t me f o r my own e d i f i c a t i o n and f o r everybody

e l s e h e r e , g o a r o u n d t h e t a b l e a n d show C o l . R u d e l

w h o s

h e r e .

I

am

C o l . Bob

D i l g e r ;

I am t h e

D i r e c t o r o f A-10

Armament. To

my l e f t i s Gen. B r i l l . e i s t h e System

Program D i r e c t o r f o r t h e A-10 program . Next t o him

i s

Mr.

Wilson from

t h e O f f i c e o f

S t r a t e g i c

Research

CIA.

Close Air

Support

i s one o f t h e

prime

s u b j e c t s

they

are

l o o k i n g

at t h i s t i m e . Next t o

him is F r e d

F e e r who

h a s

w o r k e d w i t h

Peter in s o m e

related

a r e a s of c o n v e n t i o n a l

warfare M r . M ik e M e c c a is next He is

a

retired A i r

F o r c e

O f f i c e r , 105

d r i v e r

and now

v e r y

much i n v o l v e d i n

t h e A-10 program from a v i e w p o i n t o f

employment among

o t h e r

t h i n g s .

N e x t ,

Mr. F r e d F r e d e r i c k s o n . Mr. F r e d e r i c k -

son i s

formerly from I and Warfare o f

DDR E

e i s now

i n an

a n a l y s i s program

System P l a n n i n g Program. Next

t o

him is

Mr. Spirey- Mr

S p r a y

was f o r m e r l y i n t h e group

t h a t

i s

now

c a l l e d

ASI^A


8/117

TAPE I SIDE I

He

is

the

head

of

ASD/PA E Tac Ai^. Next

to

him

IS Bernie Bock, Deputy

Director

of

the

DDR E

General Purpose

Forces . Then, Gen. Smith, DCS Air Headquarters

Marine Corps.

Tom Turner is next. Vice President of Fair

child Industries. He also

vforks

for

Gen.

Brill.

Gen. McMullen, who is next was formerly Director of

the A-10 program and is now director of all requirements

for

TAC.

This is a new job for

him

and

we

in the A-10

are delighted that he is here. Next to

him

is Maj. Tash

who

will

help with

the

interpretation.

He

speaks

fluent

German.

i would like to find a seat for Mr.

Meyers

up

here at the table. Mr. chuck

Meyers

is from ddR B

A.ir

Warfare .

This

is

an unusual position to have at a

meeting like this but

he

recently took

over

responsi

i l i ty fo r th

A 10

So,

with

this I

would

like to turn the

meeting

over to Capt. Lon Ratley. He will give us a brief over

view

of the

War on

the Eastern Front and a

background

on

Col. Rudel for those of you that have not read his

book. Then

we

will go into seminar session.

CAPTAIN LON RATLEY:

Good morning gentlemen. i am Capt. Ratley. Col.

Dilger already explained

what

we

are

going to go

through

basically; a recap of the

campaign

on the Eastern Front

and

a

few

words about the German anti tank aircraft


9/117

T A P E I

S I D E

I

The code name for the German plan for the camptiign

against Russia was BARBAROSSA

Basical ly,

the plan

consisted

of

twelve

weeks;

three

weeks

for the

capture

o f

Smolensk,

three weeks

for resupply and r e s t

and

then

s ix weeks

t h e r e a f t e r would

be the

capture

of Moscow

There were 333 German tanks used i n t h i s campaign,

o p po si ng a p p ro x im a t e ly

22-24

th ou sa nd R u ss ia n t a n k s .

About 3 . 2

m i l l i o n German s o l d i e r s

and a b o u t 4 . 5

m i l l i o n

R u s s i a n t r o o p s l o c a te d i n Western USSR.

QUESTION:

By G e n e r a l

Brill

Were these

a l l

TlQtK67

Referring to

the German

t a n k s . )

A N S W E R :

No

s i r , there were

no a t t h a t time. They

were Panze^i I I I 6 and I l / 4 . L a t e r

i n

t h e war t h e Germans

used the PanthzA which was i n the 4 ton

class and

the

TIqzh. i n t h e 60 t o n c l a s s )

CAPTAIN

LON

RATLEY;

The

German execution of the campaign went

according

t o

p l a n ,

u n t i l

t h e c a p t u r e o f

Smolensk

which f e l l on 16

J u l y ,

1941, t h a t

i s

where

t h e i r d i f f i c u l t y s t a r t e d .

There

was

some

ques t ion

about

the

s t r a t e g i c

o b j e c t i v e s

o f

t h e

campaign . H i t l e r

d e c i d e d

t h a t ,

i n l i e u o f

dlmmediately g o i n g

f o r

t h e

rail

and communicat ion

c e n t e r

i n Moscow, he would a t t a c k

i n s t e a d

t o t h e South and

^


10/117

TAPE

I S I D E I

capture

large numbers

of diso rgan ized Soviet troops

in the Ukraine. This was quite a

successful

operation.

However when

they

shifted

the

weight

of

the

campaign

back t o

t h e

North t o Moscow, t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t

s t r e n g t h left t o

p e r m i t

t h e Germans t o

e f f e c t t h e

c a p t u r e

Moscow

p r i o r

t o

t h e o n s e t o f w i n t e r w e a t h e r

Through December

41,

these

figures you see here

are rough, but approximately

3

million Russian

POW s

17,500

Russian

tanks

destroyed, 2000 Russian a i r c r a f t

were destroyed t h e f i r s t day. I might add t h a t t h a t

figure i s

somewhat

suspect. The reported

1800

a i r c r a f t were destroyed.

Back

in headquarters

M a r s h a l l Goer ing a t t h e t ime

d i d n t

b e l i e v e them and

he

s e n t h i s own

s p e c i a l

p e o p l e o u t

t o

t h e f i e l d t o i n v e s t i

g a t e

Subsequent ly he d i s c o v e r e d

it

w a s n t 1800,

i t

was

in

fact

over

2000.

Basically

the winter

campaign

deter iorated to s t a t i c warfare. German

losses during

the

winter

were primari ly due to

t h e i r unpreparedness

fo r

winter;

as opposed to any offensive

act ion

by th e Sov ie ts .

There

were

excess ive command changes

on

the

German

side

because of

the f a i l u r e to

take

Moscow. Primari ly

udzfilo Vi

and Hotk

who

were

the

two pri me

architects

of

the

BlitzkJLlQ g

and armored

t a c t i c s

All t h r e e army group

commanders,

iVon l/on Bock, and l/ow Run6te.dt were

a ls o r e lie ve d

The summer o f f e n s i v e of

19 42 had

two primary o b j e c t i v e s ;

Stalingrad and the

o i l

f i e l d s a t

Baku on the

Caspian Sea.


11/117

T PE I

S IDE

I

The e x e c u t i o n

m isc a rrie d with

th e

fa i lure

to

hold

Stalingrad. Ninety percent of the city was captured by

the

Germans

but ten p ercent

was

not.

Subsequently

the Russians

moved in

and

were

successful

in

surrounding

Stalingrad

and caputring

the Sixth

Army. At

the

same

time

a

s p e c i a l rmy

Group

i t is d iff ic ult

to

see

from

this map but

Stalingrad is

here on

the

Volga rmy

Group A p e n e tr a te d down

here

by the C acus us M ou nt ai ns

a nd a dv an ce d patrols-even reached the C as pi an S ea . You

don t

see

this much

in History books but they did in

fac t

reach th e C as pian S ea .

I t i s

down in th is a r e a .

As

yo u

can s e e this extended

r ight

wing o f th e German

Army p u t them in an extremely precarious p o s i t i o n

because

t h e y

were n o t

a b l e

to

h o l d

S t a l i n g r a d .

At

this p o in t entered

Marshall

Von

Manstein.

He

wa s

s u c c e s s f u l

in

a

se r i es

o f

d e f e n s i v e

ba t t l e s

on

i t s

l e f t

wing

an d t h er ef o r e enabled

the

Germans to withdraw

Army Group A

back

to i t s

jumping

off

p o s i t i o n .

In

March

of

19 4

3 he successful ly c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d th e

Russians

in

Kharkov and

they

suffered a

severe

d e f e a t

there and

th e

in i t i a t ive

passed back

i nt o

German

hands.

This

le d to th e

German Summer

offensive

in

1943

a t

th e

battle

of Kursk. This was a Russian salient

that

pro

truded into

the German

l in es

around

the

city

of

Kursk.

I t was the Germans plan to

pinch off

th is sa lien t by

concentric attacks from the North and South.

The

planning


12/117

TAPE I SI I

for the campaign

was

c ha ra cte riz ed by a lot of deception

delays and differences of opinion. Von ansteinhad opted

for an i mmed ia te attack at Kursk before the onset of the

rainy

season

immediately

after the battle

of Kharkov

in

March. One thing led to another

and

the actual

offensive did

not start

until

July

1943. The allies

as

you know landed in Sicily on

the

12th

of

July and

Hitler called off the

offensive

a t Kursk

in

order to with

draw

the

Second SS Panzer Corps into Italy to counter

allied

landings. I t

is

generally

agreed

that

after

the

batt le of Kursk

any

possibil i t ies

for a

total

German

victory

on

the

Eastern Front disappeared. That is not

to imply that they

lost

the war there only that the war

could not

be

t o t a l l y won.

The

final

campaigns from 1943 to 45

basically

consisted of

a war

of

attrition

with

the

initiative

swing

ing to the Soviets

and

a gradual German defeat.

There

were no

spe c t a cu l a r

ba t t l e s a f t e r th e

ba t t l e o f

Kursk.

Field

commanders because

of

mistrust between major field

commanders and W

Headquarters

were

not given

enough

authori ty in the f ield to f ully exp lo it a l l of the

si tuat ions

that presented themselves.

For

example the defens ive

l ine

because

they

taught

them not one

step backwards

could

not be straightened so as to preclude

the

number

of

miles of front

tha t

any

given

division would have to defend.


13/117

TAPE I S^IDE I

There was

a l s o

a marked d et er io ra ti on i n

mobile warfare

because of

worn-out

equipment,

lack of fuel and

logistics

s u p p o r t .

A

little

b i t about

a n t i t a n k a i r c r a f t :

Two

were

primari ly used, the HS-129 and Stuka G Model

t h a t

Col.

Rudel

f lew. The HS-129

c a r r i e d

a 30

cannon

on a

center

l ine mount. The JU87 G

carried

two pod

mounted 37 cannons mounted o u t b o a r d from t h e main

landing gear . This i s a shot o f the HS-129. Of t h i s

particular

version

here, there

were

only

6

or

9

buil t ,

I m

not sure exact ly

which. This i s n t the

37,

t h i s i s the

75

cannon t h a t was used. This

p a r t i c u l a r

a i r c r a f t was

considered ponderous and

was

only used

fo r individual

tanks

t h a t

had broken through th e f r o n t and were a t h r e a t

t o th e

major a r e a s

t o t h e r e a r

of

t h e

German

d i v i s i o n s .

Today

we

a r e

p r i m a r i l y

concerned

with

t h e

Stuka,

You

can s e e a s t a n d a r d D Model h er e w i t h ou t t h e cannons .

It

i s

impor tant

t o note t h a t t h e Stuka was considered

in

1939

by

the

Germans t o

be an

a i r c r a f t

t h a t was

not

t o

modern s t a n d a r d s . It was

n o t

c o n s i d e r e d

a

modern

front l i n e

a i r c r a f t

by

the

Germans in 1939. Yet, i t

was used up

u n t i l

t h e

v e r y

end

o f

t h e war .

This i s

a

p i c t u r e of the G Model Staka with the individual cannons

mounted

here , each weighing about 1000 pounds and

each

carrying

(you can see

it

here) a

magazine o f.

s i x 37

r

s h e l l s e a c h . Col . Rudel had 2500 c e r t i f i e d s o r t i e s .


14/117

t p I SI E I

Twenty one

hundred

of

which were

with

the

and 4

Of

which

were

in the

FW-190.

A l i t t le background on Col.

Rduel:

he was

born

in

1916 in Silesia his father was an Evangelist Minister.

He

joined

the

Luitwaiiz

in 1936

going

into pilot training

subsequently posted to the Staka squadron

and

from there

he was tranferred to a reconaissance

squadron

and then back

to a Staka squadron. From there his first actual

bomb

dropping combat did

not

start until the Russian campaign

of

June

1941.

Thereafter

he

was

promoted

very

rapidly

ending the war as a Gzickuiad l commander which would be

roughtly equivalent to an augmented AF Wing today.

He

was primarily responsible for introducing the Stuka. with

the 37 cannons into operational use in Russia. His

tally on tanks was 519 that he personally destroyed. The

figure is

somewhat

misleading

because the

Germans

required

that the tank burn

and

also explode before

i t was

con

sidered a kill So roughly you

can

multiply that by a

factor of

two

or three to get a more realistic picture

of how many tanks Col.

Rudel

personally destroyed.

He

was decorated personally by Hitler with the

Knights

Cross

Golden Oak

Leaf

Swords

Diamonds

only

one of which was awarded to Col. Rudel. He is the

highest decorated

German

soldier

in

the 2nd World

War.

T ha t c on clu de s my por t ion


15/117

TAPE I

S IDE

I

CHAIRMAN:

Let

me

jus t add

a few comments to i t and

then

we

wil l

go

to the

seminar. I t

was

the Stuka

which was an important part

of the

concept tha t

was

to provide

mobile

f i re

power

to

the rap id advancing

forces

Even

though

the

Germans

were

out

numbered

for

exapmle in Russia

by a large magnitude

by lightning

tac t ics they were able

to

get

on the

edge of

s

cow in

a

mat ter o f

6

weeks or thereabouts

That

was

a 1200

mile

advance against overwhelming numerical superiority on

the o the r

s ide

The

th ing

t h a t Lon

d id

no t

mention

was t h a t

Colonel

Rudel

also

sunk

the larges t ship of the war by ai r

The

ba t t l e sh i p

MuKat He a l so sank a

c ru i s e r

The 2500 so r

t i e s as it turns ou t in the l a t t e r

part

of

the war when the

German

Luitujaiiz was enormously

outnumbered

in

the

a i r The

Soviets actually had a i r supremeacy for a l l pract ical

purposes.

The

tank ki l l s

that he had again did not

occur dur ing

the

early part of

the war

a t

a l l

His

tank

ki l ls occurred pri

marily

a f t e r th e in tr oduc tio n of the gun

on

the Stuka. And

i t was

over the l ively

debate

that

took place

within

the Luf

forces as to whether

tha t

one could even do

t h i s

so

Rudel was much

impressed

with the

accuracy of

a gun system

and

did the

basic

R

and

D

f lying .

He brought

it out to oper

a t iona l

l ines

and

introduced it

through a combination

o f

tac

t i c s He

came enormously success fu l in

h is

venture t he r e

So most o f the

k i l l s occurred

in the

l a t e r

pa r t o f the

war

almost a l l with the gun

system.

And they occurred under a

1


16/117

TAPE I

S I D E

I

situation that would be difficul t to comprehend from a view

point

of

numerical

superiority on

the opposite side

A

tank

kil l also

had to be verified by

another

person The tank had

to burn i t had to explode and another person had to

verify

i t .

Then you

had

a

tank

k i l l and not before

Two

or three

to me

i s

a conservat ive est imate

of

what really occurred

Now u n f o r t u n a t e l y I was o u t r a n k e d . So I c a n n o t be a

p a r t i c i p a n t

i n t h e seminar A l l I can

be

i s the

Chairman

I d l ike to throw i t open to questions and we will in terpret

to make

sure

Col

Rudel understands

the q uestio ns a s well

and

we wil l in terpret back

We

wil l go slowly

QUESTION:

Bob

1 6

l ike to ask

the

Colonel t h i s . Colonel in

add

i t ion to the tanks that

you

shot a t did

you

keep

a

record

of the trucks or

a r t i l l e r y

pieces

or dxther

vehicles

accompany

ing

the tanks o r did

you

not

even bother

to shoot a t them?

ANSWER :

Yes

he did both a t t a c k

and

keep some numeration

o f

t h e

things he shot a t . Unfortunately t h e s e records were

s t o l e n

from him

so they are

unavailable

to

anybody

r ight now He

c a n t account for a l l

of

them

but

d i d in f a c t

account

fo r

over

300

vehic les and

80

a r t t i - a i r c r a f t p o s i t i o n s t h a t

he

had

d e s t r o y e d .

QUESTION:

Almost

a l l

the k i l l s I

guess

were

in the Stuka

Now you

s a i d 37 ram 6 rounds p e r

magazine?


17/117

TAPE

I

S I D E

I

ANSWER:

Y e s sir

QUESTION:

So t h o s e were r e a l l y s i n g l e s h o t ?

ANSWER;

Yes

sir

I v e

a lr e a d y t a lk e d w i t h him a b o u t t h i s so I

c a n answer y o u r q u e s t i o n . U s u a l l y what he would do is

a t t a c k

f r o n s l a n t r a n g e o f

a b o u t

300 m e t e r s .

QUESTION:

U n i n t e l l i g i b l e )

ANSWER:

No he d f i r e two

simultaneously

e would

at tempt

to

f i r e

two

a t

the same t ime;

one

from

each gun

QUESTION:

Your

s l a n t r a n g e

was 200

m e t e r s ? L e t

h im

a n s w e r t h a t .

A N S W E R :

The

g u n s w e r e

h a r m o n i z e d

t o

s h o o t t 400 m e t e r s b u t C o l .

R u d e l

f o u n d it was difficult f o r h i m t o b e a s e x a c t a s he

wanted t o

be

i n o r d e r t o e f f e c t a k i l l

by

shoot ing a t those

r a n g e s . He

would

u s u a l l y go down t o

200

somet imes 100 o r 1 5 0 .

He

had t o b e v e r y

e x a c t

i n h i s

d e l i v e r i e s a n d h e h a d t o hit

t h e

tank

i n

a

v u l n e r a b l e

a r e a

where

t h e t un g st en - ca rb i d e c e nt e r

would p e n e t r a t e t h e f u e l o r ammunition s t o r a g e a r e a i n o r d e r

t o e f f e c t

a k i l l . e

c o u l d n t do t h i s a t f u r t h e r s l a n t range

b e c a u s e

o f t h e

a c c u r a c y .

Q U E S T I O N :

- 1 ^ -


18/117

TAPE I

3 IDE

I

ow given

you had a very short open

fire unintelligible)

what sort

of

ground a ir threat was

involved?

Was there org

anized arms

act ivi ty or, because of the dynamics of

the

s i t

ua t i o n ,

was

it nonex i s t en t ?

ANSWER:

When the Russian

tanks

would b re ak th ro ug h the

f ron t ,

as

with

any a t tack ,

the i r

l og i s t i c s

t ra in

would

become

somewhat

s t r a i n ed .

VtakpanzzA., the

guns

t h a t

a re

mounted on

a

tank

chass i s would f a l l behind the t anks .

Therefore ,

the problem

would

presen t

i t s e l f :

Tanks t ha t

had

broken,

through

the

f ron t

had t u r n e d

o u t was much

more difficult

o f

c o u r s e . . . a n d

h is a tta ck in g wi th h is

a i r c r a f t

would be c oo rd in at ed w it h o the r

a ir cr af t th a t

would at tack

the Vtak

pos i t ions

on the ground.

Also,

he would make multiple

passes a t the tank

unintelligible )

Gene ra lly s pe ak in g, the re

would

on ly be

one

i n i n t e l l i g i b l e

QUESTION:

What

so r t

o f a i r c r a f t

provided Zak

suppress ion?

ANSWER ;

There were two an t i - t ank squadrons in h is w ing. Pardon

me,

t h e r e

was

on ly one an t i - t ank f l i g h t o f a i r c r a f t , it was

ca l l ed a i r c r a f t un in te l l i g ib l e

a

very s t rong squadron o f

a i r c r a f t . What he would

do

i n an a t t a ck , the re would

be

o the r

Stuka

in

h is

wing

t h a t

normal

Stuka^

without

the

cannons

on,

would

bomb,

would a t t ack the

fZak

pos i t i ons through coordina ted

effort

QUESTION;

13


19/117

TAPE

I IDE I

Were these

bombs

(unintelligible)

ANSWER;

The Stuka.

would carry a

om

that

could

unintelligible)

and the

bombs

had a fuse

in

them

that was

set

at 50 cm at that

time, which would allow them to

explode above

the ground un

intelligible) , They

would

carry about a 4 pound om inside,

similar

to our Rockeye ,

QUESTION:

How long

un in te l l ig ib le

ANSWER:

Abou t 50

s e cond s .

QUESTION:

Would you ask him to give us a review of the attack pro

file, dive angle, air speed altitude, when he d generally try

to ro l l in ,

tha t

type of

thing?

ANSWER:

If

they

had

a cloud deck

of 200

meters and they

had

to

fly underneath that and then with a very relatively

flat

at

tack angle. They didn't take into account the height of the

clouds...When they were not paying attention

to, their

cloud

decks, then they would normally start between 800 and 1500

meters. They would circle around until they found the tank

itself. The problem

was

not actually shooting or killing

the tank, but i t was finding

the

tank. Being able to vis

ually

acquire their target, that

is

where

they spent

most of

their time. e added too

that

speed

was

poison f or finding

4


20/117

TA PE

I

S I D E

I

ta r^ .

Normally they

would

fly at 25

kilometers

but

when

they were

at

an angle of 2 to 3 degrees they would dive

I t would

be

about.. 320.

They had aerodynamic problems with

the aircraft. If you got

at

32 kilometers you d ge t ossi-

lations

Q U E S T I O N :

T his

was

o n l y the

cannon

a i rc ra f t ?

A N S W E R :

Yes

th i s was

f o r t h e

cannon. Th e

cannon

would

n o t f i re

accurately i f you went over

350.

The regular ai rcraf t would

g o

4 5 0

i n

a

d i v e .

Q U E S T I O N ;

Kilometers

per hour hou re talking

about?

A N S W E R ;

E ve r ything

i s in k ilo m ete rs p er h o u r.

The

cannon

i t s e l f was th e

c o n t r o l l i n g

fac tor . I t

wa s

def ina te ly th e

aerodynamics

of th e

c ann on w hic h

l i m i t e d t h e

airspeed. Normally thei r landing speed

was 180

an d

thei r

crusing was 250

Because

the cannon was the most important

thing they would

le t the

cannon control

a ll of the

speed.

was

th e th in g t h a t

act u al l y

k i l l e d

th e tank

so

every

t h i n g

e l s e

fell

to

th e

s i d e .

Q U E S T I O N ;

180 k i l o m e t e r s fo r

th i s l andi ng

w ith

the

a i r c ra f t . . .

with th e cannon un in te l l ig ib le

A N S W E R ;

15


21/117

TAPE I

S I D E

I

A b o u t 1 4 0

Q U E S T I O N :

Pierre

mentioned something about speed

is

poison?

A N S W E R :

Yes

there is ju st

a

l i t t l e phrase a t the

end

of

what he

was saying about that the essence is to find tanks nce you

find

them you can shoot them

with

a

reasonable

candor and

the phrase

he

used was that in finding tanks speed is poison

Q U E S T I O N :

C o u l d I q u o t e t h a t ?

A N S W E R :

Ask him it i s not my statement. L e t s not take i t out of

context

e

says

that

really speed is

absolutely catastrophic

and i t is a poison when you are

trying

to k i l l a tank because

yo u can

g e t

too f a s t You w i l l ov er shoot

th e

tank and then

y o u v e

w a s t e d y o u r

m i s s i o n .

Q U E S T I O N :

Before

Tom comes in

l e t s finish developing our

point.

General Smith

said

don t

quote

i t out

of

context.

advocate

low speeds for descrimination General Smith your point is

g o i n g t o b e

w h a t ?

A N S W E R :

You ve g ot to

take

the

whole warfare into context. In

other words i f you can t survive what surrounds you you are

not going

to survive the shoot.

Speed

is catastrophic

when

you a re t r y i n g to find something

an d

a

tank

i s n o t too much

6


22/117

TAPE I SIDE I

different

from

a truck.

If

you are in foliage the slower

you can go

certainly

improves your eyeball action capability

and then you ve got to keep in sight everything that is going

around

you

too.

ou

know

the equation balances out very

quickly;

what

is coming

at

you determines your speed

and if

y o u r e going

to

survive

th e

k i l l .

Q U E S T I O N ;

This is the

question that

I was going to ask. We ve

mentioned that they did try

Vlak

suppression but

we haven t

mentioned what other kinds of air defense flying

you

were

under

while

you

were

circling looking for tanks.

While

you

were flying 25 kilometers at a couple of hundred meters.

What about rifle

firing,

what about machine

gun firing,

what

about

a ll of th e other things that

you would encounter. ow

d id

y ou

avo id t he se?

A N S W E R ;

They

had

to deal

with everything

from

pistols

on up and

they had

soldiers

that had fallen on

their

backs

who

would

just

shoot

up into

the a ir and

when you had

100

soldiers in

front of the tanks or with the tanks

and you

just

had

to pass

through

i t

and you encountered

unintelligible).

e says

that he

often

had

3

or 4

hits

in the airplane

and

as long

as none

of

those

hi t s ,

a ll

calib ers,

as

long

as

none

of

those

hits were in the radiator, i t really wasn t a big problem.

U n in te l l i g ib l e ,

EN D TA P E I

S I D E

I

7


23/117

T A P E

I

S I D E

II

ANSWER CON T:

. . . u n t i l such time as

he

has through h is experience and

seat of the pants f eel i n g and he could see- the

s lant

range to

the

tank, he would r o l l out just for a second, stabilize his

platform and

fire

and then immediately

start

jinking again.

That 3 a very

important

point,

le t me

emphasize

that,

I went

over t h a t with Colonel Rudel,

He

says th a t h is

l ine

up time

from

wings level

until firing

with

the

cannon

was

between 1

and 1

1/2

seconds, and I believe t h a t s accurate because he

quotes for

bombing

3 to 4 seconds line up time for experienced

pilots.

He said,

however,

there

was no

way

you could

get

a

pilot out of ordinary training to be able to

hit

a tank with

only one second line up time. the other hand, he said i t

was absolutely

essential for

survival to hold i t down

to

that.

And of course, in an

airplane, that would

be

less

limited by

i ts cannons, you know that one second for cannons versus three

or four seconds for bombing^ in and of i t s e l f would be a

tr e

mendous

survival advantage.

Younger

p i l o t s , to continue

aug

menting what

Mr

Sprey said, had a lo t of difficulty because

they c ou ld n t, q uite

frankly, they couldn t

see

the same

slant

ranges

that

Col. Rudel could.

They

simply

didn t

have

the

experience and

hadn t

had enough practice

to

be

able to

roll

out

ju s t

momentarily and

le t

two rounds go and

st a rt

jinking again.

The

majority of the losses

that

they

had

with

the

antitank aircraft

were in a phase where

the pilot

would

roll out, track

th e target and then

fire.

I might add

that

just based

on

a conversation with Col.

Rudel

yesterday,

that

8

-.N


24/117

T A P E

I S IDE

you had

to

be very canny

in

working with

the

Russians

said o f t e n

he

would come i n t o

the

area^ a wooded a r e a an d

finally after making several

orbits

he would spot a

tank

and

then

he

said

something would just

not

look rig h t to

him i t would look

fishy

and so he would m y e wait ten

more minutes an d then he might spot a fZdk b a tte r y o r they

would

f i n a l l y

j u s t g et disgusted with waiting and they would

open up on him They would expend a ll of

their

munitions

tha t they

ha d a t th e

time

and

then

he could go in and at t ack

the

tank

a f t e r

the

enemy had expended

a ll

of

t h e i r

flak

a t

him.

I t i s very

i n d i v i d u a l

th e way

t h a t

a pi lo t i s

going

to

a t tack

t anks

He

r a t es

tha t

a s

a

v ery im p or ta nt f ac to r

in

surv iva l

in a d d i t i o n to th e t ac t i c s t ha t he

i s

ta lk ing

a b o u t .

T ha t se n se

fo r a t ac t i ca l s i tua t ion f o r t e l l i ng

when

t h e r e wa s

a fZak

t rap

se t up

and

when

t h e r e

w a s n t .

He

r e fe rs to

it

a s

j u s t i n tu i t ion

and

a lso

cons t an t

e x p o s u r e

to

get that sixth sense

i t

is

absolutely

essential to

be flying

every single day.

A few weeks away from

the front

you

lose

c o n t a c t

wi t h th e

si tuat ion

yo u l o s e

c o n t a c t w ith th e l a tes t

tac t ics o f th e enemy He

says

it i s very dangerous when yo u

come back af ter you ve been o u t o f

c o n t a c t

fo r a few weeks.

Q U E S T I O N :

He s a id he

t y p i cal l y operated

from 1500

meters

from th e

front?

A N S W E R :

No 1500 meters i n

c r u i s e al t i tude

9


25/117

TAPE

I

S I D E II

Q U E S T I O N :

Okay t h e n ho w t y p i c a l l y

ANSWER;

Your

q ue stio n a s

to

how

fa r

de pen de d o n

th e

par t icu la r

time o f

th e

war and where th e

ai r f ie ld

happened to be. I t

could be anywhere from 17 to 1 kilometers.

I t

i s impossible

to

say.

But he d e fi na te ly s tr es se s experience. I t was a very

important thing. That i s why i t was impossible for young people

to

survive

the

way he did because

they

did not have the exper

i e n c e

Q U E S T I O N :

One

other

ques t ion

a l o n g t ha t same

l i n e

when he arr ived

in

target

area

I assume t hat he had no problem finding a

target

a re a w a s th ere any c o n t r o l

at

all o v e r th e A ir F o r c e l i k e to

da y with a i r b o r n e

a ir

cont rol lers

and

so for th o r

d id

he have

to be

b r o u g h t

in

by ex te rna l means?

A N S W E R ;

He

s tr e ss e s p a r ti cu l a rl y experience. With

th e young

pi lo t

the ai rcraf t

f l y s

the

pi lo t With the very

expereinced pi lot

i t is the p i l o t t h a t is flying

the

machine.

says t h a t he

pract ical ly

s lept in his machine.

He d

be going from

3

i n th e

morning

unt i l ei g h t o r

nine

in

the

evening.

He was

constantly

with

the

m a c h i n e

i t s e l f

an d

it was

th e

f a c t

t h a t

he had

t o t a l

cont ro l o v e r

h is a i r c r a f t

t ha t

made

the b ig di f fe rence

C H A I R M A N :

Excuse me fo r j u s t a m i n u t e . We ve been g o i n g for o ne

2


26/117

TAPE I SIDE

II

hour now Suppose we take a 15 minute break. We ve

only

scratched the surface of

Mr. Christie s

question. I don t

know

the size of the flights I

don t

know the

tactics

en

volved. I

don t

know

the coordination of the captain.

We

will open up session with those kind of questions. Did he

rendezvous how was

i t

controlled

how

did they get there

how d id they ge t back?

I N TERM I S S I O N

CHAIRMAN:

I

appreciate

the p atien ce

of

everybody

a t

this

time.

have

made a few changes. One is that Ive

asked

here

because he speaks fluent Geirman

Mr

Sprey to sit up here

so that

we

get

the full

impact

of

what

is

being

translated.

I t

is

easy

to

lose some

of

what

is

being translated. Sec

ondly there

was a suggestion made and I concur t h a t what

we Qught to do i s set up a random shotgun b la st in g r at he r

than

questions

t h a t

bounce l l

around to ll

kinds of is

sues

th t we ta k e phases o f

th e

problem and we res t r i t

questions

to

you

know

l i ke command

and

control

o r

whatever

one

t a

time

and

st a y with it unt i l

we have

exhausted it

to

our

satisfaction

then

press

on to the

next topic

area.

There

was

one other

thing

they have to have the tape

re

corder

down

here

to get

a

better

pick up and

they

have

asked

me

to ask everybody to speak up when they ask

the

questions so

th t it i s picked up

an d

i f

not

fo r me to

repeat the questions to make sure th at i t is

picked

up

2


27/117

T A P E

I S I D E II

o n t h e r e c o r d e r

Q U E S T I O N :

What a r e

you going t o do w i t h t h e t a p e ?

Q U E S T I O N :

Who s d o i n g th e ta p in g ?

B i l l

McLaurin

A N S W E R ;

Yes i f

I may

B i l l McLaurin

i s a

p r o f e s s i o n a l

jour

n a l i s t .

th o u g h t

it

m i g h t be v e r y good

i f he

wro t e a

pie c e

on how he

se e s

th e

discussion then pa ss

it around to

the

p e o p l e wh o

w e r e h e r e t o

make

s u r e

it was a t r u t h f u l r e f l e c t i o n

o f

Col.

Rude l s

comments.

That was th e

i d e a

to

g e t

a profes

sional jo u rn alist

so to

speak to give

an interpretation.

C H A I R M A N :

L e t

me

make

an o b s e r v a t i o n it i s a v e i w p o i n t o f

mine

an d

I

d o n t

know i f

it

i s held by

anybody e l s e ,

bu t

Col. Rudel

h a s

had

enormous

e x p e r i e n c e , b u t

i n

a

d i f f e r e n t

e r a

u n d e r

d i f

f e r e n t

c o n d i t i o n s an d

d i f f e r e n t t i m e s and I t h i n k it i s incum

b e n t

u p o n u s

wh o

h a v e

some i n f l u e n c e

o n t h i s e r a o n t h i s t i m e

t h a t we l i s t e n t o

t h e

h i s t o r y a s it w ere and we a r e

e a c h

r e s

ponsible for how

well

t ha t t ra n sl at es

into

t o d a y s world.

I t

may

n o t t r a n s l a t e

a t a l l o r

it

m i g h t

be

a lm o st

100 p e r c e n t

t r a n s l a t e a b l e with each o f

u s .

a r e not

he re

to

q u a r r e l

with

what

happened 3 years

ago

we a re

here

to

find

out what

happened

30 y e a r s a g o .

With

t h a t ,

I d

l i k e t o

p i c k up

w i t h where Mr C h r i s t i e s

q u e s t i o n dropped o f f . T h a t i s , we a r e

t r y i n g

to b u i l d th e


28/117

TAPE I 3IDE

II

scenario that took place more or less typically

and

I guess

when you really get

down

to it, there is no such thing as a

typical mission Questions like

how many

people flew in the

flight?

as

i t

a flight of one a

flight

of two or

was i t

squadron

size.

Did he meet up with cover, was

that

standard?

ow did he support his organization?

as

i t controlled

by

ground controllers? Those kind of questions Neil can you

go ahead

and

start that off there and

that

will open i t up

ANSWER:

e

would

usually

go out

alone.

e

would

start

early.

ed be the f irst one out to reconnoite r the area. When the

report

was that there would only be ten tanks, that they

were looking for ten to 15 then he

would

be followed up

with a very small

flight

of usually about 12 sometimes only

six or seven of those

aircraft.

e added that

he would

fly

with a squadron

size

unintelligible ,

a normal squadron

was

12 to 16

aircraft,

but

because of

the

maintainance difficulties

and so

forth,

they could only

put six or

seven up

in the

air.

If

there

was a stronger enemy formation

of

artillery and

tanks and so

forth,

instead of

flying

a squadron

level,

they

would fly at a group level. Theoretically 27 aircraft , in

reality, 15 aircraft. gain they

would

fly in a unintelligible

QUESTION:

What sort of did they have with

the

top cover?

The

fighter

ircr f t

were

there

prior rendezvous

arrangements or

was

the cover against

the

Soviet opposi ti on?

3


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TAPE

I

S I D E II

ANSWER:

1 11 answer his

question,

bu t just

to

clear up any con--

f u s i o n , I ll

run

through t h e .

Q U E S T I O N :

I

w a n t

to

know

why y ou l aughed

A N S W E R :

Because he

said

t h a t

t h e i r

coiranunications,

normally

were

te le phonic

l a n d l i n e s tha t functioned par t o f th e time and

fun

ctioned part of

the

time not. So, that was one of

their pr o

blems.

The

levels

a t which

they

would work, would be

unint

elligible)

squadrons; smaller than our squadrons,

maybe

12 -

16

air cr af t .

From there, you would go

to

a G tappe which was

three

squadrons plus a

staff flight. rom

there you would go

to

a which was

three

G/iapen.

rom there,

you would

go

to

a LaitdZxjl^lon o r a Lu{tKoA.p^, which

would

be an a i^

division

or

Air

Corps, From

there,

to

a

Luitilottz

which would

be an a ir

f lee t i t

would be

j u s t the

level of command .

In

Col. Rudel*s c a s e , h i s

wing would

be

subordinated

to an

A ir

C o rp s , t h r o u g h

l a n d l i ne s

would

coordina te w i t h

c lose

a i r

support units l i ke

Col.Rudel s and with

fighter

uni t s. They

would

s e t

a

rendezcous point

and they would

supposedly meet

th eir

a ir

cover prior to going into

attacking

their

targets.

In

pract i ce,

Gol.Rudel s

support a i rc ra ft would arrive only

about one-half o f the time. There

would

be d i f f e r e n t excuses;

they would say they were

attacked

in route, they were engaged

e l s e w h e r e , the we a the r wa s

to o bad

and

so for th .

In R u s s i a

24


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TAPE

I

S I D E

II

German l ine a t

one

poin t and the Germans in to

the

Russians

l ine

at

another

point. I t was an extremely diff icul t

problem

for

him

to

discern

which

were

friendly

and

which were enemy

and,

of

course, that was

the big thing that occupied his

time. I t was very diff icul t especially when

they

were

re

ceiving

Vlak,

because the

posit ions

on the ground

were

so

close

and the tendency would be t o i f

they^re flying

a-

round up

there

and

they s t a r t

get t ing shot

a t

they d say,

Well, we re get t ing shot a t

so

obv ious ly t hose

are

not

Ger

mans. In real i ty

it

wasn t the case because the

troops

were

so in te rmixed

so in terwoven

with one another on th e

ground.

said

that

he

had to sometimes

make

as

many

as

five or six

passes for

identification

alone (unintelligible).

QUESTION;

Were there cases o f

complaints

o f

inexperienced Stuka

pilots

shooting

up

f i rendly, as

happened

to us,

was tha t a

c o n s t a n t

prob lem

or

ANSWER:

This,

of

course,

occurred, but one did not see i t very

of t en

It

happened to Col. Rudel on

one

occas ion . It was th e

regulation

in

his wing that none

of the

pilots in

his

wing

could

drop ord inance

any

closer

than he,

himself,

per sona lly d id

He also

said

tha t he control led when

they

bombed

a t a l l so

the l a s t

decis ion

before

bombing

was h i t

QUESTION:

I was thinking in par t icular i f the case of using

the

26


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TAPE I

S I D E

II

SJtuka G with

the

37 mm whether there were cases where

inexperienced

pilots

actually

shot

up

individual

German

armored

fighting units?

Germans

because

of misidentification

stress wha t e v e r

A N S W E R :

I t happened to Col. Rudel

personally. F ortunately the

bomb

m issed

and th e gu y jumped o u t o f th e tank and waved

a t

him.

I t

was a

Tiger

tank and the guy,

very

shocked and

frightened po ppe d o pen the hatch an d waved a t him

Q U E S T I O N :

Let s pursue t h a t a l i t t le

further

then.. .did they ever

have any ground

control-or

ground a ssis ta nc e in ta rg et id en ti

f ica t ion and what marking d e v i c e s would be used?

A N S W E R ;

He said t h a t in the Panzer divisions which you have to

remember

were

e l i t e

divis ions

they

had

O f f i c e r s

who were on

the ground in

tanks

with radios.

They were in

very close communication. There is probably

a

b e t t e r

way

to

i n t r o d u c e

th i s s u b j e c t .

Th e 1 4 t h

Panzer Division

had

one

Panzer l e f t a t

the time

of t h i s

incident

and

the

commanding

general of th e u n i t

t o l d

Col. Rudel t h a t he

was

going to

use

t h a t

t a n k

as

a

r ad io t ank

P u t

in h is

Lia ison

off icer He

took th e cannons

o u t

in order to g e t th e

radios

i n . He said that the conversation the exchange was f a r

m o r e impo r t an t

to

h im th an w heth er t h a t o n e P an zer co uld

shoot o r not. The

St LLk cii

gave him the

p o ssib ili ty o f attacking

27


33/117

TAPE I

S I D E II

targets

that

he

needed attacked

and obviously

with

vastly greater

f ire power

than

that

one

tank

could give

him That introduces the importance of t h i s l i a i s o n .

But

t h e

f a c t

t h a t

t h e r e were LuitmUe

Liaison

o f f i c e r s

mounted in

specia l

tanks had

radios

t h a t

were

on the a i r -

to ground frequency of

the

JU 87 and they were

in

constant

very close contact They announced what they needed done

what targets they needed

i f

they could pinpoint them they

would pinpoint them i f they only

kn w they

were taking

f i r e from a

certain

area they would ask them to

search

for

them. So

they were in

very

close tact ical contact

Col Rudel

says

t h a t if

they

had no t

had

t h a t

kind o f

arrangement t h e

war would have

been

over i n

1943

T h a t s

how

c r i t i c a l it

was

to

the overal l success of

t h i s

close

s u p p o r t

effort

QUESTIONS

own

to what level were these pat ro l

u n i t s ,

did he

tell

you? How

many?

ANSWER:

There

was one p e r

d i v i s i o n , so

t h a t would be

d i v i s i o n

level liaison

QUESTION:

U n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) Movement around the b a t t l e f i e ld i s

terr ibly confusing and diverse i t seems to

m

tha t they

obvious ly

c o u l d n t b e ev erywhere

a t once

28


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TAPE

I S I D E

II

A N S W E R :

You ve

g o t t o

remember

t h a t th e s e were small

divisions. They were more like

our

brigades. Somewhere

between o u r

b r i g a d e

l e v e l and d i v i s i o n

l e v e l .

This was, o f

c o u r s e , up to th e

d i v i s i o n

commander

where

to

put the

aptim ^ Liaison Officer)

but he was

normally to

be found a l l the way up

front

with

the

spearhead

of th e armored di vi si on and t h a t was

j u s t

th e a s s i s t a n c e

t h e y

g a v e

t h e

d i v i s i o n

c o m m a n d e r s .

NE W V O I C E ;

You know through, P e te , Tom it seems

to

me t h a t

when you

have

friendly

versus

enemy you

g e t

into a

large

mass o f tank b a t t l e s the th in g t h a t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e )

i s

going to be very

murky

u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) .

P e o p l e

is

t h e

w r o n g w o r d .

It i s going to be d i f f i c u l t

in

f a c t i f t h e r e

was

some

kind

o f marking c a p a b i l i t y to keep

tr a c k o f

w h a t s

out there

T h a t s

wh y it i s t o i m p o r t a n t t o

t r a i n

t h e f o r c e

b e f o r e

the bat tle s ta rt s

S o w h a t ?

So i m p o r t a n t to

t r a i n

th e f o r c e b e f o r e you

g e t in

t h a t

situation

Yeah

29


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TAPE

I S IDE

II

ANSWER:

In

add it ion to the Panzer

div i s ions

t he re

were

l i a i son

of f i ce r s with 2 other e l i t e groups. The

unin

t e l l i g i b l e

were

no t o rgan ic to

th e d iv i s i on

because

the re

were not enough of them to go around. In fac t

they

were

only a ss ig ned to div is ions

tha t

were

r ig h t in the

th ick of

it

Any divis ion t ha t

was

off

the l i ne or

j u s t

holding

or

something

t h ey pu ll e d th e Lia i son

Of f i c e r and

ass igned him to

th e

rep lacement d iv i s i on .

QUESTION;

What was

th e l i n e

o f

au thor i ty? Did these

l i a i s on

o f f i c e r s

have th e au tho r i ty to d i r e c t a i r c r a f t ? What was

t h e i r

au tho r i t y ?

ANSWER:

w

jus t

one

minute

f i r s t

answer the

previous quest ion

Yes

we

have

a

p r ev i ou s ques t i on

t h a t

has

no t

been

translated

And

th e q ue stio n was about

whether

or not

you

used

p i l o t s as t he se

forward

con t ro l l e r s

o r l i a i s on

o f f i c e r s .

ANSWER:

No there

were

no pi lo t s t ha t were used. They were

Officers who had

speical

t ra in ing one

year

schooling

fo r th i s par t icular chore tha t

they

were

doing.

They were

mostly used

j us t as l ia ison of f i ce r s .

They

did not have

any

command a uth ority o r anything. They would

inform

the a i r

uni t s

how th e d iv is io n was deployed on the

30


36/117

TAPE I

S I D E

II

b a t t l e f i e l d

where t h e y

w e r e

where

t h e f r i e n d l y

t r o o p s

were and

where

t h ey s us pe ct e d t h e enemies

were . e

d i d n t

have

any

command

a u t h o r i t y .

The

o r g a n i z a t i o n

c h a r t

would

have t h e

F l i e g e r A i r

D i v i s i o n o r A i r Corps

a s Col .

Rudel s

commander and h e

was

t h e o r e t i c a l l y

r e sp o n si b le t o him.

However b e c a u s e o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e

i n n o v a t i o n

and

p r e v i o u s

employment

he i n e f f e c t had a f r e e hand w i t h

o p e r a t i o n s . . .

t h a t was g i v e n

t o

o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e d l e a d e r s a l s o b u t o n l y

v er y e xp e r i e n c ed o n e s.

They

would

be

s e n t from one a r e a t o

a n o t h e r a s t h e need

a r o s e and t h a t would come from

h i g h e r

a u t h o r i t y .

But a s

f a r a s employment w i t h i n h i s

a r e a

t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e l e a s e

h i s bombs

was

left t o him b e c a u s e o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e

and

h i s

p r i o r

s u c c e s s .

e knew

more

t h a n h i s

commanders

knew and

t he y re co gn iz ed

it and

s a i d

i n e ff e c t you f a c t a

f r e e hand

i n

what

you

a r e

d o i n g .

S t a r t

o u t w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n .

What

was t h e q u e s t i o n ?

The q u e s t i o n was d i d o t h e r commanders were

t h e y

h e l d

responsib le to the higher

echelon o f

the

command th e

Air

D i v i s i o n s a n d A i r C o r p s ?

ANSWER:

C o l . R u d e l s a i d t h a t t h e r e

w e r e

a f e w o f

c o u r s e

if

t h e commander o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l wing o r g r o u p was a new

commander

then

t h e c o n t r o l t h a t th e

Air

Divis ion commander

would e x e r c i s e

would

o f c o u r s e

be much

more

s t r i n g e n t

t h a n

h e would

w i t h someone l i k e C o l Rudel

However b e c a u s e

o f

t h e

3


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TAPE

I S I D E II

core of experienced people t h a t they had a v a il a bl e f o r

commanders by

the

end of the

war

there were very, very few

wing

commanders

t h a t

had

t o

be

subordinated

to

the A ir

C o r p s

commander , i n

t h a t m a n n e r .

For the inexperienced squadron leaders

unintelligible ,

the

Flieger Corps l e v e l

the

Air Corps l e v e l

t o l d

them

e x a c t l y where

to

bomb o r gave them exa ct c o or di na te s and

they

had to bomb

there.

They

had

no freedom

of

action,

f o r t he i nexper ienced

people, and

they

bombed

there even

i f there were f r iendly t roops r i g h t

a t

those coordinates .

Col.

Rudel

came

back from a mission

and

he s a i d

t h a t

they

had not

destroyed a l l of the Russian

tanks

or

troops

in a particular

area

and he wanted to

return to

that

parti

c u l a r t a rg e t t o

f i n i s h

up, if t h e r e

was

a c o n f l i c t between

what he thought

and what

the

Air Corps commander

thought

tha t

the Air

orps commander had a more

important

target ,

the,

of

course. Col. Rudel

was

ordered

to

the

more

important

target

QUESTION:

I d

l i k e t o ask him a two p a r t

ques t ion .

Could he

g i v e

us a b r i e f

d e s c r i p t i o n

o f how he r e a ct e d t o an a i r

request,

where

did

it

come

from

and

how

did

it

actually

get

t o him. I n r e ad in g h i s book, I s e e t h a t

some

o f h i s m i s s i o n s

were

almost

on

his

own

i n i t i a t i v e .

He

went

out s o r t

of hunting

a s

a g a i n s t r e a c ti n g t o a r e q u e s t a s we

would

t o o u r own

t a c t i c a l

a i r

c o n t r o l

s y s t e m . Aid t h e n i n

t h o s e a r e a s t h a t

were

32


38/117

TAPE I SIDE II

within the range of

friendly

units did he ever have

coordination with the

artillery

that helped him soften

up

the

area

so

to

speak

in

suppression?

Did he

ever

use the a r t i l l e ry

ANSWER:

t would be

the

f ront d iv is ion commanders tha t

woul

place their

requests

and

m ny

times the

rmy requests

would be to 3 at a

time

Of course this would far

exceed

the assets

tha t

they had

END

OP

TAPE I

SIDE

II


39/117

T A P E II

S I D E

The f i n a l d e c i s i o n on

who

would

r e c e i v e

t h e h e l p

was

made by t h e A i r C o r p s . It a p p a r e n t l y

was

n e i t h e r

j o i n t conference o f d i v i s i o n commanders nor

h ig he r th an

A ir Corps The l a s t

d e c i s i o n ,

a f t e r r e ce iv in g th e

r e

q u e s t s

and

t h e reasons from t h e

d i v i s i o n

commanders

was

made

at

t h e

A i r Co rp s l e v e l

on who

would a c t u a l l y

r e c e i v e t h e

h e l p .

QUESTION:

Yes you

s a i d

something

u n i n t e l l i g i b l e )

c o n v e r s a t i o n


You

s a i d t h a t even

though

t h e r e were

u n i n t e l l i g i b l e )

o f t h o s e who were i s s u i n g t h e o r d e r s

and e x e c u t i n g

t h a t m i s s i o n

u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) t a c t i c a l

b a t t l e ,

w o u l d n t

t h e r e

b e

some

p r o c e s s

o f u p d at i n g


ANSWER:

It was c l e a r t h a t

German pilot g r o u p commander

squadron

commander

whatever w o u l d n t knowingly

a t t a c k

German

t r o o p s .

t h i n k

what

h e meant b e f o r e was t h a t

if t h e r e

was

some f r i e n d l i e s

you

c o u l d n t s e e

o n

t h e

ground t h e y

were o r d e r e d

t o

a t t a c k t h e r e and n a t u r a l l y

t h e y w o u l d .

T h e r e

w a s ,

t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,

s y s t e m o f u p d a t e ,

b u t

it

was so c o m p l i c a t e d

and

f l u i d t h e r e , t h a t it

se ldom

f u n c t i o n e d . It

was d e p e n d e n t

upon how f a r away

they

were

from th e c o n t r o l s ,

how f a r away

they

were

from

34


40/117

T A P E

S IDE

t h e i r ow n

base s ,

from

th e Corps I f they were 300

k i lome te r s

from

th e A ir

Corps t h e i r

rad ios

could

no t

func t ion a t t h a t d i s t ance ,

so it

had to

be

s t r i c t l y

a t th e

knowledge

o f

th e f l i g h t commander

as to

whether

o r no t

t hey

would a t t a c k . He s a i d

t h a t

th e German s o l d i e r s

on th e ground . . . , it was seldom

t h a t they would

have

t roub le

d i s c e r n ing which were t h e i r

own

s o l d i e r s , in

t h a t s it u a ti o n ,

because

o f t h e

PZak

o t h e r t h an , a s

we

s a id

be fo r e , when t hey were mixing i n one w ith a no th er.

But normally

the f tak

was

so

in tense

t ha t

t h ey . . . , an

inexper ienced man would say

t h a t th a t i s th e

place t h a t

normal ly

they

(un in te l l i g ib l e ) t h a t t h e r e

was

no t

g r e a t

d i f f i cu l t y

t e l l i n g w hich w ere

th e

f r i e nd l i e s

and

no t .

The

German

f r i end ly so l d i e r s would have

f l a r e s i gna l

they would u s e , so t h a t t h ey cou ld i d en t i fy themse lves .

I f

the

Siuk a6 w ere

to f ly

over

and

t he re

was

no

s i gna l ,

they would c i r c l e aga in .

Knowing th e c i r c l e ,

t h e i r own

t r oops would

use

th e

f l a r e

s ig n a l to

say we re

Ge rman , a n d don t bomb us.

QUESTION;

I d l i k e t o go back

to h is

f l i g h t

c on t r o l .

He in

d i c a t ed

t h a t

th e

first

s h o t ou t o f th e b a r r e l in th e day

t ime was h i s . Look a t th e s i t u a t i o n and t h en qu i t e

o f t e n

it wound up wi th a dd it io na l a irp la ne s in

th e

f l i g h t s .

C ould you g e t

th e

command

and

c on t r o l

t h a t

he exe rc i s ed

ove r h i s suppor t ing a i r

t h a t was d i r e c t l y i n suppor t o f

-35-


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T A P E II S IDE I

h im on a mi s s i o n ?

A N S W E R :

Yes

s i r Could

I

j u s t

h o l d

on it o n e se co n d to

answer the previous question the ar t i l l e ry

about well t ha t a l s o I meant about th e ident i f ica t ion

of the ground troops. They would fly down

of course

and m ke these

I.D.

passes and

then

when the troops on

the

ground

realized

that

they

were

trying to

clarify

the

si t u at i o n

they would

use

f l a r e s f l a r e

p i s t o l s to

clarify their

position.

Then from above Col Rudel

could look

down

an d

he

could see

a l l

the

l i g h t s

and

maybe he c o u ld make o u t

e x a c t l y

where

th e f ron t

was.

They would use d i f f er en t colors for

d i f f e r e n t

purposes

and h e would

know

exact ly

al o n g what

l ine t h e

f r iend l ies

a n d

th e

e n em i e s

And

e v e n apparent ly

inexper ienced commanders would

n o r m a l l y b e w arned o f f if they w e r e

abou t

to bomb

on

some coord ina te s

t h a t

w e r e four

h o u r s

o ld a n d

th e

f r iendly

t r o o p s

had

advanced

t oo meanwhile. Even

an in

experienced

commander

normally

i f they were shooting o ff

fery

pis to ls would

see

tha t

he

w a s n t

supposed

to

bomb

there.

I f

he wasn t too r i g i d then apparently

they

would

l e t him move

h is coordina tes

fo rw a rd bomb fo rw a rd .

Apparently

tha t was

an

inform al arrangement s t r i c t ly

speaking

he

was

supposed to bomb th e c oo rd in at es . B ut

6


42/117

T A P E II S I D E I

a pp are ntly th e system was f l e x i b l e

enough t o

allow

him

t o

shift h i s c o o r d i n a t e s

f o r w a r d .

The

remark

t h a t yo u made about

giving

away posi t i ons,

s i r , by th e l i g h t i n g and by f l a r e s ; he

c o l . Rudel)

said

t h a t the Germans were concerned

about

having

friendly

o s

dropped on them and they would constantly l i g h t

t h e i r own

p o s i t i o n s t o

a v o i d t h i s s i t u a t i o n .

There wa s

no such th in g as a s e c r e t as to where they were. The

G e r m a n s

a l w a y s

knew w h e r e t h e R u s s i a n s o l d i e r s w e r e a n d

t h e R u s s i a n s

always

knew

where

t h e German

s o l d i e r s were.

So, it

was

not

a

problem o f giving

away

t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . . .

it was already known I t wa s more

important

to them and

to t h e i r own s a f e t y t h a t the y i d e n t i f y them selves,

which they would do c o n s t a n t l y , with

th e

Stukoi > so t h a t

t h e y w o u l d n o t g e t t h e i r ow n b o m b s .

To

answer y o u r

q u e s t i o n

a b o u t

t h e

a r t i l l e r y :

Th e

a r t i l l e r y was used only f o r

s p o t t i n g . They d

drop a

s h e l l u n in t e ll ig ib l e ) .

They

w o u l d n t

b e u s e d t o s o f t e n

u p a n

a r e a o r t o

t r y

t o d e s t r o y

s o m e

o f t h e

R u s s i a n

u n i t s . .

s u p p r e s s i o n ?

T he

a r t i l l e r y

d i d n t

h a v e

enough

m u n i t i o n s t o w a s t e

them t h a t way. N ot

t h a t

t h e y d

b e

w a s t e d , b u t

t h e r e w e r e

o t h e r

t a r g e t s o f h ig h e r

p r i o r i t y t h a t

t h e y . . . ,

Yo u s e e , t h e y w e r e o p e r a t i n g on

a

c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t

t o n n a g e s c a l e t h a n t h e U . S .

d i v i s i o n s .

A U . S . d i v i s i o n

g o t such h i g h e r

a r t i l l e r y tonnages t h a t t h e y

could a f f o r d

37


43/117

TAPE

II S IDE I

to

do

t h a t

type

o f

t h ing .

There

was

very

little

mass

a r t i l l e ry

anywhere

on

the

Russian f ron t , because they

were so

t i g h t

on

a r t i l l e r y .

Our idea

o f

a r t i l l e r y

pre

para t ion , by th e

Germans

was

r e l a t ive ly

r a r e .

CHAIRMAN:

I

t h ink we

can t ake a break

now.

I propose , i t * s

qu a r t e r

to

twe l ve r i g h t

now

t h a t

we

t a k e a f i f t e e n

minute b reak , r e t u rn

at

12 :00 , go fo r

ano t h e r

hou r

and

t hen a t 1:00 we l l

ad journ

fo r lunch-

This paper t h a t s hopeful ly

going

around; if you

would

I

would r ea l ly

l ike

you a l l to s ign up with

your

address and when

we h av e some th in g t h a t resembles minutes

ou t of t h i s ,

we l l

send them to

you

fo r your in format ion .

It s

s t a r t ed

ou t ,

it h a s n t

gone

too

f a r .

So

if each of

you would p lea se s ign we l l t r y to

t ake

c a re o f

t h a t

ad

ministrative detail

AFTER BREAK MR. TURNER

Can

I

make

a po i n t ? The

comment

t h a t I

made abou t

th e

j ou rna l i s t ; He

i s

a j ou rna l i s t

by

background bu t

t h i s

repo r t

i s s tr i c t l y

fo r

i n t e rna l

use

and

no t

fo r

the

pres s , fo r

anybody

who may be misled by

t h a t

comment.

QUESTION;

I n te rn a l to

what?

Exp la in i n t e r n a l

ANSWER;

To t h i s g roup .


44/117

T A P E

S I D E

QUESTION

H e s maki ng t h i s t a p e s o t h a t t h i s g ro u p c a n h e a r

it?

A N S W E R :

N o s o t h a t we c a n p u t o n e r e p o r t t o g e t h e r

t h a t s

not biased.

Q U E S T I O N ;

T h a t s

a n

i n t e r n a l t a p e ?

A N S W E R :

Yes.

Q U E S T I O N :

C o n t r o l l e d b y y o u ?

A N S W E R :

Correct.

Q U E S T I O N ;

T h a t s

g o i n g

t o

b e

u s e d

t o

c r o s s

c h e c k

t h e

m i n u t e s .

A N S W E R ;

That s correct.

C H A I R M A N ;

S p e c i f i c a l l y

w

w a n t t o a v o i d an y k i n d o f a n

i m p l i

c a t i o n

t h a t s o u n d s

like ...

a n d

t h a t

w as

t h e

g r o u n d

r u l e s

t h a t Tom

a n d

h a d t a l k e d a b o u t .

W e r e

g o i n g t o l i v e b y

t h o s e a n d w e d l i k e yo u all t o

d o

t h e

s a m e .

Now w e r e h av in g l u n ch

at o n e

o c l o c k a n d we h a v e

r e s e r v e d s p a c e s

f o r

t w e n t y p e o p l e

it s

f l e x i b l e . F o r

t h o s e w h o w i s h

t o

sit

in

at l u n c h

t

will

b e

i n f o r m a l .

-39-


45/117


46/117

TAPE II

S IDE I

or as

f igh ter p i l o t s , it i s n ot p os sib le to do t h i s

mission. To do close support , the pi lo t s

have

to

be,

in

h is

term,

in fan t ry

o f th e

a i r .

QUESTION:

ow

did Col. Rudel

manage

the

a ir tha t

was

support

ing him indicated that quite often the

f i r s t

f l ight

o f th e day

was

th e p erso na l reconna isance of the a rea

and t hen subsequen tly a i r power was

applied.

Did he

hold

them from

th e

f i e l d s ? Did

he

mar sh a l l

them

so f a r from

where he

was? ow

d id

he c a l l

it

in ? I s

he

a un in t e l li

g i b l e

ANSWER:

The f i r s t pa r t of t h a t ques t ion was t h a t he would

go

ou t f i r s t , then

r e turn to

th e

base ,

because th e

o the r

p i l o t s would s leep longer than he would. This was

a

before dawn

f l igh t .

I t was a reconnaisance f l i gh t before

dawn. e would re tu rn and the o ther pi lo t s would

then be

ready having

got ten

up l a t e r than

he did

and they would

t ake

of f , usual ly in

group s t r eng th ,

which was,

as

we

have said before ,

about

14 or 15 a i rp lanes . Then he

would t a k e them

back

t o t h e a r e a

that

he

had

s e l e c t e d

and

presumedDly

b r i e f

the Air

Corps

l eve l

what

was

to

a t t ack . That would s t a r t

o ff

the f igh t ing day. With h is

normal

a i r c r a f t s t rength

being

36,

he

would only

be

able

to

put

14-15 a i r c r a f t in th e a i r and ready fo r f l i gh t .

4


47/117

T A P E S I D E I

QUESTION:

Was

t h e

r e a s o n f o r

t h i s b a t t l e damage

o r was t h i s

o n e o f t h e i r m a i n t e n a n c e p r o b l e m s ?

A N S W E R ;

T h e m a i n

r e a s o n

for that w a s m e c h a n i c a l . T h e i r

problems

were because an a i r c r a f t

i s

a

v e r y

t e c h n i c a l

machine a n d i n

o r d e r t o

m a i n t a i n t h a t a i r c r a f t p r o p e r l y

t h e y

could only

g e t a b o u t 1 / 3 o f

them

i n

t h e

a i r .

It

was

l e s s t h e

problem t h a t

t h e y

had been s h o t

a t .

Hal f

o f

t h e

a i r c r a f t were

s e v e r e l y

b a t t l e

damaged.

He h a s l o c a te d t h e m . .. I n t h e o r y h e h a d 36 a i r p l a n e s

a v a i l a b l e 27

on s t r e n g t h

and

r e s e r v e . The r e s e r v e s

were a lway s

intended t o be

i n maintenance .

I n

f a c t

he was a b l e t o o n l y p u t up 14 o r 1 5 n o r m a l l y .

Of

c o u r s e

t h e r e were days when h e d go a l o n e ; t h e r e

was

o n l y

one

a ir p l a n e a v a i l a b le .

e s a y s it was

n o t

s o

much

a

problem

o f

Col. Rudel 1 - Interview at Anti-Tank Seminar Oct 1976

Documents

Transcript of Col. Rudel 1 - Interview at Anti-Tank Seminar Oct 1976