Civpro Juris

8/12/2019 Civpro Juris

1/32

Sindico vs DiazTolentino vs LevisteManila Railroad vs Atty General

Abbain vs ChuaSEAFDEC vs NLRCSoliven vs Fastforms

Siena vs Gal-langSouhern Food vs Salas

People vs SolaUrbano vs ChavezJosefa vs Zhandong

St Martin vs NLRC

CB vs CAHGC vs R-2 Builders

Ascue vs CA

Baito vs SarmientoMatling vs Coros

Lim Kieh Tong vs CABF Citiland vs OtakeRussell vs Vestil

Tomawis vs BalindongRepublic vs AsuncionLBP vs VillegasSTRADEC vs SIDCPhil. Overseas vs Africa

City of Baguio vs Masweng

Manufacturer's Distributors vs Yu Siu LiungCruz vs TanLapitan vs ScandiaGood Shepherd vs Tutaan

Optoma Hertz vs RealtyRodriguez vs AlikpalaBanco Espanol vs PalancaDe Midgely vs FerandosGonzaga vs CA

Hernandez vs Rural Bank of Lucena

De Midgeley vs FerandosCB vs CAPhil. 1st Insurance vs Pyramid LogisticsPerez vs MetrobankGo vs Tong

Felipe vs Leuterio


2/32

Santiago vs BautistaSagrada Orden vs NACOCOMa-ao Sugar Central vs BarriosDanfoss vs Continental CementBayan Muna vs RomuloSecretary of Defense vs Manalo

Juasing Hardware vs MendozaCarillo vs DabonJoya vs PCGGMinoza vs Lopez

Ablaza vs RepublicOposa vs Factoran

Wee vs De CastroArcelona vs CACerezo vs TuazonQuiombing vs CA

Orbeta vs SendiongChua vs BeltranLimos vs OdonesRobles Transport vs Manalo

Newsweek vs IACMIAA vs Rivera VillageHeirs of Dona PazFilipinas Port vs GoReyes vs RTC

Chua vs Beltran

Gojo vs GoyalaHeirs of Medrano vs De VeraDel Castillo vs JaymalinCarabeo vs Sps. Dingco


3/32

Namarco vs Federacion

WON the counterclaim was compulsory?

No.

1. It did not meet the logical relationship test because there was no connection betweenthe claim and counterclaim.

2. Assuming it met the logical relationship test, the counterclaim was after-acquired.

An after-acquired counterclaim is not barred if not set up.

An after-acquired counterclaim, even if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence thatis the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, need not be pleaded supplementally;the after-acquired claim is not considered a compulsory counterclaimunder Rule 13(a)and a failure to interpose it will not bar its assertion in a later suit.


4/32

Young vs Sy

What is the purpose of a supplemental pleading?

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which willenlargeor changethe kind of reliefto which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental

facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, areavailable by way of supplemental complaint even though they themselves cons ti tute a rightof action.

Why was the supplemental complaint proper?

The relief prayed for in the Supplemental Complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legalredemption accorded to co-owners of property, is germane to and intertwined with the cause ofaction in the Complaint for the nullification of the "Second Supplemental to the ExtrajudicialPartition" on the ground that it lacked the approval of a guardianship court.

The petitioner's right to redeem the property is dependent on the nullification of the partition,

which is the subject of the original complaint. Unless the partition is nullified or declared withoutany force or effect, the petitioner will not be considered a co-owner of the property and,consequently, she will be unable to exercise any right of legal redemption under Article 1620 ofthe Civil Code granted to co-owners of property.

The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is merely a naturalconsequence of co-ownership. Hence, the petitioner's cause of action for legal redemption asembodied in her Supplemental Complaint stems directly from and is an extension of her rightsas co-owner of the property subject of the Complaint.

Is it improper for a supplemental pleading to contain a new cause of action?

A broad definition of causes of action should be applied: while a matter stated in a supplementalcomplaint should have some relation to the cause of action set forth in the original pleading, thefact that the supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should notbe a bar to its allowancebut only a factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of itsdiscretion; and of course, a broad definition of "cause of action" should be applied here aselsewhere.


5/32

Republic vs Central Surety

What is the purpose of a third-party complaint?

The third-party complaint is but a continuation of the main action, its purpose being merely toseek "contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim."

(Rule 6, Sec. 12.) The aim is to avoid the actions which should be tried together to save the timeand cost of a reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistent results from identical or similarevidence, and to do away with the serious handicap to a defendant of a time differencebetween a judgment against him and a judgment in his favor against the third partydefendant.

Can the court decide on the third-party complaint even if, taken independently, it mightnot have jurisdiction over the third-party complaint?

Thus it has been held that "where a court has jurisdiction of a claim and the parties in theprincipal action, it generally has jurisdiction also of a suit or proceeding which is a continuationofor incidentaland ancillaryto the principal action, even though it might not have jurisdiction

of the ancillary proceeding if it were an independent and original action or proceeding. Thejurisdiction of the ancillary suit or proceeding is referrable to or dependent upon the jurisdictionof the court over the principal suit or proceeding."

Distinguish a third-party complaint from a counterclaim and cross-claim:

Petitioners urge that a rule similar to the rule on counterclaim be adopted. But a third-partycomplaint cannot be likened to a counterclaimwhich must be within the jurisdiction of thecourt trying the main case, because unlike a third-party complaint, a counterclaim "need notdiminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim itself exceeding inamount or different in kind from that sought in the opposing party's claim" (Rule 6, Sec. 6). Athird-party complaint may likewise be likened to a cross claimunder Rule 9, section 5. ...

The principle is at once apparent, namely, that where an action is ancillary to a main action overwhich a court has jurisdiction, no independent jurisdiction is needed to enable the court to takecognizance of the ancillary action.


6/32

Asian Construction vs CA

What is the purpose of a third-party complaint?

The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an

independent claimagainst a third-party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action,thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then beadjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantialright. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right tofile a third-party complaint against a third-party rests in the discretionof the trial court. Thethird-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffscomplaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the originalcomplaint.

What are the types of third-party complaint according to the relief? (Atlant ic vs. USFidelity)

The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant:

(a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity,subrogation or any other relief;

(b) on the ground of direct liabilityof the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or

(c) the liability of the third-party defendant to boththe plaintiff and the defendant.

What are the requisites of a third-party complaint?

(a) Some substantive basisfor a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one

of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right.

(b) There must be a causal connectionbetween the claim of the plaintiff in his complaintand a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.

What is the test of a third-party complaints validity? (Capayas v. Court of First Instance)

(1) whether it arises out of the same transactionon which the plaintiffs claim is based; orwhether the third-party claim, although arising out of another or different contract ortransaction, is connectedwith the plaintiffs claim;

(2) whether the third-party defendant would be liableto the plaintiff or to the defendant forall or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-partydefendants liability arises out of another transaction; and

(3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defenses which the third-partyplaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs claim .

What is CONTRIBUTION?


7/32

Common liability is the very essence for contribution:Contribution is a payment made byeach, or by any of several having a common liability of his share in the damage suffered or inthe money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the other or others.

Why was the third-party complaint improper?

The contract of lease and sale between ACDC and MEC is different and separate from thecontract for construction services between Becthel and ACDC.

What was the danger of filing an improper third-party complaint in this case?

Considering that the third-party defendant admitted its liability for the principal claim of theoriginal plaintiff in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint, the trial court did not err in rendering

judgment on the pleadings against it.


8/32

Pentacapital vs Mahinay

What is the purpose of a supplemental pleading?

As a general rule, leave will be granted to a party who desires to file a supplemental pleading

that alleges any material fact which happenedor came within the partys knowledge afterthe original pleading was filed, such being the office of a supplemental pleading. Theapplication of the rule would ensure that the entire controversy might be settled in one action,avoid unnecessary repetition of effort and unwarranted expense of litigants, broaden the scopeof the issues in an action owing to the light thrown on it by facts, events and occurrences whichhave accrued after the filing of the original pleading, and bring into record the facts enlarging orcharging the kind of relief to which plaintiff is entitled. It is the policy of the law to grant relief asfar as possible for wrongs complained of, growing out of the same transaction and thus put anend to litigation.

Why was the supplemental compulsory counterclaim improper?

Given these premises, it is obvious that the alleged obligation of petitioner already existedandwas known to respondent at the time of the filing of his Answer with Counterclaim. He shouldhave demanded payment of his commission and share in the proceeds of the sale in that

Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, but he did not. He is, therefore, proscribed fromincorporating the same and making such demand via a supplemental pleading. Thesupplemental pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the filing of the originalpleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause ofaction. Supplemental pleadings must state transactions, occurrences or events which took placesince the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.

Why was the action for preliminary mandatory injunction dismissed?

Non-payment of the correct filing fee considering that the complaint was actually a collection ofsum of money although denominated as Preliminary Mandatory Injunction

The court treated the complaint as a collection suit because respondent was seeking thepayment of his unpaid commission or share in the proceeds of the sale of the Molino Properties.

Why was the action for a sum of money dismissed on the ground of lack of cause ofaction?

The RTC found that respondent had no cause of action against Pentacapital Realty, there beingno privity of contract between them.

Why is the action for a sum of money still barred by res judicataEVEN IF the plaintiff is adifferent party from the 1stcase?

Respondents supplemental counterclaim against petitioner is anchored on the doctrine ofpiercing the veil of corporate fiction. Obviously, after the dismissal of his complaint before theRTC-Cebu, he now proceeds against petitioner, through a counterclaim, on the basis of thesame cause of action. Thus, if we follow respondents contention that petitioner andPentacapital Realty are one and the same entity, the latter being a subsidiary of the former,respondent is barred from instituting the present case based on the principle of bar by prior


9/32


10/32

Metrobank vs Absolute Management

Why was the 4thparty complaint improper? Why should the 4 thparty complaint be filedinstead as a claim in the settlement proceeding?

Metrobanks fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the claims that shouldbe filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.This is not a case of a death of a party pending action, because Metrobank filed the actionagainst the estate, not when the deceased was alive.

Example of a claim that need not be filed in the settlement proceeding, but filed as anordinary civil action against the estate:

Maclan v. Garcia:Gabriel Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessaryexpenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of itsprevious owner. He set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the specialproceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that

his claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed inthe settlement of the estate of Garcias predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of theRules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).


11/32

3A Apparel vs Metrobank

Example of application of Rule 17.3:

For the dismissal of a case for failure to prosecuteis addressed to the sound discretionof the trial court and where, as here, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence

in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude in the prosecution of its case, andabsent grave abuse on the part of the trial court, the dismissal must be upheld.


12/32

Meliton vs CA

Why is the counterclaim compulsory?

Both the claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose from the same contract of

lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their potential liability for damages,emanated from the same contractual relation. Petitioners' right to claim damages for theunlawful demolition of the improvements they introduced on the land was based on their rightof possessionunder the contract of leasewhich is precisely the very same contractsoughtto be rescinded by private respondent in her complaint. The two actions are but theconsequences of the reciprocal obligations imposed by law upon and assumed by the partiesunder their aforesaid lease contract. That contract of lease pleaded by private respondentconstitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both parties for recovery of their respectiveclaims.

An action for damages specifically applicable in a lessor-lessee relationship is authorized inArticle 1659 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in articles1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the contract andindemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.

Paragraph 3 of Article 1654 of the same Code requires that the lessor must "maintain the lesseein the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract." 21The aggrieved party has the alternative remedies, in case of contractual breach, of rescissionwith damages, or for damages only, "allowing the contract to remain in force."

The act of private respondent in demolishing the structures introduced by petitioners on theproperty leased and the improvements therein during the existence of the lease contract is a

clear violation by her, as lessor, of her obligation mandated by paragraph 3, Article 1654 of theCivil Code. The said violation gave rise to a cause of action for damages in favor of hereinpetitioners.

Why is the dismissed compulsory counterclaim not barred, when the defendant failed tofile MR or appeal on the order of dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim?

Petitioners' claims were duly set upas counterclaims in the prior case but the samewere dismissed by reason of non-payment of docket fees.

Compulsory counterclaim was DISMISSED, but not on the merits.

in the same order of dismissal of the complaint, the counterclaims of herein petitioners

were dismissed by reason of the fact the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction overthe same for non-payment of the docket fees. On that score, the said dismissal was alsowithout prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction does notconstitute res judicata, there having been no consideration and adjudication of thecase on the merits.

The discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the samesubject matter.


13/32

BY ANALOGY: On a parity of rationale, Rule 17.2should apply to a counterclaim dulyinterposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits thereof.

Example of a compulsory counterclaim:

Berses vs. Villanueva: As we have ruled, in actions for ejectment or for recovery of

possession of real property, it is well settled that the defendant's claims for the value of theimprovements on the property or necessary expenses for its preservationare required tobe interposed in the same action as compulsory couterclaims. In such cases, it is the refusalof the defendant to vacate or surrender possession of the premises that serves as the vital linkin the chain of facts and events, and which constitutes the transaction upon which the plaintiffbases his cause of action. It is likewise an "important part of the transaction constituting thesubject matter of the counterclaim" of defendant for the value of the improvements or thenecessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the property. They are offshoots of thesame basic controversy between the parties, that is, the right of either to the possession of theproperty.


14/32

Gojo vs Goyala


15/32

GSIS vs Caballero

Why is the counterclaim permissive?

The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale

and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whetherpetitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when GSISbecame the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of theproperty in its favor.

What is the rule on permissive counterclaims in relat ion todocket fees?

The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, thecounterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.

Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over itspermissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to

pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Anydecision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, evenon appeal before this Court.


16/32

Calo vs Ajax

Why is the counterclaim not compulsory?

However, plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. IV-93062 for the

simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Therule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court,presupposesthat the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, asthis Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes, we would come to the absurd situation wherea claim must be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of,being beyond its jurisdiction.

Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies in onesitting only, does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizableby the inferior court is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allowthis only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means thatshould the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount

exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on theground that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separateaction for the remaining balance of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not reallysettle all related controversies.


17/32

Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan

Why is the counterclaim not compulsory?

As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits.

However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in thevery same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damagesor other causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.

A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is keptbusy defending himself.


18/32

Cojuangco vs Villegas

Why is the counterclaim barred?

Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that she was entitled to the

parcel of land by right of inheritance, the alternative claim that assuming she was not legallyentitledto the disputed lot, at least as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value ofthe buildings and improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land.

And while it may be argued that the defense of being a builder in good faith would have beeninconsistent with her claim of ownership, in the case of Castle Bros.,Wolf and Sons v.Go-Junothe Court held that a party may set forth as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have,whatever be their nature. These may even be inconsistent with each other because what issufficient is that each is consistent with itself.

Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense (i.e. a builder in good faith is entitled torecover the value of improvements) and instead relied on the sole defense that she inherited the

land from her parents, the rejection thereof was a complete resolution of the controversybetween the parties which bars a later case based upon the unpleaded defense. Theadjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res judicata, thetheory being that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised andlitigated upon, but also such other matters as could have been raised but were not.


19/32

Chan vs CA

Why is the counterclaim compulsory?

Chan's counterclaim for ejectment is a compulsory counterclaim because it is necessarily

connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of Cu's complaint, viz.,the lease contract between them.

The case of Ching Pue vs. Gonzales is not applicable because in Ching Pue the consignationcases were filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila which did not have jurisdiction to passupon the unlawful detainer cases that were properly cognizable by the Municipal Court. In theinstant case, the consignation case was filed with the MTC which also has jurisdiction over thecounterclaim for ejectment.

Involving ejectment and consignation, why is the counterclaim permissive in Ching Puevs. Gonzales?

Ching Pue vs. Gonzales:Consignation in court under article 1176 of the Civil Code, is not theproper proceedings to determine the relation between landlord and tenant, the period or life ofthe lease or tenancy, the reasonableness of the rental, the right of the tenant to keep thepremises against the will of landlord, etc. These questions should be decided in a case ofejectment or detainer like those two cases brought by Gonzales against two of the petitionersunder the provisions of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. In a case of ejectment, the landlord claimseither that the lease has ended or been terminated or that the lessee has forfeited his right assuch because of his failure to pay the rents as agreed upon or because he failed or refused topay the new rentals fixed and demanded by the lessor. The lessee in his turn may put up thedefense that according to law, the rental demanded of him is unreasonable, exorbitant andillegal, or that the period of the lease has not yet expired, or that if the rental law is applicable,and that the premises are destined solely for dwelling, he may not be ousted therefrom because

the owner does not need them for his own use, etc. We repeat that all these questions shouldbe submitted and decided in a case of ejectment and cannot be decided in a case ofconsignation.


20/32

Sps. Javier vs Ardiente

Example of a barred cross-claim:

At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants

before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instantpetition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitionercannot, in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversaryparties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez asrespondents.

There is no basis to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitionerfiled a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez.

Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall bebarred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC,petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.


21/32

Gojo vs Goyala

May a plaintiff be declared in default with respect to a compulsory counterclaim?

No. The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in

respect of appellees counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsorycounterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint alreadydenies its material allegations. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not toanswer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because theissues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of thecomplaint.


22/32

Tec Bi vs Chartered Bank of India

What is deemed admitted under Rule 8.11 if not specifically denied?

A general admission of the truth of the allegations set forth in a pleading is notan admission of:

1. the truth of an impossible conclusion of fact drawn from other facts set out in thepleading

2. nor of a wrong conclusion of law based on the allegations of fact well pleaded3. nor of the truth of a general averment of facts contradicted by more specific averments.

Thus, if a pleader alleges that two pesos were borrowed on one day and two more borrowed onanother making five Pin all, a stipulation of the truth of the allegations in the pleading does notamount to an admission by the opposing party that twice two make five.

Again if a pleader alleges that one hundred pesos were loaned without interest for one year andhad not been paid, and that the borrower is indebted to the lender in the sum of one hundredand ten pesos, that being the amount of the capital together with interest for the year for which

the money was loaned, a stipulation as to the truth of the allegation set forth in the pleadings isnot an admission of the truth of the conclusion of law as to the interest due by the borrower.

What was the extent of the admission insofar as the document attached (i.e. a contract ofpledge) is concerned?

The plaintiff in this action does not question the truth of the bank's allegations that the pledgecontract was executed on the day on which it purports on its face to have been signed anddelivered. There is no suggestion of bad faith or sharp practice on the part of either the pledgoror pledgee in the execution of the pledge. Under the circumstances plaintiff had no reason toobject to the introduction of evidence, which tended direct to establish his claim that althoughthe pledge had been executed as alleged by the defendant bank, it could not affect his rights on

the premises. On the contrary he must have welcomed the introduction of this evidence, whichconclusively established the very point upon which his whole case necessarily turns.

Plaintiff stands strictly on the rule of substantive law laid down in this article of the code whichdeclared that this rights, as a "third person," cannot be adversely affected by a pledge the dateof which is not evidenced in a public document.


23/32

Phil. Advertising vs Revilla

Why is there failure of specific denial by disavowal of knowledge?

Whether or not the said averments in the complaint were true, could not conceivably beunknownto private respondent.

As a matter of fact it has never been denied by private respondent that it was indebted topetitioner, much less it been asserted that the letters attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to thecomplaint which were sent to petitioner by the counsel of private respondent were notauthorized by the latter.

There was thus a failure on private respondent's part to deny the material averments of thecomplaint. Consequently, the same, including the contents of Annexes "A" and "B", whichformed part of the complaint, and in which the existence and validity of petitioners claim wereunequivocally conceded, must deemed to have been admitted.

What are the requisites of disavowal of knowledge?

Although sanctioned by the rules, the form of denial adopted by private respondent must beavailed of in good faith and with sincerity and not resorted to merely for the purpose of delay orto confuse the party as to what averments in the complaint are actually put in issue.

What are instances when disavowal of knowledgeis an INEFFECTIVE denial?

1. AVERMENT OF IGNORANCE IS PAL PABL Y UNTRUE. Capitol Motors

Corporation v . Yabut:In said case the defendant's answer was as follows: "Paragraphs2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint are specifically denied for lack of knowledge sufficientto form a belief as to the truth thereof." We there held that the rule authorizing an answerto the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a

belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, doesnot apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is assertedis so plainly andnecessarily within the defendant's knowledgethat his averment of ignorance must bepalpably untrue. In the said case a copy of the promisory note sued upon was attachedto the complaint.

2. MEANS OF INFORMATION ARE WITHIN CONTROL OF PLEADER. Dahlstrom v.

Gemunder: this Court said "an unexplained denial of information and belief of a matterof records, the means of information concerning which are within the control of thepleader, or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute aneffective denial."

3. FACT BEING DISAVOWED COULD NOT CONCEIVABLY BE UNKNOWN TOPLEADER. Sy-Quia, et al. v. Marsman, et al.:We said that so lacking in sincerity andgood faith was the defendants' answer that went to the extent of denying knowledge orinformation as to whether they were in the premises of Marsman on January 4, 1961, asaverred in the complaint, although, whether such a fact was or was not true, could not beunknown to the defendants.


24/32

Liam Law vs Olympic Sawmill

What is the effect of not denying under oath the allegation of usury in the Answer?

If the contract is usurious, the party liable for the usurious interest may sue the party to

whom the usurious interest is to be paid. The party sued for usurious interest shall file Answer under oath.

Failure to Answer under oath shall constitute admission of fact that the interest isusurious.

If Liam Law did not Answer under oath, it admitted the usurious interest.

If the usurious interest is deemed admitted, the trial court is wrong to enforce thepayment of the usurious interest.

The foregoing provision envisages a complaint filed against an entity which has committedusury, for the recovery of the usurious interest paid. In that case, if the entity sued shall not fileits answer under oath denying the allegation of usury, the defendant shall be deemed to haveadmitted the usury. The provision does not apply to a case, as in the present, where it is thedefendant, not the plaintiff, who is alleging usury.

Moreover, for sometime now, usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be chargedas lender and borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury,procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.


25/32

Phil. Banking Corp. vs. CA

Course of d iscussion:

The Complaint must prove the elements of the contract of loan.

One element of a contract is consideration. The Complaint only attached as evidence the signed promissory notes and disclosure statement,

as well as the entries in the bank statement crediting the proceeds of the loan to Sarmientosaccount.

The Answer attached as evidence entries in the bank statement showing that the same loanamount was again debited or withdrawn by the bank.

Hence, the due execution of said documents, even though admitted by the defendant, does notsolve the issue of whether the contract had a consideration.

Ratio:

It is undisputed that respondent Sarmiento signed the promissory note and the accompanyingdisclosure statement on loan/credit transaction. But said pieces of evidence proved only the

existence of such documents. There was even no question as to that because respondentSarmiento himself admitted the due execution thereof. The important issue was whether or notrespondent Sarmiento actually received the proceeds of the subject loan so as to make him liabletherefor, a matter which should have been ventilated before the trial court.

The trial court did in fact make a finding that the documentary evidence of petitioner failed toprove anything showing that respondent indeed received the proceeds of the loan. The Court ofAppeals affirmed the conclusions of the trial court and declared:

A pre-existing obligation, it may be conceded, constitutes value and may, of and by itself, serveas valuable and sufficient consideration for a contract such as the loan sued upon. As anessential element of a contract, however, the same should have been satisfactorily proved by the

appellant particularly when, as in the instant case, the absence of consideration wasprecisely put in issue by the pleadings and was buttressed by both oral and documentaryevidence. Having failed in this material respect, the appellants withdrawal of the amountsupposedly credited to the appellees account was understandably interpreted by the court a quoas a termination/cancellation of the loan the latter applied for. Considering further that contractswithout consideration do not exist in contemplation of law and produce no effect whatsoever(Article 1352, Civil Code of the Philippines), the trial, likewise, correctly dismissed the appellantscase.[5] (emphasis supplied)

A statement in a written instrument regarding the payment of consideration is merely in the natureof a receipt and may be contradicted.[6] Respondent Sarmiento denied having received theproceeds of the loan and in factpresented evidence showing that on the day petitioner claimed tohave credited the subject amount, it was again debited or withdrawn by petitioner, admittedly

upon the instruction of the officials from petitioners head office . Petitioner attempted tocontrovert this fact by claiming that the proceeds of the loan were applied to respondentsprevious obligations to the bank. But we find nothing in the records showing that respondent hadother obligations to which the proceeds of the loan could or should have been applied. Moreover,petitioner failed to explain just exactly what said obligations were or to what extent the purportedproceeds were applied in satisfaction thereof. What appeared clearly was that the proceeds ofthe loan were deposited then withdrawn the same day by petitioner itself, thus negating its claimthat respondent actually received it. Petitioner therefore failed to establish its case againstrespondent Sarmiento.


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Katon vs. Palanca

Why was the action dismissed motu pr iop ioby the CA?

1. Petitioners action was brought 24 years after the issuance of Palancas homesteadpatent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken within ten yearsfrom the issuance of the homestead certificate of title.

2. No cause of action: a mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest,has no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance of a land in public domain. Nowhere inthe Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land inquestion.

Basis of CAs motu propio dismissal of the action under Rule 9.1:

Sec. 2, Rule 1:"[t]hese rules shall apply in all courts, except as otherwise provided bythe Supreme Court."

Enumeration of remedies to dismiss on the ground of prescription:

Gicano v. Gegato:"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on theground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeedtime-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v.Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28,1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of amotion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such groundas an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment onthe merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if thedefense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings

(Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; ChuaLamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v.Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating thelapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on therecord; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by theevidence."


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Valientes vs Ramas

Are there other grounds for motu propio dismissal not enumerated in Rule 9.1?

While not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we

have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may beconsidered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties.

What is so special about QUIETING OF TITLE?

Heirs of Olviga vs. CA: imprescriptibility of action for reconveyance if it is in the concept ofquieting of title, i.e. when the actual possessor is still in possession of the property.

With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that anaction for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes inten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of theissuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA

178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if aperson claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seekreconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

SC:

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action is notin possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date ofregistration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over theproperty. When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being ineffect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.


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Rumarate vs Hernandez

Requisites for quieting of title:

In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective rights of

the parties so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever freefrom any danger of hostile claim.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the realproperty subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceedingclaimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperativedespite itsprima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Imprescriptibility of quieting of title:

On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is

imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in possessionof the disputed property. A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim ofownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before takingsteps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuingright to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of theadverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.

Laches:

The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which byexercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier constituteslaches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandonedit or declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law that no title toregistered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired byprescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even aregistered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtueof laches.

In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows thefollowing number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of actionwithout enforcing his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years.

Elements of laches:

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the otherparty seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting ones rights, despite having hadknowledge or notice of the other partys conduct and having been afforded anopportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of a


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party that the person against whom laches is imputed would assert the right; and(4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the event the suit is allowedto prosper.


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Baguioro vs BarriosMorales vs CA

Cruz-agana vs LagmanWee vs Galvez

Hasegawa vs KitamuraAUB vs GoodlandMidland Pasig vs TablanteBPI vs CAVallacar vs CatubigUE vs PepanioPerpetual Savings vs FajardoCerezo vs TuazonSps. Delos Santos vs CAJuasing Hardware vs Mendoza

Dauden-Hernaez vs Delos Angeles

Phil. Infrastructure vs. Phil. ExportSurigao Mining vs HarrisBormaheco vs MalayanBautista vs Maya-MayaGCP-Manny vs PrincipeMarinduque Mining vs CACamper vs Pajo-reyesGSIS vs NLRCLuz vs National Amnesty

Toyota Cubao vs CAGentle Supreme vs Consulta

VHF vs QuelnanRobinson vs MirallesPalma vs Galvez

Arlo vs AfdalDialcorp vs SorianoMaximo vs MontalbanSahagun vs CADe Midgely vs FerandosRomualdez-Licaros vs LicarosPaluwagan vs KingMaximo vs MontalbanPalma vs Galvez

DOLE vs QuilalaFacilities Management vs Dela OsaBaltazar vs CARodriguez vs Alikpala

City of Dumaguete vs PPABarcelonia vs CAPNR vs Rustia


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Gochan vs. Gochan

although the caption of the complaint filed by therein respondents Mercedes Gochan, et al. withthe RTC was denominated as one for specific performance and damages, the relief soughtwas the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of

conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum ofagreement. Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a real action,affecting as it did title to or possession of real property. Consequently, the basis for determiningthe correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated valuethereof as alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in theircomplaint the value of the real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire

jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the correct docket fees.

Civpro Juris

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