CMH Pub 1-4 - Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare- 1943 - 1945
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Transcript of CMH Pub 1-4 - Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare- 1943 - 1945
Foreword
Within a generation the attitude and policy of the United States toward
alliances have undergone a revolutionary reversal. The nation has passed
from it s traditional suspicion and fear of "entangling alliances" to a policy
t h a t heavi ly stakes
its
security
and
interests
co-operation
of
other
powers. In World War I the U.S. Government cautiously def ined its rela-
tionship with the powers allied against Germany as that of an Associated
Power. In World War II, though last to join the Grand Alliance, it v i r tu -
al ly integrated its resources with those of the British Commonwealth and
co-ordinated its strategy and war aims with the British and the USSR in
the most
it has
and built up alliances all over the troubled
world. The climax of its most intensive experience w i t h coalition strategy
came in the phase of World War II described in this volume, which should
therefore have a special interest for all who are concerned with the impli-
cations
Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of M i l i t a r y History
30 April 1958
Washington, D. C.
and
A member of Phi Beta
Kappa and the American Historical Association's
Committee
on the His-
torian and the Federal Government, he has taught History at Brooklyn
College and the
tured on military
College,
War II, he
the Russian area and
language a t Yale and served as an instructor in intelligence and as a historian
in the
the Operations Division historical project
in the War Department General Staff as a civilian member, becoming in
1949 the Chief of the Strategic
Plans
History.
of Strategic Planning
for Coalition War-
fare: 1941-1942, and his articles and reviews on modern strategy and
state-
various service
Coalition
War-
national planning
and military strategy. The 1941-42 volume, of which th e present author
w as coauthor, told the story of plans and decisions as
they affected the
missions and dispositions of the U.S. Army in the defensive phase of coali-
tion warfare , when the Grand Alliance
was still in its
strategic planning in the midwar era
from January 1943 through the summer of 1944. This is the story of the
hopes, fears, struggles, frustrations, and triumphs of the Army
strategic
planners
coming
to
grips
offensive phase
account
of
planning
debate on European strategy
which followed the Allied landings in North Africa and continued to the
penetration of the German frontier
in September 1944.
During this period
the great international conferences from Casablanca in January 1943 to the
second Quebec in September
formulated
and decisions to the end of the summer of 1944,
when the problems of
winning the war began to come up against the challenges of
victory
and
peace, and a new era was beginning for the Army Chief of Staff and his
advisers.
The presentation util izes both the narrative and the analytical approach.
It sets forth the principal steps in the development of the
American
strategic
case, and seeks the raison d'étre behind that case. It a t tempts to view,
through the eyes of the Washington high command, the war as a whole and
in its main component parts. The
method
is to trace the plans, concepts,
and ideas of the planners up through the different levels—Army, j o in t
staff (Army and
Navy) , Joint Chiefs of Staff, th e meetings of the
American
staff with the President, and of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff at the plenary
sessions with President Franklin D. and Prime Minis te r Winston
Churchill. The chronological and structural f ramework for the study
is provided by the big conferences, Casablanca
(January 1943), TRIDENT
1943), Cairo-Tehran
treating
the planning for the war against Germany and that against Japan separ-
the debates,
compromises, decisions, and revisions, the focus is placed on the advocates of
the American military case—especially on General
Marshall.
literature available
for the
American
contributions
on the art of
strategy,
the art of the calculated risk, as it developed in World
War II. No attempt has
been
partners in the Grand Alliance. That of the British and
other English-
speaking allies is being disclosed in accounts that they are publishing.
Whether th e Russians and Chinese will ever
publish
full,
about
American
And unfortunately, despite
a flood of personal recollections of World War II, of the two principal
actors
in
filling some of the gaps in the available literature, will help
those readers
field—staff
officers, civil
In writing this volume the author acknowledges most gratefully assistance
from many of the persons mentioned in the Preface to the
preceding
volume,
notably
author
and, along with
volume, who provided stimulating discussions during the processes of plan-
ning
and
composition
and
offered
valuable
Alice
Bailey who gave unstinted help with wartime planning documents.
The author owes a great debt to Mr. Walter G. Hermes, whose assistance
has been invaluable. Mr. Hermes investigated
many
topics essential to the
completion of the volume, particularly in the field of strategy and planning
in the conflict
information, reviewed for the author countless passages and references, and
his
broad
knowledge
Army are reflected throughout the volume.
A great measure
of thanks is due to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, who
gave unstintingly
scholarly craftsmanship. Others
in the Office of the Chief of Military History who were
especially helpful
were Drs. Stetson Conn and Louis Morton, Colonels George G. O'Connor
and Ridgway P. Smith, Jr., Drs. Richard
M. Leighton and Robert W.
Coakley, and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. He is especially
indebted to Miss Mary
perceptive, and watchful
x
generous help he
wishes to thank the many records experts who aided him—notably Miss
Wava Phillips, Mrs. Hazel Ward,
Mr. Israel Wice and his assistants, and
Mr.
and his staff at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.
Copy editing was done by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes, selection of pictures
by Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and indexing by Virginia C. Leighton. Credit
fo r maintaining a correct text of the manuscript through repeated revisions
is due particularly to two high ly capable secretaries—Mrs. Ella M ay Ablahat
and Mrs. Edna W. Salsbury.
The
author
is also obliged to those others who read all or parts of the
text in manuscr ipt—to Professors Will iam L. Langer and Charles H.
Taylor of
Univers i ty ; to Professor Wesley F. Craven of Princeton
Univers i ty ,
to Dr. Harvey A. De
Weerd of the Rand Corporation; to Maj. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, who
encouraged the
from
A l b e r t
C . Wedemeyer, U SA (Ret . ) ; to Maj. Gen. R i c ha r d
C . Lindsay, U S A F ;
to Cols. W il l i a m W . Bessell, Jr., George
A. Lincoln, Edward M. Harr is ,
William
H.
Baumer;
of
nently, in the events set for th .
A special category of t h a n k s is reserved to my wife, Gertrude
G l i c k l e r
Matloff ,
interpretations presented
MAURICE MATLOFF
Washington, D.C.
10
I. CASABLANCA-BEGINNING OF AN E R A : J A N U A R Y
1943
Casablanca i n Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
II. A D V A N C E IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: JANUARY-
M A Y 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3
Critical Shortages
Atlantic . . . . 43
Rearming t h e French . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
Commitments to the Middle East
. . . . . . . . .
The Problem of the Neutrals: Spain and Turkey
... 63
Role o f
EAST:
J A N U A R Y - M A Y 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 7 7
Stalemate i n Burma
T h e Clash o f Personalities . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4
Victory Through Airpower? . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
Planning f o r Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . . 8 8
System o f Command o f
Joint Operations . . . . . .
1 0 2
. . . .
Strategy
Preparations and Rehearsal for TRIDENT . . . . . 120
xiii
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6
Cross-Channel and Mediterranean Operations . . . . 126
T h e Pacific a n d F a r East . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 5
T h e Balance Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 3
VII.
FROM
TO
A V A L A N C H E : MAY-MID-AUGUST
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 6
Search for the Formula Continued . . . . . . . . 162
Strategy, Production, a n d
Manpower . . . . . . . . 1 7 9
AND FUTURE OPERATIONS IN
JUNE-AUGUST
1943
185
193
Air Operations and Command Problems in the CBI . . . 198
Origins of the Command . . . . . . . 201
Sino-British Attitudes a n d Policies . . . . . . . . . 2 03
Planning the Over-all War Against
Japan
. . . . . . 205
X.
Debating the Issues in the War Against Germany . . . 220
Discussion on the War Against Japan
. . . . . . . 230
XI. "THE MEDITERRANEAN AGAIN":
N O V E M B E R 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4
Invasion o f Italy
T h e Balkans a n d Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 59
Mediterranean Build-up Versus OVERLORD . . . . . 2 6 2
XII. STRATEGY
AND C O M M A N D IN THE WAR AGAINST
G E R M A N Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0
The Problem of
The USSR in
T h e Moscow Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1
Fish or Cu t Bait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
XIV. STRATEGIC STRANDS IN THE WAR
AGAINST
AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . .
The Quest for Short Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
T h e Progress o f Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . 3 1 2
Shipping,
New Techniques and Weapons in the War Against
Japan
The JCS
. . . . .
Opening Skirmish
Climax at Tehran: 28 November-1 December 1943 . . 356
Mop-up
at
Cairo:
3-7
XVII. STRATEGIC INVENTORY: DECEMBER
T h e Tally Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 9 7
Preparations f o r OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 3
OVERLORD Planning and Mediterranean Options . . 412
OVERLORD and the
S E C O N D A R Y
WAR-
T H E CBI:
J A N U A R Y - M A Y 1944
. . . . . . . . 4 3 3
4 3 3
T h e
442
T h e Battle o f t h e A i r
Transports . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7
T h e Decline o f t h e C B I . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 9
XX. THE SECOND
FRONT AND THE S E C O N D A R Y WAR-
T H E PACIFIC: J A N U A R Y - M A Y 1944 . . . . . . . 4 5 1
T h e
E n d o f a Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 9
O f Troops a n d Transports . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 1
Eve of OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64
XXI. THE PROMISE OF MILITARY VICTORY: D DAY TO
SEPTEMBER 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 6
ANVIL-The Last Rounds
Target-Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T h e Anglo-American
Coalition . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
T h e Second Quebec Conference . . . . . . . . . 5 0 8
Expansion and Distribution of U.S. Military Power . . . 518
T h e
Appendix
A.
Summary
of
Current
Cairo Conference . 541
Asia—A Reflection
tember 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 6
D. Shipment of Divisions Overseas—January 1942-September
1944
. 550
tember 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
TO
FOOTNOTES
. . . 556
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY O F
INDEX
1943-44 . . . 207
377
3. Planners' Deployment Estimates of March 1943 an d Actual Deploy-
ment
1943 . . . . . . . . . . .
3 9 1
4. Arm y Overseas Deployment: 31 December 1942-31 December 1943 392
5 . U.S. Overseas
Illustrations
Outskirts
Generals Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle. . . . . . . . . . 38
High-Ranking Trio
in New
. . . . . . 218
. . . . . 22 2
General Arnold With Lord Louis Mountbatten . . . . . . . . . 237
Roosevelt's Concept of Postwar Occupation Zones for Germany ... 341
Aboard t h e
Kai-shek and Madame Chiang . . . . . . . 351
The Big Three in Portico of the Soviet Legation, Tehran . . . . . 358
The Combined Staffs Meeting in
Mena House, 4 December 1943 . . . 368
Ismet Inonu, the President of Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Supreme Commander, Allied
General Marshall With General
. . . . . . . . . 4 6 8
Guard of Honor on Review at The
Citadel
. . . . . . . . . . 509
Members
from
of December
on
Pearl
1
The
had not yet
sweeps of the Axis Powers in Europe and
in the far Pacific and had themselves
taken
turning of the
both sides would be starting
afresh and
area
close
allies,
Great
Britain
would also have to begin anew. After a
ful l year of war, th e weight of U.S. forces
was beginning to be felt in the
theaters.
Prime Minister Winston
War Department
early, direct, massive assault
new phase of global and coalition war-
fare for the strategic
The
the
full of surprises and changes. Gradually
the
nation, recovered
preparations for
pair the major part of the planners' ad-
vance work.
principle already accepted in U.S.
mil i -
They
1
General
Marshall
ton to serve as Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans
Division in
Deputy Chief
parations is
UNITED STATES
(hereafter cited as Prewar Plans an d Preparations).
See also: (1) Ma urice Matloff an d Edwin M. Snell,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
1941—1942,
UNITED STATES A R M Y IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington,
Snell, Strategic Plan-
loff, "Prewar Mili tary
2 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G
FOR COALITION W A R F A R E
basic
political
War II—that the war was to be waged as
a coalition effort. Despite
American view that the basis of strategy
must
in 1941-42. The alliance was a war
marriage,
United
member of the
pair
exist-
Europa,
partners to enter
power. Great Britain
nations
weight against
intervene actively in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East, through
which ran
it s life line to its empire in the Orient.
Its economy, while
war
avoid a repetition of its heavy
manpower
I. By necessity and
rather
than
in
pire,
alliances with
possible.
Reduced
to
out, somewhat
the long run, once the cancer of
Hitler-
a
against Germany, was a land
power
with
cation. Though it possessed an enormous
population and
great resources,
its in-
it put its
durance
3
York , The V i k i n g Press,
1947), pp.
the
massive
Red
Army
Western eyes,
power
veloped into a baffling hybrid—a combi-
nation of Russian National Socialism,
Marxist concepts, and
world revolution
declared state
of war
Union
pause
in
Both drives appear
with
the break with the Fuehrer was the ag-
gressive
serting its claims on the Balkans—a move
tha t Hitler, confronted with
a
stubborn
Britain
dangerous to
J u n e effort
can be characterized as warfare in pur-
suit of aggrandizement. The German in-
vasion simply reinforced Russia's historic
desire to strengthen its position in eastern
Europe,
an
objective
However,
for
almost
two
fight for its very existence and,
while
by no means absent, military considera-
tions were more
alike,
it
would
partnership
Deane so
have
its
greatest
whose
whole
then to prepare.
proach to European war, based on its
experience
in
World
only long enough to
Americans war was an aberration, an
unwelcome disturber of normalcy.
I and World War II the
national policy
enter military alliances nor maintain
twenty lean
tary Establishment. Yet the legalistic-
moral strain that, historically, has so in-
fluenced
the nations of the world would subscribe
to principles of justice and morality,
war,
istic strain, reflected in
World War I, became imbedded in the
pragmatism of President Roosevelt
World War II.
velt,
gradually
and resources was begun. In 1940 the
Selective Service Act was passed. Aid to
Britain became official national policy in
the same year. Lend-lease was extended
to Britain
and to
ington, laying aside their earlier aca-
demic
and coalition warfare—to take into ac-
count the rising
danger of war
peace
to
periods fo r strategic planners—the plan-
ning staffs were
can people toward war. There was a
dearth of accurate and comprehensive
intelligence
ties and intentions in 1941—a condition
that was to
U.S. military
continue
against
Germany.
from
agree
with
the
and 1941 broadened
his knowledge of
plans,
as
well
he had
But he did not
plans,
policy limited
tionship. It
freedom
using U.S.
istration. For the first time in its history,
the United
ably advanced in its military planning.
4
planning
BO W plans, see: (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic
Planning: 1941-42, Chs. I-III; (2) Watson , Prewar
Plans
Conn
WAR II
(Washington, Government
Printing Office,
By successive stages
the nation made
status
of
major
outright military collaboration with
United States into the war, in Europe as
well as in the Pacific, was a natural step
for which
Har-
the Far East and a tradition of
helping
Throughout World
could never neglect the war in the East.
This compulsion must be kept in mind,
for it was to
in the strategy for the defeat of Germany.
Given its domestic politics, and the
added pressure of the war with Japan,
it did not seem that the United
States
could
fight
"a democracy cannot fight a
Seven Years'
that gradually, under th e necessity of
war, came
Britain. The Soviet Union's
small
its
fac-
Unlike th e Western
partners, th e USSR
allies. The Russians had but to push
westward and
sure
against
was to prove
difficult. Normally, the
eral terms to the Soviet Union. The
Russians were to take formal
part in de-
confer-
Potsdam.
Chiefs
ing came of
the Western effort in the global war.
From the start these conditions,
added
understanding between the Soviet Union
and the Western Allies
basis for
was laid
became a necessity for the United States
and Great Britain immediately after the
Japanese attack. Just a few days before
5
Interv,
and Maj
il l and his principal military advisers ar-
rived
great wart ime conferences with the
President and his staff. Out of this con-
ference—known by its
bined Chiefs of
Staff (CCS) system-the
ing out Allied strategy.
the U.S. joint
chief of staff and the
senior officers of the
President;
the
other
members
Admiral Ernest J.
King, Chief of
U.S. members of the Combined Chiefs
and as the President's
tary officers—members
of the British
to direct the operations of their services
from
London,
tion for them in the CCS. Field Marshal
Sir John Dill, head of the
British Joint
in Washington.
able organization in which decisions
were
reached
strategies outlined; the
resources.
were
responsible
cal.
had more
than with their
summit
th e Foreign Secretary, the Minister of
Production, and the civilian cabinet of-
ficers
Admiralty, and the Air Minis t ry) . The
6
V. At the conference a fixed
distinction between th e
forth
Rico and ambassador to
Commander in Chief. Admiral
1941
designated
Chiefs of Staff
Committee sa t
to Mr. Churchill in his
capacity
Chiefs of Staff meetings and also insured
close liaison between British
Roosevelt
assistance of the
war-born joint staff
Cabinet,
II
illustrated at the international war con-
ferences.
system pro-
pean
early given
operations against
from the
Other Partners
decisions
partners, but
also involved to varying
ada,
Australia,
phery of the British-American coalition.
Like
pated
in military
with
Japan
other major
powers, China
state. Nominally a republic, China re-
sembled a weak
shek,
great part
munists hovered on the
politics and
worked against
any strong
l imi ted .
in manpower illusory.
basic
organized a huge and unwieldy
army of
ground forces seldom offered more than
token resistance
to the
t ive and most heavily populated
areas on
8 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR
COALITION WARFARE
early
1942
air route over the mountains from India
permitted a thin trickle of supplies to
reach China.
survival,
from it s
United States. In addition, it looked
to the United States to act as its cham-
pion vis-a-vis
whose past
interference in
suspicion. Considerable time
war effort would become clear to the
United States. Like the Russians, the
Chinese were engaged against only
one of
only one of the international
confer-
Kai-shek confer with
th e Western
a tangled
humil i -
presented a delicate problem. The
French, proud of their past
and sensitive
of their
people.
country and the
manpower closely watched by the enemy,
France's capacity to
Africa. In
contribute
decisively
Axis Powers, France was accorded an
honorary place of importance for politi-
ca l reasons. In the
case
to the
alize the position. Both the British and
the Americans wished to see a friendly
France re-established on the Continent,
though their methods
and means of
Americans to maintain rela-
so
France from their own resources and did
not attempt to foist France on the USSR
as a first
ing the fiction of France as a great power
with
weakness
muster .
lowed
British supplies and equipment, they
could only hope for the day when Axis
defeat
would
the status quo ante bellum. Only in
circumstances
where
to gain acceptance
of their own
British Commonweal th of Nations—in
general permitted the British to
repre-
tween the United States and Canada, on
the one hand, and the close wartime co-
operation of the United States
with
Australia
to
counterbalance
British
atmosphere of reliance and good faith
between these allies and the two chief
Western partners.
discussion
American grand
versations
the
resort to war.
that Germany was the predominant
member of the hostile
made in the Atlantic and European
area. Should Japan enter the war, mili-
tary strategy in the Far
East
conditional
understanding;
power
was
close
in
troops on its shores. Before the United
States
Japan
stored, ships built, and extensive pre-
l iminary operations undertaken to se-
cure
munications across
Britain,
simply could not wait for a decision in
the war
fore,
contained until
offensive
in
in World
War II.
First"
held
throughout
the
war ,
the
and applied arose early in the conflict
and remained almost to the end. One of
the
against Japan. This problem reflected a
certain divergence
strategy. For Britain, with predominant
interests in the Mediterranean, the
Middle East, and on the
Continent,
the
in
early
9
For
accounts
the Pacific war. As a
result, differences
allies over the distribution of resources
between the two wars.
expense of the Pacific.
The
Search
United
Kingdom
they
were
first, they
defeating Ger-
saw the emergence of divergent British
and
American
Germany
early
became
advanced
the
and the Mediterranean. In the summer
of 1941 during th e Atlantic
Conference,
patriots
would
fensive
action
would
operating on the
large-scale
the German
military machine.
No vast
World War I would be needed. At the
A R C A D I A Conference Churchill fur ther
elaborated on these ideas for the Presi-
dent.
with the Churchillian theory
called the peripheral
would be on swift
the
so-called
soft
underbelly
the Mediterranean involved entering
Balkans—either to the north Balkans or
to Greece—to Germany. From the begin-
ning, the British envisaged a cross-Chan-
nel operation in force only as the last
blow against a Germany already in pro-
cess of collapse. These two ideas of the
Brit ish—emphasis
on the Mediterranean
coup
British concept was a compound of mili-
tary and
ister's predilections. It was tailored to
suit scattered interests, a small-scale
economy, and limited
of
land
Germany. In the summer of 1941 the
Army strategic planners, studying the re-
quirements of a global war for the initial
Victory Program, concluded that sooner
or later "we must prepare to fight Ger-
many by actually coming to grips with
and defeating her ground forces and
definitely breaking her will to
com-
bat."
10
whelming air superiority in Europe.
11
already
disposed
meeting the German Army
Army of
theory
concentra-
defeat of the enemies' armies. It reflected
American
military hardware and the faith of the
mil i tary in the ability to raise,
equip,
train,
of relieving the pressure upon the
Rus-
other to its concept of strategy and the
long debate
From
no doubts about the
they wanted it
ponement of this
came in
an invasion of North Africa—the TORCH
operation—versus the American desire
fo r an early cross-Channel attack—the
Bolero-Roundup plan.
10
Chart, "Ultimate R e q u i r e m e n t s — G r o u n d
Forces," App II, Pt II, Sec 1, JB 355, ser 707.
The Victory Program is discussed in (1) Watson,
Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XI; (2)
Richard
tics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Gov-
ernment
William
L.
Langer
1953), pp. 735-42.
prepared
a
and embodied its strategic faith. In the opinion of
the air planners, it was
doubtful
spring
of
1944.
The
expressed
the
belief
might not be necessary.
Department,
ners approved AWPD/1, which
James
Lea
Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War 11,
I, Plans and Early
AAF I), 131-32, 146-47,
including th e evolution of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP
plan, the consequent Anglo-American debate,
and
velt
and XXV; (3) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge
Bundy,
ston S. Churchill , Th e
Second
Book
(London, Collins, 1952), Ch. V.
steps
BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, the brainchild
ference the Americans and
against Germany was to preserve the
lines of communications across the North
Atlantic between the United States and
the fortress in the British
Isles,
U.S. forces should be
any
that fortress as a base for invasion of the
Continent. In the early
gan to be
partment. Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, General Marshall, and the
Army planners became increasingly dis-
turbed over the dispersion of troops,
ships,
crises in non-European parts
Russians
Practically
all
Harbor
strategy. The thinking of the Army staff
was sharply reflected in a notation made
on 22 January 1942 by Brig. Gen.
Dwight
D.
adoption
ing me down. . . . We've got to go to
Europe
followed by a
land attack as
partment planners, under General Eisen-
hower's guidance,
subsequent
itself would not solve the problem of de-
feating Germany. As a solution, the Joint
Chiefs adopted the concept of invading
Europe
in
force
as proposed by General Marshall, called
for forces to be assembled immediately
(BOLERO) for a cross-Channel invasion
in the spring of 1943
(ROUNDUP).
To
emergency
or the USSR seem on the verge of
collapse.
plan
Hopkins
The relief felt by
1911-13;
1940 he again became Secretary of War.
14
entry, Item
assistant
chief of staff of
of the War
came
chief
his staff found
Maj. Gen. Dwight D.
". . . at
mitted
tives, our efforts will begin to fall in line
and we won't just be
thrashing around
UP was especially desirable for a
number
the
soundest
sive against Germany and an
attack
on
using the
sented the shortest route
In the British Isles, the United States
could safely land its ground forces with-
out the aid of carrier-based air cover and
could safely develop air superiority over
northern France. The route of attack
into Germany
plan would meet
a
industrial and manpower mobilization.
a
definite
a
long-range
principle of concentration. For a while
plans went ahead for the second front.
General
Eisenhower
the European Theater of Operations
(ETO), and U.S. forces began to land in
considerable numbers.
the
ister came to Washington and supported
a North African operation—as he had at
ARCADIA. So disturbed was the American
staff over the evident
ening the British with an all-out offen-
sive in the Pacific—the so-called Pacific
alternative—a
Hopkins, Marshall, and King went to
London for further discussions. Out of
these came the decision to launch a
North
1942. TORCH replaced BOLERO-ROUNDUP.
out,
the
President
tw o basic
factors—President Roosevelt's
forces against Germany in 1942, and the
categoric refusal of Churchill and his
staff to
Channel
operation.
The
need
Middle
East
influenced
tive advantages that
all sides recognized
operation. The shipping situation was
so tight that all possible measures had to
15
Notations
by
Eisenhower,
command post in World War II, see Ray S. Cline,
Washington Command
(hereafter cited as Cline, Washington Command
Post).
14 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
be taken to get more ships. A saving of
over
200
ships
per
Middle
East
Mediterranean instead of around the
Cape of Good Hope. There were, it must
be recognized, serious questions concern-
ing the feasibility of launching the cross-
Channel operation in
tions
were resources
decision was a bitter pill. To them it
meant the adoption of a strategy of en-
circlement,
later
many.
of the BOLERO versus
Depart-
system—miscarried. In retrospect the plan
seems to have been premature. Neither
the
British
means
generating a strategy of their own, and
the
impatience
it may appear to the latter. There were
enough forces and means to
undertake
TORCH.
The
Marshal Joseph Stalin's
disapproval in a
friendly gestures as offering direct mili-
tary assistance in the Caucasus, develop-
ment of the Persian Gulf delivery route,
and a build-up of the
Alaska-Siberia
air
They could expect no real improvement
in military relations
The Pacific was also diverting power
from the American
resources on which
demands in
first year of the war in the
Pacific
was
armed
supply lines and bases
allotted to
ful ly anticipated the great need for air
and ground service units for Australia
16
Plans
served as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group
until he succeeded
17
sailings to the USSR along the northern route, see
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch.
XIV.
and Pacific island bases and had to make
successive
to the Pacific conflicted with the determi-
nation
resources to the Pacific had
begun
to
produce
results,
Japanese forces at the
1942) by no
in the new phase of the Pacific war,
was
"line" of bases to support a harassing
naval defensive,
be-
yond
sives
was
plotted
inforcements in the
the
troop
Central Pacific
be needed to complete these tasks.
For the Pacific
was about equal to the total number of
Army forces
overseas and 17 of the 72 air combat
groups
successfully, but the problems
been
CBI, as in the Middle
East, the United
jurisdictional, strategic, and logistical
mainland
overseas
ward
vestment of
structed in February 1942 to increase
both the effectiveness of American as-
sistance to the Chinese Government and
the combat efficiency
of the Chinese
by the Japanese in late April, the prob-
lems facing Stilwell's mission
ever,
Middle
ply theater. A year
area.
strategic responsibility
come
18
African
th e
dia. Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general on
25 February 1942.
16 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
1942 had forced successive modifications
in the plans for the use of Army forces
in the At the end of December
1942 about
marily air and service troops. This en-
larged commitment reflected, in part, in-
creased operational air
American offensive action in the Medi-
terranean. In part, it
Gulf supply route fo r shipments of sup-
plies to the Soviet Union.
All in
divisions
and
overseas were deployed in the war
against Japan. The
combat groups overseas
were deployed in
air combat groups overseas were dis-
tributed among Latin American and
South Atlantic bases. The
against Japan exceeded by over 85,000
the total U.S. Army forces
deployed in
the parcelling out of shipping to move
and
end of 1942, the
strategy of scarcity. The basic
fear was
survival of the
1942 it had become apparent that,
though the Western Allies were still not
agreed on strategy, their plans were tied
to the outcome of the struggle on the
Eastern Front. But Stalin had turned
down the offer of Roosevelt and Church-
ill to send an Anglo-American air force
to support the Soviet forces in the Cau-
casus. He made it unmistakably clear
that Western military forces were
not
wanted
front.
their first
yet squarely joined. That British notions
of strategy had tended to prevail was not
surprising.
British
forces
19
Statistical
Digest,
1947, pp. 2-12; (2) STM-30, 1 Jan 48; and (3)
OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42. According to
the STM—30 computation, total forces deployed
in
numbered 377,644.
factors on A r m y
planning and the constant
Coakley,
of
mind,
since
in
he had asked for
twenty-five to th i r ty divisions to be sent from Great
Britain
to
Archangel
south-
ern f ront in the USSR. See Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Bos-
ton,
It had
any
appreciable
mouth,
and
siderable measure determined by
Troops had been parcelled out piecemeal
to meet immediate threats, crises, and
needs in the primarily defensive and
garrisoning phase of the war. New to the
art of military diplomacy and negotia-
tion, the Americans were
planning on an orderly,
concentration in which the
effec-
tive
dissipation o f forces and materiel in what
they regarded as
secondary ventures still
tive
staff. Active and passive fronts were now
established all over the world. The
TORCH decision had thrown all Allied
strategic planning into a state of uncer-
tainty and flux. The old issues of en-
circlement
th e Army staff hoped had been
settled
agreement in the spring of
1942
on
th e planners was how to limit operations
in
question during 1943 and
sideration of possibilities of
them could be reached. The
positive
as-
pect
invasion
the
this was the attempt to guide the inter-
mediate operations
sent
Allied coalition remained
their application
the establishment of a foothold in Nor-
mandy in the summer of 1944—was th e
period of increasing plenty. The power
to call the turn on strategy and to choose
the
with its partners, had to come to grips
with the offensive phase of the coalition
war. U.S. troops and
full
impact
larly, the
to survive the
strategy. The balance of power
within
As the new
not yet found a common ground of
agreement. Between the United States
and the United Kingdom, fundamental
war strategy and planning for the im-
mediate fu ture were unsettled. Into this
vacuum and state of uncertainty the
President, at the Casablanca Conference
in January 1943, introduced
conse-
quences
ficial meeting with Prime Minister
Churchill
a historic occasion, marking a double
first for the President: the first time that
a
fice and the first time
that a U.S. presi-
Roosevelt's departure
The
across the hazardous Atlantic at the
Nor th African port of Casablanca. There,
on the outskirts, in a large
hotel on a
the President
19
THE
ANFA HOTEL ON THE O UT SK IR T S OF C A S A B L A N C A , site of the
first midwar inter-
military staff. General Marshall and his
staff, Admiral King, and General
Arnold
had
Anfa Hotel
palm trees, bougainvillaea, and orange
groves and
tected by barbed
groves, and
seem incongruous in the wartime atmo-
sphere.
In
global
tables they carried
hours of the
series of Combined Chiefs of Staff con-
ferences. In the absence of Admiral
Leahy, who had become ill en route,
General Marshall,
Their British
Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley
Pound, First Sea Lord, and Air Chief
20 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
Marshal
Sir
Charles
Field
Marshal
British Joint Staff
Mission in Washing-
hovered the two
American invitation to participate on the
ground that the critical situation at Stal-
ingrad demanded his
cam-
paign.
The
practical
American
North African campaign
had been dis-
Africa already
campaign
British and
tion
though
would do its
hand, the
Balkans
and
leave
the Americans predicted
showed signs of
peninsula. The Americans
over the prospects of German collapse
in the
armies and air
German
3
had
had
much
in
common
since
early
in
the
war,
the answer given would
Minister had no doubt what the correct
course of Allied action for 1943 should
be. In November 1942 he had cabled
the President that the "paramount task"
before the United States and the
United
Kingdom
1
Corps in France in 1940; he became commander of
the British Home Forces in 1940 and Chief of the
Imperial General Staff in 1941.
Admiral Pound was
named First Sea Lord and chief of the British naval
staff in May 1939 and became Admiral of the
Fleet
in July 1939. Air Chief Marsha l Portal had served
on the Air Council and as Air Officer, Command-
ing-in-chief, Bomber Command; he was appointed
Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, in October
1940.
2
3
42, t i t le: German Strategy
in 1943. ( 2) Comments
1943, n. d. Both in Casablanca
Books,
Africa and open the Mediterranean to
military traffic and, second, to use the
bases on the African shore "to strike at
the underbelly of the Axis ... in the
shortest time."
it, it was the obvious immediate objec-
tive for consideration at the conference.
The British
with
complete.
5
place
staffs. Neither the U.S. and British Chiefs
of Staff nor their
planners had been able
subsequent
Marshall's own
been
concept and had afterwards been so en-
grossed
that
they
the eve of
building
up
and
North
sion for a month or two. Such
circum-
General Marshall
in the British Isles, but
Marshall
in defense of the plan. His course would
serve
a major cross-Channel operation was
still a cardinal objective in American
strategic planning.
Cross-Channel Versus
cross-Channel operation in 1943. Early
in the
question was the extent to which the
associated powers had to
which they
improve
the
Axis.
6
the American and British leaders to de-
cide on the
he added,
BOLERO and from
8
American
BOLERO. It was Marshall's belief
that
in
"ab-
4
42, No.
was circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plans
and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East,
and Near East. (2)
tions, see: (1) Cline, Washington Command
Post,
Strategic
7
Min,
G Y M N A S T was the code
name
BRITISH
AND
LEADERS AT
Roosevelt
Henry H.
of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound,
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, and Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal.
normally
main British-American effort against
operation
aimed
at
northern
France.
spring of 1942 in defense of the
BOLERO-
ranean
centration of
not become committed to
Kingdom awaiting a hypothetical Ger-
man
collapse.
A
Kingdom would
whether further operations in the
Medi-
portionate to the hazards involved. Any
Mediterranean undertaking projected
weighed
situation
the
over-all
planning
British
Germany
until late
in the
limited by the
from
1943. If the Allies prepared for
that
the USSR throughout the summer. Sir
Alan then went on to say the British and
Americans should definitely count on
entering
the
Continent
in
force
in
1944.
try to
to do this was to threaten Germany every-
where in the Mediterranean, try to knock
Italy out of the war, and try to bring Tur-
key in. Intensifying British-American
scatter its air resources. Mediterranean
operations, especially against I taly,
would result in a considerable diversion
of
the deterioration of Germany, the British
called for a continued build-up of
British-American forces in the United
Kingdom in preparation for an invasion
of th e Continent.
appeals
of Italy
launched. He was attracted by the possi-
bility of
The Germans would then have to take
over the defense of Italy and the Italian
commitments for the defense of the
Balkans.
war. Turkey
the Rumanian oil fields and for
opening
USSR. With
staff, to be thinking purely in terms of a
S L E D G E H A M M E R operation.
11
In
addition
that the President was not disinclined
toward fur ther
wanted U.S.
9
(1) Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. (2) M i n ,
58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43. (3) Min, 60th mtg CCS,
18 Jan 43.
(1) Min, 57th mtg CCS, 15 Jan 43. (2) Min,
58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
11
Official
Casa-
WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government
Print-
Churchill ,
Stim-
24 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
quick,
ranean
Italy.
American intention of relieving German
pressure on them. He may have been
influenced at this time in favor of a
Mediterranean strategy
UP but
British-American operation against Ger-
scale operation on the Continent might
be postponed until somewhat later.
Meanwhile,
the
Kingdom
showed signs of
predilections
of
Chief of Staff had to recognize that
cer-
on the possibility of a 1943
ROUNDUP.
amphibious operations. Thus Marshall
and the JCS, in a special session held
during the conference, Lt. Gen. Dwight
D.
originally
mated would be necessary.
operations following his early
BOLERO-ROUNDUP
be the submarine menace and delivery o f
supplies
followed
the
Chief
be attracted by some aspects of Mediter-
ranean undertakings.
vantages
Germany
from
conceded the argument
were the effects
line communications
vet-
th e
campaign was over. If these forces could
be employed without having to be
trans-
ported
critical Allied shipping situation in the
Atlantic would not be aggravated. Econo-
my of tonnage—especially in view of the
ever present
13
blanca Conf Book.
President,
JCS,
C A S A B L A N C A - B E G I N N I N G OF AN ERA 25
consideration." Between the two most
Mediterranean operations,
of Sicily would
Sicily in
Allied hands,
operations
in
Burma,
drawal from the
war, forcing Germany
Prime
Minister
Chiefs of Staff agreed to undertake an
operation against Sicily
the Mediterranean operation only
Mediterranean. He still wished to make
the main effort against Germany across
the Channel. At the
Turkey to
flow of lend-lease
ment that all possible aid should be given
to the Russians in
far to go in sending convoys
over th e
that the heavy losses of
1942 must
not be
themselves, simply to get
other
th e invasion of Sicily, if this proved
necessary. Admiral King, while main-
taining that
every effort
agreed with Marshall that it would not
be wise to continue the Murmansk con-
voys if the losses became prohibitive.
17
ways been a
USSR and who had been willing to have
Marshall go to the Soviet Union
to dis-
18
not be continued at prohibitive cost to
the United N ations effort ."
19
No
attempt
15
divergences
see: (1) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan 43,
Official Casablanca Conf Book; and (2) Churchill,
Hinge of Fate, p. 678.
For a discussion of Mediterranean alternatives
in Allied strategy and the f inal compromise on
Sicily at Casablanca, see H. M. Smyth, The Sicilian
Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, MS, Ch. I,
OCMH files.
of Marshall's
especially: (1 ) min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official
Casablanca Conf Book; (2) min, 60th tg CCS, 18
Jan 43; (3) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan
43 , Official
17
(1)
18 Jan 43. (2) Min, 2d
Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43. (3) Min, 55th mtg JCS, 19
Jan 43. (4) Min,
His-
of
Staff,
MS,
Sec.
Coalition
Warfare ,
Ch. IV, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Aid to Rus-
sia, 1942-43," by Capt Ernesto G iust i.
18
below.
26
STRATEGIC
P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
was made to define just what would
constitute "prohibitive
The very
f lexibi l i ty of the term indicated that the
over-all shipping situation plus the rate
of shipping losses in the months before
the
invasion
on Sicily be made with
"the favorable
if possible.
Soviet
Italy. General
east, crossed the Tunisian frontier, Gen-
eral Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander
would become Deputy
com-
tions in Tunisia,
Planning and preparations in the theater
fo r HUSKY were to begin at once. On the
other side of the Mediterranean, opera-
tions
with an agreement
between the Presi-
left as a British responsibility. The de-
feat of the U-boat menace was
accepted
the resources of the
many, the conferees did call for the es-
tablishment of a combined command
and planning staff to plan for a return
to
tions. This return might take the form
o f small-scale ra ids , an emergency
operation in 1943 in the event of a
sudden German collapse, a limited
operation in 1943 to secure a bridgehead
on the Continent for later exploitation,
or "an invasion in
suffi-
and a
commander
for a 1944 R O U N D U P could
be appointed
elsewhere, U.S.
modified BOLERO).
staff
from the
President and Prime Minister Summariz ing Deci-
sions by the CCS. See also min, 56th
mtg JCS, 20
(1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the
War in 1943. (2) 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title:
Final
Rpt
Decisions by the CCS. (3 ) Min, 66th mtg CCS, 22
Jan 43.
Command,
Control,
Planning
the COSSAC (Chief
nucleus
of
SHAEF
45 .
23
experts, it was estimated
could
at
1,118,000
43, t i t le:
Shipping Capabilities fo r BOLERO Build-
up.
nitely count on reentering the Continent
in 1944
airpower. Both sides agreed that
the
King-
To defeat Germany,
to bomb
remained a prerequisite to any major
ground
urg-
ground as
Chiefs, preferring Mediterranean action
of the bomber offensive in Allied
strategic
jectives? Specifically, how should Ameri-
can concepts of air tactics and command
be accommodated to the f luctuat ions in
combined strategic
directly interested. So was General
Marshall. He and his planning staff in
the War Department had
steadily
gram. During the debate
Marshall tried
timing by using an
ground
forces
in the
plan.
25
The decision in favor of H U S K Y clear-
ly made uncertain an all-out invasion of
th e Continent in 1943. General Arnold
supported the views
conference.
Arnold
in the postponement of that planned in -
vasion. More time would
matic strategic air bombardment. That
bomber offensive would perforce become
a more independent operation,
AAF
th e United
The postponement of the continental
invasion
clearly set forth in a document issued by
the Air planners on 9 September 1942
and
known
24
25
26
A
a
reaffirmation of A W P D / 1 , is contained in Wesley
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army
Air Forces in
multaneously against both Germany and
Japan with the resources available. Be-
tween
Germany
tive. The
accessible
to
Allied
air
forces.
For
1943
given
Ger-
many
of German
be successfully executed by mid-1944 if
over-all requirements of approximately
aircraft fo r
1943 were met.
In AWPD-42, production s c h e d u l e s ,
priorities and allocations for aircraft,
and training and deployment programs
were
that
time
it
would
many. A similar
strategic air offensive
launched against Japan. The contem-
plated air offensive
against Germany was
combined strategic
U.S. airmen
war. The U.S. air forces in the European
theater would concentrate on the de-
struction of
selected vital
centrate upon
dustrial areas.
was th e fear that its troops and planes
would be
strategic
the Air planners believed wholehearted-
ly in the
(CBO) from the
United Kingdom pre-
concurrent decision to
27
The
"the progressive
ing of the morale of the German people
to a point where their capacity for
armed
(a)
portation,
vided also for drawing
Medi-
progressive weakening of Germany
with his operations
(Chicago,
hereaf ter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF II), 277-
79,
(1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the
War in 1943. (2) See also
Craven and Cate,
cept of a cross-Channel air-ground opera-
tion,
Chief
Marshal
became an
immediate prospect,
give
opera-
tions.
29
command. The scepticism expressed
daylight
precision
30
The
Arnold enlisted the support of Maj. Gen.
Ira C. Eaker, the U.S. Eighth Air Force
commander, to present the case for the
as
yet
experienced crews, lack of long-range
fighter escorts, improved German fighter
tactics and antiaircraft
fire, the require-
program of bombardment had been de-
layed. A
year after
U.S. airpower. Marshall felt
Churchill's
sympa-
can cause,
British decided
has
since recorded his satisfaction in the
t r ibu te later paid to him by U.S. Air
leaders for saving their daylight bomb-
ing program at Casablanca.
win acceptance for AAF air tactics; it
was another to insure
full control by the
argued
demonstrated
England should therefore be put in the
hands of the British, but , Marshall in-
sisted, the bombing methods and tech-
niques of the
by the CCS. The British gave their as-
sent to this arrangement.
a definite place in Allied planning
against Germany. However, its contribu-
tion on the use of airpower was more in
th e nature of general policy and guiding
principles
target priority list
of the combined
translate
30
AAF II,
296—302.
In January 1942 Eaker
had organized the VIII
in
England,
33
(1) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (2) Min,
65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.
30
STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
Old
Versus
British delegations to
strategy, the cross-Channel-Mediterrane-
ranean offensive—against Sicily—the con-
tinuation of a modified BOLERO, and the
agreement on a round-the-clock com-
bined
bomber
plex
would be made from the United King-
dom or in the Mediterranean. The U.S.
and British staffs remained
tions had not been settled. The stake for
operational
fu r the r Mediterranean operations would
continue to be
R O U N D U P
type,
desired
by
Minister. In and out of a series of inter-
national conferences in
issue.
i t ive solution of the cross-Channel-Med-
iterranean issue, it did represent the last
real fling of the "either-or" school of
thought in American strategic thinking.
Hereafter, the U.S. staff would increas-
ingly have to recognize that a new period
of complex choices had been ushered in
—one that
terranean,
and
of
ing questions in European strategy down
to
opera-
alternatives
in
such
the United Kingdom. The
that.
divergence
of the war against Japan to the war as a
whole . A s long as plans for defeating
Hitler first remained indeterminate, the
precise place of the China-Burma-India
and Pacific theaters in the over-all
strategy of the war remained
uncertain.
years weighed
Their
final strategy against Germany was all the
greater since the Americans had early
assumed
against Japan. It was a serious question
w h e t he r the American people and the
A r m y could stand the effects of the
exhausting, long, drawn-out fight
Divergency of
the British that they still regarded as
basically sound the accepted principle
of British-American strategy: "To con-
duct the
cable date,
defensive in other theaters
JCS prepared a
modified version that
velop offensive
more seriously than apparently
quests in the
the British—of Japanese
vent the
ther expansion, provided communica-
36
Burma Road, but the U.S. Chiefs dwelt
more on the urgency of doing it.
Pacific Operations
Chiefs elaborated on these positions.
Each time the British brought up the
question of
with the question of
tance of the Pacific effort. To
bring
the
possible
was
coming to grips with Japan.
It was also
JC S had greater
peace of mind about
threat
carriers against U.S. lines of communica-
tions to the Pacific and against the Amer-
ican west coast. The Japanese must be
permitted
no
pause.
idea of surrendering and would con-
tinue to be aggressive until defeated by
attrition.
37
at Casablanca General Marshall made
the
contained
in
Basic Strategic
Concept
for 1943, circulated as CCS 135 on 26 Dec 42 for
consideration
largely the
JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for
1943; (2) JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, t i t le: Basic Strategic
Concept for 1943; and (3) JCS
167/1,
British Chiefs of Staff.
32
STRATEGIC
P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION W A R F A R E
vision
Atlantic and
that
38
specifically warned that sufficient
Pacific.
39
hampered
had made
standing
Allied effort
Chiefs turned
th e
terranean
area.
Pacific, Churchill promised that, after
th e
He went so far as to offer to enter into
a special treaty with the United States
Government to
this effect.
The Presi-
plying
ment"
th e fight
against Japan once
41
The
British
all-out
war.
American resources
many, unsuccessful.
They preferred
more
or
less
fixed
Sir Dudley Pound even suggested that
it
would
be
impossible
Within a generation the attitude and policy of the United States toward
alliances have undergone a revolutionary reversal. The nation has passed
from it s traditional suspicion and fear of "entangling alliances" to a policy
t h a t heavi ly stakes
its
security
and
interests
co-operation
of
other
powers. In World War I the U.S. Government cautiously def ined its rela-
tionship with the powers allied against Germany as that of an Associated
Power. In World War II, though last to join the Grand Alliance, it v i r tu -
al ly integrated its resources with those of the British Commonwealth and
co-ordinated its strategy and war aims with the British and the USSR in
the most
it has
and built up alliances all over the troubled
world. The climax of its most intensive experience w i t h coalition strategy
came in the phase of World War II described in this volume, which should
therefore have a special interest for all who are concerned with the impli-
cations
Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of M i l i t a r y History
30 April 1958
Washington, D. C.
and
A member of Phi Beta
Kappa and the American Historical Association's
Committee
on the His-
torian and the Federal Government, he has taught History at Brooklyn
College and the
tured on military
College,
War II, he
the Russian area and
language a t Yale and served as an instructor in intelligence and as a historian
in the
the Operations Division historical project
in the War Department General Staff as a civilian member, becoming in
1949 the Chief of the Strategic
Plans
History.
of Strategic Planning
for Coalition War-
fare: 1941-1942, and his articles and reviews on modern strategy and
state-
various service
Coalition
War-
national planning
and military strategy. The 1941-42 volume, of which th e present author
w as coauthor, told the story of plans and decisions as
they affected the
missions and dispositions of the U.S. Army in the defensive phase of coali-
tion warfare , when the Grand Alliance
was still in its
strategic planning in the midwar era
from January 1943 through the summer of 1944. This is the story of the
hopes, fears, struggles, frustrations, and triumphs of the Army
strategic
planners
coming
to
grips
offensive phase
account
of
planning
debate on European strategy
which followed the Allied landings in North Africa and continued to the
penetration of the German frontier
in September 1944.
During this period
the great international conferences from Casablanca in January 1943 to the
second Quebec in September
formulated
and decisions to the end of the summer of 1944,
when the problems of
winning the war began to come up against the challenges of
victory
and
peace, and a new era was beginning for the Army Chief of Staff and his
advisers.
The presentation util izes both the narrative and the analytical approach.
It sets forth the principal steps in the development of the
American
strategic
case, and seeks the raison d'étre behind that case. It a t tempts to view,
through the eyes of the Washington high command, the war as a whole and
in its main component parts. The
method
is to trace the plans, concepts,
and ideas of the planners up through the different levels—Army, j o in t
staff (Army and
Navy) , Joint Chiefs of Staff, th e meetings of the
American
staff with the President, and of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff at the plenary
sessions with President Franklin D. and Prime Minis te r Winston
Churchill. The chronological and structural f ramework for the study
is provided by the big conferences, Casablanca
(January 1943), TRIDENT
1943), Cairo-Tehran
treating
the planning for the war against Germany and that against Japan separ-
the debates,
compromises, decisions, and revisions, the focus is placed on the advocates of
the American military case—especially on General
Marshall.
literature available
for the
American
contributions
on the art of
strategy,
the art of the calculated risk, as it developed in World
War II. No attempt has
been
partners in the Grand Alliance. That of the British and
other English-
speaking allies is being disclosed in accounts that they are publishing.
Whether th e Russians and Chinese will ever
publish
full,
about
American
And unfortunately, despite
a flood of personal recollections of World War II, of the two principal
actors
in
filling some of the gaps in the available literature, will help
those readers
field—staff
officers, civil
In writing this volume the author acknowledges most gratefully assistance
from many of the persons mentioned in the Preface to the
preceding
volume,
notably
author
and, along with
volume, who provided stimulating discussions during the processes of plan-
ning
and
composition
and
offered
valuable
Alice
Bailey who gave unstinted help with wartime planning documents.
The author owes a great debt to Mr. Walter G. Hermes, whose assistance
has been invaluable. Mr. Hermes investigated
many
topics essential to the
completion of the volume, particularly in the field of strategy and planning
in the conflict
information, reviewed for the author countless passages and references, and
his
broad
knowledge
Army are reflected throughout the volume.
A great measure
of thanks is due to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, who
gave unstintingly
scholarly craftsmanship. Others
in the Office of the Chief of Military History who were
especially helpful
were Drs. Stetson Conn and Louis Morton, Colonels George G. O'Connor
and Ridgway P. Smith, Jr., Drs. Richard
M. Leighton and Robert W.
Coakley, and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. He is especially
indebted to Miss Mary
perceptive, and watchful
x
generous help he
wishes to thank the many records experts who aided him—notably Miss
Wava Phillips, Mrs. Hazel Ward,
Mr. Israel Wice and his assistants, and
Mr.
and his staff at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.
Copy editing was done by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes, selection of pictures
by Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and indexing by Virginia C. Leighton. Credit
fo r maintaining a correct text of the manuscript through repeated revisions
is due particularly to two high ly capable secretaries—Mrs. Ella M ay Ablahat
and Mrs. Edna W. Salsbury.
The
author
is also obliged to those others who read all or parts of the
text in manuscr ipt—to Professors Will iam L. Langer and Charles H.
Taylor of
Univers i ty ; to Professor Wesley F. Craven of Princeton
Univers i ty ,
to Dr. Harvey A. De
Weerd of the Rand Corporation; to Maj. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, who
encouraged the
from
A l b e r t
C . Wedemeyer, U SA (Ret . ) ; to Maj. Gen. R i c ha r d
C . Lindsay, U S A F ;
to Cols. W il l i a m W . Bessell, Jr., George
A. Lincoln, Edward M. Harr is ,
William
H.
Baumer;
of
nently, in the events set for th .
A special category of t h a n k s is reserved to my wife, Gertrude
G l i c k l e r
Matloff ,
interpretations presented
MAURICE MATLOFF
Washington, D.C.
10
I. CASABLANCA-BEGINNING OF AN E R A : J A N U A R Y
1943
Casablanca i n Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
II. A D V A N C E IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: JANUARY-
M A Y 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3
Critical Shortages
Atlantic . . . . 43
Rearming t h e French . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
Commitments to the Middle East
. . . . . . . . .
The Problem of the Neutrals: Spain and Turkey
... 63
Role o f
EAST:
J A N U A R Y - M A Y 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 7 7
Stalemate i n Burma
T h e Clash o f Personalities . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4
Victory Through Airpower? . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
Planning f o r Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . . 8 8
System o f Command o f
Joint Operations . . . . . .
1 0 2
. . . .
Strategy
Preparations and Rehearsal for TRIDENT . . . . . 120
xiii
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6
Cross-Channel and Mediterranean Operations . . . . 126
T h e Pacific a n d F a r East . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 5
T h e Balance Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 3
VII.
FROM
TO
A V A L A N C H E : MAY-MID-AUGUST
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 6
Search for the Formula Continued . . . . . . . . 162
Strategy, Production, a n d
Manpower . . . . . . . . 1 7 9
AND FUTURE OPERATIONS IN
JUNE-AUGUST
1943
185
193
Air Operations and Command Problems in the CBI . . . 198
Origins of the Command . . . . . . . 201
Sino-British Attitudes a n d Policies . . . . . . . . . 2 03
Planning the Over-all War Against
Japan
. . . . . . 205
X.
Debating the Issues in the War Against Germany . . . 220
Discussion on the War Against Japan
. . . . . . . 230
XI. "THE MEDITERRANEAN AGAIN":
N O V E M B E R 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4
Invasion o f Italy
T h e Balkans a n d Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 59
Mediterranean Build-up Versus OVERLORD . . . . . 2 6 2
XII. STRATEGY
AND C O M M A N D IN THE WAR AGAINST
G E R M A N Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0
The Problem of
The USSR in
T h e Moscow Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1
Fish or Cu t Bait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
XIV. STRATEGIC STRANDS IN THE WAR
AGAINST
AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . .
The Quest for Short Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
T h e Progress o f Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . 3 1 2
Shipping,
New Techniques and Weapons in the War Against
Japan
The JCS
. . . . .
Opening Skirmish
Climax at Tehran: 28 November-1 December 1943 . . 356
Mop-up
at
Cairo:
3-7
XVII. STRATEGIC INVENTORY: DECEMBER
T h e Tally Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 9 7
Preparations f o r OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 3
OVERLORD Planning and Mediterranean Options . . 412
OVERLORD and the
S E C O N D A R Y
WAR-
T H E CBI:
J A N U A R Y - M A Y 1944
. . . . . . . . 4 3 3
4 3 3
T h e
442
T h e Battle o f t h e A i r
Transports . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7
T h e Decline o f t h e C B I . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 9
XX. THE SECOND
FRONT AND THE S E C O N D A R Y WAR-
T H E PACIFIC: J A N U A R Y - M A Y 1944 . . . . . . . 4 5 1
T h e
E n d o f a Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 9
O f Troops a n d Transports . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 1
Eve of OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64
XXI. THE PROMISE OF MILITARY VICTORY: D DAY TO
SEPTEMBER 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 6
ANVIL-The Last Rounds
Target-Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T h e Anglo-American
Coalition . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
T h e Second Quebec Conference . . . . . . . . . 5 0 8
Expansion and Distribution of U.S. Military Power . . . 518
T h e
Appendix
A.
Summary
of
Current
Cairo Conference . 541
Asia—A Reflection
tember 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 6
D. Shipment of Divisions Overseas—January 1942-September
1944
. 550
tember 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
TO
FOOTNOTES
. . . 556
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY O F
INDEX
1943-44 . . . 207
377
3. Planners' Deployment Estimates of March 1943 an d Actual Deploy-
ment
1943 . . . . . . . . . . .
3 9 1
4. Arm y Overseas Deployment: 31 December 1942-31 December 1943 392
5 . U.S. Overseas
Illustrations
Outskirts
Generals Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle. . . . . . . . . . 38
High-Ranking Trio
in New
. . . . . . 218
. . . . . 22 2
General Arnold With Lord Louis Mountbatten . . . . . . . . . 237
Roosevelt's Concept of Postwar Occupation Zones for Germany ... 341
Aboard t h e
Kai-shek and Madame Chiang . . . . . . . 351
The Big Three in Portico of the Soviet Legation, Tehran . . . . . 358
The Combined Staffs Meeting in
Mena House, 4 December 1943 . . . 368
Ismet Inonu, the President of Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Supreme Commander, Allied
General Marshall With General
. . . . . . . . . 4 6 8
Guard of Honor on Review at The
Citadel
. . . . . . . . . . 509
Members
from
of December
on
Pearl
1
The
had not yet
sweeps of the Axis Powers in Europe and
in the far Pacific and had themselves
taken
turning of the
both sides would be starting
afresh and
area
close
allies,
Great
Britain
would also have to begin anew. After a
ful l year of war, th e weight of U.S. forces
was beginning to be felt in the
theaters.
Prime Minister Winston
War Department
early, direct, massive assault
new phase of global and coalition war-
fare for the strategic
The
the
full of surprises and changes. Gradually
the
nation, recovered
preparations for
pair the major part of the planners' ad-
vance work.
principle already accepted in U.S.
mil i -
They
1
General
Marshall
ton to serve as Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans
Division in
Deputy Chief
parations is
UNITED STATES
(hereafter cited as Prewar Plans an d Preparations).
See also: (1) Ma urice Matloff an d Edwin M. Snell,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
1941—1942,
UNITED STATES A R M Y IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington,
Snell, Strategic Plan-
loff, "Prewar Mili tary
2 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G
FOR COALITION W A R F A R E
basic
political
War II—that the war was to be waged as
a coalition effort. Despite
American view that the basis of strategy
must
in 1941-42. The alliance was a war
marriage,
United
member of the
pair
exist-
Europa,
partners to enter
power. Great Britain
nations
weight against
intervene actively in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East, through
which ran
it s life line to its empire in the Orient.
Its economy, while
war
avoid a repetition of its heavy
manpower
I. By necessity and
rather
than
in
pire,
alliances with
possible.
Reduced
to
out, somewhat
the long run, once the cancer of
Hitler-
a
against Germany, was a land
power
with
cation. Though it possessed an enormous
population and
great resources,
its in-
it put its
durance
3
York , The V i k i n g Press,
1947), pp.
the
massive
Red
Army
Western eyes,
power
veloped into a baffling hybrid—a combi-
nation of Russian National Socialism,
Marxist concepts, and
world revolution
declared state
of war
Union
pause
in
Both drives appear
with
the break with the Fuehrer was the ag-
gressive
serting its claims on the Balkans—a move
tha t Hitler, confronted with
a
stubborn
Britain
dangerous to
J u n e effort
can be characterized as warfare in pur-
suit of aggrandizement. The German in-
vasion simply reinforced Russia's historic
desire to strengthen its position in eastern
Europe,
an
objective
However,
for
almost
two
fight for its very existence and,
while
by no means absent, military considera-
tions were more
alike,
it
would
partnership
Deane so
have
its
greatest
whose
whole
then to prepare.
proach to European war, based on its
experience
in
World
only long enough to
Americans war was an aberration, an
unwelcome disturber of normalcy.
I and World War II the
national policy
enter military alliances nor maintain
twenty lean
tary Establishment. Yet the legalistic-
moral strain that, historically, has so in-
fluenced
the nations of the world would subscribe
to principles of justice and morality,
war,
istic strain, reflected in
World War I, became imbedded in the
pragmatism of President Roosevelt
World War II.
velt,
gradually
and resources was begun. In 1940 the
Selective Service Act was passed. Aid to
Britain became official national policy in
the same year. Lend-lease was extended
to Britain
and to
ington, laying aside their earlier aca-
demic
and coalition warfare—to take into ac-
count the rising
danger of war
peace
to
periods fo r strategic planners—the plan-
ning staffs were
can people toward war. There was a
dearth of accurate and comprehensive
intelligence
ties and intentions in 1941—a condition
that was to
U.S. military
continue
against
Germany.
from
agree
with
the
and 1941 broadened
his knowledge of
plans,
as
well
he had
But he did not
plans,
policy limited
tionship. It
freedom
using U.S.
istration. For the first time in its history,
the United
ably advanced in its military planning.
4
planning
BO W plans, see: (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic
Planning: 1941-42, Chs. I-III; (2) Watson , Prewar
Plans
Conn
WAR II
(Washington, Government
Printing Office,
By successive stages
the nation made
status
of
major
outright military collaboration with
United States into the war, in Europe as
well as in the Pacific, was a natural step
for which
Har-
the Far East and a tradition of
helping
Throughout World
could never neglect the war in the East.
This compulsion must be kept in mind,
for it was to
in the strategy for the defeat of Germany.
Given its domestic politics, and the
added pressure of the war with Japan,
it did not seem that the United
States
could
fight
"a democracy cannot fight a
Seven Years'
that gradually, under th e necessity of
war, came
Britain. The Soviet Union's
small
its
fac-
Unlike th e Western
partners, th e USSR
allies. The Russians had but to push
westward and
sure
against
was to prove
difficult. Normally, the
eral terms to the Soviet Union. The
Russians were to take formal
part in de-
confer-
Potsdam.
Chiefs
ing came of
the Western effort in the global war.
From the start these conditions,
added
understanding between the Soviet Union
and the Western Allies
basis for
was laid
became a necessity for the United States
and Great Britain immediately after the
Japanese attack. Just a few days before
5
Interv,
and Maj
il l and his principal military advisers ar-
rived
great wart ime conferences with the
President and his staff. Out of this con-
ference—known by its
bined Chiefs of
Staff (CCS) system-the
ing out Allied strategy.
the U.S. joint
chief of staff and the
senior officers of the
President;
the
other
members
Admiral Ernest J.
King, Chief of
U.S. members of the Combined Chiefs
and as the President's
tary officers—members
of the British
to direct the operations of their services
from
London,
tion for them in the CCS. Field Marshal
Sir John Dill, head of the
British Joint
in Washington.
able organization in which decisions
were
reached
strategies outlined; the
resources.
were
responsible
cal.
had more
than with their
summit
th e Foreign Secretary, the Minister of
Production, and the civilian cabinet of-
ficers
Admiralty, and the Air Minis t ry) . The
6
V. At the conference a fixed
distinction between th e
forth
Rico and ambassador to
Commander in Chief. Admiral
1941
designated
Chiefs of Staff
Committee sa t
to Mr. Churchill in his
capacity
Chiefs of Staff meetings and also insured
close liaison between British
Roosevelt
assistance of the
war-born joint staff
Cabinet,
II
illustrated at the international war con-
ferences.
system pro-
pean
early given
operations against
from the
Other Partners
decisions
partners, but
also involved to varying
ada,
Australia,
phery of the British-American coalition.
Like
pated
in military
with
Japan
other major
powers, China
state. Nominally a republic, China re-
sembled a weak
shek,
great part
munists hovered on the
politics and
worked against
any strong
l imi ted .
in manpower illusory.
basic
organized a huge and unwieldy
army of
ground forces seldom offered more than
token resistance
to the
t ive and most heavily populated
areas on
8 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR
COALITION WARFARE
early
1942
air route over the mountains from India
permitted a thin trickle of supplies to
reach China.
survival,
from it s
United States. In addition, it looked
to the United States to act as its cham-
pion vis-a-vis
whose past
interference in
suspicion. Considerable time
war effort would become clear to the
United States. Like the Russians, the
Chinese were engaged against only
one of
only one of the international
confer-
Kai-shek confer with
th e Western
a tangled
humil i -
presented a delicate problem. The
French, proud of their past
and sensitive
of their
people.
country and the
manpower closely watched by the enemy,
France's capacity to
Africa. In
contribute
decisively
Axis Powers, France was accorded an
honorary place of importance for politi-
ca l reasons. In the
case
to the
alize the position. Both the British and
the Americans wished to see a friendly
France re-established on the Continent,
though their methods
and means of
Americans to maintain rela-
so
France from their own resources and did
not attempt to foist France on the USSR
as a first
ing the fiction of France as a great power
with
weakness
muster .
lowed
British supplies and equipment, they
could only hope for the day when Axis
defeat
would
the status quo ante bellum. Only in
circumstances
where
to gain acceptance
of their own
British Commonweal th of Nations—in
general permitted the British to
repre-
tween the United States and Canada, on
the one hand, and the close wartime co-
operation of the United States
with
Australia
to
counterbalance
British
atmosphere of reliance and good faith
between these allies and the two chief
Western partners.
discussion
American grand
versations
the
resort to war.
that Germany was the predominant
member of the hostile
made in the Atlantic and European
area. Should Japan enter the war, mili-
tary strategy in the Far
East
conditional
understanding;
power
was
close
in
troops on its shores. Before the United
States
Japan
stored, ships built, and extensive pre-
l iminary operations undertaken to se-
cure
munications across
Britain,
simply could not wait for a decision in
the war
fore,
contained until
offensive
in
in World
War II.
First"
held
throughout
the
war ,
the
and applied arose early in the conflict
and remained almost to the end. One of
the
against Japan. This problem reflected a
certain divergence
strategy. For Britain, with predominant
interests in the Mediterranean, the
Middle East, and on the
Continent,
the
in
early
9
For
accounts
the Pacific war. As a
result, differences
allies over the distribution of resources
between the two wars.
expense of the Pacific.
The
Search
United
Kingdom
they
were
first, they
defeating Ger-
saw the emergence of divergent British
and
American
Germany
early
became
advanced
the
and the Mediterranean. In the summer
of 1941 during th e Atlantic
Conference,
patriots
would
fensive
action
would
operating on the
large-scale
the German
military machine.
No vast
World War I would be needed. At the
A R C A D I A Conference Churchill fur ther
elaborated on these ideas for the Presi-
dent.
with the Churchillian theory
called the peripheral
would be on swift
the
so-called
soft
underbelly
the Mediterranean involved entering
Balkans—either to the north Balkans or
to Greece—to Germany. From the begin-
ning, the British envisaged a cross-Chan-
nel operation in force only as the last
blow against a Germany already in pro-
cess of collapse. These two ideas of the
Brit ish—emphasis
on the Mediterranean
coup
British concept was a compound of mili-
tary and
ister's predilections. It was tailored to
suit scattered interests, a small-scale
economy, and limited
of
land
Germany. In the summer of 1941 the
Army strategic planners, studying the re-
quirements of a global war for the initial
Victory Program, concluded that sooner
or later "we must prepare to fight Ger-
many by actually coming to grips with
and defeating her ground forces and
definitely breaking her will to
com-
bat."
10
whelming air superiority in Europe.
11
already
disposed
meeting the German Army
Army of
theory
concentra-
defeat of the enemies' armies. It reflected
American
military hardware and the faith of the
mil i tary in the ability to raise,
equip,
train,
of relieving the pressure upon the
Rus-
other to its concept of strategy and the
long debate
From
no doubts about the
they wanted it
ponement of this
came in
an invasion of North Africa—the TORCH
operation—versus the American desire
fo r an early cross-Channel attack—the
Bolero-Roundup plan.
10
Chart, "Ultimate R e q u i r e m e n t s — G r o u n d
Forces," App II, Pt II, Sec 1, JB 355, ser 707.
The Victory Program is discussed in (1) Watson,
Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XI; (2)
Richard
tics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Gov-
ernment
William
L.
Langer
1953), pp. 735-42.
prepared
a
and embodied its strategic faith. In the opinion of
the air planners, it was
doubtful
spring
of
1944.
The
expressed
the
belief
might not be necessary.
Department,
ners approved AWPD/1, which
James
Lea
Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War 11,
I, Plans and Early
AAF I), 131-32, 146-47,
including th e evolution of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP
plan, the consequent Anglo-American debate,
and
velt
and XXV; (3) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge
Bundy,
ston S. Churchill , Th e
Second
Book
(London, Collins, 1952), Ch. V.
steps
BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, the brainchild
ference the Americans and
against Germany was to preserve the
lines of communications across the North
Atlantic between the United States and
the fortress in the British
Isles,
U.S. forces should be
any
that fortress as a base for invasion of the
Continent. In the early
gan to be
partment. Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, General Marshall, and the
Army planners became increasingly dis-
turbed over the dispersion of troops,
ships,
crises in non-European parts
Russians
Practically
all
Harbor
strategy. The thinking of the Army staff
was sharply reflected in a notation made
on 22 January 1942 by Brig. Gen.
Dwight
D.
adoption
ing me down. . . . We've got to go to
Europe
followed by a
land attack as
partment planners, under General Eisen-
hower's guidance,
subsequent
itself would not solve the problem of de-
feating Germany. As a solution, the Joint
Chiefs adopted the concept of invading
Europe
in
force
as proposed by General Marshall, called
for forces to be assembled immediately
(BOLERO) for a cross-Channel invasion
in the spring of 1943
(ROUNDUP).
To
emergency
or the USSR seem on the verge of
collapse.
plan
Hopkins
The relief felt by
1911-13;
1940 he again became Secretary of War.
14
entry, Item
assistant
chief of staff of
of the War
came
chief
his staff found
Maj. Gen. Dwight D.
". . . at
mitted
tives, our efforts will begin to fall in line
and we won't just be
thrashing around
UP was especially desirable for a
number
the
soundest
sive against Germany and an
attack
on
using the
sented the shortest route
In the British Isles, the United States
could safely land its ground forces with-
out the aid of carrier-based air cover and
could safely develop air superiority over
northern France. The route of attack
into Germany
plan would meet
a
industrial and manpower mobilization.
a
definite
a
long-range
principle of concentration. For a while
plans went ahead for the second front.
General
Eisenhower
the European Theater of Operations
(ETO), and U.S. forces began to land in
considerable numbers.
the
ister came to Washington and supported
a North African operation—as he had at
ARCADIA. So disturbed was the American
staff over the evident
ening the British with an all-out offen-
sive in the Pacific—the so-called Pacific
alternative—a
Hopkins, Marshall, and King went to
London for further discussions. Out of
these came the decision to launch a
North
1942. TORCH replaced BOLERO-ROUNDUP.
out,
the
President
tw o basic
factors—President Roosevelt's
forces against Germany in 1942, and the
categoric refusal of Churchill and his
staff to
Channel
operation.
The
need
Middle
East
influenced
tive advantages that
all sides recognized
operation. The shipping situation was
so tight that all possible measures had to
15
Notations
by
Eisenhower,
command post in World War II, see Ray S. Cline,
Washington Command
(hereafter cited as Cline, Washington Command
Post).
14 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
be taken to get more ships. A saving of
over
200
ships
per
Middle
East
Mediterranean instead of around the
Cape of Good Hope. There were, it must
be recognized, serious questions concern-
ing the feasibility of launching the cross-
Channel operation in
tions
were resources
decision was a bitter pill. To them it
meant the adoption of a strategy of en-
circlement,
later
many.
of the BOLERO versus
Depart-
system—miscarried. In retrospect the plan
seems to have been premature. Neither
the
British
means
generating a strategy of their own, and
the
impatience
it may appear to the latter. There were
enough forces and means to
undertake
TORCH.
The
Marshal Joseph Stalin's
disapproval in a
friendly gestures as offering direct mili-
tary assistance in the Caucasus, develop-
ment of the Persian Gulf delivery route,
and a build-up of the
Alaska-Siberia
air
They could expect no real improvement
in military relations
The Pacific was also diverting power
from the American
resources on which
demands in
first year of the war in the
Pacific
was
armed
supply lines and bases
allotted to
ful ly anticipated the great need for air
and ground service units for Australia
16
Plans
served as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group
until he succeeded
17
sailings to the USSR along the northern route, see
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch.
XIV.
and Pacific island bases and had to make
successive
to the Pacific conflicted with the determi-
nation
resources to the Pacific had
begun
to
produce
results,
Japanese forces at the
1942) by no
in the new phase of the Pacific war,
was
"line" of bases to support a harassing
naval defensive,
be-
yond
sives
was
plotted
inforcements in the
the
troop
Central Pacific
be needed to complete these tasks.
For the Pacific
was about equal to the total number of
Army forces
overseas and 17 of the 72 air combat
groups
successfully, but the problems
been
CBI, as in the Middle
East, the United
jurisdictional, strategic, and logistical
mainland
overseas
ward
vestment of
structed in February 1942 to increase
both the effectiveness of American as-
sistance to the Chinese Government and
the combat efficiency
of the Chinese
by the Japanese in late April, the prob-
lems facing Stilwell's mission
ever,
Middle
ply theater. A year
area.
strategic responsibility
come
18
African
th e
dia. Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general on
25 February 1942.
16 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
1942 had forced successive modifications
in the plans for the use of Army forces
in the At the end of December
1942 about
marily air and service troops. This en-
larged commitment reflected, in part, in-
creased operational air
American offensive action in the Medi-
terranean. In part, it
Gulf supply route fo r shipments of sup-
plies to the Soviet Union.
All in
divisions
and
overseas were deployed in the war
against Japan. The
combat groups overseas
were deployed in
air combat groups overseas were dis-
tributed among Latin American and
South Atlantic bases. The
against Japan exceeded by over 85,000
the total U.S. Army forces
deployed in
the parcelling out of shipping to move
and
end of 1942, the
strategy of scarcity. The basic
fear was
survival of the
1942 it had become apparent that,
though the Western Allies were still not
agreed on strategy, their plans were tied
to the outcome of the struggle on the
Eastern Front. But Stalin had turned
down the offer of Roosevelt and Church-
ill to send an Anglo-American air force
to support the Soviet forces in the Cau-
casus. He made it unmistakably clear
that Western military forces were
not
wanted
front.
their first
yet squarely joined. That British notions
of strategy had tended to prevail was not
surprising.
British
forces
19
Statistical
Digest,
1947, pp. 2-12; (2) STM-30, 1 Jan 48; and (3)
OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42. According to
the STM—30 computation, total forces deployed
in
numbered 377,644.
factors on A r m y
planning and the constant
Coakley,
of
mind,
since
in
he had asked for
twenty-five to th i r ty divisions to be sent from Great
Britain
to
Archangel
south-
ern f ront in the USSR. See Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Bos-
ton,
It had
any
appreciable
mouth,
and
siderable measure determined by
Troops had been parcelled out piecemeal
to meet immediate threats, crises, and
needs in the primarily defensive and
garrisoning phase of the war. New to the
art of military diplomacy and negotia-
tion, the Americans were
planning on an orderly,
concentration in which the
effec-
tive
dissipation o f forces and materiel in what
they regarded as
secondary ventures still
tive
staff. Active and passive fronts were now
established all over the world. The
TORCH decision had thrown all Allied
strategic planning into a state of uncer-
tainty and flux. The old issues of en-
circlement
th e Army staff hoped had been
settled
agreement in the spring of
1942
on
th e planners was how to limit operations
in
question during 1943 and
sideration of possibilities of
them could be reached. The
positive
as-
pect
invasion
the
this was the attempt to guide the inter-
mediate operations
sent
Allied coalition remained
their application
the establishment of a foothold in Nor-
mandy in the summer of 1944—was th e
period of increasing plenty. The power
to call the turn on strategy and to choose
the
with its partners, had to come to grips
with the offensive phase of the coalition
war. U.S. troops and
full
impact
larly, the
to survive the
strategy. The balance of power
within
As the new
not yet found a common ground of
agreement. Between the United States
and the United Kingdom, fundamental
war strategy and planning for the im-
mediate fu ture were unsettled. Into this
vacuum and state of uncertainty the
President, at the Casablanca Conference
in January 1943, introduced
conse-
quences
ficial meeting with Prime Minister
Churchill
a historic occasion, marking a double
first for the President: the first time that
a
fice and the first time
that a U.S. presi-
Roosevelt's departure
The
across the hazardous Atlantic at the
Nor th African port of Casablanca. There,
on the outskirts, in a large
hotel on a
the President
19
THE
ANFA HOTEL ON THE O UT SK IR T S OF C A S A B L A N C A , site of the
first midwar inter-
military staff. General Marshall and his
staff, Admiral King, and General
Arnold
had
Anfa Hotel
palm trees, bougainvillaea, and orange
groves and
tected by barbed
groves, and
seem incongruous in the wartime atmo-
sphere.
In
global
tables they carried
hours of the
series of Combined Chiefs of Staff con-
ferences. In the absence of Admiral
Leahy, who had become ill en route,
General Marshall,
Their British
Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley
Pound, First Sea Lord, and Air Chief
20 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
Marshal
Sir
Charles
Field
Marshal
British Joint Staff
Mission in Washing-
hovered the two
American invitation to participate on the
ground that the critical situation at Stal-
ingrad demanded his
cam-
paign.
The
practical
American
North African campaign
had been dis-
Africa already
campaign
British and
tion
though
would do its
hand, the
Balkans
and
leave
the Americans predicted
showed signs of
peninsula. The Americans
over the prospects of German collapse
in the
armies and air
German
3
had
had
much
in
common
since
early
in
the
war,
the answer given would
Minister had no doubt what the correct
course of Allied action for 1943 should
be. In November 1942 he had cabled
the President that the "paramount task"
before the United States and the
United
Kingdom
1
Corps in France in 1940; he became commander of
the British Home Forces in 1940 and Chief of the
Imperial General Staff in 1941.
Admiral Pound was
named First Sea Lord and chief of the British naval
staff in May 1939 and became Admiral of the
Fleet
in July 1939. Air Chief Marsha l Portal had served
on the Air Council and as Air Officer, Command-
ing-in-chief, Bomber Command; he was appointed
Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, in October
1940.
2
3
42, t i t le: German Strategy
in 1943. ( 2) Comments
1943, n. d. Both in Casablanca
Books,
Africa and open the Mediterranean to
military traffic and, second, to use the
bases on the African shore "to strike at
the underbelly of the Axis ... in the
shortest time."
it, it was the obvious immediate objec-
tive for consideration at the conference.
The British
with
complete.
5
place
staffs. Neither the U.S. and British Chiefs
of Staff nor their
planners had been able
subsequent
Marshall's own
been
concept and had afterwards been so en-
grossed
that
they
the eve of
building
up
and
North
sion for a month or two. Such
circum-
General Marshall
in the British Isles, but
Marshall
in defense of the plan. His course would
serve
a major cross-Channel operation was
still a cardinal objective in American
strategic planning.
Cross-Channel Versus
cross-Channel operation in 1943. Early
in the
question was the extent to which the
associated powers had to
which they
improve
the
Axis.
6
the American and British leaders to de-
cide on the
he added,
BOLERO and from
8
American
BOLERO. It was Marshall's belief
that
in
"ab-
4
42, No.
was circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plans
and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East,
and Near East. (2)
tions, see: (1) Cline, Washington Command
Post,
Strategic
7
Min,
G Y M N A S T was the code
name
BRITISH
AND
LEADERS AT
Roosevelt
Henry H.
of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound,
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, and Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal.
normally
main British-American effort against
operation
aimed
at
northern
France.
spring of 1942 in defense of the
BOLERO-
ranean
centration of
not become committed to
Kingdom awaiting a hypothetical Ger-
man
collapse.
A
Kingdom would
whether further operations in the
Medi-
portionate to the hazards involved. Any
Mediterranean undertaking projected
weighed
situation
the
over-all
planning
British
Germany
until late
in the
limited by the
from
1943. If the Allies prepared for
that
the USSR throughout the summer. Sir
Alan then went on to say the British and
Americans should definitely count on
entering
the
Continent
in
force
in
1944.
try to
to do this was to threaten Germany every-
where in the Mediterranean, try to knock
Italy out of the war, and try to bring Tur-
key in. Intensifying British-American
scatter its air resources. Mediterranean
operations, especially against I taly,
would result in a considerable diversion
of
the deterioration of Germany, the British
called for a continued build-up of
British-American forces in the United
Kingdom in preparation for an invasion
of th e Continent.
appeals
of Italy
launched. He was attracted by the possi-
bility of
The Germans would then have to take
over the defense of Italy and the Italian
commitments for the defense of the
Balkans.
war. Turkey
the Rumanian oil fields and for
opening
USSR. With
staff, to be thinking purely in terms of a
S L E D G E H A M M E R operation.
11
In
addition
that the President was not disinclined
toward fur ther
wanted U.S.
9
(1) Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. (2) M i n ,
58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43. (3) Min, 60th mtg CCS,
18 Jan 43.
(1) Min, 57th mtg CCS, 15 Jan 43. (2) Min,
58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
11
Official
Casa-
WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government
Print-
Churchill ,
Stim-
24 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
quick,
ranean
Italy.
American intention of relieving German
pressure on them. He may have been
influenced at this time in favor of a
Mediterranean strategy
UP but
British-American operation against Ger-
scale operation on the Continent might
be postponed until somewhat later.
Meanwhile,
the
Kingdom
showed signs of
predilections
of
Chief of Staff had to recognize that
cer-
on the possibility of a 1943
ROUNDUP.
amphibious operations. Thus Marshall
and the JCS, in a special session held
during the conference, Lt. Gen. Dwight
D.
originally
mated would be necessary.
operations following his early
BOLERO-ROUNDUP
be the submarine menace and delivery o f
supplies
followed
the
Chief
be attracted by some aspects of Mediter-
ranean undertakings.
vantages
Germany
from
conceded the argument
were the effects
line communications
vet-
th e
campaign was over. If these forces could
be employed without having to be
trans-
ported
critical Allied shipping situation in the
Atlantic would not be aggravated. Econo-
my of tonnage—especially in view of the
ever present
13
blanca Conf Book.
President,
JCS,
C A S A B L A N C A - B E G I N N I N G OF AN ERA 25
consideration." Between the two most
Mediterranean operations,
of Sicily would
Sicily in
Allied hands,
operations
in
Burma,
drawal from the
war, forcing Germany
Prime
Minister
Chiefs of Staff agreed to undertake an
operation against Sicily
the Mediterranean operation only
Mediterranean. He still wished to make
the main effort against Germany across
the Channel. At the
Turkey to
flow of lend-lease
ment that all possible aid should be given
to the Russians in
far to go in sending convoys
over th e
that the heavy losses of
1942 must
not be
themselves, simply to get
other
th e invasion of Sicily, if this proved
necessary. Admiral King, while main-
taining that
every effort
agreed with Marshall that it would not
be wise to continue the Murmansk con-
voys if the losses became prohibitive.
17
ways been a
USSR and who had been willing to have
Marshall go to the Soviet Union
to dis-
18
not be continued at prohibitive cost to
the United N ations effort ."
19
No
attempt
15
divergences
see: (1) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan 43,
Official Casablanca Conf Book; and (2) Churchill,
Hinge of Fate, p. 678.
For a discussion of Mediterranean alternatives
in Allied strategy and the f inal compromise on
Sicily at Casablanca, see H. M. Smyth, The Sicilian
Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, MS, Ch. I,
OCMH files.
of Marshall's
especially: (1 ) min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official
Casablanca Conf Book; (2) min, 60th tg CCS, 18
Jan 43; (3) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan
43 , Official
17
(1)
18 Jan 43. (2) Min, 2d
Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43. (3) Min, 55th mtg JCS, 19
Jan 43. (4) Min,
His-
of
Staff,
MS,
Sec.
Coalition
Warfare ,
Ch. IV, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Aid to Rus-
sia, 1942-43," by Capt Ernesto G iust i.
18
below.
26
STRATEGIC
P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
was made to define just what would
constitute "prohibitive
The very
f lexibi l i ty of the term indicated that the
over-all shipping situation plus the rate
of shipping losses in the months before
the
invasion
on Sicily be made with
"the favorable
if possible.
Soviet
Italy. General
east, crossed the Tunisian frontier, Gen-
eral Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander
would become Deputy
com-
tions in Tunisia,
Planning and preparations in the theater
fo r HUSKY were to begin at once. On the
other side of the Mediterranean, opera-
tions
with an agreement
between the Presi-
left as a British responsibility. The de-
feat of the U-boat menace was
accepted
the resources of the
many, the conferees did call for the es-
tablishment of a combined command
and planning staff to plan for a return
to
tions. This return might take the form
o f small-scale ra ids , an emergency
operation in 1943 in the event of a
sudden German collapse, a limited
operation in 1943 to secure a bridgehead
on the Continent for later exploitation,
or "an invasion in
suffi-
and a
commander
for a 1944 R O U N D U P could
be appointed
elsewhere, U.S.
modified BOLERO).
staff
from the
President and Prime Minister Summariz ing Deci-
sions by the CCS. See also min, 56th
mtg JCS, 20
(1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the
War in 1943. (2) 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title:
Final
Rpt
Decisions by the CCS. (3 ) Min, 66th mtg CCS, 22
Jan 43.
Command,
Control,
Planning
the COSSAC (Chief
nucleus
of
SHAEF
45 .
23
experts, it was estimated
could
at
1,118,000
43, t i t le:
Shipping Capabilities fo r BOLERO Build-
up.
nitely count on reentering the Continent
in 1944
airpower. Both sides agreed that
the
King-
To defeat Germany,
to bomb
remained a prerequisite to any major
ground
urg-
ground as
Chiefs, preferring Mediterranean action
of the bomber offensive in Allied
strategic
jectives? Specifically, how should Ameri-
can concepts of air tactics and command
be accommodated to the f luctuat ions in
combined strategic
directly interested. So was General
Marshall. He and his planning staff in
the War Department had
steadily
gram. During the debate
Marshall tried
timing by using an
ground
forces
in the
plan.
25
The decision in favor of H U S K Y clear-
ly made uncertain an all-out invasion of
th e Continent in 1943. General Arnold
supported the views
conference.
Arnold
in the postponement of that planned in -
vasion. More time would
matic strategic air bombardment. That
bomber offensive would perforce become
a more independent operation,
AAF
th e United
The postponement of the continental
invasion
clearly set forth in a document issued by
the Air planners on 9 September 1942
and
known
24
25
26
A
a
reaffirmation of A W P D / 1 , is contained in Wesley
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army
Air Forces in
multaneously against both Germany and
Japan with the resources available. Be-
tween
Germany
tive. The
accessible
to
Allied
air
forces.
For
1943
given
Ger-
many
of German
be successfully executed by mid-1944 if
over-all requirements of approximately
aircraft fo r
1943 were met.
In AWPD-42, production s c h e d u l e s ,
priorities and allocations for aircraft,
and training and deployment programs
were
that
time
it
would
many. A similar
strategic air offensive
launched against Japan. The contem-
plated air offensive
against Germany was
combined strategic
U.S. airmen
war. The U.S. air forces in the European
theater would concentrate on the de-
struction of
selected vital
centrate upon
dustrial areas.
was th e fear that its troops and planes
would be
strategic
the Air planners believed wholehearted-
ly in the
(CBO) from the
United Kingdom pre-
concurrent decision to
27
The
"the progressive
ing of the morale of the German people
to a point where their capacity for
armed
(a)
portation,
vided also for drawing
Medi-
progressive weakening of Germany
with his operations
(Chicago,
hereaf ter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF II), 277-
79,
(1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the
War in 1943. (2) See also
Craven and Cate,
cept of a cross-Channel air-ground opera-
tion,
Chief
Marshal
became an
immediate prospect,
give
opera-
tions.
29
command. The scepticism expressed
daylight
precision
30
The
Arnold enlisted the support of Maj. Gen.
Ira C. Eaker, the U.S. Eighth Air Force
commander, to present the case for the
as
yet
experienced crews, lack of long-range
fighter escorts, improved German fighter
tactics and antiaircraft
fire, the require-
program of bombardment had been de-
layed. A
year after
U.S. airpower. Marshall felt
Churchill's
sympa-
can cause,
British decided
has
since recorded his satisfaction in the
t r ibu te later paid to him by U.S. Air
leaders for saving their daylight bomb-
ing program at Casablanca.
win acceptance for AAF air tactics; it
was another to insure
full control by the
argued
demonstrated
England should therefore be put in the
hands of the British, but , Marshall in-
sisted, the bombing methods and tech-
niques of the
by the CCS. The British gave their as-
sent to this arrangement.
a definite place in Allied planning
against Germany. However, its contribu-
tion on the use of airpower was more in
th e nature of general policy and guiding
principles
target priority list
of the combined
translate
30
AAF II,
296—302.
In January 1942 Eaker
had organized the VIII
in
England,
33
(1) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (2) Min,
65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.
30
STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE
Old
Versus
British delegations to
strategy, the cross-Channel-Mediterrane-
ranean offensive—against Sicily—the con-
tinuation of a modified BOLERO, and the
agreement on a round-the-clock com-
bined
bomber
plex
would be made from the United King-
dom or in the Mediterranean. The U.S.
and British staffs remained
tions had not been settled. The stake for
operational
fu r the r Mediterranean operations would
continue to be
R O U N D U P
type,
desired
by
Minister. In and out of a series of inter-
national conferences in
issue.
i t ive solution of the cross-Channel-Med-
iterranean issue, it did represent the last
real fling of the "either-or" school of
thought in American strategic thinking.
Hereafter, the U.S. staff would increas-
ingly have to recognize that a new period
of complex choices had been ushered in
—one that
terranean,
and
of
ing questions in European strategy down
to
opera-
alternatives
in
such
the United Kingdom. The
that.
divergence
of the war against Japan to the war as a
whole . A s long as plans for defeating
Hitler first remained indeterminate, the
precise place of the China-Burma-India
and Pacific theaters in the over-all
strategy of the war remained
uncertain.
years weighed
Their
final strategy against Germany was all the
greater since the Americans had early
assumed
against Japan. It was a serious question
w h e t he r the American people and the
A r m y could stand the effects of the
exhausting, long, drawn-out fight
Divergency of
the British that they still regarded as
basically sound the accepted principle
of British-American strategy: "To con-
duct the
cable date,
defensive in other theaters
JCS prepared a
modified version that
velop offensive
more seriously than apparently
quests in the
the British—of Japanese
vent the
ther expansion, provided communica-
36
Burma Road, but the U.S. Chiefs dwelt
more on the urgency of doing it.
Pacific Operations
Chiefs elaborated on these positions.
Each time the British brought up the
question of
with the question of
tance of the Pacific effort. To
bring
the
possible
was
coming to grips with Japan.
It was also
JC S had greater
peace of mind about
threat
carriers against U.S. lines of communica-
tions to the Pacific and against the Amer-
ican west coast. The Japanese must be
permitted
no
pause.
idea of surrendering and would con-
tinue to be aggressive until defeated by
attrition.
37
at Casablanca General Marshall made
the
contained
in
Basic Strategic
Concept
for 1943, circulated as CCS 135 on 26 Dec 42 for
consideration
largely the
JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for
1943; (2) JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, t i t le: Basic Strategic
Concept for 1943; and (3) JCS
167/1,
British Chiefs of Staff.
32
STRATEGIC
P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION W A R F A R E
vision
Atlantic and
that
38
specifically warned that sufficient
Pacific.
39
hampered
had made
standing
Allied effort
Chiefs turned
th e
terranean
area.
Pacific, Churchill promised that, after
th e
He went so far as to offer to enter into
a special treaty with the United States
Government to
this effect.
The Presi-
plying
ment"
th e fight
against Japan once
41
The
British
all-out
war.
American resources
many, unsuccessful.
They preferred
more
or
less
fixed
Sir Dudley Pound even suggested that
it
would
be
impossible