Cognition and Emotion

November 12-19, 2009

What is emotion?• Communication mechanisms that maintain

social order/structure• Behavior learned through operant or classical

conditioning or nonassociative learning, not involving deliberate cognitive mediation

• Appraisal of biopsychosocial situation• Complex physiological response• Integrated, three-response system construct

– Motor behavior– Physiological activity/arousal– Cognitive appraisal

Areas of Inquiry• Effect of emotion on performance (e.g.,

memory, perception, attention)• Information processing characteristics of

emotional disorders (e.g., anxiety, depresion)

• Emotion and social learning • Cognitive neuroscience of emotions

– cognitive structure of emotion– neuropsychological studies– cognitive aspects of emotion (e.g., appraisal)

Introduction & History• James-Lange theory• Cannon-Bard theory• Schacter & Singer studies (2-factor theory)• Facial feedback hypothesis• Neurobiological contributions (Davis, LeDoux)• Neuropsychological perspectives

– Somatic markers– Emotional signal processing

• Information-processing theories

James-Lange• "My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the

perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, and angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect ... and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble ... Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or angry"

Cannon-Bard• We feel emotions first, and then feel

physiological changes, such as muscular tension, sweating, etc.

• In neurobiological terms, the thalamus receives a signal and relays this both to the amygdala (a limbic structure) and the cortex. The body then gets signals via the autonomic nervous system to tense muscles, etc.

Two-Factor Theory (e.g., Schacter & Singer)

• When trying to understand what kind of person we are, we first watch what we do and feel and then deduce our nature from this. This means that the first step is to experience physiological arousal. We then try to find a label to explain our feelings, usually by looking at what we are doing and what else is happening at the time of the arousal. Thus we don’t just feel angry, happy or whatever: we experience feelings and then decide what they mean.

Cognitive Appraisal Theory (e.g., Lazarus)

• In the absence of physiological arousal, we decide what to feel after interpreting or explaining what has just happened. Two things are important in this: whether we interpret the event as good or bad for us, and what we believe is the cause of the event.

• In primary appraisal, we consider how the situation affects our personal well-being. In secondary appraisal we consider how we might cope with the situation.

Somatic Marker Theory• Bodily states play a role in

decision-making and reasoning• “Somatic markers” link memories

of experience (cortex) with feelings (limbic)

• Attempts to account for ‘automatic’ or ‘unconscious’ biases

Personality Traits

Mood States

Emotional Processing

Personality Traits Mood States Emotional Processing

Mood States

Personality Traits

Emotional Processing

TRADITIONAL MODEL

MEDIATOR MODEL

MODERATOR MODEL

Fear Conditioning

Davis: Cortical influences on basic startle pathway

Davis: Role of the amygdala in conditioned fear

Amygdala activation in Anxiety disorders

LeDoux: direct thalamo-amygdala connections,

bypassing cortex

Preattentive Perception of Threat: Öhman

• Distinction between automatic v. controlled information processing

• Draws on animal work (LeDoux) - direct thalamic-amygdala connection

• Threat: biological and ‘derived’• Data:

– responses to masked stimuli– slowed RT to threat words in shadowing

Ohman’s Information-Processing Model for Fear and Anxiety

Emotion and Memory

“Bambi” (1942) named #20 in Time’s list of the Top 25 Horror Movies of All Time

“Kids were so frightened by these films that they wet themselves in terror. Bambi has a primal shock that still haunts oldsters who saw it 40, 50, 65 years ago.”

Flashbulb Memories• Distinct, vivid, recollections of shocking

events, and associated personal activities

• Long-lasting? Accurate? Special?– Brown & Kulick (1977): special encoding

mechanism (NOW PRINT!)– Niesser & Harsh (1992) Challenger study– Although FM appear to be different

subjectively (they provide an intersection between personal history and “History”), they are not necessarily more accurate

– Confidence is not equivalent to accuracy

Flashbulb Memories of September 11, 2001

• http://www.nyu.edu/about/video.spotlight.htmlhttp://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=632

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Weighted Accuracy Score

2 2.332.67 3 3.333.37 4 4.33 4.67 50

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Confidence Rating

Challenger Disaster Study (Neisser & Harsch, 1992)

Valence and Memory• Negative events remembered in

more vivid detail than positive events

• Positive events more associated with memory distortion and inconsistency

• Positive induced mood leads to greater “false memory”

Event Valence Affects Memory Consistency

Kensinger & Schacter, 2006

Neural Substrates of Positive (Fusiform) and Negative (frontal) rcollection; Amygdala active in both

Kensington & Schacter, 2006

Bower’s Network Theory – a theory of emotional

experience• Emotions are nodes in a semantic network• Emotions stored as propositions• Emotion = activation of network• Activation spreads in selective fashion to

associated concepts• When nodes activated above threshold level,

conscious experience of emotion results

Four Predictions from Bower’s Theory

• Mood-state-dependent recall• Mood congruity: learning best when

congruity between learner’s state and type of material (best supported)

• Thought congruity: thoughts, associations congruent with mood state

• Mood intensity: increases in intensity (arousal) lead to greater activation of network

Mood Effects on Attention and Memory

• Negative memory bias – found with depressed and anxious

normals–not consistently found with anxious

patients (active avoidance?)• Mood vs. emotion• Effects on processing capacity

(resources allocated to self-talk)

Emotion and Attention

Emotional Stroop

BOY BLOOD TABLE GASH NICE TREE PUSDOG ELBOW LACERATE RIVER GUTS CHURCH

GUILTY

CANDY

Basis of Dot Probe Results• Selective attention to threat

(McLeod)• Failure to ‘disengage’ attention

from threat (Koster, et al 2004)

Koster, et al (2004)

RT to N-N trials

Weapon Focus

Weapon Focus• Eyewitness’ inability to identify a

perpetrator when a weapon is used in a crime

• Easterbrook hypothesis: narrowing of attentional focus in emotional situations

• Arousal and central/peripheral detail

Basis of Weapon Focus?• Simple selective attention• All items attended to equally, but

weapon remembered better• Cue-utilization (threat-arousal-

narrowing)• Unusualness/distinctiveness• Effect sizes: lineup ident < feature

accuracy

Attention/Memory in Anxiety and Depression

Emotion and Performance• Performance impaired by high levels of state

anxiety– Yerkes-Dodson Law

• performance is optimal with a ‘medium’ level of arousal• ‘optimum’ level lower for hard tasks

– Cognitive Interference theory (Sarason): worry and self-preoccupation interfere

– Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck): processing efficiency = effectiveness/effort; worry reduces efficiency

• Performance in depression– impaired both by task-irrelevant information and poor

effort/motivation– most studies are of an anologue nature, though a few

patient studies are available

Anxiety and Attention• Selective attention toward threat-related

material (selective attentional bias; e.g. dot-probe, emotional Stroop)

• Distractibility ( attentional control)• Effects on breadth of attention (more local

spotlight)• Interpretive bias: interpreting ambiguous

materials as threatening (e.g., “The doctor examined little Emily’s growth”)

• Anxiety and preattentive processing

Depression• Little evidence for attentional bias in

depression• Interpretive/recall biases in depression

– Interpreting ambiguous situations as negative

– Reduced predictions of success on cognitive tasks

– Recall of past performance reduced

Siegle, 1999

Time Course of Attentional Bias in Depression

Siegle et al (2001)

Failure to Disengage from Negative Information in Dysphoric Patients (Koster, et al, Emotion, 2005)

CV=RT(invalid) – RT(valid)

Discrete v. Dimensional Theories of Emotion

Discrete Emotions Theory• Emotions are distinct and unique

states (e.g., fear, anger, etc.)• ‘Basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions -

Tomkins lists 8 (hap, sad, anger, fear disgust, surprise, interest, shame)

• Search for response patterning in emotions (Friesen, Ekman, etc.)

• Cross-cultural comparisons

Basic Elements of Discrete Emotions Theory

Bioinformational Theory (Lang)

• Emotions as action predispositions• Dimensional view of emotions

– affective valence (appetitive-aversive dimension)

– arousal (resource recruitement)• Link between emotional and

motivational behavior

Activation v. Approach/Withdrawal

Activation v. Valence

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Discrete v. Dimensional Models (Christie, 2002)

Neuropsychological Findings

• Neuropsychological studies of affective competence (RHD)

• “Modular” organization of affective systems (?)

• Modality-independent affective lexicon• Valence-related asymmetries

Emotion and the Brain: Three General Hypotheses• Right Hemisphere dominance for

emotion• Hemispheric laterality for mood

– Positive/approach: left hemisphere– Negative/withdrawal: right

hemisphere• Automatic-controlled distinction

(RH v. LH

Negative - Neutral Positive - Neutral

Localized “Damage” and Emotion

• Awakening from WADA– Right Hemisphere: crying, anxiety– Left Hemisphere: laughing,

excitement• Acute Structural Lesion (stroke)

– Right Hemisphere: indifference, ?secondary mania

– Left Hemisphere: depression (frontal)

Neuropsychiatric Disorders• Depression• Secondary Mania• OCD• Anxiety• Aggression/disinhibition• Psychopathy/APD

Neuropsychological Manifestations of Frontal Lobe Lesions IIInferior Mesial RegionA) Orbital Region (10, 11)Lesions in this region produce disinhibition, altered social conduct, “acquired sociopathy”, and other disturbances due to impairment in fronto-limbic relationshipsB) Basal Forebrain (posterior extension of inferior mesial region, including diagonal band of Broca, nucleus accumbens, septal nuclei, substantia innominata)Lesions here produce prominent anterograde amnesia with confabulation (material specificity present, but relatively weak)

Tranel, 1992

Neuropsychological Manifestations of Frontal Lobe Lesions IIILateral Prefrontal Region (8,9,46)Lesions in this region produce impairment in a variety of “executive” skills that cut across domains. Some degree of material-specificity is present, but relatively weak.A) Fluency: impaired verbal fluency (left) or design fluency (right)B) Memory impairments: defective recency judgment, metamemory defects, difficulties in memory monitoringC) Impaired abstract concept formation and hypothesis testingD) Defective planning, motor sequencingE) Defective cognitive judgement and estimation

Tranel, 1992

Neuropsychological Manifestations of Frontal Lesions IFrontal Operculum (44,45,47)A) Left: Broca’s aphasiaB) Right: ‘expressive’ aprosodiaSuperior Mesial (mesial 6, 24)A) Left: akinetic mutismB) Right: akinetic mutism

Bilateral lesions of mesial SMA (6) and anterior cingulate (24) produce more severe form of akinetic mutism

Tranel, 1992

Phineas Gage(1823-1861, accident in 1848)

Phineas Gage’s lesion reconstructed(H. Damasio and R. Frank, 1992)

Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex and Somatic Markers

• Somatic marker “biasing signals” are regulated by VM premotor cortex; these signals help regulate decision-making in uncertainty

• Support from Iowa Gambling Task; anticipatory SCR’s to selection of “unfavorable” decks– Impaired in VMPFC

Iowa Gambling Task

Actual Body Actions Expected Body Actions(Internal Model)

Problems with SMT• Assertion that IGT preferences

formed “implicitly” is untenable• Meaning of psychophsyiological

response is unclear (response to feedback, risk indicator, post-decision emotion reaction)

• Not all “normal controls” are normal

(Dunn et al., Neurosci Biobehav Reviews, 2006, 30, 239-271)

Mirror Neuron System• Class of neurons in F5 (BA 44) and ventral premotor

cortex that discharge both:– when animal performs object-directed action– when animal observes OD action in others

• Subset appear to be “communicative” motor neurons• Functions

– Imitation– Action understanding

• Potentially important for understanding social learning and imitation effects

• Being investigated in social-emotional impairments such as autism, Asperger’s disorder, and schizophrenia

• May be important in “empathy”

Action Vision – Mirror Neuron System

Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004

Mirror Neuron Responses to Action Observation (Umiltá, 2001)

Full view (a,c)

Obstructed view (b,d)

Cortical-Subcortical Interactions in Emotion

• General concept of limbic system as “emotional effector”

• Question is, “what is the limbic system?”

• Regulatory interaction between cortex and subcortical structures

• Gating• Selective engagement

General Organization of Frontal cortical-striatal-pallidal-thalamic-

cortical loops

Blumenfeld, 2002

Orbitofrontal Loop• Involved in social

and emotional functioning

• Damage produces:– Disinhibition– Hyperactivity– Emotional lability– Aggressiveness– Reduced self-

awareness