Berbecel 1

Dan Berbecel

Government 98gs

Prof. Pharr

May 3, 2010

At the Mercy of the State: the Case of Civil Society in Russia

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia along with the rest of the

countries of the former Eastern Bloc commenced a process of democratization. Despite the fall

of Communism, the state has continued to play a heavy, intrusive role in Russian society and has

created a hostile environment for the emergence of civil society. While numerous scholars have

written papers on the weakness of civil society in Russia, relatively few studies examine which

organizations were in fact able to flourish. Throughout this research paper, I will attempt to solve

this puzzle, and by the end I shall reveal not only what components of civil society were able to

emerge, but also why they were successful. I have divided this paper into four sections.

Throughout Section I, I will characterize the mechanism through which the state hinders the

development of voluntary organizations. I will include both the direct legal means through which

it exerts control as well as the indirect, “off the books” methods. Throughout Section II, I will

describe case studies representing two contrasting outcomes for civil society in Russia: the first

case studies involve organizations that failed to develop as a result of the restrictions described in

Section I, while the second set of case studies discusses those that were able to “take off.”

Throughout Section III, I will use these case studies as the basis to formulate a theory on the

broad types of civil society organizations that were able to emerge; and I will formulate an

explanation as to what particular characteristics of these associations allowed them to be

successful. Finally, throughout Section IV, I will end by discussing the future potential for civil

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society in Russia, and in particular I will emphasize how the successful emergence of NGOs is

contingent on political liberalization.

By “civil society” I mean voluntary associations independent of both the state and private

“units of production and reproduction” (Schmitter 1997; 240), such as families and firms. These

organizations form around collective interests/goals, and even if they attempt to criticize or

change a set of policies, they do not intend to replace either the state or private units of

production.

Section I: The intrusive state and the mechanisms which it uses to control civil society

The historical role of the state

In order to analyze the role of the state in the post-Soviet development of civil society, it

is essential to briefly describe the historical state-society relationship in Russia. During the

Tsarist period, the relationship between the government and voluntary organizations was highly

intertwined. In many cases, the objectives of these associations were closely related to the goals

of the government, and one salient example of this is learned societies such as the Russian

Geographical Society and the Russian Technical society, whose purpose was to disseminate

knowledge. The Russian state directly supported these organizations, and according to Joseph

Bradley, “in many ways Russian civil society was the creation of the state…the state patronized

the learned societies and granted them certain privileges…Most Russian associations, and

certainly the august learned societies, saw their role as collaborating with the authorities and

assisting the state in the achievement of mutual objectives” (Bradley 2009; 14). While civil

society organizations were allowed to manage their own internal affairs, the state was

nevertheless clearly intrusive, especially since all voluntary organizations were required to

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officially register with the government. The state reserved the right to approve the charter by

which these associations abided, as well as the right to closely monitor the activities of these

organizations (oftentimes, state officials were even on the governing boards). According to Mary

Conroy, “it is true that civil society in Imperial Russia had more obstacles to overcome than civil

society in contemporary America. The Imperial Russian government was domineering and

intrusive and sometimes moved at a glacial pace” (Conroy 2006; 12). From this analysis, one

important aspect regarding Russian society that can clearly be observed is the historically

overbearing role of the state which has persisted in the post-Soviet era.

The role of the state in post-Soviet Russia

The legacy of an intrusive state has continued to this day, and in a State of the Union

Address in 2004, former president Vladimir Putin expressed his deep skepticism regarding

Russian civil society. He claimed that “not all organizations are oriented toward standing up for

the real interests of the people. The priority for some is to receive financing from influential

foreign organizations. Others serve dubious group and commercial interests.” Since the election

of Putin, the relationship between the state and civil society has been especially strained, and one

of the most direct methods through which the Russian state hinders the development of voluntary

organizations is through draconian tax laws.

Tax laws for NGOs

There are two mechanisms through which tax laws can impact the development of civil

society organizations, namely (1) exempting their income from taxation and (2) making

donations to non-profit organizations tax deductable. In 2002 under Putin, Russia underwent

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changes in its tax code which negatively impacted nonprofit organizations. In terms of

mechanism (2), the reforms ended tax exemptions for corporate charitable donations (which had

previously been 100% tax deductable). This change not only affects charities by reducing their

base of donors, but also by reducing the sum of money that each donor is willing to contribute.

Probably the most direct means through which the state controls the types of

organizations that can flourish is through mechanism (1), exempting income from taxation.

Many civil society organizations have to pay taxes on most of the income that they earn. For

example, grants are taxed at 24%; with exceptions only being given to associations operating in

certain state approved fields such as culture, education, environmental protection and research

(note the similarities to the types of organizations sponsored by the Tsarist state such as cultural

associations). Foreign grants face significantly more restrictions, and in almost all cases Russian

charities must pay the 24% tax on funds received abroad. The only mechanism through which

foreign grants can become tax exempt is if the foreign organization is included in a list of

approved donors published by the Federal Government. This list is only sporadically updated,

and the mechanism through which a foreign association earns inclusion on this list is unknown to

the public. According to Leslie Lutz:

A large part of nonprofit tax law serves primarily to control and inhibit the nonprofit

sector... The Putin administration has clearly sought to extend its control over private

businesses, local governments, and the once-independent media; it is logical that the

administration would seek to extend its control over the nonprofit sector as well. One

Russian activist has described this process as a “strengthening of vertical power,” which

subjects the civic sector to “attacks launched by the power structures” against its

autonomy. (Lutz 2005)

By restricting donations from private entities the government is effectively reducing the

autonomy of civil society organizations in Russia since now they depend more on domestic

institutions and have a diminished capacity to pursue goals independent of those of the state.

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Registration laws

Another mechanism used by the Russian state to control civil society is registration laws.

While in theory the Russian Constitution does not require organizations to register with the

government, in practice registration is critical to the functioning of almost any voluntary

association. A 1995 law titled, “On Public Associations” dictated that only through registration

can an organization obtain rights such as being able to hire employees and open a bank account;

thus precluding all but small organizations dedicated to hobbies from not registering. In addition,

“On Public Associations” also required organizations registered prior to the enactment of the law

to reregister by June 30, 1999. Failure to reregister could be grounds for a court-ordered

liquidation of the association and its assets. In theory, while reregistration could only be denied

under extraordinary circumstances such as national security grounds, in practice the state used

this law to deny status to non-governmental organizations which opposed its policies. According

to Squier, “the reregistration provision appears to have provided various officials with an

opportunity to rid themselves of troublesome organizations—particularly trade unions and

ecological and human rights organizations—that were too openly critical of the officials or their

policies” (Squier 2002; 171).

The result of this new law was a sharp decline in registered organizations: for example of

1332 public associations that had been registered before June 30, 1999, only 770 completed the

reregistration process, effectively allowing the state to eliminate the remaining 562 associations.

Of the organizations that went through with the reregistration process, Squier points out that

many had “their reregistration either delayed or denied outright on basis of official demands—

demands contradictory to Russian law—relating to their name, structure, statutory goals, and

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activities” (171). Grounds for formally denying reregistration even bordered on the ludicrous,

including incorrect font size. (Squier 2002)

State regulation

Even if organizations pass the draconian registration or reregistration requirements

outlined above, they face stiff regulation from the state. According to Squier, “one of the more

subtle approaches to the development of state controls over civil society that has arisen over the

course of the past three years is legislation intended to regulate NGOs and their activities” (173).

For example, laws are in place that oblige associations to provide the state with whatever

information it seeks, effectively wiping out a group’s right to privacy. As well, the state has the

right to inspect any organization without a court warrant.

Russian law also makes use of intentional ambiguities to give it the right to regulate civil

society. For example, one law entitled “On the Noncommercial Society” requires all nonprofit

organization to have “socially useful goals.” The ambiguity of this phrase gives the state the

discretion to close down any organization that opposes it. As well, laws are in place that allow

the Ministry of Justice to immediately liquidate NGOs which it deems to be involved in

“extremist activities” without a court order. It also has the right to revoke the registration of

media sources which it deems to distribute “extremist materials.” While in theory a court must

subsequently confirm the decision by the Ministry of Justice to shut down the organization, in

practice the tribunal process is so lengthy that even if the decision of the Ministry of Justice were

overturned, so much time will have passed that it would be virtually impossible to resurrect the

NGO.

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Cooptation

In addition to imposing restrictions, the Russian state has also attempted to control civil

society through cooptation. The most palpable example is the 2001 Civic Forum organized by

Vladimir Putin, where for the first time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

representatives from the government and 5000 emissaries from the largest NGOs would meet to

discuss together the state of civil society in the country. Despite the ostensible intentions

expressed by Putin to strengthen the relationship between the state and civil society, many view

the Civic Forum with skepticism as an attempt by the Russian government to co-opt voluntary

associations. According to Weigle, many saw the Civic Forum as “just another attempt to co-opt

civil society organizations into a vertical hierarchy of state power and to bring them to heel under

the watchful eye of Putin’s increasingly authoritarian state” (Weigle 2002; 131). At this

conference, Putin attempted to organize the different civil society groups under a corporatist

structure where NGOs would forgo their independence in order to gain “institutionalized

consultation of their interests and a share of the benefits allocated by the state” (Evans 2002;

149).

The plan of the Kremlin to use the forum to co-opt civil society largely failed, since as

Uhlin describes, this plan was “rejected by civil society activists who established their own rules

for participation in the Civic Forum” (Uhlin 2006; 93). While some voluntary associations

including human rights groups outright refused to attend the conference, many organizations

under the People’s Assembly (an umbrella group of voluntary associations) decided to attend the

conference in order to promote dialogue with the state, yet refused to enact any resolutions or

vote on any matters including the establishment of formal ties to government organs. According

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to Weigle, the representatives from NGOs wanted “no presidium at the Forum, no voting on any

issues, and no general resolutions” (135).

GONGOs

The Russian state also attempts to control and monitor NGOs through the establishment

of GONGOs (Government-Organized NGOs). One prominent example of a GONGO is the

organization, “Walking Together” which is a youth movement. Despite its claim of being an

independent NGO which operates in over thirty regions and whose membership is over ten

thousand, its primary role is to harness support for Vladimir Putin and his ruling party. Another

prominent GONGO, ironically called, “Civil Society” was responsible for determining who

would be the participants at the 2001 Civic Forum. Although it is debatable whether the concept

of “state-sponsored NGOs” is itself an oxymoron; it is clear that the Russian state has used

GONGOs as a means to insidiously penetrate the realm of civil society and over time promote

organizations that serve its interests while marginalizing those that oppose its policies. This

concept is neatly summarized by Nikitin and Buchanan, when they write:

Altogether, through the creation of pseudo-NGOs…the administration’s strategy seemed

to involve consolidation of a cadre of loyal NGOs that could ultimately outmaneuver

more problematic opposition and activist groups on both the domestic and the

international scene. NGOs and civic leaders would then be neatly divided into two

camps: “trustworthy” and “uncooperative,” with the latter potentially marginalized into

obscurity over time. (160)

Other control tactics

Another tactic which the Russian government uses to control organizations that oppose it

is harassment by tax authorities. Tax officials in Russia regularly bully organizations such as

environmental activists, who are often subject to intrusive inspections by the tax police and even

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the Federal Security Service (the successor to the KGB). As well, the government illegally

monitors the activities of NGOs which it deems politically threatening (such as human rights

groups) by tapping their phones and monitoring emails. However, this form of monitoring is the

exception rather than the norm, and organizations such as women’s groups which are deemed

less politically threatening are not subject to these harsh measures.

Section II: How did these state restrictions impact civil society?

Cases where the state crushed voluntary associations

Trade unions

One of the most heavily repressed types of NGOs in Russia is trade unions. The state has

attempted to control the labor movement through its relationship with the FNPR (the Federation

of Independent Trade Unions of Russia), which is a GONGO and is the successor of the Soviet-

era All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. According to Sue Davis, “under President

Vladimir Putin, the FNPR has been hewing a line much closer to state interests [than worker’s

interests] as Putin labors to bring control back to Russia…[and] the independence of the FNPR

will be ever more limited as Putin constructs his vertikal’ of power and tightens control by the

state organs” (Davis 2002; 204). Oftentimes, membership to the FNPR is mandatory, and as

Kubicek describes, “membership for most is perfunctory, not a conscious choice of a worker but

a result of inertia, habit or even perhaps threats to the worker” (Kubicek 2002; 608).

In terms of direct legal means used to control civil society, the Russian state tries to

substantially weaken the independent labor movement through the 2001 Labor Code. The code

sets out the conditions under which unions may form; and one of the regulations states that in

order to be legally recognized, a union must have a membership rate of over 50% of a firm’s

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workers (this effectively makes it very difficult for small unions to emerge). Equally problematic

is the sheer size and strength of the FNPR. Approximately 60% of the entire labor force belongs

to the FNPR, and even in instances where membership is not imposed, it is extremely difficult to

leave the union in order to join an alternative independent one. According to Davis, numerous

perks are controlled by the FNPR including access to mortgages and vacation housing; and while

the union does not directly control social insurance funds, it still wields significant power over

them. As a result, it is often close to impossible to persuade workers to leave the FNPR to join a

newly-formed independent union.

Additionally, the state imposes numerous legal hurdles in organizing a strike under the

new 2001 Labor Code. In order to strike, workers must agree on a specific duration in advance.

As well, strikes can only deal with specific issues within the firm and cannot for example be used

to demand union recognition or attempt to protest against government policies. In addition to the

legal challenges that unions must overcome, strike leaders face a plethora of repercussions.

According to a Freedom House report, strike leaders are often harassed by the government (as

occurred after a 2007 Avtovaz strike where a union leader named Anton Vechkunin was

arrested). There have also been numerous incidents of strikers who lost their jobs, as happened to

two workers involved in a postal strike in St. Petersburg. (Freedom House 2008) The impact that

these policies have had on the number of strikes in Russia is described by Stephen Crowley when

he claims that the number of strikes in Russia dropped from 17,000 in 1997 to less than 300

during the first 9 months of 2001 (Crowley 2002; 246).

The overall effect of the “war” between organized labor and the Russian state has been to

cripple independent unions throughout Russia. Lacking adequate membership because of the

competition with the government-favored FNPR and possessing a dearth of bargaining tools

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(strikes), labor-oriented civil society has been thrust into near-oblivion. While certain

organizations such as the Independent Union of Miners have been able to form, overall it is

estimated that total membership in all of the independent unions combined is only 300,000-

600,000 (less than one percent of the total labor force of 64.6 million). This figure pales when

compared to the 38 million members registered with the FNPR. (Davis 2002; 203)

Media groups

Another instance where the state and civil society have run into conflict is in the case of

media groups. While in theory freedom of the press is guaranteed by the Russian constitution

under article 29 which decrees that “the freedom of mass communication shall be

guaranteed...[and] censorship shall be banned” (Sakwa 2008; 483) in practice this is hardly the

case. For example, in the year 2009, the Press Freedom Index ranked Russia 153rd

out of 175

countries. What is unique to media organizations is the nature through which the state constrains

their development. Unlike trade unions, media associations face practically no legal obstacles

(such as the law requiring a membership of at least 50%). The state controls the press mostly

through “off the books” means such as the harassment of journalists by government officials, a

subtle takeover of independent media organizations, and intentionally ambiguous laws.

One of the strongest blows to freedom of speech in Russia was a law passed in July of

2006 which broadened the definition of “extremism” under Russian law to include any

allegations involving government officials, or in legal terms, “slander directed toward figures

fulfilling the state duties of the Russian Federation.” For example, in 2008 the Russian

government closed down the newspaper of two journalists, Viktor Shmakov and Airat

Dilmukhametov, who wrote articles criticizing corruption among political figures. (CPJ 2007)

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The Russian government also accused the English daily in Moscow, “eXile,” of extremism, and

as a result it too was forced to shut down. Numerous high-profile journalists were also expelled,

including Jane Armstrong, a Canadian journalist covering the human rights abuses taking place

in Chechnya. According to Freedom House, “authorities have used extremism charges against a

number of government critics, including journalists...[and] journalists remained unable to cover

the news freely, particularly with regard to contentious topics like human rights abuses in the

North Caucasus, government corruption, organized crime, and police torture” (Freedom House

2009).

As described earlier, the Russian legal code makes use of a significant number of

ambiguities. A salient example of this which has negatively affected media organizations has

been a law passed in January of 2007 whereby Putin gave the Ministry of Justice the authority to

close down any organization whose policies run counter to the “political independence of the

Russian Federation.” For example, the government wielded this law to shut down the Russian-

Chechen Friendship Society which attempted to document human rights abuses throughout

Chechnya. (CPJ 2007)

While the tactics described above fall into the category of “soft coercion,” the

government also utilizes various forms of “hard coercion” toward media-related civil society.

For example, through Putin’s term up until 2006, there had been a total of 13 assassinations of

high-profile reporters, including Anna Politkovskaya who documented human rights abuses by

the government. She was assassinated by an “unidentified” murderer while in the elevator of her

apartment. Another example includes the assassination of Russian-American journalist Paul

Klebnikov who was the editor of the magazine, Forbes Russia. (CPJ 2006)

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Russian TV media must also go through the bureaucratic process of obtaining a

broadcasting license. Unfortunately, there is significant red tape, and oftentimes obtaining a

license is contingent on providing significant coverage for political parties. Conversely, the state

can also easily revoke a license, and as Markus Soldner describes, “the operation of broadcasting

media in the Russian Federation is completely dependent on the control of the executive branch”

(165).

While the state attempts to directly control media through various forms of “soft” and

“hard” coercion, just as in the case of trade unions it also seeks to achieve this goal through a

gradual, insidious takeover of the industry. Right now, the state owns two out of the fourteen

national newspapers, sixty percent of the local print news sources, all national television stations

as well as two national radio stations. (Freedom House 2009) According to Freedom House, “this

allowed the government to ensure that the press was filled with pro-Kremlin propaganda,

particularly ahead of the flawed March [2008] presidential election.”

One particularly salient example of tactics used by the Russian state to control news

organizations includes the takeover of NTV, which was the only independent broadcasting media

association. Because of large debts to the state-owned gas company, Gazprom, in what the CPJ

describes as a “boardroom coup” the government effectively took control of the company away

from its owner, Vladimir Gusinsky. While Gazprom claims that this action was purely business-

related; it is clear that the takeover had a largely ideological basis, especially due to the strong

anti-government rhetoric broadcast on the channel. For example, NTV routinely criticized the

wars in Chechnya and exposed several corruption scandals. Similar takeovers by the Russian

government include “Media-Most” (which was also requested by Gazprom to immediately pay

its outstanding debts), the channel “ORT,” as well as the magazines “Itogi” and “Segodnya”.

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Cases of civil society that emerged despite state controls

Despite the restrictions imposed by the state, several types of civil society organizations

were nevertheless able to emerge. Throughout this section, I will discuss how rural

organizations, women’s associations, as well as church groups were successful.

Soldiers’ mothers’ organizations

The first example of a women’s organization that not only attained mass membership but

was also able to influence policy was the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of

Russia (UCSMR). The UCSMR was formed in 1989 as the Soviet Union was disintegrating to

protest the abuses that were taking place in the Russian army. Unlike trade unions and media

organizations, this group was not only able to make its voice heard to the government, but also

successfully helped enact policy changes. Its victories include persuading the government to

enact legislation dismantling military units such as the construction battalions that were infamous

for their substandard conditions, granting amnesty to soldiers who deserted the army because of

abuse, and providing the families of deceased soldiers with social security benefits. Throughout

Russia, the UCSMR is currently lobbying to assure that soldiers receive proper treatment

including adequate food, clothing, etc. Membership has also steadily grown, and today there are

more than 300 member committees throughout the country. (McIntosh 2006; 181)

Crisis centers

In addition to soldiers’ mothers’ organizations, a second type of women’s civil society

association that was able to emerge has been crisis centers. Although they were virtually

inexistent throughout the Soviet period, crisis centers have proliferated throughout the nation in

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the 1990s, especially in large cities. Starting from 2 crisis centers founded in Moscow and St.

Petersburg in 1993, the movement has spread to include over 120 across the nation (Johnson

2006; 268). As well, the Russian Association for Crisis Centers for Women was formed, which is

an umbrella organization for all of the crisis centers in the Russian Federation. Services provided

by these NGOs include confidential hotlines, legal advice, shelters, etc. According to Janet

Johnson, “non-governmental crisis centers for women have proliferated across Russia. They

provide real psychological and legal aid to woman battery victims and make claims upon the

state that all woman battery must be punished” (Johnson 2001; 153).

Rural groups

Throughout rural Russia, another type of civil society that was able to emerge has been

the rural club, or Klubok in Russian. They provide a wide range of amenities to residents, which

is especially important considering the poverty and lack of material resources throughout the

countryside. According to Kliucharev and Morgan, “they are the sole place for communal

activities for locals, providing very basic amenities, from simple opportunities for company and

conversation to reading and television, public heating in the cold winters and folk singing on

public holidays” (64). Oftentimes, these clubs serve as vehicles for the dissemination of culture,

and provide many educational opportunities especially for youth. Although their exact number is

unknown, these organizations have proliferated in recent years as a response to the dismantling

of previous Soviet-era associations including women’s councils, sports teams, book clubs, etc.

(White 2006; 288)

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Religious organizations

Notwithstanding the heavy repression that church groups faced under the Soviet

dictatorship, the church has far from died out and two-thirds of the population identify

themselves as believers. Among the religious groups, the Christian Orthodox faith is the most

widespread, with 60% of the Russian population adhering to it.

Although largely obsolete throughout the communist period, today the Orthodox Church

has 30,142 parishes, 28,434 priests, and 788 monasteries. (Patriarchate of Russia 2010) While

the Orthodox Church has clearly experienced a revival since the Soviet period, other religious

groups have also proliferated, including Protestant groups. For example, although in 1990 there

were only 900 protestant organizations, in 2001 there were 4509. (Wallace 2006; 186)

Despite maintaining close ties to the Russian government, it is erroneous to believe that

the Orthodox Church was coopted and has become part of the state. Firstly, the Russian

constitution clearly establishes a secular state and ascertains that there is no official state

religion. Several of Putin’s actions support this notion, including a January 2001 Kremlin

ceremony where he awarded state medals not only to Orthodox priests, but also to priests of

other religions. As well, in a statement Putin claimed that “we must not tell religious figures

what to do, who to choose, and how to form associations” (119). The Russian patriarch

expressed a similar opinion that “the church must be separate from the state” (118). Edwin

Bacon agrees with the separation of the church and the state in Russia and claims that although

the relationship between the church and state “is mutually beneficial, neither the church nor the

state wishes to see a more formal linkage. From this point of view, the Russian Orthodox Church

defends its official separation from the state” (117).

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Section III: Summing up—what types of civil society were able to emerge in Russia and

what characteristics did they possess that allowed them to flourish in spite of heavy state

regulation?

The importance of cooperation with the state

One common theme that can be observed throughout both the successful and the

unsuccessful cases of civil society in Russia is the importance of cooperating with the state. It

can be concluded with near certainty that although direct support from the state is not a necessary

condition for the development of civil society in Russia, direct confrontation and opposition to

the state will destroy a civil society movement. This statement is illustrated by the different case

studies I have discussed, and although organizations such as the UCSMR never received direct

state support and clearly evolved in a “bottom up” manner, they never directly attacked the state.

In fact, rather than shunning the government and refusing to collaborate with it (like media

organizations such as NTV), these associations have consistently maintained ties to state officials

in the presidential administration, the Ministry of Defense, etc. According to McIntosh, “the

organizations that have experienced the greatest success—the soldiers mothers’ organizations—

are the ones that have been most willing to cooperate with the state” (190).

As well, the success of crisis centers can be linked to the ability of these organizations to

work with state institutions such as law enforcement. Throughout his article, “Law Enforcement

and Civil Society in Russia,” Brian Taylor discusses how in many parts of Russia, law

enforcement officials are beginning to work with crisis centers to end domestic violence, as

demonstrated through a case study in the city of Yekateriburg. Throughout this city, he describes

that “the Yekaterina Crisis Centre, a domestic violence NGO, has had moderate success in

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working with the local police…[and] a cooperation agreement between the police and the centre

was signed in 2001” (206). By working with the state and educating law enforcement officials

about their cause, crisis centers have been able to accomplish their goals more easily, and this

has laid the groundwork for the proliferation of these organizations.

In terms of rural organizations such as clubs, a large portion of their ability to grow was

related to their connection with the state. The government often provided salaries for club leaders

as well as real estate. Despite this aid from the government, they nevertheless maintained their

independence (government officials are not involved in the direct management of these

associations) and can thus still be considered civil society.

In a similar way, faith-based organizations and especially the Orthodox Church were able

to evolve by building a cooperative relationship with the government. After Putin took office, he

wanted to build closer ties with the church as a mechanism to achieve national unity. According

to a statistic, the Church is one of the most trusted institutions in Russia, and “if, as recent

research has shown, mistrust in organizations has been a key factor inhibiting the growth of civil

society in the postcommunist world, then the relatively high levels of trust in the Orthodox

Church may indicate that it starts from a privileged position in establishing itself as a key

element of Russian civil society” (Bacon 2006; 115). Church leaders were often invited to state

events, an example being the Patriarch’s invitation to Putin’s inauguration.

The broad categories of civil society that were able to emerge and the importance of not being

seen as a threat by the state

Throughout this paper, the successful civil society organizations can be fundamentally

grouped into two categories: service-providing organizations and those that promote

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cultural/nationalistic ideals. The women’s groups fall into the former category, while church and

rural groups fall into the latter.

In the case of the service-providing organizations, I would like to suggest that their

success is due largely to the fact that the state never perceived them as a threat, thus making

cooperation possible. Service-providing organizations are successful since they are generally

non-controversial and are viewed in a favorable light by the majority of the public. This

statement is supported by Alfred Evans, who describes that “social organizations that perform

services of value…may gradually win greater trust from the majority of the people” (335).

Unlike civil society such as the media and trade unions which could mobilize people against

state institutions and often campaigned for general rights and principles, the state never feels

threatened by non-controversial NGOs which provide specific material services.

In discussing women’s organizations, Uhlin agrees that because they did not attempt to

lobby for sweeping changes to government policy, “women’s NGOs have not suffered the same

form of harassment that many human rights and environmental NGOs have been victims of.”

(92). The UCSMR’s activities were largely related to fighting against direct military abuses,

enhancing conditions for military personnel, etc. rather than making claims about broad policy

issues such as the rights of soldiers. For example, when it was first founded, the UCSMR did not

voice opposition to wars themselves, but rather strictly toward the treatment of soldiers.

Although recently organizations such as the UCSMR have taken a more confrontational attitude

toward the government, it was their willingness to cooperate with the state and their focus on

concrete material benefits that allowed them to grow. Conversely, as McIntosh describes, “other

soldiers’ rights groups such as the ATA and EMAV use the language of human rights and rights

of citizens in a democracy more centrally in their work; yet, as noted earlier, their work has

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achieved very little organizational growth, public resonance, or policy success” (192). Because

they did not fundamentally challenge the Russian government policy and simply resorted to

demands such as an end to abuse, the state was able to work more closely with organizations

such as the UCSMR and never viewed them as a threat.

In addition, just like the soldiers’ mothers’ organizations, crisis centers focus on specific

material objectives as opposed to trying to enact sweeping policy reforms. Instead of using

human rights rhetoric to change government policy on domestic abuse at a national level,

successful domestic violence NGOs attempt to provide concrete benefits such counseling

services, legal aid, etc. As a result, they are not perceived as a threat to government policies, and

the state thus does not actively attempt to shut them down.

The second type of civil society that I discovered was able to flourish in Russia is the

case of cultural and nationalist-oriented groups. By cultural/nationalistic ideals, I mean those that

help generate a sense of national identity and unity. The clear examples of this are the church,

rural groups, etc. Not only did the government view these organizations as innocuous, but it

directly supported and provided aid to them. Part of this has to do with the government wanting

to strengthen national unity, which was at an all-time low after the disintegration of the Soviet

Union. In the case of rural groups, the government viewed them in a favorable light since they

helped bring together and create bonds among people in countryside communities, and often

promoted Russian culture. As well, in the case of church groups, according to Daniel Wallace:

Putin knew that he needed the church, and not for reasons of personal faith but for

reasons of state. The church offered a bridge to the rebuilding of national unity, as the

guardian of national values and religious traditions. “The time of disunity is over,”

Patriarch Aleksi II announced in December 1999, in supporting the unification of Russia

and Belarus. In January 2000, he stated, “the Church has preserved its unity” at the end of

a decade when regional authorities had proclaimed their independence and centrifugal

forces threatened the disintegration of the former Soviet Union…The church would

Berbecel 21

provide the civic values and the moral center that Russia lacked and greatly needed in

order to restore its identity (72).

Despite the success of the aforementioned groups, when the state does feel threatened by

civil society, and particularly in the case of organizations such as human rights, the media,

environmental groups, trade unions, etc, cooperation is impossible. In particular, the state finds

these organizations threatening because they are groups that often directly criticize government

policy and have the potential to rally large groups of people. In this case, the state will use the

elaborate set of mechanisms described throughout Section I to hinder their development and in

extreme cases even shut down the organizations.

The diagram below that summarizes the information presented in this section provides a

visual representation of how the interaction between the state and civil society affects which

categories of organizations were be able to emerge in Russia.

Figure 1: A graphical representation of how the state affected different sectors of civil

society

An organization attempts to form

If the state feels threatened by the organization

…then the state will destroy the

organization using both legal tactics as well

as “off the books” methods described in

Section I of this paper.

e.g. media, trade unions

If the state does not feel threatened by the organization

…and if the state is

indifferent (neither opposes

nor directly aides the

organization)

e.g. women’s groups

…and if the state

views the organization

favorably and provides

aid (i.e. subsidies,

favorable laws)

e.g. church groups,

rural groups

Then cooperation is possible and civil society

can flourish

Berbecel 22

The assertion that the main sectors of civil society that exist in Russia today are service-

providing organizations and nationalistic/cultural associations is supported by data collected

from the Russian Government (see figure below). Throughout this study of 303,187

organizations, 51% were social and religious organizations and over 25% were either consumer

cooperatives or other service-based NGOs such as cultural, health and educational associations.

Conversely, organizations such as unions and bodies of public initiatives represent less than 10%

of all total organizations. While this study does not represent the full spectrum of civil society in

Russia (the Russian government only publishes a breakdown of about 60% of voluntary

organizations), it nevertheless provides a foundation from which to analyze the composition of

the civil society sector in the country:

Figure 2: A Breakdown of 303,187 civil society organizations in Russia

Source: Government of Russia

Berbecel 23

Section IV: What is the potential of civil society to flourish in the future?

In terms of how voluntary organizations will evolve in the future, I am fairly optimistic

since Russia has the fundamentals for a strong civil society. If we consider that there are four

factors that determine how civil society will evolve—the state, civic legacy, the economy and the

international context—Russia has all three of the latter components. In terms of civic legacy,

throughout his article, James Gibson describes the strong social networks that are present in

Russia. Because civil society was heavily repressed under communist rule, citizens began

forming their own individual networks as a response. These networks are characterized by a high

degree of trust, and according to Gibson this is crucial to the development of a vibrant civil

society. He describes that “the task of building social organizations is greatly facilitated by the

ease with which Russians interact with each other…[and] Russian social networks have a variety

of characteristics that my allow them to serve as important building blocks for the development

of a vibrant civil society” (60). In addition to civic legacy, Russia is relatively prosperous with a

GDP per capita of about $15,000 and a poverty rate of 16% (roughly the same as in the US).

Finally, Russian civil society enjoys a favorable international context, as many outside

organizations including USAID strive to make donations to support grassroots movements. As

discussed throughout this paper, the critical factor that many organizations in Russia lack is a

cooperative state. Therefore, it is my belief that the development of a striving civil society will

ultimately be contingent on the degree to which Russia undergoes political liberalization.

One method to analyze the potential of Russian civil society to develop in the future is to

compare the strength of civil society in Russia to the strength of civil society in the other nations

of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, I have performed a study where I attempt to find the

relationship between the number of international NGOs per 100,000 inhabitants and the level of

Berbecel 24

state control in the country. In order to measure the degree of state control, I have used the Press

Freedom Index and have obtained information on the number of international NGOs in each

nation from the Yearbook of International Organizations.

Figure 3: The correlation between level of freedom and the number of international NGOs

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations and Reporters Without Borders

Note: Decreasing numerical values imply greater freedom of press.

Although this study does not directly establish causality, it is nevertheless plausible that

the independent variable is state control; since as I have attempted to show throughout this paper,

the state can use its power to significantly affect the development of civil society. In the former

Soviet Union, the nations most successful at establishing a thriving civil society were the Baltic

Republics, where arguably the state has “let go.” In contrast to Russia, throughout Latvia, all

NGOs are tax-exempt and individual and corporate donations to these associations are tax

deductable. In addition, according to USAID, “the registration procedure is simple and relatively

Berbecel 25

inexpensive” (USAID 2007) and it is impossible for the government to close down NGOs at its

will, even if the NGO does not abide by its charter. Therefore from this study I would like to

conclude that the future development of civil society in Russia is contingent on the level of

freedom that the state allows throughout the nation. If the government agrees to liberalize, then

Russian NGOs will be able to multiply just like their counterparts throughout Baltic nations,

Moldova, Armenia, etc. Although Russian NGOs do not need direct state support to thrive, the

end of the current authoritarian system of government would effectively eliminate the hostile

environment which has crippled many civil society organizations.

The implications of an intrusive state on the development of civil society can also clearly

be seen in another study on the relationship between the legal environment in which NGOs must

operate and overall NGO sustainability. Once again using the countries of the former Soviet

Union as the sample, this study reveals that as the legal environment of a nation becomes more

accommodating, NGO sustainability increases. While this study does not establish causality, it

demonstrates that the legal environment created by the state is strongly linked to the viability of

the development of grassroots organizations. As can be seen, nations with permissive laws (i.e.

Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) were able to develop the most permissive environments for civil

society, whereas the nations with the most stringent legal codes scored the worst on NGO

sustainability. I want to suggest that this study provides a basis for optimism, since it can be

inferred that if Russia were to adopt laws favorable toward NGOs, it has the potential to develop

a thriving civil society similar to that of the Baltic nations. As well, unlike aspects such as civic

legacy, economic development and international support, the legal system established by the

state can be changed in a very short time frame.

Berbecel 26

Figure 4: the relationship between the legal environment of a nation and overall NGO

sustainability

Source: USAID

Note: The NGO sustainability Index is published once a year by USAID to determine how accomodating the overall

environment of a nation is to the development of NGOs. Decreasing numerical values imply a more permissive legal

environment and a rise in NGO sustainability.

In conclusion, the initial puzzle guiding this essay was “what civil society organizations

were able to flourish despite harsh state controls and why?” The two categories of civil society

that have been successful which I identify are service-providing organizations as well as

cultural/nationalistic groups. The organizations that have failed however, are notably those that

directly confront the state and challenge it on issues like human rights; as well as those that can

potentially mobilize large groups such as trade unions. I also conclude that in order for civil

society to be successful, while it is not necessary for organizations to receive direct support from

the state, at a minimum cooperation is a necessary condition. Throughout my analysis, all

successful groups including women’s organizations maintain a relationship with state actors such

Berbecel 27

as politicians and the police. However, when NGOs refuse to work with the state and/or fully

oppose it on issues such as human rights, the state will automatically view them as threatening

and will use the coercive apparatus that this paper outlines to shut them down. Although many

scholars take a pessimistic stance toward the future of Russian civil society, this paper would like

to end on an optimistic tone. Russia not only has a strong civic legacy, but also high levels of

economic development and a supportive international environment. While it is true that the state

in contemporary Russian society has severely hindered the development of a vibrant civil society

in areas such as trade unions and the media; when the state relaxed its controls as in the case of

women’s groups, voluntary associations were able to flourish. Therefore, I would like to suggest

that the future of civil society in Russia largely depends on the extent of future democratization

and the willingness of political actors to relinquish control. While political liberalization in

Russia is beyond the scope of this paper, I agree with Robert Dahl that this will occur when the

costs of suppression become greater than the costs of tolerance. When full democracy does

eventually take root however, and the state refrains from hampering the growth of civil society,

voluntary associations will proliferate and have the potential to reach the same levels as in other

developed countries such as the United States.

Berbecel 28

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