Climate Change and International Migration

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Summary: Policymakers in potential

destination countries for international

migrants have been slow to identify

possible responses to manage environ-

mentally induced migration that take

these complex interconnections into

account. Humanitarian admissions

are generally limited to refugees and

asylum seekers. Most environmental

migrants, forced to ee because of

loss of livelihood or habitat and not

because of persecutory policies, will be

unlikely to meet the legal denition of

a refugee. In the absence of legal op-

portunities to immigrate, at least some

portion of those who lose livelihoods

as a result of climate change and other

environmental hazards will likely be-

come irregular migrants. The challenge

in these cases is determining whether

these individuals should be given con-

sideration over others who migrate in

search of better opportunities. Tempo-

rary protection policies that permit indi-viduals whose countries have experi-

enced natural disasters or other severe

upheavals to remain at least tempo-

rarily without fear of deportation may

help a limited number of those forced

to ee their homes because of climate

change, but these will not address

the need for permanent resettlement,

particularly for the citizens of island

nations that may be affected by rising

sea levels. Given concerns in many

potential countries of destination about

the social, cultural, economic and otherimpacts of large-scale migration, the

policy development process will need

to balance domestic interests with the

clearly humanitarian implications of

climate change induced displacement.

1744 R Street NWWashington, DC 20009 1 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E [email protected]

Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration

Experts generally agree that theenvironment is just one o the manyreasons that prompt people to migrate,sometimes operating on its own but

more oen through other mecha-nisms, particularly loss o livelihoodsaected by environmental disruption.Policymakers in potential destinationcountries or international migrantshave been slow to identiy potentialresponses to manage environmentallyinduced migration that take thesecomplex interconnections into ac-count. Tis situation derives in partrom uncertainties about the actualimpacts o climate change on migra-

tion. But, even where there is a recog-nition that some orm o migration re-lated to environmental change is likelyto occur, addressing these movementsis hampered by the paucity o policyresponses that are deemed appropriateto these orms o migration.

Tis paper begins with a brie discus-sion o the potential impact o climatechange on migration patterns. It con-tinues with an examination o existingcapacities to address these orms omovement and gaps in the responsecapacities. Te paper concludes withrecommendations or addressing cli-mate change induced migration.

Background to the problem

Dierent policies and responses areneeded at each stage o environmen-tally induced migration. Te rst

stages are pre-migration, when actionsto mitigate climate change and helpindividuals adapt to environmentalhazards take place. It is outside o

the scope o this paper to explore thesteps being taken by localities, nationsand the international community toreverse current environmental prob-lems, reduce the risks associated withnatural and human-made disasters,and avert uture environmental shocksthat may arise out o climate change.Suce to say that prevention o theunderlying causes o environmen-tally induced migration and develop-ing mechanisms to adapt to climate

change and variability is the mostcritical need in managing the issuescovered in this paper, but it will re-quire considerable political will, timeand resources to take the steps thatare needed to protect the environmentand increase peoples resilience.

Displacement is the second stageo the lie cycle. Migration can beplanned or spontaneous, involvingindividuals and households or en-tire communities. It can be internal,with people moving shorter or longerdistances to nd new homes and liveli-hoods within their own countries, orit can be international, with peopleseeking to relocate to other countries.It can proceed as an orderly move-ment o people rom one location toanother, or it can occur under emer-gency circumstances. It can be tempo-rary, with most migrants expecting to

Climate Change and International Migration

by Susan F. Martin

June 2010


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return home when conditions permit, or it can be perma-

nent, with most migrants unable or unwilling to return.Each o these orms o migration requires signicantlydierent approaches and policy rameworks. Dependingon the specic situation, the environmental migrants mayresemble labor migrants, seeking better livelihood oppor-tunities in a new location, or they may resemble reugeesand internally displaced persons who have fed situationsbeyond their individual control.

Life cycle of climate-induced migration

Mitigation

Adaptation/Disaster Risk

Reduction

Displacement

Return orResettlement

Integration

Te third stage o the lie cycle involves return or resettle-ment in another location. Te decision about whetherreturn is possible involves a range o variables, including theextent to which the environmental causes either direct orthrough other channels are likely to persist. Policies in thereceiving communities and countries, depending on wheth-er the migration is internal or international, will also aectthe likelihood or return or settlement in the new location.In addition to immigration policies, the policies aectingreturn and settlement include land use and property rights,social welare, housing, employment and other rame-works that determine whether individuals, households andcommunities are able to nd decent living conditions andpursue adequate livelihoods.

Te nal stage o the lie cycle involves (re)integration intothe home or new location. Te policy rameworks outlinedabove will be key determinants o integration, infuencingthe access o displaced populations to housing, livelihoods,

saety and security. Integration is also aected by plans and

programs to mitigate uture dislocations rom environmen-tal hazards, coming ull circle on the lie cycle to a ocus onprevention, adaptation and risk reduction.

Most migration occurring rom climate change is likely tobe internal, with the aected populations seeking to ndmore habitable locations, with greater economic oppor-tunities, within their own countries. A portion o suchmigration will undoubtedly be international, however.In the most extreme cases, particularly in the context orising sea levels, the entire population o island nationsmay need to be relocated. In other cases, environmental

migrants will ollow already established labor migrationpatterns that are international in scope. For example, iclimate change worsens drought conditions in Mexicanstates such as Jalisco that already have signicant migrationto the United States, additional residents may choose toollow their compatriots north. Similarly, rising sea levels inBangladesh may well add to already established migrationto India. In still other cases, new patterns o internationalmigration may occur, particularly i climate change aectshabitat and livelihoods in large regions and leads migrants togo to new destinations.

Complicating the situation is the lack o good inormationand analysis about the circumstances in which internationalmigration may result rom climate change. Most projectionso climate change induced migration ocus on identiyinghabitat and livelihoods that will be adversely aected byenvironmental changes. Maps o changes that will resultrom various projections o sea level rise or intensieddrought provide useul tools to assess how many peoplewill be aected by these climatic changes and how manymay be orced to leave their current homes. Tese maps donot provide a useul assessment, though, as to where theyare likely to move e.g., short or long distance, internallyor internationally or how these movements are likely totake place spontaneously or planned, slowly or suddenly,voluntarily or orced.

Without such basic inormation, developing an appropriatepolicy ramework is exceedingly dicult. Te next sectiondiscusses the rameworks already in place or managinginternational migration that may occur as a result o climatechange.

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Existing policy frameworks and gaps in capacities

Te immigration policies o most destination countriesare not conducive to receiving large numbers o environ-mental migrants, unless they enter through already exist-ing admission categories. ypically, destination countriesadmit persons to ll job openings or to reuniy with amilymembers. Employment-based admissions are usually basedon the labor market needs o the receiving country, not thesituation o the home country. Workers can be admitted orpermanent residence or or temporary stays. Family admis-sions are usually restricted to persons with immediate rela-tives (spouses, children, parents and, sometimes, siblings)

in the destination country. Most amily reunication is orpermanent residence.

Permanent Admissions

Family reunification

Labor migration/point systems

Refugee resettlement/permanent asylum

Temporary Admissions

Temporary worker programs/contract workers

Temporary protection/temporary asylum

Some countries also use point systems under which theyadmit immigrants who score highly against such criteria aseducation and language skills.

Humanitarian admissions are generally limited to reugeesand asylum seekers that is, those who t the denitionin the UN Convention Relating to the Status o Reugees:persons with a well-ounded ear o persecution on the basiso race, religion, nationality, membership in a particularsocial group or political opinion. Countries with perma-nent resettlement programs screen reugees overseas. Bycontrast, asylum generally applies within the territory o adestination country, which allows those who can establishtheir reugee bonafdes to remain, either temporarily untilthey can saely return or permanently. Most environmentalmigrants, orced to fee because o loss o livelihood or habi-tat and not because o persecutory policies, will be unlikelyto meet the legal denition o a reugee.

Some countries have established special policies that

permit individuals whose countries have experiencednatural disasters or other severe upheavals to remain atleast temporarily without ear o deportation. Te UnitedStates, or example, enacted legislation in 1990 to pro-vide temporary protected status (PS) to persons in theUnited States who are temporarily unable to saely returnto their home country because o ongoing armed con-fict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinaryand temporary conditions. Environmental disaster mayinclude an earthquake, food, drought, epidemic, or otherenvironmental disaster in the state resulting in a substan-tial, but temporary, disruption o living conditions in the

area aected. In the case o environmental disasters, ascompared to confict, the country o origin must requestdesignation o PS or its nationals.

Importantly, PS only applies to persons already in theUnited States at the time o the designation. It is not meantto be a mechanism to respond to an unolding crisis inwhich people seek admission rom outside o the country.It also only pertains to situations that are temporary innature. I the environmental disaster has permanent conse-quences, a designation o emporary Protected Status is notavailable even or those presently in the United States, or it

may be lied. When the volcano erupted in Montserrat in1997, PS was granted to its citizens and was extended sixtimes. In 2005, however, it was ended because it is likelythat the eruptions will continue or decades, [and] the situ-ation that led to Montserrats designation can no longer beconsidered temporary as required by Congress when itenacted the PS statute.

Another signicant actor is that the designation is discre-tionary, determined by the Secretary o Homeland Security.Countries or parts o countries are designated, allowing na-tionals only o those countries to apply. Currently, the desig-nation is in eect or citizens o El Salvador, Honduras andNicaragua. PS was originally triggered by the earthquakesin El Salvador and Hurricane Mitch in the other countries.It has been extended until September 9, 2010 (El Salvador)and July 5, 2010 (Honduras and Nicaragua). Notably, PSwas not triggered or the hurricanes that destroyed largeparts o Haiti. Given the temporary nature o the grant andits application only to those already in the country, PS

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has limited utility in addressing environmentally induced

migration.

At the European Union level, the emporary ProtectionDirective establishes temporary protection during mass in-fuxes o certain displaced persons. Te term mass-infuxreers to situations where masses o people are suddenlydisplaced and where it is not easible to treat applicants onan individual basis. It was decided that mass-infux was tobe dened on a case-by-case basis by a qualied majority othe Council (quoted in Kolmannskog, 2009).

Sweden and Finland have included environmental migrants

in their immigration policies. Within its asylum system,Sweden includes persons who do not qualiy or reugeestatus but have a need or protection. Such a person in needo protection has le his native country and does not wishto return there because he: has a ear o the death penaltyor torture is in need o protection as a result o war orother serious conficts in the country is unable to returnto his native country because o an environmental disaster.Te decision is made on an individual, not group, basis.Although many recipients o this status are presumed to bein temporary need o protection, the Swedish rules oreseethat some persons may be in need o permanent solutions.

Similarly, in the Finnish Aliens Act, aliens residing in thecountry are issued with a residence permit on the basis oa need or protection i [] they cannot return because oan armed confict or environmental disaster (quoted inKolmannskog, 2009).

A number o countries provide exceptions to removalon an ad hoc basis or persons whose countries o originhave experienced signicant disruption because o naturaldisasters. Aer the 2004 tsunami, or example, Switzerland,United Kingdom and Canada suspended deportations othose rom such countries as Sri Lanka, India, Somalia,Maldives, Seychelles, Indonesia and Tailand.

o date, there are no examples o legislation or policiesthat address migration o persons rom slow-onset climatechanges that may destroy habitats or livelihoods in the u-ture. For the most part, movements rom slow-onset climatechange and other environmental hazards that limit econom-

ic opportunities are treated in the same manner as other

economically motivated migration. Persons moving outsideo existing labor and amily migration categories are con-sidered to be irregular migrants. In the absence o a stronghumanitarian basis or exempting them rom removalproceedings (which is unlikely in the slow-onset situation),these migrants would be subject to the regular systems inplace or mandatory return to their home countries. Astheir immediate reasons or migrating would be similar tothose o other irregular migrants that is, lack o economicopportunities at home and better economic opportunitiesabroad there would be little reason or destination coun-tries to manage these movements outside o their existing

immigration rules.

Yet, a number o source countries are raising the potentialthat large numbers o their population may need to relocateinternationally i the worse case scenarios o climate changecome to pass. President Mohamed Nasheed announced atthe end o 2008 that the Maldives was establishing a sov-ereign wealth und which could be used to purchase a newisland or the countrys population. According to Nasheed,this trust und will act as a national insurance policy tohelp pay or a new homeland, should uture generationshave to evacuate a country disappearing under the waves.1

Hoping that the unds would never be used or this pur-pose, Nasheed used the announcement as a call or renewedaction to reduce gas house emissions.

Anote ong, president o Kiribati, has also made it clearthat the population o his island might be orced to relocateen masse. His ocus has been on identiying immigrationpossibilities or Kiribati nationals in nearby countries,particularly Australia and New Zealand. In a recent trip toNew Zealand, he suggested that the best educated Kiribatisshould emigrate rst, in an orderly ashion, and then estab-lish communities which others could join as the situationrequires.

In only a ew cases has there been any serious discussion onew immigration policy rameworks or those displaced byclimate change, but even in this context, the ocus has beenon disaster-related, not slow-onset movements. Te GreenParty in Australia launched an initiative in 2007 to establish

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1 Science News, February 28, 2009, available at http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/40789/title/First_wave


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a climate reugee visa in immigration law. Te initiative

had three components:

1. o amend the Migration Act to incorporate a Cli-mate Change Reugee Visa class;

2. o establish a program or the migration o up to 300climate change reugees rom uvalu per year; 300rom Kiribati, and 300 rom elsewhere in the Pacicwhere appropriate;

3. o push the government to work in the UnitedNations and other international orums or the

establishment o an international denition andramework on climate change and environmentalreugees.2

Te visa would be available to persons who had been dis-placed as a result o a climate change induced environmen-tal disaster, which in turn was dened as:

a disaster that results rom both incremental and rapidecological and climatic change and disruption, thatincludes sea level rise, coastal erosion, desertication,collapsing ecosystems, resh water contamination, more

requent occurrence o extreme weather events such ascyclones, tornados, fooding and drought and that meansinhabitants are unable to lead sae or sustainable lives intheir immediate environment.3

A determination that a disaster exists would have to bemade personally by the Minister, using the ollowing crite-ria: (a) the geographical scope o the disaster, (b) adaptationoptions and long term sustainability, (c) the capability othe country and neighboring countries to absorb displacedpersons, and (d) international eorts to assist.

Te bill was deeated in 2007 but members o the GreenParty intend to reintroduce it or introduce a similar bill. Tegoverning party has indicated it sees international migra-tion o environmental migrants as a last resort. When askedi Australia intended to resettle those likely to be aectedby rising sea levels in the Pacic, Immigration DepartmentDeputy Secretary Peter Hughes responded:

I think the general view that has emerged about

climate change displacement is that, rst and ore-most, the activities o governments ought to be aimedat mitigation o the climate change actors that mightdisplace people, adaptation within countries wherethat is possible and internal relocation could be parto that adaptation process and, lastly, as a last resort,i needed, international resettlement as a response(quoted in Adelaide Now, 2008).

New Zealand, under similar pressures regarding the po-tential need or resettlement o Pacic Islanders aectedby rising sea levels, has also not established a specic

category o admissions. Te government has introduceda Pacic Access Category (PAC), under which 75 peoplerom uvalu, 75 rom Kiribati and 250 rom onga mayimmigrate to New Zealand each year. Te program is basedon employment, however, not environmental actors. Teimmigrants must be between 18 and 45 years old, have anoer o employment in New Zealand, have English skills,meet minimum income requirements, undergo a healthcheck and have no history o illegal entrance. Te programis not intended to provide access to those who may be mostvulnerable to climate change induced displacement theelderly or the inrm, or example.

Conclusions

Discussion o policies to manage environmental migrationis in its inancy. As understanding increases o the variousways that environmental change aects migration patterns,and vice versa, governments are beginning to think throughhow to manage the implications o these interconnections.Much o the attention to date ocuses on internal migration,largely in the context o adaptation strategies. Few poten-tial destination countries have explicit policies to manageclimate change induced migration, unless aected popula-tions migrate through the normal immigration policies thatgive preerence to amily reunication and employment-based admissions. With the exception o some discussionsin Australia and New Zealand regarding admissions romthe Pacic Island countries, no destination countries haveconsidered establishing special labor admissions programsor persons aected by loss o livelihoods as a result o slow-

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2 Climate Refugee Visa: An Australian Greens policy initiative3 A Bill for an Act to recognize refugees of climate change induced environmental disasters, and for related purposes


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onset climate change or other environmental hazards. While

potential destination countries have asylum and/or resettle-ment systems to manage admission o persons who cannotreturn home because o a well-ounded ear o persecution,none have systems in place to manage admission o personswho cannot remain or return home because o environmen-tal threats. At best, destination countries have policies to de-er deportation o those coming rom countries with naturaldisasters, but these are generally post-disaster and ad hoc intheir implementation. In sum, no major destination countryhas a pro-active policy designed to resettle persons adverse-ly aected by environmental hazards.

Some international migration may well be needed, however,particularly or the citizens o island nations, necessitatingidentication o appropriate admissions policies in potentialdestination countries. Highest priority should be given toidentiying likely patterns o migration. Particular attentionshould be placed on identiying who cannot be relocatedwithin their home countries, either because o widespreadhabitat destruction (again, as in the case o certain islandstates) or because relocation would pose security risks thatcould provoke violence or even confict. Some attentionshould also be addressed to the slower-onset situations inwhich loss o livelihoods generates emigration pressures.

In the absence o legal opportunities to immigrate, at leastsome portion o those who lose livelihoods as a result oclimate change and other environmental hazards will likelybecome irregular migrants. Te challenge in these casesis determining whether these individuals should be givenconsideration over others who migrate in search o betteropportunities. Tere is reason or skepticism that manydestination countries will answer this question in the a-rmative. With the exception o their reugee and asylumpolicies, countries tend to rame their admissions policiesaround their own national interests, prioritizing admissiono persons who will contribute to economic growth, meetlabor shortages or have close amily ties in the destinationcounty. While exceptions may be made or environmentallyinduced migrants whose situation most resembles that oreugees, there is less likelihood that governments will makean exception or those who resemble economic migrants.

In moving toward more coherent rameworks, the lessonso the past will be useul, particularly in the context o those

countries that oresee the possibility that planned resettle-

ment, including internationally, may be needed. Moresystematic examination o previous planned resettlementprograms in the context o transmigration, villagizationand development projects would help ensure that climatechange induced resettlement programs do not all victimto the problems identied in these initiatives. Identicationo best case examples o resettlement that is, programsthat respected the rights o the resettled and resulted in animproved economic and social situation is as important asidentication o pitalls experienced in programs that ailed.Guidelines promulgated to protect those who are invol-untarily resettled rom development projects or who are dis-

placed rom natural disasters should be examined system-atically to determine their applicability to the resettlementprograms proposed by countries earing the worst conse-quences o climate change. echnical assistance and trainingto the ministries that may be responsible or resettlement isessential to ensure that all alternatives are exhausted beorepeople are required to relocate, aected populations areinvolved in the planning, and all steps are taken to ensureappropriate preparations and implementation

Susan F. Martin holds the Donald G. Herzberg Chair in International Migration and

serves as Director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown

University.

The Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM), based in the School

of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, applies the best in social science, legal

and policy expertise to the complex and controversial issues raised by international

migration.

PHOTO CREDIT: Floods in Ifo refugee camp, Dadaab,Kenya, UNHCR: B. Bannon, Decem-

ber 2006.

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References

Adelaide Now (2008) uvalu reugees last resort, October

26, 2008, http://www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/story/

0,22606,24553193-2682,00.html.

Brown, Oli (2008),Migration and Climate Change, Migration

Research Series #31, Geneva: International Organization or

Migration.

Hugo, Graeme (2008)Migration, Development and Environment,

Migration Research Series #35, Geneva: International Organiza-

tion or Migration.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) Glos-

sary available at http://www.ipcc.ch/glossary/index.htm

International Organization or Migration (2007) Discussion

Note: Migration and the Environment, MC/INF/288, available at

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/

mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/evolving_global_econo-

my_2728112007/MC_INF_288_EN.pd .

International Strategy or Disaster Reduction (2009) erminol-

ogy: Basic erms o Disaster Risk Reduction, available at http://

www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm.

Kniveton, Dominic, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith

and Richard Black (2008) Climate Change and Migration: Improv-

ing Methodologies to Estimate Flows, Migration Research Series

#33, Geneva: International Organization or Migration.

Kolmannskog, Vikram (2009) Climate change-related dis-

placement and the European response, Paper presented at SID

Vijverberg Session on Climate Change and Migration, Te Hague,

January 20, 2009.

Morton, Andrew, Philippe Boncour and Frank Laczko (2008)

Human security policy challenges, in Climate Change and Dis-

placement, Forced Migration Review, #31, October 2008.

Raleigh, Clionadh, Lisa Jordan, and Idean Salehyan (2008) As-

sessing the Impact o Climate Change on Migration and Confict,

Washington, DC: World Bank.

Renaud, Fabrice, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, and Koko Warner

(2007) Control, Adapt or Flee How to Face Environmental Migra-tion?, Bonn, Germany: UN University.

UN International Strategy or Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)

(2009) erminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, available at

http://www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.

html.

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Study team members

Susan Martin, Institute or the Study o International Migration, Schoolo Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC (Co-Chair)

Koko Warner, Institute or Environment and Human Security, United

Nations University, Bonn, Germany (Co-Chair)

Jared Banks and Suzanne Sheldon, Bureau or Population, Reugees andMigration, U.S. Department o State, Washington, DC

Regina Bauerochse Barbosa, Economy and Employment Department,Sector Project Migration and Development, German echnicalCooperation (GZ), Eschborn, Germany

Alexander Carius, Moira Feil, and Dennis nzler, Adelphi Research,Berlin, Germany

Joel Charny, Reugees International, Washington, DC

Dimitria Clayton, Ministry or Intergenerational Aairs, Family, Womenand Integration, State o North Rhine-Westphalia, Dsseldor, Germany

Sarah Collinson, Overseas Development Institute, London, UnitedKingdom

Peter Croll, Ruth Vollmer, Andrea Warnecke, Bonn International Centeror Conversion, Bonn, Germany

Frank Laczko, International Organization or Migration, Geneva,Switzerland

Agustin Escobar Latapi, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superioresen Antropologa Social (CIESAS), Guadalajara, Mexico

Michelle Leighton, Center or Law and Global Justice, University o SanFrancisco, San Francisco, Caliornia and Munich Re Foundation-UNUChair in Social Vulnerability

Philip Martin, University o Caliornia, Migration Dialogue, Davis,

Caliornia

Heather McGray, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

Lorenz Petersen, Climate Change askorce, German echnicalCooperation (GZ), Eschborn, Germany

Aly andian, Groupe dEtudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations(GERMS), Gaston Berger University, Senegal

Agnieszka Weinar, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security,European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Astrid Ziebarth, German Marshall Fund o the United States, Berlin,Germany.

List of papers

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responsesby Sarah Collinson

Migration, the Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence

by Frank Laczko

Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues or Legal Protection oMigrants and Displaced Personsby Michelle Leighton

Climate Change, Agricultural Development, and Migrationby Philip Martin

Climate Change and International Migrationby Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Adaptationby Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Confict: Receiving Communities underPressure?by Andrea Warnecke, Dennis nzler and Ruth Vollmer

Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental

Change and Human Migrationby Koko Warner

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Transatlantic Study Teams

Te GMF Immigration and Integration Programs ransatlantic Study eams link the transatlantic debate on interna-tional migration fows with its consequences or sending and receiving regions. Trough compiling existing data, policyanalysis, and dialogue with policymakers, selected study teams gather acts, convene leading opinion leaders on bothsides o the Atlantic, promote open dialogue, and help to advance the policy debate. Study teams are chosen by a com-petitive selection process, based on the overall quality o their proposal, its policy relevance, institutional strength, sus-tainability, and potential or synergies. Te ransatlantic Study eam 2009/2010 is investigating the impact o climatechange on migration patterns. Environmental deterioration, including natural disasters, rising sea level, and droughtproblems in agricultural production, could cause millions o people to leave their homes in the coming decades. Ledby Dr. Susan F. Martin, Georgetown University, and Dr. Koko Warner, UN University, the team consists o scholars,policymakers and practitioners rom the migration and environmental communities.

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking in-stitution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on trans-atlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere,by convening leaders and members o the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis ontransatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed commitment to the transatlantic rela-tionship. In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a girom Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sideso the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven oces in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava,Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

Te Institute or the Study o International Migration is based in the School o Foreign Service at Georgetown Universi-

ty. Staed by leading experts on immigration and reugee policy, the Institute draws upon the resources o GeorgetownUniversity aculty working on international migration and related issues on the main campus and in the law center. Itconducts research and convenes workshops and conerences on immigration and reugee law and policies. In addition,the Institute seeks to stimulate more objective and well-documented migration research by convening research sympo-sia and publishing an academic journal that provides an opportunity or the sharing o research in progress as well asnished projects.

Te UN University established by the UN General Assembly in 1973, is an international community o scholars en-gaged in research, advanced training and the dissemination o knowledge related to pressing global problems. Activitiesocus mainly on peace and confict resolution, sustainable development and the use o science and technology to ad-vance human welare. Te Universitys Institute or Environment and Human Security addresses risks and vulnerabili-ties that are the consequence o complex environmental hazards, including climate change, which may aect sustain-able development. It aims to improve the in-depth understanding o the cause eect relationships to nd possible waysto reduce risks and vulnerabilities. Te Institute is conceived to support policy and decision makers with authoritativeresearch and inormation.

Climate Change and International Migration

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