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AUTHORITYGroup-4 DoDD 5200.10, 26 Jul 1962; OAG,D/A ltr., 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 2011tO

~~INRI~ I REPY REPM TO /~IIt/A AGAN-P (M) (24 Apr 67),B OT

A tliebo 2t5thb Infantry Division (i)-

TO: SEE DISTRIBT

orwa ed asýet aa r 'Action Report 'l'-SOperation Attleboro. Operation Attleboro was conducted by the 25th.J Infantry Division during the period 14 September - 25 November 1966.

Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate:1benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations,.,

and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 IclKENEH G WCKAM0 D Cas Major General, USA

DISTIBUTON:The Adjutant General

Coammanding General a 16

CundnUS Azmy Combat Development Command

US Army Commnand and General Staff College KL

US Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Artillery and Missile SchoolUS Army Armor School BRENLAM tDICLIABSZDUS Army Chemical Corps School W=l 8IPARATUD F901US Army Engineer School CLAW371IE 331CLCOBIR 40%US Army Military Police SchoolUS Army Infantry School ~. $US Army Intelligence SchoolUS Army Medical Field Service School .- >

US Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency School S. 0" 0''US Army Transportation School9US Army Signal School 00.a gA,US Army Special Warfare School $6# 'ýp -01e IS

US Army Civil Affairs School V

(See page 2 for Copies furnish*YqA ; p 9 jP%

CON FIDENTIAL

0-I. 1w

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies furnished:Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopmentResearch Analysis Corporation (Library)Office Secretary of Defense, South East Asia Forces (SA)Office of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering, ODD(SEAM), ODTP•E/ 4~~CCEsg

•wl IMIrE SMCTIN r

.." ........... °' ° .I W , ,O, ................

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2'

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTII 'TMl Or T112 ARMY

HEADQUA=T2RS 25TH INFAHrY DIVISIONAPO San Francisco 96225

COMBAT OPEnrATIONS AFT ;R ACTION REPORT

OFTMATION ATTLEBORO

1. NP2At Ai'4 TYPE OF OPS&RATION: Operation ATTLEBORD was a Search andDestroy operation. For the purposes of this report, this operation has beenbroken into four phases.

Phase I: 14 Sep - 2U Oct, a series of Bn operations by the 196th In2Bde (Lt)(Sep).

Phase II 29 Oct - 5 Nov, operat:.ons leading up to and includingcontact vith the VC 9th Div.

Phase 11: 5 - 10 Nov, control of operation changed to Ist Inf Divand then II FFORCRV.

Phase IV: 10 Nov - 26 Nbv, 25th Inf Div given vission to make a

reconnaissance in force in sector.

2. DATES OF OP-RATION: 14 September 1966 - 25 November 1966.

* 3. IWCATION: TAY NINH Province.

4. CX)NM.OL OR CO~jl1aA'V H&WOQUARMES:

14 Sep - 5 Nov 196th Inf 3de (Lt)(Sep)

5 Nov - 6 Nov Ist Inf Div

6 Nov- 25 Nov II F M0R[OEV .

5. RXICRTIM OFFIGM:

a. M-ajor General Fredorick C. Weyand, 14 Sup - 13 Oct, 25 Oct - 28Oct.

b. Brigadier General GOorge G. O'Connor, 13-25 Oct., 28 Oct - 25 Nov.

6.* T;'$K ORGAFUZATION.T

a. Phase I (14 SeP -31 Oct)

196th Imt Bde (Lt)(Sep), Bri,-adi..,r Genura]. DeSausisure conmanding:2d Ba, lot Inf3d Bn, 21st Dim4th Bn,-3fst Idf3d Bn, 82d Arty

"DOW•R•DED .T 3 YAR INTEV:MSDzW3SITT1= 4r=]R 12 = ItRs

ACS~A ~,,, CONFDENIALDOD DIR 5200.10CONFIDENTIALAW01% FI/0

b. Phase II (31 Oct - 5 Elov)

p 196th Inf Bde (Lt)(Sep)2d 3n, Isat Inf3d Bn, 21st Inf4th Bn, 31st InfIst Bn, 27th Inf I ',ov2d Bn, 27th Inf 3 %-v3d 3n, 82d irtyA Btry, 1st Bn, Oth Arty r•inforcing I Nov, cttachod 4 NovC 13try, 3d Bn, 13th Arty GS,'reinforirqg 2 NovPit, B Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty attached 3 .'bv

c. Phase III (5-10 ibv 66)

196th Inf Bdo Ta.sk Force'attýched to ls•°Inf Div2d Bn, 1Ist Inif3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th En, 31st Inf 8-10 Dbv atti,.chod to 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf1st Bn, 27th Inf attached to 1st Irf Div 5-11 Nov2d Bn, 27th Inf attachsd to TAY lIMM Base Camp commanderIst Bn (M), 5th Inf attached to 1st Inf Div 6-10 Nov

d. Phase IV (iO.1%v - 25 Nov)

2d Bde Task Force1st Bn (1), 5th Inf 10 bvIst Bn, 27th Inf2d Bn, 27th Inf 11 Nov2d Bn, 14th Inf2d Bn (M.), 22d Inf 13 Nov (from 3d doo, 4th Inf Div)I st 3n, 8th Arty D6

196th Inf Bda T7sk Forcm2d Bn, Ist Inf3d Bn, 21st inf4th Bn, 31st Inf3d 3n, 82d Aýrty

7. SUPP0TICI~Q FORCES'3:

a. Air Support.

(1) Geieral: During Phase I & II air support was provided byfighter bombers. During Phase IV both fighter bom.-r and heavy bombers woreused. A total of 1029 sorties ware flown in thu aro. of operations from 16Sep - 25 &bv. Lighty-four imediate sorties wwr; flown and 53 sorties wjroflown by VMLF.

(2) Elvwn B52 strikvs wore flown in the AO during the period11-23 Nov. They wer as follows:

2

&A) F D6,1 rz) 7 4S.

CONFIDENTIALijaio~ :X~. ). 'f t.~; ."tA a. T:R.2D

25-10-1 1 0•2.0 N;ov 66 XI3278,3 - 340843327813 - 340813

F 71 11710 Aov XT305780 - 320780305753 - 320753

25-11-1 (P96) 130730 Nov .140787 - 142758158760 - 153790•

25-12-1 (M98) 14i 100 !bv XT313922 - 32592326•96 - 33890

Sailed by 1it Div 161000 Nov =344780 - 3207in 25t! Div AO 333752 - 3537(Danger 6)

25-15-1 (F107) I0700 otbv M-370810 - 320?350810 - 350

F102 -. 190730 %bv X'366868 - 377880392851 - 400861

TN 30 221800 Nov XT145390 - 17337725-1I-1 162350 - 138370

Quickrun 23 210500 %bv XT223970 - 223980A93 243970 - 243980

25-21-1 230"00 aiov r200o82O - 200810TV 43 230810 - 230820

(3) R1-osults of t.:,e Lactical airstri'ms were:

4 VC K;9i, (0c)115 VC KZA (poss)80, buildi.•S destroyed17 buf.,.inzs ,14 hL.1nars destroyed8 burIwrs r~wxzdl2 s::•Vias destr yed121 ucqnda,'y explosLons1 0 *,•oond:rxv L£ires

I !,ri;dge d-'mriged

* This includes the t96th t Inf We from 16 S&p - 25 lbv andthe 2d .!du, 25th I.a! Div fr.? 1- :bv - 25 Wov.

CONFIDENTIAL3

b. Artillory Support.

(1) During Phase 1. the 196th Inf Bdo was supported by the 3dn82d Arty vith B try, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-). Btry, 2d Dn, 13th Arty was

in DS from 20-29 Sep.

(2) During Phase II & III# 3d Bn, 82d Arty (+) continued in

support of 196th Inf Wei On I lov, A Dtry, Ist Bn, fth Arty reinforced theirfires.

(3) During Phase IV, 3d Bn, 82d Arty, (+) supported the 196thInf Bd-. I st 3-n,, Sth Arty •lrth A Btry, 2d Bn* 13th Arty; A ry, 2d Dn, 77thArty; B Jtryp 3d Dn, 13th Arty SUpiportod the 2d Drigre Task Force.

(4) Artillery -"ira was utilizud to:

(a) Suppross snipir fire.

(b) Soften nioas in front of advancirg ivnouvur elements.

(c) Preparu ainding zones and suppress ineWy fires duringthe asscilt and extraction phases of an airmobilj operation.

(d) Fire fv-lse prepnrations to mislead the enene" as tointended or possible landing zonws.

(a) Harrass And interdict.

(f) Assist patrols navigating "hrough dense terrain andduring hours of darkness by firing high air burst 0P rounds.

kg) Fire defensivi concentrations for forwafd support bases.

(5) Total missions %nd rounds fired:

(a) I-assiona: Support--2634; 1LI 10,356.

(b) ;Amunition uxpandid: HE - 70,470i TIP - 2095, ILL - 342.

(c) Rusults: 70 VO KIA (3C), 132 VC KIA (poss).

a. Aviation Support.

(1) units.

(a) 2 5U ;.vn Dn.

ACo 1&(l' 7-4,4€

5 116th Avn Co (Ut)147t't Avn Co (Med)178th Avn Co (11i.d)

(c) 13th Avn Dn

175th Avn Co (Ut)

(d) 52d Avn 3n

117th Lvn Co (Lt)

(o) 145th Avn Dn

68th Avn Co (Lt)713t Avn Co (Lt)118th Avn Co (Ut)

(2) TYpu and numbur of airmobile op'rtntions.

____4 Zn Co

Combýt Assaults 17 3Extractions 12 2Repost.tions 7 1

(3) Helicopter assets w.re utilized for commmd and control,.irmobilj assc-ults and oxtrnctions, ricon s rsupply and n=dicaluvrmcation.

S. (C) I;M u rN :

a. General: Operation ATT."OfRO was initially a 196th 13de operationto the south and west of TAY MTN,-. City. The AO was expanded to include theDAU TIU& area in exploitation of VC logistical bases located in this areaand subsequently included e!.l of War Zone C. VC units located in the areaincluded oldments of the 9thi VC Division (271st, 272d and 273d Regts) 101atNVA Rogt, 70th Guard Rest, U80 Arty R COSVN HQ =nd associatud facilities,the 320th LF 3n, 0 LF Copr%.nios, and local gu'rrilla elemunts. The areacont.,inod largu supply/arnz/ammo cach.s, factories, hospitals and base cacpsof tho. Rear Survicus Supply Pnd Trt.nsportation s;ctions of Group 82 and 83.It was antieipt-td that the VC would havu the arva woll fortified againstground ,nd airmobile assaults. Tho proximity of thu CGbodian borders therivers into the area, thu wjll doveloped roads and trails n.ttested to thefact that tho VC wure present and hoA the arua wull devejloped as a diversifirjdmilitary complex. Theru hnd buon no sienificf.nt ARVN/IJAPF operation inWar Zone C since April "- I-.Iy 1966. Agnt -reports, PWMe, CIF HOI '0, II

CONFIDENTIAL5

L

reports,, iiý;u'1 reprt -A,;~' ~~z~~ reu utili~zjd toasain't~ inl (kjvýlOpmnlt 0Z.L, Q..ea, jit.untion. 3o r~lthe intL.;Ui~uncerecul.vud bafCoru -ýnd durin,; l. . oi...r I. ,orn pm-vvd to hoi w3.1.lhen prop.;rlyI :::~~:::i (1::::Collt. .0T~ ~St

b. Terrain: The teorrain in the arta of oporat.iona vairied i'rorn low

doi~e ad tipa capy.TheL~itter of foi'd utxceient ceincflC&meft and poor

writh consiaioroable VC actdvi~~y on tho slopK.s. Obs-Laclos woire to be fou.nd instrunwus, do0f3e foreistsp i.rznd-.-"A nr-4a3 !%.v paddzi3. Mhu low lu,.d in thainortinsrn ar-j.a wa~s inundat.:d vrith wiator, akii o vwuncnt of tra1ckvd vwhiclesand foot troops vary difficult.

c. UWathur:

(1) 14. to 22 Sup: Cloud;, ini the crl -acrIinZ hours lbucna.dngper'tly cloudy by noon., trith n'.Liat d.-d-ly rn~lnfýll.

(2) 23 Sep to 4 Oct: The skiu~ s' p,.rtl,' cloudy thr'oug~houtthoi dt with no rain or othur rvstrictions to opum~tions.

(3) 5 to 3 Oct: Corrditiorns r'.zw-.Ined p,*.rtly cloudy but occasionalaftornoon rainshow-.rs w-,rj prjj.;nt in the :zrua.~

(4) 9 to 14 Oct: Conditions w.mr.5 --in p-irtly cloudy wit~h onlyslight ristrictiorw two visibilit:' in thu m-rl or-ng.. Yhura due to fog- or hazu.

(5) 14 to 1'3 Oct: Coiidil.-or~s rm'inAp!'.rtly cloudy,, but d:.ilynft~jrnoon :%nu` jw-uninfr r,.i 5&owjrs %nd tII-undjrshciw ,.r3 ii~ presjrnt.

(6) 19 to 29 Oct: Clonudy cvrmIitit.r..3 uitth frrucýuot jnrly mrningfog ,,nd -j.r-'.rin pr-ij -it ovur t~he ~~r~cr.

(7) 30 Oct. to 8 'bv: G-)r~ritj.Lfls w-.ro p-rt1lr clo~udy with~ nor~iatr.!cticn3 to .pr-tnoduring thu- psrie;d.

(03) 9 to 19 Pk.w: 51c, wknfdj 4.i; nu cotinu1 ..! t,) bu p!,rtly cloudy,arA tl.,.iro IurQYu %Ctlrno .- izw:-~,r L!ur.-!urstý -;x.s prja .nt in thj zxa

(9) 20 to 25 *4,v: PFx'tlý, ci, udr. wit-ji n. i~s~rarctivns.

LT: &ýrly uilrwii.1 ;,;lilift o r .r3w ~U rustrictucd by, fogor low clouds iintil :-Id-n, :'.-ine on thi zl.irv dat'.:: 14-1 5 Sup,, 27-29 Oct-nd 13 Nov,

d. O~wation6

_ _ _ A-- -Z; Al Y-, -,

(l) During tv.iaL~... r..; put r-1.;n -%rund TAY 1UXIM* / ~~City.0 t~ho VCA urite oxpuia~d Lo W~ cunt-.ctjuc1 i'..ro thIe 040 C.jmpvny, 4 other LFCo&%poniivu, I platoon cp~r:%Linl', naa the TAI& A.P'i(s~eut -iifield,, and otherlocal forcoa ,.nd guarrili.p oleur~ts operaring' withinf 15 kiloi~ters of TAY RNIIIThe units irure probabl~y in the are.-# Wt ..u* to the influx of & lar4(s US uxditpthey evidentrly privferred to ;;void cont-at durinZ the iniLti:l st.Nos. 0On1yUnist --j4 sror:ýdic cont-act w-ý encountorel Ly thos 196th during this phasu ofthe op.jr!tion,

(2) Tho 196Wh, in Uctol~r,, shift4i its oparations to the DAU* TI2N -%raa to conountrztto on nvtrclizin. too muppl~y activitius of Groups

82 And 03 of OiSVN Ru-r &~rvic.j uit3. This shift wasw prompt-ad by thennwnroue, r%*ports of logisMtc.-l canpldamou in this tara Pid tho location bythe 1 at BMo, 25th Inf Div of 279 tons of ricu via V148242~3. DovAarnts capturedin thu art idtintifiu;d Group 83,, %' CWVN RQuir Sorviou Group# and 3ubstantintedothir ruports th-%t the arur. w"s a w.wjor VC suprly no.altvity, Other doausntecapturedi by the lot Ode waro VC pl-nm for politicvl !%tivities, diruotivesfrom h~idhur h-uadqu.,.rters conceinning tax collection aucudu1~s -xA personraitylists of the Finiance Section =~d other infr~atrocturv %.ctivitius withinTAY flriý, Province. The fact that all, of the food arvi docuimnts wujra found1K on tho fringus of ths woods -;.ithout a majaor wmavp into the interior undo the

ari a vory lucrativo tfir~at for future US opua %tions. During the firsthaf of Octoberj, VC units in thu nr-ua, including thu 9th VC Diviuion opvro't*idin thjir nortirl. tarun of op-rations, with a. Sr~dual3 southirly movumjnt otad,Itow~rds tho dnd of the mo~nth. Buc=.use of thuj suothward wmoiant, of the VCunits, it wc.3 :-nticipt!.id that. possibly altswints of tho Me1t and 273d Rogtoswould b,. conta.otud in thu4 n.raý-. loc:'.l gue.rrillno opeirating in thes area wijreexpictud to offer aunai.-.ýnt hrrmjao.-nt to US forco.) w.;.ah provud to bu !,naccura'tcs astiartwkt.. Bitwown 20 Oct -nil 3 ?bv,, thui 196th Fdo locat.4d sjv~ra1large riao/suppl~y cachus in vic XT'4342 whilu :.rking cixL. sporadic coatý^ct withthe %oivzzq. Docuzwnto c-.t.ur.!d (-r' 31 Oat 17~440501 duelnn, % sweep tthruuphthe T-2 CUX F1-.ntatiun inedic-t4. tha.t thu uxtonsiv- ricu %.nd ,.Apply crnchusw..re zrlnt-ýInwd by the D16U Sxction., Group 82 of 00)SWA R.I= Sorvics, Dop~awtmnt.On 3 Ibv, 196th Bdu oiuomwait3 mar.du con-rct with !%n un~rkoin situ VC fort viLcIT41 5536 -.nd XI'442518. Thu VC us'id SAO Ivnd 1!r J11J.? riro n:-ds, clay.mur zuinu, '.nd ounduct~id n u~i.n, dafunso of t!,, ilo in~.ic'%tinS a w:inforco ol-awnt w-.9invu~lvue!. Doew.L.-tr c:'pturu'lI vic =l454534 -n 3 t&,vmabordstr~bliohucd thl~t the VC u.ni.t cjnt~v.cu 'i w.--. tho 095 Roco~ai..*ss-.ncu uniit5psuborctii'attut 9th VC ivisiin. Six docwu..nts contlirwd the cW±iCnatiortfor the 273d Rogt. Sporna dc ec.nt!ýct o)ni63ni.esl thr- uji. A the niGht of 3-4.lbvnimbur 1966. On 4 !4dur,..lumoents of th-.s 196th. Bd.. wyr. zc.goin honviilyjnf,,gx- vria Xfl'7540. Thruo c.ar~.'y sius VC f~anlta w~re repelled duringthu &,,.y rissul.tine in 40 VC KIA (BC). Docw:wnts a-,pt iu n the bttlofi..2Aidontjfijd .sii.Munts if thu 2'71 t -%!tl 273-, fluIta3 St-. rtlv aftohr mdanigitun 4 Nov. tho 2d Bn,, 2-2,' Rqjst vx..cutid a c,,r!it. -. t.Vdc .n SOLI CAU OPvia 17'45328S, using nzrrt!%rj0 RRj, AW !,n* a v'.ri-uty o~f b.,rk.:'.L-re torpsu%!,s =vIsachul ritwr!:v9 in -n attwi~pt to brw,'ch thu W~'funsjs :,r th ca::V Thai Att.vIcwas ropol1l.! ind Lhta VC t'Vv.k hi..vy puruni.;l -nz. vqui*~'flt losatis beforewitýti.cIrinr. to the !30 IA-L Wt.,.IS lu;vinT .,xv~r 50 VC KIA (DC) on'thu bt-.ttls-fiultd! Also on thc nk~rnirr of 4~ &I.v~a'*r, bk.-Lw...un O2Ot8..03O,, 0540-0550#

7

the VC mortared the 196th Bde base camp vic XT165515. It is believed thatthe attacks were designed to relieve the pressure on VC units in the DAU TIENXarea. On 5 November, vie XT4154 and XT4054 elements of the 196th Bde againi..ade contact with a VC force well fortified in bunkers resulting in 123 VCKIA (BC) and 19 VC KIA (poss). Frontal assaults involving 80-100 VC eachwere again used by the VC against US forces. It is believed that the VC forcewas composed of elements of the 271 st and 273d Regts. After the engagrmuntswith tha 25th Division on .3-4-5 November, the 1st Inf Div made contact withthe VC who were withdrawing. The Ist Inf Division had contact with the VCon several occasions and identified the let Bn, 2d Bn, and 3d Bn of the 101stNWA Regt and the 2d Bn, 271st Rugt and 273d Rugt.

(S) The 25th Division main effort was then directed rnrth toWar Zone C. It was anticipatcd that if heavy contact was made, it would bewith main force tlements. Food, supply, arms and ammo caches were expectedto be found as US troops moved into the area. In order to disrupt operationsand harass the US base ca:mp at TAY NINH, the VC mortared thu camp on the nightof 11 Novembur and the morning of the 12th. A setarch of tha mortar positionon 12 Novembur rdv,;aled a doctuwrnt that indicted that the C16 Recon Company,subordinate to the 271st Rest could have be~n responsible for the attack.Contact with the VC was sporndic until 19 Nov when contact was made with aVC platoon vic XT216804 and XT229811 and a VC comp.iny via XT274956. Thecompany contacted vie XT274956 was the C2 Co, 1st Bn, 70th Regt. (The SecurityRegt for COSVN) Documents captured vie )X1278908 disclosed the LBN 1751Bwhich is the Signal Bn subordinate to 00SVN. Documents captured vic XT229811indicated the unit contacted w"s a medical unit subordinate to the 271st Regtwith a conva-lsconct contor and a Rear Service Section also mentioned. Docuw.ments and capture of two 12.7mm barrels vie XT227813 indicated thQ presence ofan Antiaircraft Battilion in the AO. This is believed to have b-un the Z43 AABn which had pruviously been ruported. Contact continued to b- sporadicthroughout thu remainder of the operation with thj mr•Jority of the VC contactedin squad size or less. The VC rection a.nticipa.ted by US forces because ofthe intrusion into War Zone C did not mn.turialize. It is b.lievwd that dueto the losses suffered as a rvsult of cunt-.cts with thi 25th and let Inf Dive',Main Fbrcu units withdrew to avoid major contact .nd begin retraining andresupply activities. Local forees were to continue to harass US forces andmonitor our movement in the ,rea. During the operation, it is believed thatthe 2d Bn, 70th Re#t operated alkng Route 4 and had full responsibility forthe road. The 3d Bn, 70th Regt had control and operated on Route 22. TheVC controlled roand running from vie XT396632 to XT380858 is now bflievedto be a primary LOC for rusup. ly ýctivities in War Zone C. T1 1 Ist Divisionfound tho &,tjority of the caches in the -xea -Long the controlled read.The route runs both north and south, and it .ppuars that th- VC utilizethu BOI 1ID Wouds, the 3AIGOiV Rivwr und the cintrolla d rmad to accoqlishmost of their major transpurt of supplies. There are m.) friendly units toharass the VC in the area. It is believed that major logistical ceinpleisare still located along the road, and that the 23th Division lid not locateany major cachus in their area of operatins in the h-,nrt of War Zone Cbecause the USSF Cwmps at TRAI BI and SOUI DA -re in an uxcellont positionfrom which to harass thj VC logistical rmutes. The VO prefer to havw a

8

controlled rute thr.)ugh War Zone C fr im iihich they can support opu'rationsin any direction with relatively no harassment. Indications are that AITIEBOROcompletely disrupted VC plans for a major winter offensive by the 9th VC Divand the 101st NVA Regt. Rice caches (I ton or over), base camps, supplycaches, ammo caches, and contacts of estimated platoon size or larger: (Ref:25th Division INSUMS)

15 Sep XT079559 2.5 tons riceI 17 Sep Xr068543 1.25 tons rice25 Sep Xr496418-501417 Base 6amp25 Sep 72487424 Base camp25 Sep XJ480427 1.75 tons rice26 Sep XT488425-482425 279 tons rice

- 26 Sep X2486421 2 tons rice & 1.5 tons peanuts29 Sep XTr48426 1.25 tons salt29 Sep XT520363 6 tons rice9 Oct XT073545 1.7 tons rice20 Oct X2487424 680 sheets of tin21 Oct X484425 13 tons rice - supply cache22 Oct X490413 1.65 tons cumont24 Oct XT509401 I ton rico29 Oct T438500 420 tons rice, 25 toils salt, sup,.ly cache30 Oct 2T433496 60 tons rice30 Oct XT441499 32.5 tons rice30 Oct Xr435501 Arums cache30 Oct XT4455o6 4.5 tons rice31 Oct VT4405O1 23.7 tons rice, su p!ly cache31 Oct XT440501 59.8 tons ric 4, 3/4 ton beans, 4.5 tons tbacco31 Oct IT438503 187.5 tons ricw1 Nov XT443501 55 tons rice, 15 tons beans, supply cache2 Nov XT436501 Supply cache2 Nov XT445493-445506 28 piles of lat:rite3 Nov XT415536 Unknown number of VC3 Nov XT442518 Unknown number of VC3 Nov XTi446518 Base ca;p4 Nov XT417540 Elurnts 271st & 273d Regt4 Nov XT417540 Elaments 271st & 273d Rugt4 Nov XT436541 215 tons riceý4 Nov XT408543 Ist Bn of 273d Rugt5 Nov ;24114-4O54 273d Regt (element)10 Nov XT270755 I ton rice-supr y cache12 Nov ;=303777 20 tons rice14 Nbv XT255807 20 tons rice14 Pbv XT263757 1.25 tons rico.17 Mbv XT285897 Basu c .u,,18 Nov X361462 VC platoon19 Nov V274956 VC com•.any19 Nov ?216804-223811 VC platoon19 Nov Xr144496 VC platoon20 Nov XT206812 VC platoon

9

21 Nov XT349940 !3~':S C-vlp22 Nov 72303775 12.4 toms ric, & bý.:. ar-,25 N6v Xlr130384 VC plattoon

VO U67 OF *CI1'AR LOCATION' JU1BZR OF ROUNDS

9 Oct XT298 564 154 Nv X165515 150

11 Nov XT165518 512 Nov VC167518 8422 Nv X26985 48~ac n ~isryo.sain

9, (C) s mi'I Th 5hBfDiv conductvd s -jarc a nd d ustroy opeiratioon

b. Phase2 II. 196th Inf Bde cunducts s.;.arch aiid destroy op.vrati,.nain vie of DAU TIE1If to iccato and destroy VC forc'.ýs, sup li.;s and b3'-sv c~sps.

c. Pivisu III. 196th Inf Bd-i is umv.-r thv contrrnl of tho 1st Inf Div.

d. Phase IV. 25th Inf Div (-), condu~cts ar ;onnaissmnou uf forcwoporation in assigonod nrin of' opration.

11. (C) W.CUJTION:

Phase I (14 Septdnnbur - 28 Oct..bvr).

(1) 14 - 21 Sopt.embr. B Cui, 2d Bn,, 1st Inf o..nduct.ud an air-zmobilo nss~rult to astab-ish blocking positirnn vic XTO7l534. A Co, 2d Bn, 1stmIn And C Co,. 2d rBn, 1st Inf drc-va I .nt'; the block and then hwlpkod 4gtablish a.base camp vie XT073546. During the nm.xt 6 d'!y3, light contact w.as zmca. withthe VC. On,21 Septemboir, thu brttali.on clostud TAY !TIMi bnso c.iaip.

(2) 18 .? 25 Soptbmbvr. The 4th 11n, 31st Inf crnductud -%n air-mobilo assault t';- usta'blish -a f .rt'rxd b-sQ vic XT191393. On the nrixt d-ny thubfatt,'I~ion air assau~ltend in vic rT1C1468 4:tving light ena.V. cýnt-ct. On 20-21Supte*mbar ru, cont-.ct vr-as in-adu eith ths ;.nvr.ly. On 22 Supt,.m-bvr thi battali~onlocatod n VC basmw ntrie vic XT165490. Frurn 22-25 5,pcvb n,.. Zu-th-jr contactwas inadoi with Cth vncaq~. Thu Bn cl~sid TAY WIffil b!aso camp :,n 25 &Sptumb.r.

(3) 6 - 14 Oct...bur. Thij 4th 13n, 31st IrC c-.nduct.;d S&W opuratiunsvic XTO954. Light enazqr ccntact waýs :xidij with rwg-ttive rosults. On 7 Octobar,A 0, a-do contact with 3 VC Vic X"1073547.. rvsulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) -:nd 1 VC

101

-/ A (poss). On 8 October, Cb D dostr,,yud 250 lbs of rico vic XT062543 and 4bcx'by traps vic XT069546. On 9 October, the b'itta-lin mnizd its bso c• <

W. vic XT066545. On 10 October no contr.ct wri3 raude. On 11 October, Co A andUK Co B discowvred and destroyud a tunnll c mpl.-x vic XTO55554. On 14 October,

S..tho Bn was oxtr -.cted to TIY NINH base camp.

(4) 15 - 23 October. On 15 October, the 3d Bnp 21st Inf was,irliftad to TRAI BI vic XT120686. All units wore closed by 1710 hours. On16 Octobe.r. Co A ecnductud an S&D opiration east of TRAI BI with nV~gativ-contact. C:.,ntinued operations t, the east and west of TRAI BI resulted innegativw contact. On 22 October, the Bn conducted an SOD opuration towardTAY MUNI! b!-se c-mp arriving on 23, Oct.

(5) 18 - 28 October.

A, (a) 18 October. Due to increased reports of VC caches inthe area, an operation was directed toward the west side of the SAIGON Rivervie JT4842. The 2d Bn, Ist Inf commenced air movement oC troops and suppliesto DAU TI.2I'W.

(b) 19 October. The 2d Bn,. 1st Inf completed their airmovement to DAU TIEN.

(c) 20 October. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an airmobileassault vie XT483438 with Co A and Co C, and vie XT455436 with Co B. Co Bset up a block while Co A and Co C drove against it.

(d) 21 OuLober. B Go, 2d Bn, Ist Inf discovered 13 tons ofrice, 500 cans of milk, 1000 lbs of salt and 2500 lbs of peanuts vie I460420.

(e) 22 October. C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf discovered 3630 lbsof camtnt and 20 1"x12" planks vie XT481427.

(f) 23 October. B Co, 2d Bn, Ist Inf conducted an SOoperation from vie XT483421 to vic XT489400, resulting in 2 tons of rice,15 lbs of sulfa drugs and 150 lbs of epsom salts captured and 6 VC structures,10 lbs TNT and 7200 lbs of fish destroyed.

(g) 24 Octobur. A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and B Co, 2d Bn, 1stInf conducte..d an operation vic Xl4542, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VCstructures, 2 foxholes, 2 undergroud fortificritions 2 tunnels, 1.58 tons ofri.ce and 400 lbs of wheat ddstruyjU. In addition, 14 lbs of documonts and 400lbs of VC clothing were capturod.

(h) 25 October. The 2d Bn, Ist InC conducted operationsvic XT4542 irith neg.tivw conta.ct.

Wi) 26 October. 2d Bn, 1st Inf conductod operations in vieof XT485414 with light contact. Rosults were 2 VC KIA (poss).

•'•11; a

(J) 27 October. 2d Bn, Ist Inf conducted operations fromvic XT451431 to vic XT747456, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (poss)and 8 VCS apprehended.

(k) 28 October. 2d Bn, lot Inf conducted operations fromvic XT478437 to vic X•442448, resulting in 34 VCS apprehended and 200 punjistakes destroyed.

b. Phase II (29 October - 5 November) (Diagram 16). On reports ofa possible VC hospital in the ar.a vie XT4348, attention was directed to thatarea.

(1) 29 October. 2d Bn, Ist Inf conducted an airi;,bile S&Doperation vie XT430488 resulting in 1 VCC, 420 tons of rice and 15 tons ofsalt captured. In addition, 440 gels of tar, 450 gals of gasoline, 5 oxcarts, 2 VC structures and 4 hand grenades wire destroyed.

(2) 30 October. On this day, the 196th Inf Bde directed the 4thBn, 31st Inf into araa and the Bde CP displaced to DAU TIENG and was reinforcedby G2 and G3 personnel from division. 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted an airmobileass;.ult to vic XT45506 resulting in 4.5 tons of rico, 3 bicycles and 100 lbsof clothing captured. The 2d Bn, Ist Inf conducted an S&D operation viaXT44490 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (poss) and 92.5 tons of rice,1 CHICOM rifle, 91 hand grenados, 26 rifle grenades and 2 bicycles captured.

(3) 31 October. The 196th Inf Bde directed 2d Bn, 1st Inf toconduct an S&D operation vic XT455500 and the 4th Bn, 31st Inf to conduct anS&D operation via XT441498. At 0900, 2d Bn, Ist Inf recuived sniper fire andone claymore at XF438498 which rosultJd in 2 wounded and I killed. Thebattalion continued on its mission and discovored 83.5 tons of rice, 9000 lbsof tobacco, 1 CIUCOM rifle, 300 hID" handlu shovels, 600 grls of cooking oil,and 1500 lbs of b,%ns. Mranx.hile, 4th Bn, 31st Inf stnrt,.d their operationhaving no onumy contact until 1600 hrs, when C Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf discovered187.5 tons of rice vic XT438503.

(4) 1 November. Due to finding andditional foodstuffs, theComnanding General, 25th Inf Div placd the ist Bn, 27th Inf under OPCON ofthe 196th Inf BdQ. The Ist Bn, 27th Inf w's giv'n the mission of securingthe 196th Inf Bdo Hq at DAU TIý= and conducting eagle flights over the ricecache rea.. Tho 2d Bn, lst Inf secured the rice a.ches and conducted saturationpatrolling within 1000 mnters of XT441491, the b-ittalion base. C Co, 2d Bn,lst Inf captured 55 tons of rice nnd 15 tons of bans vie IT4450. The 4th Bn,31st Inf conducted satur.tion patrolling vic XT441491 resulting in negativecontact.

(5) 2 November. A total of 8143 tons of rice had been capturedto d&,te vie XT4450. The 2d Bn, lst Inf a•nd 4th Bn, 31st Inf continued con-ducting saturation patrolling while the Ist Bn, 27th Inf co)nducted eagle flightsvie XT425458 and VT425530. The 4th Bn, 31st Inf discovered 6 bicycles, assortediwdical supplies and l lb of dcocumunts vic T44•O496. In addition, they searched

12

an ox trail via XT445505. On either side of the trail were foxholes andtrenches. Twenty-eight piles of latorite were discovered from rT445493 to

XT445506:I(6) 3 November. The 196th Bde planned to search for cacheareas to the north. In order to do this, they had 3 battalions; 2d Bn, 1st Inf;4th Bn, 31st Infj aid Ist n 27th Inf (-). (Diagram 1) The plan was to blockwith the .let Bn, 27th 1nf (-5 from XT423547 to ZT450538, on the general lineof provincial route 19. (Diagram 2) The 2d Bn, lst Inf (-) would attack onAXIS RED from vic of the rice cache area Tl4450 to the northwest I000 meter.pthen guide on a trail as it Wes to the northwest 1000 meters, then guide on atrail as it goes to the northeast. . coordinating point was established atXT434538. Co ', 2d Bn, lst Inf was to attack north on .-JIS BLUE which was onthe west side of LTL 19 from the 50 oast-dest grid line to XT443538. A Oo, 4thBn, 31st Inf would attack on .IS •VHITE which was on the east side of LTL 19.the 4th Bn, 31st 7nf (-) would attack on *.:S PURPLE northeast from the ricecache area until they reached a trail vic XT461507 and would then guide onthe trail until reaching a coordinating point at XT450538. The operationkicked off at 0900 hours when 2d Bn, lst Inf (-) and Ath Bn, 31st Inf (-)attacked along =XIS RED, BLUE, WHITE and PURPLE. 1t 0922, B Co, ist Bn, 27thInf 3anded at LZ #2 vic XT463529. The LZ was cold. The company then movednorth and at 1207 discovered a VC fortified village at XT451538 which had newCHICOM tools (axes, hoes, and shovels). Meanwhile at 0950, 0 Co, lst Bn, 27thInf landed on LZ #1 vie XTh10533. The LZ was cold. The company moved north for1200 meters, through elephant grass to vie fT11I1538. At that time the companycommande sent a point forward to discover the trail the company had to guideon. Upon moving 40 meters north into the wood, the point came under smallers and automatic weapons fire. The company in the elephant grass also cameunder fire from the frontj, both sides and the rear which cut off any escape,route. (See Diagram #3 for dispositio of the unit.) The company hadcome upon a fortified position of the Recon Company of the 9th VC Division.Upon coming under fire, the company suffered casualties immediately. By 1210hours the company had 6 KI. and 6 IM.. One of the casuclties was the commandingofficer. At 1120 hours, B Go, 2d Bn, lst Inf on 'JIS BLUE ran into an enemyposition on the 52 east-west grid line. The fight lasted a short while and theVC withdrew. The 2d Bn, lst Inf (-) continued on its missico. By 1230 hours,Co C, 1st Bn 27th Inf had 10 MI. and 14 WIA. At that time, A jo, Ist Bn, 27thInf which was at DAU TIEIG was committed to reinforce C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf.At 1248, the 1st lift of z Co, st Enj, 27th Inf !anded vie XT41053,ý At 1306,the 2d lift arrived and the company was ordered to attack west of C Co, st Bn,027th Infto roll up the VC flank. A 1330, C Go, 3d n, 21st Inf was moved toDA TIEZG and 2d Bn, 1at 1sf (-) was alerted to reinforce lt Bn, 27th Inf. At425 the Ist lift of 0 Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf landed at LZ hl. At 1505 the 2d lift

landed C Co., 3d Bj, 21st Inf was then ordered to attack east ct C Cop ltBn, 27th Inf. (See Diagram #4) At 1515 hours ; Co, let Bn, 27th Inf married lpwith C Co, lt BnE, 27th Inf vie Ic41537. At 1559 houra, C o•, 3d Bn, 21st Infmarried up with 3st Bn, 27th Inf (-). At 1600 hours, 2d Bn, lst Inf (-) wasordered to reinforc, the let Bn, 27th If (-). At 1800 hours 21 Bn, 1st Io (-)landed and a perimeter was formed vie XIT30537. (See Diagram #5) Evacuation of

13

------ --- -

the dead and wounded then began and lasted into +,h3 night. %aure were 8 /*"light, VC probes on the perimeter that night, Late that evening the 196thBdi published orders for 4 NOv. (See Diagram #6) Th Ita lb n, Ah Iraf (-)would attack northaot guiding or, the a"e trail that C Coo lot M # 27th mta

wans supposed to guide on the day before and set Vp a position via 2T424544BaGt ltalint base Wi wa5s8 for atblckiwa lng potion9 atd link3up3withe leturbeenooposition . Bolath,"37 Cs2 n Isthlnf would beamvnattacoern link up wt

Thesio le om 20in totesuhatae tteaetwtocosoiaeUTheordiwate wasad

battaion b o iang353 o tas thekin poeihtloat k43do Tey pituitto*red foapoionk. Bh Co lt Bn, 27th Int (-) waegtan movdnr vasy fo ine fupbtwith lotanks with sipeArC 2ir frat lthei rarl eventoghn theirmv meC pstona

lineau. (Dith. 2d#7)Is ;f The l0a1t Bhr 27th Inf o-dedid no0,lt begn, theitrtmove utilpt.t thei migft kisland beof cuCo. dE,2s The dBt lnoe to the ri)bghtntherove lotn 2the eat. a)th 105 t IW hethemi laoept BfC 2o Idf (.21steamwasngto the nora itheas right lAk Cos,~ 1s t 27t, 27th laiglth wOsno able toacGowp3dsBut Mis beae f; end hev0ie h Oo Cos let Bn, 27th Inf floigi htodrMetlead thisW wasx ore is rightn of awopith toc corven baD andor lik p ththpThr frau n o adtvEnced 27however thepu lo) Thsq 2 t was ledat1done. in linfration an0 sinresad betaween tine the beimnnigof the tirdeltight. mvdallax~Ientel of0 mtr othe 1 n,2twho alt wer AComte. het Bat2talion hade unodirecaml who easd atoemiatic aon to thnd6t mangun fire. vat ZT12460 Co, 0d En,27t21tInf waleordeed tor possibles movementtion renfo the left fla, o7f Aopmt. The00 dE,27t Inft requeoted thas wopt e'v go into actionlankhaCo Anerid CwCntbutthe. rih wlan eie eoe orhe le ,2thm elmnt. (- ast 1315, theav fi0e from bno2th

moit twos a~t to cnctthe le 3, flan of, 1oo3Bt h 1st aId eqt anhiset uitherano. o

wasnto tie in withthe igt fankedof A top I Batdfhlt 27th fwanoabet

wtloe this wand oater apoed by igtfan~ the Curebckandin Genral 196wth thenpB rigm 0t 1320, lth 00Blb n 27thW.1agm#8 Thi ws woade by orltely frnes Onl

WFu 0 iie had elapse since~ :'~einigo hefr igt

-amns fte-ltBs,2t Ifwr cmiteTe atlonhdnodrc

.adi cotec~wit th 19th de. diwver conactwasestblised hrogh

"/ The fire in the area continuod to bo intense. At 1435j, B C0, et BDs, 27th liawas locat6d 4 Z=4245 and bqgn heading southwest to attempt to Lid thebattalion t 3OC opan, 2d Bn 27th Inf with the O0O 2d Bo 2Mh Inf landed

at n408538. They then moved to the uast in an attept to inll Up the VC eZ'tflank. At 241L the ItPlat of A Cop let Bnf 2?th Int was attack d b anestimated 300 VCOhe 'ame. at tho plttoon in a ine of skimishers. This =a'**fist,,of thro. frontal asaulo againsit .1 OCa It b, 27th We A Cop, lt &A#.2ft mi antDu4 a fire repulsed the attack. The •u•tlley WO firUw freMU -TA at close to aLmm rziru at thi, time. At 342),c Co, a2Ii, 7th Inm with a Battalion Ommamid Orcup departed for an LI atf4IMW53a. Thuy 2anded on a oo3d LZ. The opMany immediately moved to the saot(See .Diaro #)I At 1515 hours, the (OI, let Ba, 27th nt ari. MO, 21 hj, 27th InSOasrd that C Cb, 2d n, 27th lInf should roll .up the wast Cl)ak of the VC, Ittook the conpany 2 hours to roach via 12411,%l duo to the'datse junglae. At IMhares, a sA ond t&I ealt was launched againt kA Co, lot ii, 21th nnt andC OD. .3d. B 218t Inf , At 1M0 hours CCo, 2d Bn, lt Wit had arrited in thevicinity of Z 69 ter having traveled through heoy jungle. C COa 2dRi, lot, ln came unde hev fire fra. an datenaion of tU fcwtifieation 'whishwme Owing down the let Raj, 27th Wt (-). C Cc, 2d Bn, lot Inf was about 3Wmeters from A Co, lst Bn, 27th nf at this time. The OD# lot ha, 27th Infordered B Co. 2d Eh.. lt LInf to fill the gpq between tht right flank ot A Cop 14Pah 27th Imt and. the left flank of A Ca, 21 Bn, let Into If 10 hr., A Go# 21,Ha, let Int had broken ost~at and was then 6rdered to aulng to the, southmet. endcover the southeast portion of the perimeter*. (See, Diagra 9) 8 C0,, 2d B 14tInf then was moved so that the ompany was oriented to the east. Also at 136M bA Coo 2a Sh, 27th Int landed at •r•07537. A Co, 2d Bn. "h Inf thent'mved up andassiated 1st Box Zt Inf in seauring a PZ and eacuating eazalties. At thissoeetim a third frontal assault hit the positions of A Co .st 1 iBa 27th W or&C Cos, 3d Ba, 2& Inf. At 1700 hours, it wus determined that aInf had Cone too far to the north %Wd was actually behind the.'VCpositiniiiIdijIst Bn, 27th Inf (-). At 1715 hours C C(b 2d BnD, 27th tnf &-m under hermy ma.m afd autosatio weapown fire. The OD, C Cop 2d Bii, 27th Inf was lowdiately

killed- The rwkilng platoon leader took covaw1 at 174,5 ho~re. C Cb, Id~ ha, 27thWt Assoilted the position in an attempt to overcome the VC. They'were un ise,-

eful. It was dotezuoned that the VC I oe2siti consil.d er e! nf ap-Orinkeps jut normected b" traichep Exn frm tho bankers w clard

iffi Wlaes w n *Zenal 35-0- •0otors from the bunxkrs. Those lanes had onlytho undorbrush 6lared from them and an attackmr could not see them unless he us

atmidng in one. At this ti the 00,# 2± , , thth re tro a gso na, anda PAC dft • 'ndtha•t 0 Cop 2d Bnj 27th Inf was approximatol 200 citers frm letPh, Mth"L (--). At IMr hoursi resupply and madivae began in nt Raj, 27th f

ar.) %a. At I2" thoa O, 21 Bhi 27th Inf took one squad and att•mqpd to llnkup with the 1st BnD 27th Inf. He crossed a fire lane and was ki.s4. 13.6 bythis tim,. the lot Sg t, a platood leader nad a platoon Sgt had been kidlie, Thecoopany fored a tight perimater. C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was oompltelr isolatedI fton the romaindr of tWx units on the battlefield. At 1941 houis, C Co, ad am$lit Inf was ordered by 00, lst 9h., 27th it to conduct a night attack in matteat to reach C Cop 2d Bhj, 27th Wet C* op 2c± On; lIt Int intended to attacknorth and then west, to relieve C Co, 2d Bni, 27th It. They cam unider heavy fLu

01 5 Z

II,

ijr odi5. ty cnd wer unable to link up with, C Co, 2d B, 27th'Inf. At about this A6am time the 4th Bh, 31st Inf; A Co, 2d Php 1st lf and B Co, lat Bht 27th Infvho had earlier been ordered to assist l1t Bn, 27th Wt (-) from the north wasordered to withdraw and establish a perimeter via XT4M25," (See Diagrmm #10)•As night wore on and cripple& C Co, 2d Bn, 2st Inf returned, they relieved A Clo2d Ba, 27th tnf of re•ponsibiL1ty for the 12 as A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf vms scheduledto make a day1Aft attempt at rescuing her sister company, 0 Got 2d 4 27 Infwas ordered not to fire regard-loes of how many times it was probed, They were .

probed four times dOut the night, took casualties but by thin tactic the VCwere not able to determine exactly wher# the bmpany was located.

(8) 5 November. In the early hours, additional DUST OFF's wereneeded to evacuats the wounded of C Co, 2d En, lot Inf and as the let aitcraftcame in and switched on his landing lights, the VC began a mortar attack. TheCD, let Bn, 27h lnf called the aircraft and told the pilotseither they had tocowe in blind and land by flashlights or wait until daylight. The pilots of tkaDUST OFF decided to come in blind and evacuated the wounded bf C Co, 2d Bn, let"la by morning. As day light came, the fire fight continued, At 0745 hrs, A Co,2d En, 27th Inf mov~d out to the east and then north and then west to relieve C

2i, 2d n 7th Wot. (See diagram #j1) After moving 30 maters, the company oaeunder heavy Autcmatic weapons and machine gun fire and immediately sustained8 casualties. A CO, 2d Br, 27th Wt laid down a base of fire ani ovewran threebunkers and a trench but they could not breach the VC lines. *The company againlai down a base'of fire and evacuated their wounded and dead. At 0S30, A Co,2d Bn, lst; B GO, lat Bn, 2?th Inf and A Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf who were in aposition in the vicinity of •..24546, attacked southwest in order to assist 1stBn, 2Mth In (-) and C Go, 2d Br, 27th Inf. The three companies came alongdifferent axis and coordinated their movements between each other. At 1000 hours,the omamnding General, 196th mt Bde placed these three companies under the con-trol of the 00, let Bp, 27th In. The companies were navigated by sound andsmoke. B Co, let Bn, 27th LSt was directed into the northeast corner cf lt En,Z7th Inf perimeter. A GO, 2d Bn, lt Inf and C Go, 4th Bns 31st Inf were directedinto C Co, 2d &i, 27th Int perimeter. By 1200 hours B Co, l&t B, 27th Inf reachedthe perimeter, having received only one casualty. Also by 1200 hours, A Co, 2d Ba,let Inf and C Go, 4th Ba, 31st Wt reached C Co, 2d BRa 27th Inf. Upon arrival;however, the fighting began again in the loation of C CO, 2d Bt, 27th lIn. Thethree companies were ordered to move north, west and then south to rejoin the mainforam. (Diagrua 22) This, the force succesefu1ly accomplished. The extractteiof CO, 2d En, 27th Int began mmediately and was completed atl 600 hours. At1610 hours, .1t En, 1th Int from the lIt tnf Div landed and the extraction of lsoOBn 27th Inf Task Force began, At 1630 hours, C GO, let Bn, 27th Int withdrew,B Coo 3st En, 27th Inf withdrew. B Go, 1st Bn, 27th Irf set up a secondary block"B Co, 2d Bn, lat lnfolowed by C CO, 3d Rn, 21st Inf and A Co, lst B, 27th lfconducted a passage of lines through the block. At the same time artillery fire9wA called in to within 25 meters of the withdrawi•Ag elements. At 1700 hours the

extraction was palete.

a. PhaseI l (5 Nov - 10 Nov was under the control of the let InfanU7

DivCi A

3A

77 I

d. Phase IV (10 Nov - 26 Nov). For a detail account of unitsI actlaws

17 see the Brigade and Battalion reports at Appendix 2.

(1) On 7 November, following heavy contact by elements of the lat InfDiv northeast of SOUl DA# this division was ordered to start operations in thewestern part of War Zone C. HQ# 2d Bde and the 2d Bn, 14th Inf were ordered tomove to TAY NINH whioh they accomplished on 8 Nov 66. On 9 Nov# the Div FNd CPalong with Hq, Div Arty displaoed to TAY NINK. The Div FWd assumed operationalcontrol at 0930 10 NOv. The Div mission was to destroy elements of the 9th VCDiv ini War Zone C. At this time, it was believed the 271st Regt (VC) was 3ocatedin the woods northeast of BAU 00 via X13370. An order was passed to th 2d Dde toconduct S&D operations to destroy the 271st Regt with priority to oebjetiveMHO Y vie XT3370. Operations mould not go further north than the 80 east westgrid line. Guidance trm OMS MACV required that one B52 striks per da beplanned for by each division. The operation began on 10 Nov. The 21 3de onthat day moved thel st Bn (M) 9th Inf and the 2d Bna.4th Inf to BAU 0O (22768)to establish a fire support base. The let Bn, 8th Arty then displaced to BAU Me.A decision was made to open the LOC from SOUl DA to BAU CO in order to save arthelioopter support.

(2) On 11 Nov, the II FFORCEV comnander attached 2d Bn (M)I, 22d Inffrom the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div to the 25th Div (-), The Div was to use the bat-.talion near GO DAU HA in order to protect against a threat from the BOI IDI -HOBO Woods complex (Xr5333). The lst Bn, 27th Inf was released from the lot lnfDiv on U Nov and arrived at BAU 00 on 11 Nov. A series of operations wereconducted by this base (see diagram Ll&12). The 2d Bn, 14th Inf conductedoperations from 31-13 Nov, east of BAU 00,, sending patrols as far as th southedge of IONKEY. The lst Bn, 27th Inf conducted an airmobile assault on the 12a.and established a base t6 search out an area hit by a B52 strike, (See diagram13 for B52 strike areas). The 2d Bn, 27th LX moved to BAU 00 on 12 Nov. Alsoon the name day elements of the 196th Inf Bde (LT)(SEP) were released from letmt Div. The 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted a 50 operation north of BkU 00 andestablished on 12 Nov a base which was later called Fire Support Base #1 in thevicinity T275W90. The 2d an (M), 22d Inf established three compan bases northof GO DAU HA and BAO DON with the mission of conducting opersioms south ct theBOI LOI Woods. On the morning of 12 Nov, the battalion was given orders tosecure-the Rt 22 bypass in the vicinity of CAU 1OI Plantation in the vicinityXT244.5." The Bn made this move on 13 Ncv. On 14 Nov, the battalion mission againchangedp this time because of a change of mission for the division. The ." Idivisionts mission changed from a search and destroy mission to reconnaissancein force astride Route #4 to KATUM and be prepared to move north and seize objeo-tives in the vicinity of the Camioaii Border or to move southeast to seize B0DUG. The 2d Bn (M)s, 22d Inf was attached to the 2d Brigade on 14 Nov. The Brigadetherefore had 2 mechanized battalions. 3 infantry battalions and 2 artillerybattalions. The 2d Bn, let Wt took over the mission of guarding the Route #22Bypass and the plantation, At that time the division was directed to constructa Special Forces camp in the vicinity of Fire Support Base #1 prior to thecompletion of the operation. Though this mission was later reecinde4, it did maiethe division keep the Fire Support Base at BAU O0 open longer thM :Intended.

17i .

Mire Support Base #2 In the vicinity r XT270865 was established by tUs lst n /(M)p %th Int and the 2d On (H)p 22d Inf on 15 14Dv. Two batteries of arti4lerywer then moved to the area, Local operations were conducted in the vic inity ctboth Fire Support Bases for several days, The base at BAU 00 was closed on 17Nov 66 and the 2d Bn, 14th Inf moved back to TAX IMM, On 18 NOvY the 1lt Da (M)"

th Inf drove north and prepared to recon east of tTUl. The 1st Bn (9),q thInt est.Ilished a base north of KATUM in the vicinity of XT92. The battalionconducted operations in the area until the 22d, The let '., 27th Inf moved fromFire 3ttpport Base #1 to Fire Support Bise #2 on the 18th. A series of combatassaults w.ere .conducted from 20-23 Nov. The 2d Bap 24th le conducted one the20th in the vicirnLty of fl204803, where the 2d Bn (M)p 22d Inf had a iharp tirefight the day before. They conducted Xwother on the 21st to establish a temporaryfire suport base to support the Aero-4=3 Platoon, D Troopp 3d Sqdn; 4th Cavwhich eWgoited a B52 strike next to the border. The 1st Bn, 27th Imn conducteda combat assault on 2. Nov and another on 23 Nov. The decision was made not tomove the lt Bn (M)p 5th Int southeast to the BO TUC area. Rathei ti 2d Bn27th Inf corducted an air assault into the area on the 22d. On thm 23d, the lsth (H)p 5th Inf moved back to Fire Base #1 and then secured Fire Base #0 in thevicinity of X1977 on 24 Nov with one company. The majority of units moved backto base camp on 24 Nov and the operation terminated on 25 Nov for all *x~ept theet Ba (M), %h bnf which conducted a reconnaissance to TRAI BI (XT1170).

32. RMSULTS:

Enomw I•oses$

a. Personnel.

VC KIA (C) 254VC KIA tpass) 237vcc 6VCS 60Detainees 19

b. Equipweat:

Field Expedient Rocket Launcher I60 m MIbrtar 1

1-9 G0mad. Lumdma 2Shaotguans 2QIION SMC 1Thompsoa SHC 1BAR 20U0)NM Assault Ri~fles 3GMIIOD 7.62 Rifles 2CHICOH Carbines 20. RLtfb 3

Russian Ri/f a 2

38

PFenoh 7 As-36 Rifl.Rif le. (typ. unknmo) 3isem ade riflaeUS Cewbdmse 3gm Pistol IHoimsede Pistols 3

Oroe z •"iw e" I

Dark GuniRR4..-•2 3ock s om 1. e60= ert1ar RoundsSmalS Ann hmmunits c

aDqz.Mnse 12

Rifle, retnadesHandL GranadesAT NLrn. 4.

BMWs 1s tonsCaimed ftod 2 b

2500 The

l-Iutsz7 RadiePor Otable 1

Tin 6M0 sheett.Bicycle.25

Bei~cles 9D bottle,Ogments 100 lb bags 33bagslot x 12" Jlumber 2Sulfa drugs 15lbNOMsa alt 35012b$Yedical &upplies 4 lb.clot~hizn35 bDotoasbin Cord 20 ftRadlo, transistorg, cowwewCial. 3cookLagt oil. 600 4,a0,BatteriessvD"I hmndle ShovelS30Medical UniformsPills (typa imlmwn) 20

as. Hanks3Chinee 8J' Nagasina 5

JD CI M Barrel

12.Wm Hvy 10 Ba&rrels 2Wheeled IlbuntaPUaS". Electrical 2Ret riterators 2

19

a___

(2) Destro~yed

60M fds 3SA Aum 10263M036b Bombs 2200 1b Bombs25D lb Bombs I2D lb Bombs

8AT N.ins 5AP Mines 15M.aQmre mi.nes 1Hand Grenades 91am 29B~astirg caps 2VC Strzuctuies 228ra'nne" 9*U•ge 9ICaves 36U1nderground FotiricatiormPunji Pits I"Ibih&2as 169Trenches 2Weqpapen q~a~ceente 28Slans •eOxcarts 36Boat Docks 2Ries 729.4 tonsWheat W0 UbsFert~iliu- 205D jbsFish7955Cmmed Food 25) lbseOient 5 lb-bags aMeAtbing 460 TheTor 440 galsGasoline 5)0 galsSa4. 30 tonsTobacm 900 lbsBeams 1 tonPicks 3O"DO Hand." Shovels 61Bicycles 2116tor, outboardIAcid (typ unknown) 176 galaRice S.1b 1pows 300 lbWire 35) ft

20

Friandly Losses (Phase I, 1I, III# IV)

a* Personnel.- 196th Bde 2,% Inf Df -

53 144M~A .399 342

DOW 4

b, E~quipment

t ton M51. 4Wrecker 5T 1Trator 5T 1XL13 PC

33. A~MJISTRLMflE I.TTERS.

a. Logistics. For a listing of logistic prdblems enoounteredsee the /fter Action Report of the 25Uh mt Div SUP0OD4 (App 2).

b. Signal. The circuits established to suppoft ths aperstimase described in the 125th Signal Bn Afte ',ction Report (App 2).

l).. GIVIC AMfON iLND PSYIOOGCA 0PER.TI03S.

a. ftiS. Action did not becom a part ct Operation ATTIMMO1Mto a uowavsble degree. This was due to a lack of civilian populace in theAO, particulary in Wai- ZofC, An esawnt of the 196th Ede did conduct oneMCAtP a BEN RUU (CM3240), a VC dominated hrmlet in the C,',U XOI rubberplantation. treating 2D7 patients. This battalion was statically deployed'inthe area of this hamlet for a prolonged period 6n a route security misuioM Anincident occured en 19 Nov whe a Ut Div tank struck and seriously injured= e3•w73v man. !k subsequently passed way and was identified as the 3drmking bishop ct the CAO DAI Temple of TAY MN. 'The C, 19fth Bde and hisS5 aceoMpanied by the TAY BINH Province Chief Iumediately paid their respectsto the ranking GAO D.A Bishop expressing their regets. Solatium was paid andhe. bishop was most impressed by their exprassion of concern and sympathy.

There was little PSIOP exploit possib:e. during the operation due to a lack ofHOI MNLl, and few prisoners wre taken. Leaf)Bts and loudspeaker tapes weaeplannme and utilized by the 196th Ble and by the division PSYOP section insupport of the, 2d Bde. In'future aperations, each Bis must p3an daily applieationof P810P activities as a regular support adjunct to their tactical planM. Div.PS1P doveloped and locally reproduced an outline strip map which was distributedwith CIIEU HM. leaflets -nd NSC passes prior to operations in the KCAUK aaea(O3093) in an effort to reach any possible., returnees who might be located inthis &", The tot-l leaflLits distributed xAd loudspezaer missions flownfollow with general subject themes:

Total - 2,697,000 leaflets

21+ . . . .... ... .. . . . . .. . .. . . Ie-+ . .. . . .. . .. . ... .. . ...

CONFIDENTIAL.

14 ýoudspekr misasione

a, G & 2A6oh Ps-, i 196h ReCH Nor 7soDooo 1,377,ocOPourer Sa•e 4^5000 52,000Raverd for weapons or info 105,000 50,0001dcspazikmr. mLissc ns 6

*RNfl . Figure includes 3 days of "No Dose" missione

b. B52 strikes were. .cploitad by quantity leaflet drops by the 246th(be No Mvic ;,0tion/PSYOr evaluation of population and attitufs was possiblebeasc of the sparse•y populated. nature of the general AO.

35. Cmauders Analysis. An after action critis byp aic andattached infanmtx oomuandere was conducted on 29 Nov 6(ppole

FOR TO COKKANR:

+ l'"187•-I- • 22 alpT, AGCO2 Combat Opns After Action Asst AG

Reportsi Czriqee of Ojrn MUIMEDWO uI"

DISTRIBUTIONsSpeojal

CONFIDENTIAL22

CONFIDENTIAL25'H AV•ftl lr( iAITALIt (INF 01V)

AfO 96225

DAVj•W-C 15 bscember 1966

.. LiJV(I: Combat Operations After Action wujort (U)

TC: Co.anding General25th Infantry uiviaionAM :~ G3APO US Forces 96225

1. 0 Iliku'11Y 0F.0.kj'1I(di: Op rtion ittl'boro.

2. (U) BilUS Ok' OP&,TIChi l1th tLrough 25th Novabur V066.

3. (U) LOOATICN: Tay Kinh trovinc.43

4. (i)C2hTLQi ChGOJIND PAWA'~U~iThRS 25th Infantry' Division.

5. (gi) _jtT Si LTC Edwvrd F. ~Das, CcýLundlag Officer, A25th Avyt~ion D..ttalon.

6. (C) TASK (r.•=Nf T ,,kTTCM2

a, CONTROL HAklJAitTUY ,S: Headquarters, 25th Aviation xiattalion.

b, ASSIMLZD Wk OPkAMAIcJ L CCit±OL:

Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion

Co b, 25th Aviation battalion

170th Aviation Co, AJO 96318 (O-W)

175th Aviation Co, AEC 96357 (0&'CG)%

c. MJIIl UI/TS UhDLA 25TH MVIkTIC• tAATT1'LICh C(h;•IOL F(4 F*dICMS .Ct MLH Ok1ATIW:

Headquarters, 145th Aviation Battalion (-), IO 96227.

56th Transportation Co,(-), APO 96307.

71st Aviation Co (-), AI0 96227.

116th Aviation Co (-), J.-C 96225

118th Aviation Co (-), Ai O 96227

CO,/F1 L?&N T/,OL. J

12.fth Avi:-tion Co -) ArC 962E9

162nd Avi-tion Co (-,A. C 962e9

147th .4via~tion Co (fLed), APO 96291

178th Avi:..tion Cc (1LtLd), APC 96289

7. .(U) 5L.fAj. F4/A N/

9. .(c) in-ri Th. 25th i.vir.tion bticn()prcvidtd ;.vi.:ticn suppci-tto the~ 25th IniYatiiiy VivIsion duringE tt.; conduct of Operation /.ttleboro toincludc tvic~tion co..bt a~ssaults, :tri?.1 supp.ly, cozuzand and control aircrvnft,aerfial rtconnaissance, amo~d helicoptur support., and artillory rtopositioning.

10. (C) Cc"C'LliCL¶ e CAiI0"'1O:

a. Duriig the I~riod 11-24 i.e~vei..ber 1966 the 25th Avirticn j..attnlicrnest-clished a fcrim~rd com and post, vicinity T,%y ?Ninh "est Airfield (ai165 1).The 145th Aviation L'-tV-lion Yeadquarters (-), 170th Aviation Co, -.nd 175thP'ivi:tiofl Co co-located their eleLer.ts with- tie 25th Avi-tion 6attalion forw.rdcoabc.-nd post. Other supporting aviation units coLr-uted fror. ho~.e sta~tion ondaily or L~ission bk'SiG, as3 required.

b. The over-U1. con~trolling he,-dcvuarters for n.vi.ztion support during0per~tion Attl~eboro was trne 25th Aviaticn i~ttalion. The 145th Avi t~ion=ýttalion vr-s utilized cs the controlling headquarters for all troop liftLissions.

a. The 25th ikvi,-Lion .att.-lion .-nd supportire- avi:xtion Wiits conduct-

ed the following troop cLoveLents durirAk, the rperiod 11-24 L~ovei..ber 11,66:

TIIZ. I.GVL,.Li.T Ii.ir .1,!LICN INiFI.TIzY GUSFAiuY

Ccmb:t Jss-.ults 10 N~one

kErtm.ctions ic kLone

rýepositions 5 1

b. A total of sixteen Artillery battery rel~ositionings were cornducte;:b5 rattached Chi-47 helicorters.

C. A tott'l of 5,65E flying hours were flown by units tuider tihe ccr~t~rJ_cI t;.e 25th Avia-tion Lattr.lion durinr. ti-e period 11-.241. over.aber 1966. Adetcailed :-.nalysis of these totrals is included as 1A±6 A.

C ONF10FA7-1T/41-

a. I.' friurnily aviation personn.t1 were wondad in a~ction.

b. J, total of 4 VC were IK.i-. (.C) LO total of 3 VC wer K5Aj (EWO').

13. (C) Aik.1I ý:IpaIVL i-.AT~iu45:

a. Supply: Aduiquzntt.

b. i~aintu.n~nce- Adbqwurt. Supporting aviation Mite rotatud air-.cr',ft froL. hot*. stction or nitr.rby fixc-d f-.ciliti...s to jxurf om organimationrl,-nd d.Lri..t support P.~ir.ten~.ncc.

c. Treatment of casu0.ltius and evacuastion and )osp;ULsatimi:N/J-..

d. Transportation: N/-..

u. C.ouriunications: Adtquatt.

f. Ihiical Lvacuation: N/A,

14. (U) SYSiIMAL kýMIPMk.V AND IECHNIQUS N/A

15.(C) &AIDI~ 'SJILYSIS AND U q~hSNkTIOh,5:

(1) K4rtillery firir., during tzne conduct of ainhobile opera~tion5e~.~~ur.d troop carricrs and f.L.Larked p;.rsonncel.

(a) &'Jiscussion: Infan~try b~attalion L-rtillor7 Liaison'.IT icvrs aboard CXC aircraft wt~ not able to providb tir..ely control of firesduving airmobile lifts. This difficulty is attributted to emiploymnent of*-r*tillu.ry units C ror, sev%.ral C irw suplort Law.-s in support of sew.ralt..z~i-.Luvf-r units. *ihe Artill-.r-y LNO in the C.& aircraft controllud only thost;fjirS in support of th-; bzttalion conducting tht. airniobilE assault,

(b) khecotaindation: ;.rti1l.r-y Liaison Cifficte~r aboard C&dCi.;ircraft durint thtu conduct of airmobile operations xiust bt fror. an 4.chlt.ont!-L..t is capable of ccntrollinEg all art~illu.ry fim-.s which hawt. an intlu~ence ontie., t~xtcutio!. of the airwobile optration.

(2) 'Iwo A.vietiori vattalior. IPuadquart#.rs art- n~ithtzr rtquirt~d nordebirablu for an opt-;.ation of tsi.L 5copt. trrcownL-urrd in OPratiorn ,-ttlezboro.

(a) ulscussjon: 1hL ijivisiofl's organic aviation battalionis ccapatlv~ of controllinr tactical and lo&iStiCal 3upi.ort for tactical opzr-ations of thtu tzmgnitua. e-ricount...red in CL;Yation i~ttlv-boro. iu&.u'ntCation isrmcuim~d in I-OL diapznsinj; 55yst't.:.5.snd pathfind..rs. 'ih,. addition of LnothEraviation battalion h adquart,ýrs s;.~rvts to incro-ase. thf. chain of caimuxiicatiot.sind coordination rtzquired to trxL-cute a ivtn naission. The- addition of a stcordhtadc:uarturs cr-,at~.a a structurt. wiiich bucoiw.s unhuildy whoun tactical liftreuuir#..munts and logistical lift rt~cuirul...ts am~ iflterUeshoz utilizing tht.

4V C O4//OEWT,,qL.

(b) Rucome..ndetion: That tht. Division's organic AviationnBattalion be utilized to conduct and control all airmobilb activitfe5 in 5up-port of op~rations t&~ploying tactical forctus of tht, size uflcountuirtd in Cpera-.I tio Attlboro(3) Airfield operoting pý;rsonne~l "a.ut bc aujg.ontfd whn operat-ing forward airfir.1d feacilitiuzs.

(a.) Discussion., In addition to c~ratin,2. the forwrArdairfiold, forwa~rd rbfueling, and forward mrtining areas, th6 P~viatin battal-ion was responsible for thL. non~ial operation of Vthi Division Eazte L.rfitld

opuratiuS personnel were reoquirw.d for thec sustained op,;ration of -6h,_ forwe~rdfecilities at Tay 1'Jnh !-eet 'Airfield. Only thirty peroont of thc, ptrscrnm4reLAined at the Base Airfield, thorbby dreasiteally reducing tho operatingcapability of the. airficld.

(b) hccom,_ndaticn: That tht; r.quireL.!nt for th-~ personneland oquipruýnt to oper,ýte the divis ion forward U~rfild control tow-.r bc;rlaccd oni Ua-iV on a Lission basis. Thc. 1_25t~i Air Trzaffic Control C='paYhas rthL. additional xdssion of operating formard airfitblds on a zassion requimstbc-ais. A !lutinn arriviud at by tnE, 1st Infantry Livision is to use a sUP-port bat~alion for the oparat-on of the facilitit.s in thu forward area.

(4) Soparatce rtfu,ýlinrj z:rt~as and ad&quat6 IOGL dispcai5±11equip~ont for COi-47 and UK-I. aircraft P-m. ý.ssv.ntia1 to ufficicntly utilizeF.ll r.vrilabl-ý daily oaperating hours of tircraft lift assuts.

(a) Discussion: CPE-47 2ircraft refut-linc requires approxi-3iLatc~ly thirty ,.inutes per aýircraft utilizing th.~ standard 120C gcllon POLdispensing ' -i~cks rtior of one 1200 _g.Uon truck po-i tuo opt.rczting CF-47'sis mquc-_. dl to ý-rciude refueling d&lays. UH-l aircraft ref ut~ing areas eanddispensing systted Lasit bce capalrLe of refusiin.- a Liniti.wa. of ttri troop carri.~r-aircraft and two Pamted lhulicopters at onv tiL~b This is bust aceoiplishedthrou,,:h thd use of ejix, 105 GR_ portable dispunsing ý=ape.

' -j Rh..coi..mndaation: That steparate refuv~ling ar#eas be.catablishod for CH-.47 and UH-l aircraft on all future opcrations.

(5) Fathfindc.r requireýL~cmts for thQ control "of siz.mltaneousactivitibsm involving troop lifts =rd resupply by airmobile. light coi,-aniesand artillery or heiivy equipe~ent displanc nýt by CE-47 a~ircraft exctods tlit:capabilitr of thte Division's organic pathfindbr df;tac1:~.nt,

(a) Discussion: The. p..rsonnel -nd e.quipmiwnt of tha. iivis-ion's organic patIhfinctur deta^c1=,:.nt wvill pexm.it SiLmultaneous oPteratacri In thr,.ýa~reas at one tiLa. During Operation kttlcboro, pati findprs w-.re frecu-i-atlYreq~lirsd to operat~e similtaneously in six areas: Three location$ workingCL:-47 lov-ding or unlotdungp one UT,-lD resupply ari-, on. troop piLckup zonmand one st-aging area for reaction forcs.

(b) RecoL~icndation: Thu Division's petihfinder dotachLerltbe aupr~intcd ti~th a doetaciuirnt of ptatbf indurs f roL thca unit providing CH-47support. CO ',~V f9

CONl FI PE "IA7,

(6) Aviction require,.ents for tvctical operations and logisticalsupport Liust be considered siLultaneously.

(a) Discussion: Aviretion recuireLants const&ntly exceeded:.viation assets for a given day. It is a muet tLat the unit comander becppraised of aviation assets and consider t,:e requireoents for tacticaloperations and logistical support simultaneously. The comander wust considerthe effect of each of these areas upon the other and how he can best acom-Splish the ission.

(b) hecon.endction: Th.:t the unit logistical representativeand the aviation laision officer be brought into the tactical planning asearly as possible. This will enable complete plmis to be foramlated andpresented to the commander for a decision only after all aspects of the oper-ation. have been considered.

(7) RequireLects for UH-1D coi.i~mnd tnd control. aircrcftdeplete the e.viation airlift capability.

(a) Discussion: ALU requireLants for C & C aircraft umstbe taken from available total lift assets. This reduces the capability ofthe aviation unit to perform its mission of troop lift or aerial resupply.During Operation Attleboro, four UF-iD aircraft were utilized for CVW bythe Ebrigade. Under this concept, and assuming a two brigade operation, theassets of one lift c•mpany will be required to support C&C requirements.

• (b) ,Recowuendiition:

I.. 'lhat the 0H-23 capability of the brigade be usedto provide C&C aircraft for ground c~anders not engaged in airwobileoperations.

;L Each brigade be furnished one UK-1D for C&C toaugment assigned CH-23s.

(8) flanuing of aviation support .ust consider the effects ofadverse weather and darkness.

(a) Discussion: it is desirable to ccmilete all aviationoperations during daylight hours. iiight operations near the border andover undefined terrain are hazardous. Adverse weather, i. e..rly morningfog and late afternoon thundershowers, nust always be considered as possi-Lility. The effect of these liwitations on the mission must be consideredby the commander.

(b) hecomendction: That emphasis and consideration beplAced on the possibility of adverse weather and darkness when planning anoperation. Alternate courses of action should be established.

(9) The detertitnaion of overall aviation requireLents tosupport a given operation m.ust corsider the rotation of units for Lainterancedown time.

C" • O/v'F/vET?4L.

(c) Discussion: Neither the Division nor supportingaviation companies possesses the ca:-ability to displace adequate a. andDS r•intenance support to forvard locations to sustain the high flyinghour deuands which were imposed during Cperation Attleboro.

(b) Kecoisendation: Frovisions tust be Liade to statlliteaviation units mn a x;,aintenance facility near the base of deoloyrient for aportion of their a. and all of ti±eir DS rtintenance or rave sufficientl0titude in aviation assets available versus derands so as to perLit rotationof units, or portions thereof , to howe 3tation for Laintenance.

b. Tactical Coerations.

(i) Pu diffi. ul.eU were encountered during air•obile operations.This is attribut.'cd to the extensive cinolnile experience of the units of the2nd LrigLde to include the planning, coordination and execution of combatassaults.

(2) Tiwe factors for the aimobile deployuant of artillery units

Lust consider te aimobile experience level of these units.

(a) Discussion: The ability of an artillery unit to weetaverage, expected airzobile depleywnt tLA5s is directly proportional tothe airuobile training and experience of that unit. Attempts to move suchunits by aizrobila Lcans during tke rapid pace of com bat orerations can havea serious impnct on the entire ground tactical -lan if this factor is notconsidered and appropriate allowances Lade.

(b) Reccmrndation: Tiat artillery units without previousainmobile experjence be eLployed where tire factors are not critical, andwhere feasible$ assistance be provided by personnel fro& experienced units.

(3) Three CI-T47 aircraft are nornally adequate for the rapiddisplace•Ant of a 1O51,& Artillery Latter- for one-way distances up to 30Kilorwtters. An increase in aircraft above t..is nu~ber offers no increasein expediting the displaceLent.

(a) Discusslon: The deterLininc f.ctor in short distancedisplaceLent of artillery units is the speed with which a unit cz.n rig itsequipuent for moverzent. T. c allocation of lift aircraft above ti.at levelwhich th.. unit cm Landle, only results in inefficient use of aircraft.

(b) 1econaaendation: Tlx.t xtreiu cE-re be utilized in

dotermining and scheduling aircraft for heavy lift rjquire-.ents. Tht (I1-47

Liasion officer is best able to assist a unit in detenr.ning the waximuumnutmber of aircraft whickh a unit can efficiently ut-lize for a rapid LovY.

c. Arrial Resupply.

(1) An adequate resupply staging area, properly orEanized and

controlled, is essential.

'S P-, ½

(a) Discussion: UE>1D atr~iz rLSUPP1.' Was LI.."4kired init-Z9 ially by lack of adequatte resuptply stc~ging Lcrea. This was L~tvr rv:..editd

cnd positive control and coordination purmittt~d efficihnt n.C~V~u.ent of sup-Plius to ti&e units in tILL fitld.

(b) Fiecomcendation: c-rior to -in omer-tion,, detailedPlanni~ng L~ust bra directed toward este.blisl.ýing t, re-5uppl-y sta~ging arbas.

(2) Avia-tion support of tli-:. A,,Pgnitudc. required during (.serationAtt'lebcro is dtrendent on early anticip..tion of tbý ground unit's require-ments and tiix.ly pas~ma~e of inforiation to supporting Paviition battalion.Liasion Officers frou. trie avieticn battalion and CP-L47 unit., locate~d in the

Pigade forward ccna..and post wL-re found to ba indispensible.

(r.) Discussion: Upon receipt of tht; cwuulcative dailysortie rbque~st, th6 Brigade 5.-3, ±Lrigade kviation Cfficer arid the kviationLiaision Officers considered the validity of the request, established prior-itie~s and computtd, the aircraft requireLent3 for the followire day.

(b) iiecor~&.endation: That CA*laision officurs bb utilizedon all future operations of this ciagnitucle.

(3) Unit equiiluent and supply displZC6i.ent by e'.rzmobile Leansui~ust Le controlled by a m-prtsentative. of tI.L highest htadquiarte~rs bfingdisplaced.

(a) Discussion: A singu represeritative vvusted with the'uthcrity to act in accordance with tLe ground cou..anders desires and support-ed with tdequatb couamuications raust be r-M-sLr~t to direct pethfi~nder personnelduring the displaceLent of a unit's cauip~..nt ai.d. supplies, Ln the tl.%e zbstaice.of such a representative of the groundi ccg..ander, with an adequatte cozauni-cztions capability, pathfinder pwrsonnel are lteft without proper guidarnceshould a situý-tion arise whic~h necessitatas a cia.a gQ in priority or sequencuof events.

(b> P~cor,ýe.ndation: That a staff reprtstertativv of thieh adquart~ers being dist-laccd, with nccessary conuitunications ruquiIx..nt reLainat tht displacr."ent, site to ltnd guidanct. to pathfinder personnel1 during theconduct of the displacLL~ent.

(4) A cfr.tral &&e;i.c5 is necessary to establish resupply requir-';1L.cnts and priority of mover-ent.

(a) Discussicn: 11k; iLrigadf, dsigri~.tud an it~dividuEl wi~coma~cived and consolidated t-ýc. logistical reouir*L.ornts fcr ell cf th~t Laneuvfr

and fare support. CLer~ents. lic coordina-,ed lo~isticE.1 rec~uir(..L(nts in vie-wof of tactical. requimi-ents and prioritie.s .. saL.iLd f or acrial rjsuj,,ly.LEach battalion furthcr Evaluated and estublisihed pr:.oritis-s wit,' in the-irILssigned block of sorties.

(b) 1Recou.x-nd~'tion: TI,.t ta..e b~rigade dcsignatt a indivi-dual to function as a ctrnter agei~c:- for consolidatingv rsu i ,,ly requiret..entsand establishi~ng ti-e priorit:y of L~ovc.-i-nt of suplý]ies fcr all units of ti-eFrig~ade Tiask Force.

(::QIV1F/OEr/Jj_

units (5 isi ccuretv forecz.sting (A loE-x1CtiCLl recuirwi..iunts Ly supportetd i

(a) Discussion: i-or routing crbtratiohs, it is L.sbwhtial1that daily lofistical requirei..oxits forecast be accurate; and exp~ressed intermm of sort~ibs. I.n gerie~rpl, ti., follovdng sortie; rquiruL~ents wwre avorage;

D:114Li kuZ.U1 zL, SCR~Tfl.e

U14-ID SC0i'145 ct"-427 3CraL

Bde liq 4-5 None

lnf bn 15-16 flone

Leoch Bn 22-26 2 (iF0L) (20 Bararmls persortie)

Arty Btry None 5 (4 A". 0~, 1 wter traiht.r)

DitIIA CALGC LiZ~Cl0Wi ~ SOKILL-S

U1P-ID bOf.1JLLS Wi .-47 GA

itde Hq 1 None

Ihf Bn 5-7 None

Lech kin 10-12 1 (h.Lpty 1-OL barrels)

Arty Btry None 1

CiýFGC -z(UhT" .S ,'11LD TO fwt (LIEL IO.N U4I

CE-47 SckALS

Bdts Flq 8

Lech kBn

Arty bn 13-19

(b) fie~coriat-ndation: Thý.t standarized initial supplysortics be established for units base~d on unit tactical ei-ployrkuflt. ThatUnit S-4's bstablish t ypcal daily warial rcsup;ly requireuints for eachindividual unit to eliiJinttu the accuaiulc tion of supplie~s in tho fowrirdlocation,

(6) A dcily m~eeting of aviation and 1ELo-.tical rupre~sbntie~tivesto revibwv all rquirviksnts is £ssential.

3.

- ---- -~- -

Ii

(a) Discussion: Throughout thv operation, the dailyr, e.ting (2100 hra) of thv aviction and logistical rmprsrtcr.tivcs was L.0stbeneficial. This &.eetinf pernitted a discussion of thL day's aetivitius,[ valuation and establish.&nt of th%. coming day's re•LW Jants, and theresolution of any probloaM or difficultius wl.icL Lay havc. arisen during thecurrent day's oyvrations,

(b) RecoaLendation: That this rm4ting be ha•de a Latterof regular practice.

(7) It is desirable that Leoving units establish a night basecarly enough to receivc rmsuprly during daylight hours. Tr.c area chosrnshould be large enough for ruultiaircraft resupply.

(a) Discussion: Cn se..ral occasions units failid toLstatlish a night base in sufficient tiLe to receive resurrly during day-light. Adverse wewthej coubined with darkness could have prevLnted theunit's receiving critical supplies on several occasions.

(b) hecoia=endation: That ,ovint. units atte.pt tocstablish a resuprly base in sufficient tu-e to recoeiv re suply duringdc:-light hours. That this base be capable of accoLdatin£ fivfw aircraftsi.wultaneously whenever the tacticel situation and tUrrain periits.

(8) Aerial resupply of ertillery amunition cmn bb grtatlyexpedited by prepackcd loads.

(a) Discussion: The pecking of artillery aununition foracrial delivery is quitc tiL. consuLing. The prepacking of loads duringperiod of very liglt requirwcnts will preclude an inturruption in flowduring periods of hezvy requirements.

(b) Recora.endation: That artillery azsunition be pro-packed and riggtd for aircraft sling loads to ueet normal resupply and&ergency resupply requirem-ents.

1 Indc L.-11LD P. BkVISas LTC, kriaor

Comz~anding

* ~ )GW.WhADED AT 3 YEAii. UMM1±~AIS;DLAS,5IF'L,,D AFL.& 12 TEAlS

UOD DIh 5200.10

W14

TAB A, Summary of Aircraft Flying Eours, Cper.tion Attleboro

1, The following is a sumzary of the e ircraft flying hours for unitsin dir6ct suprort of the 25th infantry Division during pFuration AttleborofroL 11-24 Noveiber 1966.

UUilT HOURS

11th Combat Aviation Bnttalion 1,100

145th Combat Aviation Battalion 1,334

22nd Combat Support Avaition Un. 407

17Oth Av.'Etion Cof,.pany 921

175th Aviation Company 1,020

A Co, 25th Aviation Battalion 724

bi Co, 25th Aviation Battalion 328

TOT.'.L kLYIG EI.O.S 5,658

N)

Cc'4'F A'7b1

C DEW: /O _1JA LPA1-,PTMEIT OF TfM AWJ

M0u~TJt.25TH flINFANTRY DIVJI1(1 AMItTIJ&API San Pisnoisoc 96225

ArAVDC.!L.op 12 eooer' 19M6

SUDJMCS Ccmbat Opewetions fte Aption Report (=c/J3/32)

Tot Camudind~g Gaere1

A~9~

1. U, Operation Attleboro.

2. DLU-SOF OPEU.TIOka 3.Nov tlu'25 Nov 66.

3o M ~QUis Western Bbih Duong Prov~noe aud lorthszu ?ay zh

4, ibiu" a 25th Ientrtzy Divislcm.

3At '84tuions etih kitil2.ewy (LTC Jam. M damnon Q)

Btry A (1-3 Nov# 12 Nov-25 Nov)

Btry B

BtZy CBt27' h, X 3h -Arty (9-23-N'v

Dtspv A (1 -.--2t, 77th Arty ('44 Nay)

Btry-KB,, 3d Bni, M3t Arty (5 Nov)*

3d Battalicmo 13th Art-'j~oy (I=1 BiUy B Nichca&*s, Cm*d)

Btry A ()(9 Nov-25 Nov)

Dtry B .. (9647 Nov# 24-25 Nov)

PIM Dtz7 D (9 1'v-25 Nov)

7.DtUy C,, 2d B, 32d Artfl 081 Rdn lat Div Arty and 25th Div At~

CONFIDENJTIAL 31

.k14F/ID 7A'7'/ALStrategic Air.:(Iopmnd provided extensive B.-52 strikes,I

7th Air Porce pr-ovided direct air support&

25th Aviation Battalion provided UH_-1D airorafte,

184th Aviation Company p~'oviaed 01 air~craft,

147th Aviation CompazW provided Cu.4 ? aircraft.

178th Aviation Company provided CH-7 aircraft.

8,0 IMM&IMI~EXa2 Reports indicated that contact ha~cibeen m~d& withelements of the 9th VC Division during the week of 1 November. The 196thLight Infantry Brigade'bade contact with the Joist NVAL Regiment and the273d VC Regimxent of th5 9th VC Division- In .the dress of .Nui Ba Den the1st & 2d Batta1ioq1%:-7bt.WRegiment were encoointer~dd. After 9 Novemberthere was no major:. I.conta~.& With either VC or INVRO' The okrea. of operationwas a VC stronghold With manTy cacheso The total~ frator~i4 cj&ur~d-ordestroyed wre the largest of the waro

9. il&o For the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, OperationAM~Ek()P0 is divided for 66nvenierpe into three phases with elements ofthe comamnd exe outing alswigned miq'qiopp ad- noted below:

Phase 1 (1-4 NoY) Reinforce lires of 196th Light InfantryBrigade.

Phase 2 (5-1-UNay) Reinforce lot Infantry Division Artillery.

P hase (32-9~5 Nay) Provide direct and general support for thecc~tted organic- and att.-.hed mneuver elements of the 25th Infentry-Division. .

Joe Ra CUU MW~

a. 1 Novembers-. Battery A., lot Battalion, 8th Artifle becamethe firs: element of 'the cmadt eoeeggdi prto LWO

Iniialy a alrtwas reevdtomoene15 hwtrbtryoTaNinh at 1045 hrs, At 1144 hre the requirement was changed to move the

bater toDa Tingbyar oeet Th oontoDuingwsn-tiaed t 1#00hreand the battery ,cl~osed vicinity XT 492 473 at 2200 hre

bo 2 November: Battery A, lot Battalion, Mt Artillery contin-ue~d its mission of reinforcing the 3d.Battaliocn, 82d Artillery at DauTimig. In order to provide medium, arUillery fire, Battery C WsX 3dBattalion,*13th Artillery diiplaoed trom vicinity Go. Dau Ma to vicinityTrumn Nt (T389) closing at 1130 brar and was assigned the missionof GSj 'reinforce 3d Battalion, a~d Artillery.

o. -3 lovembert The build up of artillery support contirnued asa Platoon of Battery Bo Xd Battalions 13th Artiller (attached to 3d

IC tY/DT T/A L.

CN' Ir/DEtIALBattalion, 82c, Artillury) was moved to vicinitv Soul Da (XT 349579).Batter'yAkA !t. Batta2Aon, E+,h Artillery and Battery C (-), 3d Battalion,13th Artillery remsive-d in place and continued their missions. Enemactivity indicated substantial enr strength and resulted in threefriendly casualties (1 KIA and 2 WIA) in the let Battalion, 8th Artillery.

do, 4 Novesiberr Battery A, let Battalion, 8th Artillery wasatt;."ached to; the*3d Battalion, 82d Artillery effective 0001 hours, Thebatterlv tir4d in support of both the let and 2d Battalions, 27th Infantry.The ist.Battalion, 27.th Infantry became heavily engaged at 1200 hoursand wa'pAn,,ed down by heavy automatic weapons fires The eneW• attackedCompany"A'A lot Battalion 27th Infantry using human wave assaults; butwas repul sed with the aid of fires from Battery A. The eneny atteckedagain at Alohours and was Aain repulsed with the aid of Battery A'sfires- :0n .5 N-ovember surveillance-.of the ii.iby .an infantry elementcredited A ttery A for 25 VC.IA-[b.d cot.Aid 1O0VC KIA (possible).The positltonling of -artillery to support :V1# otx.,-ition cPontinued with aPlatoon 6f Battery B: 3d Battalion,, l3th'ArtI3lery (attached to 3dBattalion, 8d Artillery) moving to Soui Da (XT U49579) Joining the pla-toon already there. In addition, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillerydisplaced from Cu Chi Base Camp to Tay Ninh Base Camp closing at 2130hours "nd wrs attached to the 3d Battalion, 92d Artillery. Battery C (-),3d Battta3io•n 13th Artillery displaced from vicinity Truong Rit to vici-nity Go Dau Ha (XT 414239) where it remained for the rest of the operationin support of convoys traversing Highway #1 and #22 eontributing indirect-ly to the success of Operation ATTL dOaO

00 5 November: Battery A, lot Battalion, 8th Artillery re-mained at Dau Tieng and along with other elements of the 196th LightInfantry Brigade were placed under the operetional control of the lotInfantry Division* A command group from the lt Battalion, 8th Artillerymoved from Ca Ch• to vicinity Soul Da (XT 349579) by CH- 47 closing at0855 hours and aesimed control of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery.Battery A, 2d Fa'talion, 13th Artillery displaced from Tay Ninh to SoulDa and was attached to the let Battalion, 8th Artillery closing at 1000hoWrs, The Platoon. of Ba'Atery D, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery which wasattached to the 2d Ba'b'ttalion, 32d Artillery and positioned at Tay Minhwith convaTronce of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery was directed tomove to Soui Da and to become attached to Battery B. 3d Battalionj 13thArtillery, Haintenance difficulties precluded 1 howitzer from moving,however, the platoon less the 1 howitzer displaced to Soul Da closingat •165 hours and was attached as stated. The second howitzer was re-"_paired with a par-t airlif'bed from Cu Ch:1. to Tay Uinh the night of 5-6November and di.,pla-Ze to Soul Da e.osing at 061TL5 hours, At 2400hoaurs the command grcrp relinquished control of the two batteries whichwere then placed under control of the let Infantry Division.

e. 6 November: At 0001 elements previously under the centrolof the comi=.4 roup, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery were attached to the1st Infantry• tDision. The commnd group returned to Tay Minh closing at1235 hours* At j hs int all elements of the oomnd that were support-ing Operati&ok'I 1 were either ae.tached to or under the operationalcontrol of the let Infantry Division.

(O 0 N F /,jiV F7/, AL

ASP.

, ./'tI 1;"i jO / v' /-!/A.~.--

go 7 November: The .. mtrol group from the lat Battalion, 8th

Artillery displaced from Tay Ni-nh to Cu. Chi by ground convoy closing at.828 hours. 'n

;J'h. 8 November&.. At 1200 hourointformtion mas received that thetactical CP of the, 2d Brigade., 25th Infantry Division would move to TayNinh immediately, lst Battalion, 8th Artille~ry. (-) wns attached to the2d Brigade Task Force as of 1200 hours -and was to move with the brigade.At 1515 hours the lIt Battalion, 8tb ArtiLleqr. departed Cu Chi for TayNinh closing at 1835 hours," At about 1800 h6urs the Division Artillerywas alerted to move 'a forward oomrnd post to Tay Ninh and the 3d Bat-talion$ 13th Artillery (-) to Soui Da cn..9 Novejbero.

1. 9 November: The 25th Infantry Division Artillery forward,C? displaced from .Cu Chi tolTay Ninh Base damp and established, a-forwardtactical CP vicinity XT 165520 closing at 1200 hours. 'The 3d Battalionp13th Artillery (-) displaced from Cu Chi to Soui. Da (XT 343577) closingat 1400,hours and aseumed control of its organic units already there*At that time the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (-) was comprised of ele-ments of Headquarterso Headquarters & Service Battery, Battery A (.),,Battery B (..) and a Platoon of Battery D. The battalion was placed underthe operational control of the st- Infantry Division, Battery A, 2dBattaLiono 13th Artillery was released from control, of the lat. InfantryDivision. and. displaced to Tay Ninh Base Camp closing at 1630 hours whereit was attached to the lst Battalion, 8th Artillery and prepared for airmovemento

J.1 0 November: At 0600 hours the 3d Battalion., 13th Artilleryreverted to control. of the 25th Infantry Division and was assigned themission of GS; reinforce 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery. A battalion com-mand group and Battery B, 1st Battalion,. .Sth Artillery moved by air tovicinity Ban Tam .XT 276685) using 29C-L47 sorties closing at 1810 hours*.BattexyAs 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery was released from control of thelat Division and returned to Tay Ninh Base Camp closing at 1840 hours._

,k. 11 November: Battery A, .2d Battalion, 13th Artillery andBattery Op lst Battalion;, Ath Artilleryý displaced from Tay Ninh. to vici-nity Bau Tam (XT 276685) u'.ilizing 41 CH-47 sorties. The forward CP ofthe 34 Battalion, 82d Artillery returned to Tay Ninh completing theactive participation of that- battal.on in Operation ATTLEE10RO. The enaWattacked the Tay. .Kinh Base Camp with rifle grenades at 2110 hours, Asa result of the reaction to this attack, Headqua.ers and HeadquartersBattery, 25th Infant:.7 Div.`!ion Artille.', .sustained 1 KIA when a defectiveUS Air Force flare istrck an enlisated man from the aviation section on thehead,

1. 12 Ncvember: Battery A, Ist Battalion, 8th Artiller wMsreleased from attachemant to the lot Infantry Division and .moved by airto vicinity .Trai Bi (XT 119692) utilizing 1 C .7 sorties, . -One sortieresulted in a howitzer being droŽ-ped some 5 kilometers from its..estination,That howitzer was. later locat•.d through the search, eOrts-of CA!Doroe "

Sb

-s.-- L-.

( L. IFDI 'rfrom Tral Di and the vil:lagars, of Xoa Hoe Thuc And deetroyed to preventUts use by the enezV0 At'02600 the enem agasLn btzuck the Tay Ninh BaseCamp with mortars which continued. until 0220 hours. Casualties sustain.-ed byHeadquarters and HaOiuartef's Battery, 25th Divi0 Artillery Wr12 W.Awitlj the majorityl of the 8e~,n1 from the comurications section.n e warr ant off icer, in ,the. lbt Batta on, 8th Artllery w'sa also . oundedo

It addition the Special Porces Compound atTrang Sup we emorbared result-ing ixýlKU and IWIA in the Platoca of :attery B, 3d Bttalion, 13thArtillery positioned there*.

* m. e 13.November: Battery A (-.), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillerydiu8plased from Soui Da to viiinity Bau Tam (XT 278680) closing at 1305hour& mnd was assigned a mission of GSI reinforce 1st Battalion, 8th

n," 14 November: The coamnd post of the lot Battalion, &h'ArWtLery wea split into two control groLps. Battery A,. Battery C andBattalion Control Group number one, lot Battalionp 8.h Artillery weremoved by air to vicinity XT 273785 using 34 C-.4 7" soroies.

o. 15 November. Battery A. 2d Battalions 13th Artillery andBattery 2B let Battalion, 8th Artillery under control of a battalioncontrol group were airl•.fted from Bau Tam to a position vicinity XT266 utiliziug 35 CH-47 sorties. A preparation, to inelude qmo"icna theeastern slopes of Nui Ba Den while the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechab-lied) zkived past Nui Ba Dens was fired under Division Artillery control.A Platoon of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery displaced from Cu Chito Soui Da Joining the Battery (-) that bad been previously positionedthere&

p. 16 Novembers All artillery units remained in position. Inaddition to its normal direct support mission, Battery B, lot Battalion,8th Artillery supported a long range reconnaissance patrol action neargrid IT 2795. The patrol adjusted fire against Viet Cong in the openand credited the artillery-with 10 VC IJL (boy count). With the aid offires from Battery B, the patrol was extracted from the area v4thoutsustaining a casualty.

O. 17 November: Since elumets of the 2d Brigade., 25th Irafn-try Division were out of range and road trafficability precluded mowe-ment forward, and to lend crodence to the Division faint to the leftsall elements of the 3d Battal:ons 13th Artillery were displaced to thevicinity of Tay Ninh with Battery B (-) returning to its Base at Tru.ngSup where it was attac!ied to the 196th Light Infantry Brigsde and theremaining elements elosing into Tay Ninh Base Camp vicinity XT l5453A4The lot Battelion, 8th Artillery remained in position.

r. 18 November: All artillery units ZewImnd. in position andcontinued their msasions. .

a. 19"Novenber, Al artl-ry _unte 'rem.ed iii positloA enicontinued their misson.. The intensive kIW prop= that had been

s. I 19 oiery tsI

instituted by the-ist ;Batt*aon, 8th Artillery wes increasod further as a -•result :of intelligence'idicating an increased effectiveness against thefenemy,.

t #. 20 November: The,'Co .ndig Officers, 3d Battalion, 82dArTtilery warn alerted to eeplace. Battery A (-),, 2d- Battalion, 77thArtillery., which had boeen atached to his battalion,. and prepare it forair movement and further attachment to the 1s4 Battalion, 8th Artillery,Battery C, 2d Battalion- 32d Artillery displaced from Soui Da to Tay'an.h Base Camp. An intensified H&i program was contdnuedo

.'. 23 Novembe a-. Batter. let, Battalion Sth AAU2ery.displaced to a firing p•oitTi• xn-ty Phum'Piey Sala UT 265960) inrupport of Troop D, 3d Squadron, 4th dalvalryfs exploitation of a B- 5 2strike near the Cambodian Border, One howitzer was damaged when it wasdropped from a. height of 19 feet, After the exploitation, Battery C wasairlifted to vi inity XT 335925 where it supported the let Battalion,5th (Mechanized) Infantry. Two preparations were fired and the intense

program contmueded

V. 22 November: Battery C, let Battalion, 8th Artillery sup-ported the airmobile operation of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry vici-nity XT .3785 .and then displaced by air to Tay Ninh, Battery A (-5, 2dBattalion, 77th Artillery we s.attached to the lst Battalion, 8th Artilleryand, ailifted into fire support base number 1, vicinity' Van Lich (XT276785) in support of the .2d Battalion, 22d (Mechanized) Infantry. Head-quarters':Headqusrtere and Service Battery, Battery A (-) and cne Platoonof Bat' er "y Ds 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced to positions vici-nity Soui Da (XT 342579) where it closed at 11400 hours. At 2155 hours,the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery was attacked by mortars, Approximately20 mortar rounds were received which inflicted 15 casualties includingone enlisted man 1UA and two officers and 12 enlisted men woundbd.

w. 23.November: Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery sup-ported an airmobile assaxlt by the let Battalion, 27th Infantry and thenwas aikrlited'to Tay Ninh Base Camp where it .6losed at 1745 hours, wasreleased fhe attachment to the lt Battalion, 8th Artillery and pre-pared for movement back to Phu Loi Base Camp.

x. 4 Nvemer:Bater.A,y 2d. Battalion,, 13th Artillery wasreleased .from attached and departed Tay Ninh for* Phu .oi closing -at 164.hours. Battery-A (-), 77th Artillery was released from attached t0the let Battalion, 8th Artillery and was airlifted to Soui Da where itJoined the 2d Battalion, 22d- (Mechanized)"InfantryO Battery A,. letBatta)Aona gth Artillery rntpported the extraction of all elements fromfire' pport base number 2 and the move of Batter7 B, ist Battaion, 8thArtillae to vicinity Soc Ky (XT 185765) fire support base number 0, dnd-then together with the battalion cantrol group ies airlifted to Ta•' Nirt..Base Camp, Battery B (-), 3d Battalion. 13th Artillery displaced fr"k'Trans Sup to vicinity Trai Bi (XT 117698) where it was given a mission

ofG-1 elfprce Dettery7 Bs lot Battalion, 8th Artiller.

02CN F TLNTA

.y, 25 Novrmber: The lst Battalion, 8th Artillery (-) dis-"*plitd-.fz'mi.•I'e 'Ninh Base Camp by road convoy and returned to Cu ChiBhee, Cezý. la"ttex. -B.0 lt Battalion,: 8th Artillery supported the .eX,*:.,traction'of eements of the lpý, Battalion, 5th (Mechanized) Infantryand was then airlifted to Teq Ninh Base Camp where it wps attached totfe 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. Elements of the Division ArtilleryForward'OP returned to Cu Chi Base Camp. The 3d BUtalion, 13th Artil-ler7 (-w) with Battery A (-) and a Platoon of Battery D retirned to CuMi. Base Camp and 'continued the mission of general support of the 25th

Intantry Dielsion. Battery B (.)a 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery remain-ed vicinity Trai Bi in support of elemepte of the let Battalion1 5th(Mechanized) Infantry, At 2400 hours, .Operation J-TTLELO) terminated.

so 26 November: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 25thInfantry Division Artillery displaced to Ou Chi Base Camp*

a& Enemy~ lossesi

-(1) Forty viet Cong, kil-led Wyartillery (bodyacount).

(2) One-hundred and seventy-nine Viet Gong killed byartillery (possible).

(3) One Viet Cong structure destroyed.

(4) Thrzee Viet Cong structures damaged,

(5) Three Viet Cong bunkers destroyed,

be Friendly artillery losses.

(1) Three US kldl ed in action.

(2) Thirty-Zoun' US voundqd. in aotikon, (Note: This in-cludes 4 US wounded when Battery A, let aattalion', fth Artillery wasattached W, the lit- Infant~ry Dlpn)

(3), Two OH-23 helicopters damaged. (Repaired)

(4) Twjo ANAGR 46 shelters damaged@

(5) Two 105mm hcmitmera deotroyed (not due to-enewq action).

a. Maintenance: No abnonr3. mechanical failures were noted dur-.ing the operation. Preventive maintenance was performed on all equirimentduring the operation*

Cc~N F' t~NT71AIL,

" • :"L .... "Zl.. ...$ 49

a 'E~,• "' .. .. .

S',' '' ,,\'P E T'YIA L-..

U0 Tranuportption: • Durmg Operation ATTLLEOf• extensive useof air.•e.f.wea S utilized for both n•vemont and, resupply. Between 1November and 25 November 1966'somo 462 CH-47 sorties were utilized .andthe HDU`.w. an averege of 5:30 hours each day re-supplying forwardunits and. t" rnsporting unit and staff personnel. During the operaticnJsupport Wi' both timely and well ooordihated; often on short notice.The most ,etficient use of heliooptper slings that are available deserve.more. study, On several occasions shortage of slings or componnent a be-came critioal ¶% the' 6peration, Preupt return of sling equipment to ....the resupp4.point must be emphasized. Battery persomnel must be.. elltrained idi airmoode operations sinoe Pathfinders often have little orno time to check loads.

o. Communicationst The wide spread deployment of subordinateorganizations made coommicatione difficult. The use of retransmissic'facilities on Nui Ba Den, facilitated radio eamunmications with sub-ordinate and adjacent headquarters. VHF facilities afforded !'excellentcomminietions and are considered mandatory for the acomplishment ofthe mission.

d4 During the operation the' Division Artillery continued itsprogrsm of coamand inspections of subordinate organizations*

13, SPEjLt-L EMUIPINT AND TECHNIyUF• S A 200 meter height or burst.with Shell W@ fuze time was effective as the first round in adjustmentfor a gr'ound observer in dense vegetation. It also proved to be effectivein pro-riding navigational marking rounds for maneuvering ground unitsas well as marking the limits of an axis of advance for a mechanizedbattalion.

14 OOI5.UJU2tS ANALYSISt The maJor portion of Operation ATTLEBOHOsupported by the Division Artille2y was'a reoonniissance in force Northinto War Zone C by a reinrorced brigade. Artillery support for the op-eration involved positioning batteries within fire bases secured byinfantry battalions, and as the operation progressed, establishing newfire bases within artillery range of existlng fire bases, Medium artil-lery was used in the mutually supporting -fire be ses as fa-r into War ZoneC as the roads permitted, However, moat of the* operation wes aupportedby direct support 105,nm howitzer batteries, which were employed in two-battery fire bases with an artillery control hedquarterse During theoperation, an extensive H&I program wpe developed. Intelligence derivedfrom forward observer reports, visual reconnais4ahce flights, long range.patrol reports, agent reports and other reconnaissance means we used

as a basis 'for the program. Indicntions are that the H&I program washighly effective and as the operaticn progressed it was further inten.,elfied.

15. sT4STITTAL DWA*

a. Artillery ammunition expenditures.

A41,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _A

iL

/ (a) o5,, 28,354

(b) 155,V8 in , 5,7_q

TOTAL 34,17

.(2) WP

(a) 1035. 655

(b) 155=

TOTAL 798

(3) Il

(a) 105== 9

(b) 155..

TOTAL 914,

"a, Hissions by tpes.

(1) Ii•k- 5,533

(2) Support 798

* NOTi~ All data includes the fires of Battery A; Ist Battalion, 8thArtillery during !-5 November 1966, and the fires of Battery A, 2dBattalions 13th kr-tilýlery for 5 November. It does not include the firesof the 3d Batta&ion, 82d A:-iUllery or the fires of Battery A (-), 2dBattaLionj, 77th Artit.erynccept forr the period when it wse attached

to the lot Batta".lons, fth Artillery.

co OH-2.3GP, Organci aircraft support by organizations

MUIT Z~ MROD W W ITE

3st Ba, 8th Arty 1042350) 30:15 35:50 38:45

3d Bn, 13th Arty 61:30 15:10 IO00 35:20

94, Div Arty 91:1O 17300 4O0 70:10

TOTAL 257030 72t25 50:50 1.a415

CcN F I EN7/+ L

I|

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Ol aircraft support (two Ole daily)

180000 57 ~ 2

FOR THE. ,HMANM3

NUMF.T. J STNIEVEmajors, Artiller"Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

--.-