CIVIL SOCIETY VOICES...1 CIVIL SOCIETY VOICES: HOw THE EU SHOULd EngAgE ITS EASTERn nEIgHBOURS....

CIVIL SOCIETY VOICES:HOw THE EU SHOULd EngagE ITS EaSTErn nEIgHbOUrS

By iskra Kirova and Sabine freizer

Briefing PaPer MaY 2015 | OPen SOcietY eurOPean POlicY inStitute

acKnOwledgeMentS The authors wish to thank larisa Minasyan, Director, and david amiryan, Deputy Director for Programming of Open Society Foundations (OSF)-Armenia; Ketevan Khutsishvili, Director, and Vano chkhikvadze, EU Integration Field Manager of Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF); Olga crivoliubic, Project Director at Soros Foundation-Moldova; Yevhen Bystrytsky, Director, inna Pidluska, Deputy Director and dmytro Shulga, European Program Manager at International Renaissance Foundation, Ukraine (IRF); OSF’s Eurasia Program, especially Regional Advocacy Manager Viorel ursu and Senior Policy Analyst Michael Hall; and researcher daria goncearova.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

6 I. INTRODUCTION

10 II. THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

11 1. The Partnership’s Opportunities

13 2. The Partnership’s Challenges

17 III. A NORMATIVE AGENDA, FOCUSSING ON COMMON INTERESTS

17 1. The Eastern Partnership’s Normative Agenda

19 2. Deeper Integration with Ambitious Partners

20 3. Interest-based Targeted Partnerships

22 4.ConflictResolutionandRegionalStability

25 IV. IMPROVING THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP’S TOOLBOX

25 1.FinancialAssistanceandTechnicalSupport

26 2.ProgressReports

27 3. Multilateral Platforms

28 4.BuildingLocalOwnershipandEngagementofMultipleActors

29 5.CommunicationandOutreach

30 6.CooperatingwithCivilSociety

32 V. CONCLUSION: A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR ALL

1 CIVILSOCIETYVOICES:HOwTHEEUSHOULdEngAgEITSEASTERnnEIgHBOURS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T hisreportisinformedbytheviewsofcivilsocietyleadersinthecountriesoftheEuropeanUnion’s(EU)easternneighbourhood.TheOpenSocietyFoundations(OSF)heldextensivediscussionsinJune(Brussels)andSeptember(Kyiv)2014,tocollectnewthinkingandlocalperspectivesfromtheseleadingexperts

ontheEU’sEasternPartnership(EaP)policyinlightofrecentdramaticpoliticaleventsandlessonslearnedsinceitslaunchsixyearsago.withthisreportwehighlighttheirconcernsandexpectationsabouttheEU’sfutureroleintheirregionanditscontinuedsupportfordemocracyandstability,aswellastheirwisdomborneofdecadesofexperienceofbeingonthereceivingendofEUpoliciesandfunding.

TheEU’seasternneighbourhoodhasbecomemorecomplicatedthanatthetimeoftheEaP’slaunch.ThechallengeofRussia’sresurgenceandtheresistanceofdomesticelitestoreformisforcingtheEUtore-evaluateitspolicies.ButtheEaPisstilltheEU’smosteffectiveinstrumenttobringlong-termstability,transformlocaleconomies,buildaccountableinstitutionsandtheruleoflaw.BypromotingreformtheEaPencouragesmorestableandprosperouscountriesthatarethebestguaranteeforEUsecurity.IthassucceededinspurringchangeinthethreeeasternpartnerswhohavesignedEUAssociationAgreements—georgia,MoldovaandUkraine.Ithasnotlostthepotentialtocontributetodemocraticprocessesandsupportreformersintheotherthree—Armenia,AzerbaijanandBelarus.TheEUcanmakeitsEaPmoreeffectiveifitusescarrotsandsticksmoreastutelywithgovernmentsandforgesapartnershipwithitsstrongestlocalallies—civilsocietygroups,rightsdefenders,butalsoparliamentarians,business,localauthoritiesandotherreformers.

ThecountriesthathavesignedAssociationAgreementsarealreadyboundtodetailedreformblueprintswithstricttimelines.Theyneedtodemonstratestrongwillforimplementationandbekeptaccountable.Reformswillhavefinancialandpoliticalcostsbeforetheybringbenefits,andrequirenewskillsandcapacitiestoimplementsuccessfully.PeopleneedtoseeresultsinthecomingyearstocontinuetomobilizeinsupportofEUintegration.ThethreepartnershavemadeabigsacrificefortheirEUambitions,includingwiththeirsecurity.TheEUanditsmemberstatesshouldensurethattheycanmakethemostoftheassociationprocessandre-affirmthatitistheirsovereignrighttopursuecloserrelations,includingtheperspectiveofEUmembershipinthelongterm,iftheymeetthecriteria.

2 CIVILSOCIETYVOICES

ThreeotherEaPcountriesarenotinterestedincloserEUassociationtodaybutseekrelationswiththeEUtotakeadvantageofhumancapital,skills,markets,andtransport,andtomaintainamulti-vectorforeignpolicy.TheEUhasaninteresttocooperatewiththemtoincreaseenergysecurity,regulatemigration,counterterrorismandothersecuritythreats,includingstatefailureduetocentralizationofpower,atrophiedinstitutionsandcorruption-ravagedeconomies.withthesestatestheEUcanbuildtiesbasedoncommoninterests,especiallytostrengthentheinstitutionsthatwillsecurestatestabilityandtransparency.Theapproachcanbemorefocussed,forexampletopromotemobility,butpartners’obligationsshouldalsobemoreclearlydefined.whentheEU’sfundamentalinterests—whichincluderespectofbasichumanrights—areviolated,theEUshouldapplytargetedsanctions.

TheEaPhashadarealinfluenceintheeast,supportinglargelypeacefulhome-grownchange.TheEUshouldinvestinthoseactorswhoarepromotingdomesticreformtoachievegoodgovernanceandstability.Policy-makersshouldrememberthateverytimetheywaverintheircommitmenttotheEU’snormsandvalues,theyundercuttheirmostreliablealliesintheregion.Theyshouldcontinuetobuildapartnershipwithsocieties,notjustwithgovernments.AstheEUbeginstoreviewitsneighbourhoodpolicyandrethinksitsvisionfortheEaP,weofferrecommendationsonhowtomakethepolicyintheeastmoreeffectiveandrelevanttopeople,societiesandgovernment,andtosecuretheEU’sinterestsinanincreasinglypolarizedandunstableregion.

3 HOwTHEEUSHOULdEngAgEITSEASTERnnEIgHBOURS


MaintaintheEaPumbrellapolicytopreserveapositive,forward-lookingreformagendaforallneighboursandcontinuetopursue stability and prosperitybasedonpoliticalandeconomicinclusion,therespectforhumanrights,anddemocraticprocesses.distinguishbetween partners who are interested in deeper integration and those for whom more targeted partnerships are better suited.

Monitorcloselytheimplementationofagreementswithgeorgia,MoldovaandUkraine,frontloadingtangiblebenefitsandprovidingpoliticalandtechnicalsupport.Help bear the high political, economic and security costs of European integration.Re-affirmthosestates’sovereign right to pursue closer relationswiththeEU,includingtheperspectiveofEUmembership,ifandwhentheymeetthecriteria.

Reconsider the suitability of the integration logicforArmenia,AzerbaijanandBelarus.FocusonanarrowersetofissuesthatadvancetheEU’sinterestsviaconcretebindingcommitments.Usethefullpotentialofframeworkslikevisadialogues,financialassistanceandcooperationinmodernizationandtechnology.Do not compromise on democratic standards in differentiating amongpartnersandapplytargetedsanctionsconsistentlywhenegregiousviolationsofEUvaluesandinterestsoccur.

definecommon interestsinclusively,consideringnotonlytheinterestsofelites,butalsothoseofsocieties.Recognizethatcivil societygroupsarenotonlyeffectivechangeagentsbutalsothebestallytopromoteEuropeannormsandvalues.Involvethemmore in the negotiations of agreements and their implementation.

Focusonanti-corruptionandlinkthefightagainstcorruptionathomewitheffortsintheneighbourhood.Investinreformingjusticeandhomeaffairsinstitutions,essentialfortheimplementationofEUagreementswithallpartners.Tielargefundingtoreforminpublicadministration.developsynergiesbetweentheEU’sexistingpracticeofsupportingcivilian security sector reform through itsCommonSecurityanddefencePolicy(CSdP)andtheEaP’ssupportofreformincriminaljustice,policeandanti-corruption.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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UsetheopportunitiesprovidedbytheAssociationAgreementsto engage with non-recognized entitiesingeorgia,MoldovaandAzerbaijantobringthemclosertotheEU,normalizeeconomicandpoliticalexchangethroughouttheregionandgraduallytransformconflict-affectedsocieties.

Makefinancial assistance conditional on clear results-based obligations,focussedonpolicyimplementationratherthanlegislativeprocesses.Maketheseobligationspublic.

Revisereporting on progress for less ambitious partners to provideimpartialexpertevaluationsofpoliticalandeconomicdevelopments,ratherthanfocusonalignmentwithEUstandards.devolvemoreresponsibilitytocivilsocietyinthereportingprocess.

Maintain and strengthen multilateral platforms to bring allpartnerstogetherforpoliticaldialogueonimportantregionalissuesandtoshareexperiences.AddnewmultilateralcooperationforaforthethreecountriesthathavesignedAssociationAgreements.

Reachouttoamorediversegroupofactors,includingyouth,business,politicalparties,parliamentsandreligiousgroups. Improve information and communicationsaboutEUpolicies,usinglocallanguages,includingRussian,andmediaoutlets.SupportindependentlocalmediatocounterRussiandisinformationandinvolvecivilsocietyandlocalauthoritiestomultiplymessages.

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TheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy(EnP)wasconceivedin2003atahighpointfortheEuropeanintegrationproject.1Twelveyearson,theEU,memberstates,partnercountriesandcivilsocietyagreecomprehensiverevisionisneededtomakeitmoreresponsivetotheregion’schallenges.TheEUHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy(HighRepresentative)andtheEuropeanCommissionerforneighbourhoodPolicyandEnlargementnegotiationsstartedconsultationsinMarch2015toimprovethepolicybyasking:“shouldtheEnPbemaintained?”2Policyexpertsandcivilsocietyrepresentativesfromtheeasternneighbourhood,whohadalreadymetintwo2014seminarssponsoredbytheOpenSocietyFoundations(OSF),overwhelminglysay“yes”.Butintheeastatleast,theEUshoulddefineclearandambitiousgoals,backthemwithstronginstitutionalandmember-statecommitmentandpursuetheminaprincipledway.whenengagingwithneighbours,theEUshouldconsidersociety’sinterests,notonlythoseofunaccountablegovernmentsorself-servingelites.

Sovereignandwell-governedneighboursareacriticalelementforEuropeansecurity.In2003theEUbelievedthatdemocraticneighbours,governedbytheruleoflawandrespectinghumanrights,serveditsinterestsbest.AfterthesuccessfulenlargementincentralEurope,policymakerswereconfidentthattheattractionofcloserEuropeanintegrationcouldadvancedemocraticstandards,accountability,freedomandequality.3withthelaunchoftheEasternPartnership(EaP)in2009,shortlyafterthegeorgia-Russiawar,theyalsosawthereinforcementofgeorgia’sindependence,andthatofothercountiesfacingRussianthreats,asameanstoensuresecurity.

1 TheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicywasconceivedin2003andlaunchedin2004.ItwasextendedtoAlgeria,Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Egypt,georgia,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Libya,Moldova,Morocco,Palestine,Syria,Tunisia,andUkraine.Somecountrieschosenottoparticipate,whileothersareinvolvedinonlylimitedways.“widerEurope—neighbourhood:AnewFrameworkforRelationswithourEasternandSouthernneighbours”,JointCommunication,COM(2003)104Final,Brussels,March11,2003.

2 “TowardsanewEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy”,JointConsultationPaper,JOIn(2015)6final,Brussels,March4,2015.

3 In2003,twelvecountriesincentralandeasternEuropeandtheMediterraneansoughttoconsolidatetheirdemocraciestojointheEU,whilethewesternBalkanstateswereassuredoftheirmembershipperspectiveiftheyreformed.ThessalonikiEuropeanCouncilPresidencyConclusions,11638/03,Brussels,October1,2003.

I INTRODUCTION

“Twoprocesseswent in parallel afterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion:manycountriesemergedas independent but chosetoaligntotheKremlin.Civilsocietywasformedin alignment to the EU.Therewasnootherchoice.”6

ARTUR SAkUNTS Vanadzor Helsinki Citizens’

Assembly, Armenia

TheEnPnowconfrontsanenvironmentthathasdramaticallydeteriorated.Moscow’saggressioninUkraineandthepressureitputonMoldovaandArmenianottosignAssociationAgreementshaveraisedintegration’scosts.EUassociationshortofmembershipcomesatahighpriceforsomepartners,whileothersarenotwillingtoreformandadoptthedemocraticstandardslinkedtoit.ConfidenceintheEU’sgravitationalpullandtransformativepowerwhenRussialoomslarge,domesticelitesresistreform,andmembershipisnotonoffer,isindecline.

TodayofficialsarequestioningwhetherapartnershipbasedonEuropeanintegrationandthepromotionofdemocraticandeconomicreformsgivestheEUenoughpoliticalinfluenceandsecuresitsstrategicinterests.AstheHighRepresentativeandtheCommissionerpointout,“theEnPhasextendedtheEU’sinfluenceinsomerespects,butinanumberofareas,thereformagendahasstalled,inpartduetocompetinginterests,inpartbecausenotallpartnersareequallyinterestedinaspecialpartnershipwiththeEUunderthemodelofpluralismandintegration.”4HighRepresentativeMogherinihassaidthattheEUshouldmoveawayfromevaluatingpartners’reformprogresstoaprocessofpoliticaldialogueand“politicalpartnership.”5

Thoughconditionshavebecomemoredifficult,theEUshouldnotbacktrackonitsambitions.TheEUisapoliticalplayerbecauseofthevaluesitpromotes.TheEaPhasreinforceddomesticconstituenciesforchangeinatleastthreeEUpartners—georgia,MoldovaandUkraine—thatin2014signedAssociationAgreements.Itismorethaneverneededtosustainreformagentsintheotherthree—Armenia,AzerbaijanandBelarus—whereeliteshavenofurtherthanRussiaandtheMoscow-ledEurasianEconomicUnion(EEU)tolooktoforanalternativemodelofgovernancethatallowsthemtomaintaintheirpowerattheexpenseofdemocracyandrights.The EaP is needed in the entire eastern neighbourhood to uphold the EU’scommitmenttoitsneighbours’sovereigntyandtheirrighttomakeindependentforeignpolicychoices.

Intheeastapolicybasedonpromotingnormsandreformshasworked.ItsmostdramaticeffectsweremanifestedintheEuromaidan movement thatdefendedUkrainians’righttobuildanaccountable,bettergoverned,lesscorruptstate,andseektheEU’sassistanceinthiseffort.IngeorgiaandMoldovaindigenousprocessesbroughtlargelypeacefultransformationofpoliticalpower.TheEUrepresentedanimportantpointofreferenceforpro-democracyadvocates,andtheEaPtodayisananchorforreform.ThemoreconsistenttheEUisintakingafirmandprincipledapproachinrelationswithpartnergovernments,themoreitstrengthensthesereformagents.

4 JointConsultationPaper,op.cit. 5 FedericaMogherini,“TowardsanewEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy:theEUlaunchesaconsultationonthe

futureofitsrelationswithneighbouringcountries”,Brussels,March4,2015.

6 StatementsquotedinthemarginofthisreportweremadebyexpertsandcivilsocietyleadersduringthecourseofextensivediscussionswithOSFinJune(Brussels)andSeptember(Kyiv)2014.



Toooften,however,commitmenttopromotegoodpracticesanddemocraticvalueshasbeenweak.Incivilsociety’sview,“the EU speaks of values but behaves as a realist actor.”7 A “pragmatization of relations” betweentheEUandpartnersresultsinsacrificesinthedemocraticagendaforpoliticaloreconomicdeals.8Atbest,theEUhasbeennegligentandtooacceptingofimitationreforms.Thisispalpableinpartnercountrieswherereformchallengesoligarchicandpoliticalinterests.TheEUhasfailedtodefineaneffectivestrategytocontaindomesticspoilers,particularlytotacklethecorruptionofself-servingelitesenmeshedinnepotism.

EUofficialsandmember-staterepresentativesspeakoftheneedtobecomemore“political”intheneighbourhood,buttheEaPisalreadydeeplypolitical.9Ithashelpedcitizenschangehowtheyaregovernedandoffersthemadevelopmentalmodelbasedondemocracy,ruleoflaw,humanrightsandmarketeconomics.TheAssociationAgreements,includingadeepandComprehensiveFreeTradeArea(dCFTA),arereformblueprintstomakepartnersmorepredictableanddemocratic.Theyliberalizeeconomiesandshouldcreatemoreaccountablegovernments,thereforethreateningcorruptvestedinterestsandprofoundlyaffectingtheregion’spoliticaleconomy.Theycouldhaveapositiveeffectonprotractedconflicts,particularlyinMoldova’sbreakawayregionofTransnistriawherethereisinterestintheeconomicopportunitiesandvisa-freetravelwiththeEU.

ThegreatertheEU’sstrategicroleintheeast,themoreRussia’scurrentleadershipislikelytopushback.FromitsbeginningthoughtheEaPwasnotmeanttocompetewithRussia,itwaspartiallyaresponsetoMoscow’sincreasedassertivenessinthesharedneighbourhood.10 Fearing it might losecontrolofitsnearabroad,RussiahasvoicedverbaloppositiontotheEaPsinceitslaunch.11By2013,whenittookpolitical,economicandlatermilitarymeasurestodissuadeUkraine,MoldovaandArmeniafromsigningAssociationAgreementsinfavourofexclusiveEEUmembership,itwasclearitconsideredtheseprojectsincompatible.12

TheEUanditsmemberstatesdidnotappreciatethischallenge.13whilethisreportdoesnotdiscussrelationswithMoscow,theEUshouldclarifyandsharpenitsRussiapolicy.TheEaPcanhelpprotectmanyoftheEU’sstrategicinterestsintheregionbutitdoesnotreplacetheneedforafullcomplementofforeignandsecuritypolicyresponsestoregionalthreats.

“Bycontinuingtogivemoneyandignoring serious deficienciesandsuppression of basicfreedoms,theEUlegitimizedcorruptandauthoritarian regimes.”

VARUzHAN HOkTANYAN Transparency International

Anti-Corruption Centre

of Armenia

7 giorgigogia,HumanRightswatch,OSEPISeminarontheEasternPartnership,Brussels,June19-20,2014. 8 LeylaAliyeva,CenterfornationalandInternationalStudiesofAzerbaijan,ibid. 9 FedericaMogherini,Brussels,March4,2015,op.cit.“TheCouncilemphasizestheneedtoworkonarevision

oftheEnPinordertoensureitprovidestheadequateframeworkforlong-termrelationswithallEnPpartners,whilemakingitaswellmorepolitical[…].”CouncilConclusionsontheReviewoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy,CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,April20,2015.

10 PreparatoryworktolaunchtheEaPwas“accelerated,respondingtotheneedforaclearersignalofEUcommitmentfollowingthe[August2008]conflictingeorgiaanditsbroaderrepercussions.”“EasternPartnership”,JointCommunication,COM(2008)823final,Brussels,december3,2008.

11 “EU’snewEasternPartnershipdrawsIreFromRussia”,deutschewelle,March21,2009. 12 FormoreontheEEUseeIanadreyerandnicuPopescu,“TradingwithMoscow:thelaw,thepoliticsandthe

economics”,EuropeanUnionInstituteforSecurityStudies(EUISS),BriefIssue,november7,2014.

13 Formoresee“TheEUandRussia:beforeandbeyondthecrisisinUkraine”,6thReportofSession2014-15,HLpaper115,EuropeanUnionCommittee,HouseofLords,UKParliament,February20,2015.

ThereviewoftheEU’sneighbourhoodpolicyprovidesanopportunitytodefineaconsensusamongmemberstatesandinstitutionsontheEU’sstrategicgoalsanditstoolstoachievethem.EUmemberstateshavealreadyagreedthat“stabilityandprosperitybasedonprinciplesofpoliticalinclusion,ruleoflaw,therespectofhumanrightsandinclusiveeconomicdevelopmentinitsneighbourhoodisafundamentalinterestoftheEU.”14

InthisreportwearguethattheopportunitiesthattheEaPoffers,andthepromiseofcloserintegrationwiththeEU,stimulatereformingeorgia,UkraineandMoldova.ThistransformationcanhelpbuildasharedareaofstabilityandprosperityintheeastandtheEUshouldgiveititsfullbacking.Inviewofitsneighbours’differentambitions,theEUshouldreviewiftheintegrationlogicandtheincentivesitprovidesareappropriateforArmenia,AzerbaijanandBelarus.whilethescopeforrelationswiththesethreepartnersmightseemmorelimitedtoday,theEaPshouldkeepthedooropenforclosertiesanddomesticreformers.

Thisworkistheresultofconsultationswithnearly100experts,primarilyfromEaPparticipatingcountries,inaseriesoffocusedworkshopsthatdiscussedreforms;securityandprotractedconflicts;supportingopensocietyandtheshrinkingspaceforngOs;trade;EUandRussiansoftpower;andcorruptionasasourceofpowerandvulnerability.TheworkshopswerecomplementedbyinterviewswithseniorEUofficials.whilethisreportaimstoreflectthelocalexperts’voices,theauthorsshareresponsibilityforthecontent.

14 CouncilConclusionsontheReviewofEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy,op.cit.

“weneedtorecognizethattherealimpactoftheAssociationAgreement goes beyondthetextofthe agreement. It opens a new page ofEUexternalpolicyassuch.”

OLEkSANDR SUSHkO Institute for Euro-Atlantic

Cooperation, Ukraine



TheEaPaimstobringtheeasternneighboursclosertotheEUandencouragereform.Ithasbeenmostsuccessfulingeorgia,MoldovaandUkrainebuteventheyhavemuchworklefttostrengthendemocracy,human rights and rule of law. Implementation of the agreements will testtheirpoliticalwillandcapacities.CompliancewithInternalMarketrequirementswillraisecostsfortheprivatesectorandsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs),whileRussia’spunitivetrademeasureswillcompounddifficulties,especiallyforheavyindustryandagriculture.15 That tangible benefitswillnotbefeltforsometimemayunderminesupportforEUintegration.georgianexpertsforexampleask:“Disillusioned with an unclear NATO and EU membership perspective, the drive to implement a new set of reforms is beginning to shrink. We need to ask, are we seeing a new reform fatigue in society? How can the EU help us get over it?”16

Armenia,AzerbaijanandBelarushavetakenlessadvantageoftheEaPbutarestillinterestedinstrengtheningEUties.ArmeniainSeptember2013decidedtojointheEEUofRussia,BelarusandKazakhstan,despiteyearsofworkingtowardanAssociationAgreement.ItwillnownegotiateanewagreementwithBrusselsthatwilltestwhetherambitiousreformsandcloserelationsarepossibleoutsidetheassociationprocessandconsistentwithEEUmembership.AzerbaijanblatantlyviolatesEaPcommitmentstorespectdemocracyandhumanrightsbutseeksastrategicpartnershiptosupportmodernization,includingEUcommitmenttosupportitsterritorialintegrityandcooperateonenergy.BelarusshowslittleinterestincloserassociationorreformbutuseslimitedengagementtobroadenpolicyoptionswithRussia.

II THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

15 In2013,Russiaimposedexportrestrictionsonwine,followedbybansonfruit,meatandotherproductsin2014.InAugust2014,RussiasuspendedMoldova’stariff-freepreferencesundertheRussia-MoldovaCommonwealthofIndependentStatesFreeTradeAgreement(CISFTA)mainlyforfoodproducts.withUkrainein2013-2014,Russiabannedalistofagriculturalandsomemanufacturedgoodsonallegedsafetyandnon-conformityconcerns.MoscowhasthreatenedtosuspendUkraine’stradebenefitsunderitsCISFTAifitbeginsdCFTAimplementation.denisCenusa,MichaelEmerson,TamaraKovziridseandVeronikaMovchan,“Russia’sPunitiveTradePolicyMeasurestowardsUkraine,Moldovaandgeorgia”,CentreforEuropeanPolicyStudies(CEPS),September2014.

16 KornelyKakachia,TbilisiStateUniversity,OSEPISeminarontheEasternPartnership,Kyiv,September29-30,2014.TheTradeSustainabilityImpactReport(TSIA)publishedinOctober2012notesthatingeorgiadespitepossibleimprovementsinwagesoverall,therewillbegreaterinequalities,particularlyamongthebottom10%ofincomeearners(singlemothers,farmers,pensioners).QuotedinStephenJones,“AgreementbyAssociation:georgiaedgesclosertoEurope,”Opendemocracy,March19,2015.

“TherearethreeconditionsthatneedtobefulfilledfortheEaPtoactas an agent of reform:politicalwill translated intoconsistentpolicyacrossgovernment,proper institutional arrangements andcoordination,andeconomiccapacity.”



17 TheEUisthetoptradingpartnerforallbutBelarus.ItsignedPartnershipandCooperationAgreements(PCAs)withMoldovaandUkrainein1994;andwithArmenia,Azerbaijanandgeorgiain1996.TheEUnegotiatedEnPActionPlanswiththefivecountriesthatincludeddetailedreformprograms.

18 TheEUdelegationinUkraineisthelargestintheregionwithover100staff,whilethedelegationinMinskisthesmallestwith27staff.EEASofficialfigures,March2015.TheEUin2014setupanewdirectorategeneralforneighbourhoodandEnlargementnegotiations(dgnEAR)andincreaseditshumanresources.In2014,theEUestablishedtheUkraineSupportgroupwithsome30professionalstaff.

19 Requirementsincludedliftingtechnicalbarriersfortrade,sanityandphyto-sanitarymeasures,improvedcompetitionpolicy,intellectualpropertyandothers.withUkrainenegotiationsongoingsince2007,threetechnicalissuesremainedtoberesolvedinMay2011:quotasonUkrainiangrainexports,accesstotheEU’sservicesmarketandgeographicalnamesofUkrainiancommodities.AttheEU-UkraineSummitindecember2011theEUalsoexpressedconcernsaboutthejailingofformerPrimeMinisterYuliaTymoshenko.TheEUdelayedsigningin2012-2013duetocontinuedconcernsoverruleoflawandselectivejustice,flawsinelectorallawsandtheinfluenceofbusinessinterestsovergovernmentdecisions.“EUleaders:RatificationofAssociationAgreementanddCFTAdependsonsettlementofTymoshenko-Lutsenkoissue”,Kyiv Post,July20,2012.PiotrKościńskiandEvgenVorobiov“Ukraine’sEUdeal:goodorbadfortheoligarchs?”,PublicServiceEurope,August20,2013.geirFlikke,“normsandConditionality:theEUandUkraine”,norwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairsPolicyBrief,2013.

20 JohannesHahn,EUCommissionerforEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicyandEnlargementnegotiations,“EuropeanUnion-keypartnerforallcountriesinourneighbourhood”,4thOrdinarySessionofEUROnESTParliamentaryAssembly,Yerevan,March18,2015.“EU-UkraineAssociationAgendatoPrepareandFacilitatetheImplementationoftheAssociationAgreement”,EU-UkraineAssociationCouncil,Brussels,March16,2015.“AssociationAgendabetweentheEuropeanUnionandgeorgia”,Brussels,June26,2014.“AssociationAgendabetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicofMoldova”,Brussels,June26,2014.ProgressReportsonImplementationoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy,EuropeanCommissionandHighRepresentativeoftheEUforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy,Brussels,March25,2015.

“Backin1992itwasn’tclearwherethesecountrieswereheaded.Theydidn’thaveaclearvision about their own long-term development. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)reflectedtheseminimalisticobjectives.Thepolicygrewasitwent.Itworked.ThecountriesbecamefriendlytowardstheEU.Theystartedtrading under worldTradeOrganization(wTO)ruleseveniftheywerenotwTOmembers.Thentheyproceededwiththeimplementation of more ambitious andconcreteEnPActionPlansand later even more ambitious AssociationAgreements.”

kAkHA GOGOLASHVILI Georgian Foundation

for Strategic and International

Studies

1 | THE PARTNERSHIP’S OPPORTUNITIES

TheEnPandEaPhavehelpedbringtheeasterncountries,withtheexceptionofBelarus,closertotheEUviastrongercontractualtiesandtrade.17TheEUhassubstantiallyincreaseditshumancapacitiesworkingontheregion,withnewdelegationsinBakuandYerevan,reinforcedpresenceingeorgia,MoldovaandUkraineandmorestaffinginBrussels.18

TheAssociationAgreementsoffergeorgia,MoldovaandUkrainecomprehensiveblueprintstosequenceandmonitorreformandintegration,accesstotheInternalMarket,andtechnicalandfinancialassistance.Togettheseagreements,theyhadtodemonstratetechnicalpreparednessforthenewtraderegimeandinsomecasesadvancedemocraticreforms.InUkraine,concernsoverselectivejustice,electoralsystemflawsandcorruptiondelayedtheagreementbyseveralyears.19

Bysigningtheagreements,thethreecountriescommittedtoreformtheirelectoralsystems,courts,publicadministrationandprotecthumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms.Moldovaisexpectedtoreviseitsconstitutiontopreventfurtherinstitutionaldeadlock;intensifythefightagainsthigh-levelcorruption;reformtheprosecutor’sofficeandimplementjusticesectorlegislation;tacklemediamonopolies;establishoversightofthebankingsector;andcreateastable,predictablebusinessenvironment.georgiamusttacklejusticesectorreformandconcernsoverpoliticallymotivatedprosecutions;managetransitionfromapresidentialtoaparliamentaryrepublic;protectpersonaldataandendintrusivesurveillancebylawenforcement;andreformitscivilserviceonanon-partisanbasis.Ukraine,inverydifficultcircumstances,hascommittedtofar-reachingreformofitsconstitution,publicadministration,andenergysector,includingtovetcorruptjudgesandensurejudicialindependence;buildastronganti-corruptionagency;strengthenlocalandregionalself-governmentwithlawsandmoney;andcreateaneffective,transparentpublicfinancemanagementsystem.20



“Thenextfewyearswill be a real test fortheEU.Canitmanage the high expectationsandfrontloadbenefitsto avoid serious disillusionment among the general public?”

GIORGI GOGIA Human Rights Watch

“Visaliberalizationwasthebackbonefor Moldovan politicianstomaketheprocessmoreattractive.”

SERGHEI OSTAF Resource Center for Human

Rights CReDO, Moldova

ThedCFTAswilltransformtheregulatorybasisoftheUkrainian,georgianandMoldovaneconomiesaccordingtoEUstandards,includingincompetitionpolicy,intellectualproperty,foodsafety,customs,consumerprotection,publicprocurementandroadsafety.Partnerswilltransposesome300EUdirectivesandeventuallyadoptnearly80percentoftheacquis.21 TheEUhasremovedthebulkofitscustomsdutiessincetheagreements’provisionalapplication.22Improvedtechnicalregulations,standards,andcompetitionshouldproducemoretransparencyinbusiness,ensurebetterproductsandservices,raiseproductivityandencouragenewforeigndirectinvestment.23ThedCFTAshouldhelpallthreecountriesbecomemoreenergyefficientandstrengthenenergysecuritythroughimplementationofthe“thirdEUenergypackage”andmembershipintheEUEnergyCommunity.24Yet,economiccostsandpainfulreformwilltestgovernmentandpopularcommitmenttoEUintegrationquickly,whilepositiveimpactwillbefeltmainlyinthelongterm.25

Mobilityandeaseoftravelthatdirectlyaffectpeople’slivesaretheEU’sclearestpositiveincentive.Moldovansalreadyenjoyvisa-freetraveltotheEU;Ukrainiansandgeorgiansshouldattainitin2016.ArmeniaandAzerbaijanhavenegotiatedvisafacilitationandreadmissionagreementsandcouldlaunchdiscussionsonvisa-freetravelattheRigaSummit.Belarus,too,isnegotiatingamoreopenvisaregime.CivilsocietywelcomesvisaliberalizationasoneofthemosteffectiveEaPtoolstogivecitizensatangiblebenefitofEUintegration.Toobtainvisa-freetravelrequiredseriousreform,includinglegalandinstitutionalprotectionagainstdiscrimination,improvedpersonaldataprotectionandanti-corruptionaction.IfvisadialoguesstartwithAzerbaijanandArmenia,equallyfar-reachingreformsshouldbeincludedintheirVisaLiberalizationActionPlans(VLAPs).26

TheEaP’smostsignificantachievementhasbeentofacilitatetheemergenceofapro-democratic,pro-Europeancivilsocietybyprovidingfundsandalegalandpoliticalframeworkforgovernmentalaccountability.Regardlessofhowgovernmentsalignedandwhethertheyactivelypursuedreforms,theEaPbuiltaconstituencyincivilsocietythatremainsitsstrongestally.“Two processes went in parallel after the collapse of the Soviet Union: many countries emerged as independent but chose to align to the Kremlin. Civil

21 TarasKachka,AmericanChamberofCommerce,Ukraine;denisCenusa,Expert-grupMoldova,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar.

22 ProvisionaldCFTAsimplementationwithMoldovaandgeorgiastartedonSeptember1,2014.TheEUcurrentlyunilaterallyimplementsitsdCFTAscommitmentswithUkraine,havingremovedcustomsdutiesonUkrainianexportsasofApril23.ImplementationofthedCFTAhasbeensuspendeduntilJanuary1,2016.

23 ForalistingofhowtheeconomiesofMoldova,georgiaandUkrainemaybenefitfromtheAssociationAgreementssee“TheEU’sAssociationAgreementswithgeorgia,theRepublicofMoldovaandUkraine”,EuropeanCommission,memo,Brussels,June23,2014.

24 ThethirdlegislativepackageforaninternalEUgasandelectricitymarket–the“thirdenergypackage”.MoldovaandUkrainearealreadymembersoftheEnergyCommunitywhilegeorgiaisnegotiatingtojoin.

25 InpartduetotheeconomiccrisisintheregionandtothewarineasternUkraine,in2015Moldova’seconomyisexpectedtocontractby0.2-1.8%andUkraine’sbycloseto5%,whilegeorgia’sistogrowbyamaximumof4%.AcrosstheEaP,nearlyfourrespondentsinfivejudgetheeconomicsituationintheircountriesasbad(79%).EUneighbourhoodBarometer–EasternPartnership,Autumn2014athttp://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6009EnPI_Report-wave-6_East_En_final.pdf.

26 BelarusandtheEUhadtworoundsofnegotiationsonVisaFacilitationandReadmissionAgreementsin2014.

“Iamabsolutelysure that if it was notfortheEUrequirementsenvisaged in the Visa Liberalisation ActionPlan(VLAP),the government ofgeorgiawouldnot adopt the anti-discriminationlawwhichstrengthenstheprotectionofminorities in the country.”

VANO CHkHIkVADzE Open Society Georgia

Foundation

http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6009ENPI_Report-Wave-6_East_EN_final.pdf


27 ArturSakunts,VanadzorHelsinkiCitizens’Assembly,Armenia,OSEPIKyivSeminar. 28 For more see www.democracyendowment.eu.InBelarus,the“ClearingHouse”initiativeandEUspecial

measuresfinancinggavealifelinetoindependentorganizations.“EuropeanneighbourhoodandPartnershipInstrument.2007-2013OverviewofActivitiesandResults”,developmentandCooperation–EuropeAid,EuropeanUnion,Brussels,2014.

29 Thefiveworkinggroupsfocusondemocracyandhumanrights;economicintegration;environmentandenergy;peopletopeoplecontactsandsocialandlabourpoliciesandsocialdialogue.Formoreseehttp://eap-csf.eu/.

30 CivilSocietyForumSteeringCommitteePositiononImposingSanctionsagainstRussianMedia,March6,2015. 31 TheEUadmitsreforms“weresometimespreventedorslowedbyvestedpoliticaloreconomicinterests.”

“neighbourhoodattheCrossroads:ImplementationoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicyin2013”,JointCommunication,JOIn(2014)12final,Brussels,March27,2014,p.5.

32 Sierznaurodski,CaseBelarus,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 33 Richardgiragosiyan,RegionalStudiesCenter,Armenia,OSEPIKyivSeminar. 34 natangarstea,“Abouttheexchangerateoftheleuandwhatwillfollow”,Jurnal.Md,February17,2015.Mark

Baker,“Moldova’sMissingMillions:MassiveBankScandalRoilsChisinau,”RFE/RL,April23,2015.

“TheEaPisagoodprogrambecauseit gave impetus to the European spirit ofcivilsocietyinAzerbaijan.despiterepression,thereis permanent resistance.”

LEILA ALIEVA Center for National and

International Studies, Azerbaijan

society was formed in alignment to the EU. There was no other choice.”27

ThroughthenewEuropeanEndowmentfordemocracy(EEd)thatfocusesonsupportingnon-registeredormarginalizedgroupssuchasLgBTIandpoliticalactivistsintheneighbourhood,theEUsustains157initiatives,amongthemmanythatcouldnotaccessotherfinancing,asinAzerbaijan.28TheEaPalsocreatedtheEasternPartnershipCivilSocietyForumasaformalchannelforcivilsocietytoaccessEUinstitutionsandpolicydiscussions.Meetingyearlyandinworkinggroups,ithashelpedprofessionalizelocalcivilsocietybycreatingnationalplatformsandpreparingjointpolicyinputs.29Itfosterslinksandcohesionbetweencivilsocietyandacommondemocraticculture.TheForumhastakenstrongpositionsonRussia,particularlycallingforsanctionsonitsmediafor“propaganda[that]supportsPresidentVladimirPutin’swarinUkraine,seekstodestabiliseotherEasternPartnershipcountries,andpromotesfear,insecurityandaggressionintheregion.”30

2 | THE PARTNERSHIP’S CHALLENGES

weakgovernmentsandelitesbentonregimesurvivalobstructtheEaP’sreformagenda.31Instate-controlledeconomies,themodelofopentradingrelationshipsfundamentallyclasheswithpatronageandprotectionsystems.“The economic potential of the EU28 is six times higher than the joint potential of Russia and Kazakhstan. But the choice between a DCFTA or the Customs Union is not about foreign trade only but about governments’ will to undertake comprehensive internal structural reform. For Belarus, the EEU is a way to preserve the existing economic model.”32Elsewhere,powerfuleconomicinterestsresistchangetoprotecttheirprivilegedpositions.“In Armenia, business was not in favour of a DCFTA. It feared the unknown and preferred the old ways. The DCFTA would have introduced a healthy dose of competition that was unwelcome.”33

InMoldovaandUkraine,thefightagainstcorruptionandthecreationofapredictablebusinessenvironmentisonlystarting.Innovember2014,“raider”attacksonthethreebiggestMoldovanbankscausedrapidcurrencydepreciationandthelossofsome€1billionofpublicfunds(onefifthofthegdP).Aninvestigationisongoing,buttherehavebeennoindictments,thoughitisassumedseveralseniorofficialswereinvolved.34

“Thechoicebetween a DCFTA or the Customs Unionisnotaboutforeign trade onlybutaboutgovernments’ willtoundertakecomprehensiveinternalstructuralreform. For Belarus,theEEUisawaytopreservetheexistingeconomicmodel.”

SIERz NAURODSkI Case Belarus


http://www.democracyendowment.eu


“InArmenia,business was not in favour of a DCFTA. It feared theunknownandpreferred the oldways.TheDCFTA would haveintroducedahealthydoseofcompetitionthatwasunwelcome.”

RICHARD GIRAGOSIYAN Regional Studies Center,

Armenia

OnlygeorgiahasdonethederegulationandliberalizationneededtoscorewellintheworldBank’sEaseofdoingBusinessreport,whereMoldovaandUkrainerankedamiserable63rdand96thplacerespectivelyin 2014.35Reformofelectorallawsandpoliticalpartyfinancingisneededinallthreecountriessooligarchsdonotdeformthepoliticalplayingfield.

EUofficialsacknowledgethat“the oligarchization of society is one of the biggest obstacles to creating normal accountable democracies. All efforts should be made to open as much as possible the economic sphere and create normal economies to get rid of this oligarchization.”36 ArangeofconcreterequirementstofightcorruptionwereintroducedintheEnPActionPlans,reviewedandextendedintheVisaLiberalisationActionPlansandupdatedintheAssociationAgendas.37ButtheEUunderutilizedtheinstrumentsatitsdisposal.InYanukovych’sUkraine,anti-corruptiongroupscollectedarichbodyofevidenceexposingstatecorruptionanduseofthewesternfinancialsystemtosyphonoffmillionsofpublicfunds.38AresponsefromwesternlawenforcementundertheEU’sownanti-moneylaunderingregulationswasnotforthcominguntilaftertheregime’scollapse,whentheEUimposedtargetedsanctionsand sought the restoration of stolen state assets.39

TheEUshoulddomoretomonitoruseofitsowncorporatestructuresformoneylaunderingandstatetheft.Inanalreadycapturedstate,therearefewmeanstofightcorruptiondomestically.Localwatchdogscanhelpuncoverfacts,butonlyamorestringentEUresponsecanhaltabuseoftheEUfinancialsystem.“If in our countries we cannot achieve investigations, we have to trigger a reaction in the West.”40Considerationshouldbegivenbymemberstates,whoarenowmakingattemptstobettercoordinateanti-corruptionefforts,tohowanti-corruptionathomecansupportthefightagainstcorruptionintheneighbourhood.41

InabilitytotacklecorruptionispartoftheEU’sbroaderreluctancetostandupforthedemocracyandhumanrightsstandardsallEaPmembersclaimtouphold.TheEUmakesstatementswhenactivistsorthepoliticaloppositionareimprisoned,electionsriggedorpoliticalprotestssuppressed,butdoeslittleelsetodefendthenormativebasisofthepartnership.ThishasledtogrowingcivilsocietydisillusionmentabouttheEU’scommitmentandgoalsintheregion.

Azerbaijanisacaseinpoint.Overthepasttwoyears,itsgovernmenthascrackeddownoncivilsocietyandpoliticalactivists,arrestingdozensof

35 worldBankgroup,Doing BusinessRanking,June2014,atwww.doingbusiness.org/rankings.

36 EUofficial,OSEPIKyivSeminar. 37 Thesecoverlaws,anti-corruptionstrategiesandupgradeoftheinstitutionalset-up,suchasestablishmentand

strengtheningofnationalanti-corruptionbureaus,aswellastheobligationtofollowtherecommendationsofspecializedinternationalbodiessuchasgRECO.

38 ThesegroupsincludethecivilsocietyorganizationsAnticorruptionActionCentre(AntAC)(http://antac.org.ua/en/)andnashigroshi(http://nashigroshi.org/).Formoreseealsohttp://yanukovich.info/.

39 RegulationsoftheEUFinancialActionTaskForce(FATF)bardealingswithclientswhoseassetsaresuspicious.dariyaKalenyuk,AntAC,Ukraine,OSEPIKyivSeminar.ThetimelineofCouncildecisionsonrestrictivemeasuresinresponsetotheUkrainecrisisisathttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/.

40 dariyaKalenyuk,AntAC,Ukraine,OSEPIKyivSeminar. 41 Formoreonanti-corruptionintheEUsee“EUAnti-CorruptionReport,”EuropeanCommission,COM(2014)38

final,Brussels,February3,2014.

“IntheEU’seasternneighbourhood—aregionofweakstates and complicatedgeopolitics—corruptionisnotjustabad-governanceissue,butasecurityissue. For both the statesinquestionandtheEUitself.Thatiswhyamuchstrongerfocusonsecuritysectorreform and anti-corruptioniskeyfortheEaP.”

NICU POPESCU European Union Institute for

Security Studies

http://antac.org.ua/en/

http://antac.org.ua/en/

http://nashigroshi.org/

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/

humanrightsdefenders,journalists,bloggersandlawyers.42ngOs,includingEUgrantees,havebeenunabletoregistergrantssincesummer2014.TheEUissuedeightstatementscondemningthesedevelopments,andtheEuropeanParliamentpassedaresolutioncallingforafreezeintalksandtargetedsanctions.43Yet,theEUcontinuestotalktoBakuaboutastrategicmodernizationagreementwithanevenweakernormativebasisthanthecurrentEnPActionPlan.44AdayafterAzerbaijan’smainelectionobservationngO—theElectionMonitoringanddemocracyStudiesCenter—wasraidedanditshead,aprominentEaPCivilSocietyForummember,wasarrested,EuropeanleaderssignedinBakuacontractonamajorgasprojectincleardemonstrationthatcommonenergyintereststrumpvalues.45

Armeniapledgedtoreformthejudiciaryandelectorallaw,improvemediafreedom,fightagainstcorruptionandderegulatethemarket,butithastakenfewconcretesteps.Only1percentofArmeniansbelievethejudiciaryis independent.46Seriousviolationsoccurredduringthe2013presidentialelections.47Therecentswitchovertodigitalbroadcastingresultedinfewerlicencesandlimitsmediadiversity.48Armenia’srankingintheTransparencyInternationalCorruptionPerceptionIndexhasremainedalmostunchangedforthreeyears.49Moreover,Armenianevercompleteddiscussionsonadoptionofanti-discriminationlegislation,failedtopassalong-promiseddomesticviolencelawandhasyettomatchitstorturedefinitiontointernationalstandards.Yet,theEUacceptedthisimitationofchangetodeliver“moreformore”assistance,whichismeanttooffermorefundstocountriesthatareprovenreformers.

TheArmenianandAzerbaijaniexperiencesdemonstratethelimitationsoftheEU’sstatedfocusonpromotingdemocraticreformwhenitisnotwillingtoconfrontdelinquency.UntilitdecidedinSeptember2013todropplansforanAssociationAgreement,Armeniawassettosign,thoughithadkeptfewofitspromises.50InUkraine,theEUinitiallyimposedstrongconditionsonelectoralandjusticereform,butlaterwas

42 AmongthosearrestedareinternationallyrenownedactivistsLeylaYunusandherhusbandArif,whofortwodecadeshaveleddialoguewithArmeniancounterparts;IntigamAliyev,alawyerwhohasbroughthundredsofrightscasestotheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandadvisedtheCouncilofEurope;andRasulJafarov,whowithotherrightsdefendersgaveevidencetotheParliamentaryAssemblyoftheCouncilofEurope(PACE)onAzerbaijanipoliticalprisoners.In2014,AzerbaijancompleteditsChairmanshipoftheCouncilofEuropeCommitteeofMinisterswithoutdisruption,andthenATOandOSCEParliamentaryAssembliesmetinBaku.

43 Seehttp://www.eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/news/index_en.htm#top.“EuropeanParliamentresolutiononthepersecutionofhumanrightsdefendersinAzerbaijan”,2014/2832(RSP),Strasbourg,September18,2014.

44 “AzerbaijanandEUracetoagree‘modernisation’pact”,EUObserver,September27,2013.AEuropeanParliamentobservationmissionthatgavethe2013electionsacleanslate,incontrasttotheOSCE/OdIHRconclusions,isoneofthemostegregiousexamplesofsuchcapture.Seealso“Caviardiplomacy.HowAzerbaijanSilencedtheCouncilofEurope”,TheEuropeanStabilityInitiative(ESI),Berlin,May24,2012.

45 “FinalinvestmentdocumentonShahdeniz-2projectinked”,Azernews,december17,2013.Azerbaijansupplies4-5%ofEUoilneeds.Itwillbeabletoprovideabout2%oftheEU’sannualgasrequirementthroughanewpipelinetoEuropeanmarketsinwhichitislikelytoinvestsome$20billion.guyChazan,“AzerbaijanigaspipelineaimstocarveoutanicheacrossEurope”,Financial Times,January1,2014.ButothergasresourcescomingonlineandtheshalegasexplosionmayunderminetheimportanceofAzerbaijanigas.

46 CaucasusBarometer2013availableathttp://www.crrc.am/caucasusbarometer/documentation?lang=en.

47 “EnPCountryProgressReport2012–Armenia”,EuropeanCommission,Brussels,March20,2013.OSCE/OdIHRElectionObservationMissionFinalReport,warsaw,May8,2013.

48 giorgigogia,HumanRightswatch,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 49 Itplaced94thamong175countriesin2014. 50 LarisaMinasyan,OpenSocietyFoundations,Armenia,OSEPIKyivSeminar.

“TheEU’sinconsistencywhenitspeaksofrights but doesn’t penalizeleadersand governments who violate them both lowered thecostsforundemocraticregimes and undercutitscredibility.”



“InArmenia‘morefor more’ meant moremoneyfor more laws adopted,butfailedtotakeintoaccountimplementation.”

VARUzHAN HOkTANYAN Transparency International

Anti-Corruption Centre

of Armenia


http://www.crrc.am/caucasusbarometer/documentation?lang=en


“IftheEUstoppedtolerating abuses andfalsifiedelections,wemightmakeabiggerstep towards democracy.”

STEPAN GRIGORIAN Analytical Centre on

Globalization and Regional

Cooperation (ACGRC),

Armenia

preparedtoreconsidertheserequirementstosecuretheagreement’ssignatureattheVilniusEaPSummit.51

Finally,twooftheEaP’sbiggestfailuresarethatithasnotcapturedthepublic’simagination,andsomeofitspoliciesaredeeplymisunderstood.AccordingtooneEU-fundedpoll,positiveattitudesandtrusttowardstheEUare58percentingeorgia,56percentinUkraine,only28percentinAzerbaijan.52OtherpollsputsupportfortheEUingeorgiamuchhigher(85percent),andshowariseoffavourableattitudestowardstheEUinUkraine—from47to56percentin2014.53 Even where support ishigh,EUpoliciesandtheopportunitiesthatcloserintegrationoffersarenotsufficientlyunderstood.Ingeorgia,a2013opinionpollshowedthatrespondentswerelargelyunder-informedabouttheEU,andonly23percentofgeorgiansandsevenpercentofminoritiessaidthattheyhadheardoftheEaP.54 After the signature and start of provisional implementationofMoldova’sagreementwiththeEU,60percentsaidinthelatestnovember2014country-wideBarometerofPublicOpinionthattheywerepoorlyornotatallinformedabouttheAssociationAgreement.55

RussiasubtlyandeffectivelyunderminestheEUandmisrepresentsitspoliciesthroughitsmoreprofessionalmedia,influenceoverlocalinformationsourcesandsomengOs.Itcapitalizesonthefactthat“while many people’s minds are rationally in Europe, people believe that their identity and traditions are better protected by Russia. Emotionally their memories are in the Russian sphere, the Russia world.”56

Meanwhile,civilsocietyhasbeengivenonlylimitedaccesstoEUdiscussions,makingitharderforittoadvocateforEUpoliciesandsecurepopularbuy-in.InArmenia,forexample,ngOsstartedreceivinginvitationsfromtheEUdelegationforconsultationsonthefutureofEU-ArmeniarelationsonlyafterthegovernmentdecidedtojointheEEU.57withoutproperinformationontheagreement,ngOscoulddolittletorefutewidespread(andfalse)rumoursthatitwouldhaverequiredconcessionsonnagorno-Karabakh.58 “The involvement of civil society is critical. CSOs should be part of all discussions. They can help ensure the buy-in of society especially in regions prone to conflict or emerging from conflict.”59

51 TheVerkhovnaRadafailedtodecideonthesituationofformerPrimeMinisterTymoshneko,andreformoftheelectoralandthejusticesystems.“5daysbeforeVilniussummit2conditionsforassociationagreementstillnotmet”,EuropeanPeople’sParty,Brussels,november13,2013.

52 EUneighbourhoodBarometer–EasternPartnership,Autumn2014athttp://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6009EnPI_Report-wave-6_East_En_final.pdf.

53 PublicOpinionSurvey:Residentsofgeorgia,February3-28,2015,InternationalRepublicanInstitute(IRI).FiguresforUkrainefromRazumkovCentreatwww.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=919.

54 “KnowledgeandAttitudestowardstheEUingeorgia:ChangesandTrends2009-2013”,CRRC-georgia. 55 39percentsaidtheywouldvotetojointheEU,43percenttojointheCustomsUnion.“BarometerofPublic

Opinion”,InstituteforPublicPolicy,October-november2014.

56 Moldovanexpert,OSEPIKyivSeminar. 57 VaruzhanHoktanyan,TransparencyInternationalAnti-CorruptionCentreofArmenia,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 58 Theagreementhadnoprovisionsontheconflict.AghasiYenokyan,ArmenianCenterfornationaland

InternationalStudies,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar.

59 ErwanFouéré,AmbassadorandformerSpecialRepresentativefortheIrish2012ChairmanshipoftheOSCE,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar.

“TheAssociationAgreements were not open to civilsocietyforconsideration.Therefore there was no ownership oftheircontent andgoals.”




http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=919

TheEU’smixedrecordinpromotingreformhasledtodoubtintheeffectivenessoftheEnP’snormativeagenda.whenlaunchingtheEnPreview,CommissionerHahnwascandid:“Thepromotionofdemocracy,humanrightsandruleoflawisadefiningcharacteristicoftheEU.Butletusaskourselves,whethertheEnPascurrentlyconstituted,hasbeenthesuccesswehoped,intransmittingthesevalues.”60 The Commissioner and HighRepresentativenowask,“canpartnershipsbefocussedmoreexplicitlyonjointinterests,inordertoincreaseownershiponbothsides?”TheyaddthattheEnPreviewwillaimto“clarifywhataretheinterestsoftheEUandeachpartner,andthoseareasofstrongestcommoninterest.”61

whileMoscow’scountervailinginfluencehasplayedanimportantrole,thisnewfocusoninterestsisalsopartiallyduetorealizationamongpolicy-makersthattheEUlacksaneffectivestrategytodealwiththosewhodonotseekanambitiouspartnershipbasedonacommunityofvalues.Inits2011EnPreview,theEUstressedthatsupportforpartnerswasconditional“onprogressinbuildingandconsolidatingdemocracyandrespectfortheruleoflaw”andthat“itwillupholditspolicyofcurtailingrelations with governments engaged in violations of human rights and democracystandards.”62Butthe2015consultationpapermakesnomentionofconditionalityorsanctions.63Instead,EUofficialsstresstheneedfora“partnershipofequals”thatisnot“condescending,patronisingorpreaching.”64

1 | THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP’S NORMATIVE AGENDA

AweakernormativeapproachwouldlimittheEU’sstrategicfootholdintheregion.Thepromiseofdemocracy,ruleoflaw,transparentinstitutionsandbetterlivingstandardsiswhatsustainedchangethere.Euromaidanactivists

III A NORMATIVE AGENDA, FOCUSSING ON COMMON INTERESTS

60 JohannesHahn,“EuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy:thewayforward”,Speech/15/4530,Vienna,March2,2015. 61 JointConsultationPaper,op.cit. 62 “AnewResponsetoaChangingneighbourhood”,JointCommunication,COM(2011)303,Brussels,May25,

2011.

63 JointConsultationPaper,op.cit. 64 JohannesHahn,SpeechtoAFETCommitteeattheEuropeanParliament,Strasbourg,March10,2015.

“ConditionalityhasbecomeaspookywordinEUquarters.dealingwithUkraine’sYanukovychsetabadexample.Theperceptionin Brussels is that conditionalityfailedinUkraineanditdoesn’twork.”



wentintoKyiv’sstreetsin2013ostensiblybecauseofYanukovych’sdecisiontodroptheAssociationAgreement,butthousandsofpeopledidnotsufferfreezingtemperaturesandpolicerepressionnightafternightforthedocument,butforthevaluesatitscore.Ingeorgiain2003andMoldovain2009,protestorsusedEuropeanvaluestolegitimizetheirlargelypeacefulstruggleagainstcorrupt,ineffectiveelites.EUnormsandstandardswereaframeworkofreference.ThemoreconsistentlytheEUinsistsondemocraticpractices,themoreitreinforcesdomesticagentsofreform.

Topartnersthatdonotwanttodothedeepreformsnecessaryforcloserintegration,theEUalreadyofferstopickandchoosefromarichcooperationmenubasedontheirinterestsandinitiative:marketaccessinreturnforeconomicreforms;mobilityofpeopleinreturnforruleoflawandborderprotection;financialassistanceinreturnforreformsinthepublicadministrationreforms.65ConditionalitydidnotpreventtheEUandmemberstatesfromconcludingtradeandenergydealsorseekingtailor-made“strategicpartnerships.”EUofficialsstressthathumanrightsandEUvalues“willalwaysbeontheagenda,”66butthereisadangerthatare-focusonshort-termexigenciesandareasofeasyconvergenceofinterests—suchasenergyorcounter-terrorism—willunderminefurthertheEnP’spromotionofreforms.

OneofthemostimportantlessonstheEUseemstohavelearnedfromtheArabSpringisnottoinvestexclusivelyinrelationswithgovernment.withthe2011EnPreview,theEUprominentlystatedthatitseeksa“partnershipwithsocietiesalongsidetherelationswithgovernments,”topromotegovernmentaccountability,inclusivepolicy-makingandeconomicgrowth.67 Thisisnotproposedasanareaoffocusinthe2015consultationpaper,thoughmanypartnergovernmentslackdomesticcredibilityandarenotrepresentativeoftheircitizens’interests.whilemuchissaidaboutidentifying“sharedinterests”,theEUshoulddefinethoseinclusively,consideringnotonlytheinterestsoftheEaPcountries’smallelites,butalsothoseoftheirsocieties.Tostrengthenstatestability,itisalsointheEU’sinteresttosupportresilient,dynamicsocietiesandencourageaninformedandactivecitizenrythatcanpartakeingovernanceandwithstandmanipulationanddemagoguery,includingextremistideologyofallkinds.

Incountrieswhereelitesrejecttheassociationreformagenda,CouncilPresidentdonaldTuskhassuggestedthattheEUfocusoninstitutionbuildingandEUmemberstateshaveconfirmedthatparticulareffortsshouldbedevotedtoadvancecooperationinstatebuilding.68 The EaP


65 “AnewResponsetoaChangingneighbourhood”,op.cit. 66 JohannesHahn,“TowardsanewEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy:theEUlaunchesaconsultationonthefuture

ofitsrelationswithneighbouringcountries”,Speech,Brussels,March4,2015.

67 “TowardsanewEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy:theEUlaunchesaconsultationonthefutureofitsrelationswithneighbouringcountries”,pressrelease,EuropeanCommission,Brussels,March4,2015.“AnewResponsetoaChangingneighbourhood”,op.cit.“AMediumTermProgrammeforarenewedEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy(2011-2014)”,EuropeanCommission,SEC(2011)650,Brussels,May25,2011.

68 ConclusionsoftheEuropeanCouncilMeeting,EUCO11/15,Brussels,March20,2015.“Leadersagreedapriorityareaistohelpbuildupstateinstitutionsandstrengthentheruleoflaw,basedoneachcountry’sneedsandpreferences.Inotherwords,thenextphasewillbeaboutstrengtheningthedemocraticinstitutionstotheeast.”RemarksbyPresidentdonaldTuskafterthefirstworkingsessionoftheEuropeanCouncilmeeting,Brussels,March19,2015.

“TheEUwasquickto give up in the moredifficultcountrycontexts.”



isastrongtoolforthis.TheEUhasalreadysetupaninstitutionbuildingprogramfortheeastandin2011promisedtogiveitmoreresources.69 InallEaPcountries(exceptBelarus),itstrengthensthecapacityofselectinstitutionstoimplementEUagreements,includingtomanagemobilitypartnershipsandvisafacilitation.AsitagreestonewcontractualframeworkswithArmeniaandAzerbaijan,includingvisadialogues,theEUshouldtakegreatefforttoengagewithjusticeandhomeaffairsinstitutionstofightcorruptionandensureaccountability.Anylargefundingshouldbetiedtopublicadministrationreform,astheEUisaskingofArmenia.70

Fortheireffortstosucceed,theEUandmemberstatesshouldmoreclearlydefinetheirgoalsinbilateralrelationsandtakeamoreprincipled,consistentstanceinpursuingthem.Thiswouldmeanstrengtheningcarrotsandstickswithmoreandlessambitiouspartnersalike.

2 | DEEPER INTEGRATION wITH AMBITIOUS PARTNERS

withthreeoftheEU’seasternpartners—georgia,MoldovaandUkraine—thenormativeframeworkbroughtresults.Buttheynowfacea“reversedintegrationparadigm”:unliketheirBalkanneighbours,theyhavetomakesubstantialreformsbeforetheycanseekanEUmembershipperspective.AsMoldova’sambassadortotheEUpointsout,“weconsiderthattheballisinourcourt.weneedtobethedrivingforce.wehavetoproveourselvestotheEU.”71Itremainstobeseenifthisframeworkwillwork.“Thehighpoliticalcostsofreformdomesticallyarewelcome—theyleadtothetransformationofthecountry.Buttheeconomiccostsarealreadymountingandpartnerspayabigpricewiththeirsecurity.georgiaandUkrainehavelostpeopleandterritory.”72

MostexpertsfromMoldova,georgiaandUkraineareeagerfortheircountriestoobtainanEUmembershipperspectiveasaclearincentiveforfurtherreformandtohelpimprovetheirsecurityprospects.Thegovernmentsofthethreecountriesrealize,however,thatsuchaperspectiveisnotimminent.TheyexpecttheRigasummitandEaPreviewtorestatetheEU’sprincipledpositionandcommitmenttosupporttheirdemocratictransitionandEuropeanaspirationsandthat,ataminimum,thedoortomembershipshouldnotbelocked.

EUmemberstateshavesaidtheAssociationAgreementisnotafinalgoalandregularlyacknowledgethe“EuropeanaspirationsandEuropeanchoiceofsomepartners.”73Butmemberstatesalsostronglyresistanytalkofmore

69 ThisreferstotheComprehensiveInstitutionBuilding(CIB)program.“AnewResponsetoaChangingneighbourhood”,op.cit.

70 OSEPIInterview,EUofficial,Yerevan,March17,2015. 71 OSEPIinterview,AmbassadorEugenCaras,MissionoftheRepublicofMoldovatotheEU,Brussels,February17,

2015.

72 OSEPIinterview,AmbassadornatalieSabanadze,MissionoftheRepublicofgeorgiatotheEU,Brussels,March24,2015.

73 ConclusionsonUkraine,EUForeignAffairsCouncil,Brussels,February20,2014.“EasternPartnership–thewayAhead”,JointdeclarationoftheEasternPartnershipSummit,17130/13,Vilnius,november29,2013,p.2.

“TheEaPgivesa false sense ofequalityforallparties.Yetsome are free of Russianinfluenceand others are still under it. SomeaspiretoEUmembershipand are willing to sacrificeforit.ForgeorgiacloserEUintegrationhas resulted in theoccupationof20percentofherterritorybyRussia.Moldovafacessimilarproblems, as does now Ukraine.”

kAkHA GOGOLASHVILI Georgian Foundation for

Strategic and International

Studies


enlargement.CommissionHeadJunckerpledged“nomoreenlargementforthenextfiveyears”onassumingoffice.Evenmoderatepoliticiansfearnationalistbacklashfortalkingaboutnewmembershipperspectivesinatimeofeconomicausterityandgrowingeuro-scepticismandanti-immigrantsentiment(especiallyintheUK,France,Spain,andgreece).74 More than domesticsentimentinEUcountries,however,EaPpartnersworryaboutMoscow’sdeterminationtocrushtheirEuropeanambitions.georgia’sEUambassadornoted:“werespectinternalconsiderations.Butforeignpolicyshouldnothaveaneffectonthisdecision.”75TheUkrainecrisisshowedthatfurtherEUexpansionintoformerSovietspaceisared-lineforMoscow,andpartnersareconcernedthatRussiahasacquiredadefactoveto.

whiletheEUisloathtoofferamembershipperspective,thepartnersarepreparedtobe“visionary”andshowthattheywilldeliveronagreements.InMoldova’sview,“thesituationintheregionisnotconducivetoboldstatementsonenlargement.wehavetotakethetimetodeliver.Bybeingpragmaticbutvisionarywecanchangeoursituation.”Thepriorityfornowistofulfilthepotentialofagreedcommitments.“ForMoldovathekeywordisimplementation.Rigawillbea‘summitofimplementation.’Changesshouldincrementallyputusinabetterposition.”76

Itisprematuretoconfirmanymembershipperspective,buttheEUshouldcommittopartners’freedomtopursueone,ifandwhenready,andprovethisbycommittingtime,peopleandresourcestosupportsuccessfulimplementationoftheAssociationAgreements.Article49oftheLisbonTreatyguaranteesthat“[a]nyEuropeanStatewhichrespectsthevaluesreferredtoinArticle2andiscommittedtopromotingthemmayapplytobecomeamemberoftheUnion.”77 OnceeasternneighbourshaveimplementedtheiragreementsandalignedmostoftheirlegalandregulatorypracticeswiththeEUacquis,theywouldbeinamuchstrongerpositiontoaskforascreeningoflegislationthatregularlyoccursincountriesthathavebeengrantedEUcandidatestatusand,iftheyhavemettheCopenhagenCriteria,beallowedtoprepareamembershipapplicationorbeginthekindofHighLevelAccessiondialogue(HLAd)processthattheFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedoniahashadsince2012.78

3 | INTEREST-BASED TARGETED PARTNERSHIPS

Increaseddifferentiationisanaturaloutcomeoftheimplementationofnewagreementsingeorgia,MoldovaandUkraineandshouldbeformalizedmoreexplicitly.Unlikethosewhoeventuallywishtohaveamembershipperspective,Armenia,AzerbaijanandBelarusareprimarilymotivated


74 JoséIgnacioTorreblancaandMarkLeonard,“Thecontinent-wideriseofEuroscepticism”,EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations(ECFR),May2013.

75 OSEPIinterview,AmbassadornatalieSabanadze,March24,2015. 76 OSEPIinterview,AmbassadorEugenCaras,February17,2015. 77 TreatyofLisbonamendingtheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandtheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanCommunity,

signedatLisbon,13december2007.

78 TheCopenhagencriteriaare:political(stabilityofinstitutionsguaranteeingdemocracy,ruleoflaw,humanrightsandrespectforandprotectionofminorities);economic(functioningmarketeconomyandcapacitytocopewithcompetitivepressureandmarketforceswithintheUnion);andacceptanceoftheacquis(abilitytotakeonmembershipobligations,includingadherencetotheaimsofpolitical,economicandmonetaryunion).

“RussiawillalwaystrytoinfluencetheAssociationAgreement. whenitaskedtopostponeit,itwasonlytobuytime.InUkraine,weareliving under the threatofRussianinvasion. But our firstandmainbattlefieldistoimplement reforms forwhichweneedtheEU’ssupporttosucceed.”



byotherinterests:bettermobility,accesstotheEUinternalmarket,technologicaltransfers,economiccooperation,financialassistance,and(forAzerbaijan)EUcommitmenttoitsterritorialintegrity.EUwillingnesstoengagewithArmeniaandAzerbaijanontailoredagreementsthatfallshortoffullassociationdealsisawelcomeattempttomaintainstrongrelations,butbothshouldadvancetheEU’sstabilityandreformgoalsinreturn.

ArmeniacanbeatestcaseofwhethertheEUcanmaintainclosetiesandanadvancedreformagendainthecontextofEEUmembership.“ArmeniawouldofferablueprintforBelarusdowntheline.”79YerevansaysEEUmembershipwillnotaffectitshumanrightsandreformcommitments,anditisreadytofulfilallobligationsunderthepoliticalandhomeaffairschaptersofthealreadynegotiatedAssociationAgreement.80IthasagreedtoanEUhumanrightsbudgetsupportprograminexchangeforreforminelections,genderequality,anti-discrimination,children’srightsandcombattingtortureand ill-treatment.81ThisfirstsuchEaPcountryprogramcouldbeanimportantprecedentiftheEUmonitorsandinsistsonimplementationofcommitments.

TheEUhasleverswitheachpartner.ArmeniawantsmoreEUfinancialaid.82 Azerbaijanisinterestedindeepeningtradeandenergylinks.83 Both want visaliberalization.Aswithothers,theEUshouldusethefullVLAPpotential,includingtosecureprogressonfightingcorruptionanddevelopingequalityandanti-discriminationlegislationandpractices.AnytalksonvisaliberalizationwithAzerbaijanshouldbeconditionalonfreedomfromrepressionandpoliticalprosecutionandreleaseofpoliticalprisoners.

TheEUandAzerbaijanarediscussinganewStrategicModernizationPartnershipandtheEUshouldapplyleveragetoensurethatitmeetsitsownintereststoo.Azerbaijan’sambassadortoBelgiuminsiststhatwhilecooperationwiththeEUislikelytobedrivenbysharedenergyinterests,“weassesstheSgC[SoutherngasCorridor]asahugeeconomicalandcommercialfoundationuponwhichwecanbuildaveryseriouspoliticaldialogue.Abouteverything,abouthumanrights,aboutdemocracy,aboutsocialissues,aboutmulticulturalism.”84AzerbaijanneedstheEUasareliablecustomerforitsenergy,especiallyasRussiaisplanningasoutherngascorridorthatwillcompetewithAzerbaijan’ssupply.Thecooperationinenergy,supportforterritorialintegrity,education,cultureandmobilitythatBakuseeksshouldbetiedtoreforms.ImprovedaccesstoEUmarkets,supporttoAzerbaijan’sagriculturesectororITindustryshouldbeconditionedonaliberalizedeconomywhoserulesaretransparentandridofcorruption.Closerpoliticalrelationsshouldoccurwhentheclimateoffear

79 OSEPIinterview,EUofficial,Brussels,February20,2015. 80 OSEPIinterview,governmentofficial,Yerevan,March18,2015. 81 Theprogramwilloffer€11millionover5years.OSEPIinterview,EUofficial,Yerevan,March17,2015. 82 OSEPIinterview,EUofficial,ibid.OSEPIinterview,Armenianexpert,Yerevan,March19,2015. 83 52percentofitstradeiswiththeEU.“Sowehaveaverypragmaticapproachtohaveasustainableeconomic

basis,onwhichwecanbuildpoliticaldialogue.Anequal,futureoriented,pragmaticapproachbasedonstrategicpartnershipagreement”,quotedin“Ambassador:Azerbaijanisunfairlytargeted,”Euractiv,March6,2015.“AzerbaijanisinterestedinadCFTA”,OSEPIinterview,EUofficial,Brussels,February20,2015.

84 “Ambassador:Azerbaijanisunfairlytargeted,”op.cit.


andrepressionofpoliticalcriticsandrightsactivistsislifted.ThiswouldfocusrelationsaroundaclearersetofdeliverablesthatmeettheEU’sinterests.

whileBelaruspursuesmorelimitedcooperation,itexpectstosignaVisaFacilitationandReadmissionAgreementattheRigaSummit,andthereistalkofhigh-levelrepresentationforthefirsttimeifitreleasespoliticalprisoners.85 PresidentLukashenkosaidin2014,“ifthewestoffersuscooperation,wecannotmissthechance.”86BelarushasshowninterestintechnicalaidandcarriedoutreforminsectorssuchasroadtransportincompliancewithEuropeanstandards.87despiteitslimitedparticipationintheEnP,BelarusconsistentlyisthirdamongEnPcountriesinseekingexchangeofbestpractices,know-howandexperiencewiththeEUunderprogramssuchasTAIEX.88

AzerbaijanandBelarusneedrelationswiththeEUandtheEaPtobroadentheirforeignpolicyoptionsandstrengthenindependencevis-à-visRussia.TheyshouldremaininthepartnershipbuttheEUshouldmakebetteruseofthisleverage,includingwithrestrictivemeasuresastheEUpledgedto“upholditspolicyofcurtailingrelationswithgovernmentsengagedinviolationsofhumanrightsanddemocracystandards,includingbymakinguseoftargetedsanctions.…[w]henittakessuchmeasures,itwillnotonlyupholdbutstrengthenfurtheritssupportforcivilsociety.”89

SanctionswereimposedonBelarusin2004andUkrainein2014.Theyhaveincludedanarmsembargo,assetfreezesandtravelbansagainstpersonsresponsibleforserioushumanrightsviolations.However,theEU’sunwillingnesstoimposesimilarmeasuresonAzerbaijanisselectiveandinconsistent.TomaintaintheEaP’scredibilityengagementwithAzerbaijanicivilsociety,eveniflocatedabroad,andsanctionsagainstthemostconsistentviolatorsofhumanrightswouldbemoreprincipledthancontinuingtobehaveasthoughAzerbaijanisupholdingEUvalues.

4 | CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND REGIONAL STABILITY

EUmemberstatescallforanEaPthat“shouldcontributetopromotingstabilityintheneighbourhood…instrumentsshouldbeusedmorewidelytostrengthenpartners’capacitytoaddresssecuritythreats,notablythroughsecuritysectorreforms.”90EaPpartnersexpectthattheEUwilldomoretoassureregional


85 FourroundsofintergovernmentalconsultationsonmodernizationandtworoundsofconsultationsonvisafacilitationtookplacebetweenMinskandBrusselsin2014.

86 “President:Ifthewestoffersuscooperation,wecannotmissthechance”,Tut.by,december30,2014. 87 Sierznaurodski,CaseBelarus,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 88 TAIEXisanEUprogramforsharingbestpractices,know-howandexperienceinmanagingreformswithpartners.

ItofferstechnicalhelpandinformationexchangethroughEUexpertandadvisorymissions,seminars,studyvisitsforEaPofficialstoEUmemberstatesandreformassessmentmissions.UkraineandMoldovasurpassbyfarotherneighbourhoodcountriesinTAIEXrequestsandparticipation,withBelarusthird.“EuropeanIntegrationIndex2014forEasternPartnershipCountries”,February2015.

89 “AnewResponsetoaChangingneighbourhood”,op.cit.,p.3.TheEuropeanParliamentaddedthatsanctionscouldinclude“increaseddiplomaticpressureandtheintroductionofindividualtargetedmeasures,travelbansandassetsandpropertyfreezesdirectedatofficials…responsibleforhumanrightsviolations,andofsteppingupeffortstostopmoneylaunderingandtaxevasionbycompaniesandthebusinesspeopleofthecountryconcernedinEuropeanbanks.”“EuropeanParliamentresolutiononassessingandsettingprioritiesforEUrelationswiththeEasternPartnershipcountries”,2013/2149(InI),Strasbourg,March12,2014.Seealso“EuropeanParliamentresolutiononthepersecutionofhumanrightsdefendersinAzerbaijan”,2014/2832(RSP),op.cit.

90 ConclusionsontheReviewoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy,op.cit.

“Belarus’government istechnicallyadvanced.IfitchosetoalignwiththedCFTA,itcouldmakeveryspeedyprogress.”

BALAzS JARABIk Carnegie Europe

securityandstability.However,eventhoughtheEUintheEnPcontextdescribesitselfasa“diplomaticactorandproviderofsecurity,”itcannotofferhardsecurityguarantees.91 “The EU was not set up for security. It is a political reality. There is no EU army. This is the role of NATO with its limitations.”92

TheAssociationAgreementscontainasectionon“foreignandsecuritypolicy”thatemphasizesstrengtheningcooperationonCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP);conflictpreventionandcrisismanagement;thefightagainstterrorism;non-proliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction;andpeacefulconflictresolutionthroughdialogue(withTransnistria,AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia).ThethreesignatoriesofAssociationAgreementsarerequestedtobindthemselvesclosertoEUsecurityprioritiesandoperations,butnotmuchisofferedtothemtoaddresstheirowninsecurity.Russiaisnotmentioned,thoughthecountriesconsiderittheirbiggestthreat.TheEUexpressespoliticalsupportfortheterritorialintegrityofcountrieswithanAssociationAgreement,butitwasnotuntil2014andtheannexationofCrimeathatmemberstateswereabletoreachconsensusonrestrictivemeasuresagainstRussiaforviolatingapartner’ssovereignty.

MoldovahasaskedforEUpolicetoreplacetheRussiandominatedpeacekeepingforceinitsbreakawayregionforseveralyears.SinceFebruary2015,UkrainehasbeencallingontheEUtosendapolicemissiontoitseasterndistrictscontrolledbypro-Russianseparatists.93 Member statesshowlittleinterestineitherrequest.94Ingeorgia,anEUmissionmonitorsformerconflictareas,butitseffectivenessislimitedbyinabilitytopatrolterritoryTbilisidoesnotcontrol.

OpportunitiesexistforclosercoordinationbetweentheEaPandthewiderEUCommonSecurityanddefencePolicy(CSdP).95 In the eastern neighbourhood,thelatterislargelyaninstrumentforsecuritysectorandbordermanagementreformandfocusesonconfidencebuildingmeasuresaroundconflictzones.TheEU’stwomissionsinzonesofconflict(EUMMandEUBAM),96togetherwiththeinternationaldiscussionsingenevaonthegeorgianconflictsandthe5+2negotiationsonTransnistria,helpnormalizationbutdonotservetoresolvetheconflicts.Insituationsofacuteconflictoraggression,asingeorgiain2008,assistancewasmainlylimitedtofunds,humanitarianassistance,monitorsandmediation.

ButtheEUhasdevelopedanichesupportingciviliansecuritysectorreformviaCSdPmissions,suchastheadvisorymissiontohelpUkrainereform

91 “neighbourhoodattheCrossroads”,op.cit.Itconcludes:“[T]heEU’sobjectiveremainstoensurethattheEnPisrelevantandeffectiveforallitspartners,includingthosefacingpressuresandconflicts.TheEnPneedstoeffectivelycontributetoconflictprevention,managementandresolution,andtoprovidetherightsetofincentivesforpartnerstomovetowardsdemocratic,economicandstructuralreforms.”

92 EUofficial,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 93 BerndRiegert,“EUPoliceasPeacekeepersinUkraine?”,February19,2015,dw,http://dw.de/p/1EeqH.

94 TheJointStatementof17thEU-UkraineSummitonApril27,2015madenomentionofthepossibilityofdeploymentofEUpoliceorpeacekeepers.“17thEU-UkraineSummit:JointStatement”,Kyiv,April27,2015.

95 AscalledforintheConclusionsontheReviewoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy,op.cit. 96 TheEUMonitoringMissioningeorgia(EUMM)andtheEUBorderAssistanceMissiontoMoldovaandUkraine

(EUBAM).

“Theinvolvementofcivilsocietyiscritical.CSOsshould be part of alldiscussions.Theycanhelpensurethebuy-inofsocietyespeciallyin regions prone toconflictoremerging from conflict.”

ERwAN FOUéRé Ambassador and former Special

Representative for the Irish 2012

Chairmanship of the OSCE


itssecuritysector(EUAM).SynergiescouldbeimprovedfortheEaPtoassistinthefightagainstcorruptioninthesecurityservicesandsupportbroadercriminaljusticeandpolicereform.97JointCSdP/EaPsecuritysectorreformmissionsmightbeofferedtoEaPcountries,includingtoimprovepenitentiariesandendill-treatment.MorecouldbedonewithnATOtoensuredemocraticcontrolofarmedforces,apriorityofboththeAssociationAgreementsandnATO’sIndividualPartnershipActionPlans(IPAPs).98

dCFTAscancontributetoconflicttransformation.AlreadymanyTransnistrianfirmshaveagreedtoregisterinMoldovatobenefitfromautonomoustradepreferences(ATP)withtheEU.99AsformerSpecialRepresentativefortheIrish2012ChairmanshipoftheOSCEErwanFouérépointsout,“in Transnistria interest in the agreement and its economic opportunities is high. More could have been done to bring them in to talk about the DCFTA. Forty percent of Transnistrian exports go to the EU, compared to 20 percent each to Russia, Moldova and Ukraine.”100 ThebreakawayentitysentarepresentativetotheEU-MoldovadCFTAnegotiations,thoughasoleparticipantwithalimitedobservermandatecouldnotpartakeeffectivelyinthemanyroundsoftechnicaltradetalks.101 withthestartofimplementation,TransnistriawillbesurroundedbydCFTAcountries;morethan25percentofitsexportsmaybelost,withpossiblepoliticalconsequences.102Visa-freetravelforMoldovaencouragedsome300,000peopleinTransnistriatotakeMoldovanpassports.103AbkhaziaandSouthOssetiahavefirmlyrejectedjoiningthedCFTAortakinggeorgianpassportstobenefitfromEUvisa-freetravel,butinthelongertermthismaychange.

Cooperationineducation,suchasErasmusMundusandTempus,couldbeextendedtotheun-recognizedentities,togetherwithcivilsocietysupportinitiatives,includingfundingundertheCivilSocietyFacility.104 TheEuropeanEndowmentfordemocracyalreadyworksinseveralsuchplaces.105TheCivilSocietyForumcouldbeusedtofosterdialogueandcross-borderprojects,butthoughitsliberalformatmayallowgroupsfromun-recognizedentitiestoparticipate,theyhavesofarnotbeeninvited.106


97 The2011EnPreviewsuggestedthattheEUshould“backpartnercountries’effortstoreformtheirjusticeandsecuritysectorswithruleoflawmissionsorotherCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)instrumentsthattheywillconsideruseful.”“AnewResponsetoaChangingneighbourhood”,op.cit.

98 “Animportantpriorityistopromotethedevelopmentofeffectivedefenceinstitutionsthatareundercivilanddemocraticcontrol,”atwww.nato.int/cps/it/natohq/topics_80925.htm.nATOhassignedIPAPswithArmenia,Azerbaijan,georgiaandMoldova.

99 TheexistingATPswillremaininplaceuntiltheendof2015. 100 ErwanFouéré,AmbassadorandformerSpecialRepresentativefortheIrish2012ChairmanshipoftheOSCE,

OSEPIBrusselsSeminar.

101 ArcadieBarbarosie,InstituteforPublicPolicy,Moldova,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 102 denisCenusa,Expert-grupMoldova,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 103 ArcadieBarbarosie,InstituteforPublicPolicy,Moldova,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 104 IskraKirova,“PublicdiplomacyandConflictResolution:Russia,georgiaandtheEUinSouthOssetiaand

Abkhazia”,CPdPerspectivesonPublicdiplomacy,Paper7,2012,p.56.

105 OSEPIinterview,EEdofficial,Brussels,April28,2015. 106 AghasiYenokyan,ArmenianCenterfornationalandInternationalStudies,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar.

“Transnistrianbusinesses were interested in the agreementalreadybefore the start of negotiations. As smuggling has dropped with the set-upofEUBAMandiftheycannolongerexporttotheEU,theeconomywillsuffer.Pressurecouldbebrought to bear on the regime fromtheeconomicdecline.”

ARCADIE BARBAROSIE Institute for Public Policy,

Moldova

http://www.nato.int/cps/it/natohq/topics_80925.htm

TheEaPisauniquepolicyintheregionbecauseofitsextensivetoolboxthatincludesbilateralandmultilateraldialogueframeworks,monitoringreports,financialassistance,technicalandknow-howexchange,andoutreachwitharangeofactors.Yet,thetoolscouldbemademoreinclusiveandflexibletoencourage,stimulatebestpractice,improveunderstandingofEUpolicyandpreventabuse.

1 | FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

TheEUspentabout€2.5billionofitsbudgetintheEaPregionover2010-2013andwillmaintainthesamelevelsoffinancingoverthenextsevenyears.107BudgetsupportisthemainformofEUassistanceanditisusedtohelpreformsinareassuchasjustice,agriculture,energy,andregionaldevelopment.Countrieshavealsobeengivenaccesstosomeinstitutionbuildingprogramsoriginallydesignedtosupportthoseintheenlargementprocesstoalignwiththeacquis.108AllexceptBelarusandAzerbaijanrelyonEUdirectorindirectfinancialsupport.MoldovareceivesthehighestpercapitashareofEUassistanceintheworldandoverallEUaidis2.19percentofitsgdP.georgiaisalsoabigrecipientofEUassistance,whileinresponsetothecrisisinUkrainetheEUhasoffered€6billioninloansandgrantssinceMarch2014.109

TheEUisinterestedinwaysforthisfinancialsupportto“berecastinaninvestmentratherthandonordynamic.”110Resultsbasedmonitoringofinvestment,isperhapsevenmoreimportantthanmonitoringofgrants.ForthistheEUcanbetterpartnerwithlocalcivilsociety.TheEUwillneedto

IV IMPROVING THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP’S TOOLBOX

107 “EuropeanneighbourhoodandPartnershipInstrument.2007-2013OverviewofActivitiesandResults”,op.cit.€15.4billionisforeseenfor2014-2020underthenewEuropeanneighbourhoodInstrument(EnI)forthewholeneighbourhood,ofwhichonethirdwillbeallocatedtotheEastandtwothirdstotheSouth.

108 “EUCooperationforaSuccessfulEasternPartnership:SupportingReforms,PromotingChange”,EuropeanCommission,availableathttp://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eap-flyer-results.pdf.

109 InMoldova,theEUprovided€131millioninassistancecomparedto€5.984billiongdPin2014.nationalBureauofStatisticsofMoldovaathttp://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=ro&idc=191.georgiareceivedthesameamount.AssistancetoBelarusandAzerbaijanismuchsmaller,amountingto€19and€21millionrespectively.“ImplementationoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicyStatistics”,JointStaffworkingdocument,Swd(2015)77final,Brussels,March25,2015.“17thEU-UkraineSummit:JointStatement”,op.cit.“EuropeanCommissionsupportforUkraine”,memo,Brussels,April27,2015.

110 JointConsultationPaper,op.cit.

“Benchmarksshouldbe in areas where real improvements totheviabilityand strength of institutions are possible.Theyshould be based on specificindicatorsand monitor implementation not justcommitmentsmade.”

LARISA MINASYAN OSF–Armenia


http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eap-flyer-results.pdf

http://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=ro&idc=191

focusonfightingcorruptionandreformingcourts,police,securityservicesandpublicadministrationswhichlacktransparency.EUassistance,andparticularlybudgetsupport,isopaqueanddifficulttomonitorbywatchdoggroups.Civilsocietyisoftenun-awareofobligationsattachedtoEUaid.Expectedoutputstendtobebroad,focusedonthepassageoflawsratherthantheimplementationofpolicies.weakandill-equippedcivilserviceacrosstheregionalsoneedstobereformedtotakeadvantageoftheexchangeofbestpractice.TheEUshouldaddresstheseinadequaciesandfreezeorterminateassistancewhenreformprogressislackingtoensureaninvestmentthatreallystrengthensinstitutionsinsteadofmakingthemevermorevulnerabletocorruptionandthemisuseofaid.

2 | PROGRESS REPORTS

TheEUquestionswhetherannualpublicationofEnPProgressReports,whichmonitorpartners’implementationofcommitmentsaddsvalueandifalternativescan“bedevelopedthatareseenasmorerespectfulbypartnersanddemonstrateapartnershipofequals?”111 Differentiation between countriesisalreadycreatingsomedistinctionsinmonitoringandreportingformats.Since2014,theAssociationAgendahasreplacedtheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicyActionPlan(EnPAP)forgeorgia,MoldovaandUkraineandissubjecttoahostofreportingandmonitoringassessments.112 ButinMarch2015,whentheEEASunveiledcountryreportsforallEnPstates,thoseforthesignatoriesofAssociationAgreementswerenotmuchdifferent from the rest.113

OverthelastfiveyearsProgressReportshaveevolvedtobecomedetailedassessmentswithspecificsetsofrecommendationsforeachcountry.ProgressReportshavehelpedspurinstitutionalchange,suchasdifficultjudicialreformingeorgia.Civilsocietygroupshaveopportunitiestocontributetoreports,butmorecouldbedonetobringtheminofficiallyintotheprocessbyhostingjointreportingconferencesandmeetingswithgovernmentwherecivilsocietycouldpresentitsassessmentofprogress.Thiswoulddevolvemoreresponsibilitytolocalgroupsinthereportingprocess,whoarelegitimatecommentatorsontheirgovernment.

TheremaybeatemptationtodropyearlyProgressReportsforthethreecountrieswithoutAssociationAgreements,buttheyshouldbemodified,


111 JointConsultationPaper,op.cit.EnPProgressReportsmonitortheimplementationofobligationsunderActionsPlansandtheAssociationAgendasforthecountriesthathavesignedAssociationAgreements.InadditiontotheannualEnPProgressReports,thereisanAnnualneighbourhoodPackageconsistingofonestrategiccommunicationandtworeportsontheregionaldimension,includingaspecificreportontheEaP.

112 newdocumentsarebeingdrafted,includingnationalActionPlans(nAPs)forimplementationofAssociationAgreementsandProgressReportsonnAPs.Partnersaretakinggreaterownershipbypreparingtheirownprogressreports.georgiapreparedaProgressReportonImplementationoftheEnPActionPlanandtheEaPRoadmapinOctober2014.UkrainepublisheditsreportonimplementationoftheAssociationAgreement(September2014-January2015)inFebruary2015.MoldovagavetheEuropeanCommissionitsfirstimplementationreportinJanuary2015.

113 Allcontained10-18recommendations,includingcallstoadoptspecificlaws,implementresolutionsoractionplans,continuereformsordoassessments.ForcountrieswithAssociationAgreements,thesewereonlyslightlymorespecificanddetailed.The2015ProgressReportsonEnPimplementationareathttp://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/progress-reports/index_en.htm.

“IttookcivilsocietyfiveyearstoconvincetheEUtomaketheProgressReportsmoreconcretewithspecificbenchmarks,buttodaythisisareality.”

TINATIN TSERTSVADzE International Partnership for

Human Rights

http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/progress-reports/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/progress-reports/index_en.htm

noteliminated.Ratherthanbeingcomprehensivelistingsofpartnercountries’alignmenttoEUstandards,reportscouldprovidedeep,impartialandexpertevaluationsofpoliticalandeconomicdevelopments.Reportscouldfocusonmonitoringspecificpoliciesandagreements.EconomicandmobilitycooperationwithArmeniaandAzerbaijanrequiresassessmentsofthebusinessandtransparencyclimate.114VisadialoguesobligetheEUtoscrutinizeconditionsofpoliticalrepressionthatcouldgivereasonforseekingasylumorpreventrepatriation.

3 | MULTILATERAL PLATFORMS

TheEaPassistsregionalcooperationthroughmultilateralforums,includingdedicatedplatformsforofficialsinareassuchasdemocracy,economicintegration,energysecurityandpeoplecontacts,aswellasbi-annualSummits,aregionalparliamentaryassembly(EUROnEST),aBusinessForum,theCivilSocietyForumandothers.115 Even though differentiation among EaP partnershasdeepened,civilsocietyandgovernmentsagreethatacommonregionalapproachstilladdsmuchvalueinbringingallneighbourstothetabletosharepracticesanddiscusscommonregionalorbilateralchallenges.ForMoldova,forinstance,themultilateraltrackisanopportunitytodiscusstradewithBelarusandregionalsecurityandcooperationwithUkraine.116

ForUkraine,georgiaandMoldova,anewquadrilateralplatformwiththeEUwillbebeneficialtoidentifycommonalitiestomeetcommonchallengesofimplementationoftheAssociationAgreements.JointAssociationCouncilsorministerialscouldbeorganized.Mid-level,specializedofficialscouldbenefitfromgreatercooperationandexperiencesharingviasectorialcooperationinareassuchastrade,energyandsecurity,includingjusticeandhomeaffairs.CivilsocietyingeorgiaandMoldovaalreadycooperatesinaligningtheircountries’foodsafetyandconsumerprotectionframeworkswithEUstandardsandpromotingcivicengagementintheprocess.117

Aregionalfreetradearea(FTA)amongthethreecountries(EasternEuropeanEconomicArea)andintegrationofUkraineandgeorgiaintotheCentralEuropeanFreeTradeArea(CEFTA)(Moldovaisalreadyamember)couldbefirststepstoincludedCFTAcountriesintheEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA).ThroughtheirparticipationintheEuropeanEnergyCommunity,Ukraine,Moldovaandgeorgiashouldbenefitfromincreasedsupport

114 AzerbaijanhasmostrecentlybeendowngradedtocandidatecountryintheExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative(EITI)andaninquiryintoitscomplianceisopenwithintheOpengovernmentPartnership(OgP).“Azerbaijandowngradedtocandidatecountry”,EITI,April15,2015.

115 Thefourmultilateralplatformsfor2014-2020aredemocracy,goodgovernanceandstability,EconomicintegrationandconvergencewithEUpolicies,Energysecurity,andContactsbetweenpeople.Formoreseehttp://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/index_en.htm.TheregionalEUROnESTParliamentaryAssemblywascreatedinMay2011.Formoreseehttp://www.euronest.europarl.europa.eu/euronest/cms/home.ThefirstEaPBusinessForumtookplaceinSopotinSeptember2011onthefringesofthesecondEaPSummitinwarsaw.TheforumcontinuestomeetonthesidelinesofeachEaPSummit.

116 OSEPIinterview,AmbassadorEugenCaras.Seealso“EuropeanParliamentResolutiononassessingandsettingprioritiesforEUrelationswiththeEasternPartnershipcountries”,2013/2149(InI),op.cit.

117 Theprojectisentitled“TransparentConvergencetoEUPoliciesinSanitaryIssues:theCaseofgeorgiaandMoldova.”ItisbeingimplementedbytheEurasiaPartnershipFoundationgeorgiawiththeEastEuropeFoundationMoldovaandCenterforStrategicResearchanddevelopmentofgeorgia(CSRdg)overthenext30months,athttp://www.mkidveli.ge/2.


http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/index_en.htm

http://www.euronest.europarl.europa.eu/euronest/cms/home

“MoreshouldbedonetoexplainthedCFTA,intermsof regulations but alsoofincentivesfor business. Businesses hadn’tproperlyconsideredtheoptions with the EUbefore.”

TARAS kACHkA American Chamber of

Commerce, Ukraine

inbuildingelectricityandgasinterconnectorswiththeEuropeangridinexchangeforimplementingtheEU’s“thirdenergypackage”.MultilateralcooperationintheEaPregionwouldbenefitgreatlyfromaneventualopeningoftheConnectingEuropeFacilitytothirdcountries.118The€22billionprogramsupportscommon-interestprojectsintransport,energyandtelecommunicationsonlyonmember-stateterritory,unlessactivitiesinthirdcountriesaredeemedindispensablefortheinitiative’ssuccess.

4 | BUILDING LOCAL OwNERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT OF MULTIPLE ACTORS

HighRepresentativeMogheriniandCommissionerHahnnote“itisclearthatsubstantialeffortsareneededinthecontextoftheEnPreviewtoimproveboththeownershipofthepolicybypartnercountriesandtoimprovecommunicationsofitsobjectivesandresultsbothwithintheEUanditspartnercountries.”119However,theymakelittlementionoftheneedtoreachouttomultiplegroupsbeyondgovernmentwhocancontributetobuildlocalownership.VilniussummitparticipantsunderlinedthattheEaP’sambitiousagenda“requirestheengagementofthebroadersocietyand…theincreasedinvolvementofparliaments,civilsociety,localandregionalauthorities,[the]businesscommunityandotherrelevantstakeholders.”120 TheEuropeanParliamentalso“stresse[s]theimportanceofengagingwiththebroadersociety[…]inordertobuildconstituenciesforreformabletoinfluencenationaldecision-making.”121

TheEU,especiallytheEuropeanParliamentandpartygroups,coulddomoretodeveloptheircounterparts’knowledgeofEUlegislativepracticeandreformsbasedonharmonizationwithEUstandards.ThisisespeciallyimportantfortheimplementationoftheAssociationAgreementsasparliamentarianswillneedtosignoffonsubstantiallegalapproximation.Positively,theEuropeanParliamentisstartingacapacity-buildingprojectwithUkraine’sParliamentaryCommitteeonEuropeanIntegrationandhasmade a similar offer to Moldova.122TheConferenceofRegionalandLocalAuthoritiesfortheEasternPartnership(CORLEAP)providesopportunitiesforcoordinationbetweenregionalandlocalpoliticiansfromtheEUandtheEaPcountries.AtitsannualmeetinginTbilisiin2014,itcalledonheadsofstateandgovernmenttotakestepstoincreaselocalandregionalauthorities’roleinimplementingEaPpoliciesandstrategies.123


118 FormoreontheConnectingEuropeFacilityseehttp://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connecting-europe-facility. 119 JointConsultationPaper,op.cit. 120 JointdeclarationoftheEasternPartnershipSummit,op.cit.,p.3 121 Inthesamedocument,theEuropeanParliamentcalled“ontheEUtoincreaseitspresenceinthepartner

countriesusingmoreinteractiveaudio-visualmeansandsocialmediaintherespectivelocallanguages…callsontheCommissiontoprepareaclearcommunicationsstrategyforthesocietiesintheEaPcountries…aimedatanchoringthebenefitsofprospectiveassociationtopublicopinion.”“EuropeanParliamentResolutiononassessingandsettingprioritiesforEUrelationswiththeEasternPartnershipcountries”,op.cit.

122 OSEPIinterview,EuropeanParliamentofficial,Brussels,February19,2015. 123 “RecommendationstoheadsofstateandgovernmentinRigaMay2015forEaPSummit”,CORLEAP,COR-2014-

04375-00-00-TCd-TRA,Tbilisi,September29,2014.

http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connecting-europe-facility

InthethreecountrieswheredCFTAsarebeingimplemented,localbusinessesare natural partners. “More should be done to explain the DCFTA, in terms of regulations but also of incentives for business. Businesses hadn’t properly considered the options with the EU before.”124TheEUcansupportlocalentrepreneurswithtechnicalassistancebutalsobyhelpingthemmarkettheirgoodsandfilltheirmarketquotasthroughexportpromotionprograms,asitdoesforaccessioncountries.125Somestepshavebeentakenalready.AgriculturalexpertsfromtheCommissionhavestartedtalkingtoMoldovanbusinessandfarmers.Ingeorgia,undertheleadoftheEnPARdprogram,farmersarereceivinggrantstosupportcooperativesacrossthecountry.126

greaterattentionshouldalsobepaidtoyouthtomakethemmoreawareofEUinstitutions,standardsandvalueswithmoreexchangesandtrainingopportunities.127Thechurchisaninfluentialinstitutioninmanyoftheeasternpartnersandtheclergyshouldnotbesidelined.

5 | COMMUNICATION AND OUTREACH

TheEUassertsthatitsteppedupeffortstocommunicateitspolicytopartnercountrieswiththelaunchofanEaP“visibilitystrategy”in2013andrecognizesthattheEUshouldexplainbettertheconcretebenefitsofitsinitiatives.128EUdelegationsinEaPcountriescoordinatetheorganizationof Europe Day everyMay.InthethreecountriesthatsignedAssociationAgreements,thedelegationheadsareactiveinlocalmedia.Everyprojectthatdelegationsimplementofficiallyhasavisibilitycomponent.Atthesametime,delegationsthemselvesgenerallyremainofflimitstothegeneralpublicwithstringentsecuritymeasures,andnorealinformationcentresthatcouldserveasmeetingandorganizinghubsforpeople,especiallyyouth,interestedintheEU.

Thenewcommunicationsstrategyhasnotbeenvisibleontheground.duetolackofresourcesatdelegationlevel,alargepro-EUinformationcampaignwascarriedoutinMoldovaduringsummer2014byOSF,withadditionalnon-EUfunding.Ingeorgia,theOSFledacoalitionofcivilsocietyorganizationstoprepareanEUIntegrationInformationandCommunicationStrategy(2014-

124 TarasKachka,AmericanChamberofCommerce,Ukraine,OSEPIBrusselsSeminar. 125 TheEuropeanCommission,forinstance,helpedmarketCroatianwinethroughanexportsupportprogram.Taras

Kachka,ibid.

126 EnPARdistheEuropeanneighbourhoodProgrammeforAgricultureandRuraldevelopment.Sixteengeorgianandinternationalorganizationsinfourconsortia–ledbyCAREAustria,MercyCorpsScotland,OxfamUKandPeopleinneed–havereceivedgrantstosupportestablishmentof160cooperativesin45districts.Inaddition,theautonomousregionofAdjarawillbenefitfromajointprogramco-financedwiththeUnitednationsdevelopmentProgram(UndP).Formoreseehttp://www.enpard.ge/news/details/4081.

127 Seealso“BuildingaStrongerCompactwithourneighbours:AnewMomentumfortheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy”,StatementbytheForeignMinistersoftheweimarTriangle,weimar,April1,2014.

128 AttheVilniusSummit,“participantsinvitedEUinstitutions,EUMemberStates,EasternEuropeanpartnersandotherstakeholderstocontributetotheEasternPartnershipVisibilityStrategyimplementationbyfurtherinformingsocietyinpartnercountriesandintheEUofthebenefitsderivedfromthePartnership,theimplementationoftheAgreementsconcludedintheframeworkofthePartnershipforcitizens,businessesandsocietyasawhole.”“ImplementationoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicyin2013Regionalreport:EasternPartnership”,JointStaffworkingdocument,Swd(2014)99final,Brussels,March27,2014.OneinstrumentofthestrategyistheEuropeanneighborhoodInfoCenterwebportal(www.enpi-in.eu).EUInformationCentresingeorgia,MoldovaandUkrainearealsousefulsourcesofinformationonEUintegration.“neighbourhoodattheCrossroads”,op.cit.,pp.6-7

“TheEUhasnotreallytalkedwithbusinesses,explainingtheconcreteprosof entering the EUmarketandapproximatingEUmarketlaw.Itwasamistake.”

DENIS CENUSA Expert-Grup Moldova

“Ingeorgia,when former Commissioner Füle visited,hemetwiththePatriarch[whohadbeenskepticalabouttheEUpreviously].Afterwards the Patriarchsaid“IseegeorgiaintheEU”whichwasaveryimportant message forthepublic.”

kORNELY kAkACHIA Tbilisi State University


http://www.enpard.ge/news/details/4081

http://www.enpi-in.eu

“Theproblemsofaris that European integration has been an elite drivenprocess[ingeorgia].The government needstoworkwithsociety,in the regions. People there are interested,theywanttoknowwhattheAssociationAgreement will bringthem.EveryministryshouldbeencouragedtohaveanAssociationAgreement communicationsplan.”

kORNELY kAkACHIA Tbilisi State University

2017)thatwaseventuallyadoptedbythegovernment.129 Brussels has given littlemoneytoincreaseknowledgeabouttheEUingeorgia,whereRussiaissowingpoliticaldiscordbyusingmarginalpoliticalparties,andwieldinginfluenceoverRussian-speakingminorityareasandthegeorgianOrthodoxChurch.130delegationsshouldworkcloselywithlocalauthoritiesandcivilsociety,notjustincapitals,toproduceinformationthatexplainstheEaPandtheAssociationAgreementtocitizens.

TheEUhasundertakentoelaborateacommunicationstrategytocounterRussianpropaganda.131ItwillbeachallengetocompetewithslickRussianprofessionalswhodesignbasedontheemotionalpullofsharedhistoryandnostalgiaandportraywesterneffortstopromotereformaspartofaplantosubverttraditionalvalues.Consultationswithawiderangeofgroups,includingmediaintheregion,andinRussia,andlocalmediadevelopmentspecialists,isessentialifthisstrategyistomeettheregion’sneeds.RatherthancreateanewEU-basedmediaoutletbroadcastinginRussian,EUfundsandexpertiseshouldsupportlocalinformationprovidersthatdevelopcontentinRussianandlocallanguagestoincreasetheirreach,distributionandresources.

TheEUshouldalsocontinuetobuildcapacityingovernment,asitdidbyfinancingaStrategicCommunicationsandPolicyPlanningAdviserintheMoldovanprimeminister’sofficein2012.ThecreationinMarch2015ofaCommunicationCoordinationUnitonEUprojectsandimplementationoftheAssociationAgreementingeorgiamayofferanevenbetterwayforward.132

6 | COOPERATING wITH CIVIL SOCIETY

TheEUhasdevelopedgoodpracticeofengagingcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs).InadditiontotheworkoftheCivilSocietyForum,theCommissionhascountryroadmapsforengagementwithcivilsocietyatthedelegationlevel.AllEaPpartnersexceptAzerbaijannowhavearoadmapforEUworkwithCSOs,elaboratedwithlocalgroups.133Ukraine,georgiaandMoldova


129 ThegovernmentadoptedthestrategyinSeptember2013anddevelopedannualactionplansforitsimplementation.TheEU-nATOInformationCenterundertheOfficeoftheStateMinisterforEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegrationisresponsibleforimplementationofthestrategy.TheOfficeoftheStateMinisteralsoplanstosetupacommunicationsdepartmentbutdoesn’thaveoneinplaceyet.

130 SergiKapanadze,“georgia’sVulnerabilitytoRussianPressurePoints”,ECFR,June2014. 131 InitsJanuary15,2015resolutiononUkrainetheEuropeanParliament“[c]allsupontheEuropeanCommission

andCommissionerHahntoprepareandpresenttotheEuropeanParliamentwithintwomonthsacommunicationstrategytocountertheRussianpropagandacampaigndirectedtowardstheEU,itsEasternneighboursandRussiaitself,andtodevelopinstrumentsthatwouldallowtheEUanditsMemberStatestoaddressthepropagandacampaignatEuropeanandnationallevel”,“EuropeanParliamentresolutionof15January2015onthesituationinUkraine”,(2014/2965(RSP)),Strasbourg,January15,2015.TheMarchEuropeanCouncilinvitedtheHighRepresentative,withmemberstatesandEUinstitutions,topreparebyJuneanactionplanonstrategiccommunication.Ateamisbeingsetupasafirststep.ConclusionsoftheEuropeanCouncil,EUCO11/15,Brussels,March20,2015.

132 Theprojectiswithinthe“Let’smeetEurope–4”program,launchedinMarch2015for15months.ItisfundedbyEnPIwithabudgetof€450000.AnothergoodexampleisaregionalpubliccommunicationstrainingprojectfinancedbytheEstonianforeignministry.ATbilisiseminarforArmenian,Azerbaijani,Belarusian,georgian,MoldovanandUkrainianpubliccommunicatorswasorganizedinApril2014.BespoketrainingseminarsweresubsequentlyheldinMoldova,georgiaandArmenia,followedbystudyvisitstoEstoniaforcommunicationofficialsandjournalists.Formoreseehttp://eceap.eu/en/estonia-shares-eu-related-communication-experience-with-georgian-government-press-people-and-journalists/.

133 Theroadmapsprovideanalysisofthecivilsocietyarena,anassessmentoftheEU–CSOengagementinthecountryandsetprioritiesforEUengagementandactions.Formoreseehttp://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps.

http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps

http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps

willsetupCivilSocietyPlatforms,foreseenbytheAssociationAgreements,asoneofthejointbodiestomonitorimplementation.despiterisksthatrepresentationmightbeskewedinfavouroftradeunionsandemployers’associations,acompromisehasbeenreachedinUkraine’scasetoalsoincludecivilsociety.Theseplatformsareimportantchannelsforindependentmonitoringandinputontheimplementationoftheagreementsandcivilsocietyshouldbeprominentlyrepresentedinallthreenationalstructures.134

CSOfundingisavailablethroughthematicprogramsfocusedonhumanrightsandcivilsociety,andnon-stateactorsandlocalauthorities.Yetitisestimatedatonly5percentoffundsallocatedtotheneighbourhoodregion.135MostmoneygoestointernationalngOs,asdisbursementconditionsdiscouragesmallergroupsfromapplying.136TheEUhasdifficultyfundingngOsinBelarusandAzerbaijan.Inthelatter,thedelegationdisbursedonlytwoof13grantsin2014,duetogroups’inabilitytogetjusticeministryauthorizationtoregisterprojects.Acallfor2015proposalsworth€3million is postponed.137TheEUshouldprioritizeintalkswiththegovernmentre-establishingitsabilitytofundngOs,devisemoreflexiblefundingformats,orallocatemoreresourcestotheEEdtostepupitsworkindifficultcontexts.

TheCivilSocietyForumstrengthenscivilsocietyinvolvementandforgesaregionalsenseofcommunity,butitissometimeshijackedbypoliticalinterestsorblockedbyngOinfighting.Atitsannualassemblyin2014,AzerbaijanidelegatesdisruptedapresentationonhumanrightsviolationsinAzerbaijanbytheCzechngOPeopleinneed.138TheAzerbaijaninationalplatformisweakanddeeplydivided.139Separately,smallerngOsconsiderthattheForumdoesnotalwaysrepresenttheirinterestsandaccusetheEUofcreatingparallelcivilsocietynetworks,underminingindigenous ones.140TheForumasaplatformforallcivilsocietyfromtheregionshouldmakeanactiveefforttostayinclusiveandbroadenEUcontactwithlocalcivilsociety.

134 UkraineheldtheinauguralmeetingofitsCivilSocietyPlatformonApril16,2015.Formoreseehttp://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-eu-ukraine-civil-society-platform.TheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee(EESC)hasinsistedthatthecompositionofthenationalcivilsocietyplatformmatchthestructureoftheEuropeansideoftheplatform,whichiscomposedofEESCmembers.

135 Itisestimatedat5percentofEuropeanneighbourhoodInstrumentallocations.“Troubleintheneighbourhood?TheFutureoftheEU’sEasternPartnership,”AdamHuged.,ForeignPolicyCenter,2015,p.8.ThewholeCivilSocietyFacilityallocationfortheneighbourhood2011-2013was€22million.

136 SergheiOstaf,ResourceCenterforHumanRightsCRedO,Moldova,OSEPIKyivSeminar. 137 OSEPIinterview,EUdelegationofficial,Baku,April1,2015. 138 18of26AzerbaijaningOrepresentativesboycottedtheseconddayafterarepresentativewasexpelledfor

violentlydismantlingtheexhibitonAzerbaijanipoliticalprisonerssetupbyPeopleinneed.PhotosofthosewhodidnotboycottwerecirculatedinAzerbaijanimediawithallegationsthattheywerecollaboratingwithArmenians.

139 Accordingtoawomen’srightsactivist,“wehavecompletelylosttheplatformassuch.”OSEPIinterview,Baku,March30,2015.TheCSFSecretariatinBrusselsistryingtoremedythesituationbyplayingaroleinselectingtheAzerbaijaniparticipantsattheMayRigaSummit.Thishasledthenationalplatformleadershiptoask,“don’ttheytrustus?”OSEPIinterview,SabitBagirov,Baku,March31,2015.

140 SergheiOstaf,ResourceCenterforHumanRightsCRedO,Moldova,OSEPIKyivSeminar.


http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-eu-ukraine-civil-society-platform

http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-eu-ukraine-civil-society-platform


TherearestrongargumentsforkeepingtheEnPandEaPasasinglecommonpolicythatmobilizesinstitutions and member states to support all partners in a broad range of areas from human rights toenergy,transporttotrade.Acommonpolicyensuresbalancebetweenmemberstates’interestsandbuy-in,regardlessofindividualstrategicfocusonthesouthoreast.141Itdrawsneighbourscloser,makingthemanambitiousoffertheymightnothavegottenindividually.Someengagedlesttheybeestrangedfromamajorregionalinitiative,eveniftheEaPitselfdidnotmuchinterestthem.142TheEUneedsacommonEaPtopreserveapositive,forward-lookingreformagendaforalleasternneighbours.despitestilllimitedunderstandingofEUpolicies,thereisdemandfromsocietiestoaligntoEuropeanstandards.ThelatestEUneighbourhoodBarometershowsthatamajorityacrosstheEaPthinktheEUshouldplayagreaterroleintheircountries’economicdevelopment,securityanddefence,protectionofhumanrightsandjusticereform.143

TheEaPcultivatedandsustainspro-reformcivilsociety,rightsgroupsandotheradvocatesofdemocraticchange,inoroutofpower,inthewholeregion,notjustthemorereformistcountries.IftheEUgaveupambitioninthemoredifficultcontexts,itwouldcutthelifelineofreform-mindedactorsinhardtimes.Moreover,itwouldloseopportunitiestostimulatechangewhenpoliticalconditionsimprove.TheEaPshouldremainopentoallsixpartnersandengageonthebasisoffirmprinciplesandcommoninterests—thelatterdefinedwithbroadconstituencies,notonlyelitesseekingregimepreservationorenrichment.

TheEUstillhasmanyalliesintheregion.Someofthemhavecarriedthedemocracyagendafordecadesthroughchangesofgovernment,oftenatgreatrisk.TheEUshouldnotunderminethem,anditsowninterests,bybeingunprincipledandinconsistent.wheregovernmentcooperationislimited,theEUcancontinuetoworkmorecloselywithactorsthatwanttokeepthepartnership’svalues,includingcivilsociety,SMEs,media,tradeunionsandbusinessassociations.Theyareitsbestchanceofhavinganimpact,includingimprovingtheunderstandingandvisibilityofEUpolicies.

TobeconsistentwiththesecurityandforeignpolicydimensionsofEUactionsabroad,ascalledforbymemberstates,theEaPcannotdropitscommitmenttobuildingdemocratic,prosperousstates,restingontheruleoflawsoastoensureregionalstability.144Atthesametime,memberstatesneedabettersharedunderstandingoftheEU’slong-termgoalsandroleintheregion.Thisrequiresacoordinated,strategicforeignpolicyapproachthatgoesbeyondwhattheEaPreviewcanaccomplishandbecomespartofthefutureglobalsecuritystrategyreviewcurrentlyunderway.TheEaPprovidesameansfortheEUtoactbasedoncommoninterestsandvalues,animportantcomplementbutnotafullsubstitute,forfirmpoliticalwillandthesecuritycapabilitiesalsorequiredtoguaranteeEUstabilityandsecurityintheeasternneighbourhood.

V CONCLUSION: A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR ALL

141 OSEPIinterview,EEASofficial,Brussels,February20,2015. 142 OSEPIinterview,EEASofficial,Brussels,February19,2015. 143 “EUneighbourhoodBarometer–EasternPartnership”,Autumn2014,op.cit. 144 ConclusionsontheReviewoftheEuropeanneighbourhoodPolicy,op.cit.

aBOut uS The Open Society european Policy institute (OSePi) is the EU policy arm of the Open Society Foundations (OSF), based in Brussels. We work to influence and inform decision-making on EU laws, policy and funding to ensure that open society values lie at the heart of what the European Union does, both inside and outside its borders.

OSEPI brings into EU policy debates evidence, analysis and recommendations drawn from the work of the Open Society foundations in more than 100 countries. OSF began supporting the transformation of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus in the late 1980s. We have since grown into one of the largest non-governmental funders for civil society in support of human rights, justice and accountability. OSF’s work has contributed to the emergence of democratic governments and more open societies in many countries of the former Soviet Union. Today, OSF has four national foundations in the Eastern Partnership region, based in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and we run programs on Azerbaijan and Belarus from abroad.

iskra KirovaIskra Kirova is a policy analyst at OSEPI, responsible for EU advocacy on Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Russia. She supports OSF in advancing human rights and the rule of law through EU policies, legislation, and political influence. Previously, she worked for the International Crisis Group as EU advocacy and research analyst.

dr. Sabine freizerDr. Sabine Freizer is a senior fellow (non-resident) at the Atlantic Council Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center and Transatlantic Relations Program. Previously, she served as Europe director at the International Crisis Group, leading reporting on south-eastern and eastern Europe, Russia and Turkey.

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Open Society european Policy instituteRue du Trône 130Brussels B-1050BelgiumPhone: +32-2-505-4646

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