Coalitional Games with Interval-Type Payoffs: A Survey
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Transcript of Coalitional Games with Interval-Type Payoffs: A Survey
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative Game Theory. Operations ResearchGames. Applications to Interval Games
Lecture 6: Coalitional Games with Interval-Type Payoffs: ASurvey
Sırma Zeynep Alparslan GokSuleyman Demirel University
Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Department of Mathematics
Isparta, Turkey
email:[email protected]
August 13-16, 2011
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Outline
Introduction
Cooperative interval games
Classes of cooperative interval games
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Handling interval solutions
Final remarks and outlook
References
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Introduction
I This lecture is based on the book
Cooperative Interval Games: Theory and Applications
by Alparslan Gok published by
Lambert Academic Publishing (LAP).
I For more information please see:http://www.morebooks.de/store/gb/book/cooperative-interval-games/isbn/978-3-8383-3430-1
The book is the PhD thesis of Alparslan Gok entitled
Cooperative interval games
from Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Motivation
Game theory:
I Mathematical theory dealing with models of conflict andcooperation.
I Many interactions with economics and with other areas suchas Operations Research (OR) and social sciences.
I Tries to come up with fair divisions.
I A young field of study:The start is considered to be the book Theory of Games andEconomic Behaviour by von Neumann and Morgernstern(1944).
I Two parts: non-cooperative and cooperative.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Motivation continued...
I Cooperative game theory deals with coalitions whichcoordinate their actions and pool their winnings.
I The main problem: How to divide the rewards or costs amongthe members of the formed coalition?
I Generally, the situations are considered from a deterministicpoint of view.
I Basic models in which probability and stochastic theory play arole are: chance-constrained games and cooperative gameswith stochastic/random payoffs.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Motivation continued...
Idea of interval approach:
I In most economic and OR situations rewards/costs are notprecise.
I Possible to estimate the intervals to which rewards/costsbelong.
Why cooperative interval games are important?
I Useful for modeling real-life situations.
Aim: generalize the classical theory to intervals and apply it toeconomic situations and OR situations.
I In this study, rewards/costs taken into account are notrandom variables, but just closed and bounded intervals ofreal numbers with no probability distribution attached.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Interval calculus
I (R): the set of all closed and bounded intervals in RI , J ∈ I (R), I =
[I , I], J =
[J, J], |I | = I − I , α ∈ R+
I addition: I + J =[I + J, I + J
]I multiplication: αI =
[αI , αI
]I subtraction: defined only if |I | ≥ |J|
I − J =[I − J, I − J
]I weakly better than: I < J if and only if I ≥ J and I ≥ J
I I 4 J if and only if I ≤ J and I ≤ J
I better than: I � J if and only if I < J and I 6= J
I I ≺ J if and only if I 4 J and I 6= J
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative interval games
Classical cooperative games versus cooperative intervalgames
I < N, v >, N := {1, 2, ..., n}: set of players
I v : 2N → R: characteristic function, v(∅) = 0
I v(S): worth (or value) of coalition S
GN : the class of all coalitional games with player set N
I < N,w >, N: set of players
I w : 2N → I (R): characteristic function, w(∅) = [0, 0]
I w(S) = [w(S),w(S)]: worth (value) of S
IGN : the class of all interval games with player set NExample (LLR-game): Let < N,w > be an interval game withw({1, 3}) = w({2, 3}) = w(N) = J < [0, 0] and w(S) = [0, 0]otherwise.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative interval games
Arithmetic of interval games
w1,w2 ∈ IGN , λ ∈ R+, for each S ∈ 2N
I w1 4 w2 if w1(S) 4 w2(S)
I < N,w1 + w2 > is defined by (w1 + w2)(S) = w1(S) + w2(S).
I < N, λw > is defined by (λw)(S) = λ · w(S).
I Let w1,w2 ∈ IGN such that |w1(S)| ≥ |w2(S)| for eachS ∈ 2N . Then < N,w1 − w2 > is defined by(w1 − w2)(S) = w1(S)− w2(S).
Classical cooperative games associated with < N,w >
I Border games: < N,w > and < N,w >
I Length game: < N, |w | >, where |w | (S) = w(S)− w(S) foreach S ∈ 2N .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative interval games
Preliminaries on classical cooperative games< N, v > is called a balanced game if for each balanced mapλ : 2N \ {∅} → R+ we have∑
S∈2N\{∅}
λ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N).
The core (Gillies (1959)) C (v) of v ∈ GN is defined by
C (v) =
{x ∈ RN |
∑i∈N
xi = v(N);∑i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ 2N
}.
Theorem (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)): Let < N, v > be ann-person game. Then, the following two assertions are equivalent:
(i) C (v) 6= ∅.(ii) < N, v > is a balanced game.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative interval games
Selection-based solution concepts
Let < N,w > be an interval game.
I v is called a selection of w if v(S) ∈ w(S) for each S ∈ 2N .
I Sel(w): the set of selections of w
The core set of an interval game < N,w > is defined by
C (w) := ∪{C (v)|v ∈ Sel(w)} .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative interval games
Selection-based solution conceptsAn interval game < N,w > is strongly balanced if for eachbalanced map λ it holds that∑
S∈2N\{∅}
λ(S)w(S) ≤ w(N).
Proposition: Let < N,w > be an interval game. Then, thefollowing three statements are equivalent:
(i) For each v ∈ Sel(w) the game < N, v > is balanced.(ii) For each v ∈ Sel(w), C (v) 6= ∅.(iii) The interval game < N,w > is strongly balanced.
Proof: (i)⇔ (ii) follows from Bondareva-Shapley theorem.(i)⇔ (iii) follows using w(N) ≤ v(N) ≤ w(N) and∑
S∈2N\{∅}
λ(S)w(S) ≤∑
S∈2N\{∅}
λ(S)v(S) ≤∑
S∈2N\{∅}
λ(S)w(S)
for each balanced map λ.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative interval games
Interval solution conceptsI (R)N : set of all n-dimensional vectors with elements in I (R).The interval imputation set:
I(w) =
{(I1, . . . , In) ∈ I (R)N |
∑i∈N
Ii = w(N), Ii < w(i), ∀i ∈ N
}.
The interval core:
C(w) =
{(I1, . . . , In) ∈ I(w)|
∑i∈S
Ii < w(S), ∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
}.
Example (LLR-game) continuation:
C(w) =
{(I1, I2, I3)|
∑i∈N
Ii = J,∑i∈S
Ii < w(S)
},
C(w) = {([0, 0], [0, 0], J)} .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Classical cooperative games (Part I in Branzei, Dimitrovand Tijs (2008))
< N, v > is convex if and only if the supermodularity condition
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
for each S ,T ∈ 2N holds.< N, v > is concave if and only if the submodularity condition
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T )
for each S ,T ∈ 2N holds.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Convex and concave interval games
I < N,w > is supermodular if
w(S) + w(T ) 4 w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ) for all S ,T ∈ 2N .
I < N,w > is convex if w ∈ IGN is supermodular and|w | ∈ GN is supermodular (or convex).
I < N,w > is submodular if
w(S) + w(T ) < w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ) for all S ,T ∈ 2N .
I < N,w > is concave if w ∈ IGN is submodular and |w | ∈ GN
is submodular (or concave).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Illustrative examples
Example 1: Let < N,w > be the two-person interval game withw(∅) = [0, 0], w({1}) = w({2}) = [0, 1] and w(N) = [3, 4].Here, < N,w > is supermodular and the border games are convex,but |w | ({1}) + |w | ({2}) = 2 > 1 = |w | (N) + |w | (∅).Hence, < N,w > is not convex.Example 2: Let < N,w > be the three-person interval game withw({i}) = [1, 1] for each i ∈ N,w(N) = w({1, 3}) = w({1, 2}) = w({2, 3}) = [2, 2] andw(∅) = [0, 0].Here, < N,w > is not convex, but < N, |w | > is supermodular,since |w | (S) = 0, for each S ∈ 2N .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Example (unanimity interval games):
Let J ∈ I (R) such that J � [0, 0] and let T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Theunanimity interval game based on T is defined for each S ∈ 2N by
uT ,J(S) =
{J, T ⊂ S[0, 0] , otherwise.
< N, |uT ,J | > is supermodular, < N, uT ,J > is supermodular:
T ⊂ A,T ⊂ BT ⊂ A,T 6⊂ BT 6⊂ A,T ⊂ BT 6⊂ A,T 6⊂ B
uT ,J(A ∪ B) uT ,J(A ∩ B) uT ,J(A) uT ,J(B)J J J JJ [0, 0] J [0, 0]J [0, 0] [0, 0] J
J or [0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0].
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Size monotonic interval games
I < N,w > is size monotonic if < N, |w | > is monotonic, i.e.,|w | (S) ≤ |w | (T ) for all S ,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T .
I SMIGN : the class of size monotonic interval games withplayer set N.
I For size monotonic games, w(T )− w(S) is defined for allS ,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T .
I CIGN : the class of convex interval games with player set N.
I CIGN ⊂ SMIGN because < N, |w | > is supermodular impliesthat < N, |w | > is monotonic.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
I-balanced interval games
< N,w > is I-balanced if for each balanced map λ∑S∈2N\{∅}
λSw(S) 4 w(N).
IBIGN : class of interval balanced games with player set N.
CIGN ⊂ IBIGN
CIGN ⊂ (SMIGN ∩ IBIGN)
Theorem: Let w ∈ IGN . Then the following two assertions areequivalent:
(i) C(w) 6= ∅.(ii) The game w is I-balanced.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Solution concepts for cooperative interval gamesΠ(N): set of permutations, σ : N → N, of NPσ(i) =
{r ∈ N|σ−1(r) < σ−1(i)
}: set of predecessors of i in σ
The interval marginal vector mσ(w) of w ∈ SMIGN w.r.t. σ:
mσi (w) = w(Pσ(i) ∪ {i})− w(Pσ(i))
for each i ∈ N.
Interval Weber set W : SMIGN � I (R)N :
W(w) = conv {mσ(w)|σ ∈ Π(N)} .
Example: N = {1, 2}, w({1}) = [1, 3],w({2}) = [0, 0] and
w({1, 2}) = [2, 3 12 ]. This game is not size monotonic.
m(12)(w)is not defined.w(N)− w({1}) = [1, 1
2 ]: undefined since |w(N)| < |w({1})|.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
The interval Shapley valueThe interval Shapley value Φ : SMIGN → I (R)N :
Φ(w) =1
n!
∑σ∈Π(N)
mσ(w), for each w ∈ SMIGN .
Example: N = {1, 2}, w({1}) = [0, 1],w({2}) = [0, 2],w(N) = [4, 8].
Φ(w) =1
2(m(12)(w) + m(21)(w));
Φ(w) =1
2((w({1}),w(N)− w({1})) + (w(N)− w({2}),w({2}))) ;
Φ(w) =1
2(([0, 1], [4, 7]) + ([4, 6], [0, 2])) = ([2, 3
1
2], [2, 4
1
2]).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Properties of solution concepts
I W(w) ⊂ C(w), ∀w ∈ CIGN and W(w) 6= C(w) is possible.Example: N = {1, 2}, w({1}) = w({2}) = [0, 1] andw(N) = [2, 4] (convex).W(w) = conv
{m(1,2)(w),m(2,1)(w)
}m(1,2)(w) = ([0, 1], [2, 4]− [0, 1]) = ([0, 1], [2, 3])m(2,1)(w) = ([2, 3], [0, 1]])m(1,2)(w) and m(2,1)(w) belong to C(w).([ 1
2 , 134 ], [1 1
2 , 214 ]) ∈ C(w)
no α ∈ [0, 1] exists satisfyingαm(1,2)(w) + (1− α)m(2,1)(w) = ([ 1
2 , 134 ], [1 1
2 , 214 ]).
I Φ(w) ∈ W(w) for each w ∈ SMIGN .
I Φ(w) ∈ C(w) for each w ∈ CIGN .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
The square operator
I Let a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn) with a ≤ b.
I Then, we denote by a�b the vector
a�b := ([a1, b1] , . . . , [an, bn]) ∈ I (R)N
generated by the pair (a, b) ∈ RN × RN .
I Let A,B ⊂ RN . Then, we denote by A�B the subset ofI (R)N defined by
A�B := {a�b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B, a ≤ b} .
I For a multi-solution F : GN � RN we defineF� : IGN � I (R)N by F� = F(w)�F(w) for each w ∈ IGN .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Square solutions and related resultsI C�(w) = C (w)�C (w) for each w ∈ IGN .
Example: N = {1, 2}, w({1}) = [0, 1],w({2}) = [0, 2],w(N) = [4, 8].
(2, 2) ∈ C (w), (31
2, 4
1
2) ∈ C (w).
(2, 2)�(31
2, 4
1
2) = ([2, 3
1
2], [2, 4
1
2]) ∈ C (w)�C (w).
I C(w) = C�(w) for each w ∈ IBIGN .I W�(w) = W (w)�W (w) for each w ∈ IGN .
I C(w) ⊂ W�(w) for each w ∈ IGN .I C�(w) =W�(w) for each w ∈ CIGN .I W(w) ⊂ W�(w) for each w ∈ CIGN .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Classical cooperative gamesTheorem (Shapley (1971) and Shapley-Weber-Ichiishi (1981,1988)):Let v ∈ GN . The following five assertions are equivalent:
(i) < N, v > is convex.
(ii) For all S1,S2,U ∈ 2N with S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U
v(S1 ∪ U)− v(S1) ≤ v(S2 ∪ U)− v(S2).
(iii) For all S1,S2 ∈ 2N and i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ {i}
v(S1 ∪ {i})− v(S1) ≤ v(S2 ∪ {i})− v(S2).
(iv) Each marginal vector mσ(v) of the game v with respect tothe permutation σ belongs to the core C (v).
(v) W (v) = C (v).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Basic characterizations for convex interval games
Theorem:Let w ∈ IGN be such that |w | ∈ GN is supermodular. Then, thefollowing three assertions are equivalent:
(i) w ∈ IGN is convex.
(ii) For all S1,S2,U ∈ 2N with S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U
w(S1 ∪ U)− w(S1) 4 w(S2 ∪ U)− w(S2).
(iii) For all S1,S2 ∈ 2N and i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ {i}
w(S1 ∪ {i})− w(S1) 4 w(S2 ∪ {i})− w(S2).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Basic characterizations of convex interval games
Proposition:Let w ∈ IGN . Then the following assertions hold:
(i) A game < N,w > is supermodular if and only if its bordergames < N,w > and < N,w > are convex.
(ii) A game < N,w > is convex if and only if its length game< N, |w | > and its border games < N,w >, < N,w > areconvex.
(iii) A game < N,w > is convex if and only if its border game< N,w > and the game < N,w − w > are convex.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Basic characterizations for convex interval games
Theorem: Let w ∈ IBIGN . Then, the following assertions areequivalent:
(i) w is convex.
(ii) |w | is supermodular and C(w) =W�(w).
Proof: By (ii) of Proposition, w is convex if and only if |w | ,w andw are convex. Clearly, the convexity of |w | is equivalent with itssupermodularity.Further, w and w are convex if and only if W (w) = C (w) andW (w) = C (w).These equalities are equivalent with W�(w) = C�(w). Finally,since w is I-balanced by hypothesis, we have C(w) =W�(w).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Basic characterizations for convex interval games
Theorem: Let w ∈ IGN . Then, the following assertions areequivalent:
(i) w is convex.
(ii) |w | is supermodular and mσ(w) ∈ C(w) for all σ ∈ Π(N).
Proposition: Let w ∈ CIGN . Then, W(w) ⊂ C(w).Proof: By the above theorem we have mσ(w) ∈ C(w) for eachσ ∈ Π(N). Now, we use the convexity of C(w).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Population interval monotonic allocation schemes (pmias)(inspired by Sprumont (1990))
For a game w ∈ IGN and a coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, the intervalsubgame with player set T is the game wT defined bywT (S) := w(S) for all S ∈ 2T .
TIBIGN : class of totally I-balanced interval games (intervalgames whose all subgames are I-balanced) with player set N.
We say that for a game w ∈ TIBIGN a schemeA = (AiS)i∈S ,S∈2N\{∅} with AiS ∈ I (R)N is a pmias of w if
(i)∑
i∈S AiS = w(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅},(ii) AiS 4 AiT for all S ,T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ⊂ T and for each
i ∈ S .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Population interval monotonic allocation schemes
A pmias allocates a larger payoff to each player as the coalitionsgrow larger.
In order to take the possibility of partial cooperation a pmiasspecifies not only how to allocate w(N) but also how to allocatew(S) of every coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
I We say that for a game w ∈ CIGN an imputationI = (I1, . . . , In) ∈ I(w) is pmias extendable if thereexists a pmas A = (AiS)i∈S ,S∈2N\{∅} such thatAiN = Ii for each i ∈ N.
Theorem: Let w ∈ CIGN . Then each element I of W(w) isextendable to a pmias of w .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Population interval monotonic allocation schemesExample: Let w ∈ CIGN with w(∅) = [0, 0],w({1}) = w({2}) = w({3}) = [0, 0],w({1, 2}) = w({1, 3}) = w({2, 3}) = [2, 4] and w(N) = [9, 15]. Itis easy to check that the interval Shapley value for this gamegenerates the pmias depicted as
N{1, 2}{1, 3}{2, 3}{1}{2}{3}
1 2 3[3, 5] [3, 5] [3, 5][1, 2] [1, 2] ∗[1, 2] ∗ [1, 2]∗ [1, 2] [1, 2]
[0, 0] ∗ ∗∗ [0, 0] ∗∗ ∗ [0, 0]
.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Classical big boss games versus big boss interval games
Classical big boss games (Muto et al. (1988), Tijs (1990)):< N, v > is a big boss game with n as big boss if
(i) v ∈ GN is monotonic, i.e.,v(S) ≤ v(T ) if for each S ,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T ;
(ii) v(S) = 0 if n /∈ S ;
(iii) v(N)− v(S) ≥∑
i∈N\S(v(N)− v(N \ {i}))for all S ,T with n ∈ S ⊂ N.
Big boss interval games:< N,w > is a big boss interval game if < N,w > and< N,w − w > are classical (total) big boss games.BBIGN : the class of big boss interval games.Marginal contribution of each player i ∈ N to the grand coalition:Mi (w) := w(N)− w(N \ {i}).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Properties of big boss interval games
Theorem: Let w ∈ SMIGN . Then, the following conditions areequivalent:
(i) w ∈ BBIGN .
(ii) < N,w > satisfies
(a) Veto power property:w(S) = [0, 0] for each S ∈ 2N with n /∈ S .
(b) Monotonicity property:w(S) 4 w(T ) for each S ,T ∈ 2N with n ∈ S ⊂ T .
(c) Union property:
w(N)− w(S) <∑
i∈N\S
(w(N)− w(N \ {i}))
for all S with n ∈ S ⊂ N.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
T -value (inspired by Tijs(1981))
I the big boss interval point: B(w) := ([0, 0], . . . , [0, 0],w(N));
I the union interval point:
U(w) := (M1(w), . . . ,Mn−1(w),w(N)−n−1∑i=1
Mi (w)).
I The T -value T : BBIGN → I (R)N is defined by
T (w) :=1
2(U(w) + B(w)).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Holding situations with interval data
Holding situations: one agent has a storage capacity and otheragents have goods to store to generate benefits.In classical cooperative game theory, holding situations aremodeled by using big boss games (Tijs, Meca and Lopez (2005)).For a holding situation with interval data one can construct aholding interval game which turns out to be a big boss intervalgame.
Example: Player 3 is the owner of a holding house which hascapacity for one container. Players 1 and 2 have each onecontainer which they want to store. If player 1 is allowed to storehis/her container, then the benefit belongs to [10, 30] and if player2 is allowed to store his/her container, then the benefit belongs to[50, 70].
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Example continues ...
The situation described corresponds to an interval game as follows:
I The interval game < N,w > with N = {1, 2, 3} andw(S) = [0, 0] if 3 /∈ S , w(∅) = w({3}) = [0, 0],w({1, 3}) = [10, 30] and w(N) = w({2, 3}) = [50, 70] is a bigboss interval game with player 3 as big boss.
I B(w) = ([0, 0], [0, 0], [50, 70]) andU(w) = ([0, 0], [40, 40], [10, 30]) are the elements of theinterval core.
I T (w) = ([0, 0], [20, 20], [30, 50]) ∈ C(w).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Bi-monotonic interval allocation schemes (inspired byBranzei, Tijs and Timmer (2001))
I Pn: the set {S ⊂ N|n ∈ S} of all coalitions containing the bigboss.
Take a game w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss.We call a scheme B := (BiS)i∈S ,S∈Pn an (interval) allocationscheme for w if (BiS)i∈S is an interval core element of thesubgame < S ,w > for each coalition S ∈ Pn. Such an allocation
scheme B = (BiS)i∈S,S∈Pn is called a bi-monotonic (interval)allocation scheme (bi-mias) for w if for all S ,T ∈ Pn with S ⊂ Twe have BiS < BiT for all i ∈ S \ {n}, and BnS 4 BnT .Remark: In a bi-mias the big boss is weakly better off in largercoalitions, while the other players are weakly worse off.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Classes of cooperative interval games
Bi-monotonic interval allocation schemesI We say that for a game w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss, an
imputation I = (I1, . . . , In) ∈ I(w) is bi-mias extendable ifthere exists a bi-mas B = (BiS)i∈S,S∈Pn such that BiN = Ii foreach i ∈ N.
Theorem: Let w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss and let I ∈ C(w).Then, I is bi-mias extendable.
Example continues: The T -value generates a bi-mias representedby the following matrix:
N{1, 3}{2, 3}{3}
1 2 3
[0, 0] [20, 20] [30, 50][5, 15] ∗ [5, 15]∗ [25, 35] [25, 35]∗ ∗ [0, 0]
.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Airport situations with interval dataIn airport situations, the costs of the coalitions are considered(Driessen (1988)):
I One runway and m types of planes (P1, . . . ,Pm pieces of therunway: P1 for type 1, P1 and P2 for type 2, etc.).
I Tj < [0, 0]: the interval cost of piece Pj .
I Nj : the set of players who own a plane of type j .
I nj : the number of (owners of) planes of type j .
I < N, d > is given byN = ∪mj=1Nj : the set of all users of the runway;
d(∅) = [0, 0], d(S) =∑j
i=1 Ti
if S ∩ Nj 6= ∅, S ∩ Nk = ∅ for all j + 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
S needs the pieces P1, . . . ,Pj of the runway. The interval cost of
the used pieces of the runway is∑j
i=1 Ti .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Airport situations with interval data
Formally, d =∑m
k=1 Tku∗∪mr=kNr
, where
u∗K (S) :=
{1, K ∩ S 6= ∅0, otherwise.
Interval Baker-Thompson allocation for a player i of type j :
γi :=
j∑k=1
(m∑
r=k
nr )−1Tk .
Proposition: Interval Baker-Thompson allocation agrees with theinterval Shapley value Φ(d).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Airport situations with interval data
Proposition: Let < N, d > be an airport interval game. Then,< N, d > is concave.
Proof: It is well known that non-negative multiples of classical dualunanimity games are concave (or submodular). By formaldefinition of d the classical games d =
∑mk=1 T ku
∗k,m and
|d | =∑m
k=1 |Tk | u∗k,m are concave because T k ≥ 0 and |Tk | ≥ 0for each k , implying that < N, d > is concave.
Proposition: Let (N, (Tk)k=1,...,m) be an airport situation withinterval data and < N, d > be the related airport interval game.Then, the interval Baker-Thompson rule applied to this airportsituation provides an allocation which belongs to C(d).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Example:< N, d > airport interval game interval costs: T1 = [4, 6],T2 = [1, 8],d(∅) = [0, 0], d(1) = [4, 6], d(2) = d(1, 2) = [4, 6] + [1, 8] = [5, 14],d = [4, 6]u∗{1,2} + [1, 8]u∗{2},
Φ(d) = ( 12 ([4, 6] + [0, 0]), 1
2 ([1, 8] + [5, 14])) = ([2, 3], [3, 11]),γ = ( 1
2 [4, 6], 12 [4, 6] + [1, 8]) = ([2, 3], [3, 11]) ∈ C(d).
Figure:
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Sequencing situations with interval data
Sequencing situations with one queue of players, each with onejob, in front of a machine order. Each player must have his/her jobprocessed on this machine, and for each player there is a costaccording to the time he/she spent in the system (Curiel, Pederzoliand Tijs (1989)).
A one-machine sequencing interval situation is described as a4-tuple (N, σ0, α, p),σ0: a permutation defining the initial order of the jobsα = ([αi , αi ])i∈N ∈ I (R+)N , p = ([p
i, pi ])i∈N ∈ I (R+)N : vectors
of intervals with αi , αi representing the minimal and maximalunitary cost of the job of i , respectively, p
i, pi being the minimal
and maximal processing time of the job of i , respectively.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Sequencing situations with interval data
I To handle such sequencing situations, we propose to use eitherthe approach based on urgency indices or the approach basedon relaxation indices. This requires to be able to compute
either ui =[αipi
, αipi
](for each i ∈ N) or ri =
[piαi, piαi
](for each
i ∈ N), and such intervals should be pair-wise disjoint.
Interval calculus: Let I , J ∈ I (R+).We define · : I (R+)× I (R+)→ I (R+) by I · J := [I J, I J].Let Q :=
{(I , J) ∈ I (R+)× I (R+ \ {0}) | I J ≤ I J
}.
We define ÷ : Q → I (R+) by IJ := [ IJ ,
IJ
] for all (I , J) ∈ Q.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Sequencing situations with interval dataExample (a): Consider the two-agent situation withp1 = [1, 4], p2 = [6, 8], α1 = [5, 25], α2 = [10, 30]. We can computeu1 =
[5, 25
4
], u2 =
[53 ,
154
]and use them to reorder the jobs as the
intervals are disjoint.
Example (b): Consider the two-agent situation withp1 = [1, 3], p2 = [4, 6], α1 = [5, 6], α2 = [11, 12]. Here, we cancompute r1 =
[15 ,
12
], r2 =
[4
11 ,12
], but we cannot reorder the jobs
as the intervals are not disjoint.
Example (c): Consider the two-agent situation withp1 = [1, 3], p2 = [5, 8], α1 = [5, 6], α2 = [10, 30]. Now, r1 is definedbut r2 is undefined. On the other hand, u1 is undefined and u2 isdefined, so no comparison is possible; consequently, the reorderingcannot take place.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Sequencing situations with interval dataLet i , j ∈ N. We define the interval gain of the switch of jobs i andj by
Gij :=
{αjpi − αipj , if jobs i and j switch[0,0], otherwise.
The sequencing interval game:
w :=∑
i ,j∈N:i<j
Giju[i ,j].
Gij ∈ I (R) for all switching jobs i , j ∈ N andu[i ,j] is the unanimity game defined as:
u[i ,j](S) :=
{1, if {i , i + 1, ..., j − 1, j} ⊂ S0, otherwise.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Sequencing situations with interval data
I The interval equal gain splitting rule is defined byIEGSi (N, σ0, α, p) = 1
2
∑j∈N:i<j
Gij + 12
∑j∈N:i>j
Gij , for each
i ∈ N.
Proposition: Let < N,w > be a sequencing interval game. Then,i) IEGS(N, σ0, α, p) = 1
2 (m(1,2...,n)(w) + m(n,n−1,...,1)(w)).ii) IEGS(N, σ0, α, p) ∈ C(w).
Proposition: Let < N,w > be a sequencing interval game. Then,< N,w > is convex.Example: Consider the interval situation with N = {1, 2},σ0 = {1, 2}, p = (2, 3) and α = ([2, 4], [12, 21]).The urgency indices are u1 = [1, 2] and u2 = [4, 7], so that the twojobs may be switched.We have:G12 = [18, 30], IEGS(N, σ0, α, p) = ([9, 15], [9, 15]) ∈ C(w).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Bankruptcy situations with interval data
In a classical bankruptcy situation, a certain amount of moneydhas to be divided among some people, N = {1, . . . , n}, who haveindividual claims ci , i ∈ N on the estate, and the total claim isweakly larger than the estate. The corresponding bankruptcy gamevE ,d : vE ,d(S) = (E −
∑i∈N\S di )+ for each S ∈ 2N , where
x+ = max {0, x} (Aumann and Maschler (1985)).
I A bankruptcy interval situation with a fixed set of claimantsN = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a pair (E , d) ∈ I (R)× I (R)N , whereE = [E ,E ] < [0, 0] is the estate to be divided and d is thevector of interval claims with the i-th coordinate di = [d i , d i ](i ∈ N), such that [0, 0] 4 d1 4 d2 4 . . . 4 dn andE <
∑ni=1 d i .
BRIN : the family of bankruptcy interval situations with set ofclaimants N.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Bankruptcy situations with interval data
We define a subclass of BRIN , denoted by SBRIN , consisting of allbankruptcy interval situations such that
|d(N \ S)| ≤ |E | for each S ∈ 2N with d(N \ S) ≤ E .
I We call a bankruptcy interval situation in SBRIN a strongbankruptcy interval situation. With each (E , d) ∈ SBRIN weassociate a cooperative interval game < N,wE ,d >, defined by
wE ,d(S) := [vE ,d(S), vE ,d(S)] for each S ⊂ N.
SBRIGN : the family of all bankruptcy interval games wE ,d
with (E , d) ∈ SBRIN .
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Economic and OR situations with interval data
Bankruptcy situations with interval data
Example: Let (E , d) be a two-person bankruptcy situation.We suppose that the claims of the players are closed intervalsd1 = [70, 70] and d2 = [80, 80], respectively,and the estate is E = [100, 140].Then, the corresponding game < N,wE ,d > is given by
wE ,d(∅) = [0, 0],wE ,d(1) = [20, 60],wE ,d(2) = [30, 70]
and wE ,d(1, 2) = [100, 140].
I This game is supermodular, but is not convex because|wE ,d | ∈ GN is not convex.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Handling interval solutions
How to use interval games and their solutions ininteractive situations
Stage 1 (before cooperation starts):with N = {1, 2, . . . , n} set of participants with interval data ⇒interval game < N,w > and interval solutions ⇒ agreement forcooperation based on an interval solution ψ and signing a bindingcontract (specifying how the achieved outcome by the grandcoalition should be divided consistently with Ji = ψi (w) for eachi ∈ N.
Stage 2 (after the joint enterprise is carried out):The achieved reward R ∈ w(N) is known; apply the agreed uponprotocol specified in the binding contract to determine theindividual shares xi ∈ Ji .Natural candidates for rules used in protocols are bankruptcy rules.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Handling interval solutions
Handling interval solutions
Example:w(1) = [0, 2], w(2) = [0, 1] and w(1, 2) = [4, 8].Φ(w) = ([2, 4 1
2 ], [2, 3 12 ]). R = 6 ∈ [4, 8]; choose proportional rule
(PROP) defined by
PROPi (E , d) :=di∑j∈N dj
E
for each bankruptcy problem (E , d) and all i ∈ N.(Φ1(w),Φ2(w)) +
PROP(R − Φ1(w)− Φ2(w); Φ1(w)− Φ1(w),Φ2(w)− Φ2(w))= (2, 2) + PROP(6− 2− 2; (2 1
2 , 112 ))
= (3 14 , 2
34 ).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Final remarks and outlook
Conclusion and future work
The State-of-the-art of interval game literature:
I Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S., “Shapley-like values forinterval bankruptcy games”, Economics Bulletin 3 (2003) 1-8.
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei R., Fragnelli V. and Tijs S.,“Sequencing interval situations and related games”, to appearin Central European Journal of Operations Research (CEJOR).
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei O., Branzei R. and Tijs S.,“Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs forinterval games”, to appear in Journal of MathematicalEconomics (JME).
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Final remarks and outlook
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei R. and Tijs S., “Convex intervalgames”, Journal of Applied Mathematics and DecisionSciences, Vol. 2009, Article ID 342089, 14 pages (2009a)DOI: 10.1115/2009/342089.
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei R. and Tijs S., “Big boss intervalgames”, International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness andKnowledge-Based Systems (IJUFKS), Vol. 19, no:1 (2011)pp.135-149.
I Branzei R. and Alparslan Gok S.Z., “Bankruptcy problemswith interval uncertainty”, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, no. 56(2008) pp. 1-10.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Final remarks and outlook
I Branzei R., Mallozzi L. and Tijs S., “Peer group situationsand games with interval uncertainty”, International Journal ofMathematics, Game Theory, and Algebra, Vol.19, Issues 5-6(2010).
I Branzei R., Tijs S. and Alparslan Gok S.Z., “Somecharacterizations of convex interval games”, AUCO CzechEconomic Review, Vol. 2, no.3 (2008) 219-226.
I Branzei R., Tijs S. and Alparslan Gok S.Z., “How to handleinterval solutions for cooperative interval games”,International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness andKnowledge-based Systems, Vol.18, Issue 2, (2010) 123-132.
I Branzei R., Branzei O., Alparslan Gok S.Z., Tijs S.,“Cooperative interval games: a survey”, Central EuropeanJournal of Operations Research (CEJOR), Vol.18, no.3(2010) 397-411.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Final remarks and outlook
I Moretti S., Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei R. and Tijs S.,“Connection situations under uncertainty and cost monotonicsolutions”, Computers and Operations Research, Vol.38, Issue11 (2011) pp.1638-1645.
I Branzei R., Alparslan Gk S.Z. and Branzei O., “On theConvexity of Interval Dominance Cores”, to appear in CentralEuropean Journal of Operations Research (CEJOR), DOI:10.1007/s10100-010-0141-z.
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei R. and Tijs S., “Airport intervalgames and their Shapley value”, Operations Research andDecisions, Issue 2 (2009).
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Miquel S. and Tijs S., “Cooperationunder interval uncertainty”, Mathematical Methods ofOperations Research, Vol. 69, no.1 (2009) 99-109.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Final remarks and outlook
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., “Cooperative interval games”, PhDDissertation Thesis, Institute of Applied Mathematics, MiddleEast Technical University, Ankara-Turkey (2009).
I Alparslan Gok S.Z., Branzei R. and Tijs S., “The intervalShapley value: an axiomatization”, Central European Journalof Operations Research (CEJOR), Vol.18, Issue 2 (2010) pp.131-140.
Future work:
I Promising topic (interesting open problems exist to begeneralized in the theory of cooperative interval games).
I Other OR situations and combinatorial optimization problemswith interval data can be modeled by using cooperativeinterval games, e.g., flow, linear production, holdingsituations, financial and energy markets.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
References
References[1]Alparslan Gok S.Z., Cooperative Interval Games: Theory andApplications, Lambert Academic Publishing (LAP), Germany(2010) ISBN:978-3-8383-3430-1.[2]Aumann R. and Maschler M., Game theoretic analysis of abankruptcy problem from the Talmud, Journal of EconomicTheory 36 (1985) 195-213.[3] Bondareva O.N., Certain applications of the methods of linearprogramming to the theory of cooperative games, ProblemlyKibernetiki 10 (1963) 119-139 (in Russian).[4] Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S., Models in CooperativeGame Theory, Springer, Game Theory and Mathematical Methods(2008).[5] Branzei R., Tijs S. and Timmer J., Information collectingsituations and bi-monotonic allocation schemes, MathematicalMethods of Operations Research 54 (2001) 303-313.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
References
References
[6]Curiel I., Pederzoli G. and Tijs S., Sequencing games, EuropeanJournal of Operational Research 40 (1989) 344-351.[7]Driessen T., Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications,Kluwer Academic Publishers (1988).[8] Gillies D. B., Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. In:Tucker, A.W. and Luce, R.D. (Eds.), Contributions to the theoryof games IV, Annals of Mathematical Studies 40. PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton (1959) pp. 47-85.[9]Ichiishi T., Super-modularity: applications to convex games andto the greedy algorithm for LP, Journal of Economic Theory 25(1981) 283-286.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
References
References
[10] Muto S., Nakayama M., Potters J. and Tijs S., On big bossgames, The Economic Studies Quarterly Vol.39, No. 4 (1988)303-321.[11]Shapley L.S., On balanced sets and cores, Naval ResearchLogistics Quarterly 14 (1967) 453-460.[12] Shapley L.S., Cores of convex games, International Journal ofGame Theory 1 (1971) 11-26.[13] Sprumont Y., Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes forCooperative Games with Transferable Utility, Games and EconomicBehavior 2 (1990) 378-394.[14] Tijs S., Bounds for the core and the τ -value, In: MoeschlinO., Pallaschke D. (eds.), Game Theory and MathematicalEconomics, North Holland, Amsterdam (1981) pp. 123-132.
6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
References
References
[15] Tijs S., Big boss games, clan games and information marketgames. In:Ichiishi T., Neyman A., Tauman Y. (eds.), Game Theoryand Applications. Academic Press, San Diego (1990) pp.410-412.[16]Tijs S., Meca A. and Lopez M.A., Benefit sharing in holdingsituations, European Journal of Operational Research 162 (1)(2005) 251-269.[17] von Neumann, J. and Morgernstern, O., Theory of Games andEconomic Behaviour, Princeton: Princeton University Press(1944).[18] Weber R., Probabilistic values for games, in Roth A.E. (Ed.),The Shapley Value: Essays in Honour of Lloyd S. Shapley,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1988) 101-119.