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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MADRASAS

The word "madrasa" generally has two meanings: first in its more common

literal and colloquial usage, it means "school", in its secondary meaning, a madrasa is

an educational institution offering instruction in the Islamic subjects including, but not

limited to, the Quran and the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad).' It is an

Arabic word, which has originated from another Arabic word Dars, which means "to

tell something or to teach something. "2 Therefore, the word madrasa means, the place

where something is taught. The word school in English also carries the similar

meaning, so the word madrasa actually means "schoo1."3

According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, "madrasa is the name of an

institution where Islamic sciences are studied."4 Traditionally a madrasa is a place of

religious learning, which has a long-standing history and has produced many great

scholars and reformists of their time who preached and struggled against the lofty

humanitarian values and virtues even before Pakistan came into existence. 5 The

objective of the madrasa is to introduce Muslim children to basic Quranic teachings,

promote an Islamic ethos in society and groom students for religious duties. These

elementary schools generally are to be located in the most convenient central place,

namely, the mosque premises, where memorising and proper understanding of the

Quran and the tradition, formed the starting point in the earliest Islamic educational

system.6

2

4

6

H.A.R. Gibbs, J.H. Kramer's & E.J. Brill, Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Netherlands, 1974), pp. 300-309. Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied and Dayang Istiaisyah Hussin, "Estranged from the Ideal Past: Historical Evolution of Madrassas in Singapore," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (London: Taylor and Francis), Vol. 25, No.2, August 2005, p. 250. "Madrasa," Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 221. H.A.R. Gibbs, n.1, p. 62. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrasa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh," in Limaye, S., Wirsing, R. and M. Malik, (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: APCSS, 2004),p.101. "Closures of Dini Madaris," Pakistan Opinion Trends (New Delhi), February 12, 2000, p. 600.

1

There are a variety of Islamic educational institutions in Pakistan. The

Quranic School (Maktab) is an infom1al learning place where children learn to read

and recite the Quran, often in Arabic.7 These Maktabs are usually small in size, based

around a single instructor, and provide only very basic education based on the Quran.

Madrasas on the other hand are generally more organised institutions with classrooms

and provide a higher level of religious education.8 In addition to advanced theology

classes, madrasas often provide free room and board for students, and sometimes even

a stipend which can be used to support students families. 9

The major difference between the Islamic system of education and the modem

system lies in their attitude towards life itself. While the former does not regard the

worldly life as an end in itself, the latter considers this life and its happiness as its

ultimate goal. 10 Also, there is no segregation between the religious and secular

education in the Islamic system. 11 Before the invasion and occupation of Muslim

lands by the western colonial powers, there was only one type of schooling prevalent

throughout the Muslim world. In that world, madrasas used to impart both religious

and temporal education. The system produced young men for the services, trade, and

industries who were also rooted in their religion and culture. 12

In 622 AD, Prophet Muhammad migrated from Makkah, (the city in Saudi

Arabia where Islam originated), to Madina, in Saudi Arabia where Prophet

Muhammad is buried, and laid the foundation of first madrasa of Islam. 13 This

madrasa was attached to the first ever mosque, the holy place for Muslims just like

church for Christians and synagogue for Jews, constructed in the world;

7

9

10

II

12

13

"Maktab," Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9050246/maktab Uzma Anzar, "Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrasas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices," Research Paper March 2003, p. I. http://www.uvm.edu/-envprog/madrassahlmadrassah-history.pdf. Tariq Rahman, "Language, Religion and Identity in Pakistan: Language-Teaching in Pakistan Madrassas," Ethnic Studies Report (Kandy: Sri Lanka), Vol. XVI, No.2, July I998, p. 32. Amir Ullah Khan, Mohammed Sakib aml Zafar H. Anjum, "Madrasa System in India: Past Present and Future," p. 6. http://www.indiachinacentre.org/bazaarchintanlpdfs/madarsas.pdf. S.A.R Adil, "Islam and Modem Education," Islamic Voice, November, 2004. http://www.islamicvoice.com/November2004/0pinion Amir Ullah Khan, Mohammed Sakib and Zafar H. Anjum, n. I 0. Ibid.

2

Masjid-e-Kuba, was the original name of mosque. They then studied Islam in detail

and spread it throughout the world. 14

The institution of the madrasa and the Ulema as a class of religious specialists

emerged with the spread of Islam outside the Arabian Peninsula, in the years after the

death of the Prophet. 15 Imam Ghazali (1 058-1111 AD) said that "the first condition

for the development of the active mind is the purity of faith and firmness of iman. " 16

Therefore, he said, primary education should be in accordance with religious beliefs

and religious requirements. The Ulema set apart from the general body of Muslims,

were experts in Islamic theology and law. The two classes, Ulema and Caliphs

worked in tandem with each other. 17 The Caliphs provided the Ulema with protection

and official patronage and the Ulema seeking to interpret the Islamic tradition in order

to legitimise the rule of the Caliphs. 18

During the Abbasid period, when Islamic civilization and culture was at its

zenith, Muslims not only became proficient in the literature and philosophy of the

Greeks but also became familiar with the sciences. It was during this period that

institutionalisation of learning came about with the establishment of Bait-ul-Hikma

(House of Wisdom) set up by Al-Mamun in 830 A.D. 19 However, the first Islamic

institution, which enjoyed a wide reputation, throughout the Muslim world was

AI Azhar university of Cairo founded by the fourth Caliph of Fatmid dynasty,

Al-Muizz (925-975 A.D.).20

The madrasas as an organised system of education were formulated in

eleventh century in Baghdad (1067) under the patronage of Nizamul Mulk Toosi,

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Ibid, p. 6. Yoginder Sikand, "Lessons of the Past: Madrasa Education in South Asia," Himal: South Asia (Katmandu), November, 2001. http://www.himalmag.com/november200 1/essay.htm Amir Ullah Khan, Mohammed Sakib and Zafar H. Anjum, n. 10. The Caliph {pronounced khaleef in Arabic) is the head of state in a Caliphate, and the title for the leader of the Islamic Ummah, or global Islamic nation. It is a transliterated version of the Arabic word tJ.iwo Khalifah (help·info) which means "successor" or "representative". The early leaders of the Muslim nation following Muhammad's (570-632) death were called "Khalifat ar-rasul Allah", meaning the political successor to the prophet of God (referring to Muhammad), also as the spiritual leader of Islam. Ibid, p. 40. Husain F. Nagamia, "Islamic Medicine History and Current Practice," Journal of Islamic Medical Association (Florida). http://www.iiim.org/islamed3.html Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Al-Azhar Moves with the Times," Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), July 9-15, 1998, No. 385. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/385/fr2.htm

3

Prime Minister of the Seljuk ruler.21 The madrasas curriculum although varied from

place to place, was always religious in character because these schools ultimately

were intended to prepare future Islamic scholars (Ulema) for their work. In

emphasising classical traditions in Arabic linguistics, teachers lectured and students

learned Quran through rote memorisation?2

The Nizamiah school, like the madrasas which, following it, were set up in

other parts of the Muslim world, was intended to train bureaucrats for the royal courts

and the administration, as well as judges (qazis, muftis)?3 Typically, teachers as well

as students were drawn from the elite, while there seems to have been little provision

for the education of children from the poorer classes. Since one of the primary aims of

the madrasas was to produce a class of bureaucrats and, particularly, judges, as

employees of the state, the teaching of Islamic law (fiqh) came to occupy a major

position in the madrasa curriculum?4 This is in contravention to the early reference to

the segregation of religious and secular streams of knowledge. By the twelfth century

the madrasa had become the most characteristic religious institution of the medieval

urban landscape.25 The institution trained many of Muslim society's leading lights,

including jurists, religious scholars, and, in some countries, mathematicians, medical

doctors, and astronomers. In all these regards, the madrasa was the central institution

of medieval Muslim civil society.26

In the late seventeenth century, the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb

commissioned a team of Ulema to prepare a compendium oflslamic law, named after

him as the Fatwa-i-Alamgiri?1 Aurangzeb granted one of the Ulema associated with

this project, Mulla Nizamuddin Sehalvi, an old mansion owned by a French trader, in

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

A.H. Nayyar, "Madrasas Education Frozen in Time," in Pervez Hoodbhoy (ed.), Fifty Years of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 216. Asma Afsaruddin, "Muslim Views on Education: Parameters, Purview, and Possibilities," Journal of Catholic Legal Studies (New York: St. John University), Vol.44, No. 143, 2005, p. 145. Yoginder Sikand, "Madrasas in a Morass: Between Medievalism and Muslimophobia," The Milli Gazette http://www.milligazette.com/ Archives/151 02001129 .htm Amir Ullah Khan, n. 10, p. 43. Robert W. Hefner "The Culture, Politics, and Future of Muslim Education" in Robert W. Hefner & Muhammad Qasim Zaman, (eds.), Schooling Islam: Modern Muslim Education (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 12. Ibid. Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 23.

4

Lucknow, where he set up a madrasa, which soon emerged as the leading centre of

Islamic studies in North India.28 Mulla Nizamuddin prepared a fresh curriculum for

study here, which came to be known after him as the Dars-e-Nizami or the "Syllabus

of Nizami. "29 The focus of the Dars was on what were called the "rational sciences"

subjects such as law, philosophy and grammar that would befit prospective

bureaucrats. 30 Three centuries later, the Dars-e-Nizami continues to be the syllabus of

most madrasas in South Asia, although an increasing number of books on the

"revealed sciences" such as theology and the traditions of the Prophet have been

added.31

In Mughal times, madrasas served the purpose of training to the intellectual

and bureaucratic elite, leaving the poor classes largely out of their purview, but the

things began to change with the onset of British rule.32 By the early nineteenth

century, the British had replaced Persian with English as the language of officialdom

and Muslim qazis and muftis with lawyers and judges were trained in English law. 33

The eclipse of Muslim political power in the region now meant that the Ulema and

their madrasas were now bereft of sources of political support and patronage. In many

cases, the British revoked the huge grants that Muslim rulers had provided the

madrasas.34 In this rapidly changing context, the Ulema began to tum to the Muslims

in the society for support. With the march of modernity and secularisation, madrasas

were seen as centres of obscurantism and superstition, and as one of the principal

causes of Muslim decline at the hands of the West. With the arrival of colonial rulers,

traditional education was more and more marginalised. The British substituted a new

formal system, tailored to the British needs.35

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

Mohammad Akhtar Siddiqui, "Development and Trends in Madrasa Education," in A. W. B. Qadri, Riaz Shakir Khan and Mohammad Akhter Siddique, (eds.) Education and Muslims in India Since Independence (New Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 1998), p. 81. F Robinson, The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture (Delhi: Permanent Black Publication, 2001), pp. 23-4. Yoginder Sikand, "Lessons of the Past: Madrasa Education in South Asia," Him a! South Asia, November, 200 I. http://www.himalmag.com/november200 1/essay.htm Amir Ullah Khan, Mohammed Sakib and Zafar H. Anjum, n. 10, p. 12. Y oginder Sikand, n. 30. Ibid. Ibid G. W .Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab since Annexation and In 1882 (New Delhi: Amar Prakashan, 1982), p. 97.

5

Historically, some madrasas have contributed to the national cause. Madrasa

graduates as well as the founders of some leading madrasas in India played an

important role in the struggle against the British. The prominent Ulema led uprisings

against the British in the 1857 revolt, and, for decades after, the reformist Ulema kept

aloft the banner of defiance in the Pathan borderlands till the British forcibly put them

down. 36 Madras a teachers and students, such as Maul ana Obaidullah Sindhi and

Maulana Barkatullah Khan Bhopali were among the first Indians to demand complete

freedom for India.37

According to Metcalf, "the decline of the vast Muslim empire, the occupation

of the land by foreign forces-particularly the defeat at the hands of British forces in

the war of independence, the onslaught of the Christian missionaries, introduction of a

different educational system by the colonial power, and the failure of the Muslim

population in general to accept the available alternative forced a large section of

Indian Muslims to fortify their religious identity, which led to a new wave of

madrasas in the second half of the 19th century."38 Many of which piloted a new

movement for Islamic education, proved standard-bearers of the present day

madrasas. 39

The great names in this category were Darul Uloom Deoband (established in

1867), Nadwatul Ulema (established in 1894), Darul Uloom Mazahirul Uloom

Saharanpur established m 1898) etc.40 Although they mainly followed

Dars-e-Nizami, (syllabus of Nizami) they could be distinguished from the earlier

madrasas by the mode of teaching, organisation, regularisation of curriculum and

system of awarding degrees and certificates.

Muhammad Iqbal, the poet philosopher also expressed his concern on the

importance of madrasas. He once stated, "When I was young, I also believed in

reform and revolution of Muslims towards Western civilization. However, after

spending time in Europe (Iqbal did his doctorate in Germany), my views changed. Let

these maktabs be as they are. Poor Muslim children should continue to study in these

36

37

38

39

40

Yoginder Sikand, n. 30. Amir Ullah Khan, n. 10, p. 7. Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 49. Ibid, p. 131. A.H. Nayyar, n. 21, p. 224.

6

schools- if we did not have mullahs and dervishes, do you k.t1ow what would happen?

I have seen what would happen. If the Muslims of India were deprived of the

influence of these schools, they would fall to the same fate as the Muslims of Spain

where the Alhambra and the mosque at Cordoba are devoid of any Muslim presence.

In India too we would be left only with Muslim monuments such as the Taj Mahal

and the Red fort but deprived oflslamic vitality."41

Curriculum

The basic mission of madrasas in Pakistan is to prepare students for religious

duties and adhering to strict religious teachings. Most of the madrasas teach Islamic

subjects such as the Quran, Islamic law and jurisprudence, logic and the Prophet's

traditions.42 The concentration of religious teachings increases with the levels of the

madrasas (primary, middle or high). Hafiz-e-Quran (the one who memorises the

Quran fully) or Qari (the one who can recite the Quran with good pronunciation and

in a melodic tone) are produced at the lower level ofmadrasas.43 The higher levels of

madrasas produce Alim- the Islamic scholar. An Alim certificate from a madrasa is

equivalent to an MA degree in Islamic studies or Arabic from a regular university.44

Those students who enroll in madrasas full time do so with the knowledge that they

will become well versed in religious studies only and will find jobs in the religious

sector.45

There are several levels of Islamic education in Pakistan which is provided by

madrasas as well as primary Islamic schools known as maktab.46 Maktab teach

primary Islamic subjects such as reading the Quran. Some may also teach Hift

(memorisation of Quran). The sine qua non of a madrasa is that it teaches-either in

41

42

43

44

45

46

Saleem H. Ali, "Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrasas of Pakistan," Project Report (Washington: US Institute of Peace, August 2005), p. 22. Sharon Benoliel, "Strengthening Education in Muslim World," USAID Paper (New York), April, 2004, p. 49. Ibid. Uzma Anzar, "Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrasas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices" Research Paper (University of Vermont), March 2003, p.l4. http://www.uvm.edu/-envprog/madrassah/madrassah-history.pdf. Ibid

C. Christine Fair, "Islamic Education m Pakistan," United Institute of Peace Report (Washington), March 21,2006, p. I.

7

full or in part-a specialized curriculum called Dars-e-Nizami.47 For a schedule of

degrees and their comparable attainment in the mainstream educational system, (more

details in table).

Table No.1

Programmes of Madrasa Study and their Chronological Equivalency to Non Religious School

Comparable to Mainstream Dar_ja Level Duration Certificate (Sanad) Education

Nazara (is the student's first introduction to

lbtedai learning to recite the 4-5 yrs. Primary (5th grade) Quran) Shahadatul Tahfeez ul

Quran Hifz (is the memorization

Mutavasatta of the Quran) 3 yrs Middle (8th) Shahadatul Mutavasatta

Tajveed, Qeeraat48 (is another form of

2yrs Matric (lOth) Sanviya recitation of the Quran.) Shahadatul Sanviya ul Amma Amma

Sanviya Tehtani (Higher 2 yrs. Intermediate (FA) Khasa secondary) Shahadatul Sanviya Khasa

Aliya Mohqufaleh Khasa va 2 yrs. Shahadatul Aliya BA Sada (College)

Alamiya Daura Hadees Sabia va

2 yrs. MA and recognized as MA in

Saniya Shahadatul Alamiya phil Arabic and Islamic studies by the

Uluum Arabia vul Islamia Government of Pakistan.

Source: "Pakistan Religious Education Institutions an Overview," IPS Taskforce Report {Islamabad: IPS, 2002), p. 22.

The original curriculum of madrasas consisted of two mam branches of

learning; "revealed knowledge" and "the knowledge acquired through intellectual

endeavours."49 It consisted of following topics:

47

48

49

• • • •

Quran: Tajweed, Qirat, and Tafseer .

Hadith and the ancillary knowledge of ascertaining the authencity of Hadith .

Fiqh and Usul-e-Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence and its principles) .

Philosophy of religion .

Ibid Qeeraat is the learning to recite the Quran in all seven modes for such recitation. One who has mastered all is called a Qari. A.H. Nayyar, n. 21, p. 243.

8

• Tasawwuf(mysticism).

• Linguistic Sciences: Nahw (grammer), Lughat (etymology) Bayan (Rhetoric).

• Mantiq (Logic).

• Hissab (Arithmetic's).

• Ilm-e-Hindsa (Geometry).

• Ilm-ul-Hae 'at (Astronomy).

• Ilm-ul-Tabiaat (Physics, Chemistry and Medicine).

Lr . ·eM . )5o o mOOSlql USIC •

"Topics 1 to 5 belonged to the realm of revealed knowledge

(Uloom-e-Naqliah). These must have formed the core of the curriculum of the

seminary part of the school. The remaining topics: 6-12 belonged to the intellectual

knowledge (Uloom-e-Aqliah), and were deemed necessary for any one intending to

enter into government service. The Aqliah curriculum was very restrictive and

perhaps meant only to provide enough knowledge for state employment of the

madrasas graduate."51

The students complete four successive degrees (sanae!) at regular intervals.52

The government of Pakistan (GOP) recognises the final degree as the equivalent to an

M.A. in Arabic and Islamic studies for most purposes. None of the lower degrees are

recognised by the government.53 Dars-e-Nizami covers some 20 subjects which fall

into two categories: al-uloom annaqliya (transmitted sciences) and al-uloom al-aqliya

(rational sciences).54 Most of the curriculum includes subjects that are strictly

religious in nature. The remaining subjects include medicine, mathematics,

astronomy, history, philosophy and polemics were included in the 19th century. 55

50

51

52

53

54

55

Ibid. Ibid. C. Christine Fair, "Islamic Education m Pakistan," United Institute of Peace Report (Washington), March 21, 2006, p. 2. Ibid. Ibid. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrassas Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh," in Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Malik (eds.) Religious and Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: APCSS, 2004), p. 102.

9

The core religious curriculum in Pakistani madrasas is more or less similar to

any other madrasas in the world. It focuses on the teachings of Islam - Hadith, Fiqh,

Tafseer, Sunna and the like.

Yearly Curriculum of a Madrasas

"First Year: Biography of the Prophet, conjugation-grammar, syntax, Arabic

literature, logic, chirography, chant illation.

Second Year: Conjugation-grammar, syntax, Arabic literature, jurisprudence, logic.

Third Year: Quranic exegesis, jurisprudence, syntax, Arabic literature, Hadith, logic,

Islamic brotherhood, chant illation, external study.

Fourth Year: Quranic exegesis, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence,

rhetoric's, Hadith, logic, history, chant illation, modem sciences (sciences of

cities of Arabia, geography of the Arab peninsula and other Islamic countries).

Fifth Year: Quranic exegesis, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, rhetoric,

beliefs, logic, Arabic literature, chant illation, external study.

Sixth Year: Interpretation of the Quran, jurisprudence, principles of interpretation &

jurisprudence, Arabic literature, philosophy, chant illation, study of Prophet's

traditions.

Seventh Year: Sayings of the Prophet, jurisprudence, belief, responsibility, chant

illation, external study.

Eighth Year: Ten books by various authors focusing on the sayings ofthe Prophet."56

For graduate classes beyond eight years, greater emphasis is paid to

interpretation of the Quran and various books written in Persian and Arabic which are

mastered at this stage. In addition, various aspects of Islamic jurisprudence are

mastered through different books in Arabic and Persian, which cover all aspects of

Muslim life, including banking, divorce, etc. 57

The philosophical, natural and foreign sciences are rarely taught at the

madrasas because the Islamic waqf, upon which rests the whole edifice of institution

of learning, excluded any of all things that are considered, being inimical to the basic

56

57 Darul-Uloom Deoband in India. http://darululoom-deoband.com/english/index.htm Ibid.

10

tenets of Islam. 58 The exclusion meant that the study of "foreign sciences" has to be

pursued privately, without being subsidised in the same manner as the Islamic

sciences and its ancillaries. 59Most of the Muslim scholars maintain that the

segregation of religious and temporal subjects in madrasas is a colonial invention.60

This is the curriculum, which is similar in all of the madrasas in South Asia.

In South Asia and especially in Pakistan, which came into existence in 1947,

the rulers made elaborate arrangements for the setting up of madrasas to train a class

of Ulema. 61The most mosques had attached to madrasas wherein children were taught

to recite and memorise the Quran, a pattern that still continues.62 As can be seen from

the above list of subjects and table, there is not much emphasis on "rational" or

"modem sciences."

Teachings in Madrasas

According to Tariq Rahman, "Pakistani madrasas do not teach Arabic as a

living language, but as a historic specimen, frozen in time. Few students emerge from

madrasas are able to converse fluently in Arabic. The majority of students, who leave

after just a few years, do not understand the Arabic passages from the Quran that they

have memorised."63 In addition to purely Quranic studies, most of the madrasas teach

Urdu (the official language of Pakistan) or one of the regional languages such as

Punjabi, Pashto, or Sindhi, for a few years at the primary level. A very small minority

ofmadrasas also teach modem subjects using modem textbooks.64

Jamal Malik stated that "the supporters of the new nation state of Pakistan

continued promoted the modem system of education, and the traditional way of

teaching was increasingly neglected. Such a policy of giving a modem orientation to

madrasa education nevertheless could not ignore completely the clergy and other

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

Muhammad Sharif Khan, Education, Religion and Modern Age (New Delhi: Asish Publishing House, 1999), pp. 85-86. J.D.Kraan, Religious Education in Islam with Special Reference to Pakistan: An Introduction and Bibliography (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1984), p. 9. Amir Ullah Khan, n.IO, p. 42. Yoginder Sikand, n. 30. Ibid. Tariq Rahman, "Language, Religion and Identity in Pakistan: Language Teaching in Pakistani Madrassas," Ethnic Studies Report (Kandy: Sri Lanka), Vol. XVI, July 1998, p. 200. Ibid, pp. 200-201.

11

traditional forces. This led to a number of concessions towards the Ulema partly to

meet their demands for the realisation of a state based on Islamic principles, and

partly to guard and guarantee at least formally the national ideology of Pakistan."65

All madrasas, including the Shia ones, teach the Dars-e-Nizami though they

do not use the same texts. They also teach their particular point of view (maslak)

which clarifies and rationalises the beliefs of the sect (Sunni or Shia) and sub-sect

(Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith).66 Moreover, they train their students to refute

what in their views are heretical beliefs and some Western ideas. All madrasas teach

modem subjects in some measure and with varying degrees of competence. As for

teaching modem subjects, the Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas have been teaching Pakistan

Studies, English, Mathematics and General Science for a long time.67 According to a

report published in the weekly The Friday Times in 2003, "post September 11 the

Deobandi Wafaq-ul Madaris has started accommodating modem and secular subjects

on a larger scale than ever before."68

Classification of Madrasas

There are five independent madrasa boards for registered madrasas. 69 They

determine the syllabus; collect a registration fee and an examination fee. They send

examination papers, in Urdu and Arabic, to the madrasas where students sit for

examinations and declare results. 70 The names of the boards are as follows:

65

66

67

68

69

70

Jamal Malik, Colonialization of/slam: Dissolution ofTraditional Institution in Pakistan (New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 1996), p. 126.

Saleem H.Ali, n. 41, p. 42. Ministry of Education Report (Islamabad: Islamic Education Research Cell, Government of Pakistan, 1988), pp. 73-74. Hasan Mansoor, "Groundwork to Modernize Seminaries Begins," The Friday Times (Lahore) August 1-7, 2003. Pakistan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2004 (U.S. Department of State: the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), February 28, 2005. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41743.htm Tariq Rahman, "Madrasas Religion, Poverty and Potential for Violence in Pakistan," Research Paper (Islamabad Policy research Institute), Winter 2005. ipripak.org/joumal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml

12

Table No.2

Central Boards of Madrasas in Pakistan

Name Sub-Sect Place Date Established Wafaq ul Madaris Deobandi Multan 1959 Tanzim ul Madaris Barel vi Lahore 1960 Wafaq ul Madans (Shia Shia Lahore 1959 Pakistan Rabta-tul-Madaris-al-Islamia Jamaat-i-Islami Lahore 1983 Wafq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia Ahl-i-Hadith Faislabad 1955

Source: Tariq Rahman, "Madrasas: Religion, Poverty and Potential for Violence in Pakistan," Research Paper (Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005). http.//ipripak.org/journal!winter2005/madrasas.shtml#ftnl

There are five distinct types of madrasas in Pakistan, divided among sectarian

and political lines.71 The Sunni population subdivides into four major streams­

Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahl-i-Hadith and Wahhabis, within these there are dozens of

subgroups. 72 Despite these divisions, the majority of Sunnis follow the Hanafi School

of Islamic Jurisprudence. The Deobandi and Barelvi schools represent the Hanafi

school of thought and account for nearly 70 per cent of the total madrasas in

Pakistan.73 The Ahl-i-Hadith is strongly influenced by the Hanbali school of thought

as represented by the Saudi Arabian Wahhabis.74 There are three streams of follower

of Shia sect in Pakistan, the Ismail, the Ithna Ashariya and the Bohras. 75

The Sunnis as well as the Shias created own madrasas to preserve and

propagate what, in their view, was the correct interpretation of Islam.

Deobandi~adrasas

The madrasa at Deoband, a small town in the United Provinces (now Uttar

Pradesh) of India, was founded by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-

71

72

73

74

75

"Pakistan: Madrasa, Extremism and the Military," International Crisis Group Report (Islamabad), July 29, 2002, p. I. Rizwan Qqureshi, "The Second Coming," The Herald (Karachi) Vol. 30, No. 2, February 1999,p.59. Amneh Shaikh, "Warring Ideologies: The Use of Education Policy to Control Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan," Discussion Paper (Crawford School of Economics and Government: Australian National University), June 12, 2006, p. 17. http:/ iwww .era wford.anu.edu.au/ degrees/pogo/ discussion _papers/P D P06-1 0. pdf The Muslim World After 9/JJReport (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), p. 262. Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalisation of Shia and Sunni Identities," Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge: UK), July 1998, Vol. 32, No.3, p. 691.

13

1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905) in May 1866.76 According

to Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, "the school was a pioneer

effort to transmit the religious sciences ... by utilising institutional forms derived from

British schools."77 It was established to preserve the teachings of the Islamic faith in a

period of non-Muslim rule and considerable social change by holding Muslims to a

standard of correct practice central to that goal was the creation of a class of formally

trained and popularly supported Ulema.78Whi1e earlier seminaries were loosely

organised, Deoband had a chancellor and the chief instructor (sadr mudarris). Its

income was derived from popular contributions and the curriculum was based on the

D 1\T" • 79 ars-e-1vzzamz.

The Deobandis opposed the folk Islamic culture in which intercession by

saints occupied a major place, seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the

path to salvation and miracles etc., were seen as the crucial and defining attributes of

saints and prophets. They did not oppose mysticism altogether but did argue that

adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the path to mystical exaltation.80 At the

same time, Deoband exploited modern technology, especially in the dissemination of

fatwas on every issue brought before its muftis.81 By this ~eans Deoband gained the

support of the masses, providing Muslims with a new sense of identity and an

alternative to the British model. In 1879, the institution assumed the additional name

of Darul-Uloom (the abode of Islamic learning). By then it was already becoming

renowned throughout the Islamic world as a center of religious study second only to

Al-Aqsa in Cairo. 82

Francis Robinson says, "the Deoband follows the Dars-e-Nizami syllabus in

spirit, as it brings together the excellence of all of the previous centers of learning and

their syllabi in addition to the changes demanded by the new situations and time, in

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband: 1860-1900 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 88. Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 362. The UNHCR Briefings, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx!home/opendoc.htm F. Robinson, The Ulema of Farangi Maha/1 and Islamic Culture (Delhi: Permanent Black Publication, 2001), p. 70. Barbara Daly Metcalf, n. 76, p. 96. Charles Allen, "The Hidden Roots of Wahhabism in British India," World Policy Journal (New York), Vol. XXTI, No.2, Summer 2005, p. 93. Ibid.

14

this basis Deoband claims to be more comprehensive and rationalistic."83 In reaction

to the introduction and wholly uncritical adoption of modem Western education,

Deoband laid its special emphasis on traditional subjects, but it has also absorbed

some of the features from the modem institutions such as the division of students in

classes, attendance registers and written examinations etc. 84

Majority of independent madrasas in India, as also in the other parts of South

Asia are modeled on it and follow the curriculum set by it. Deoband, since its origins

has played a significant role not just in training and equipping highly qualified

leaders, but has also played a central role in nation building through the Indian

freedom movement. 85 By the beginning of the nineteenth century Deoband had

founded over two dozen allied madrasas in northern India. Today that figure stands,

remarkably, at over 30,000 worldwide.86 Deobandi institutions are relatively more

influential in Pakistan. The Deobandi led politico-religious party known as Jamiat

Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), has widespread support in the Pathan tribal areas. Pakistan now

has well over 7,000 JUI and Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas.87 It was here in the 1980s and

1990s that the Taliban's leaders and many of its rank-and-file were educated.88

Deoband had produced 6,986 graduates and established 8,934 maktabs and madrasas

within a hundred years of its establishment. 89 In 1967, the number of graduates from

Pakistan was 3,191 (including those from East Pakistan).90 Today, the number of

students exceeds I 02,865 and the number of those who appeared in the Alimia (MA)

examination exceeds 4500.91

Some of the more well-known militant Pakistani madrasas such as the one in

Binnori town, Karachi as well as the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania madrasas are

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

F. Robinson, n. 79, p. 37. Barbara D. Metcalf, "Traditionalist, Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs," ISIM Research Paper (Leiden: The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World), 2002, p. 8. Barbara Daly Metcalf, n. 76, pp. 82-83. Charles Allen, n.81, p. 93. Ibid. Ibid. Barbara Daly Metcalf, n. 76, pp. 110-11. Tariq Rahman, 'The Madrasa and the State of Pakistan: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan" Himal: South Asia (Katmandu), February, 2004, p. 3. Ibid.

15

Deobandi.92 These institutions preached violence and hate against all who do not

share their views, that are associated with both domestic and international tenorist

organisations. 93 Militant Deobandi madrasas are most conspicuous in and around the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which border Afghanistan, but they can be

found all across Pakistan.94 The bulk of Pakistani madrasas, up to two-thirds of the

total, are run by Deobandis. 95Khaled Ahmed estimated in 2002, that "they run some

64 per cent of the madrasas in Pakistan. "96

The Taliban leadership emerged from these Deobandi madrasas. Not

surprisingly, the Taliban were able to exploit Deobandi adherents for political as well

as military support.97 The Deobandis are associated with one main political party, the

Jamiat-Ulema-e-Jslam (JUI). The JUI's madrasas not only provided a wellspring of

manpower for the Taliban, but they also provided its ideological cornerstone and

strength in uniformity.98 (These are discussed in details in Chapter II&IV).

Barelvi Madrasas

Barel vis are a majority and the more tolerant sect in Pakistan. 99 The Oxford

Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World indicates, "the Barelvi movement

emerged during the 1880s in the North Indian town of Bareilly, in the Rohilkhand

region of the United Provinces."100 It was inspired by Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly

in India (1856-1921 ), who is highly revered by his followers. 101 The Barel vis justified

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

Saleem H. Ali, n. 41, p. 38. Ibid. Eliza Griswold, "Where the Taliban Roam: Dodging the jihad in Pakistan's Tribal Lands," Harper's Magazine (New York), September, 2003, pp. 67-76. Andrew Coulson, "Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World Is There a Problem? What Can We Do about It? Policy Analysis (Washington), March 11,2004, p. 5. Khaled Ahmed, "The Power of the Ahle Hadith," Friday Times, July 15, 2002. Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 78, No.5, November-December 1999, p. 23. Michael Griffm, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, A! Qaeda and the Holy War (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 66. Mubasher Bukhari "Barelvi Leaders Mull Grand Party led by Pir Pagaro," Daily Times (Karachi), April 23, 2006. Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 200. Usha Sanyal, and Ahmed Riza Khan, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Bare/vi and his Movement: 1870-1920 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43.

16

the mediational, custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the pirs of the

shrines. 102

The conflict between Barelvis and "other Sunn.i Muslim reform movements,"

particularly the Deobandi movement "was primarily the Barel vi vision of the prophet

Muhammad's Attributes."103 Barelvis believe, as did Ahmad Riza, that Muhammad

was able to "see into the future, ... have knowledge of the unseen, ... be spiritually

... present in many places simultaneously, and ... be invested with Allah's preeminent

light."104 To deny, as Deobandis do, that Muhammad had any of these attributes was,

according to Ahmad Riza, a "denial of some of the fundamentals of faith" and

"tantamount to apostasy from Islam."105 The fundamental theological issue that

divides the two Sunni sects is the role of the Prophet and the status of hereditary

saints. The Deobandis tend to demystify these roles, whereas the Barelvis regard

saints as intermediaries to communicate with the Prophet and seek divine salvation.

"Each sect has its distinct mannerisms in saying prayers and other rituals and disputes

over mosque administrations are common."106

Barelvis "believe themselves to be the true representatives and heirs in South

Asia of the earliest Muslim community, the companions and followers of the Prophet

Muhamrnad."107 The Barelvi madrasas in Pakistan also teach the Dars-e-Nizami and

appeal to the ordinary folk of the country. 108 These are an important source of revenue

for Barelvi community. 109

The primary organisation that represents Barelvi political aspirations is the

Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP). JUP is the primary political party associated with the

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

B. Raman, "Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Bin Laden & Ramzi Yousef," South Asia Analysis Group (New Delhi), July 1, 2002, No. 484. <http://www. saag.org/papers5/paper484. Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 201. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 201-2. "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military," International Crisis Group Report (Islamabad), March 20, 2003, p. 5. http:i/www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/afghanistan_southasia/reports/ Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 200. Usha Sanyal, and Ahmed Riza Khan, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Bare/vi and his Movement, 1870-1920 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 46. Saleem H. Ali, n. 41, p. 39.

17

Barelvi movement. It was founded in 1949 as a rival to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam

(JUI). 110 Over time, the JUP has splintered into five different groups, some of which

have become militarised. The Karachi-based Sunni Tehreek is the largest and has

become involved in sectarian violence. 111 Despite their majority position in the

population at large, Barelvis operate only about one-quarter of the country's

madrasas. 112 The conflict between Barelvis and Deobandis has also spilled over into

the madrasas, which reportedly have "spawned rival terrorist forces." 113 In this regard,

"most sectarian bombings and shootouts originate from or occur at mosques housing

these schools." 114 (More details in chapter IV).

Ahl-i-Hadith Madrasas

The name "Ahl-i-Hadith" means "People of the Hadith" and is applied to a

reform movement which arose in India during the 19th century. "It is called W ahhabi

because the movement inspired by Sayyed Ahmed, and his associates,

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792) of Saudi Arabia. All leaders wanted to

purify and reform Islarn."115They used the term Jamaat Ahl-i-Hadith for themselves

and appealed to the Government of India that the term Wahhabi should not be used

for them. The government ordered in 1886 that the term W ahhabi should not be used

in official correspondenceY6 The critics of Ahl-i-Hadith were quick to label it

"W ahhabi" and to this day it continues to be described and denounced as such. 117

The Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas also teach the Dars-e-Nizami but they strictly

adhere to the Quran and Hadith and oppose folk Islamic culture and common

110

l11

112

113

114

115

116

117

"Internal Affairs," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment South Asia (London), July 30, 2003. Muslim World After September 11 Report, n. 74, p. 302. Mandavi Mehta and Teresita C. Schaffer, "Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions: Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options," CSIS Project Report (Washington), October 7, 2002, p. 11. http://www.csis.org/saprog/islaminpakistan.pdf. "Pakistan: The Barelvi and the Deobandi Stream of Sunni Islam," Research Paper (UNHCR: Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada), September, 2003. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm Ibid. Mumtaz Ahmed, n. 55, p. 6. Qeyamuddin Ahmed, The Wahabi Movement in India (New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 1994), p. 17. Charles Allen, n. 81, p. 92.

18

practices like the anniversaries of saints, the distribution of food on religious

occasions and popular mysticism. 118 The Ahl-i-Hadith has created a political branch,

in 1987: Merkaz-i Dawa Wal Irshad (Centre for Preaching and Guidance). 119 Based in

a compound in Muridke, near Lahore, it gets support from Saudi Arabia and Arab

donors from the Gulf. 120 The Merkaz puts great importance onjihad, and has created

an armed branch, the Lashkar-e- Taiba. 121

In Pakistan today it has over 400 madrasas and has sponsored a number of

militant organisations linked to terrorism. 122 Khaled Ahmed estimated their number at

only 6 per cent of the madrasas in Pakistan and 15 per cent of the youth enrolled in

h d fi . 123 t ese rna rasas are oretgners.

Shia Madrasas

In Pakistan, Shias are an influential minority; Shia Muslims are estimated to

be between 15 to 20 per cent of the Muslim population. 124 However, historically they

had a strong control on land holdings in central and Southern Punjab as well as

Sindh.125 There is also a clear funding connection between Shia madrasas and the

government of Iran, which even has a cultural center in the central city of Multan,

where many madrasas are congregated. 126 While the majority of Shias belong to the

Ithna-Ashariya sub-sect (believing in twelver), there is also a sub-sect of Shias who

revere only six of the Imams and also revere, the Agha Khan, whom they believe to be

a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad (The Ismailis). 127 Related in beliefs to

them are the Daudi Bohras (followers of Burhanuddin) and the Sulemani Bohras

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

for 126

127

Saleem H. Ali, n. 41, p. 40. Oliver Roy, "Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan," CNRS Paper (Paris: UNHCR Emergency and Security Services), No.06/2001, January 2002, p. 4. Ibid. Ibid. Charles Allen, n. 81, p. 92. Kha1ed Ahmed, "The Power of the Ah1-i- Hadith," The Friday Times (Lahore), July 15,2002. Iftikar Malik, "Religious Minorities in Pakistan," Minority Group International Report (London), September 2002, p. 13. Tariq Rahman, "The Madrasa and the State of Pakistan: Religion, Poverty and the Potential Violence in Pakistan," Himal South Asia (Katmandu), February, 2004, p. 3. Mohammad Waseem, "Origins and Growth Patterns oflslamic Organizations in Pakistan," in Limaye, S., Wirsing, R., and Malik, (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, (Honolulu: APCSS, 2004), p. 26. Saleem H. Ali, n. 41, p. 42.

19

(followers of Masood Salebahi). 128 The Bohra community compnses a largely

affluent class of business entrepreneurs who migrated from Gujarat in India to the

Karachi area (Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan was himself a Bohra). 129

Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP) literally meaning "Army of Muhammad" refers

to a Shia group which is involved in sectarian terrorist activity primarily in

Pakistan. 130 (More details in chaper IV).

Jamaat-i-Islami Madrasas

The Jamaat-i-Islami 1s a revivalist political party formed by

Abul Ala Mawdudi. He was an editor of a daily newspaper, was not a traditional

cleric. All his knowledge of religion was acquired from reading books, rather than

studying at a madrasa. 131 Mawdudi believed in borrowing concepts from the West in

order to empower the Islamic community. 132 He favoured more modernist education

than any of the orthodox madrasas. He did, however, also emphasize upon the

refutation of Western culture and intellectual domination and, therefore, his anti­

Western critique is more thorough, trenchant and appealing than that of the

traditionalist madrasas. 133 So in Jamaat madrasas, besides traditional texts, emphasis

is laid on the modem subjects such as science, economics and history with a view to

prepare the young Ulema for confronting the ideas of the West. 134

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

Ibid. Ibid. "Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan," http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistanlterroristoutfits/SMP.htm Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Pakistan turns on Itself' Asia Times: South Asia, August, 19, 2004. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_ Asia/FH 19DfD5 .html Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996}, p. 112. Maudoodi Abul Ala, Talimat (Lahore: Islamic Publications1974). Quoted in Mumtaz Ahmed, "Pluralism and Intolerance in Pakistani Society," pp. 6-7. http://www .aku.edu/news/ma j orevents/ ismcconf-tr. pdf Tariq Rahman, n. 125.

20

Sect wise Increase in Number of Madrasas

Table No.3

Ahl-i- Jamat-i-Deobandis Barel vis Hadith Shia Islami Total

Years 1988 2002 1988 2002 1988 2002 1988 2002 1988 2002 1988 2002

Numbers 1779 7000 717 1585 161 376 47 419 97 500 2801 9880

Sources: Ministry of Education Report (Government of Pakistan: Islamabad, 1988) and Report ofSindh Police published in The Dawn (Karachi), January 16,2003.

Table No.4

Important Madrasas in Pakistan

Baluchistan NWFP Punjab Sin db

Madras a Jamia Imdad-ul- Jamia Ashrafia, Lahore Madrasa Muthla-ul Uloom,Peshawar Furqania Taiba, uloom, Bruri Jarnia Madina, Karim Karachi Road, Quetta Dar-ul-Uloom Park, Lahore

Haqqania, Akora Khanqah Haliji Madrasa Arabia Khattak,Peshawar Anjuman Khuddam-ud Sharif, Sindh Siddiqia,Qalat, Deen, Badshahi Baluchistan Dar-ul-Uloom Surhad, Mosque, Lahore Khanqah Aliah

Peshawar Qadria Rashidia, Nusratul-Uloom, Umrot Sharif,

Madrasa Dar-ul- J amia Uloom Sharia, Gujranwala Sindh Uloom Islamia, Banu Loralai Jamia Khair-ul- Madrasa Najm-

Jamia Madina, Attock Madaris, Multan ul-Madaris, Karachi

Tehrik Khuddam Able-Sunnat, Chakwal Madrasa Binauri

town, Karachi. Dar-ul Uloom, Faisalabad

Source: http://www.hazara.net/persecution/Jeaflet/leaflet.html also in ashrafia.org.pk/todav htm

21

TH 371.077095491

M6877 Ma-i

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \~1 T\-\14339

Rawalpindi & Islamabad

Jamat-ul-Uloom Islamia Alfaridia, Islamabad

J amialslamia, Kashmir Road, Rawalpindi

Musjid Siddiq Akbar, Rawalpindi

Bajaur Madrasa in Islamabad

JamiaHafsa and Jamia Fareedia

Madrasas in Present Context

The attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 had a series of

consequences for political Islam in South Asia. 135 To understand "political Islam"

one has to begin at the level of definition: what is political Islam and how best can it

be defined? Because of this problem, many authors dispense with a definition

altogether, leaving it to the reader to infer the many meanings of political Islam. This

is also reflected in the common practice of "prefixing" Islam to create a confusing

conceptual plurality, which, to name but a few, includes radical Islam, militant Islam,

extremist Islam, revolutionary Islam and fundamentalist Islam. This diversity points

both to the many aspects believed to characterise political Islam, as well as to the

problem of finding an appropriate term. The shortest and most encompassing

definition of political Islam is that it denotes "Islam used to a political end."136 A

general problem with the term political Islam is that it tends to imply "an illegitimate

extension of the Islamic tradition outside of the proper religious domain it has

historically occupied." 137

"Political Islam" or "Islamism" (in some ways a better term to use, i.e., use of

Islam as a political ideology rather than as religion or theology) more analytically

useful definition given by the political scientist Guilian Denoeux, who writes of

"Islamism as a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and

organisations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's

societal challenges by imagining a future based on re-appropriated, reinvented

concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition." 138 This re-appropriation of the past,

the "invention of tradition" to use Eric Hobsbawm' s term, is a romanticised notion of

a largely mythical golden age. It is this romanticised, instrumentalised definition of

Islam that lies at the heart of Political Islam. 139

135

136

137

138

139

Are Knudsen, "Political Islam in South Asia" Development Studies and Human Rights Report (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, 2002), No. 14, p. 7. www.cmi.no/public/pub2002 Are Knudsen, "Political Islam in the Middle East," Development Studies and Human Rights Report (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute Norway, 2003), No. 3, p. 2. C.Hirschkind, "What is Political Islam," Middle East Report (Washington), OctobertDecemberl997, p. 12. Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," Middle East Policy (Washington), Vol. 9, June 2002, p. 61. Moham;ned Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality," World Policy Journal (Washington), Fall 2004, p. I.

22

According to Mohammed Ayoob, "Political Islam provides Islamists a

powerful ideological tool that they can use to "purge" Muslim societies of the

"impurities" and "accretions" that are the inevitable accompaniments of the historical

process, but which they see as the reason for Muslim decline."140 Islamic religious

vocabulary, like the vocabulary of most other religions, lends itself to political ends.

Madrasas and their affiliated institutions could be used to send out political messages

dressed up in religious garb- the sermon as manifesto. 141

The threat from political Islam to the West has been accentuated, and its

antagonistic image reinforced, by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Western

perceptions of this threat already perceived before the events of 2001. The noted

Western analysts, such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, were writing about

the "roots of Muslim rage" and the "clash of civilizations" long before the terrorist

attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 142 They say that political

Islam is unique not because it only uses religion for political purposes in order to

create national identity or transform society but it is seen as outstandingly threatening

because it uses violent means as an instrument to challenge. It is this dimension of

political Islam that makes it appear threatening to the international system.

It is be important to make difference between Islamic fundamentalism and

religious extremism. Islamic fundamentalism is not a "monolithic affair" as scholar

Lawrence Davidson aptly remarked. 143 Islamic fundamentalists wish to revive the past

glory of the Islamic empires, and preach the "fundamental" aspects of Islam. This

fundamentalist approach includes a literal interpretation of the Quran and a revival of

Islam's role in politics. 144 First of all, anyone labeled an "extremist" generally resorts

to (or thinks in terms of) a militant solution first and finds justification for it in faith or

the literal meaning of text (e.g., "when texts have spoken, reason must be silent). 145 It

is this silencing of reason which characterizes an extremist. Extremists are, after all,

140

141

142

143

144

145

Ibid. Ibid, p. 3. Bernard Lewis, "Roots of Muslim Rage," Atlantic Monthly (Washington), September 1990, pp. 47-60, and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 72, Summer: 1993, pp. 22-49. Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 14. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Books Publication, 1979), p. 95. "Islamic Extremism," Research Paper (New York: Austin Peay State University). http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3400/3400lcct04a.htm

23

defending their God, and corning closer to their God. The acts of destruction that they

engage in (any destruction being a victory) bring value to the cause and are a vivid

proof of faith. 146 Islamic extremists have a particularly violent manifesto and call for

the destruction of non-Muslirns. 147

Madrasas have been of increasing interest to policy makers, security analysts

and political scientist since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 200l.This is because

it is believed that several extremists and militants have developed radical political

views at rnadrasas in Pakistan. Some of these schools were reportedly built and

financed through Saudi Arabian sources and some from other sponsor countries. The

terrorist attacks also brought Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network to world

attention and ultimately led to the American offensive against Afghanistan's Taliban

regime. 148

The general perception about rnadrasas that has evolved today is that they are

fundamentalist in orientation and are involved in the promotion of religious

extrernisrn.'49Islamisation in itself may not be an issue but it becomes so when

"fundamentalism (the intra and inter-religious fault-lines accentuates) and violence

(inter-faith conflicts leading to symbolic or actual suppression of diversity or

bloodshed) come to be linked to the rnadrasas."150

It has already been discussed that Pakistani rnadrasas trace their origin and

traditions back to nearly a thousand years of Islamic teaching. Over the last decades,

however, they, barring exceptions, have increasingly played a role contrary to their

original intent. As Singer has stated that the rnadrasas were "founded as centers of

learning for the next generation of Islamic scholars, but these schools now

146

147

148

149

150

J. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. "Islamic Extremism," Research Paper (New York: Austin Peay State University). http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/3400/3400lect04a.htm Christopher M. Blanchard, "Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background," CRS Report for Congress (Washington), February 10, 2005, p. I. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654 .pdf Khalid Rahman and Syed Rasad Bukhari, "Pakistan: Religious Education and Institutions," The Muslim World (Oxford: Blackwell Publication), Vol. 96, April2006, p. 323. David Emmanuel Singh, "The Independent Madrasas of India: Dar al-Uloom, Deoband and Nadvat al -Ulema: Lucknow," http://missioneducation.net/docs/madrasas _ deoband.pdf

24

increasingly dominate the educational sphere." 151 Similar v1ew also expressed by

Robert Looney, who aptly remarked, "the biggest concern about these schools is now

that some of these schools have built extremely close ties with radical militant groups

and play a critical role in sustaining the terrorist network." 152

The madrasas have received extensive media coverage and have been

discussed within the broader context of radical Islarnisation. There are scholars such

as Singer has called them a "displacement of the public education system."153

Jeffrey Goldberg, even before September 11, 2001, termed them as "means of

education of the holy warrior."154

Jessica Stem, while describing them as emblematic of "Pakistan's jihad

culture," uses epithets and sub-headings like, "schools of hate", "Jihad International

Inc."155 In July 2004, the September 9/11 Commission Report of "the National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States" described madrasas as

"incubators of violent extremism."156 In December 2004, President Musharraf called

his "biggest fears" extremism, terrorism, and militancy that have "really polluted

society in Pakistan," considering that some of Pakistan's religious schools are "part of

the problem" and that "there are many madrasas which are involved in militancy and

extremism."157

In an opinion article for the Washington Quarterly, Peter Bergen and

Swati Pandey have referred to the concern over madrasas as a "myth."158 This

assertion is based on a study on the background of 75 terrorists behind major attacks

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

P.W. Singer, "Pakistan's Madrasas: Ensuring a System of Education not jihad," Brookings Analysis Paper (Washington), No. 14, November 2001, p. 2. Robert Looney, "United State Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: Expanding Educational Opportunities," Strategic Insight (Monterey: California), September 2, 2002.p. 7. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sept02/southAsia.pdf. P.W. Singer, n. 151. Jeffrey Goldberg, "Inside jihad University: The Education of a Holy Warrior" New York Times Magazine, June 25, 2000. Jessica Stem, "Pakistan's jihad Culture," Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 79, No. 6, November/ December 2000, pp. 115-127. The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 367. K. Alan, "Terrorism in South Asia" CRS Report for Congress (Washington), December 13, 2004, p. 9. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrasa Scapegoat", Washington Quarterly (Washington), Spring 2006, Vol. 29, No.2, p. 118.

25

on Western targets and concluded that only nine attended madrasas. However, their

study did not focus on sectarian violence. William Dalrymple has also taken

exception to sensationalism about madrasas and provided a more humane and

nuanced account of madrasas in South Asia. 159 There has been a controversial study

prepared with World Bank funding by Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das of the World Bank

and other Harvard University members titled, Religious School Enrollment in

Pakistan: Look at Data that questions the need for anxiety over madrasas by

providing data that suggests their limited prevalence within the larger context of

Pakistani schooling. According to study, "the madrasas account for less than 1 percent

of all enrollments in the country and there is no evidence of a dramatic increase in

recent years." 160

However it would not be reasonable to say that all madrasas are involved in

the promotion of Islamic militancy and terrorism. The percentage of either may be

debatable. Thus, the Interior Ministry Report of Pakistan: 1995 speculates "around

10-15% of madrasas might have links with extremist religious/political groups and

international terrorism."161 The same impression provided by the Report of the Human

Rights Commission of Pakistan 2001. The report states "about one-third of Pakistani

madrasas are providing military training to their students and some madrasas provided

training for their students to participate in Afghan war, without the knowledge of their

parents."162

Nadim Iqbal speculates, "the number roughly 1 in 10 suggesting that there

could be one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand potential recruits for Islamist

terrorist organisations in Pakistan's madrasas alone."163 The World Bank Report, June

2002, estimates that 15 to 20 per cent of religious schools are involved in military-

159

160

161

162

163

William Dalrymple, "Myths and Madrasas" Asia Time: South Asia News, November 24,2005. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South _ Asia!GK24Df0 l.html Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Tristan Zajonc, "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data" Faculty Research Working Paper Series (John F. Kennedy School of Government: Harvard University), RWP05-024, March i005, p. 18. P.W. Singer, n. 151. Human Rights Commission Report of Pakistan: 2001 (Islamabad), p. 122. Nadeem Iqbal, "Upgrading' Madrasas" The News International Pakistan, June 29, 2003. http:/ /www.jang.com. pk/thenews/

26

related training or teachings. 164 In July 2002 the International Crisis Group Report

put the figure at 10 to 15 per cent. 165 The report also mentioned that "Pro-jihadi

madrasas only play a supporting role mainly as a recruiting ground for militants."166

Khalil Rana says, "the madrasas teach a distorted view of Islam. Hatred is

permissible; jihad allows the murder of innocent civilians including other men,

women, and children. The new heroes are jihadi and martyrdom through suicide

attacks is also extolled."167 The USAID, Bureau of the Policy Programme

Coordination (PPC), undertook a three month desk study to analyse the strengths and

weaknesses of secular and Islamic education system in 12 Muslim countries including

Pakistan in 2003 and found out that "Many madrasas in Pakistan include weapon and

physical training, as well as weekly lessons on political teachings (where anti­

American and anti India rhetoric is memorised). The students are generally cut off

from contact with their parents for years at a time, and thus highly susceptible to

being programmed towards violence."168 The Pakistan's Annual Report on Christian

Solidarity, 2002 speculates, "madrasas have become the new breeding ground for

radical Islamic militants, where the next generation is trained and groomed. Their

graduating classes form an integral recruiting pool for transnational terrorist and

conflict networks."169

Broadly, the madrasas are increasingly teaching a more extreme version of

Islam than what had been propagated before in Pakistan. They combine a mix of

Wahabism (a puritanical version of Islam originating in Saudi Arabia) with

Deobandism (a strand from the Indian subcontinent that is anti-Western, claiming that

the West is the source of corruption in contemporary Islamic states and thus the laws

of state are not legitimate). 170 With practically no state supervision, it is up to the

individual schools to decide what to teach and preach. "Many provide only religious

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

Report cited in Nadeem Iqbal, "Medievalism and Pakistan's Madrassas," Asia Times, August, 29,2002. http:/ /www.atimes.com/atimes/South _ Asia/DH29Df05 .html International Crisis Group Report, n. 71, p. 2. Ibid. Khalil Rana, "Beyond Islam: Understanding the Muslim World Curriculum," World Affairs Council (Washington), 2005, p. 3. "Strengthening Education in the Muslim World," USAID Issue Paper (New York), No. 2, June 2003, p. 66. Pakistan: Annual Report on Christian Solidarity (Islamabad), May 2002, p. 36. http:/ /www.csw.org.uk/country%20reports%2003/Pakistan%20AR %202003 .pdf. Amir Mir, "Test of Will," Newsline (Karachi), August, 2005, p. 24.

27

subjects to their students, focusing on rote memorisation of Arabic texts to the

exclusion of basic skills such as simple math, science and geography. The graduate

students are unable to multiply and find their nation on a map and also are ignorant of

b . . h h" ,(71 astc events m uman 1story.

Madrasa recruits spell serious security implications both inside and outside

Pakistan because it is believed that they receive militant training and have become the

primary soldiers in the internal sectarian conflicts that have reached increasing levels

of violence and involved in the promotion of Islamic militancy at the various parts of

the world, including J arnmu and Kashmir in India. In order to understand these

developments it is important to look more closely at the many factors that have played

important role in flourishing madrasas during the past few decades.

Problem of Education System

In the history of Islam, the madrasas have been the most prestigious seats of

learning. Due to the "limited knowledge" and "lack of exposure to the outside world"

these institutions make the students vulnerable to fundamentalist beliefs and other

notions, which are controversial to the teaching of Islam. 172The religious leaders

especially Ulema are the key factors in maintaining the rigid and closed attitude of

recruits towards social development. According to Jamal Malik, madrasas are

significant in several ways besides imparting religious education. "Madrasa plays an

important role in Pakistan's education policy as they had in the pre-Pakistan period.

They were an important factor during the Islamisation drive of General Zia-ul Haq.

The leading clergy is recruited from these madrasas."173

Fazal Mehmood argues, "the mind-boggling curriculum of most of these

madrasas entirely neglects all branches of secular instruction, including the basics of

mathematics and science, and comprises long years of purely theological education,

recitation of the Quran, Fiqh (interpretation of the Sharia), and indoctrination for

171

172

173

"Alternative Rep01t on the State of Child Rights in Pakistan," Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (Islamabad), April2003, p. 24. http: I lwww. crin. org/ docs/resources/treaties/ ere. 34/pakistan _ ngo _report. pdf. Brigid Smith, Report of the EC Rapid Action Mechanism Assessment Mission on Pakistan Education (Islamabad), June 2002, p. 149. Jamal Malik, n. 65, p. 120.

28

jihad. 114 Ajay Sahni says "the inevitable consequence of such an education has been

the chronic inability to produce reality-based theories of change."175

These madrasas impart religious education and the famous syllabus taught by

these institutions are known as Dars-e-Nizami, which has little relevance to the

present day situation because it is inflexible and focuses only on narrow version of the

teachings of Islam and promotes blind pursuing and preach, 'hate' against different

religious factions and sects. 176

The education system in Pakistan is facing several difficulties. Poverty is

cited as the key factor responsible for defeating the government efforts to provide

education to the masses. 177 In addition, "the low national spending on education,

absence of schools, non availability of teachers, high absenteeism of teachers,

corruption, lack of motivation of teachers, limited participation of parents, low

support from local communities, poor management of government schools, poor

physical infrastructure (building, water, toilets, etc.) high fee of private schools (other

factors for the low enrolment), high drop-out rates, diversion of children to madrasa

and maktab (government mosque schools) and mushrooming of poor quality private

schools, are some of the main reasons for setback to the education."178 The result is

that the current system cannot provide the quality education.

The madrasa system has changed in outlook, at the same time it has expanded

in number and influence. The reason for the madrasas new centrality stems from the

weakening of the Pakistani state. While the law promises, the education for all

children, but in reality, it is not so, because Pakistan spends only 2% of its GNP on

public education, one of the lowest in world (just behind Congo in UNDP

174

175

176

177

178

Fazal Mehmood, "Politics oflslam in Pakistan," http:/ /www.dailyexcelsior.com/O 1 aug 17 /edit.htm#top Ajay Sahni, "Islamic Extremism and Subversion in South Asia: Wars within Borders," F aultline (New Delhi), June 2001. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni!NA TIV2002.htm Harnza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.) State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (London: 1988), p. 76. Chris Kraul, "The World Dollars to Help Pupils in Pakistan," Los Angeles Times, April 14, 2003. Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 123.

29

rankings). 179The Government-run schools are generally considered horrendous. "They

often lack teachers, books, electricity, running water, and even roofs. A significant

number are ghost schools, which exist only as budget line items for corrupt

bureaucrats to draw money. Many administrators receive their jobs only through

political connections and teachers regularly go on strike for pay."180 The result is that

the Pakistani literacy rate is, at best, estimated only around 50 per cent. 181 The elite

class in Pakistan responded to this government pullback by sending their own children

to an expanded number of private schools, which are considered far superior.

However, the poor cannot afford the private schools, which is where the madrasas

stepped in. With no better options, poor parents send their children to madrasas,

where they receive at least some education. 182

Most of the madrasas provide free food and clothes, and even pay parents to

send their children, further increasing their enticement. 183 As Pakistan's state-run

educational system steadily collapsed, these madrasas became the only avenue for

boys from poor families to receive the semblance of an education. 184 Thus, madrasas

became immensely popular by targeting the lower class and refugee populations,

whom the Pakistani state has failed to provide proper access to education. For

example, "the Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqania, one of the most popular and influential

madrasa includes most of the Afghan refugee and Afghan - Taliban leadership among

its alumni. 185 It has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students,

from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie

for its 400 open spaces."186

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

Pakistan Human Development Forum: (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan), Volume 1, January 24-26, 2002, p. 36. http:/ /In web 18. worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/ Attachments/Proceedings. pdf Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 126. Dawood Shah, "Decentralization in the Education System of Pakistan: Policies and Strategies," Ministry of Education Report (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan), June 2003, p. 3. Masooda Bano, "Beyond Politics: the Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan," Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford), July 2006, p. 7. Tahir Andrabi, and othres, "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data" Faculty Research Working Paper Series (John F. Kennedy School of Government: Harvard University), RWPOS-024, March 2005, p. 20. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London & New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 89. Pakistan Human Development Forum (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan), Volume 1, January 24,2002,p.37. Ibid.

30

The crux of problem is the type of education madrasas impart. Education that

creates barriers to modem knowledge, stifling creativity and breeding bigotry, has

become the madrasa-defining feature. 187 It is this foundation on which

fundamentalism-militant or otherwis~is built. Is it possible to reform this extremism

by replacing intolerance through a modem curriculum? Can an austere and rigid

system of teaching coexist with modem arts and sciences? Is madrasa reform

possible? These are some of the pertinent questions that drag the debate on madrasas

and have no easy answers.

Socio - Economic Factors

The madrasas are important stakeholders in the civil society in Pakistan. 188

The numerical strength, potential of influence and acceptability among the

communities, the proximity of contact with the people at the grass roots level, and

various services these institutions are already providing make them a very fit means

for supporting the process of social transformation in the country. 189

Mumtaz Ahmed points out, "Madrasa education remains the surest paths of

social mobility for the lower level occupational castes and artisans of the rural areas

of Pakistan ... upon the completion of their madrasa education, they are certain to take

a step forward .. .in terms of both income and social status."190 Thus, the social

significance of the madrasa education lies only in the fact that it imparts religious

education to a large number of students, but that it does not ensures access to

employment. However, no organised effort has ever been made to bring them into the

mainstream of development and to tap their potential for developmental activities in

the country. These institutions also could not come up with concrete ideas to solve the

growing socio-economic problems of the local communities. Most of the

developmental initiative that were taken in the country, they see it as a conspiracy

187

188

189

190

"Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military," International Crisis Group Report (Islamabad), July 29, 2002, p. 3. Adnan Sattar Rabia Baig, "Civil Society in Pakistan," Occasional Paper (Islamabad: Aga Khan Foundation Karachi), Vol. 1, Issue 11, August 2001, p. 6. Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 149. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh" in Limaye, S., Wirsing, R. and Malik, M., (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: APCSS, 2004), p. 101.

31

against Islam. 191 Very often, they oppose the western democracy, the rights of women

to education, to vote and to employment, functioning of the civil society organisations

in the country. 192 Furthermore, on many occasions, they make deliberate efforts to

spread hatred against people from other religions and beliefs. 193

The development initiatives in Pakistan remained state sponsored since its

creation in 1947.194 It was believed that large public investment would raise per capita

income, and benefits would eventually reach the poor even if they were not

specifically targeted. Moreover, the greater state control over the resources steadily

resulted in rampant corruption and numerous other socio-economic problems that

ultimately eroded the people confidence in state machinery. 195 This phenomenon has

negatively affected the civil society and ultimately led to the exploitation of religion

to promote sectarianism, militancy, religious intolerance and gender discrimination. 196

Madrasas Statistics

There have been several important -albeit overlooked - surveys of madrasas

conducted by the Government of Pakistan, including a report in 1979 done by the Ministry

of Religious Affairs and two other reports by the Ministry of Education in 1989 and

2000.197 These reports suggest that as of 2000, there were 6,741 registered madrasas in

Pakistan. Following table provides a historical count of madrasas by geographical

distribution.

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

Isaac Kfir, "The Paradox that is Pakistan: Both Ally and Enemy of Terrorism," The Middle East Review of International Affairs (Herzliya), Vol. I 0, No. I, March 2006. http:/ /meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/2006/issue I /jv I Ono I a6.html Report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (Islamabad), 2002, p. I7. Brigid Smith, n. I72, p. I28. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, "Pakistan's Performance: An Independent Analysis" SDPI Research and News Bulletin (Islamabad), Vol. 13, No.4 & 5 July-October 2006, p. I. "Education Sector Reform Action Plan 200I-2004, the Road Ahead," Ministry of Education Report (Islamabad: Government ofPakistan), December 200I, p. 48. Ibid. The Report of Ministry of Religious Affairs (Islamabad) 1979, Minist1y of Education (Islamabad) 1988 and 2000. Compiled in Saleem Mansoor Khaled, Deeni Madaris Main Ta/eem (Islamabad Policy Research Institute publications: 2002), p. 145.

32

Table No.5

Regional Expansion ofMadrasas from 1947 to 2000

Province/ Area 1947 1960 1980 1988 2000

Punjab 121 195 1,012 1,320 3,153

Sarhad (NWFP 59 87 426 678 1,281

Sindh 21 87 380 291 905

Baluchistan 28 70 135 347 692

Azad Kashmir 4 8 29 76 151

Islamabad ..... 1 27 47 94

Northern Areas 12 16 47 102 185

FATA ········· ...... 300

Total 245 464 2056 2861 6,741

Source: The Report of Ministry of Religious Affairs (Islamabad) 1979, Ministry of Education (Islamabad) 1988 and 2000. Compiled in Saleem Mansoor Khaled, Deeni Madaris Main Taleem (Islamabad Policy Research Institute publications, 2002), p.145.

The growth of madrasas is an indication of Pakistan's mounting problems.

According to Muhammad Qasim Zaman, in 194 7, there were 13 7 madrasas in the

entire country. 198 By 1971, this number had grown to 900. 199 General Zia pursued a

policy of generously funding of madrasas to all sectarian persuasion, as a result by the

end of his regime in 1988, there were 8,000 registered madrasas and 25,000

unregistered ones, educating over half a million of students.200 Sources indicate that

by the middle of the year 2000, the number of registered madrasas had grown to

nearly 9,500, and some commentators in Pakistan estimate the current number of

unregistered madrasas at between 40,000 and 50,000?01

198

199

200

201

Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan," Comparative Studies (London: Cambridge University Press), No. 41, April, 1999, p. 294. Ajay Sahni, "Islamic Extremism and Subversion in South Asia: Wars within Borders," Faultlines (New Delhi), June 2001. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/NATIV2002.htm Ahmed Rashid, n. 184, p. 89. Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's jihad Culture," Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 79, No. 6, November/ December 2000, p. 119.

33

The exact number of madrasas is not known although, in early 2002, Pakistani

President Pervez Musharraf announced that he would implement new policies to

oversee the 10,000 madrasas, which "propagate hatred and violence" and "produce

semi-literate religious scholars?02 According to the Report of European Commission

of Rapid Action Mechanism Assessment Mission on Pakistan Education June 2002,

"there are currently probably in excess of 80,000 madrasas in Pakistan."203

The extent of nse in the number of madrasas and its students can be

estimated by the simple fact that in Peshawar only a total of 24,000 students were

receiving education in 152 madrasas in 2001 (For details the table given below).204

These statistics in the table do not include informal madrasas and mosque schools and

the number of students receiving education therein (no formal data is available on

them). There are also madrasas that impart education to women only. According to

Iqbal Khattak, "the number of such schools across Pakistan is said to be 150: Punjab

(75), NWFP (15), Sindh (19), Baluchistan (15) Islamabad (11) and Azad Kashmir

(15)."205

Number of Madrasas in District Peshawar

Table No.6

S.N No. of Madrasa Male No. of Total Increase No. of by Madrasas Female Students the Year Madrasas

I 1947 2 - 2 - 37

2. 1980 13 - 13 11 -3 1990 38 - 38 25 -4 1998 72 14 87 49 18,000

5 2001 127 25 152 65 24,000

Source: Report of the National Research and Development Foundation (Islamabad), Pakistan 2001, p. 125.

The National Research and Development Foundation study on madrasas

shows that there are 3000 formal madrasas exist in NWFP that impart education to

202

203

204

205

Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia Crucible of Terror (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 11. Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 121. Ibid. Iqbal Khattak, "US Allowed Growth of Seminaries of Bleed-Russia Strategy," The Friday Times (Lahore), March 15, 2002.

34

over 600,000 students mainly through the support oflocal communities.206 Their food

cost range from $130-146 million annually, which form around 20 per cent of the

total cost of madrasas.

Funding

Most of the madrasas have permanent sources of income such as land, buildings

and other types of property that produce regular retums.207 Since madrasas typically

did not charge tuition fee, the funds required for their operations had to come from

sources other than the student body. Most funding was derived from religious

endowments provided by local notables.208 The legal basis for these pious

endowments centered on the well-known institution of the waqf. "A waqfis a private

endowment set aside in perpetuity for the purpose of providing funds for some public

good or service, typically of a religious nature. "209

In addition to this, they receive foreign donations and Zakat (religious tax), which

makes them a very viable institution to compete with public sector primary or middle

schools. Provincial and local Zakat committees have continued this tradition of

selective state financial patronage. Zakat is therefore a tool of state patronage.210

According to a survey conducted by Agha Khan University in 2002 the local

communities in Pakistan annually contribute around 70 billion rupees, which was

almost six times higher than the money contributed by the international communities

and agencies to the country.Z11 On the contrary, Alex Alexiev, a fellow at the Center

for Security Policy United States, suggested that as much as three-quarters

(75 per cent) of all madrasa funding comes from abroad, and pointed to Saudi Arabia

as by far the largest foreign contributor.212

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

Study cited in Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 125. "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military," International Crisis Group Report (Islamabad), July 29, 2002, p. 14. Robert W. Hefner, "The Culture, Politics, and Future of Muslim Education" in Robert W. Hefner & Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds.) Schooling Islam (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 7. John L. Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Vol. 4, p. 312. International Crisis Group Report, n. 207, p. 15. Agha Khan Survey Cited in Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 125. Alex Alexiev, "The Pakistani Time Bomb," Commentary, March, 2003, http://members.lycos. co. uk/tcrrorism/paki stani-time-bomb .htm.

35

Afzaal Mahmood notes that, "By allowing Iran and Saudi Arabia to fund,

influence and use some sectarian organisations of their liking...... virtually

encouraged Teheran and Riyadh to fight a proxy war on the soil of Pakistan, with

serious consequences for sectarian harmony and law and order in the country."213

Funds also come from Libya, Iraq and several other Gulf countries, creating an

intricately nuanced web of conflict.214 In April 1995, for instance, the Benazir Bhutto

government released a list of 38 foreign funded madrasas and sectarian organisations

that possessed arms and imparted weapons training to local and foreign students.

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, UAE and Kuwait were identified as the sources of

funding and support to these organisations.215

The Saudi money is spent according to a carefully designed plan to enhance

Wahhabi influence and control at the expense of mainstream Muslims?16 The Saudi

Arabia economic aid has been estimated in 2002, at no less than $350 million per

year?17 Starting in the 1980's, "the four largest Wahhabi front organisations--the

World Muslim League (WML), the AI Haramain Foundation, the World Assembly of

Muslim Youth (W AMY), and the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO)

became the main sponsors of Deobandi madrasas and jihadi organisations in Pakistan,

as well as of the most extreme of the Afghan resistance groups and later of the

Taliban and AI Qaeda."218 The WML alone is said to have provided more than $200

million for various projects?19 According to the Report of European Commission on

Rapid Action Mechanism Assessment Mission: Pakistan Education, 2002, some of the

important financial sources of madrasas is given below:

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

• • • •

Local donations from public (cash and kind) .

Special donations from general public (cash) .

Zakat and charity from local communities .

Collections by the students and hired workers .

Afzaal Mahmood, "What Price jihad Culture," The Dawn (Karachi), January 15, 200 I. http:/ /www.dawn.com/200 1/01 /15/op.htm. Ibid. Shafiq Awam, "Foreign-Funded Madaris list provided to Government," The Nation (Lahore) Aprill6, 1995. Rohan Bedi, "Have Pakistanis Forgotten their Sufi Traditions? Research Paper (Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism), April, 2006, p. 2. Alex Alexiev, n. 212. Ibid. Ibid.

36

e Hides and skin collection on Eidul Azha.

• Government funding from Zakat Fund.

• Donations from Islamic countries.

• Muslims living abroad particularly in Western countries.220

The orthodox and modern Muslims alike provide voluntary alms, skins of

slaughtered animals and fitrana (Eid donations) to madrasa students to fulfil their

religious duty. In the tribal areas and the Pashtun regions of Baluchistan, madrasa

students have been reported to go door to door for collecting money. Funds, however

modest, are also regularly raised at weekly and annual prayer congregations?21

Factors of Madrasa Extremism

The growth of religious extremism in Pakistan has, to a substantial degree,

been caused by the proliferation of madrasas since the outbreak of Afghan war and

General Zia's policy of Islamisation?22(More details in chapter II) Islam provides a

convenient religious cover for its perpetrators to achieve political objectives through

the means of violence and coercion.223 A violent and terrorist movement, launched in

the name of Islam, touches the sentiments of the followers of Islam, which makes

lethal and dangerous destabilising phenomena in Pakistan. It has emerged as the

patron and promoter of extremism and militancy with the aim of utilising it to serve

its policy interests?24

The surge in the number of madrasas in Pakistan since 1980s coincided with

the influx of some three million Afghan refugees?25 The madrasas located along the

North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan frequently provided the education and

trainings for these refugees.226 One school in particular, the Haqqania Madrasa, in

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

Brigid Smith, n. 172, p. 126. International Crisis Group Report n. 207, p. 15. Ibid, p. 2. Andrew Coulson, "Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World: Is There A Problem? What Can We Do about It?, Policy Analysis (Washington), March 11, 2004, p. 6. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf P.B. Sinha, "Pakistan: The Chief Patron-Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism," Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. XX, No.3, p. 1015. Barbara D. Metcalf, "Traditionalist, Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs" ISIM Research Paper (Leiden: The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modem World), 2002, p. 13. The Muslim World After 9/JJReport (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), p. 47.

37

Akora Katthak near Peshawar, trained many of the top Taliban leaders.227 Pakistan

has several Ulema-based political parties with millions of supporters. The Taliban

regime in Afghanistan was entirely Ulema-based, products of Pakistani Deobandi

madrasas.228 Taliban leaders were rigorously concerned with fulfilling rituals;

opposition to custom laden ceremonies like weddings and pilgrimage to shrines, along

with practices associated with the Shias minority; and a focus on seclusion of women

as a central symbol of a morally ordered society.229 The narrow interpretation of

Sharia law, which emphasised personal behaviour and ritual, was something the

Taliban shared with other Deobandi movements. 230

The madrasas openly support Taliban and their philosophies in Afghanistan

and provided continued support to them for recruitment of religious warriors. It is

estimated that 30 per cent of Taliban fighters were supplied by the Pakistani

madrasas.231 In the early 1990s, Afghan Islamic clerics and madrasa students became

party of the Taliban movement. Many of them were former Mujahideen who had

studied and were trained in Pakistani madrasas and advocated a strict version of Islam

similar to the Wahhabism practiced in Saudi Arabia.232 This phenomenon greatly

contributed to the rise in militancy and extremism in Pakistan.

The major concern is the proliferation of religious influence through a network

of madrasas that are perceived to have links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda activities?33

Poverty, igr10rance and lack of educational facilities at primary level cause gravitation

towards these institutions that provide for all the needs of the children.234

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

Masood Ansari, "Jehad Factories," Frontline (Chennai), October 2001, p. 67. John Butt, "The Taliban Phenomenon," in Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter (eds.) Afghanistan (Geneva: Cross lines, 1998), pp. 23-24. Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 20. Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," Foreign Affairs (New York) November-December1999. http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/think _ tank/taliban _extremism_ fa_ nov _99. Brigid Smith, p.172, p. 9. Husain Haqqani, "Islam's Medieval Outposts," Foreign Policy (Washington), Vol. 133, 2002, p. 4. K. Alan Kronstadt, "Terrorism in South Asia," CRS Report for Congress (Washington: Library of Congress), March 2004, p. 1. "Strengthening Education in the Muslim World," USAID Issue Paper Washington), No. 2, June 2003, p. 44.

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Most of madrasas allegiance is commanded by various "spiritual leaders" who

run madrasas that acquired extraordinary notoriety over the past years, both as

hotbeds of terrorism and as the spawning ground of the Taliban. It is here that a

"theology of rage" is taught, and the Talib (student) exhorted to practice a "sacred

violence" that is his greatest duty in Islam. These institutions include most

prominently the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak; the

Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI) at Muridke; the Dar-ul-Uloom, Pashtoonabad; the

Dar-ul-Iftah-ul-Irshad, Nazimabad; and the Ahle-Sunnat-wal Jamaat madrasa at

Rawalpindi etc.

Many of these institutions run a multiplicity of schools across the country -

the Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad, for instance, had 137 madrasas by late 2000?35 These,

however, are only a sample, the visible tip of the iceberg, and there are hundreds of

lesser known "Jihad Factories" that indoctrinate their students and gives military

training for the cause of sectarian war and international terrorism. 236 The apparatus of

training for terrorism reflects the same curious dualism and principal-agent conflict

that characterises the growth of the madrasas.237

The privatisation of these camps and of the jihadi armies, however, has had

disastrous consequences, and there is now mounting evidence of a loss of control as

the autonomous religious groups challenge, not only their Army and lSI handlers, but

the government itself.238 No clear division now exists between various social,

political, religious and terrorist organisations, and most groups that have actively

participated in street violence and acts of terrorism, both within Pakistan and abroad,

are also openly active on Pakistan's politicallandscape.239 There has, moreover, been

increasing penetration by extremist Islamic elements into Pakistan's Army, and

elements of "Islarnisation" have been introduced into the Army's training

programmes at various levels. In 1992, the then Prime Minister appointed a well-

235

236

237

238

239

"Jihad Culture Spreading World Over, Says Lashkar Chief," The News International (Karachi), December 3, 2000. http:/ /www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2000-daily/03-12-2000/metro/k2.htm Ben Barber, "Pakistan'sjihad Factories," War/and Journal (Washington), December, 2001. http://www. worldandi.com/ specialreport/2 00 11 december/S a221 00. htm Ahmed Rashid, n. 184, p. 92. Ajay Sahni, n. 199. Ibid.

39

known Tablighi (congregationist), Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, as the Director

General of the all-powerful ISI.240 Post Soviet defeat, madrasas became instrumental

in the power politics between the military and the democratically elected governments

of the 1990s. The military and intelligence agencies continued to provide support to

radical groups in Pakistan and promote militancy in Kashmir against the India.241

A major development that served to raise the level of sectarian tensions was

the rapid spread of madrasa movement during the 1980s and 1990s?42 These

madrasas, sponsored by politico-religious parties and often funded by donors from the

Middle East, instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs of the

schools sponsor. The phenomenal growth of madrasas has been witnessed as playing

a pivotal role in promoting sectarianism by producing a large number of indoctrinated

students with sect-oriented education. Hence, these students are converted into

sectarian militants readily available to fight .for their sectarian organisations against

the rival sect. The role of madrasas is important in terms of providing manpower to

sustain the sectarian conflict and as an institution for reproducing the ideology. The

madrasa and terrorist organisations have promoted sectarian violence within Pakistan,

because of the two movements; jihad against the Indians in Kashmir and jihad against

the Shia in Pakistan are inextricably linked. As a matter of fact, jihadi organisations

in Pakistan are much more powerful today than they were during the days of the

Afghan war. In fact over a period of time a vicious circle has emerged between rise of

sectarianism and madrasas culture, each promoting the other.

With this background, the study aims to provide an empirically grounded

analysis of madrasas in Pakistan thereby delving into the larger discussion of the role

of Islamic education and extremism. The study starts on the basis of three hypotheses,

first, the Islamisation policy of General Zia led to mushrooming of the madrasas in

Pakistan, secondly, madrasas played key role in the promotion of sectarianism, which

became the major internal security threat in the country and finally, the use of

240

241

242

Robin Wright, "The Chilling Goal of Islam's New Warriors," Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles), December 28, 2000. http:/ /www.latimes.com/news/nation/2000 1228/tOOO 123 583 .html. P.W. Singer, n. 151. Owais Tohid, "The jihad at Home," The Herald (Karachi), Vol. 28, No.l2, December 1997, p. 64.

40

madrasas for political objectives by the ruling elite boomeranged and is a maJor

source of extremism in Pakistan.

In the coming chapters the issues like the Islamisation policy of Zia and its impact '

on madras as, Afghan War and the role of United States in promotion of madrasas, the

role of madrasas in promotion of Islamic militancy, linkages between madrasa and

sectarian violence in Pakistan, and the state response on madrasas with special

reference to madrasa reforms is sought to be analysed.

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