CLEAVAGE THEORY MEETS EUROPE’S CRISES: LIPSET, ROKKAN, …€¦ · Revealingly, Lipset and Rokkan...

THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIESHoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)

CLEAVAGETHEORYMEETSEUROPE’SCRISES:LIPSET,ROKKAN,ANDTHETRANSNATIONALCLEAVAGE

LiesbetHoogheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHillGaryMarksUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill ABSTRACT:ThispapertheorizeshowtheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisishavereinforcedatransnationalcleavagethathasatitscoreaculturalconflictpittinglibertarian,universalisticvaluesagainstthedefenseofnationalismandparticu-larism. Radical right and green parties take polar positions on Europe and immigration, placemore salience onthem,andexhibitgreater internalunitythanmainstreamparties.Theperforationofnationalstatesby immigra-tion, integration, and trademay signify a critical juncture in thepolitical developmentof Europeno less conse-quential forpartiesandpartysystemsthantheprevious junctures thatLipsetandRokkan (1967)detect in theirclassicarticle. KEYWORDS:cleavage,politicalparties,Eurocrisis,Europeanintegration,elections.


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1.Introduction

HavetheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisiscongealedadistinctivestructureofconflictinEurope?1In

thispaperweusethebuildingblocksofacleavagetheoryofpartycompetitiontoarguethatEuropehas

been transformedbyanewdivide.Cleavage theory claims that the issues thatdividevotersare con-

nected in durable dimensions, that political partiesmake programmatic commitments on these issue

dimensionswhichareself-reinforcing,andthatasaresultofissuecoherenceandprogrammaticsticki-

ness,changeinpartysystemsisapunctuatedprocessthatarisesfromshocksexternaltothepartysys-

tem.

Summarizinganextensiveliteratureoverthepastdecade,wedescribetheemergenceofatransna-

tionalcleavagewhichhasasitscoreapoliticalreactionagainstEuropeanintegrationandimmigration.

Theperforationofnationalstatesbyimmigration,integration,andtrademaysignifyacriticaljuncturein

the political development of Europe no less decisive for parties and party systems than the previous

juncturesthatLipsetandRokkan(1967)detectintheirclassicarticle.Forchallengingpartiesontheradi-

calrighttheseissuesrelatetothedefenseofnationalcommunityagainsttransnationalshocks.TheEu-

ropeanUnionisitselfsuchashockbecauseitintroducesrulebythosewhoareregardedasforeigners,

diminishes the authority exercisedby national states over their ownpopulations, produces economic

insecurityamongthosewholackmobileassets,andfacilitatesimmigration.Immigrationisperceivedas

athreatbythosewhoresentculturalintermixingandtheerosionofnationalvalues,bythosewhomust

1WewouldliketothankDavidAttewellforresearchassistance.Earlierdraftswerepresentedataworkshop,TheoryMeetsCri-sis,organizedbytheauthorsattheSchumanCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,June30-July12016,attheAmericanPoliti-calScienceAssociation,Philadelphia,1-3September2016,ataconference,“SteinRokkan’sHeritagetoContemporaryPoliticalScience:UnderstandingRepresentational andPolicy-MakingChallenges inMulti-Jurisdictional Polities,”University of Bergen,September20-212016,the26thPhDSummerSchooloftheECPRStandingGrouponPoliticalPartiesattheUniversityofNot-tingham, September 23 2016, and the ComparativeWorkingGroup atUniversity ofNorth Carolina-Chapel Hill, October 18,2016.Wethankparticipantsattheseevents,andespeciallyJanRovnyandFrankSchimmelfennig,forcommentsandsugges-tions.Thisresearchwasco-fundedbytheEUENGAGEHORIZONgrant#649281andbytheCenterforEuropeanStudiesattheUniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill.WealsothanktheRobertSchumanCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,forhostingasFellowsinJune-July2016andforfinancingandhostingtheconference“TheoryMeetsCrisis”inJune2016,whereafirstdraftofthispaperwaspresented.


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competewithimmigrantsforhousingandjobs,and,moregenerally,bythosewhoseekculturaloreco-

nomicshelterintherightsofcitizenship.

Wetermthiscleavageatransnationalcleavagebecauseithasasitsfocalpointthedefenseofnation-

alpolitical,social,andeconomicwaysoflifeagainstexternalactorswhopenetratethestatebymigrat-

ing,exchanginggoods,orexerting rule.Thisconceptionhasmuch incommonwithpriorconceptions,

but because we wish to outline its character, sources, and consequences in ways with which other

scholarsmightdisagree,weadoptadistinctivelabel.

Theemergenceofanewcleavagerevealsthecausalpowerofsocialforcesinthefaceofestablished

institutions.Perhapsthesinglemoststunningconsequenceofthecrisesisthebreakthroughofaradical

rightparty inacountry,Germany,thatwasperceivedtobepractically immune.Forthisreasonalone,

thecrisescanbeconsideredtohaveusheredinanewera.However,virtuallyeverycountrycontainsits

ownsurprises,andwerewetofollowthemwewouldbelostinfascinatingdetail.

Ourfocusinthisarticleisonthegeneralcharacterofconflictsthathavearisen,theirrelationtothe

existingstructureofpartycompetition,andhowtheyhavealreadyreshapedpartysystems.Thecrises

arecriticaljuncturesthatreveal,intheopenairsotospeak,thelatentpressuresthathavebuiltupover

thepasttwodecades.Theysuggestthatpartysystemsaresubjecttodiscontinuitiesratherthantoin-

crementalchange,andthattheresponseofapartysystemtoexogenouschangecomesfromvotersra-

therthanparties.

Inthenextsectionweexplainwhywethinkcleavagetheorycanhelpusunderstandwhathashap-

pened.Wehavenohesitation indroppingthepresumptionthatpoliticalpartiesareexpressionsofal-

readyformed,denselyorganized,andsociallyclosedgroups,whilebuildingonthreefundamentalclaims

ofcleavagetheory:partysystemsaredeterminedinepisodicbreaksfromthepastbyexogenoussocial

forces; political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, in consequence, party system change

comesintheformofrisingparties.


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Theremainderofthisarticleprovidesevidencethatthishasindeedhappened.Thefollowingsection

conceivestheriseofatransnationalcleavageasareactiontoreformsthathaveweakenednationalsov-

ereignty,promotedinternationaleconomicexchange, increasedimmigration,andexacerbatedcultural

andeconomicinsecurity.Weexaminetheeffectoftheeconomicandmigrationcrisesinraisingthesali-

enceofEuropeandimmigration,andthenshowthatthemodalresponseofmainstreampoliticalparties

wastostayputontheseissues.Voterschanged,butmainstreampartiesdidnot.

We thenpresentevidence that competitiononEuropean integrationand immigration is structured

onthenewcleavage.TheTANpoleofthiscleavageisstakedoutbytheradicalright.2Radicalrightpar-

tiestakemoreextremepositionsontheseissues,placemoresalienceonthem,andexhibitgreaterin-

ternalunitythanmainstreamparties.ByvirtueoftheircommitmenttoGALvalues,greenpartiesarelo-

catedatthealter-pole.JustasthereligiouscleavageandtheclasscleavagewereraisedbyCatholicand

socialistpartiesononesideofthedivide,sothetransnationalcleavageismobilizedbyradicalrightpar-

ties at one extreme. As the transnational divide has become salient, mainstream parties have been

compelledtocompeteonissuesthatliefarfromtheirprogrammaticcore.

2.Cleavagetheory—thenandnow

Cleavagetheory,originatinginLipsetandRokkan(1967),conceivesanationalpartysystemastheex-

pressionofunderlyingsocialconflicts.Revealingly,LipsetandRokkanignorestrategicinteractionamong

parties inexplaining thestructureofcontestation. Instead, they focuson thebasiccleavages thatun-

dergirdpartysupportoverthemediumorlong-term:thenationalrevolutionthatproducedacleavage

between the central stateandperipheral communities andbetween the central stateanda suprana-

tional church; and the industrial revolution that produced an urban/rural cleavage, and later awork-

2TANreferstothetradition/authority/nationalpoleofaculturaldimensionwithGAL(green/alternative/libertarian)attheop-positepole.


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er/employer cleavage. In each case, the political parties that were eventually formed were expres-

sions—or, to put itmoredirectly, instruments—of self-conscious, socially closed groups. Conflicts be-

tweenworkersandemployers,betweenthoselivinginperipheralcommunitiesandcentralstatebuild-

ers,andbetweensecularistsanddefendersoftheChurchwererootedincollectiveidentitiesthatwere

expressedingrass-rootsmovementsandhierarchicalorganizations.Thesolidaritythatexistedinthese

groupswasmuchmorethananexpressionofthesocialoroccupationallocationofanysetofindividu-

als.Itwasexperiential,theoutcomeofrepeatedconflictwhichdefinedandsolidifiedthecompositionof

in-groupsandout-groups(Bartolini2000;Marks1989).3Thepoliticalorganizationsthatexpressedtheir

voiceweremuchmorethanconvenientvessels,but“politicalactorsthatgavecoherenceandorganized

political expression towhat otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences”

(Kriesi2010:673;BartoliniandMair1990).

Beforewegoanyfurther, it isworthnotingthattheexistenceandsubsequentdeclineofsocialclo-

surearenotallornothing.Socialclosurewasfarfromcompleteevenintheimmediatepost-WorldWar

IIdecades.RecallthataroundoneinthreeBritishmanualworkersvotedLiberalorConservativeinthe

1950sand1960s(Stephens1979:404).Aclassicinvestigationofcleavagevotinginitsgoldenagefinds

that, for fifteenadvanceddemocracies,occupationexplained just4.9percentof thevariance inparty

choiceinthemediancountry,Franceunderthe4thRepublic,andreligionexplainedjust8.0percentin

themedian country, Canada (Rose1974: 17). Franklin (1992: 386)providesextensivedata suggesting

thatthemedianvarianceinleftvotingexplainedbysocialstructureinfourteencountriesdeclinedfrom

around20percentinthe1960stoaround12percentinthe1980s.Recentliteratureexplainingcontem-

poraryradicalrightorgreenvotingattributesaround10to12percentofthevariancetomodelstapping

3ThishasaffinitieswithMarxism.KarlMarxregardedclassconsciousnessastheoutcomeofcollectivestruggleinwhichindi-vidualswouldcometoseetheirfateasboundtothatoftheirclass.Objectiveclasslocationhadtobeactivatedinconflictbe-foreonecouldspeakofclassasapoliticalcategory.


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education, occupation, rural/urban location, sex, and age (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Dolezal 2010;

Norris2005;Oesch2008).

Lipset/Rokkan show little interest in the factors that bind individuals into collectivities (Bornschier

2009: 2).Whatmatters in their theory is that fundamental divisions in a society give rise to durable

cleavagesthatstructurepartycompetition.Thequestionstheyputunderthespotlightare1)Whatare

thefundamentaldivisionsinasociety?2)Whichdistinctionsamongapopulationbecomethebasesfor

cleavages? 3)Howdo these cleavages interact to shape voter preferences? 4)How are voter prefer-

encesexpressedinpartyformationandcompetition?5)Howarecleavagesmediatedbytherulesofthe

gameandbypartystrategies?

In coming to grips with these questions, we draw on cleavage theory tomake the following

moves:

! Thestrategicflexibilityofapoliticalpartyonmajorconflictdimensionsisconstrainedtotheex-

tent it hasadurable constituencyof voters, adecentralizeddecision-making structure, a self-

selectedcadreofactivists,aself-replicatingleadership,andadistinctprogrammaticreputation

(Schumacher,deVries,andVis2013).Politicalpartiescanbeflexibleonparticularissues,butef-

fortstoshiftpositionatthelevelofaconflictdimensionarerare.Thatistosay,politicalparties

areinducedtoseeklocalmaximaincompetingforvotes(LaverandSergenti2009).4Inaddition

toshifting its issueposition,apoliticalpartymayseektosubsumean issue intothedominant

dimension,bluritsresponse,orignoretheissue(Rovny2015:913;Lacewell2015).Theproblem

forestablishedpartiesisthatalocal,blurring,orstatusquoresponseismoreeffectiveforasin-

gleissuethanforasetofstronglyrelatedissues.

! Hence,thesourceofdynamisminpartysystemsinresponsetomajorshiftsinvoterpreferences

isthegrowthofnewpoliticalparties.Thebasicpremisesofcleavagetheoryarethatexogenous

4 It issimplynotpossible,onstrictly logicalgrounds,to identifyavotemaximizingstrategyforanyparty inapopulatedtwo-dimensionalspace(LaverandSergenti2009:43).


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forcesshapedemocraticpartysystems;thatchangecomesfromvoters,notestablishedparties;

thatpoliticalpartiesareprogrammaticallyinflexible;andthatasaconsequence,theresponseof

a party system to a serious exogenous shock takes the form of challenging, rather than re-

formed,politicalparties.

! Bythetimemasspoliticalpartiescameonthescene,cleavageswerealready institutionalized.

Nowthe sequence is reversed.Competitiveparty systemsexistprior to theonsetofanynew

cleavage.Hence,itmakesnosensetobelievethatchallengingpoliticalpartieswillberootedin

pre-existing, socially closed, groups. The connection between rising parties and voters has

changedbecausepoliticalpartiesarenow formedalongsideanewcleavage, rather thandec-

adesorcenturiesafter.Politicalpartiesareactors,notsubjects,intheformationofsocialdivi-

sions.

! Cleavagetheoryisabouttheinteractionofcleavagesratherthanthereplacementofonealign-

mentbyanother.So insteadofconceivingpartysystemchangeasaprocessofrealignment in

whichanewdimensionofconflictcomestosupersedeapriordimension,cleavagetheoryasks

how the continued existence of one division affects the party-political expression of a subse-

quentone. Inpartysystemsthat loadthediceagainstnewparties,anewcleavagecanbeex-

pected toproduce intense frictionswithin parties. In low-barriermulti-party systems, by con-

trast,anewcleavagecanbeexpectedtoproducenewchallengingpartiesthatexistalongside,

withoutreplacing,partiesformedonpriorcleavages.

! Lipset/Rokkanwerealert tosocial changes thatwerecorrodingclassconflict,but theyhadno

ideathatthecontainers—nationalstates—weregoingtobetransformedinthedecadesaround

theturnofthetwenty-firstcentury.Territorial identityasamotiveforconflictwasthoughtto

beathingofthepast.Nationalismwasthedead-endresultofinter-warfascism,nevertobere-

peated.Ethnicnationalismwithinstateswasconsideredaninertremnantoflong-pastperipher-


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alresistancetonationbuilding.Intheabsenceofterritorialidentity—perhapsthemostpower-

fulsourceofmasspoliticalmobilization—domesticconflictwascompressedtoleft/rightconflict

aboutwhogetswhat.WhenthepoliticalgorillaofnationalismlefttheroomafterWorldWarII,

domesticdebatewasnarrowedtoeconomicissues,i.e.theroleofthestate,taxes,andwelfare

spending.LipsetandRokkan(1967:13)recognizedthat“Functionaloppositionscanonlydevel-

opaftersome initialconsolidationof thenational territory,”buttheywereunabletoseethat

nationalterritorymightbedeconsolidatedinauthoritativeredesignandthemovementofpeo-

ples.

3.ATransnationalcleavage

Theinstitutionalpointofdepartureforapost-Lipset/Rokkancleavageisaseriesofmajorreformsin

theearly1990sthatdiminishedthecostof internationaltradeandmigrationwhilediffusingauthority

fromcentral states tobodieswithinandamong them.TheMaastrichtTreaty (1993)extendedEUau-

thorityoverwiderangesofpublic life,madeitmucheasierforpeopletowork inanotherEUcountry,

createdacommoncurrency,andturnednationalsintoEuropeanUnioncitizens.Thedissolutionofthe

Sovietempirein1989releasedmorethanonehundredmillionpeopletotradeandcirculatewithinthe

EuropeanUnion.TheWorldTradeOrganization (1994)wasnegotiated in theearly1990s,aswerere-

gional tradeorganizations,nowtotaling thirty-five innumber (Hooghe,Lenz,andMarks forthcoming).

The1990swerethecuspofarapidincreaseininternationaltrade,internationalmigration,andeconom-

icinequalitythathavetheirideologicalrootsintheThatcher-Reaganyears.However,theconsensuson

transnationalismencompassedthemainstreamleftaswellthemainstreamright.

Theintellectualbasisfortransnationalismisbroadanddeep.Thelowerthetransactioncostsofinter-

national economic exchange, the greater the scope for specialization and economies of scale. A core

premise of neoclassical economics is that introducing common standards and diminishing barriers to


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tradeandinvestmentincreaseseconomicgrowth.Fromapublicgoodsperspective,nationalstatesare

bothtoosmallandtoolarge.Manyofthemostintractableproblemsthatconfronthumanity—including

globalwarming, failed states, species loss, andenvironmentaldegradation—requireongoing coopera-

tionamongstatesandtheirpopulations.Nationalsovereigntyanditspoliticalexpression,thenational

veto, are obstacles to problem solving,which iswhymany international organizations pool authority

amongtheirmemberstatesinquasi-majoritariandecisionmaking(HoogheandMarks2015).Functional

efficiencyintheprovisionofpublicgoodscallsforgovernanceatdiversescales,includingregionaland

globallevels.

However, transnationalism proved to be highly contentious, particularly in Europe where in-

creasedtradeandinterminglingofpeopleswenthandinhandwiththecreationofasupranationalpoli-

ty(Hurrelmann,Gora,andWagner2015:55-6).Europeanintegrationraisedfundamentalissuesofrule

and belonging for thosewhowished to “defend national culture, language, community and national

sovereigntyagainsttheinfluxofimmigrants,againstcompetingsourcesofidentitywithinthestate,and

against external pressures from other countries and international organizations” (Marks and Wilson

2000:455;Prosser2016:748-9).Beginningin1999,theChapelHillExpertSurveytappedthepositionsof

politicalpartiesonaGALversusTANdimensionwhichprovedtobestronglyassociatedwithsupportfor

Europe.

Transnationalism also has transparent distributional consequences, biasing the gains from trade to

thosewhohavemobileassets.Loserswhofeeltheyareslippingwithnoprospectofupwardmobilityre-

sent thedilutionof therightsandprotectionofcitizenshipbyaglobalelite thatviewsnationalstates

andtheirlawsasconstraintstobefinessedorarbitraged.AsMartinWolf(2016)wroteintheFinancial

Times: “[T]heshareof immigrants inpopulationshas jumpedsharply. It ishard toargue that thishas

brought largeeconomic,socialandculturalbenefits tothemassof thepopulation.But ithasunques-

tionably benefited those at the top, includingbusiness.” Resentment canbe sharp among thosewho


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valuenationalcitizenshipbecausetheyhavefewalternativesourcesofself-worth.Nationalismhaslong

beentherefugeofthosewhoareinsecure,whosensetheyarelosingstatus,andwhoseekstandingby

identifyingwiththegroup.Thepromiseoftransnationalismhasbeengainsforall,buttheexperienceof

thepasttwodecadesisthatithurtsmany.Hence,oppositiontotransnationalismisformanyapopulist

reaction against eliteswho have little sympathy for national borders (Inglehart andNorris 2016; van

Kessel2015).

4.Thesocialbasis

Fromthelate1990s,severalwritersbegantoconsiderEuropeanintegrationfromacleavageperspec-

tive.5ExplainingtheriseofthevotefortheradicalrightinSwitzerland,Kriesi(1998:180)pointedto“the

emergenceofyetanothernewcleavage–thecleavageopposingthenewmiddleclasswinnersofthe

transformationofWesternEuropeansocietiestothegroupoflosersoftheverysameprocess.”Inthese

years,aflowofpublicationssuggestedthatconflictoverEuropecutacrosstheleft-rightdivide,thatEu-

ropewaspartofalargerculturalconflict,andthatthisconflictwassociallystructured.Inachapterti-

tled,“Europe:ANewElectoralCleavage?”Evans(1999:220)madethecasethatEuropehad“thepoten-

tial to cross-cut and restructurepartisandivisions in theBritish electorate.”Marks andWilson (2000:

433)suggestedthatEuropeanintegrationamountstoa“constitutionalrevolution,”whichtheyanalyze

from a cleavage perspective. Hooghe et al. (2002: 979) went on to argue that “Nationalism, anti-

immigration,andtraditionalismgohandinhand”andconstitutedadistinctdimensionofconflictdriven

byradicalrightparties.Andinhisinfluentialbook,Bartolini(2005:395;404)assertedthatEuropeanin-

tegrationwas a process of fundamental territorial re-articulation that could produce a new cleavage

5Inglehart(1971:992)detectedapost-industrialcleavageinwhichayoung,educatedsectionofthemiddleclasswouldrealignonlibertarianvaluesandworkerswouldbepotentialrecruitsforconservativeparties.Inhisearlyformulation,Inglehartmadetheconnectionwithinternationalism:“[T]helibertarianpositionseemslinkedwithinternationalism.Thisfollowsfromthefactthat,accordingtoouranalysis,thepost-bourgeoisgroupshaveattainedsecurity inregardtoboththesafetyandsustenanceneeds;insofarasthenation-stateisseenasabulwarkprotectingtheindividualagainstforeignthreats, it is lessimportanttopost-bourgeoisrespondents”(1971:997).


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“rootedin…lifechancesandmaterialopportunities”thatwould“cutheavilyacross,reshuffle,andre-

shape”nationalpoliticalparties.

Inaseriesofempiricallyrichbooks,Kriesi,Grande,andco-authors(2006;2008;2012)haveexplored

howEuropeanintegrationandimmigrationhavestructuredpreferencesandpoliticalconflictinBritain,

France,Germany,Switzerland,theNetherlands,andAustriabypittingthewinnersofglobalizationwho

favor transnational integration against losers who seek demarcation. Winners and losers have con-

trastingeconomic interestsandculturalpreferences,withthedifferencemostpronouncedonthecul-

tural dimension.Winners and losers have social-structural characteristics that are equally distinctive:

“Twoofthemostimportantgroupsonthewinners’side,highlyeducatedpeopleandsocio-culturalspe-

cialists,arefarmoresupportiveofopeningbordersthanarethosewith lower levelsofeducationand

thosewhoareunskilledworkers”(Kriesietal2012:73).

Themostactivepoleofthiscleavageconnectsnationalandwesternvalues,defenseofnationalsov-

ereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade skepticism. Theseare reinforcing issues for thosewho

feeltheyhavesufferedtransnationalism—thedownandout,theculturally insecure,theunskilled,the

de-skilled,i.e.thosewholacktheeducationneededtocompeteinamobileworld.Educationemerges

asapowerfulstructuringfactorwithadoubleeffect.Itisnecessaryforthosewhorelyontheirowntal-

entstoliveaneconomicallysecurelifeinaworldwithlowbarrierstotrade.Justasimportantly,educa-

tionshapesthewayapersonlooksattheworldandtheirfellowhumans.Educationallowsapersonto

seethingsfromtheotherside,akeytoempathyforthosewhohaveadifferentwayoflife(Bornschier

andKriesi2013).

Educationappearstoshapeattitudesontrade,immigration,andglobalizationbecauseitaffectsboth

values and economic interests (Hainmueller andHopkins 2014;Hainmueller andHiscox 2006, 2007).6

6Accesstohighereducationshapesaperson’slife-longattitudes(Triventi2013:499).Controllingforsocioeconomicstatusandattitudinalvariables,CofféandVoorposte(2010:442)findthat“YoungpeoplewhoseparentsvotefortheSVP[SwissPeople’s


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Thisviewgainedcredibilitywhenpoliticaleconomistsinvestigatingtheeconomicundergirdingoftrade

attitudesfoundapowerfulandunexpectededucationaleffect(MaydaandRodrik2005;O’Rourkeand

Sinnott 2002). Individuals with limited education aremuchmore likely to have an exclusive national

identity(PolyakovaandFligstein2016:Table5),andthereisevidenceofa“wideningeducationalgapin

Euroscepticattitudes”sincetheMaastrichtTreaty(Hakhverdianetal.2013:534).Kuhnetal(2016:38)

find that“peoplewith low levelsofeducationalattainmentaremoresensitive to increasedeconomic

inequality thanarehighlyeducated individuals.”Bechtel,Hainmueller, andMargalit (2014) showhow

culturalvalues,inparticularcosmopolitanbeliefs,drivethepositiveassociationbetweensupportforEu-

rocrisisbailoutsandhighereducation.Card,Dustmann,andPreston(2012)concludethatculturalcon-

cerns aremore decisive than concerns aboutwages and taxes in explaining attitudes to immigration

among less educated respondents. Students of immigration had always considered non-economic

alongside economic factors, but the role of community, identity, and framing appears to be even

strongerthanoriginallythought(ChandlerandTsai2001;SidesandCitrin2007).

5.TheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisis

In the sameway that theBolshevik revolutionwasa critical juncture in theexpressionof the class

cleavage, the Eurocrisis and themigration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a

transnational cleavage. These criseshave raised the salienceof Europeand immigration inpublic de-

bate,intensifieddivisionswithinmainstreamparties,andhaveledtoanupsurgeofrejectionistpolitical

parties(HoboltandTilley2016;HoboltanddeVries2016).Attheveryleast,itis“tempting”–toadopta

Party]aresignificantlymorelikelytosupporttheSVP.”Longitudinalsurveyresearchsuggeststhatattitudesunderpinningright-wingextremismarerooted inearlychildhood,persistoveraperson’s life,andaretransmitted intergenerationally.AnalyzingnineteenwavesoftheGermanSocio-EconomicPanel(SOEP),AvdeenkoandSiedler(2015)findthatamalewhoseparentsex-pressaffinitytowardaright-wingpartyisthirteenpercentmorelikelytosupportaradicalrightparty,controllingforincome,education,andunemployment.


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wordthatLipsetandRokkan(1967:47)useinasimilarcontext–tosaythatsomethingfundamentalis

takingplace,namelythegenerationofadistinct,rooted,anddurableconflictthatwilloverlayanddis-

rupttheexistingstructureofpartycompetition.

Thecrisesthemselvesprovidesomecluesregardingtheirlargersignificance.Thefirst,economic,crisis

transmuted into a distinctly European crisiswhenChancellorMerkel declared soon after the Lehman

Brotherscollapse thateverycountrymustact separately todefend its financial institutions.Under in-

tensepressurefromGermanpublicopinion,whichwasvehementlyopposedtoEurozonebailouts,Mer-

kel committed her government to preserving Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty, the anti-bailout

clause prohibiting shared liabilities or financial assistance. Eurozone governments were trapped in a

postfunctionalist dilemma.On theone side theywere impelled by an unrelenting functional logic to-

wardfiscalunion.Ontheothertheywereunnervedbytenaciousdomesticresistance.

Theresultwasaseriesofincrementalreformsthatstavedoffdisasterwhileprolongingtheagonyof

austerity. Fearing opendebate, parliamentary votes, andpopular participation, national governments

revertedtoconventionaldiplomacywhichhadthe intendedeffectofempoweringnationalexecutives

and,atleasttemporarily,avoidingEUinstitutions(Jones,Kelemen,andMeunier2015).7TheEuropean

StabilityMechanismwasbasedonatreatymodificationwhich,ingeniously,avoidedreferendumsbyre-

quiringonlyatwo-lineamendmenttotheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion.Since2012,

the European Central Bank, a technocratic institution insulated from popular pressures, has been in-

strumental in providingmuch needed liquidity. Piecemeal reforms, alongside banking union and up-

gradedfinancialsurveillance,didjustenoughtosavetheEurozoneandavertthedefaultofheavily in-

debted countries.National governmentshave taken thepathof leastpolitical resistance, keeping the 7InJune2010,thesegovernmentssetupalimitedliabilitycompanyunderLuxembourglawwithseventeen(national)share-holderstoprovideemergencyloanstoGreece,Ireland,andPortugal.InSeptember2012,theysetupanintergovernmentalor-ganization,theEuropeanStabilityMechanism,againinLuxembourg,thistimeunderinternational(notEuropean)lawtopro-videa financial firewall fordistressedcountries.AsSchimmelfennignotes,“asymmetrical interdependenceresulted inabur-den-sharing and institutional design that reflectedGermanpreferences and its allies predominantly” (Schimmelfennig 2015:179).


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Euroafloatwithregulatorymeasures,whileavoidingpopulistpressuresthatwouldariseinmajortreaty

reform(cfBörzelandRisse,forthcoming).

The outcome was a North-South rift between creditor and debtor nations (Laffan 2016; Tsoukalis

2014).Discursiveanalysisrevealsthatthisrifthassharpnationaledgesandfeedsonsimplisticnational

stereotypes(Mylonas2012).Redistributionwasperceivedasanissuewithprofoundconstitutionalim-

plicationsfornationalcommunities(OtjesandvanDerVeer2016).Thenetresultwastoraisethesali-

enceofEuropeanintegrationindomesticdebate,particularlyamonggroupsandpartiestakingextreme

positions(Hutter,Grande,andKriesi2016;Risse2014).

Expert estimates summarized in Figure 1a show that the salience of European integration has in-

creasedmarkedlysince2006,fromameanof4.60inthatyearto5.93in2014,adifferencethatishighly

significant(p=.000).TheFigurealsorevealsthatsalienceisskewedtoEuroskepticparties,whichiswhat

onemightexpectonanissuethathasbecomepolarized.Northernimpositionofordo-liberalismandfis-

calausteritybackedbyasystemofsanctionsprolongedtheEurocrisiswhileitfailedtocontaintherise

ofnationalistpoliticalparties.Ironically,radicalrightpartiesgainedintheverycountrieswherenational

interest shaped government policy. In the South, by contrast, austerity and currency inflexibility pro-

ducedeconomicmiseryandresentmentwhichwasmobilizedchieflybytheradicalleft.

Figure1a:SalienceofEuropeanintegration

0

2

4

6

8

10

Sal

ienc

e of

Eur

opea

n in

tegr

atio

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1 3 5 7Position on European integration


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Note: Salience isestimatedonan11-point scale ranging from“not importanceatall” (0) to“ofgreat importance” (10).Thecontinuouslineisthefitlinefor2014(N=208);thedashedlineisthefitlinefor2006(N=158).Source:2006and2014datafromtheCHEStrendfile.

Figure1b:Salienceofimmigration

0

2

4

6

8

10

Sal

ienc

e of

imm

igra

tion

0 2 4 6 8 10Position on immigration

Note:Salienceisestimatedonan11-pointscalerangingfrom“noimportantatall”(0)to“extremelyimportant”N=157.(10).Thecontinuouslineisthefitlinefor2014(N=208);thedashedlineisthefitlinefor2006(N=158).Source:Source:2010datafromtheCHEStrendfile.

Figure1brevealsthatthesalienceaccordedtoimmigrationissimilartothatforEuropeanintegration.

Politicalpartiestakingextremepositionsonimmigrationtendtoemphasizetheissuemorethanthose

takingmoderatepositions.And,similartopartysalienceonEurope,theU-curveistiltedupforparties

thattakestrongrejectionistpositions.Partysalienceonimmigrationin2010(Figure1b)isconsiderably

higherinthenorthwesternandsoutherncountries(6.63and6.23,respectively,onazerototenscale)

thanincentralandeasternEurope(4.09).WhereascountriesintheNorthwestandSouthwererecipi-

entsintheflowofpopulationwithinEurope,thoseintheEastweredonors.Aregionalbreakdownof

thesaliencedatasuggeststhatevenbeforethemigrationcrisisof2015,immigrationwasperceivedto

beamajorissueintheNorthwestandSouth.Thesalienceofimmigrationin2010exceedsthesalience

ofEuropeanintegrationateverywaveoftheCHESdata.


16

Thepartysaliencequestionon immigrationwasaskedtoexpertsonly in2010,sowecannotassess

change. However, mass surveys suggest that the migration crisis, which became acute from August

2015,ratchetedupconcernwithimmigrationinthegeneralpublic.InSpring2014,priortothecrisis,15

percentofthosesurveyedbyEurobarometerselectedimmigrationas“oneofthetwomost important

issuesfacing[ourcountry]atthemoment.”InnoEasterncountrywasimmigrationflaggedasimportant

by tenpercentof the respondents,whileninecountries in theNorthorSouth registereddouble-digit

figures.InSpring2016,theoverallfigurehadincreasedto28percent,alevelofconcernsecondonlyto

unemployment (33percent)andgreater than for theeconomicsituation (19percent),health (16per-

cent),orterrorism(16percent).CentralandeasternEuropeancountrieswerenolongerinsulated.Im-

migrationwasatop-twoissueinallEasterncountriesexceptRomania.

6.StickyPoliticalParties

Cleavage theory is a theoryofdiscontinuity in the responseofparty systems to seriousexogenous

shocks. Change comes chiefly in the formof newpolitical parties that challenge existingparties on a

newcleavage(deVriesandHobolt2012;Rovny2012).Thepositionalmaneuverabilityofpoliticalparties

establishedonpriorcleavagesisconstrainedbyself-selectedactivists,self-replicatingleaders,andem-

beddedreputations.Far fromrationalactorsmakingoptimaldecisions,politicalpartiescanbeconsid-

eredtobesatisficerswith“theirown‘boundedrationality’thatshapesthewayinwhich[they]cometo

termswithnewchallengesanduncertainties”(MarksandWilson2000:434;DaltonandMcAllister2015;

Kitscheltetal1999;MarksanddeVries2012).Complexorganizations,ingeneral,adaptwelltogradual

change,butarechallengedtorespondtomajorchangeintheirenvironment(Aldrich2007).

Theevidenceisinlinewiththis.PoliticalpartiesinEuropeappeartobesticky,asacleavageperspec-

tivewould leadonetoexpect.PartysystemshaverespondedtoconcernsaboutEuropean integration


17

andimmigration,butthishasnothappenedbecausepoliticalpartieshaveshiftedposition.Figure2dis-

playskerneldensityestimations(KDE)usingChapelHillExpertSurvey(CHES)dataonpartypositioning

onEuropeanintegrationfor215nationalpoliticalpartiesintwenty-fourEuropeancountries(Bakkeret

al.2015).Eachcurverepresentstheprobabilitydistributionforachange inpartypositioningbetween

successivewavesacrossfiveconsecutivesurveys:1999,2002,2006,2010,and2014.Negativenumbers

ontheX-axisdenoteadecline insupportonaseven-pointscale,andpositivenumbersan increase in

support.8Theprobabilitydistribution isstronglypeaked:90.1percentof thepoliticalpartiessurveyed

movelessthanonepointineitherdirectionacrossconsecutivesurveys.Thereisabitmoremovement

acrosslongertimespans,butnotmuch.Just17.2percentofthepartiesshiftmorethanonepointover

threeCHESwaves,and20.0percentshiftmorethanonepointoverfourCHESwaves.Thisisconsistent

withRohrschneiderandWhitefield (2016:145) finding,basedon theirexpert survey, thatparties “do

notchangetheirintegrationstancetoanygreatdegree.”

8Kerneldensityestimationisanon-parametricmethodinwhichthedataaretreatedasarandomizedsampleandthedistribu-tionissmoothened.WeuseStata’sdefault,theEpanechnikovestimator,whichselectsasmoothingbandwidthof0.123forthetwo-wavekernelfunctionandabandwidthof0.171forthethree-wavefunction.


18

Figure2:KernelDensityCurveforChangeinPartyPositiononEuropeanIntegration,1999-2014

Note:ChangeinsupportforEuropeanintegrationonaseven-pointscalefrom1(stronglyopposed)to7(stronglyinfavor)overtwowaves(N=566);threewaves(N=388);fourwaves(N=230);andfivewaves(N=98).Source=1999,2002,2006,2010,and2014datafromtheCHEStrendfile.

Expertevaluationsofpartypositioningonimmigrationgobackto2006.Overtheperiod2006to2014

wedetectsimilarstability (seeTable1).Of140parties thatwetrackover theperiod,only threeshift

morethantwopointsinanyonedirectiononimmigration.Theaverageabsolutechangeoverthisperi-

odis0.59onimmigrationand0.55onEuropeanintegration,bothonaseven-pointscale.9Partiestend

9Positioningonimmigrationisestimatedonaneleven-pointscalerangingfrom“stronglyopposestoughpolicyonimmigration”(0)to“stronglyfavorstoughpolicyonimmigration”(10).Forcomparability,werescalethevariablezerotoseven,andreversethescalesothatahighervalueindicatesapro-immigrationstance.


19

to switch back and forth over time. The average raw change over this eight-year period is just –0.02

pointsonimmigrationand+0.05pointsonEuropeanintegration.

Table1.ChangeinPartyPositioningonImmigrationandEuropeanIntegration,2006to2014Changeoverthreewaves

Absolutechange Directionalchange

Immigration Europeanintegration Immigration EuropeanintegrationMeanvalue 0.59 0.55 -0.02 0.05Medianvalue 0.49 0.35 0.05 0.07Min;maxchange 0;2.30 0;2.79 -2.30;+1.80 -2.79;+2.41#partiesmoving+/-2points

3 6 3morerestrictive 3moreoppositional,3moresupportive

StandardDeviation 0.50 0.53 0.78 0.76Numberofparties 140 143 140 143

Source:ChapelHillExpertSurvey(Bakkeretal.2015).Europeanintegrationisscaledfromstronglyopposed(1)tostronglyin

favor(7).Forcomparabilitywerescaletheoriginaleleven-pointscalefor immigrationtoaseven-pointscalerangingfromre-

strictive(1)toliberal(7).

Beforewemoveon,weneedtoassessthevalidityofthisfinding.Partymanifestos,ingeneral,reveal

greater change thanexpert judgments (DaltonandMcAllister2015:767ff).Thereare severalpossible

reasonsforthis.Oneisthatcodingofpartymanifestosatthelevelofanindividualissuemightproduce

greaterchangethanexpertevaluationatamoregeneraldimensionallevel.Thiswouldbethecaseifpo-

liticalpartieswereabletomaneuveronspecificissues,butweremoreconstrainedonbundlesofissues.

Asecondpossibilityisthatexpertsthinkalongcleavagelinesin“recordingthelongstandingcoreprinci-

pledpositionsofparties,”whichmightleadthemtodowngradeeffortsbypartiestoshifttheirpositions

(McDonaldetal.2007).Thiswouldhappenifmanifestosrecordattemptsbypartiestoshapehowthey

areperceived,whileexpertsevaluatehowpoliticalpartiesareactuallyperceived. Ifso,onewouldex-

pectexpertstousemanifestosasonesourceamongotherstoestimatepartypositioning.Expertscan

plausibly be regarded as Bayesians who use party manifestos alongside other indicators, such as

speechesmadebypartyleaders,toupdatetheirjudgments.


20

OnemightexpectvoterstobeBayesianstoo.Giventhetimeandcognitiveconstraintsontheirpoliti-

cal attention, voters tend to rely on generalized conceptions of party identity (Green, Palmquist, and

Schickler2002).These tend tobestableover time.TheEuropeanElectionSurvey (EES)asksvoters to

placepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration,andtheresultsaresimilartothoseusingCHESdata(see

appendix).DaltonandMcAllister(2015:768)findstrikingconsistencyacrosstimefortheleft/rightposi-

tioningofparties,withassociationsfromelectiontoelectionaround0.96.Remarkably,theconsistency

inpartypositioningappears todecay little across threeoreven fourelections.On this evidence,one

mustlookbeyondpartypositioningtoexplainhowpartysystemsrespondtoexogenousshocks.

This is a scenario for disruption. If existing parties cannot radically shift their issue positions, one

wouldanticipate1)sharptensionswithinmainstreampartiesonanewdimension,particularly inhigh

barrier systems,and2) thegrowthof challengingparties,particularly in lowbarrier systems.Theevi-

dencewehaveisinlinewiththis.Figure3revealsthatseriousinternaldissentishighestamongpolitical

parties that takeamiddlingpositiononEuropean integration in2014. Inresponsetoanewcleavage,

moderationdoesnotproduceconsensus.Dissentisloweramongpartiesthattakepolarpositionsonthe

keyissues.


21

Figure3:DissentonEuropeanintegration

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Dis

sent

on

Eur

opea

n in

tegr

atio

n

1 2 3 4 5 6 7Position on European integration

Note:N=208politicalparties.Dissentisestimatedonan11-pointscalerangingfrom0(partywascompletelyunited)to10(partywasextremelydivided)inresponseto“WhataboutconflictordissentwithinpartiesoverEuropeanintegrationoverthecourseof2014?”Source:Datafor2014fromtheCHEStrendfile.

Conservativepartiesmaybeparticularlyprone to internaldissentbecause theycombineneoliberal

support for transnationalismandnationalistdefenseof sovereignty (MarksandWilson2000). Fourof

the sixpartieswithadissent scorehigher than5.5 in2014areConservative: theBritishConservative

Party(dissent=7.3),Lithuania’sOrderandJustice(6.0),Italy’sForzaItalia(5.9),andFrance’sUMP(5.8).

Institutionalrulesplayarolehere.BritainandFrance,theEuropeandemocracieswiththehighestbarri-

erstopartyentry,havehadexceptionallevelsofintra-partydissentin2014andoverthe1999to2014

periodasawhole.TheBritishConservativepartyhasbeenmoredeeplyriventhananyotherparty,and

inthewakeoftheBrexitreferendumismorebitterlydividedthanever(Hobolt2016;Tzelgov2014).


22

7.Theriseofpartiesonthetransnationalcleavage

Moderate political parties based in the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan have declined

acrossEurope.Onaverage,thevoteshareforsocialdemocratic,Christiandemocratic,conservative,and

liberalpartiesfellfrom75percentinthefirstnationalelectionafter2000to64percentinthenational

electionpriortoNovember2016.Withfewexceptions,thesepartieshavecontinuedtosupportEurope-

anintegrationatatimeof increasingskepticism.In2014, justsevenof112mainstreampartiestooka

positiononthenegativesideofourEuropeanintegrationscale.

ConsensusonEuropeamongmainstreampartiesdidnotmattermuchwhentheissuewasmarginal.

Mainstreampartiessoughttode-emphasizethe issueto“retainthecurrentdimensionalcompetition”

(DeVriesandHobolt2012:263;Green-Pedersen2012:126-7).PriortotheEurocrisis,PeterMair(2007:

12)couldwritethatthefamedEuropeangiantdescribedbyFranklinandvanderEijk(1995)“isnotonly

sleeping,buthasbeendeliberatelysedated,sothatJack–intheshapeofthemainstreamparties–can

runupanddowntheEuropeanbeanstalkatwill.”Nolonger.Thegianthasawakenedinaneraofcon-

strainingdissensuswhenattitudesoverEuropeareexpressedinnationalelections,Europeanelections,

and,aboveall,innationalreferendumcampaignswhichescapemainstreampartycontrol(Hoogheand

Marks2009;GrandeandHutter2016:40;Treib2014).

InmuchofEuropethecriseshavereinforcedanewtransnationalcleavagethathasatitscoreacul-

turalconflictpitting libertarian,universalisticvaluesagainst thedefenseofnationalismandparticular-

ism (BornschierandKriesi2012;Golder2016:488;Höglinger2016).Recent literaturehasproduceda

seriesofconvergentconceptstodescribethis:demarcationvs. integration(Kriesi,Grande,etal.2006;

2012);libertarian-universalisticvs.traditionalist-communitarian(Bornschier2010);universalismvs.par-

ticularism(HäusermannandKriesi2015;Beramendietal.2015);cosmopolitanvs.communitarian(Ten-

ey,Lacewell,andDeWilde2013);GALvs.TAN(Hooghe,Marks,andWilson2002).


23

Europe and immigration—issues that have risen sharply in salience as a result of the crises—are

flashpoints in thegenerationof this cleavage.These issuesareperceived fromdiametricallyopposing

standpoints by TAN and GAL political parties.Whereas social democratic, Christian democratic, con-

servative,andliberalpartiesaresimilarlypositionedontheseissues,TANpartiesandGALpartiestake

distinctpositions thatplace themat thepolarextremes.Thecoefficient forvariationamongTANand

GALpartiesis0.53onEuropeanintegrationand0.96onimmigration.Formainstreampartiesitis0.19

and0.38,respectively(CHES2014).

Whereaspoliticalparties formedonprior cleavages conceiveofEuropeand immigrationas loosely

connectedissues,TANandGALpartiesconceivethemasintimatelyconnected(MarchandRommerskir-

chen2015).TheassociationbetweenthepositionsthatmainstreampartiestakeonEuropeandimmi-

grationis0.33;forradicalrightandgreenpartiesitis0.82(CHES,2014).Transnationalismintheformof

supportforEuropeancooperationandfreemovementisstronglyconsistentwiththesociallibertarian,

cosmopolitan,anduniversalist valuesofgreenparties.Equally,but in theopposite camp, rejectionof

EuropeanintegrationandimmigrationlieatthecoreofTANdefenseofthenationagainstexternalforc-

es(Tillman2013). TANandGALpartiestakemoreextremepositionsonEuropeandimmigrationthan

mainstream political parties. They tie these issues into a tightly coherent world view. They consider

themasintrinsictotheirprograms.And,correspondingly,theygivetheseissuesgreatsalience.

EverycountryinEuropehasbeendeeplyaffectedbythepoliticalfalloutofthecrises,butthewayin

whichpartysystemshaverespondedvarieswidely.Cleavagetheorysuggeststhatthisreflectstheparty-

political expression of prior cleavages and the character of the crises.Whatmatters from a cleavage

perspectiveishowissuesthatmightotherwisebeunconnectedformacoherentprogram,howpolitical

partiesgainareputationaroundsuchprograms,howthoseprogramsaredifferentiatedfromthoseof

existingpartiesonpriorcleavages,andhowpartiesonanewcleavagearepolarizedinresponsetothose

issues.


24

InmostwesternEuropeancountries,theconflictovertransnationalismhasbeentakenupasanew

cleavagebyTANandGALpartiesandasanextensionoftheprioreconomicleft/rightcleavagebyradical

leftparties.ThecircleatthecenterofFigure4encompasseseightcountrieswithsuchpartysystems.In

contrast to radical rightandgreenparties, radical leftparties conceive transnationalismasadistribu-

tional issuearisingfromtheeffectsof internationaleconomicexchange(HoboltanddeVries:2016:7;

BrigevichandEdwards2016;VanElsas,Hakhverdian,andvanderBrug2016).TheyrejectEuropeanin-

tegrationon theground that ithurts thosewhocannot takeadvantageof transnationalmobility,but

they retain a conventional leftist commitment to working-class internationalism and do not take a

strongpositionagainstimmigration.

Figure4:Green,TAN,andradicalleftvote,2014

Note:Votetotalsforgreen/radicalrightandradicalleftpartyfamiliesinthenationalelectionpriortoNovember2016.Seeap-pendixfordetails.

InthecountriesofeasternEurope,mostofwhichareencompassedinthelongnarrowellipseinFig-

ure4,theGALsideofthetransnationalcleavageisweakorabsent.Thechiefresponsetothecriseshas


25

beenthegrowthofthevoteforradicalrightparties.Thisisfilteredthroughpre-existingcleavages(Casal

Bèrtoa2014).Insomecountries,CommunistruleforgedanaffinitybetweeneconomicleftandTANval-

ues. Thiswasopposedby thosewho favoredmarket reformsand cultural openness (Coman2015:3;

Marksetal.2006).Here,Left-TANversusright-GALconflictwasreinforcedbytheprospectofEUmem-

bership which required market-oriented reform and liberal democratic institutions (Vachudova and

Hooghe2009:188).Incountrieswheresizeableethnicminoritieshadbeenatthecoreofacommunist

federation(Estonia,Croatia,Latvia,Slovenia),formercommunistpartiessupportedmulticulturalismand

leaned GAL, while the anti-communist right defended the ethnicmajority and espoused TAN values.

Hence,inthesesocieties,anaffinitybetweenLeft-GALandRight-TANdeveloped(Rovny2014a,b).

Inresponsetothecrises,bothgroupsofeastEuropeancountrieshaveseentheriseofradicalright

parties.However,theresponsecamelaterthanintheWest.AllbutSloveniaandSlovakiawereoutside

theEurozoneattheonsetofthecrisis,andsowereshieldedfromthebitterdistributionalbattlesthat

markedsouthernEurope.10 Further, immigrationbecameahot issueacrosseasternEuropeonly from

May2015followingtheEuropeanCommission’smigrantdistributionscheme.Prior tothat time,most

wereemigrantsocieties(Allen:2015:8-10;BustikovaandKitschelt2009;Koev2015;Rovny2014a).11

InFigure4theUnitedKingdomislocatedamongthecountriesofEasternEuropewitharadicalTAN

partyandnoradicalleftparty.ThereasonforthislieschieflyintheUK’spluralityelectoralsystemwhich

exaccerbates conflictwithin themajorparties andpunishesminorparties lacking territorially concen-

trated support. The transnational cleavagehasbeenexpressedoutside theparty system in theBrexit

referendumandbytheflashriseoftheIndependenceparty.TheConservativepartyisrivenbyconflict

10RohrschneiderandWhitefield(2016:142)notethatinCentralandEasternEurope“partyreputationsarelessstronglyem-beddedintheelectorate.”Crossnationalvariationintheideologicalspaceisalsogreater(Savage2014;RovnyandPolk2016)andthereisalargerrolefornon-ideologicalissuesconcerningcorruption,goodgovernance,andpopulism.Thishasproducedpoliticalpartiescombiningmoderateagendasoneconomicandsocio-culturalissueswitharadicalanti-establishmentrhetoric(e.g.ResPublica inEstonia,NewEra in Latvia, SMER inSlovakia,andTOP09 in theCzechRepublic).Thephenomenon isde-scribedas“centristpopulism”(Pop-Eleches2010)and“mainstreamreformism”(HanleyandSikk2016:523).11The salienceof immigration for radical rightparties inEasternEurope is6.56ona zero to ten scale, compared to9.40 inwesternEurope.


26

betweenitsnationalistandneoliberalfactions,andintheabsenceofaradicalleftparty,theLabourpar-

tyhasshiftedtotheleft.

SouthernEuropeancountrieshaveseentheriseofradicalleftpartiesinresponsetothecrises.Large-

ly as a consequence of austerity, the Eurocrisis reinforced rather than challenged economic left-right

conflictcenteredondistributionandwelfare.ThishassharpenedtheeconomiccaseagainstEuropean

integration(OtjesandKatsanidou2016).WhereasTANpartiesintheNorthstrivefortheethnichomo-

geneity of the nation, radical left parties, predominant in the South, emphasize civic nationalismand

territorialcontrol (Halikiopoulou,NanouandVasilopoulou2012).Thedistributional framingof theEu-

rocrisisexplainsalsowhy,intheSouth,radicalrightpartieshavesofarnotbeenthechiefbeneficiaries

ofmainstreamdisaffection.InPortugal,Spain,andIreland,radicalrightpartiesstartedfromaverylow

supportbase.TheyhavehadtocontendwithconservativepartieswithastrongTANinclination,which

havesofarbeeneffective inaccommodatingculturaloppositiontotransnationalism(AlonsoandKalt-

wasser2014).OnlyinItalyandGreecedidradicalrightpartieshavemorethantwopercentofthevote

priortothecrisis(Ignazi2003).InItaly,radicalTANsupporthasremainedjustabovetenpercent,while

inGreece it increased from3.7percent in 2007 to10.7percent in the2015national election (Ellinas

2014;LamprianouandEllinas2016).However,inbothcountries,theradicallefthasbeenthemajortar-

getfortheexpressionofdiscontent.

8.Conclusion

Theexperienceofthepasttenyearsfollowingtheeconomiccrisisandmigrationcrisisleadsustore-

considertheresearchprograminitiatedbyLipsetandRokkan.Thereasonsfortherejectionofthepro-

gramfromthe1980sareseveral,andtheyremainpersuasive.Partysystemshaveunfrozenasnewpolit-


27

icalpartieshave risenandoldpartieshavedeclined.More fundamentally, theorganizations that tied

voters to parties—including churches for confessional parties and unions for socialist parties—

encompassasmallershareofthepopulationandhavelessinfluenceonthosetheydoencompass.Final-

ly, the life-long attributes that structured political preference—chiefly social class and religion—have

losttheirpredictivepower.

However,webelievethatthesedevelopmentsdonotexhaustcleavagetheory.Cleavagetheoryhy-

pothesizesthattheresponseofapoliticalpartytoanewsocialdivisionisconstrainedbyitslocationon

apriorsocialdivision.Justasitwasdifficultforapartybasedonreligiousconflicttosubsumeclasscon-

flict,soit isdifficultforapoliticalpartybasedonclassconflicttosubsumeconflictovertransnational-

ism.Hence,cleavagetheoryexplainspartysystemchangeasadisruptiveprocessratherthananincre-

mentalprocess.Extantpoliticalpartiesare inconstantmotionastheyseektoadapttheirpositionsto

thepreferencesofvoters,buttheyareabletosustaintheirsupportonlyinnormaltimes.Theirefforts

toadaptareconstrainedbythepolicycommitmentsofself-selectedactivistsandleaders,bybrandrep-

utationsembeddedintheexpectationsofvoters,andbytheinterestsandvaluesoftheirsocialbase.

Hence, thedynamicsof long-termandshort-termchangeappeartobedifferent.Upclose,onecan

detect almost continuous adjustment by political parties to the preferences of voters. Over longer

reachesof time, theyappear tobemoving inquicksand.The crises reveal this starkly, andprovokea

theoreticalchallengeforfutureresearch:Howcanoneputshort-termstrategicresponseandlong-term

cleavageconstraintsonthesamepage?

Cleavage theory implies thatpartysystemchange isdiscontinuous. It is characterizedbyperiodsof

relativestabilityaspoliticalpartiesjostletogainsupportandbyperiodsofabruptchangewhennewpo-

liticalparties riseup in response toacritical juncture.Theevidencepresentedheresuggests that the

crisesofthepastdecademaybesuchacriticaljunctureforEurope.InaDownsianmodelofissuecom-

petition,onewouldexpectexistingpoliticalpartiestorespondtovoterpreferencesbysupplyingappro-


28

priatepolicies.However,ascleavagetheorypredicts,thepositionalflexibilityofpoliticalpartiesisheavi-

ly constrained. Change has come not becausemainstream parties have shifted in response to voter

preferences, butbecause votershave turned topartieswithdistinctiveprofiles on thenew cleavage.

Thesepartiesraise issuesrelatedtoEuropeand immigrationthatmainstreampartieswouldrather ig-

nore.RadicalTANpartiessettheframeofcompetitiononthesetransnationalissues,andgreenparties

takediametricallyoppositepositions.Bothpartiesgivethese issuesmuchgreatersalience intheirap-

pealstovotersthanmainstreamparties,andtheyarelesshandicappedbyinternaldivisions.

Theresult,accordingtocleavagetheoryisnotrealignment,butaccretion.Theshapingpowerofprior

cleavagesdiminishesovertime,butfewdiecompletely.Theterritorialcleavage,thereligiouscleavage,

andtheclasscleavagehaveeachlostbite,butnonehasbeenextinguished.Cleavagetheoryconceives

layersofpartisanattachmentratherthanthereplacementofonedimensionofcontestationbyanother.

Thepartysystemofacountryreflectsitshistoryofpriorstrugglesaswellasitscurrentdivides.

Becausetheexpressionofacleavagedependsontheinstitutionalizationofpriorconflicts,auniform

response toanewcleavage isunusual. Theoneexception in LipsetandRokkan’saccount is theclass

cleavage,rootedintheindustrialrevolution,whichproducedmajorsocialistpartiesacrosstheboard.12

ThetransnationalcleavagehashaddistinctlydifferentexpressionsacrossEurope.Themajorcontrastis

betweentheSouth,where thecrisishaswidenedtheclassdivide,andtheNorth,whereculturalcon-

cernsaboutcommunityandimmigrationhavepulledlesseducatedvotersawayfromleftpartiestorad-

icalrightparties.

LipsetandRokkanwouldnotbesurprisedtofindthataperiodoftransformativetransnationalismhas

given rise to an intensepolitical reaction.Viewed from thepresent, the cleavage structureof Europe

beginswithonesweepingjurisdictionalreform,theriseofthenationalstate,andfinisheswithanother,

12ThoughnotintheUnitedStatesforreasonsexploredinLipsetandMarks(2000).


29

the internationalizationofeconomicexchange,migration,andpolitical authority.Thecleavagearising

fromnationalstateformationisstillverymuchinevidenceinminoritycommunitiesthatcontinuetore-

sistnationalassimilation(HoogheandMarks2016).Thecleavagearisingfromtransnationalismmayalso

endure.Itisgroundedineducationalopportunitiesthathavepersistenteffectsoveraperson’slife,and

whichareconveyedtooffspring.However,thefunctionalpressuresthathavegivenrisetotransnation-

alismareperhapsevenmoredurable.Transnationalexchangeandsupranationalgovernancereflectthe

benefitsofscaleinhumanaffairs.EveniftheEuropeanUnionweretofail,immigrationstop,andtrade

decline,theforcesthathaveledtotransnationalismarelikelytopersist.


30

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AppendixTableA.1:Partyposition,dissent,andsalienceonEuropeanintegrationandimmigrationPositiononEuropeaninte-gration

“HowwouldyoudescribethegeneralpositiononEuropeanintegrationthattheparty’sleadershiptookoverthecourseof[year]?Onaseven-pointscale:1=stronglyopposed2=opposed3=somewhatopposed4=neutral5=somewhatinfavor6=infavor7=stronglyinfavor[Don’tknow]

SalienceofEuropeanintegra-tion

“WewouldlikeyoutothinkaboutthesalienceofEuropeanintegrationforaparty.Overthecourseof[year],howimportantwastheEUtothepartiesintheirpublicstance?”Onaneleven-pointscale:0=noimportance,nevermentioned10=greatimportance,themostimportantissue

DissentonEuropeanintegra-tion

“WhataboutconflictordissentwithinpartiesoverEuropeanintegrationoverthecourseof[year]?”Onaneleven-pointscale:0=Partywascompletelyunited10=Partywasextremelydivided[Don’tknow]

Positiononimmigration “Positiononimmigrationpolicy.”Eleven-pointscale:0=fullyopposedtoarestrictivepolicyonimmigration10=fullyinfavorofarestrictivepolicyonimmigration[Don’tknow]Note:scaleisreversedinanalysis,andforTable1,recalibratedtoaseven-pointscale.

Salienceofimmigration “Importance/salienceofimmigrationpolicyforeachofthefollowingparties”Onaneleven-pointscale:0=notimportantatall10=extremelyimportant[Don’tknow]

Source:ChapelHillexpertsurveytrendfile,whichcombinesfivewaves(1999,2002,2006,2010,2014)for14NorthwesternandSouthernEUmemberstatesandfourwaves(2002,2006,2010,2014)for10Central-andEastEuropeancountries.Cy-prus,LuxembourgandMaltaarenotincluded.Estimatesareaverageplacementsbypartyexperts,aggregatedbypartyandcountry.Foradiscussionofthereliabilityandvalidityofthedata,seeBakkeretal.2015;Hoogheetal.2010;Marksetal.2007;SteenbergenandMarks2007.


39

TableA.2:Categorizationsbygeographicalregion,partyfamily,timepoint

Region North=Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Netherlands,Sweden,UK;South=Greece,Ireland,Italy,Portugal,Spain;East=Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia.

Partyfamily “Mainstreamparties”arepoliticalpartiesthatLipsetandRokkanrecognizedinthemajorpartyfamiliesthatexpressedthehistoricalreligiousorclasscleavage,i.e.theChristiandemocratic,socialdemocratic,lib-eral,andconservativepartyfamilies.Wecategorizeapoliticalpartyasmainstreamifitisamember(orap-pliedtobeamember)oftheEuropeanPeople'sParty(EPP),thePartyofEuropeanSocialists(PES),theAlli-anceofLiberalsandDemocratsforEurope(ALDE),ortheEuropeanConservativesandReformists(ECR),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwithacorrespondingmainstreampan-Europeanpoliticalparty:EuropeanPeople'sParty(EPP),thePartyofEuropeanSocialists(PES),theAllianceofLiberalsandDemocratsforEurope(ALDE),theAllianceofEuropeanConservativesandReformists(AECR),theEuropeanDemocraticParty(EDP),EuropeanChristianPoliticalMovement(ECPM).

“Newcleavageparties”arepoliticalpartiesthatidentifywiththeGreenorradicalrightpartyfamily.

Wecategorizeapartyasgreenifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheGreens–EuropeanFreeAlliance(Greens/EFA),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwiththeEuropeanGreenParty(EGP).WeexcluderegionalistpoliticalpartiesintheEuropeanFreeAlliance(EFA).

Wecategorizeapartyasradicalrightifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheEuropeofFree-domandDirectDemocracy(EFDD/EFD),orEuropeofNationsandFreedom(ENL),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwithacorrespondingpan-Europeanpoliticalparty:theAllianceforDirectDemocracyinEurope(ADDE),theAllianceforPeaceandFreedom(APF),theEuropeanAllianceforFreedom(EAF),theAllianceofEuropeanNationalMovements(AENM),theEUDemo-crats(EUD),MovementforaEuropeofLibertiesandDemocracy(MELD),ortheMovementforaEuropeofNationsandFreedom(MENF/MELD).

“Radicalleft”partiesarethosethataremember(orappliedtobemember)oftheEuropeanUnitedLeft/NordicGreenLeft(GUE/NGL)intheEuropeanparliament,orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpre-viousEuropeanParliament,affiliatedwiththeNordicGreenLeftAlliance(NGLA),thePartyoftheEuropeanLeft(PEL),theEuropeanAnti-CapitalistLeft(EACL),ortheInternationalMeetingofCommunistandWork-ersParties(IMCWP).


40

Post-crisiselection

(Figure4)Votetotalsforgreen,radicalright,andradicalLeftpartiesinthenationalelectionpriortoNo-vember2016.InthethreecountriesthathadnotyetconductedasecondnationalelectionsincethecrisiswesubstitutevotetotalsbyvotesharesprojectedbythreeormoreopinionpollsfromSummer-Fall2016.Thevotepercentagesarefortheelections(orpollaverage)inBelgium(2014),Denmark(2015),Germany(2013),Greece(2015),Spain(2016),France(2012),Ireland(2016),Italy(pollaverage),theNetherlands(2012),UK(2015),Portugal(2015),Austria(pollaverage),Finland(2015),Sweden(2014),Bulgaria(2014),CzechRepublic(2013),Estonia(2015),Hungary(2014),Latvia(2014),Lithuania(2016),Poland(2015),Ro-mania(pollaverage),Slovakia(2016),Slovenia(2014).

A.3:ChangeinpartypositioningonEuropeanintegrationreportedbyvoters(EES)andexperts(CHES)TheEuropeanElectionSurvey(EES)asksvoterstoplacepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration,andtheCHESexpertsurveyasksexpertstoplacepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration.Bycomparingcomparewave-to-wavepartyshiftscalculatedbyAdams,Ezrow,andWlezien(2016)foreightcountriesinthe1999,2004,and2009EESsurveyswithwave-to-wavepartyshiftsinthe1999-2002,2002-2006,2006-2010CHESexpertsurveys,itispossibletocomparehowvotersandexpertsviewchangeinpartypositioning.Acrossconsecutivewaves,themeanabsolutechangeinpartypositiononEuropeanintegrationis0.52ona10-pointscalecomparedto0.59forCHES,convertedtothesamescale.Soonaverage,votersandexpertsperceiveaboutthesameamountofchangeinpartypositioning.

Voters(Adamsetal.) Experts(owncalculations)mean 0.14 0.10absolutemean 0.52 0.59minimum;maximum -1.35;1.41 -1.48;2.71

Adamsetal.concludethatcitizens’perceptionsofpartyshifttrackexperts’perceptions,albeitwithamodestbivariatecorrela-tion(r=0.26),whileestimatesofpartypositionsusingEuromanifestosdonottrackcitizens’perceptions.


THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES,ISSN:-----------Copyright©2016-Universityof……..

TableA.4:GREENPARTYFAMILYCountry Elec-

tionyear

CHESpartyabbre-

viation

PartynameinEnglish

CHESpartyid

Voteinpost-crisiselection/

poll

CHESGAL/TANposi-

tion(2014)

CHESeco-nomic

left/rightposition(2014)

CHESEUposition(2014)

Familyaffilia-tioninEuro-peanParlia-ment(most

recent)

European/internationalfamilyaffilia-tion(mostre-

cent)

Austria Polls GRUNE AustrianGreenParty 1304 12.0 1.7 2.8 6.5 Greens/EFA EGP

Belgium 2014 ECOLO Ecolo 104 3.3 1.2 2.2 6.3 Greens/EFA EGP

Belgium 2014 Groen! Groen! 105 5.3 1.2 2.0 6.2 Greens/EFA EGP

CzechR. 2013 SZ GreenParty 2107 3.2 1.3 3.7 6.6 noMEP EGP

Denmark 2015 SF SocialistPeo-ple’sParty 206 4.2 3.1 2.3 4.6 EFA EGP

Estonia 2015 EER EstonianGreens 2207 0.9 4.3 6.0 6.0 noMEP EGP

Finland 2015 VIHR GreenLeague 1408 8.5 0.8 4.4 5.9 Greens/EFA EGP

France 2012 VERTS GreenParty 605 5.5 1.4 3.3 6.2 Greens/EFA EGP

Germany 2013 Grüne GermanGreens 304 8.4 2.2 3.5 6.2 Greens/EFA EGP

Hungary 2014 LMP PoliticscanbeDifferent 2309 5.3 2.9 3.6 5.3 Greens/EFA EGP

Hungary 2014 E14 Together2014 2310 2.1 2.4 4.9 6.6 Greens/EFA EGPIreland 2016 GP GreenParty 705 2.7 2.6 3.8 4.4 noMEP EGP

Latvia 2014 LKS LatvianRus-sianUnion 2402 1.6 8.3 2.9 2.9 Greens/EFA EGP

Latvia 2014 ZZSUnionof

GreensandFarmers

2405 19.5 7.2 5.7 5.0 Greens/EFA EGP

Lithuania 2014 LVZSLithuanianPeasant&

GreenUnion2507 22.5 6.2 3.4 4.7 Greens/EFA EGP

Lithuania 2016 LZP LithuanianGreenParty 2521 2.0 NA NA NA noMEP EGP

Nether-lands 2012 GL Green-Left 1005 2.3 1.0 2.7 6.5 Greens/EFA EGP

Romania Polls USRUnionfortheSalvationof

Romania2713 9.1 NA NA NA noMEP EGP

Spain 2016 ICV InitiativeforCatalonia 518 1.3 0.9 2.0 4.8 Greens/EFA EGP

Sweden 2014 MPEnvironment

Party-TheGreens

1607 6.9 1.6 3.5 4.4 Greens/EFA EGP

UK 2015 GREEN GreenParty 1107 3.8 1.0 2.0 5.2 Greens/EFA EGP

Legend:Greens/EFA=Greens–EuropeanFreeAlliance;EGP=EuropeanGreenParty


42

TABLEA.5:RADICALRIGHTPARTYFAMILYCountry Election

yearCHES

partyabbre-viation

PartynameinEnglish

CHESpartyid

Voteinpost-crisiselection/

poll

CHESGAL/TANposition(2014)

CHESeconomicleft/rightposition(2014)

CHESEUposition(2014)

Familyaffilia-tioninEuro-peanParlia-ment(most

recent)

European/internationalfamilyaffilia-

tion(mostrecent)

Austria Polls FPO FreedomParty 1303 34.0 8.8 5.5 1.9 ENF MENL

Belgium 2014 VB VlaamsBelang 112 3.7 9.0 5.5 2.6 ENF MENF

Belgium 2014 PP People’sParty 120 1.5 7.5 8.5 2.5 noMEP ADDE

Bulgaria 2014 VMRO-BND BulgarianNation-alMovement 2005 3.1 8.6 3.7 3.3 ECR none

Bulgaria 2014 ATAKA NationalUnionAttak 2007 4.5 9.6 1.4 1.5 noMEP none

Bulgaria 2014 NFSBNationalFrontfortheSalvationof

Bulgaria2014 4.2 8.0 4.3 3.0 EFD MELD

CzechR. 2013 USVIT DawnofDirectDemocracy 2112 6.9 7.7 5.3 2.3 ENF MENF

Denmark 2015 DF DanishPeople’sParty 215 21.1 8.4 4.5 1.9 EFD/ECR MELD

Finland 2015 PS TrueFinns 1405 17.7 9.1 4.1 1.6 EFD/ECR ACRE

France 2012 FN NationalFront 610 13.6 8.9 5.9 1.2 ENF MENF

France 2012 MPF MovementforFrance 612 0.2 8.9 8.0 1.2 EFD MELD

Germany 2013 NPDNationalDemo-craticPartyfor

Germany309 1.3 9.8 5.3 1.7 non-inscrit APF

Germany 2013 AfD AlternativeforGermany 310 4.7 8.7 8.3 1.6 EFD,ENF none

Greece 2015 LAOSPopularOrthodoxRally 410 0.0 8.3 5.3 3.3 noMEP MELD

Greece 2015 ANEL IndependentGreeks 412 3.7 8.6 5.1 2.2 noMEP none

Greece 2015 XA GoldenDawn 415 7.0 10 2.9 1.1 non-inscrit APF

Hungary 2014 JOBBIK MovementforaBetterHungary 2308 20.2 9.5 4.0 1.2 non-inscrit AENM

Italy Polls LN NorthernLeague 811 13.3 9.1 7.3 1.1 ENF MENF

Italy Polls Fdl BrothersofItaly 844 3.3 9.3 5.6 2.2ANsuccessor,

cooperateswithFN

none

Latvia 2014 NA NationalAlliance 2406 16.6 8.1 5.9 5.7 ENF/ECR ACRENether-lands 2012 PVV FreedomParty 1017 10.1 7.8 4.6 1.1 ENF EAF

Poland 2015 PiS LawandOrder 2605 37.6 8.5 3.1 3.8 ENF/ECR ACRE

Poland 2015 KNP CongressoftheNewRight 2614 4.8 8.8 9.6 1.1 ENF none

Poland 2015 SP UnitedPoland 2616 NA 8.6 3.4 3.0 EFD MELD

Poland 2015 KUKIZ15 Kukiz’15 2617 8.8 NA NA NA noMEP none


43

Slovakia 2016 SNS SlovakNationalParty 2809 16.7 9.4 4.8 2.3 EFD MELD

Sweden 2014 SD SwedishDemo-crats 1610 12.9 9.2 5.4 1.3 EFDD ADDE

UK 2015 UKIPUKIndependenceParty 1108 12.7 9.3 8.6 1.1 EFD ADDE

Legend:ECR=EuropeanConservativesandReformers;ENF=EuropeofNationsandFreedom:EFD=EuropeofFreedomandDirectDemocracy;ACRE=AllianceofConservativesandReformistsinEurope;UEN=UnionforEuropeoftheNations;ADDE=AllianceforDirectDemocracyinEurope;AENM=AllianceofEuropeanNationalMovements;APF=AllianceforPeaceandFreedom;EAF=EuropeanAllianceforFreedom;MELD=MovementforaEuropeofLib-ertiesandDemocracy;MENF=MovementforaEuropeofNationsandFreedom.

TableA.6:RADICALLEFTPARTYFAMILYCountry Elec-

tionyear

CHESparty

abbrevi-ation

PartynameinEnglish

CHES

par-tyid

Votein

post-crisiselec-tion/

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