Civpro Pleading Cases

8/12/2019 Civpro Pleading Cases

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G.R. No. 180595 March 5, 2010ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO,Petitioners,vs.HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR. and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA,Respondents.

D E C I S I O NABAD, J.:This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct forum foractions for damages arising from alleged wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search warrant issued inconnection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law.

The Facts and the CaseOn January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),

requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. After doingsurveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded inconfirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision,Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario.On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear theapplication and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the operation,the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the warrant. Their search yielded nofake Marlboro cigarettes.Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50 million in

damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City,Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the complaint with a motion todismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBIagents immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBIagents filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003.

Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTCs orders, first, in allegingmerely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without stating the facts that made theprocurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty offorum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for damages against the NBI agents through a motion forcompensation with the court that issued the search warrant.The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007, prompting themto file this petition for review.

The Issues PresentedThe petition presents two issues:

1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosarios did not state a cause ofaction; and2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping.

The Courts Rulings

One. The CA held that the Del Rosarios complaint before the RTC fa iled to state a cause of action against

respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that the NBI agents unlawfully procured and enforced the searchwarrant issued against the Del Rosarios but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they drew such conclusion.The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, thecourt can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks.1And judgment would be right only if thefacts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiffs legal right in the matter; (2) the defendants corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendants subsequentviolation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.2According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause or causes of action againstrespondents NBI agents:

2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered byforce the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street,Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] ofAngeles City, Branch 57 x x x.x x x x2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x

and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No. 02-09A, no fake Marlboro cigarettes and theirpackaging were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.

2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basisconsidering that the premises searched is the property solely of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids andsearches that was conducted in Angeles City and Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in thecommunity and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entitieswho were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.x x x x3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeitMarlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search warrant, and the malicious service of the suchwarrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members ofthe community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and

Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good names which Plaintiffs have painstakinglybuilt and maintained over the years.x x x x3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on thesubject residential premises, and subjected them to much unwarranted speculation of engaging in thesale of fake merchandise.

Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully obtainedsearch warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant,the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosarios premises.But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described il licit article does not of itself render the courts order"unlawful." The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimoniesto convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used anunlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true the factsalleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law .3Statements of mere conclusions oflaw expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.4

Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient.Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate fa cts to support the same are mereconclusions of law.5The Del Rosarios broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted "in full and plain view of membersof the community" does not likewise support their claim that such search was maliciously enforced. There is nothinginherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of neighbors. In fact, when the respondent or hisrepresentative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in the presence of two residents ofthe same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches weredone surreptitiously or clandestinely.Two. Invoking Section 21 of this Courts Administrative Matter (A.M.) 02 -1-06-SC (not A.O. 01-1-06-SC as cited), theCA held that, rather than file a separate action for damages, the Del Rosarios should have filed their claim forcompensation in the same proceeding and with the same court that issued the writ of search and seizure. The DelRosarios were thus guilty of forum shopping.A.M. 02-1-06-SC, the Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infri ngement of Intellectual Property Rights,provides:

SEC. 21. Claim for damages.Where the writ [of search and seizure] is discharged on any of the grounds providedin this Rule, or where it is found after trial that there has been no infringement or threat of infringement of anintellectual property right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party andafter due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate the defendant or expected adverse party upon the cashbond, surety bond or other equivalent security for any injury or damage the latter suffered by the issuance andenforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the amount of the bond, the applicant shall be liable for thepayment of the excess.When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the same court during the trial or beforeappeal is perfected or before judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant, setting forth the factsshowing the defendants right to damages and the amount thereof. The award of damages shall be included in thejudgment in the main case.Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion shall be filed with the court which issuedthe writ. In such a case, the court shall set the motion for summary hearing and immediately determine the expectedadverse partys right to damages.A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not necessarily bar the alleged infringing defendant

from recovering damages where he suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or enforcement of the writ.
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The damages provided for in thi s section shall be independent from the damages claimed by the defendant in h iscounterclaim.But the subject search warrant was not issued under A.M. 02-1-06-SC, which governed the issuance of a writ ofsearch and seizure in a civil action for infringement filed by an intellectual property right owner against the supposedinfringer of his trademark or name. Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes, did not go by this route.Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of its trademark against the Del Rosarios before the RTC ofAngeles City.Instead, Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the apprehension and criminal prosecution of thosereportedly appropriating its trademark and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI instituted a police actionthat included applying for a search and seizure warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules ofCriminal Procedure (not under the provisions of A.M. 02-1-06-SC) against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that they

were storing and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in violation of the penal provisions of the intellectual property law.The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for the filing of counterclaims for damagesagainst those who may have improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del Rosarioshad the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on themby an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed to state aproper cause of action.1avvphi1Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully included him as respondent in theirapplication for a search warrant since he neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But therules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of the premises to be searched. If thiswere the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other peoples residence for storing sucharticles to avoid being raided and searched.The Del Rosarios raise a number of procedural issues: a) the supposed failure of respondents NBI agents to file theirmotion for reconsideration of the RTC order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days of receipt of the order; b)their resort to a special civil action of certiorari to challenge the RTCs denial of their motion to dismis s; c) thepropriety of their inclusion of a motion to dismiss in their answer; d) the CAs grant to them in 2003 of a 15 -day

extension to file a petition for certiorari after the lapse of 60 days when the Court did not yet come out with a rulingthat barred such extension; and e) their being represented by private counsel rather than by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral.With the Courts rulings in the principal issues raised in this case, it finds no sufficient reason to further dwell on thelesser issues that the Del Rosarios raise above. Besides, the Court finds no error in the CAs disposition of the same. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP79496 dated June 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated November 19, 2007 for the reasons stated in this Decision, withthe MODIFICATION that Civil Case 10584 is DISMISSED without prejudice.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182779 August 23, 2010VICTORINA (VICTORIA) ALICE LIM LAZARO, Petitioner,vs.BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL, INC.,Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O NNACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decisio n1dated September 4, 2007and Resolution dated January 31, 2008, which awarded the amount sought by respondent in its Complaint. As heldby the CA, to grant the relief prayed for by respondent is, in the words of Section 6 of the Revised Rule on SummaryProcedure, the judgment "warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint."Respondent, Brewmaster International, Inc., is a marketing company engaged in selling and distributing beer andother products of Asia Brewery, Inc. On November 9, 2005, it filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Prescillo G.Lazaro (Prescillo) and petitioner, Victorina (also known as Victoria) Alice Lazaro, with the Metropolitan Trial Court(MeTC) of Makati City. The complaint alleged as follows:

6. During the period from February 2002 to May 2002, defendants obtained on credit from plaintiff beerand other products in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDREDTWO PESOS AND NINETY TWO CENTAVOS (Php 138,502.92), evidenced by sales invoicesphotocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A," "A-1" to "A-11,"7. Despite repeated demands, defendants have failed and refused, and up to now, still fail and refuse topay their aforesaid obligation to plaintiff in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSANDFIVE HUNDRED TWO PESOS AND NINETY TWO CENTAVOS (Php 138,502.92) as evidenced by the

demand letters dated 21 April 2003, 12 May 2003, 5 August 2003 and 17 August 2005, photocopies ofwhich are hereto attached as Annexes "B," "C," "C-1," "D," "D-1," "D-2," and "E," "E-1,"

8. Under the terms of the sales invoices, defendants agreed that in case of litigation, the venue shall onlybe at the proper courts of Makati City and to pay 24% interest on all overdue accounts.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants,ordering the latter to pay the sum of Php138,502.92 representing plaintiffs claim and the sum of Php33,240.00 asinterest.Plaintiff prays for such other or further relief and remedies that are just and equitable in the premises .2Annexes A, A-1 to A-11 are photocopies of sales invoices3indicating the amount of the goods purchased andshowing that they were sold to "TOTAL" and received by a certain Daniel Limuco.Prescillo filed an answer with counterclaim, denying any knowledge of the obligation sued upon. According toPrescillo, he and petitioner had lived separately since January 15, 2002 and he never authorized petitioner topurchase anything from respondent. He pointed out that the purchaser of the items, as borne out by the sales

invoices attached to the complaint, was Total, which should have been the one sued by respondent.4Petitioner, in her own answer with counterclaims, likewise denied having transacted with respondent, and averred thatthe documents attached to the complaint showed that it was Total which purchased goods from respondent.5On June 14, 2006, during the scheduled preliminary conference, petitioner and her co-defendant did not appear.Hence, the MeTC declared the case submitted for decision.6On August 22, 2006, the MeTC dismissed the complaint, ratiocinating that respondent, as plaintiff, failed to meet theburden of proof required to establish its claim by preponderance of evidence. The court a quo noted that the salesinvoices attached to the complaint showed that the beer and the other products were sold to Total and were receivedby a certain Daniel Limuco; they did not indicate, in any way, that the goods were received by petitioner or herhusband.7Respondent elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) through a notice of appeal. Attached to itsMemorandum was additional evidence, showing that it transacted with petitioner and her husband, who were then theoperators and franchisees of the Total gasoline station and convenience store where t he subject goods weredelivered, and that Daniel Limuco was their employee.8Unmoved, the RTC found no reversible error in the assailed decision. It agreed with the MeTC that respondent failed

to submit any evidence proving that petitioner and her husband were liable for the obligation. The RTC disregardedthe documents attached to the m emorandum on the ground that adm ission of such additional evidence would beoffensive to the basic rule of fair play and would violate the other partys right to due process. Thus, the RTC affirmedthe assailed decision in toto.9Respondent then went to the CA through a petition for review. There, it succeeded in obtaining a judgment in itsfavor. Applying Section 710of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in conjunction with Section 611thereof, theCA held that judgment should have been rendered "as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint"considering that both defendants failed to appear during the preliminary conference. The appellate court said that "byinstead referring to the sales invoices and bypassing [the] ultimate facts [alleged in the complaint], the MeTCcontravened the evident purposes of the [Revised] Rule on Summary Procedure directing that the judgment be basedon the allegations of the complaint, which were, firstly, to avoid delay and, secondly, to consider the non-appearanceat the preliminary conference as an admission of the ultimate facts." The CA judiciously pronounced that:In fact, evidentiary matters (like the sales invoices attached to the complaint) were not yet to be considered as of thatearly stage of the proceedings known under the Rule on Summary Procedure as the preliminary conference. Theevidentiary matters and facts are to be required only upon the termination of the preliminary conference and only if

further proceedings become necessary to establish factual issues defined in the order issued by the court. (citingSection 9, Rule on Summary Procedure)Thus, finding the amount claimed to be warranted by the allegations in the complaint, the CA, in its September 4,2007 Decision, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered petitioner and her husband to pay the said amount plusinterests, thus:WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED MARCH 12, 2007 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.The respondents are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the petitioner the amount of P138,502.92, plus

interest of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint until this judgment becomes final and executory, and 12%per annum upon finality of this judgment until full payment.The respondents are also ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.12Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its January 31,2008 Resolution.13Petitioner submits the following issues to this Court for resolution:Petitioner respectfully submits that the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in the interpretation of Section 6 of the

Revised Rules of Summary Procedure when it reversed the Decision of the RTC, Branch 162 of Makati in Civil Case[N]o. 06-944.
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Petitioner further submits that the Court of Appeals erred in giving relief to the private respondent despite the lack ofcause of action in its complaint against the petitioner herein.14Petitioner contends that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not warrant the automatic grant of relief infavor of the plaintiff when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. She avers that respondents complaint fails tostate a cause of action; hence, no relief can be given to respondent. Petitioner points out that the sales invoicesformed part of the complaint and should be considered in determining whether respondent has a cause of actionagainst her. Consideration of the said sales invoices, she avers, would show that there is no contractual relationshipbetween her and respondent; the invoices did not indicate in any way that petitioner was liable for the amount statedtherein.Petitioner is correct in saying that no relief can be awarded to respondent if its complaint does not state a cause ofaction. Indeed, if the complaint does not state a cause of action, then no relief can be granted to the plaintiff and it

would necessarily follow that the allegations in the complaint would not warrant a judgment favorable to the plaintiff.The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and directstatement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim .15Ultimate facts mean the important andsubstantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up thewrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.16They refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon theexistence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars ofevidence which establish the material elements.17The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the factsalleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition orcomplaint.18To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all documents attached thereto may, infact, be considered, particularly when referred to in the complaint.19We emphasize, however, that the inquiry is intothe sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in the complaint.20Thus, consideration of the annexeddocuments should only be taken in the context of ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.Petitioner argues that the complaint fails to state a cause of action since reference to the sales invoices attached toand cited in paragraph six of the Complaint shows that it was not her who purchased and received the goods from

respondent.Contrary to petitioners stance, we find that the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.1wphi1The followingallegations in the complaint adequately make up a cause of action for collection of sum of money against petitioner:(1) that petitioner and her husband obtained beer and other products worth a total of P138,502.92 on credit fromrespondent; and (2) that they refused to pay the said amount despite demand.As correctly held by the CA, the sales invoices are not actionable documents. They were not the bases ofrespondents action for sum of money but were attached to the Complaint only to provide details on the allegedtransactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint.At any rate, consideration of the attached sales invoices would not change our conclusion. The sales invoices,naming Total as the purchaser of the goods, do not absolutely foreclose the probability of petitioner being liable forthe amounts reflected thereon. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity, and costof the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale.21Had the case proceeded further, respondent could havepresented evidence linking these sales invoices to petiti oner.In Pea v. Court of Appeals,22petitioners therein likewise argued that the sales invoices did not show that they hadany involvement in the transactions covered by the same. What the Court said in reply to this argument bolsters our

view in this petition:Although it appears in the other sales invoices that the petitioners were the salespersons who brokered the sales ofthe products covered by the said sales invoices to the vendees therein named, the said entries are not conclusive ofthe extent and the nature of the involvement of the petitioners in the sales of the products under the said salesinvoices which are not absolutely binding. They m ay be explained and put to silence by all the facts andcircumstances characterizing the true import of the dealings to which they refer. The facts contained in the said salesinvoices may be contradicted by oral testimony.23WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 4, 2007 and Resolution datedJanuary 31, 2008 are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171842 July 22, 2009GLORIA S. DY,Petitioner,vs.MANDY COMMODITIES CO., INC.,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Gloria S. Dy seeks to reverse and set aside the 15 September2005 Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground offorum shopping and its Resolution2dated 3 March 2006, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.This case has its origin in the contract entered into by the National Government with the Philippine National Bank(PNB) on 9 June 1978, wherein the former leased in favor of the latter the 21,727-square meter government-ownedland located at Numancia Street, corner Urbiztondo, Binondo, Manila. The lease was good for 25 years whichcommenced on 1 August 1978 and was to expire on 31 July 2003, renewable for the same period upon agreement ofboth parties.On 17 October 1994, PNB sublet a portion of the subject land consisting of 8,530.l6 square meters to respondentMandy Commodities Co., Inc. (Mandy Commodities), for a period corresponding to PNBs contract with the NationalGovernment. Respondent constructed on the subleased portion a two-storey warehouse which was leased out to its

tenants.When the expiration of the subject lease contract was approaching, then Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR) Secretary Heherson Alvarez (Secretary Alvarez), on behalf of the government, issued aMemorandum Order dated 6 May 2002 initially approving the renewal of PNBs lease for another 25 years. In anotherMemorandum dated 6 August 2002, Secretary Alvarez, however, recalled the earlier 6 May 2002 Memorandum andrevoked the renewal of the said lease contract for the purpose of clarifying the terms thereof and re-evaluating therole, qualifications and capability of the subject realtys sub-lessees. Later, in a Final Endorsement dated 29November 2002, Secretary Alvarez had a change of heart and approved the renewal of the lease in favor of PNB andincluded respondent as one of the sub-lessees. This Final Endorsement, though, did not last long as the then newDENR Secretary, Elisea Gozun, issued a Memorandum dated 27 May 2003, withdrawing the lease contract with PNBand, consequently calling off the sub-lease contract with the respondent.Since the subject lease was about to expire, the Land Management Bureau (LMB), on behalf of the NationalGovernment, in a letter dated 25 July 2003, informed PNB that a take over team was created to effect repossessionof the subject property and requested the PNB to turn it over to the DENR upon the termination of the lease contract.On 30 July 2003, in order to avert the eventual take over, PNB commenced a complaint for Injunction (PNB Injunction

Case) with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction anddamages docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0368-CFM before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay, Branch 118. ThePNB alleged that the contract of lease between it and the National Government had already been renewed by virtueof the 29 November 2002 Final Endorsement of then Secretary Alvarez; hence, PNBs possession of the disputedproperty must be respected by the LMB. The PNB Injunction Case prompted Secretary Gozun to issue aMemorandum dated 31 July 2003 directing the LMB to observe the status quo until further advice from her office orfrom the Pasay RTC.In an Order dated 28 August 2003, the Pasay RTC in the PNB Injunction Case denied PNBs application for TROand/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Pasay RTC also ordered the LMB to secure and take over the subject land.PNB questioned this order before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78980. Although the 28 August 2003 Orderof the Pasay RTC had yet to be decided by the Court of Appeals, the LMB was able to implement said order and gainpossession of the subject property on 29 August 2003.On 18 September 2003, the Court of Appeals, in the PNB Injunction Case, nullified the said RTC Order and grantedPNBs application for TRO.Since the LMB had already ta ken possession of the questioned property, thereby rendering the 18 September 2003

TRO issued by the Court of Appeals moot, the LMB sought the legal advice of the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG). In its Opinion dated 23 September 2003, the OSG opined, among other things, that the TRO issued by theCourt of Appeals against it was indeed moot, and that provisional permits for occupancy of the same property couldbe issued to qualified applicants, subject to the outcome of the main PNB Injunction Case involving the propertybefore the RTC.In a letter dated 6 October 2003, PNB demanded the pull-out of the guards posted by the LMB in the premises of theproperty. This demand letter was ignored by the LMB on the strength of the Solicitor Generals opinion. In the meantime, banking on the same OSG opinion, LMB granted petitioner Gloria Dy a provisional permit to occupythe subject realty. Equipped with the provisional permit from the LMB, petitioner was able to enter and install her ownguards in the premises of the property on 10 October 2003. Petitioner also posted notices announcing that all thetenants therein should secure from her an authorization to enter the same.On 15 October 2003, respondent Mandy Commodoties, being the sub-lessee, reacted to petitioners intrusion on thesubject property by filing a complaint for Damages with prayer for injunction (Respondents Injunction Case) and TROdocketed as Civil Case No. 03108128 before the Manila RTC, Branch 25. On 21 October 2003, through the aid of itsown security personnel, respondent regained possession of t he same property.

Meanwhile, in the PNB Injunction Case, the Court of Appeals in its 30 October 2003 Decision, affirmed the 28 August2003 Order of the Pasay RTC denying PNBs application for TRO on the ground that PNB failed to establish its right
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to the disputed property. Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 August 2003 Order of the Pasay RTC, itnonetheless declared void the take over order, since the subject matter of the PNB Injunction Case was limited towhether the grant of the provisional remedy of TRO was warranted or not; hence, the RTC Pasay went beyond thematter submitted for adjudication when it ordered the take over of the property. The Court of Appeals went on bydeclaring that the take over by LMB of the property was void, and that any action affecting PNB and its lease was alsocondemned as lacking any legal basis, since such order to take over amounted to a disposition of the main case ofinjunction. PNB elevated this adverse decision to this Court, which case was docketed as G.R. No. 164786.On 7 November 2003, petitioner was able to wrest from respondent possession of the property in question.On 4 December 2003, respondent commenced the instant case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila,Branch 20, for Forcible Entry (Respondents Forcible Entry Case), with prayer for mandatory injunction, docketed asCivil Case No. 176953-CV.

On 6 April 2004, in Respondents Forcible Entry Case, the MeTC Manila ruled against respondent, opining that, byvirtue of the expiration of PNBs lease contract, respondent lost its right to possess said property. Concomitantly, asrespondents right thereto was intertwined with that of PNB, the same right also vanished. Respondent appealed to the RTC Manila, Branch 30, for the dismissal of its forcible entry complaint.On 12 July 2004, the RTC Manila, in Respondents Forcible Entry Case, reversed the MeTC decision and orderedpetitioner to vacate the subject property. It ruled that despite the take over by the LMB, respondent was allowed tocontinue its business and possession of the disputed landholding. Hence, it was respondent who had pr ior, actual andphysical possession of the property and had a better right over it. This favorable decision prompted respondent to filea motion for immediate execution which was granted by the RTC Manila and, accordingly, a Writ of Execution dated 7September 2004 was issued in favor of the respondent. Conversely, petitioners motion for reconsideration of theRTC decision was denied. Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 86478.Meanwhile, the OSG filed an Omnibus Motion seeking intervention in Respondents Forcible Entry Case, as well asthe admission of its motion for reconsideration-in-intervention of the RTC decision and opposition-in-intervention torespondents motion for immediate execution. The RTC Manila denied the Omnibus Motion filed by the OSG. This

adverse ruling was questioned by the OSG before the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.86307 (OSG Certiorari).On 8 November 2004, petitioner moved for the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 86307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 86478, amotion that was granted by the Court of Appeals, subject to the conformity of the ponente in the former case.On 21 April 2005, the OSG Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 86307) was dismissed by the Court of Appeals upon a motionfiled by respondent. The Court of Appeals said that the OSG should address its motion to intervene in CA-G.R. SPNo. 86478. No further action was taken by the OSG in CA-G.R. SP No. 86307.In the meantime, on 15 May 2005, without waiting for the result of Respondents Forcible Entry Case (CA -G.R. SPNo. 86478) pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed an Unlawful Detainer case (Petitioners UnlawfulDetainer Case) against respondent before the MeTC Manila, Branch 15, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.00000004-CV. In her complaint, petitioner made use of the same facts as in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478.On account of the foregoing fact, respondent moved for the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 on the ground offorum shopping. Calling the Court of Appeals attention to the 10 November 2004 and 2 February 2005 Resolutions ofthis Court in G.R. No. 164786 (PNBs Injunction Case) denying PNBs application for TRO, petitioner opposed themotion to dismiss on the ground that, among other things, her Unlawful Detainer Case was now premised on the

settled termination of PNBs contract of lease with the National Government as implied by said Resolutions. In a Decision dated 15 September 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 on the ground offorum shopping and for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioners filing of the Unlawful Detainer Caseduring the pendency of the Respondents Forcible Entry Case (CA-G.R. SP No. 86478) in the Court of Appealsconstituted forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED on account of forum shopping and for lack of merit3.On 6 October 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. For its part, respondent filed an Urgent Motion toInclude in the Decision an Order Dismissing the Case Simultaneously Commenced by the Petitioner Together withthe Instant Petition. The Court of Appeals was also apprised that petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case had alreadybeen decided by the MeTC Manila i n petitioners favor and was now pending appeal before the Manila RTC, Branch9.In its 3 March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court ofAppeals, on the other hand, granted respondents urgent motion to dismiss Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case,which is now on appeal before the RTC Manila.Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner maintains that she did not commit forum shopping, since there is no identity of the cause of action or of theissue between Respondents Forcible Entry Case and Petitioner s Unlawful Detainer Case.

The petition is not meritorious.Forum shopping is a deplorable practice of litigants consisting of resorting to two different fora for the purpose ofobtaining the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.4What is pivotal to thedetermination of whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the party-litigants by aperson who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant thesame or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the differentcourts or fora upon the same issues.5The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals oftwo separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competenttribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid theresultant confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules

results in the dismissal of a case. To stamp out this abominable practice, which seriously impairs the efficientadministration of justice, this Court promulgated Administrative Circulars No. 28-91 and No. 04-94, which are nowembodied as Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which reads:SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaintor other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneouslyfiled therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues inany court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pendingtherein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) ifhe should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that factwithin five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or otherinitiatory pleading, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification of or non-compliance with any of theundertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrativeand criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the

same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a causefor administrative sanctions.The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, orwhether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when thefollowing elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in bothactions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) theidentity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of whichparty is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive ofthe requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.In the instant case, the first element of forum shopping is present. The parties to CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 andPetitioners UnlawfulDetainer Case are the same. As to the second element, it must be stressed that in ejectmentcases, either in unlawful detainer or in forcible entry cases, the only issue to be resolved is the question of who isentitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.6Thus, these are summaryproceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession ofproperty. Title is not involved; that is why it is a special civil action with a special procedure .7Here, the rights asserted

in both cases are also identical, namely, the right of possession over the subject property. In fact, in the UnlawfulDetainer case, petitioners cause of action was based on her alleged superior right over the property in question as alessee thereof, pursuant to the provisional permit from the LMB, as against respondents allegedly expired sub-leasecontract with the National Government.8This is the very same assertion of petitioner and the contentious fact involvedin CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 (Respondents Forcible Entry Case). As the issues in both cases refer singularly to the rightof material possession over the disputed property, then an adjudication in Repondents ForcibleEntry Caseconstitutes an adjudication of Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case, such that the latter court would be bound therebyand could not render a contrary ruling on the very same issue.Petitioner insists that, assuming arguendo he is guilty of forum shopping, the Court of Appeals should have onlydismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 (Respondents Forcible Entry Case) and allowed Petitioners Unlawful DetainerCase be decided first by the MeTC.Petitioners argument is inaccurate.Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition pending beforethis Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitivemeasure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice.

In Buan v. Lopez, Jr.,9

petitioners therein instituted before the Court a special civil action for prohibition and, almost amonth earlier, another special civil action for "prohibition with preliminary injunction" before the RTC Manila. Finding
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petitioners guilty of forum shopping, the Court dismissed not only the action before it, but also the special civil actionstill pending before the RTC, viz:Indeed, the petitioners in both actions x x x have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of their case before thisCourt in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions,that in this Court and that in Regional Trial Court as wel l.10Also, in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,11an action for specific performance became thesubject of a petition for review before the Court. While said case was pending, a second one -- denominated as aderivative suit and involving the same parties, causes of action and reliefs -- was filed before the RTC Makati. TheCourt therein dismissed the petition before it and the derivative suit that was pending before the RTC Makati, thus:[F]inding the existence of forum-shopping x x x, the only sanction now is the dismissal of both cases x x x.12Taking our cue from these cases, the Court of Appeals action of dismissing petitioners appeal relative to

Respondents Forcible Entry Case and Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case is, therefore, warranted. Moreover, even as we pass upon the merit of the instant case, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err indismissing the same.There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means offorce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth .13The basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. Infiling forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquirejurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must al lege prior physical possession of the property; and second, he must also allegethat he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution of such cases, what isimportant is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property. Thus, the plaintiff must prove thathe was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. Indeed, any ofthe parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover the possession even from the owner himself, sincesuch cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merel y to prove prior possessionde facto and undue deprivation thereof.1avvphi1In the case under consideration, the Court of Appeals found that respondent as sub-lessee of the PNB was acting

within its prerogatives as possessor when it filed the forcible entry suit against petitioner. From 1994 until thecontroversy arose, respondent was in peaceful possession of t he property in question. The Court of Appeals evenpointed out that even when the L MB gained possession of the property on 29 August 2003, respondent was allowedto continue business within the premises. In contrast, petitioners possession was predicated on the provisional permitissued to her by LMB and the 28 August 2003 Order of the Pasay City RTC in the PNB Injunction Case. It must benoted that the said order directing the take over of the disputed property was declared void by the Court of Appeals,even when it denied the propriety of the issuance of a TRO in the PNB Injunction Case. The said ruling of the Court ofAppeals was in turn affirmed in the 10 November 2004 and 2 February 2005 Resolutions in G.R. No. 164786.Considering that the possession of petitioner was declared void, and bearing in mind that the validity of petitionersprovisional permit to occupy the property is yet to be settled in the PNB Injunction Case, still pending in the PasayCity RTC, petitioners occupation thereof is without legal authority. Simply put, petitioner has no right to occupy theproperty. In contrast, respondents right to occupy it remains intact, since the records of the case are barren of anyindication that the National Government or the PNB made a formal demand on the respondent to vacate saidproperty. The way things stand, respondent, whose prior possession over the property remains intact, has the betterright over it. Thus, when it filed the instant forcible entry case against petitioner who forcibly took possession thereof

on 7 November 2003, respondent was just exercising its right.In sum, this Court defers to the findings of the Court of Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away from suchfindings.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15September 2005 and its Resolution dated 3 March 2006 dismissing petitioners appeal of the adverse resolutionagainst her in Respondents Forcible Entry Case (CA-G.R. No. 86478) and Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case ((CivilCase No. 00000004-CV) in the MeTC Manila, Branch 15, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154704 June 1, 2011NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA FORMOSO-PESCADOR, ROGERFORMOSO, MARY JANE FORMOSO, BERNARD FORMOSO and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO, and ROBERTONAVARRO,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition are the January 25, 2002 Resolution1and the August 8, 2002 Resolution2of the Court ofAppeals (CA)which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners on the ground that the verification andcertification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners in CA G.R. SP No. 67183, entitled"Nellie P. Vda. De Formoso, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al. "The Factual andProcedural AntecedentsRecords show that on October 14, 1989, Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her children namely: Ma.Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, and Benjamin Formoso,executed a special power of attorney in favor of Primitivo Malcaba (Malcaba) authorizing him, among others, tosecure all papers and documents including the owners copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to the loan withreal estate mortgage originally secured by Nellie and her late husband, Benjamin S. Formoso, from Philippine

National Bank, Vigan Branch (PNB) on September 4, 1980.On April 20, 1990, the Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba through a Deed of AbsoluteSale. Subsequently, on March 22, 1994, Malcaba and his lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation includinginterests in the amount of 2,461,024.74.PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcabas tender of payment and to release the mortgage or surrenderthe titles of the subject mortgaged real properties.On March 24, 1994, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB before the Regional TrialCourt of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (RTC) praying, among others, that PNB be ordered to accept the amount of 2,461,024.74as full settlement of the loan obligation of the Formosos.After an exchange of several pleadings, the RTC finally rendered its decision3on October 27, 1999 favoring thepetitioners. The petitioners prayer for exemplary or corrective damages, attorneys fees, and annual interest and dailyinterest, however, were denied for lack of evidence.PNB filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to comply with Rule 15, Section 5 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. PNB then filed a Notice of Appeal but it was dismissed for being filed out of time.The petitioners received their copy of the decision on November 26, 1999, and on January 25, 2001, they filed their

Petition for Relief from Judgment4questioning the RTC decision that there was no testimonial evidence presented towarrant the award for moral and exemplary damages. They reasoned out that they could not then file a motion forreconsideration because they could not get hold of a copy of the transcripts of stenographic notes. In its August 6,2001 Order, the RTC denied the petition for lack of meri t.5On September 7, 2001, the petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Omnibus Orderof September 26, 2001.6Before the Court of AppealsOn November 29, 2001, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the RTC Order ofAugust 6, 2001 and its Omnibus Order dated September 26, 2001.In its January 25, 2002 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition stating that:The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one (Mr. Primitivo Macalba) of the manypetitioners. In Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000, it was ruled that allpetitioners must be signatories to the certification of non-forum shopping unless the one who signed it is authorizedby the other petitioners. In the case at bar, there was no showing that the one who signed was empowered to act forthe rest. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the one who signed knew to the best of his knowledge whether his co-

petitioners had the same or similar claims or actions filed or pending. The ruling in Loquias further declared thatsubstantial compliance will not suffice in the matter involving strict observance of the Rules. Likewise, the certificationof non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who executed the same and that petitioners mustshow reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just berationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.Aggrieved, after the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed this petition for review anchored onthe following

GROUNDSTHE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS MUST SIGN THEVERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEREINONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE INVOLVED.ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE WHOLE PETITION WHENAT THE VERY LEAST THE PETITION INSOFAR AS PETITIONER MALCABA IS CONCERNED BEING THESIGNATORY THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT ON TECHNICALITIES WHEN THE

PETITION BEFORE IT WAS CLEARLY MERITORIOUS.7
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The petitioners basically argue that they have substantially complied with the requirements provided under the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. The petitioners are of the view thatthe rule on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping that all petitioners must sign should be liberallyconstrued, since only questions of law are raised in a petition for certiorari and no factual issues that require personalknowledge of the petitioners.The petitioners further claim that they have a meritorious petition because contrary to the ruling of the RTC, theirPetition for Relief clearly showed that, based on the transcript of stenographic notes, there was enough testimonialevidence for the RTC to grant them damages and attorneys fees as prayed for.On the other hand, PNB counters that the mandatory rule on the certification against forum shopping requires that allof the six (6) petitioners must sign, namely: Nellie Vda. De Formoso and her children Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, and Bernard Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba. Therefore, the

signature alone of Malcaba on the certification is insufficient.PNB further argues that Malcaba was not even a party or signatory to the contract of loan entered into by his co-petitioners. Neither was there evidence that Malcaba is a relative or a co-owner of the subject properties. It likewiseargues that, contrary to the stance of the petitioners, the issue raised before the CA, as to whether or not thepetitioners were entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees, is a factual one. Finally, PNB asserts that the body of the complaint filed by the petitioners failed to show any allegation that Macalbaalone suffered damages for which he alone was entitled to reliefs as prayed for. PNB claims that the wordings of thecomplaint were clear that all the petitioners were asking for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. OUR RULINGThe petition lacks merit.Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right. Accordingly, the party whoseeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.8Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure provides:SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, aperson aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and prayingthat judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting suchincidental reliefs as law and justice may require.The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copiesof all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shoppingasprovided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. [Emphasis supplied]Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari mustbe verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements .The petition shall containthe full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the mattersinvolved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of thejudgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, ifany, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with theoriginal copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legibleduplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such materialportions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certificationshall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of thecourt, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number ofcopies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certificationthat he has not theretoforecommenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or differentdivisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the statusof the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending beforethe Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakesto promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amountof P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground forthe dismissal of the petition. [Emphases supplied]

The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to thesound discretion of the court. Although the Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari,it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch ofthe government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme CourtCirculars.9[Emphasis supplied]In the case at bench, the petitioners claim that the petition for certiorari that they filed before the CA substantiallycomplied with the requirements provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and Certificationof Non-Forum Shopping.The Court disagrees.Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,

verified or accompanied by affidavit.A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are tru eand correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge,information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaintor other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneouslyfiled therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues inany court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pendingtherein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) ifhe should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that factwithin five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or otherinitiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, uponmotion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings

therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminalactions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shallbe ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause foradministrative sanctions. x x x.In this regard, the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,10isenlightening:Respecting the appellate courts dismissal of petitioners appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the thereinaccompanying verification and certification against forum-shopping, the Courts guidelines for the bench and barinAltres v. Empleo,which were culled "from jurisprudential pronouncements," are instructive:For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements alreadyreflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification andcertification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission ofdefective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certificationagainst forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render thepleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if theattending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in orderthat the ends of justice may be served thereby.3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to thetruth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in thepetition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike inverification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is aneed to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstancesor compelling reasons."5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiablecircumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke acommon cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum

shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
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6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by hiscounsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he mustexecute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

The petition for certiorari filed with the CA stated the following names as petitioners: Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso,Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, Benjamin Formoso, andPrimitivo Malcaba.Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to signfor them. There was no special power of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a reasonable explanation as towhy only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R.

Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes , the Court explained that:The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals were signed onlyby Jimenez. There is no showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena, his co-petitioner.Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadingand that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification shouldhave been signed not only by Jimenez but al so by Athenas duly authorized representative. In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that thecertificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all thepetitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation onnon-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing t he same, and the lone s igningpetitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners ofany action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been dulysigned by both petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.We have consistentlyheld that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. With respect to acorporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized

lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed i n such document.While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injusticecommensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures, nevertheless they must be faithfullyfollowed. In the instant case, petitioners have not shown any reason which justifies relaxation of the Rules. We haveheld that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may haveprejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except for the most persuasiveof reasons when they may be re laxed. Not one of these persuasive r easons is present here.In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in view of the procedurallapses committed by petitioners.11[Emphases supplied]Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the CA should not have dismissed the whole petition but should have given itdue course insofar as Malcaba is concerned because he signed thecertification. The petitioners also contend that theCA should have been liberal in the application of the Rules because they have a meritorious case against PNB.The Court, however, is not persuaded.The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their motion forreconsideration, but they refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the

verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to denytheir motion and affirm the earlier resolution .12Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.13In these cases, however, those who did not sign wererelatives of the lone signatory, so unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with theother petitioners and who cannot speak for them. In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa,Sr.,14it was written:In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively claim a right not tobe dispossessed of the subject lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents construction of a family home andoccupation thereof for more than 10 years. The commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over thecontroverted lot thus gave petitioners xxx authority to inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners thatthey have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there isno other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyedand a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore,for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed

any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification thatHernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. [Emphasis supplied]

The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Grower sMulti-Purpose Cooperative,15where it was stated:The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executedthe certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares acommon interest. x x x16Considering the above circumstances, the Court does not see any similarity at all in the case at bench to compel itselfto relax the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification against forum shopping.At any rate, the Court cannot accommodate the petitioners request to re -examine the testimony of Malcaba in thetranscript of stenographic notes of the April 25, 1999 hearing concerning his alleged testimonial proof of damages forobvious reasons.Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions

of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on acertain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the allegedfacts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of theevidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the lawprovides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,the question posed is one of fact.17In this case, the petition clearly raises a factual issue.1avvphilAs correctly argued by PNB, the substantive issue ofwhether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is a factualissue which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.Secondly, even if the Court glosses over the technical defects, the petition for relief cannot be granted. A perusal ofthe Petition for Relief of Judgment discloses that there is no fact constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusablenegligence which are the grounds therefor. From the petition itself, it appears that the petitioners counsel had a copyof the transcript of stenographic notes which was in his cabinet all along and only discovered it when he wasdisposing old and terminated cases.18If he was only attentive to his records, he could have filed a motion forreconsideration or a notice of appeal in behalf of the petitioners.

WHEREFORE,the petition is DENIED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91391 January 24, 1991FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitionervs.THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes &a

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