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KOSOVO AND METOHIJA FINAL STATUS
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1244 ()UN SC RESOLUTION 1244 (extract)
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,
...
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The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, and the primary
responsibility of the Security Council for themaintenance of international peace and security...,
Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis shall be based on the general principles in
annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles
and other required elements in annex 2;
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1 ANNEX 1 -
8, , 06. 1999.
8 :
; , ; - -
, , - ;
Statement by the Chairman on theconclusion of the meeting of the G-
8 Foreign Ministers held at thePetersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted thefollowing general principles on thepolitical solution to the Kosovocrisis:
Immediate and verifiable end ofviolence and repression in Kosovo;
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military,police and paramilitary forces;
Deployment in Kosovo of effective
international civil and securitypresences, endorsed and adoptedby the United Nations, capable ofguaranteeing the achievement ofthe common objectives;
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1 ANNEX 1 -
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Establishment of an interimadministration for Kosovo to be decidedby the Security Council of the United
Nations to ensure conditions for apeaceful and normal life for allinhabitants in Kosovo;
The safe and free return of all refugeesand displaced persons and unimpededaccess to Kosovo by humanitarian aidorganizations;
A political process towards theestablishment of an interim politicalframework agreement providing for asubstantial self-government forKosovo, taking full account of theRambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and the othercountries of the region, and thedemilitarization of the KLA;
Comprehensive approach to theeconomic development and stabilization
of the crisis region.
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2 () ANNEX 2 (extract)
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5. Establishment of an interimadministration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence underwhich the people of Kosovo can enjoysubstantial autonomy within the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, to be decided bythe Security Council of the UnitedNations. The interim administration toprovide transitional administration whileestablishing and overseeing thedevelopment of provisional democraticself-governing institutions to ensureconditions for a peaceful and normal lifefor all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number ofYugoslav and Serbian personnel will bepermitted to return to perform thefollowing functions:
o
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Liaison with the international civil mission
and the international security presence;
Marking/clearing minefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb
patrimonial sites;
Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees anddisplaced persons under the supervision of
the Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees andunimpeded access to Kosovo byhumanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of aninterim political framework agreement providingfor substantial self-government for Kosovo,
taking full account of the Rambouillet accordsand the principles of sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaand the other countries of the region, and thedemilitarization of UCK. Negotiations betweenthe parties for a settlement should not delay ordisrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
2 () ANNEX 2 (extract)
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THE MEETING
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VICTIM - FATHER CHARITON
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CHURCH OF THE HOLY VIRGIN IN MUUTITE
- 1315. .
1999.
The endowment of the
main accountant JovanDragoslav and his family
was built in 1315.
Destroyed in 1999.
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SPECIAL REPORT 91
Kosovo Final StatusOptions and Cross-Border Requirements
Briefly... Kosovo's final status, left undecided at the end of the Yugoslavia-NATO war in June 1999,
will need to be discussed sooner than the international community anticipates; aroadmap will need to be drawn and the issue decided within the next three to five years. , - , ; , 3 5 .
This discussion should begin with an examination of a wide range of options, includingthose described and evaluated in Part II of this report. , II
Two options can be ruled out as unrealistic: immediate independence, and return ofKosovo to Belgrade's rule.
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A third option should be ruled out as inimical to international peace and security: a
regional rearrangement of borders in an attempt to accommodate ethnic differences. : .
There remain a range of outcomes and procedures, none of which stands out asobviously preferable to others. ,
Negotiations over final status should include direct discussions between governingauthorities in Belgrade and Pristina with international facilitation. .
U.S. leadership is essential if negotiations are to succeed. .
Improved security and economic development are required in the interim, as provided for
in UNMIK's benchmarks. , , - .
Whatever the decision, cross-border arrangements will be required to ensure Kosovo'sinterests as well as those of its neighbors and other international partners. , - ,
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Option 1: Kosovo Remains a ProtectorateIndefinitely
UNMIK or the European Union wouldcontinue to oversee increasing Kosovoautonomy in the absence of any process todetermine final status. No decision point orprocess would be specified for deciding onsovereignty, independence, or UNmembership.
Implications for U.S. Policy Continuation of UN protectorate requires
U.S. engagement indefinitely, but possiblylower troop levels if the situation calmsfurther.
The United States would have to deliverboth Albanian and Serbian agreement to
EU protectorate. Difficult negotiations with European Union
might lead to continuing U.S. commitments.
The United States would have to acceptend of EU protectorate on terms decided bythe Europeans.
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Option 2: Cantonization/DecentralizationSerb enclaves govern themselves under de
facto (not necessarily de jure) Yugoslavsovereignty, regardless of Kosovo'sstatus; this is a "soft" partition scenario.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Efforts to consolidate Bosnian andMacedonian states should be redoubled.
The United States should not press forreunification of Mitrovica or UN authorityin the north.
Establishment of multi-ethnic Kosovoadministration not important.
Belgrade efforts to maintain authority inthe north should not be resisted.
Return of Serb internally displacedpersons (IDPs) and refugees toAlbanian-majority areas should nolonger be encouraged.
2:/
defacto ( de jure) -, ; ,,
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Option 3: Loose Federation
Belgrade retains nominal sovereignty,
but Kosovo functions as an
independent state within current
borders although without separate
UN membership (like Montenegro)
Implications for U.S. Policy
The United States should emphasize
that independence and sovereignty
can be separate issues.
.
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Option 4: CommonwealthBelgrade retains nominal sovereignty,
but Kosovo functions as anindependent state within currentborders and with separate UNmembership (like Canada or
Australia).
Implications for U.S. Policy
The United States would have toconvince Russians and Chinese toallow UN flag for Kosovo.
The United States shouldemphasize that independence andsovereignty can be separate.
4:
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Option 5: Decision by an InternationalPanel by a Date Certain
An international panel would determine finalstatus within a fixed period (for example, threeyears); there would be no guarantee ofeventual independence. The outcome would beconditional on the performance of Serbs andAlbanians with respect to specific criteria.These could include democratic self-governance, participation in Kosovo
institutions, respect for human rights, return ofrefugees and displaced persons, andresponsible regional behavior.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Rather than focusing on the final statusoutcome, the United States would participate ina process that will allow a reasonable decisionto be made.
If the United States wants more control overthe outcome, it could seek to name the chair ofthe panel, as it did with the Brcko arbitration.
Incentive for both Serbs and Albanians tobehave well would reduce burdens on theUnited States and international community
generally.
5:
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, .
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Option 6: Conditional IndependenceWith unchanged borders, Kosovo would
progress toward independence, contingenton demonstrated democratic self-governance, respect for minority rights, andresponsible behavior in the region. Theguarantee that Kosovo will not return toBelgrade rule would match a commitmentthat Kosovo will not seek to expand itsboundaries or de-stabilize neighbors. Theinternational community would providesecurity guarantees for minorities andrefugee return. Independence would be theultimate endpoint, including Kosovo controlof foreign policy, budget, public security,and the judicial system. The UN specialrepresentative would retain veto power
over issues relating to protection of minorityrights and external borders during thetransition period. An international forcewould still be needed indefinitely forexternal security. A small, local armed civildefense force would back up the KosovoPolice Service.
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Implications for U.S. Policy
The United States must remain
engaged, both to ensure properfulfillment of conditions and to backcontinuing international presence.
The United States will also have toconvince China and Russia to go along.
Consultations on this approach shouldbegin with the Europeans as soon aspossible.
The United States would have to insiston this approach with Belgrade, whichwill resist.
UNMIK efforts to establish authoritythroughout Kosovo, establish Kosovo-
wide administration, and return IDPs andrefugees home should be redoubled.
Efforts to consolidate Bosnian andMacedonian states should be redoubled.
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Option 7: Independence WithinExisting Borders at a Date
CertainAfter an agreed period (perhaps three years) of
increasing self-rule under internationalsupervision, Kosovo would become anindependent state within its current borders.Kosovo Serbs would get internationallyguaranteed rights and broad local autonomy.Before independence, Kosovo would establishcooperative trans-border political, economic,and security relationships with neighboringstates. International monitoring would continuefor a limited period after independence.
Implications for U.S. Policy U.S. leadership required to sell the idea to
Russia, China, and some Europeans.
Active U.S. engagement in negotiation andimplementation.
Need to counter possible anti-reform backlashin Belgrade and possible regional spillover toneighboring hotspots, such as Macedonia andRepublika Srpska.
Successful accord vindicates U.S.-led
intervention and allows reduced U.S. presence.
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Option 8: Independence withPartition
Three northern municipalitiesZvecan,
Zubin Potok, and Leposavicas well as
Mitrovica north of the Ibar River would go to
Serbia. The other 26.5 municipalities would
constitute an independent Kosovo state.
Albanian-dominated areas of southern
Serbia would become part of Kosovo.Willing Serbs and other minorities would be
assisted in moving. Kosovo Serbs who stay
(and others who want it) would be granted
dual citizenship. The KFOR mission would
support this movement, then redeploy
along new Kosovo borders. Key Trepca
mining components would go to Serbia, butparts would remain under Albanian control.
UNMIK would become a smaller advisory
mission.
8: ,
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Implications for U.S. Policy Efforts to consolidate Bosnian and
Macedonian states should be redoubled.
The United States should not press for
reunification of Mitrovica or UN authority
in the north.
Implementation of southern Serbia
agreement not a priority.
Establishment of multi-ethnic Kosovo
administration not a priority.
Belgrade efforts to maintain authority in
the north should not be resisted.
Return of IDPs and refugees to their
homes in Albanian areas should not beencouraged.
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17. 2004PRIZREN, MARCH 17, 2004
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17. 2004
CATHEDRAL CHURCH IN PRIZREN AFTER MARCH 17, 2004
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Kosovo: Status with Standards WASHINGTONApril 15, 2004
The anti-Serb rioting by Albanians in KosovoMarch 17-19, which resulted in Serb and
Albanian deaths as well as substantial damage
to Serb property and churches and the removal
of thousands of Serbs from their homes,
requires a U.S. and international community
response. So far, discussion has been
polarized between those who advocateimmediate independence for Kosovo and those
who want to shut off that possibility. The former
argue that the rioting demonstrates that Kosovo
cannot be kept in limbo for much longer and
that the international protectorate has to give
way to self-determination. The latter argue that
misbehavior should not be rewarded, that multi-ethnicity in Kosovo has failed, and that the only
prospect for maintaining the Serb population in
Kosovo comes from physically separating
Serbs and Albanians and maintaining Serbian
sovereignty.
: 15. 2004
17.-19, ,
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In order to prevent future violence,
an effective response strategy
should aim to:
Discourage extremism and reward
moderation;
Provide youth hope for a better
future through employment and
educational opportunities; and
Give renewed momentum to the
process of determining final status.
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Any new resolution should
include ironclad international
guarantees of Serb and other
minority rights and safety as
well as the following four "no's":
No return of Kosovo to
governance from Belgrade; No partition of Bosnia or
Macedonia;
No alienation of Serb property
or monuments in Kosovo; and
No violence.
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?
PLACE FOR RETURN?
17. 2004.
akovica before and after March 17. 2004
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?
IS THIS THE ALBANIAN VISION OF FUTURE
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? AND SERBIAN?
?