Class Status and Party in Islam Politics

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February 2010 2010 43: 835 originally published online 26Comparative Political Studies

Sebnem GumuscuTurkey and Egypt

Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in

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Comparative Political Studies

43(7) 835 –861

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414010361341http://cps.sagepub.com

Class, Status, and

Party: The Changing

Face of Political Islam

in Turkey and Egypt

Sebnem Gumuscu1

Abstract

This article argues that socioeconomic changes within Islamist constituenciesare critical parts of understanding of how moderate Islamists emerge andsucceed. The diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt havegenerated different effects on the Islamist constituencies in these twocountries. Economic liberalization has played both a constitutive and a causal

role in transformation of political Islam in Turkey by facilitating the growth of astrong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy.With the growing support of this rising devout bourgeoisie, the moderateIslamists managed to transform Islamism into a democratic conservativeparty. In Egypt, in contrast, the way the state implemented economic reformprevented the formation of as strong and independent a devout bourgeoisiethat could be assertive in political Islam. Instead, the lower-middle-classprofessionals, losers of reform, populated the Islamist constituency and

entrenched Islamism in ideological positions rather than pragmatism. Thisultimately led to the marginalization of the moderates in Egypt.

Keywords

Islamist moderation, devout bourgeoisie, economic reform, Justice andDevelopment Party, Muslim Brotherhood

1University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA

Corresponding Author:

Sebnem Gumuscu, University of Virginia, Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, P.O. Box

400787, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4787

Email:[email protected]








836 Comparative Political Studies 43(7)

Can Islamic political parties undergo fundamental change? Under what

conditions do they go beyond strategic participation in legal politics and

internalize the principles of democracy? During the 1990s in Turkey andEgypt, groups within political Islamic movements shifted to the center of

the political spectrum where they assumed a moderate role and adhered to

democratic principles.1 Although moderates within each movement became

increasingly visible in both countries, only in Turkey did they successfully

transform the Islamist party into a centrist conservative party, Adalet ve

Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, “Justice and Development Party”). In Egypt moder-

ates failed to transform the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the party they

established, Wasat (“Center”), became a marginalized actor of Islamic activ-

ism in Egypt.2

Why did the Turkish Islamists succeed in marginalizing radicals and

moderating political Islam whereas their Egyptian counterparts failed and

got marginalized? Existing explanations based on inclusion, political learn-

ing, and repression cannot sufficiently address the complexity of moderation.

I contend that the socioeconomic changes are important factors that facilitate

a better understanding of belated moderation in Turkey and partial modera-

tion in Egypt. In that respect, the ways in which economic liberalization

affected the Islamist constituency in Turkey and Egypt complement the exist-ing explanations of the evolution of Islamism in these countries.

This article first assesses the extant explanations of moderation in the lit-

erature. The following section introduces the main argument in comparative

perspective. In the third section, the article lays down the details of Turkish

economic liberalization, how it affects the political Islamic constituency, and

the consequences for Islamism. In the final section, the article analyzes the

partial economic liberalization in Egypt, its effects on business classes and

professionals, and the implications for political Islamic movements.

Alternative Explanations of Islamist Moderation

Some scholars contend that institutional change can bring about substantive

changes in Islamic parties (Robinson, 1997; Schwedler, 2006). Labeled as

the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis,” this approach suggests that during

periods of political liberalization radical political parties face a trade-off

between radicalism and inclusion, which requires them to moderate if theyare to be included in the legal political system (Huntington, 1991). Accord-

ingly, when Islamists face a similar trade-off, they decide to partake in legal

politics and accept the rules of democratic politics, which signifies a tactical

change. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis anticipates that after this initial







Gumuscu 837

tactical adjustment an eventual ideological change will occur. This expecta-

tion, however, is theoretically underspecified and empirically unfounded for

the causal links between inclusion and ideological moderation are unclear,and empirical studies reveal that rarely does inclusion induce ideological

moderation (Schwedler, 2006).

Other scholars highlight the importance of political learning. The “politi-

cal learning thesis” emphasizes that political experience at the individual

level changes perceptions of democracy in a way that makes democratic par-

ticipation more attractive (Bermeo, 1992; Wickham, 2004). Because political

learning is confined to the individual level, the thesis is not well suited to

addressing how individual experiences diffuse and shape group decisions.

That is, it cannot explain how change at the individual level translates into

broader changes at the party level.

Neither the inclusion-moderation thesis nor the political learning thesis can

solve the puzzle that Turkey and Egypt pose. Turkish Islamic parties opted for

inclusion in the democratic politics in 1970, but they showed no sign of ideo-

logical moderation until late 1990s. Likewise, in Egypt the MB participated in

parliamentary elections and established electoral alliances with rivals, yet this

experience has not induced an overall moderation. Therefore, inclusion is not a

good predictor of the timing of ideological moderation, suggesting that theremight be other factors beside inclusion that induce moderation. The political

learning thesis, on the other hand, might be a compelling argument for modera-

tion of some Muslim Brothers, but it cannot explain why they failed to appeal

to a greater audience within the ranks of the MB. Likewise, the political learn-

ing thesis cannot fully explicate the reasons why groups within Turkish political

Islam emerged with diverging levels of moderation despite the fact that they

had similar political experiences. Finally, even if it was political learning that

induced moderation in Turkey, the mechanisms of diffusion of such individual- based political experience are unclear.

Alternatively, one could consider the history of militant Islamism in Egypt

and lack thereof in Turkey as a factor explaining the diverging outcomes in

these two cases. Although militant Islamists performed violent acts in 1970s

and 1990s, the MB denounced violent means of achieving an Islamic state

and society as early as the late 1960s when Supreme Guide Hudaybi (1977)

penned “Preachers, not Judges” in response to Qutbian radicalism. That is,

the MB like the Turkish Islamist parties preferred nonviolent means andworking through the system to Islamize the society and the state. Moreover,

militant Islamism never appealed to as wide a following as the MB, which

remained the dominant actor in Egyptian political Islam. Finally, militant

Islamist groups were increasingly marginalized following the state’s heavy








crackdown in the mid-1990s, and recently some militant groups called for

revision of violent means employed in attaining political goals.

Despite the similarity in strategies, Turkish Islamist parties enjoyed legalstatus, whereas the MB remained an illegal organization since 1950s. The

MB’s illegality, however, did not prevent them from running in parliamen-

tary elections in alliance with other parties in the 1980s or as independents

since the 1990s and overtaking the professional associations in the early

1990s when the state accommodated the brotherhood. Illegality, however,

has been a handicap for the MB whenever the state resorted to it as an excuse

for intermittent repression. Yet again, legal status of Turkish Islamist parties

has been no guarantee against the wrath of the secular state establishment.

This has been manifest in party closure or political bans on its leaders, par-

ticularly when Islamists make their goals of Islamization of state and society

more explicit.3 In other words, the relationship between Islamists and the

state in both Turkey and Egypt is one of antagonism, and the difference in

legal status does not generate as wide a gap to adequately explain the differ-

ent developments in political Islam.

The common trend of state repression observed in both cases cannot suf-

ficiently address the differing scales of moderation in these countries either.

If it was state’s repression that induced moderation in Turkey, why has it notgenerated moderation in Egypt where Islamists suffered in greater scale and

frequency compared to their Turkish counterparts? Again, why did it take

four different parties in three decades, all closed down by the Constitutional

Court, for Turkish Islamists to realize that the state would not allow them to

pursue Islamism? Therefore, state repression is insufficient in explaining the

timing of moderation. Likewise, it fails to explain why groups within politi-

cal Islam adopt differing levels of moderation. In the “February 28th process,”

the secular Turkish state establishment cracked down on Islamists who inturn adopted differing degrees of moderation that culminated in two different

political parties, the AKP and Saadet Partisi (SP, “Felicity Party”) emerging

out of the Milli Gorus (MG, “National Outlook”) movement. To put it differ-

ently, repression might induce strategic change and introduce schisms within

Islamist movements, but it is insufficient to explain how exactly strategic

change turns into ideological moderation.

A fuller explanation of moderation requires specification of conditions

under which moderates overcome the resistance of the hardliners and replacethe authoritarian perception of Islam with that of liberal understanding.

Building on Bayat’s (2007) contention that change occurs when liberal and

democratic understanding of Islam is voiced by a powerful group within the

broader Islamist coalition, this article argues that developments that distribute







Gumuscu 839

power among parts of the Islamist constituency are critical in detecting these

conditions. Economic liberalization has been one such development that has

not only distributed power among components of Islamist coalition but alsogenerated an elective affinity between the most powerful group and a liberal

perception of Islam through novel articulations of Islam and its relations with

economy, politics, and society.

Economic Liberalization and

Its Effects on Class, Status, and Party

Political Islam is a movement that binds individuals at very different levels

of the social strata in a cross-class alliance by bringing forth the Islamic iden-

tity and appealing to religious sentiments (Onis, 1997, p. 748). This does not

necessarily imply that class interests are absent in these alliances (Tugal,

2002). In fact, different social classes join together for different goals and

ideals under the umbrella of Islamist politics (Gulalp, 2001). Economic

liberalization had diverging economic and political consequences for the

constituencies of political Islam in Turkey and Egypt. Although economic

reforms reduced state employment, shrank budgets, and privatized social ser-

vices to the detriment of the middle- and lower-class professionals and wagelabor in both countries, implementation of an export-oriented economic pro-

gram in Turkey facilitated the emergence of a strong devout bourgeoisie.

Egypt’s liberalization, in contrast, was limited to the financial and commer-

cial sectors, and its beneficiaries were a narrow range of carefully selected

clients who remained dependent on the state.

In Turkey, economic liberalization provided opportunities to provincial

entrepreneurs that were previously excluded from the benefits of the import

substitution regime. As this provincial bourgeoisie began to prosper, it becamea force for pragmatism. Although their power grew within the Islamist coali-

tion with their increasing financial and organizational strength, the power of

the losers of economic reform—the professional and lower classes—declined

(Tugal, 2002). State retreat from economic activities and social services in

favor of the private sector further contributed to the strength of the devout

bourgeoisie that heavily invested in education, health, and media where the

losers within the Islamist constituency turned for employment, social ser-

vices, and schooling (Yavuz, 2003a).As the provincial entrepreneurs enjoyed economic growth and new life-

styles, they fused their religious piety with capitalist activity to build a new

class identity around relations of production, consumption, and religious

devotion.4 The “devout bourgeoisie” came to embody a new Weberian status








group with a distinct lifestyle and monopolized practices (Gerth & Mills,

1946) manifested in new customs of veiling, fasting, and Islamic vacationing.

The changes in economic class and social status led to changes in political preferences of the devout bourgeoisie, creating an elective affinity between

the new bourgeois class and pragmatic politics that moderates advocate, for

ideological politics of Islamism, which the provincial entrepreneurs supported

throughout the 1970s, became increasingly costly over 1990s when the devout

bourgeoisie started to make extensive long- and short-term investments.

The new devout bourgeoisie hence emerged as a natural ally for moderate

Islamists in creating a new political identity that fuses religiosity and rights, faith

and freedom, and marries Islam with democracy and modernity (Bayat, 2007,

p. 11). Defense of this new economic and political identity was possible through

pragmatism and moderation in political tone and consolidation of liberal econ-

omy and democracy, which would strengthen the devout bourgeoisie vis-à-vis

the agents of the secular state led by the military. Increasing predominance of the

new devout bourgeoisie within the Islamist constituency strengthened the mod-

erate forces within Turkish Islamism at the expense of the hard-liners.5

In Egypt, on the other hand, economic liberalization favored financial and

commercial sectors over manufacturing. It benefited big businesses more

than small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and it did not promote the inte-gration of Islamic business with markets. And the state’s continuing presence

in the economy contributed to the heavy dependence of big business, secular

and devout alike, on the state for the continuing flow of profits. This led to

a weak presence of the devout bourgeoisie in politics. Instead, “new middle

classes” formed the main pillar of Islamist constituency. Economic liberal-

ization in Egypt curtailed the state’s social welfare role and privatized welfare

services. Private voluntary associations and charity organizations filled the gap

left by the retreat of the state. Established by and serving the new middleclasses, these organizations entrenched the middle class’s commitment to polit-

ical Islam, and they enhanced its power relative to other social groups. This

Islamic parallel sector has come to represent an alternative vision of an Islamic

state that offers an alternative to sacrifices of economic liberalization. Though

this ideological project was attractive to the new middle classes, it was devoid

of the pragmatism that was essential to the incorporation of bourgeoisie in

Turkey’s more moderate political Islam.

Turkish Economic Liberalization

and Emergence of Devout Bourgeoisie

The Turkish government abandoned an import substitution industrialization

model and switched to economic liberalism in January 1980 as a response to







Gumuscu 841

the current account imbalance and debt crises, which emerged as a result of

internal inability to adjust to the oil shocks of the 1970s (Rodrik, 1999).

Turkish economic reform sought macroeconomic stabilization, outward ori-entation through export promotion, and trade liberalization. The government

deregulated key relative prices such as the real exchange rate, real wages, and

interest rates.

As part of a broader structural reform, the government aimed at expansion

of export-oriented private sector. To initiate an export drive, the government

substantially devalued Turkish lira by 100% between 1980 and 1988. Tax

rebates, credit subsidies, and duty-free imports for exportables’ production

accompanied devaluation of the currency (Celasun & Rodrik, 1989, p. 668).

Finally, the income policy reduced the labor cost for manufacturers by 1.6%

annually from 1980 to 1988 (Odekon, 1992, p. 159). These policies bore

fruit when the total value of exports reached $13 billion in 1990 from a mere

$2.3 billion in 1979.6 The share of the manufactured goods in total exports

reached 78% in 1991, whereas the exports market diversified as Turkish goods

penetrated the new markets in the Middle East (Saracoglu, 1994, p. 71).

As the Turkish economy underwent a significant transformation, SMEs

in Anatolia gradually integrated with international markets in the 1990s

through buyer-driven commodity chains that emerged in the production oflabor-intensive consumer goods such as garments, housewares, and furni-

ture (Gereffi, 1995, p. 116). This global post-Fordist production system

benefited small-scale manufacturers because they had flexible and labor-

intensive production systems that could easily integrate with global chains of

production through subcontracting. Thus, the benefits of liberalization trick-

led down to the provinces of Anatolia in the 1990s.

The establishment of the Association of Independent Industrialists and

Businessmen (MUSIAD) in 1990 facilitated these developments. UnlikeIstanbul-based, secular TUSIAD, MUSIAD represented SMEs based in

Istanbul and Anatolian provinces and pronounced its attachment to religious

and traditional values (Bugra, 1998). MUSIAD served as a “catalyzer” for

international integration for provincial entrepreneurs by facilitating the dis-

covery of benefits of trade in its trips to several countries in Europe, Central

Asia, East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, its international fairs

where MUSIAD members could establish new connections with actors in

the global market, and its booklets and journals on a wide range of issues pertaining to macro- and microeconomic developments.7 Thus, MUSIAD

substantially reduced the cost of information for devout businesses and ren-

dered their integration with the global market easier.

As MUSIAD contributed to the development of devout bourgeoisie in

Turkey, it experienced substantial growth in size and power. The association








was founded in 1990 with 12 members and opened offices in 28 cities and

registered over 2,000 members over the course of 10 years. MUSIAD’s fastest

growing branches were located in cities with improving records of exports inthe postliberalization period. The relation between liberalization and growth

of MUSIAD is revealed in the fact that 1,330 of 1,776 MUSIAD member

companies as of 1995 were established after 1980. Many of these companies

engage in foreign trade and manufacturing in traditional export sectors (Bugra,

1999). A closer look at one of the bastions of devout bourgeoisie provides

further detail regarding the dynamics of change in Anatolia.

Konya: An Emerging Bastionof the Devout Bourgeoisie

Konya is a central Anatolian city, famous for its conservative and pious

inhabitants. It hosts the largest MUSIAD branch after Istanbul. Konya has

been a site of phenomenal economic growth in the aftermath of liberaliza-

tion. GDP per capita in Konya has increased to $2,241 in 2000 from $1,300

in 1987 while the city’s population has increased 25% in the same period.

The change in the membership of the Konya Chamber of Commerce tells

more about the flourishing economic activity in the city. There were14,279 members in the chamber in 1994, 19,366 in 1999, and 20,734 in

2007 (Arabaci, 2007, p. 29). The number of stock companies and limited

liability partnerships increased considerably during this period, pointing at

the growing size and financial power of the firms. The number of stock cor-

porations was 539 in 1988, 740 in 1994, and 1,505 in 1999. Limited liability

partnerships totaled 360 in 1988, 2,347 in 1994, and 7,603 in 1999 (Arabaci,

2007, p. 29). The volume of exported goods produced in Konya has also

substantially increased over the years. The number of exporting companieshas doubled since 2001, whereas the value of their total exports quadrupled.

According to a survey conducted by the Konya Chamber of Industry, 64% of

industrialists (including subcontractors) in Konya export their products. Of

all exports, 60% goes to European countries, whereas the remaining 40%

goes to North Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America.8

As Konya’s economy grew, so did the power of Konya MUSIAD. Selcuk

Ozturk, the current chairman, estimates that members of MUSIAD’s branch

in Konya control 30% of Konya’s economy.

9

MUSIAD members dominatethe boards of Konya’s chambers of commerce and industry, with nine board

members in the Chamber of Industry and five board members in the Chamber

of Commerce. When asked about the causes of their economic success, sev-

eral Konya MUSIAD members highlight the critical role MUSIAD played in







Gumuscu 843

their integration with global markets, along with Ozal’s liberal economic

policies that changed their business prospects by showing new opportunities

in the domestic and international markets. However, the change that thedevout entrepreneurs experienced was not confined to the economic sphere

alone. These achievements triggered a significant transformation of lifestyles

and Islam’s role in everyday life.

Embourgeoisement of the Devout Bourgeoisie

New consumerism, which constituted an inalienable part of economic and cul-

tural globalization, started to affect the emerging devout entrepreneurs in the

1990s through the inflow of imports, novel trade relations, and new private

media. Consumerism presented a grave challenge to devout Muslims for it

fundamentally opposed the Islamic principles of modesty and frugality. Never-

theless, Muslims experienced a change in their consumption patterns facilitated

by marketing and advertising in Islamic media, changes in spiritual and intel-

lectual values, and reconfiguration of space and class (Robbins, 2005, p. 16).

Devout businessmen substantially increased their power in the media

through the Islamic television stations and newspapers they established over

the 1990s. These Islamic media channels constituted the primary means ofmarketing and advertising new Islamic commodities and hence transforming

the buying habits of individuals by turning luxuries into necessities. Mean-

while, new apparel companies founded by devout businessmen to produce

Islamic attire for women, tesettur , capitalized on this opportunity and further

perpetuated the process. Tekbir Apparel, a MUSIAD member company, is

the first of such companies whose marketing strategies created a fashion for

tesettur particularly through fashion shows with celebrity models.10 This new

fashion for Islamic attire “pressured people to buy not out of need [or forreligious concerns] but for style—from a desire to conform to what others

defined as ‘fashionable’” (Robbins, 2005, p. 17).

Fashionization of the veil replaced concern for religious piety and obser-

vance with a concern for beauty and style. Women of devout bourgeois

background satisfied their need for new styles by shopping for Turkish and

foreign brand names such as Vakko, Beymen, Burberry, and Escada (Turk,

2003). In so doing they turned the brand of one’s headscarf into a sign of

one’s status (Yavuz, 2003b, p. 281). This association has been continuouslyreproduced in commercials that are often shot in fancy malls and relate the

product to high-status lives.

In response to those who intensified their criticisms of devout bourgeois

consumerism,11 founding chairman of MUSIAD, Erol Yarar (n.d., p. 39), blamed








mystical frugality popular in Sufi Islam and its motto “one mouthful food,

one short coat” as the source of sluggishness and lack of motivation toward

the world and the main cause of the backwardness of the Muslim world.Moreover, the devout bourgeoisie attempted to obscure the line of demarca-

tion between needs and luxury that determines the limits of consumption in

Islam. MUSIAD fairs host stylish brands of Ottoman-style furniture and dec-

oration, whereas realtors in these fairs sell luxurious residences overlooking

the Kaaba in Mecca. These businessmen prefer foreign designer brands for

their attire or accessories (Turk, 2003), whereas in Ramadans they eat their

iftar (after-sunset feast) in five-star hotels or fancy restaurants.12 They enjoy

summer vacations in five-star hotels on the coast of the Mediterranean, tai-

lored to their Islamic sentiments.13

Devout bourgeoisie also make long-term investments in their children’s

education by enrolling them in private schools, often established by other

devout businessmen, that emphasize bilingual education in Turkish and

English with a focus on science (Yavuz, 2003b, p. 281). Similarly, the new

bourgeoisie pronounce their existence as a distinct status group by moving to

the suburbs of the cities (Yavuz, 2003b, pp. 278-282). In Istanbul, the devout

bourgeois families reside in up-scale suburban neighborhoods such as

Florya, Beykoz, or Camlica. Reconfiguration of space is strikingly visible ina MUSIAD residential project in Konya that offers a secluded space for fami-

lies of MUSIAD members. This well-protected gated complex is located in

hip Meram with spacious apartments and variety of facilities, tennis courts,

parking lots, and indoor fountains. Meanwhile, socialization of devout bour-

geoisie increasingly takes place in shopping centers, the ultimate site of

consumerism. The largest shopping center in Konya is located in the tallest

building in the city, Kule-Site, which is built by a MUSIAD member, who

takes pride in this accomplishment.Hence, a new class of devout bourgeoisie has taken shape with its substan-

tial economic power, distinct tastes, consumer preferences, and transformed

religious practices that set them apart from both secular bourgeoisie and

devout lower classes (Yavuz, 2003a, pp. 97-100). Through these practices

devout Muslims fused Islam with capitalism, modernity, and individualism.

Prolongation and consolidation of this new lifestyle within the broader

society necessitated changes in political preferences now dominated by prag-

matism. The new political calculus forced the devout bourgeoisie to be anardent supporter of economic liberalism as the primary mechanism of capital

accumulation and democracy that would ensure a greater role in the decision-

making process without paying the costs of Islamism or abandoning their

Muslim identities in business networks or public life.








Gumuscu 845

Effects of the Emergence of the Devout

Bourgeoisie on Turkish Political Islam

Devout provincial entrepreneurs had formed the core of the Islamist constitu-

ency since the establishment of the first Islamist party in 1970 by the MG

movement.14 Throughout the 1970s, marginalized Anatolian business fun-

neled their grievances about the close alliance of Istanbul-based secular big

bourgeoisie and the state through the Milli Selamet Partisi (“National Sal-

vation Party”; Gulalp, 2001; Onis, 1997). Islamism increased its popularity

from the early 1990s onward under the Refah Partisi (RP, “Welfare Party”),

which managed to build a cross-class coalition of winners and losers of eco-

nomic reform. On one hand the RP reflected the growing aspirations of the

devout bourgeoisie to consolidate their positions in the society and to achieve

elite status (Onis, 1997, p. 760), and on the other it appealed to the losers of

liberalization by greater reliance on the logic of redistribution (Bellin, 2000)

and demanding social justice through what the RP called the “Just Order”

program, which was a state-centered Islamic project that would deliver a

larger state and extensive welfare programs (Yavuz, 2003b).

Success in the 1995 elections made the RP the senior partner in a coalition

government with the center–right True Path Party. The RP stayed in powerfor a year and had to resign as a result of culminating pressures in the after-

math of the National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997.15 In

1998 the Constitutional Court (CC) closed down the RP. In response, the MG

established the Fazilet Partisi (“Virtue Party”) but could not prevent the

growing schism between the moderates ( yenilikciler ) and the hardliners

( gelenekciler ). The whole process strengthened the hand of the moderates,

who since the late 1980s insisted that the RP should leave its radicalism

based on the presentation of Islam as an ideology and embrace a centrist polit-ical vision that would allow the party to reach a wider populace (Cakir &

Calmuk, 2001, p. 56).

Rapprochement between the rising devout bourgeoisie and moderates

crystallized into a close alliance in the aftermath of the February 28 process.

Although hardliners insisted on ideological dogmatism and state interven-

tionism, the moderates responded to the change that has been taking place

within Islamist constituency. In 1998, the leader of the moderates, Erdogan,

pointed to this change and claimed that the MG had increasingly distanceditself from its constituency and failed to respond to their demands (Cakir &

Calmuk, 2001, p. 154). The devout bourgeoisie openly supported the moder-

ates against the hardliners for they believed moderates’ political vision to be in

greater conformance with their interests, new class identity, and social status.








The hardliners’ statist, anti-Western, and confrontational discourse conflicted

with the interests of the rising devout bourgeoisie, who desired liberal mar-

kets, minimal state intervention, a pro-Western attitude, and relatively peacefulrelations with the secular state establishment.16 Erol Yarar, the founding

chairman of MUSIAD, stated that the members of MUSIAD were highly

skeptical of Erbakan’s Just Order Economic Program and they rather pre-

ferred a political cadre who could deliver a well-functioning free market

(personal communication, March 14, 2007). Seyit Mehmet Buga, a Konya

MUSIAD member, confirms that the main factor behind the separation within

MG was its insistence on state’s dominance in the economy. Buga argues that

the hard-liners in the RP could not realize that the age of etatism was long

gone (personal communication, September 6, 2007). In short, the devout

bourgeoisie longed for a leader like Ozal who could merge piety with free

markets and democracy.17

The tense relations between the party and the secular establishment during

the RP’s incumbency further contributed to this alienation. The uneasy rela-

tions of the party with state institutions substantially increased the risks for the

devout entrepreneurs within the RP constituency who would naturally desire

to minimize political costs. Finally, the distance of the RP to the West and

particularly the EU turned into a major concern for the devout bourgeoisie,which established close business relations with the EU countries following

economic liberalization and the Customs Union finalized in 1996.

In their growing confrontation with the hardliners, which climaxed in the

Fazilet Party congress in 2000, the devout bourgeoisie supplied the moderates

with financial and political resources. Albayrak Group, a MUSIAD member

company and the chief financer of the moderates (Cakir & Calmuk, 2001,

p. 151), heavily propagated the cause of the moderates through its daily

newspaper, Yeni Safak , before and after the FP Congress (Yeni Safak , Mayand June 2000). In reaction to growing support of MUSIAD for moderates,

Erbakan requested the establishment of an alternative businessmen associa-

tion, ASKON, which would not attract as much following as MUSIAD (Nazli

Ilicak, personal communication, February 16, 2007).

Defeated in the party congress with half of the votes, the moderates left

the MG movement soon after the CC closed down the FP. Devout bourgeois

support for the moderates continued; 28 out of 31 businessmen MPs within

the ranks of FP joined them rather than staying with the hardliners.

18

Whenmoderates established their conservative-democratic party, the AKP, in 2001

several MUSIAD members joined them to found the party’s local offices in

Anatolia. Numerous MUSIAD members ran on the AKP ticket in the 2002

elections, and 20 MUSIAD members were elected AKP MPs.








Gumuscu 847

Unlike the MG parties of the past, the AKP clearly separated religion and

politics and claimed that religion provides meaning to believers’ lives and it

should not have any political role beyond that. The party also adhered to a lib-eral and pluralist understanding of political parties and human rights as opposed

to totalizing and monopolizing perception of politics and human rights of the

MG. Moreover, the AKP clearly supported Turkey’s accession to the EU and

supported consolidation of democracy and liberal economy in the country.

The close affinity between the devout bourgeoisie and the AKP is mani-

fest in the party platform. As Ali Bayramoglu, former chairman of MUSIAD

and a current AKP MP, states, the association’s policy recommendations have

substantively inspired the party (Turk, 2004). Indeed, the AKP party program

significantly parallels MUSIAD’s economic and political demands. MUSIAD

report on Democratization and Constitutional Reform published in 2000

clearly inspires the AKP, which, like MUSIAD, demands a more civil and

democratic constitution, extension of human rights and freedoms, decentral-

ization of administration, and greater compliance with the EU Copenhagen

Criteria. Likewise, the AKP defends liberal economy and a small state, while

it advocates SME-based, export-oriented economic growth.

In short, the rising devout bourgeoisie, aiming to protect its economic

power and consolidate its identity, which fuses Islam and capitalism, as dis-tinct from secular bourgeoisie, could not afford costly Islamism or political

passivity. These devout businessmen thus emerged as an ally to the moder-

ate Islamists, who increasingly challenged the hardliners in the aftermath of

the February 28 process. This alliance facilitated the emergence of a moder-

ate, democratic, economically liberal, and socially conservative political

party from the ranks of the MG.

Egypt’s Limited Economic

Opening and Its Beneficiaries

The state in Egypt carried out economic liberalization in two stages in 1970s

and 1990s, and in both waves of reform the state managed to preserve its

dominant role in the economy. It could exert great degree of control over the

effects of liberalization as well as the new private economic actors. The out-

come was the accruing of benefits to a concentrated group of big business

with close ties with the regime. Few benefits trickled down to SMEs, and themiddle classes were impoverished by the state’s retreat from social welfare

and employment provision.

Following two decades of Arab socialism, Sadat initiated a process of eco-

nomic liberalization called Infitah (Open Door Economic Policy), which was








designed to give a greater role to the private actors in the economy. The main

goals of the Infitah at its inception in 1974 were to attract foreign capital and

foreign direct investment, to stimulate private sector, and to increase the effi-ciency of the public sector enterprises (Waterbury, 1985, p. 66).

The way the Egyptian government designed economic opening led to

major developments in financial and commercial sectors without generating

any significant change in the manufacturing sector and its export capacity.

Most of the foreign investment entered Egypt in the early years of the Infitah

was directed to construction, petroleum, and services sector, that is, tourism

and banking. None of these sectors provided Egypt with new sources of

employment or exportable surplus. Foreign investors were mostly interested

in establishing joint venture banks to extract foreign exchange remittances

from Egyptian depositors for profitable placements abroad than in investing

in Egyptian enterprise (Moore, 1986, p. 634). Even when these joint venture

banks invested in Egyptian undertakings, they preferred financing foreign

trade (Moore, 1986, p. 643) because “the government’s interest rate policy

had the effect of discouraging investment in tradable agriculture and industry

in favor of commercial transactions” (Shafik, 1994, p. 17).

During the Infitah the state managed to retain its centrality in the economy

because of extensive rents collected in the 1970s and 1980s such as oil, remit-tances of migrant labor in the Gulf, Suez Canal revenues, tourism, international

aid from the West (Springborg, 1989, p. 154), and legal regulations. One such

regulation concerned joint ventures between public companies and private

investors. What seems, at first, to be back door privatization was in fact another

route for the government to extend its control over the emerging “private

sector” (Springborg, 1989, p. 151). That is why the public sector expanded

over 3.5% per annum between 1973 and 1982 (Shafik, 1994, p. 13).

Such a prominent role preserved by the state in a relatively liberal economyled to the emergence of “state bourgeoisie,” composed of managers, techno-

crats, and high-level bureaucrats who are in close contact with foreign and

private capital (Waterbury, 1991). Along with state bourgeoisie Infitah has

also given birth to a new bourgeois class that has grown heavily dependent

on the state that reigned over the banking sector in joint ventures, determined

the interest and exchange rates, shaped the course of investment through vari-

ous incentives, and handed down large-scale public projects to the new class

of oligopolists. It was mostly the public sector and big business in joint ven-tures that benefited from this policy. SMEs “have been deprived access to the

same attractive rules offered to large firms” (Hondoussa, cited in Springborg,

1989, p. 159).

Most of these decisions in favor of big business were extensions of close

and personal connections between the state and the Infitah bourgeoisie. For







Gumuscu 849

instance, big businesses hired former cabinet members with no prior experi-

ence in the private sector as board chairmen, general managers, or advisers

(Ibrahim, 1994, p. 21). Or these businessmen joined the ranks of the ruling National Democratic Party and got elected to the People’s Assembly. In 1987,

there were more than 80 members of the Infitah bourgeoisie in the Assembly,

compared to fewer than 20 in 1976. Prominent figures of the new bourgeoisie

also found the opportunity to sit in the cabinet as ministers. The percentage

of businessmen in cabinet appointments increased from 2.4 in 1970 to 14.7

in 1981 and to 20 in 1990 (Ibrahim, 1994).

The Infitah has provided devout businessmen with opportunities of expan-

sion as well. In the 1980s the Islamic financial sector emerged and developed

as Islamic banks and Islamic investment companies handsomely benefited

from Infitah policies. The two major Islamic banks in Egypt, the Faisal Islamic

Bank and the International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development,

channeled most of their activity to either short-term trade financing, which

carries relatively little risk, or foreign currency and precious metals specula-

tion (Ayubi, 1991, p. 185). Islamic investment companies also flourished in

the same period; their number reached 50 in 1980s, as they gained the lion’s

share of workers’ remittances (Moore, 1990, p. 249). They operated like ven-

ture capital firms, paying depositors on the basis of the profitability of their portfolio rather than a fixed rate of interest. These funds were unregulated

and uninsured but were able to mobilize substantial savings with high rates

of return (Shafik, 1994, p. 18), which was possible because of substantial

profits they made in currency speculation, gold trade, real estate, and com-

merce (Moore, 1990, p. 250). Manufacturing was a marginal undertaking for

Islamic investment companies because of greater risks and lower returns

associated with this particular sector.

Expansion of devout bourgeoisie in the finance sector in the 1980s wasstalled when the government imposed reporting requirements and a regula-

tory structure on the Islamic funds in 1988 that in turn triggered numerous

bankruptcies (Moore, 1990). By the late 1980s, Islamic investment compa-

nies lost their power in the financial sector, whereas Islamic banks managed

to hold on to their activities albeit in a smaller scale as their clientele—migrant

workers—shrank in the late 1980s as a result of the recession in the Gulf.

Although the state built strong and intimate ties with big business, SMEs

during Infitah did not receive any assistance from the state or the secular andIslamic financial institutions. Because they were deprived of incentives and

access to cheap credit, they had to rely on their own resources for capital

accumulation. Moreover, because their business ventures have not rested on

strategic relationships with the bureaucracy or the political elite and because

there is no organized group that could defend their collective interests, they








have been vulnerable to “arbitrary and frequently destructive interventions of

the bureaucracy” (Springborg, 1989, pp. 78-80). Finally, the state’s reluc-

tance to pursue an export-oriented growth strategy deprived the SMEs of theopportunities in the international markets that their Turkish counterparts sub-

stantively enjoyed.

Economic Stabilization in the 1990s

In the 1980s, Egypt suffered economic crises that could not be solved by oil

and tourism rents. The gap between investment and savings grew exponen-

tially as the state directed already scarce sources for investment to infrastructure

and neglected the manufacturing and agricultural sectors in favor of com-

mercial and service sectors while simultaneous boosts in imports culminated

in an ever-growing deficit in the current account.19 The government financed

the gap by borrowing, making Egypt the most indebted country in the world

(Richards, 1991, p. 1723).

Mubarak signed a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary

Fund in the 1991 for economic stabilization and structural adjustment. Soon

the macroeconomic indicators improved.20 The state has taken steps to liber-

alize trade and finance, to deregulate prices, and to make Egyptian poundconvertible. However, the Mubarak regime was not as successful in enacting

structural reforms. The state maintained its predominant position in the econ-

omy. State-owned banks controlled 70% of all bank assets; privatization of

the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remained dawdling (91 out of 314 SOEs

were privatized, only 9 had a change in management; Shafik, 1994, p. 18).

The state continued to support big business primarily through investments

in transportation and communications sectors and bids in airport and road

development projects on which big business could embark. Although big business enjoyed the benefits, the business environment remained unfriendly

for the SMEs. A survey concludes that small firms suffer more than larger

firms do from institutional constraints such as tax administration, dispute

settlement, cost of access to finance, and unofficial payments made to state

agents (Fawzy, 1998). The reason is that the SMEs have limited access to

the state mechanism and limited or no personal connections to the state elite.

Therefore, they have no political assets to counterbalance the unlimited dis-

cretionary power of the tax collector or a way of avoiding unofficial paymentsmade to the bureaucracy (Fawzy, 1998).

In sum, the two-staged economic liberalization in Egypt generated a dif-

ferent outcome than the Turkish case. Economic policies in Egypt enabled

the state to construct a new winners circle mostly composed of big business







Gumuscu 851

and state bourgeoisie, pushing small and medium entrepreneurs and the

middle and lower classes to the sidelines. As a result, the devout bourgeoisie

emerged divided and ineffective. Small devout businessmen have neverfound the opportunity to expand, given the unfavorable economic environ-

ment for small-scale manufacturers. Only big businesses owned by devout

families could grow in this economic environment and could do so heavily

dependent on the state. Despite its limits and ineffectiveness, a process of

embourgeoisement nevertheless took place among devout upper classes.

New Devout Bourgeois Culture in Egypt

Globalization combined with economic liberalization under the state’s con-

trol brought conspicuous consumption, shopping malls, gated communities,

and Western-style vacations to the lives of devout upper-class Egyptians

(Bayat, 2007, p. 165). As a new devout bourgeois class has taken shape

Islamist practices underwent a process of embourgeoisement that ultimately

divorced political and official Islamic content from these practices.

Veiling, a critical symbol of Islamist politics in the 1970s and 1980s, has

become increasingly an item of luxurious consumption in the bourgeois

culture of upper class Egyptian women. Hijab, which had been a sign ofequality and decency for the Islamist movements, now turned into a sign of

status and taste for bourgeois women, who shop in fancy boutiques in Egypt

and Europe (Haenni & Tammam, 2003). And as they do so they follow the

new trends and styles in magazines such as Hijab Fashion, for they desire

to conform to fashion and accentuate their individuality rather than their

Islamic modesty.

The uneasy combination of piety and privilege in new patterns of con-

sumption and new forms of observing Islam has been justified by the new preachers in Egypt. Amr Khaled, the most popular of them all, first appeared

in late 1990s in salon-style gatherings with his designer suits, Hugo Boss

shirts, and tie and clean-shaven face, and he looked more like a “televange-

list” than the ulama of al-Azhar. Amr Khaled talks about attaining the values

of liberal modernity: ambition, success, hard work, and efficiency. For him,

Muslims should seek wealth through hard work and ambition, and they

should never be ashamed of their material possessions. He assures his nou-

veau riche audience that they could be pious while maintaining their powerand prestige (Bayat, 2007, p. 153):

I want to be rich so that people will look at me and say “You see, rich

and religious,” and they will love God through my wealth. . . . I want








to have money and the best clothes to make people love God’s religion.

(quoted in Haenni & Tammam, 2003)

As for political preferences, Egypt’s small devout bourgeoisie followed

a different path from their Turkish counterparts. The pervasive state role

in economy rendered the devout bourgeoisie dependent on the state for

preservation of affluence and economic power. Although this dependence

rendered Islamism increasingly risky, the new lifestyles with novel values of

consumerism decreased the affinity between the devout bourgeoisie and

mainstream Islamist ideology. Thus, they embraced “passive piety” rather

than Islamist political activism (Bayat, 2007, p. 7).

Political Connections of the Devout Bourgeoisie

Political Islam shows a greater diversity in Egypt than it does in Turkey.

Although militant Islamist groups made to the headlines often in the 1970s

and 1990s with assassinations and attacks on tourists and Copts, they remained

mostly insignificant and fragmented within broader Islamism (Bayat, 2007,

p. 40). Since 1928 the MB has determined the course of Islamism in Egypt

and has monopolized the terrain in recent years.The primary goal of the brotherhood has been the establishment of an

Islamic society and state that fully conforms to Shari’a (Mitchell, 1969). The

MB followed mostly a gradualist method of Islamizing the society primarily

through da’wa (invitation to God) that would ultimately deliver the Islamic

state. In his first decade in power Mubarak accommodated the MB, without

bestowing legality to the organization, and allowed it to run in elections in

alliance with legal parties. From the early 1980s onward the MB added the

parliament and professional associations to its areas of activism. The middle-generation Muslim Brothers capitalized well on the opportunities of

participation and achieved success at the polls and overwhelming victory in

the professional associations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

A wave of state repression in response to the increasing power of the

MB particularly in the professional associations exposed the internal strife

between the moderate and conservative Brothers. The moderates, who had

demanded that the MB pursue legality, greater cooperation with secular

opposition, and internal democracy within the organization, accused the con-servative old guard of being “autocratic, ideologically rigid, and obsessed

with internal unity and discipline” (Wickham, 2002, p. 217). When the old

guard insisted on staying the course, a group of Muslim Brothers left the

movement to establish the Wasat Party in 1996. The Wasat distanced itself







Gumuscu 853

from the MB’s authoritarianism and scriptural dogmatism and sought to

build a new polity around a civilizational concept of Islam that was more

inclusive and pluralist than the MB’s vision that treats Islam as religion andstate (din wa-dawla; Stacher, 2002; Wickham, 2004).

Those moderates who decided to stay in the MB continued their struggle

to reform the organization from within. Led by Essam al-Erian and Abu al-Futuh,

the moderates convinced the old guard that establishing a Muslim Brothers

party would serve the interests of the movement. However, significant divi-

sions persist within the movement over issues pertaining to democracy,

citizenship, minority, and women’s rights as well as the place of a prospective

Muslim Brothers party within the larger organization. The conservative old

guard believes that a formal political party would prolong the existence of the

MB given the existing institutional constraints, but they contend that a pro-

spective Muslim Brothers party should be an organic extension of the society

of the Muslim Brothers. As such the party would be an arm of the MB active

in politics, whereas its other arms reach religion, business, education, and

charity. Moderate Muslim Brothers, however, ask for an independent Muslim

Brothers political party with no organic ties with the organization and separa-

tion of the MB’s religious functions from its political activity.21 Such a

separation would secure the party from the authority of the old guard anddemocratization of membership by removing the existing obstacles before

membership of women and non-Muslims.

Though moderates introduced concepts such as citizenship, democracy,

and pluralism to the discourse of the MB through testimonies released in

1990s and 2000s, contradictory remarks by different MB leaders regarding

democracy, the rights of the Coptic minority, and women’s status illustrate

unresolved disputes and the lack of consensus among the brothers.22 Nor does

the moderates’ rhetoric of pluralism and popular eliminate references to thesupremacy of Shari’a or idioms such as Islam is the solution or Islam is both

religion and state (Bayat, 2007, p. 186). Thus, the brotherhood’s new dis-

course on democracy appears ambivalent as it signifies a set of procedures

that facilitate the implementation of Shari’a rather than a system that expresses

the will of the populace to govern themselves (Bayat, 2007, p. 177).

An important factor that contributes to this ambivalent position toward

democracy is the distribution of power within the Islamist constituency. Ideo-

logical dogmatism prevails over pragmatism within the ranks of the MB. Thisis partly because of the weakness of pragmatist elements, primarily the devout

bourgeoisie within the Islamist constituency. There are two primary reasons as

to why the devout bourgeoisie generally avoids connections with the brother-

hood. First, for those who are sympathetic to the cause of the brotherhood, such








a connection carries considerable political and economic risks. Owner of the

Rayan Group, Ahmad Tawfik Abd al-Fatah, confirmed these risks: “The busi-

ness of working with money requires stability, not continuous change orsurprises, and certainly not getting into dangerous political games” (Moore,

1990, p. 252). The fact that it is too costly to confront the state given the high

level of dependency of the bourgeoisie, secular and devout alike, forces them

to ally with elements in the state apparatus and the official press by employing

ex-ministers, governors, outspoken editors, and journalists (Ayubi, 1991, p.

193). These high costs attached to Islamism became once more apparent when

the state cracked down on the businessmen affiliated with the MB in early

2007. Khariat al-Shater, as a prominent leader of the brotherhood, paid for this

involvement in Islamism when he, along with other businessmen associated

with the MB, was tried before the military tribunal and sentenced to several

years in prison following the most recent cycle of state repression.

Second, the values of the new bourgeois lifestyle conflict with the Islamic

values internalized by the MB. The devout bourgeois concern for capitalist accu-

mulation and consumption directly contradicts the MB’s vision of Islam based on

humbleness and modesty. Muslim Brothers express their disdain of the new trend

propagated by Amr Khaled by calling it “air-conditioned Islam.” Because the

devout bourgeoisie and the Muslim Brothers represent different status groupswith different values and lifestyles, the followers of air-conditioned Islam either

remain apolitical or stay closer to the more democratic Wasat Party (Haenni &

Tammam, 2003). Five businessmen sitting on the board of the Wasat Party epito-

mize its appeal to the devout bourgeoisie. The WP leader al-Madi confirms this

connection between his party and the new trend and claims that his party repre-

sents the interests of the medium-size devout bourgeoisie and upper-middle-class

professionals (personal communication, July 11, 2007).

Ultimately, the MB remains predominantly an organization of the educatedlower-middle classes and professionals (Bayat, 2007; Clark, 2004; Wickham,

2002). The MB’s exceptional success in the professional syndicates in the early

1990s and its comparative absence in business associations demonstrate the

predominance of the professional class among the ranks of the organization.

The greater strength of the lower-middle classes has crucial implications for

the MB’s political vision. The middle and lower classes have been among the

losers of economic liberalization programs that led to the retreat of the state

from the welfare services, cancellation of the graduate program, slow butongoing privatization, and increasing impoverishment and unemployment.

This meant the annulment of the social contract concluded between Nasser and

the middle classes following the revolution. Economic reforms increasingly

led to economic, political, and social marginalization of the new middle classes,







Gumuscu 855

who aspired for upward mobilization but instead experienced decreasing

wages, inadequate housing, and unemployment (Clark, 1996, p. 39). The new

middle classes’ disappointment with the state fed into a growing adherence tothe ideal of an Islamic state that would deliver higher status, better lives and

prestige for professionals by justly acknowledging and rewarding merit (Wick-

ham, 2002, p. 160). These professionals indeed started constructing this Islamic

polity as an alternative to the secular state through da’wa, which served as an

ideological framework that mobilized them on the basis of interests and ideas

through mosques and private voluntary organizations, that is, clinics, schools,

hospitals, day care centers, and vocational training centers (Wickham, 2002,

pp. 161-162). These organizations represented “ideology through action” by

showing the shortcomings of the secular state following its retreat from social

services (Clark, 2004, p. 12). In short, Islam as din wa-dawla would deliver the

future that the new middle classes have dreamed of.

The way the Egyptian state pursued economic liberalization had signifi-

cant implications for Islamic constituency and its political preferences. First,

the government implemented economic liberalization in such a way that the

benefits of liberalization accrued predominantly to the big business. SMEs,

unlike their Turkish counterparts, have not benefited from liberalization, thus

the expansion of devout bourgeoisie was curtailed. Second, continued statedominance in the economy combined with ongoing confrontation with the

Islamists had significant consequences for the activity of devout bourgeoi-

sie within political movements. Because of high costs associated with

political Islamic activity, many devout businessmen have remained apoliti-

cal, whereas some parts of devout bourgeoisie stayed closer to the moderate

and less confrontational line of the Wasat Party. This ultimately left the main-

stream political Islam under the dominance of lower-middle classes whose

interests have been hurt by economic reforms and who demand an Islamicstate to replace the existing corrupt and exclusionary regime.

The current makeup of the Islamist constituency prolongs the hesitant

moderation within the MB where moderate voices remain weak vis-à-vis the

conservatives. This is why mainstream political Islamism cannot success-

fully internalize democratic principles. It is why the moderate WP remains

marginal and weak as opposed to the more prominent MB.

Conclusion

The diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt have generated

different effects on the Islamist constituencies in these two countries. Eco-

nomic liberalization has played both a constitutive and a causal role in








transformation of political Islam in Turkey by facilitating the growth of a

strong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy

and increasing its power within the broader Islamist constituency. In Egypt,in contrast, the way the state implemented economic reform prevented the

formation of a strong and independent devout bourgeoisie that could be

assertive in political Islam. It was primarily the losers from reform who pop-

ulated the Islamist constituency and entrench Islamism in ideological

positions rather than pragmatism.

The socioeconomic developments within political Islamic constituencies

indeed fill in the gaps left by inclusion, political learning, and repression-based

explanations of political Islamic change in Turkey and Egypt. The emergence

of a strong and well-organized devout bourgeoisie in Turkey triggered a sig-

nificant ideological change in the Turkish political Islamic tradition that

showed no signs of ideological change in three decades following its inclusion

in the democratic political system. Only after the constituency of the political

Islamic party experienced significant economic, social, and political changes

did Turkish political Islam embrace ideological moderation, while in Egypt

moderates within political Islamic movements failed to induce broader ideo-

logical change. The weak and divided nature of Egyptian devout bourgeoisie

is a reason as to why moderates both within and outside of the MB could notdefeat the conservatives and incur substantial moderation in Islamism.

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this article was published in the Robert Schuman Centre Advanced

Studies Working Paper Series. I would like to thank John E. Echeverri-Gent, William B.

Quandt, Carol M. Mershon, Thomas W. Smith, Jeff Haynes, Guy Ben-Porat,

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Nora Fisher, and two anonymous referees for their comments

on the article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship

and/or publication of this article.

Financial Disclosure/Funding

The author received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this

article.

Notes

1. By democratic principles this article refers to liberal norms of democracy that

include civil, political, and social rights and pluralism.








Gumuscu 857

2. This article adopts the distinction made between tactical (strategic) and ideologi-

cal moderation in the literature. Tactical moderation refers to strategic adaptation

of Islamists to the institutional environment often observed as acceptance of the

rules of electoral competition without abandoning the overall goal of establishing

an Islamic state. Ideological moderation, on the other hand, refers to abandonment

or revision of Islamist goals. It entails a substantial commitment to democratic

principles such as political pluralism, peaceful alternation of power, and citizen-

ship rights (Wickham, 2004, p. 206). The primary puzzle of this article is belated

ideological moderation in Turkey and marginal ideological moderation in Egypt.

3. The Islamic political parties were closed down in 1970, 1980, 1998, and 2000,

and the leader of Islamists, Erbakan, was banned from politics in 1980 and 1998.

4. The fact that the devout entrepreneurs attain greater wealth and new social status

does not lead to the disappearance of religion as a system of meaning in their

lives (Tugal, 2002). The concept of “alternative modernity” well captures this

synthesis of capitalism and Islam constructed by the devout bourgeoisie.

5. This alliance was possible because of the high degree of independence of the

devout bourgeoisie from the state for profit accumulation. Because profitability

is not subject to the discretionary support of the state through subsidized inputs,

protected markets, and cronyism (Bellin, 2000, p. 184), the new bourgeoisie

could enjoy political activism as a means of protecting their new status. 6. Turkish Statistical Institute, Foreign Trade Statistics (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/

VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4, retrieved January 4, 2008).

7. For information on the Association of Independent Industrialists and Business-

men (MUSIAD) activities, see www.musiad.org.tr.

8. See the Konya Chamber of Industry (www.kso.org.tr).

9. This and the following information was collected through a series of interviews

conducted with 15 MUSIAD members in Konya between September 2 and

November 12, 2007.10. For a detailed study of tesettur companies, see Binark and Kilicbay (2000).

11. More radical and revolutionary groups and prominent intellectuals of Islamist

movement such as Mehmet Sevket Eygi and Ali Bulac heavily criticized emerg-

ing embourgeoisement and consumerism within devout upper classes. For a study

of these divisions, see Tugal (2002).

12. For changing practices in Ramadan, see Sandikci and Omeraki (2007).

13. A sector of Islamic vacationing provided by five-star hotels in compliance with

Islamic rules became increasingly popular in the 1990s. These hotels serve devout bourgeois families with gender-segregated beaches, and they refuse to serve alcohol.

14. The Milli Gorus (MG) movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan has

implicitly envisioned an Islamic state, and it explicitly aimed for Islamization of

Turkish society. The movement established the National Order Party in 1970, the








National Salvation Party in 1971, the Welfare Party (RP) in 1983, and the Virtue

Party in 1998.

15. The military wing of the NSC demanded Prime Minister Erbakan during the

meeting on February 28 to take steps to eradicate Islamist reactionary activism in

Turkey and hence started a new period known as the February 28 process that entails

a major crackdown on Islamism by the secular establishment. In this process, the

Constitutional Court shut down the RP in 1998 and banned several politicians

including its leader Erbakan from politics, whereas succeeding coalition govern-

ments reinstated the headscarf ban in the universities and extended compulsory

education to 8 years to cut down on the demand for religious vocational schools.

16. One might ask why the devout bourgeoisie did not simply turn to the Center–

Right parties but tried to transform Islamists. Indeed, the devout bourgeois was

longing for a party like Ozal’s Motherland (ANAP) with closer ties to pious

groups in society and clear preference for economic and political liberalization

and Europeanization. ANAP, however, after Ozal’s death in 1992, distanced itself

from conservatives and allied with liberal–secular upper classes. Clearly, they

would not cater to the devout identity of the rising bourgeoisie. Moreover, Center–

Right parties were facing significant corruption charges that made them noncred-

ible alternatives. Having no other place to turn, the devout bourgeoisie tilted the

balance of power within the MG movement via its financial and political supportin favor of moderates.

17. Not surprisingly, Erdogan insistently identified with Ozal’s policies and resorted

to his legacy after he and other moderates established the Adalet ve Kalkinma

Partisi in 2001 (Yavuz, 2003a, p. 258).

18. Based on the information provided by the Grand National Assembly (www

.tbmm.gov.tr).

19. Of the total investment, 45% was concentrated in infrastructure, and less than

20% of infrastructure-related investments were related to the manufacturing sec-tor (Richards, 1991, p. 1722).

20. The public deficit to GDP ratio shrank to 3%; the inflation rate was cut back to 7%.

21. Essam al-Eryan clearly states this necessity in his article titled “Towards the

Renaissance” in Al-Ahram Weekly Online (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/771/

op71.htm).

22. Although moderates claim that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) stands for equal

rights for Copts and women, former supreme guide Mashur argued that the state

should impose jizya (poll tax) on the Copts. Likewise, former supreme guideOmar al-Tilmissani stated,

I do not like to talk about women. . . . I want nothing to do with modern theo-

ries and the equality of men and women. . . . A woman who believes that she







Gumuscu 859

is equal to a man is a woman who has lost her femininity, virtue, and dignity.

(El-Ghobashy, 2005, p. 382)

MB contends that Copts and women cannot become president.

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Bio

Sebnem Gumuscu is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at University ofVirginia in Charlottesville, VA.

Class Status and Party in Islam Politics

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