Club of Amsterdam, June 25, 2003

Club of Amsterdam, June 25, 2003

Re-Inventing Democraciesfor the Future:A few Remarks on the Swiss «Model»

TH/June 25 2003 Club of Amsterdam

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«Super Sunday», May 18, 2003:National vote on 9 propositions

• Reform of the armed forces• Civil defense and population protection• Program for the creation of apprenticeships• Closure of nuclear power plants• Moratorium for refurbishing nuclear power plants• Income and wealth-tested premiums for health

care insurance• «Four Sundays without Car Traffic»• Equal rights of access for the handicapped• Regulations for «Fair Rents»


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Closure of nuclear power plants


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Income and wealth-tested premiums for health care insurance


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High hurdles: Popular and state vote

Proposition Popular Vote% Nay

State VoteNay : Yea

Moratorium on nuclear power 59,4 22 : 1

Equal rights for handycapped 62,3 20 : 3

«Four Car-free Sundays» 62,3 23 : 0

Closure of nuclear plants 66,3 22½ : ½

Regulation for «Fair Rents« 67,3 22 : 1

Programm for apprenticeships 68,4 23 : 0

Health care insurance 72,9 23 : 0


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Examples for cantonal votes (%Yea)

• Law on extended shopping hours (2000, 56%)

• Cantonal supplements to federal social security payments (44,1%)

• Cantonal investment in Crossair/Swiss (55,5%)


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Examples for communal votes

• Budgeting and expenditure authority of local council (2002, 863 yeas vs. 611 nays, 51,4% voter participation)

• Contribution of CHF 2’481’200.- for renovation of regional hospital (2001, 3133 yeas vs. 1005 nays, 33,3% voter participation)


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Direct democracy on the rise: More votes

• 1848 – 1970: 223 (Ø 1,9/year)• 1971 – 1990: 256 (Ø 7,8/year)• 1991 – 2001: 105 (Ø 9,5/year)


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Participation in elections and in votes


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Declining vote participation

• Vote participation rate >> election participation rate→ limited role of parliament→ stable 4 party government («Magic Formula»)

• Participation rate depends on mix/composition of ballot→ (additive) issue voting→ high degree of predictability


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Mandatory referendums as confirmation and legitimation of consensus process

• Mandatory referendums– Amendments to the Constitution– Membership in supranational organizations– Majority of voters and majority of the cantons

required

• 1848-2001: 198 votes • 75% accepted


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Optional referendums as veto mechanism for special interest groups/cantons

• Optional referendums– Laws and certain international treaties– 50’000 voter signatures required within 100

days after final vote by parliament– Majority of voters required

• 1848-2001: 141 votes • 51% accepted


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Low success rates for popular initiative• Popular initiatives

– Amendment to the Constitution– 100‘000 voter signatures required within 18

months– General proposal or precise paragraphs– Optional counter-proposal by

government/parliament plus tiebreaker– Agenda setting and reform function

• 1848-2001: 138 votes• 8,7% accepted


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In praise of direct democracy …

• More communicative politics• Reduction of apathy and cynicism,

increase of self-esteem (and happiness)• Financial and fiscal restraint• Collective learning processes• Antidote to the «personalization» (and

banalization) of politics (?)• Restoration of trust (?)

TH/June 25 2003Club of Amsterdam

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Club of Amsterdam

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TH/June 25 2003

Switzerland with low (or no) growth

80

100

120

140

160

180

1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Schweiz

USA

EU

EFTA

Basisjahr 1984 = 100, Quelle: OECD


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Growth 1980 – 2000: Switzerland‘s position according to 3 concepts of GDP

GDP standardized Command GDP GDP in PPP


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Ranking GDP per capita: Top Ten 1970 - 2020

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

CH USA LUX LUX LUX LUX

LUX CH USA USA USA IRL

USA CAN CH NOR IRL USA

DNK NOR CAN CAN NOR NOR

SWE ISL JPN DNK DNK KOR

AUS LUX DNK CH CAN DNK

CAN DNK ISL IRL JPN JPN

NLD SWE SWE AUS AUS AUS

NLZ AUS NOR BEL CH CAN

NOR NLD FIN JPN ISL GBR


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Projection of GDP per capita for 2015


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Labor force participation, 1999 (in %)

50. 856. 3

59. 359. 460. 560. 961. 862. 864. 7

68. 569. 669. 970. 3

73. 974. 8

78. 579. 8Schweiz

Norwegen

Japan

USAGrossbritannien

Kanada

Schweden

Australien

Fürstentum LichtensteinÖsterreich

Niederlande

Neuseeland

Deutschland

Frankreich

Irland

Italien

Belgien

Quelle: OECD, 1999

Club of Amsterdam

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TH/June 25 2003

Growth of labor productivity, 1992-2001


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Patterns of labor productivity

Quelle: seco 2003 (Studien zum Wachstumsbericht)

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

ModèleAnglo-SaxonModèle

LatinModèle Scandinave

Japon

Modèle Allemand

Suisse


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Change in public expenditure (% of GDP), 1992-2001


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Change in fiscal quota, 1992-2001


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Change in public debt, 1992-2001


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The price of direct democracy (and «extreme» federalism)?• Chronic lack of growth, low productivity• Loss of competitive advantages • Missed opportunities due to, and of, Non-

EU-membership• Systemic blockage of necessary reforms• Demographic trap: democratic majority of

elderly voters against younger generations?

• Territorial units VS. urban development


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December 6, 1992: 50,3% of voters and two thirds of cantons vote against EES

Club of AmsterdamInterlaken

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TH 08.05.2003

Electricity prices for industrial clients in selected cities in Europe and Switzerland (1.1.2003)

Quelle: Enerprice / Avenir Suisse, 2003

4.4

6.0

6.5

8.0

8.2

8.2

8.6

8.9

9.7

11.1

11.2

12.2

12.5

13.2

13.2

14.0

15.4

16.2

Stockholm

Oslo

Helsinki

Madrid

Paris

London

Athen

Hamburg

Lissabon

Brüssel

Freiburg

Dublin

Bern

Basel

Genf

Zürich

Rom

La Chaux-de-Fonds

Preise in Rp. / kWh

Club of Amsterdam

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TH/June 25 2003

Liberalization of postal service market (2001): Switzerland still with a weighty monopoly


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Speed of liberalization: Slow Switzerland


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Effects of federalism on veto players and other institutions


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Veto players

«In Switzerland, a federal country with a combination of bicameralism und qualified majority decision making , the role of the President of the Confederation is even more reduced; in fact, Swiss Citizen may even ignore his name.

George Tsebelis, Federalism and Veto players


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Reform of federalism (>> direct democracy)• Centralization [«fédéraliser»]• Equalization?• Unbundling?• New layers (agglomerations)• New territorial Functional, overlapping,

and competing jurisdiction (FOCI)• New definition and reduction of territorial

units

Club of Amsterdam

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TH/June 25 2003

Net-contributors and net-receivers due to New (federalist) Financial Equalization (in Mio. CHF)

-350

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

ZH

ZG SZ

GE

NW GL

AR

OW A

I

JU VD

GR

NE

BL

SH

UR

AG

BS

FR

SG LU TI

SO

TG BE

VS


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Reform of federalism (>> direct democracy)• Centralization [«fédéraliser»]• Equalization?• Unbundling?• New layers (agglomerations)• New territorial Functional, overlapping,

and competing jurisdiction (FOCI)• New definition and reduction of territorial

units


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A program for autonomous (economic) policy reform (?)

• Maximum openess for international exchange and immigration

• Liberalization of domestic markets, decisive free market and competition policy

• Active foreign trade policy in all directions• Redimensioning of welfare state, strengthening

individual responsibility• Investment in education and research (plus

structural innovation)• Maintain and protect Swiss accomplishments: liberal

and flexible labor market, high quality infrastructure, safety, quality of life

Club of Amsterdam, June 25, 2003

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Transcript of Club of Amsterdam, June 25, 2003