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ahead, most projections put China’s emissions in 2030 at a level close to 500 percent higher than its 1990 levels (EIA 2011). Globally, this translates to China’s emissions accounting for almost 50 percent of all new energy-related carbon dioxide (CO

2 ) emissions by 2030. If

China’s emissions continue to grow at the rate of 8 per-cent per year (the average annual growth rate between 2005 and 2010), by the year 2030 it could be emitting as much CO

2 as the entire world is today. In contrast, US

emissions are only expected to increase by 22 percent above 1990 levels by 2030 (EIA 2011). In historical terms, the United States is by far the largest contributor to the greenhouse gases now in the atmosphere. It is responsible for 27 percent of energy-related CO

2 emis-

sions since 1900, while China accounts for only about 10 percent of these cumulative emissions. China’s per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are below the world average and approximately one-third those of the United States. (See fi gure 1 on the next page.)

China’s increase in energy-related emissions in recent years has been driven primarily by industrial energy use, fueled by an increased percentage of coal in the overall fuel mix. Industry consumes about 70 percent of China’s energy, and China’s industrial base supplies much of the world. In 2010, for example, China produced about 66 percent of the world’s aluminum and 44 percent of its steel (International Aluminum Institute 2012; World Steel Association 2012). Studies have estimated the CO

2

emissions embedded in China’s domestic production of goods for export represent about 30 percent of the coun-try’s total annual CO

2 emissions (Xu et al. 2011).

China relies on coal for more than two-thirds of its energy needs, including approximately 80 percent of its  electricity needs. China’s power sector is the largest source of CO

2 emissions in the country, responsible for

about one-half of energy-related CO 2 emissions. Within

By 2012, China had become the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. At the core of the climate change challenge is China’s energy sector. Despite a reliance on coal-based energy to fuel its rapidly growing economy, China has made major achievements in promoting energy effi ciency and low carbon energy technologies. Many new mitigation eff orts are underway, including China’s fi rst ever carbon target and carbon emissions trading programs.

Continued growth in the prosperity of the population is viewed as fundamental to maintaining political

stability in China, and progress to date in this regard has been impressive. Although China roughly quadrupled its gross domestic product (GDP) between 1980 and 2000, it did so while merely doubling the amount of energy it consumed over that period, marking a dramatic achieve-ment in energy intensity (ratio of energy consumption to GDP) gains not paralleled in any other country at a similar stage of industrialization. Th is allowed China’s energy intensity and, consequently, the emissions inten-sity (ratio of carbon dioxide–equivalent emissions to GDP) of its economy to decline. Without this reduction in the energy intensity of the economy, China would have used more than three times the energy that it did during this period. Th e energy savings over this time period meant less reliance on imported energy resources, and less carbon dioxide

emissions.

China’s Mitigation Challenge

Between 2002 and 2005, however, this trend reversed, and growth in energy consumption surpassed economic growth for the fi rst time in decades. As China’s energy demand has boomed, its emissions have soared. Looking

Climate Change Mitigation Initiatives (China)

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66 • THE BERKSHIRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY: CHINA, INDIA, AND EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY

and even carbon capture and sequestration technologies, but for the time being these technologies are considered too costly to be deployed at full scale. Perhaps the most impres-sive achievements since 2005 have been in the areas of energy effi ciency and renewable energy. In addition, China surprised much of the world by announcing a national carbon target prior to the 2009 UN climate negotiations in Copenhagen, and by disclosing the development of a domestic cap and trade program (a system designed to limit the aggregate emissions of sources through the assignment of allowances that are surrendered following the release of emissions) for carbon emissions in 2011.

Energy Effi ciency Programs and Intensity Targets

A suite of energy effi ciency and industrial restructuring programs has aimed to drive down China’s energy inten-sity. One of the core elements of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, spanning from 2006 to 2010, was to lower national energy intensity by 20 percent. China’s Top 1,000 Program has helped to cut energy use among its biggest energy-consuming enterprises (accounting for 33 percent of its overall energy consumption, 47 percent of industrial energy consumption, and 43 percent of its CO

2 emissions) (Price and Wang 2007). Th e Ten Key

Projects Program (fi rst launched in 2004) provides fi nancial support to companies that implement energy-effi cient technology. In addition, many ineffi cient power and industrial plants have been targeted for closure, which helped contribute to the decline in energy inten-sity experienced during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, with a reported 72.1 gigawatts (GW) of thermal

the power sector, about 98 percent of China’s CO 2 emis-

sions comes from coal use (IEA 2007). Currently, more coal power plants are installed in China than in the United States and India combined. China’s coal power use is expected to more than double by 2030, representing an additional carbon commitment of about 86 billion tons (IEA 2007). Although China is also expanding its utili-zation of nuclear power and non-hydroelectric renew-ables, these sources comprise 2 percent and 0.7 percent of China’s electricity generation, respectively, whereas hydroelectricity contributes about 16 percent (National Bureau of Statistics 2007; REN 21 2006 and 2010). Given China’s substantial domestic coal reserves and its heavy investment in coal-fi red power plants over the past few decades, coal will likely remain an inescapable foundation of its economy for years to come. Rendering coal a climate-friendly energy source, however, will require signifi cant advances and sustained investment in new technologies that burn it more effi ciently and capture and sequester the resulting greenhouse gas emissions.

China’s Mitigation Actions

China has begun to implement many national policies and programs to address its increasing greenhouse gas emis-sions and reliance on fossil fuels. Nuclear power and hydropower are key elements of China’s low-carbon energy development strategy, and the country is planning to expand the use of conventional and nonconventional natu-ral gas, which, if used to displace coal, could help to decar-bonize the power sector. Several demonstration projects are underway in China using high-effi ciency coal gasifi cation

Notes: Data are for 2010 and include CO2 emissions from fossil fuels only.

ROW 5 Rest of World.

Sources: CDIAC (2011); World Bank (2011).

In historical terms, the United States is by far the largest contributor (27 percent) to the greenhouse gases now in the atmosphere; China accounts for only about 10 percent of these cumulative emissions. China’s per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (on the right in this fi gure) are below the world average and approximately one-third those of the United States. As China’s energy demand has boomed in recent years, however, its emissions have soared.

Russian Federation

6%

USA21%EU-15

21%

India8%

China24%

Share of Annual Global CO2 Emissions Annual Per Capita Emissions

India

China

EU-15

Russia

USA

0 5 10

Metric tons CO2 per person

15 20

Rest of world

29%

Figure 1

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CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION INITIATIVES (CHINA) • 67

Historically, China has been consistent in its position in the international climate negotiations that, as a devel-oping country, it will not take on any binding interna-tional commitments to reduce its GHG emissions. At the December 2011 climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, China expressed a willingness for the fi rst time to adopt legally binding commitments (rather than just vol-untary commitments) as part of a future climate change agreement. Th ere is no question that China’s announce-ment of its fi rst carbon target represents a monumental change in its approach to global climate change. It is also important to recognize, however, that even with this tar-get in place, growth in absolute emissions could continue to increase rapidly. A meaningful reduction of emissions encouraged by a carbon intensity target hinges upon future economic growth rates and the evolving structure of the Chinese economy, as well as on the types of energy resources utilized and the deployment rates of various technologies, among other factors. Carbon intensity, like energy intensity, has declined substantially over the past two decades. Between 1990 and 2005, China reduced its carbon intensity by 44 percent. It is also projected to reduce its carbon intensity by 46 percent, from 2005 levels, before 2020, while still growing its emissions by 73 percent during this same period (EIA 2009). Th is has sparked much debate over whether such a domestic pol-icy target is suffi cient based on China’s role in the global climate challenge.

If implemented eff ectively, a carbon intensity target will not only accelerate the energy effi ciency improve-ments already taking place in response to the energy intensity target, but will also further promote the devel-opment of low-carbon energy sources like nuclear, hydro-power, and renewables. In addition, implementing a carbon policy through a domestic carbon trading pro-gram, or through other fi nancial incentives like a carbon tax, would be a signifi cant step toward implementing a comprehensive climate policy in China, complementing ongoing eff orts to improve energy effi ciency and promote low-carbon energy sources. An October 2011 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) notice announced that seven provinces had been selected to pilot cap and trade programs for CO

2 , including

Guangdong, Hubei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen; these programs are currently under development (NDRC 2011).

Renewable and Non-Fossil Energy Targets

Th e Twelfth Five-Year Plan includes a target to increase non-fossil energy sources (including hydro, nuclear, and renewable energy) to 11.4 percent of total energy use (up from 8.3 percent in 2010) (Government of the PRC 2011; Zhang 2011). While not formally enshrined in

capacity shut down between 2006 and 2010—equivalent to 16 percent of the total capacity added over that period (Wen 2011). Elsewhere in the world, it is very unusual, if not unprecedented, to shut down such a large number of power plants in the name of effi ciency (Gallagher and Lewis 2012).

Th e government has also strengthened local account-ability for meeting the Eleventh Five-Year Plan targets by intensifying oversight and inspection. Each province and province-level city was required to help meet China’s goal to cut energy intensity by 20 percent, and was assigned its own target ranging from 12 to 30 percent (Ohshita, Price, and Tian 2011). Governors and mayors were held accountable for meeting their targets, and experts from Beijing conducted annual site visits to facil-ities in each province to assess their progress ( China Daily 2006).

Programs included in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) build directly on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan energy intensity target and its associated programs, including a new target to reduce energy intensity by an additional 16 percent by 2015 ( China Daily 2011). While this may seem less ambitious than the 20 percent reduc-tion targeted in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, it likely represents a much more substantial challenge. Th e largest and least effi cient enterprises have already undertaken effi ciency improvements, leaving smaller, more effi cient plants to be targeted in this second round. Also under preparation is a new Top 10,000 program, which is mod-eled after the Top 1,000 Program, but it adds an order of magnitude of companies to the mix. But as the number of plants grows, so do the challenges of collecting accu-rate data and enforcing targets. Even though the country likely fell just short of meeting its Eleventh Five-Year Plan energy intensity target of 20 percent (the govern-ment reported a 19.1 percent decline was achieved), there is no doubt that much was learned through eff orts to improve effi ciency nationwide.

Carbon Management Programs

While estimates have been made of the potential carbon emissions savings that could accompany the Eleventh Five-Year Plan’s target of reducing energy intensity by 20 percent (Lin et al. 2007), China never put forth any targets that explicitly quantifi ed its carbon emissions until late 2009. Leading up to the Copenhagen climate nego-tiations, the Chinese government pledged a 40–45 per-cent reduction in national carbon intensity (the ratio of carbon emissions to GDP) from 2005 levels by 2020 (Government of the PRC 2009). To achieve this 2020 target, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan set an interim target of reducing carbon intensity by 17 percent, relative to 2010 levels, by 2015.

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the CO 2 emissions that are contributing to global climate

change, the rest of the world may be able to learn from both its challenges and its achievements.

Joanna I. LEWIS Georgetown University

See also Automobiles and Personal Vehicles; Climate Change Migration (India); Consumerism; Corporate Account-ability (China); Education, Environmental (China); Energy Industries—Nuclear; Energy Industries—Renewables (China); Energy Security (East Asia); Five-Year Plans; Great Green Wall (China); Green Collar Jobs; National Pollution Survey (China); Reforestation and Aff orestation (Southeast Asia); Steel Industry; Utilities Regulation and Effi ciency

FURTHER READING Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). (2011).

Fossil fuel CO 2 emissions. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from

http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/meth_reg.html China Daily . (2006, July 27). Offi cials made accountable for energy

saving. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/175957.htm

China Daily . (2011, March 5). Key targets of China’s 12th fi ve-year plan. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011npc/2011-03/05/content_12120283.htm

Energy Information Administration (EIA) . (2009 and 2011). International energy outlook . Washington, DC: US Department of Energy.

Fellman, Joshua. (2010, October 20). China to hold primary energy use to 4.2 billion tons in 2015, Xinhua says. Bloomberg . Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-30/china-to-hold-primary-energy-use-to-4-2-billion-tons-in-2015-xinhua-says.html

Gallagher, Kelly Sims, & Lewis, Joanna I. (2012). China’s quest for a green economy. In Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft (Eds.), Environmental policy: New directions for the twenty-fi rst century (8th ed.). Washington: CQ Press.

Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (2009). Guowuyuan changwuhui yanjiu jueding woguo kongzhi wenshiqiti paifang mubiao [Standing Committee of China State Council to study the decision to control greenhouse gas emissions targets]. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-11/26/content_1474016.htm

Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (2010, September 8). Guowuyuan tongguo jiakuai peiyu he fazhan zhanluex-ing xinxing chanye de jueding [State Council’s decision on speeding up the cultivation and development of emerging strategic indus-tries]. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-09/08/content_1698604.htm

Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (2011, March 16). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao [Th e People’s Republic of China’s 12th Five Year Plan for economic and social development]. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-03/16/c_121193916.htm

Th e Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. (HSBC). (2010, October). China ’s next 5-year plan: What it means for equity markets . Hong Kong: HSBC.

International Aluminum Institute. (2012). Current and alternative source statistics. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://www.world-aluminium.org/Statistics/Current + statistics

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2007). World energy outlook 2007 . Paris: IEA & OECD.

the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, another recent notable announcement is a cap on total energy consumption of 4  billion tons of coal equivalent (tce) in 2015 (Fellman 2010). To meet the cap on energy consumption, annual energy growth would need to slow to an average of 4.24  percent per year, down from 5.9 percent between 2009 and 2010.

Th e Twelfth Five-Year Plan also includes many new industrial policies to support clean energy industries and related technologies. Industries targeted include the nuclear, solar, wind, and biomass energy technology industries, as well as hybrid and electric vehicles, and energy savings and environmental protection technology industries (Government of the PRC 2010). During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, an estimated 15.3 per-cent of government stimulus funding was directed toward innovation, energy conservation, ecological improve-ments, and industrial restructuring (HSBC 2010).

One key element of China’s energy strategy, as well as its low-carbon development strategy, is the promotion of renewable energy technologies. Th is eff ort was kick-started with the passage of the Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China that became eff ective on 1 January 2006 (NPC 2005). Th e Renewable Energy Law created a framework for regulating and promoting renewable energy in China. It established a national renewable energy target; a mandatory connection and purchase policy; a feed-in tariff system (a monetary incentive system designed to encourage the use of renew-able energy); and a cost-sharing mechanism, including a special fund for renewable energy development. In December 2009 amendments to the Renewable Energy Law were passed, further strengthening the process through which renewable-electricity projects are con-nected to the grid and dispatched effi ciently. Additional policies to promote renewable energy include mandates and incentives to support the development of domestic technologies and industries. China invested $50 billion in 2010 in renewable-energy development, far more than any other country in the world (Renewable Energy World 2011). China now leads the world in wind power deploy-ment and is rapidly becoming a global leader in both the manufacturing and deployment of most key renewable energy technologies.

Looking Ahead

China’s mitigation challenge is considerable, due to the scale of its emissions, its energy sector, its economic growth, and its population. Th e achievements China has already made, however, in promoting energy effi ciency and the use of clean energy technologies are also consid-erable. As China takes additional measures to mitigate

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Wen Jiabao. (2011, March 5). Report on the work of the government, delivered at the fourth session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/15/c_13779521.htm

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Xu, Ming; Li, Ran; Crittenden, John C.; & Chen, Yongsheng. (2011). CO

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2 : Th e magic of China’s 11th

Five-Year Plan? Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

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People’s Daily Online. (2011, January 6). Zhang Guobao: Shi’er wu mo lizheng feihuashi nengyuan zhan yici nengyuan bizhong 11.4% [Zhang Guobao: Working hard to make non-fossil energy account for 11.4 percent of primary energy at the end of the Twelfth Five Year Plan]. Retrieved December 19, 2011, from http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/13670716.html

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