CIPATI in the^

U N I T E D S T A T E S A R M Y F O R C E SIN THE I

P A C I F I C O C E A N sLieutenant General ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.

HEADQUARTERS ITED STATES ARMY FORCES, MIDDLE PACIFICOFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 968

In reply refer to: 15 March 1946

SUBJECT: Okinawa Operation - ICE3ERG

TO: The Chief of StaffUnited States ArmyWar DepartmentWashington 25, D. C.

1. At the conclusion of the Okinawa Operation, the Command­ing General, Tenth Army, submitted an operational report to the WarDepartment through the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces,Pacific•

2. The participation report submitted herewith was .preparedto supplement the operational report and to record the duties as­signed to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, PacificOcean Areas, in the Okinawa Operation. It undertakes to present acomprehensive account of the administrative and logistical responsi­bilities incident to the plan of operation. Its purpose is to showthe contribution made by the United States Army Forces, Pacific OceanAreas, in support of the operation - ICEBERG.

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr.Lieutenant General, U. S. A m yCommanding

1 Inclosure Participation report

!2s >J] •-. 6.: • \

P A R T I C I P A T I O N

I N T H E

O K I N A W A O P E R A T I O N

BY

THE UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

APRIL - JUNE 1945

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR. , U. S. ARMYCOMMANDINO

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Part Subject Page

VOLUME I

IntroductionHeadquarters United States Army Foroes,

Pacific Ocean Areas 52 Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas 1373 Tenth Army 2034 Central Pacific Base Command 313

VOLUME II

5 Western Pacific Base Command 4236 South Pacific Base Command 4517 Army Garrison Forces, Okinawa. 5258 Army Garrison Forces, Ie Snima 6119 Replacement Training Command 62510 Assistance Rendered to the Navy and Marines 63311 Summary and Conclusions 665Annex 1 List of Participating Army Forces 677Annex 2 Selections from Observers1 Reports 701Annex 3 Organization Diagram of Task Forces 717Annex 4 Map of Western Paoific Area 721Annex 5 Map of Okinawa 725

S l a* / . / <y

INTRODUCTION

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A. SUBJECT AND PURPOSE OF REPORT.

1. The subject of this report is the participation by theUnited States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA), inthe campaign against Japanese-held Okinawa and adjacent islandsin the Ryukyus group. The report covers the period from theplanning stage to 21 June 1945, the date Okinawa was declaredsecure.

2. The Okinawa operation was the first in the PacificOcean Areas in which a field army was employed against anenemy objective. As commander of the expeditionary troops, theCommanding General, Tenth Army, acting under the operationalcontrol of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA),and with the administrative and logistical support of the Com­manding General, Pacific Ocean Areas (ComGenPOA), was delegatedthe responsibility for the capture, occupation, base develop­ment, and defense of the island positions Involved.

3. This report i8 not intended to be an operations reportor a discussion of the activities of the Navy and Marines en­gaged in this campaign, but rather undertakes to present a com­prehensive account of the administrative and logistical supportfurnished by Army agencies in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Thissupport includes the allocation, organization, training, equip­ping, and mounting of the troops making up the Army portion ofthe assault and garrison forces.

4. This presentation attempts to give a clear understandingof the effort required to support a major campaign in the PacificOcean Areas.

B. PLAN OF REPORT.

1« This report is divided into parts, each part presentinga factual summary of the contribution of HUSAFPOA and of eachof its major echelons of command to the prosecution of theRyukyus campaign. Although each command is treated as a separ­ate entity, the interrelationship of the commands to each otherand to HUSAFPOA has been stressed. The activities of the TenthArmy Itself are included, insofar as they contributed to theoverall logistical and administrative mission.

2. One part is devoted to assistance rendered to Naval andMarine units by USAFPOA agencies.

3. The final part of the report (Summary and Conclusions)summarizes the principal lessons learned from the operation.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

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PART I

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PART 1 ­

- INDEX ­

SECTION SUBJECT PA&E

I Personnel (G-l) 9

III Planning, Organization and Training (G~3) 25^

Operation

II Combat Intelligence (G— 2) and Public Relations 13

IV Supply (0-4) 31V Long Range Planning and Logistics for Okinawa 39

VI Postal Officer and Machine Records Units 47VII Artillery Officer 49VIII Chaplain 57IX Chemical Officer 59X Engineers 77XI Exchange Officer 83XII Finance Officer 85XIII Information-Education 89XIV Judge Advocate 91XV Ordnance Officer 93XVI Provost Marshal 99XVII Quartermaster 101XVIII Signal Officer 111XIX Special Service Officer 123XX Surgeon 125XXI Transportation Officer 133

PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION I - PERSONNEL (G-l)

A. PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT.

1. Planning.

a. The USAFPOA replacement officer determined that9,000 replacements would be required for the first 60 days ofthe Okinawa operation. This decision was based on estimatesof the number and type of troops to be employed, length ofemployment, expected enemy resistance and capabilities, healthand sanitation at the target, and available shipping. Alsoconsidered was the fact that the XXIV Corps, which was to beemployed in the Okinawa operation, was understrenf.;th 3,^00men as a result of participation in the Leyte operation. Withthe concurrence of Tenth krmyf a plan was formulated to furnishthe initial replacement support for the operation.

b. The authorized theater replacement level of17,000 men was found inadequate ta suoDort an operation thesize of the Okinawa campaign. A directive was therefore issuedwhich removed basic privates from the authorized strength ofall theater units, excepting infantry rifle companies andmedical detachments of infantry regiments. The result of thisaction was an increase of approximately 13,000 in the theaterreplacement level. Requisitions were than submitted to theWar Department to obtain this number of replacements for theunits affected by this reduction.

c. In order to permit units to requisition replace­ments immediately Upon loss by evacuation, Okinawa was declareda Personnel Replacement Combat Area. Howver, as it was anti­cipated that replacements would not be available in quantitiessufficient to permit immediate replacement of all hospitalizedpersonnel, the Tenth Army proposed that Okinav/a be designateda modified Personnel Replacement Area. This proposal providedthat only Individuals evacuated from the target area would betransferred to the War Department Detachment of Patients.This modification to established procedure was approved byHUSAFPOA.

d. After consultation with ComG-enTen, it was agreedthat a replacement depot of two battalions, one of which wouldaccompany the assault echelon, would be adequate to meet opera­tional requirements.

e. Emergency requisitions were submitted to the WarDepartment to obtain headquarters and headquarters companiesfor three Army garrison forces, as experience had shown thattactical units should not be burdened with the administration

'Upon indication that personnel from the;ates would not arrive in sufficient time

to meet mounting dates, it was necessary to procure much ofthe personnel locally on the condition that such would be re­placed upon arrival of the fillers.

2. Support. From the start of the campaign to 21 June1945, when the island was declared secure, 671 officers and13,686 enlisted replacements were shipped to Okinawa.

B. ORGANIZATION.

1. AGF headquarters. Three headquarters were activatedas follows: Army garrison force, Okinawa, consisting of 234officers, 15 warrant officers, and 1,022 enlisted men; Armygarrison force, Miyako Jima, consisting of 125 officers, 11warrant officers, and 600 enlisted men; and Army garrisonforce, Kikai Jima, consisting of 97 officers, 8 warrant offi­cers, and 379 enlisted men.

2. Commanding generals. Commanding generals weresnomlna­ted and accepted for garrison forces as follows:

AGF, Okinawa Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace 5 Jan 45AGF, le Shima Brig. Gen. Charles A. Thomas, Jr. 27 Jan 45AGF, Miyako Jima Brig. Gen. Bdwin B. Lyon 14 Mar 45AGF, Kikai Jima Brig. Gen. Lawrence A. Lawson 14 Mar 45

3# Deactivation of AGF headquarters. Headquarters andheadquarters company, AGF, Miyako Jima, was deactivated, ef­fective 15 July, and the grades and personnel were generallydistributed among the base commands for utilization withinpersonnel centers. Headquarters and Headquarters company,AGF, Kikai Jima, was deactivated on 26 July, and the gradesand personnel were generally transferred to AGF, Okinawa, asan augmentation.

C. AWARDS. Authority to award the Distinguished ServiceCross, Silver Star, Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star Medal, AirMedal, and Purple Heart was delegated to the Commanding Gen­eral, Tenth Army (ComGenTen), by letter of instructions fromHUSAFPOA. Recommendations for award of the Medal of Honorand Distinguished Service Medal were forwarded to HUSAFPOAfor appropriate action. HUSAFPOA retained authority for theaward of the Legion of Merit.

D. MILITARY GOVERNMENT,

•« Planning. HUSAFP0A was charged with the supervisionof the Tenth Army military government planning activities forthe Okinawa operation; specifically, the procurement of Armypersonnel, the requisitioning and delivery of all military

supplies from ComServPac, and the rendering of logisticalsupport. In discharging this responsibility, liaison was main­tained with Tenth Army and the CinCPac military governmentsection.

2. Organization.

a. It was estimated by "the Tenth Army that 395 ol­ficers, 2 warrant officers, and 995 enlisted men would be nec­essary to accomplish the military government mission in theRyukyu8. HUSAFPOA obtained from the War Department an over­all allotment of 182 officers, in addition to 6 officers, 1warrant officer, and 14 enlisted men for the Tenth Army staff.The Navy furnished additional personnel to fill Tenth Armymilitary government requirements.

b. One hundred Nisei interpreters were procured,trained, and made available to CinCPac. Seventy-five ofthese men were assigned by CinCPac to the Tenth Army as inter­preters for military government work. In addition, the 6205thInterpreters Special Detachment, consisting of 90 Nisei, wasorganized, trained, and similarly assigned.

3. Support.

a. Military government in the Kerama Retto proceededaccording to .plan. The few hundred civilians on these Islandswere taken into custody early in the operation.

b. On Okinawa, due to the light resistance offeredthe landing and the rapidity with which the assault troopsextended the beachhead, a greater number of civilians foundwithin our lines than was initially anticipated. These wereplaced under the control of the military government, and ade­quate supplies, including medical and hospital facilities, wereprovided.

E. INSPECTOR GENERAL. Assistance was furnished all echelonsof the Tenth Array and AG-F in solution of administrative prob­lems occurring prior to the Okinawa operation. Administrativeassistance was furnished the rear echelon of the Tenth Armyin the period before its departure to the target.

F. PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS. Prior to the Okinawa opera­tion, HUSAFPOA appointed a total of 289 enlisted personnelfrom Tenth Army units as second lieutenants In the Army ofthe United States. These appointments were made primarilyto bring the Tenth Army up to officer strength for the opera­tion. During the operation (April, May, and June 1945) atotal of 57 appointments were made, of which 19 were combatappointments. Prior to the operation, promotion authority

ComG-enTen to permit expeditious actionin this matter.

G. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Inadequacy of replacement level. A replacement levelof less than 30,000 would be Inadequate to support an opera­tion of this size. It has been recommended that an adequatereplacement reserve be established prior to the start oflarge-scale offensive operations.

2. Personnel replacement combat area. The designationof Okinawa as a modified Personnel Replacement Combat Areaproved to be unsound due to resulting administrative diffi­culty. Units were unable to drop hospitalized personnel from,their rolls even after the casualties had been evacuated fromthe island. This made replacement difficult as the strengthof units carried was inconsistent with the present-for-dutystrength. An Army detachment of patients should have beenestablished to which all personnel could have been transferredimmediately upon evacuation from the division area.

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PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION II - COMBAT INTELLISENCE (0-2) AND PUBLIC RELATIONS.

A. PREPARATION.

1. Planning.

a. Early in November, 1944, preparations were madefor employment in the assault phase of the Okinawa operationof the G-2 USAFPOA enemy equipment intelligence service team.augmented by a quartermaster salvage and collection company.CinCPOA directed that the technical aspects of enemy equipmentof interest to the Army ground forces would constitute afunction of that team Independent of the control and super­vision of the POA Joint intelligence center (JICPOA). Inanticipation of special problems, an administrative and func­tional standing operating procedure was prepared by theHUSAFPOA G-8 and approved by the Tenth Army.

b. On the basis of the projected troop strength ofthe Tenth Army and garrison forces, it was determined that145 officers and 80 enlisted men would be required to provideadequate censorship control. Because local sources were shortof personnel, it was necessary to requisition the bulk of therequired personnel from the War Department. Inasmuch as thenewly-arrived censors would have had but a cursory backgroundin current censorship policies and procedures of this theater,plans were made for an intensive training program. Accordingly,the CPBC chief censor was charged with the following responsi­bilities:

(1) To provide a limited number of experiencedpersonnel to fill positions of responsi­bility in the newly activated censor de­tachments.

(2) To conduct a thorough program of indoctri­nation and training for the recently arrivedcensorship personnel.

(3) To assist the chief censors of these newdetachments in the drafting of censorshipregulations consistent with current HUSAFPOApolicies and procedures, and to coordinatethese with Navy and Marine censorship regu­lations.

c. Planning for unified public relations and his­torical coverage of the Okinawa campaign culminated in the ac­tivation by HUSAFPOA of the First Information and Historical

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Service. A nucleus of experienced personnel was drawn fromthe public relations office to provide the basic staff of thenew organization. Based upon the close initial relationshipbetween the First Information and Historical Service and theUSAFPOA public relations office, a Joint plan was developedand approved by the USAFPOA G-2 and ComGenTen, delineating themissions of the two organizations as follows:

(X) First Information and Historical Service:The forward echelon mission of gathering,reoording, photographing and transmittingnews at the front, at headquarters, and inbivouac areas.

(2) Public Relations Office, USAFPOA: The rear•* £ echelon mission of auditing and rewriting

news and feature copy, the processing andcaptioning of photographs, the technicalprocessing and editing of voice records onwire, and the transmission of material tothe War Department Bureau of Public Rela­tions and direct to press and radio media.

•w««ii| d. A historical subdivision was established in the«fe'J*iSITJSAFPOA G-2 section and was charged with the general mission

of supervising and coordinating the historical program of thetheater. Historical coverage of the Okinawa operation inclu­ded on-the-spot observations, interviews and examination ofcaptured documents. Because of the experience gained in thisspot coverate, the historical subsection was able to issue aGuide for Historical Officers in the Field which aided in thesuccessful writing of the Okinawa campaign.

e. USAFPOA G-2 furnished the 310th CounterintelligenceCorps Detachment, which was the largest that operated in ttoeOkinawa campaign, with pertinent information on the conduct ofJapanese civilians which had been gained from experiences onOahu and Leyte.

2* Organization.

a. General supervisory authority over counter­intelligence corps detachments attached to units of the TenthArmy rested with USAFPOA G-2. Particular assistance wasrendered in the procurement of personnel. To augment the310th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, three officers andeight agents were secured for that organization from the 401stCounterintelligence Detachment, CPBC. In addition, the fol­lowing number of officers and agents were provided from thesame source: two officers and seven agents for the 7th de­tachment, two officers and four agents for the 27th detachment,and three officers and seven agents for the 224th detachment.

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The USAFPOA enemy equipment intelligence serviceteam was organized into three separate and independent detach­ments. One participated in the Iwo Jima operation; anotherwas scheduled for Okinawa and the third formed a rear echelonat HUSAFPOA to maintain continuity in the team's work. Eachdetachment was organized into ordnance, signal, medical,quartermaster, chemical, and engineer sections. For admini­strative purposes the Okinawa detachment was merged with acomposite group of Army, Navy, and Marine language specialistsfrom JICPOA team No* 26. The control and command of thisteam resided in the senior officer of the USAFPOA enemy equip­ment intelligence service team.

c. The 2223rd, 2224th, and 6213th Censor detachments,activated by and assigned to HUSAFPOA, were attached as follows:

Detachment Officers Enlisted Men Attached To

2223rd 89 45 Tenth Army2224th 40 29 AGF, Okinawa6213th 14 6 AGF, Ie 3hima

d. Preliminary planning provided for three historicalteams and five news teams for the Okinawa operation. However,it was eventually estimated that the minimum requirement foradequate coverage was a news team consisting of a news officer,an enlisted combat correspondent, two enlisted combat photo­graphers, a sound technician (magnetic wire recorder), and anofficer or enlisted historian, for each of the five divisionsemployed in the assault. Assignments on this general basisto the 7th, 27th, 77th, 81st, and 96th Infantry divisionswere made accordingly. A headquarters and headquarters de­tachment supplied personnel at Corps and at Army level. TheFirst Historical and Information Service was called upon toassume all public relations functions at the Army level afterthe initial assault, the commanding officer of the unit alsoassuming the duties of acting public relations officer of theTenth Army.

e. Nineteen photo interpretation teams consisting of36 officers and 93 enlisted men were attached to units of theTenth Army as follows:

Organization Number of teams Officers EM

Hq Tenth Army 10 19 49 Hq XXIV Corps 5 9 24 7th Infantry Division 1 2 5 27th Infantry Division 1 2 5 77th Infantry Division 1 2 5 96th Infantry Division 1 2 5

^even order of battle teams totaling seven officersand 13 enlisted men were attached to units of the Tenth Army asfollows:

Organization Number of teams Officers EM

Tenth Army 2 2 4 XXIV Corps 1 1 2 7th Infantry Division 1 1 2 27th Infantry Division 1 1 1 77th Infantry Division 1 1 2 AGF, APO 331 1 1 2

g. Nine Japanese interrogator-translator-interpreterteams totaling 12 officers and 92 enlisted men were attachedto units of the Tenth Army as follows:

Organization Number of teams Officers EM

Tenth Army 2XXIV Corps 27th Infantry Division 127th Infantry Division 177th Infantry Division 196th Infantry Division 1AGP, APO 331 1

4 311111

222010 10 10 10 10

In addition, a special interpreter detachment consist­ing~of 90 enlisted men was attached to Tenth Army for militarygovernment purposes,

3. Supply and equipment.

a. Individual and organizational equipment as esti­mated on the basis of the Leyte operation was drawn by theenemy equipment Intelligence service team. After a specialstudy of the transportation problem, authority to includeeight quarter-ton trucks and four quarter-ton trailers in thecombat shipment was requested and obtained.

b. In compliance with directions from HUSAFPOA, theCPBC chief censor provided all necessary base censorship sup­plies and equipment required by the 2223d, 2224th, and 6213thCensor detachments.

c. Equipment for the magnetic wire recorder was pro­cured for the First Information'and Historical Section.

d. Terrain model kits for the Tenth Army G-2 and photointerpretation supplies, in excess of table of allowances, asrequired by the Tenth Army photo interpreter teams were pro­cured.

e. New dictionaries and other language materials weresent to all language teams operating with the Tenth Army.

4. Compilation and dissemination of enemy informationand information on terrain not under our controir"

a. On 10 February 1945 an objective folder on theOkinawa archipelago, prepared by USAFPOA G-2, was issued toArmy and Navy combat and support headquarters, and interesteddepartment staff sections in the War Department.

b. An information bulletin for briefing purposeswas prepared by the CPBC information and education sectionfrom data furnished by USAFPOA G-2. Thirty thousand of thesewere furnished to the Tenth Army, 5,000 to Commander Amphib­ious Forces Pacific, and 5,000 to JICPOA.

c. The 30th and 64th Topographic Engineer battalionsprepared and reproduced maps and other Intelligence materialunder the operational control of HUSAFPOA.

d. Prior to the operation, the HUSAFPOA G-2 inter­pretation section prepared and furnished Tenth Army units atotal of 14 photo interpretation reports and 20 overlays show­ing fields of fire and defenses on Okinawa.

e. Prior to the departure of the Tenth Army for thetarget, prisoners of war were segregated for questioning atthe Army prisoner of war camp on Oahu. Approximately 300interrogations were conducted by language personnel attachedto Tenth Army, assisted by the USAFPOA language section, toobtain information on terrain, climate, cultural objects,fortifications, habits, customs and other matters pertinentto the mission.

f. USAFPOA G-2 periodic reports and intelligencebulletins were distributed to headquarters of the followingorganizations: Tenth Army, XXIV Corps, Advance IntelligenceCenter, CinCPAC, JICPOA, United States Marine Corps, FleetMarine force Pacific, III Amphibious Corps, 7th, 27th, 77th,96th Infantry divisions, AGF Okinawa and AGF Ie Shima.

g. The Tenth Army G-2 was furnished the followingspecial reports on request:

Estimate of Enemy Strength on Okinawa,including Estimate of Mobile Artillery onOkinawa, dated 3 December 1944.

Estimate of Enemy Capabilities with Re­ference to Paratroops and Employment ofGas Warfare, dated 29 December 1944.

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Estimate of Enemy Capabilities with Re­ference to Phase III Okinawa Campaign,dated 29 January 1945.

(4) Estimate.of Enemy Capabilities - TokunoShlma, dated 1 March 1945.

5. Training.

a. USAFPOA censorship personnel contributed to theTenth Army's intelligence training program by giving securityand censorship lectures to troops, and assisting in the pre­paration of a security guide.

b. Training programs designed to familiarize troopswith recognition and use of enemy equipment were conducted bythe officers and enlisted men of the USAFPOA enemy equipmentintelligence service teams. These programs included lectures,displays, and demonstrations for the 7th, 27th, 77th, and96th Infantry divisions.

•c. Personnel of the First Information and HistoricalService were trained in the use of the magnetic wire recorderby the USAFPOA public relations section. The USAFPOA G-2 his­torical subsection organized an informal training school whichincluded lectures each Sunday morning and on-the-Job trainingduring the week for combat historians.

d» Two photo Interpretation schools were conductedby the USAFPOA G-2 photographic interpretation section forcorps and divisional photo interpretation teams.

e» Arrangement's were made for the Interrogator-translator-interpreter teams attached to the Tenth Army toperform practice interrogations at the Army prisoner of warcamp on Oahu. Captured documents were made available to theseteams for translation practice. A special interpreter de­tachment of 90 enlisted men was trained at the Japanese lan­guage school at the Combat Training Center (CTC) on Oahu.

6. Liaison.

a. The -senior officer of team No. 26 collaboratedwitJh the Tenth Army G-2 In drafting orders necessary to imple­ment the broad policies of enemy equipment intelligence oper­ation. Daily liaison was established and maintained with JICPOAand CinOPOA until the date of embarkation. Intermediate head­quarters were kept informed of the status of current planning.

b. During the entire Okinawa campaign the USAFPOAG-2 historical subsection was in constant liaison with theG-2 historical branch, War Department General Staff.

c. After the Tenth Army headquarters had departed,a specialist from USAFPOA G-2 worked with officers of theTenth Army rear echelon on beach studies for the third phaseof the operation.

d. During the mounting out phase, close liaison wasmaintained by members of the USAFPOA G-2 objective data sub­section with the Tenth Army G-2. Duplication of effort wasavoided by frequent interchange of available information andcoordination of work. Tenth Army G-2 was also given assist­ance in obtaining information from JIGPOA, Navy sources, andthe Army air force.

7. Counterlntelllgence. An objective data study ofFormosa similar to that of the Okinawa archipelago was pre­pared and distributed as a counterintelligence measure.

8. Censorship. In preparation for the impending oper­ation, censorship personnel accomplished the following:

a. Enforced the restrictions of Section I, Circular141, HUSAFICPA, 1943, applicable to the various units andorganizations as they were alerted.

b. Prepared for publication the censorship regula­tions covering the various phases of the operation, as previousexperience had emphasized the necessity for a clear-cut lineof demarcation between censorship regulations applicable toassault troops and those applicable to garrison force troops.In conjunction with the CinCPac-CinCPOA chief censor and theCPBC chief censor, the following censorship regulations weredrafted and disseminated to all concerned:

(1) After official announcement by CinCPac-CinCPOA of the identity and location ofunits, commanders were authorized to permitall personnel of the announced units todisclose their location and relate theirpersonal experiences during the assaultphase of the operation. Upon completion ofthe assault phase, when command was trans­ferred from the landing or assault forcecommander to the occupation force commander,personnel were permitted to relate experi­ences which occured during the assaultphase, but were not permitted to disclosetheir location.

(2) Garrison and development units, and unitsalready assigned and using the APO or FPOaddress of the locality under attack, were

excepted from the provisions of

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the above paragraph, and were not permittedto reveal either their location or theirparticipation in the action.

(3) Upon completion of the assault phase, garri­son and development units were permitted toreveal their general i Q C a ^ l o ^ t i . e v t ^ Is­land group) but not ti^iri^^pfeific ^<si^0ii

: (1. e* a. particular "l iltttdtlB -js c p / feiSl ^ lfe ii-T*".­a single island or adiMt^i^^%^d^^i^^^J--'­a small portion of the island group wa# occu­pied, only the general term ^somewhere inthe Western Pacific" was authorized.

c. Maintained constant liaison with unit censors toassist them in their censorship duties.

d. Assisted in the checking of diaries, footlockers,and personal effects.

e. Prepared plans for the physical plant and organi­zation of the base censorship detachment at destination.

f. Made arrangements for the conduct of censorshipduring the staging phases and while enroute to target.

B. SUPPORT.

1. Interrogation of prisoners of war. Members of theUSAFPOA enemy equipment intelligence service team conductedInterrogations of prisoners of war to secure information re­garding the use of enemy equipment captured during the campaign.

2. Processing of captured documents* Niimerou«diariea, maps, and personal letters: were £fco«H?e$ -^by^atlves of the enemy equipment intelligence service team duringdaily reconnaissance, and were turned over to language per­sonnel for translation. Language personnel would frequentlyaccompany members of the enemy equipment team into the £iel$where they obtained material first hand.

3. Processing of captured enemy equipment and supplies*

a« The collection, processing, and evacuation ofenemy equipment for technical analysis began on L plus five,and was pursued vigorously until 21 June, the date the islandwas declared secure* During that period detachments in theforward areas covered the entire front.

b. Captured equipment was placed in one of twocategories: equipment deemed to be of technical intelligence

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value, or equipment required to satisfy training quotas. Theformer was briefly retained for analysis and report by thetechnical section concerned. The latter was immediatelystored in the salvage dump for processing by salvage companypersonnel.

4. Reports,

a. Information from both Army and Navy sources inthe field was collected and transmitted daily by radio to WarDepartment and other interested commands. A G-2 weekly peri­odic report and a bi-weekly intelligence bulletin were alsoprepared and distributed,

b. Field reports on enemy equipment of technicalinterest were promptly submitted. The item and the report weredispatched immediately to the chief of the technical serviceconcerned. The ordnance and chemical warfare sections renderednumerous on-the-spot reports to XXIV Corps and division ord­nance and chemical officers on the capabilities and methods ofemploying captured equipment.

5. Public relations. Public relations and historicalnews teams attached to divisions landed with assault waves andstarted the flow of photographs, news, feature stories, andrecorder wire. The amount of news coverage accomplished duringthe operation is indicated in the following tabulation:

News stories transmitted to HUSAFPOA,processed and released 25,088

Photographic prints released from HUSAFPOA but received in raw print or negative form 18,791

The above figures do not inolude the many items released onthe spot and inserted into correspondents1 stories, nor do theyinclude wire recorder shows.

6. Assistance to civilian correspondents. Personnel ofthe First Information and Historical Service assisted civilianwar correspondents in obtaining coverage of the operation.The commanding officer of the section coordinated all presscoverage from Army headquarters and conducted daily briefingsfor war correspondents. A nightly operational summary wasprepared and dispatched from Okinawa to CinOPac at Guam. Re­porters at Gruam prepared much of their copy from this material.A USAFPOA public relations officer stationed on Guam coordi­nated the flow of copy, and assisted in providing housing andtransportation for the correspondents.

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7. Historical coverage. Historical personnel landed withtheir respective units on Okinawa as follows: two with TenthArmy, one with XXIV Corps, one with 7th Infantry Division, twowith 27th Infantry Division, and one with 77th Infantry Divi­sion. One of the historians attached to the 27th Division wastransferred to the 96th Infantry Division when that unit enter­ed the line* It was the duty of the division historian toobserve unit action and interview personnel taking part in theaction. Daily Journals of observations were submitted to thesenior historical officer attached to Tenth Army. Historicalpersonnel attached to the XXIV Corps specialized on terrainstudy and the relationship between units. Tenth Army historicalpersonnel were charged with administrative supervision andcoordination of historical coverage activity. At Army and Corpslevels, draftsmen and artists assisted in the coverage ofterrain and defensive installations. Arrangements were madeto secure a copy of each picture taken by the signal corps asa supplementary means of achieving historical coverage.

8. Censorship.

a. Base censor personnel attached to the XXIV Corpsand the various divisions were operating ashore on a limitedscale by L plus three. Censor personnel attached to the TenthArmy was operating ashore by L plus eight.

b. All unit-censored mall and as much officer mailas could be examined at source was dispatched directly, butbecause of a shortage of censor personnel it became necessaryto send the overflow of officer mail to CPBC chief censorfor examination.

C. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Counterintelllgence. The counterintelligence corps(CIC) attached to the Okinawa operation was without inter­preters schooled in the Oklnawan and Japanese languages. Asa field expedient in the screening of the civilian populationit was found that local civilians of the more educated classescould be used as interpreters. To unify the work of theseassistants a questionnaire was written in Japanese characterswhich stipulated the questions that should be asked. Thisquestionaire proved of great value and was later enlarged andimproved by HUSAFPOA with the view of furnishing it to CICdetachments in future operations.

2. Enemy equipment. The abrogation of the 79th and 80thArticles of War impeded the efforts of team No. 26 in ful­filling War Department training requirements. It cannot beurged too strongly that all troops engaged in future opera­tions be thoroughly acquainted with the necessity of reporting

and safeguarding captured enemy materiel. The salvage andcollection company attached to the enemy equipment team couldhave retrieved for training much equipment which was lost tosouvenir hunters or sealed in caves by demolition squads.

Censorship. The work of the base censors was serl­gp.laously impeded by lack of adequate office space, office sup­

plies, transportation, quarters and subsistence for personnel.The lack of adequate transportation facilities for base censorsduring this operation made liaison difficult and resulted insome delay in the organization and functioning of the variouscensorship detachments because supplies and personnel couldnot be moved as promptly as desired.

4. Public relations. The T/0 & E of Army divisions andcorps should allow for a public relations office. A recommen­dation to this effect has been forwarded to the War Department.

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PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION III - PLANNING. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING, 0-5.

A. PLANNING- The HUSAFPOA 0-3 section coordinated trainingplans with representatives of the training staff of the TenthArmy and the Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC). Specialtraining activities and requirements were determined, andfacilities were made available for their accomplishment.Plans for determining combat units necessary and available forthe operation were accomplished in coordination with CinCPOAand Tenth Army.

B. OPERATIONS.

1. Assignment of units,

a. Early in February 1945, upon receipt of a firm Ldate, action was taken to assign to the Tenth Army all unitsmoving in the assault and first three echelons, effective 25February 1945, and to assign those moving in the fourth andsixth echelons, effective 1 March 1945. Units not present inthe theater but scheduled for one of the first six echelons,were assigned to the Tenth Army, effective upon arrival inPOA. Units scheduled for subsequent echelons were not assign­ed prior to 90 days of departure. Certain units stationed inthe South Pacific Area, though assigned to Tenth Army, wereattached to SPBC until departure*

b. In accordance with a request from the Tenth Army,the AAF combat and service units to be employed in the opera­tion were attached to the Tenth Army.

c. Combat units assigned to the Tenth Army for thisoperation are listed below:

Headquarters, Tenth ArmyHeadquarters Company, Tenth ArmyHeadquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special

troops, Tenth Army and MedicsHeadquarters and Headquarters Company, XXIV Army

CorpsMilitary Police Platoon, XXIV Army CorpsHeadquarters and Headquarters Battery, XXIV Army

Corps Artillery7th Infantry Division27th Infantry Division77thInfantry Division96th Infantry DivisionHeadquarters and Headquarters Company, 20th

Armored Group763d Tank Battalion

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711th Tank Battalio706th Tank Battalion713th Tank Battalion193d Tank Battalion708th Amphibian Tank Battalion776th Amphibian Tank Battalion780th Amphibian Tank Battalion715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion734th Amphibian Tractor Battalion536th Amphibian Tractor Battalion726th Amphibian Tractor Battalion718th Amphibian Tractor Battalion720th Amphibian Tractor Battalion728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion788th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CinCPac did not approve the movement of the 320th BarrageBalloon Battalion to Okinawa because it would Interfere withair operation.

2. Statistical control. The large number of units sched­uled for the Okinawa operation necessitated a system of recordsthat would provide accurate and readily available informationon the status of each unit to be employed. Accordingly, theG-3 statistical sub-section augmented its records system witha separate, comprehensive file covering the projection, assign­ment and attachment, location, strength, and echelon of depart­ure of all units employed with the Tenth Army. Pertinent In­formation was extracted from every possible source. The insti­tution of this "up-to-the-minute" record proved invaluable inthe clarification of conflicting directives.

3. Army garrison force organization-

a. Many units scheduled for garrison force duty werealso required by the Tenth Army for operational requirements.It was therefore deemed advisable that all garrison force units,including AGF headquarters and headquarters company, be assign­ed to the Tenth Army for further assignment to garrison forcesas required. G^3 submitted recommendations which were includedin a "Guide to the Organization of a Garrison Force" preparedand published by a board of officers at HUSAFPOA in order tofacilitate the organization of garrison force headquarters andstaffs for this and future operations.

b. Upon initiation of plans to activate an AGF atOkinawa, USAFPOA G-3 submitted recommendations as to the per­sonnel requirements for the G-3 section, Headquarters and Head­quarters Company, AGF, Okinawa. A general order was published,organizing and assigning this AGF to the Tenth Army, effective13 December 1944. Subsequently, Gw3 received the proposed base

development plan for Okinawa and recommended appropriatechanges thereto.

c. The Ie Shima AGF was activated on 24 January 1945and assigned to Tenth Army, which in turn reassigned it toAGF, Okinawa. On request of USAFPOA G-l, G-3 submitted itsrecommendations relative to the personnel requirements for theG-3 section, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, AGF, IeShima. Upon receipt of the directive for the base develop­ment plan for Ie Shima, USAFPOA G-3 also submitted additionalinformation to be included therein. Initially under CG, 77thDivision, the command of Ie Shima changed to IsCom Ie Shima,under IsCom Okinawa on 26 April 1945. CG, AGF, Ie Shima,requested that he be granted authority to designate a liaisonofficer to deal directly with HUSAFPOA. CG, AGF, Okinawa, andCG, Tentti Army, approved the request. USAFPOA G-3 recommendedapproval.

d. Army garrison forces, Mlyako Jlma and Kikai Jima,were organized on 14 March 1945 to garrison bases scheduledfor capture by the Tenth Army. Changes in operation plans inaid-February caused these two AGF's to be diverted to othermissions.

C. TRAINING.

1. General.

a. Generalized training requirements relative to theOkinawa operation were delineated in a letter of instructionsto the Commanding General, Tenth Army.

b. All ephelons were directed at an early date tomaintain those units potentially liable for commitment insupport of the Okinawa operation at an operational strengthand status of training to permit deployment forward on shortnotice.

c. After approval by War Department of a policy ofattaching overstrength, unassigned officers to combat units(1 lieutenant per Infantry company, 1 lieutenant per combatsupport battalion), G-3 stressed the implementation of thepolicy on the contention that It represented the most val­uable system devised to maintain satisfactorily trained re­placements under control of organizational commanders.

d. General training requirements for replacementswere established and published in a training memorandum.Theater training for replacements included a requirement forattendance at unit Jungle training centers, either on Oahuor Saipan.

e. A special training program for signal personnel

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was prepared in order to'provide replacement specialists.

f. Improvements were made In the processing of unitstatus of training reports in order to furnish garrison forcecommanders with desired information on their new units,

g. A memorandum was published which outlined trainingrequirements for medical units scheduled for assignment to theTenth Army. Water discipline, malaria control, and precautionsagainst disease were stressed,

h. A centralized training aid library was establishedin the Hawaiian area.

i. The use of Japanese materiel was stressed for thetraining of all units scheduled for the Okinawa operation.

j. Assignment of key personnel to the Okinawa garrisonforce received prime consideration.

2. Amphibious training.

a. Arrangements were made for Naval and air supportin amphibious rehearsals staged by Tenth Army troops prior totheir departure for the target.

b. Instruction teams from the War Department werescheduled to assist in training appropriate units of the TenthArmy in the use of the M-29 cargo carriers, A special schoolwas established on Oahu.

c. Information was obtained from the War Departmentrelative to the handling of heavy field artillery in amphibiousoperations. A War Department team provided instruction in theuse of moving artillery materiel over soft ground.

d. Assistance was given in training personnel in theproper employment of the 4.2 inch mortar gun boats.

3. Training for land operations.

a. All units and replacements received training atunit Jungle training centers on Oahu, Saipan, or bases in theSouth Pacific.

b. Assistance was given the G--2 of the Tenth Army inlisting special equipment for use in training programs forreconnaissance forces.

c. On request of the Tenth Army, amphibian tank bat­talions were required to stress field artillery firing practices,

conjunction with the USAFPOA signal officer,training was sponsored in radio communications and anti-Jamming measures*

e. A program of night vision training and testingwas sponsored,

f. To assist in the training of combat engineertroops with respect to the neutralization of Japanese aerialbombs and artillery shells used as land mines, CP8G head­quarters was directed to prepare a manual on the subjectof Instruction presented at the CPBC mine jchool.

g. A special training program was established topromote training of ground radar personnel.

h. Training in the operation of the Mark I AAmachine gun trainer was provided Tenth Army personnel.

i» Assistance was rendered in obtaining and train­ing war dogs, including those used in mine detecting.

J. A school was established for instruction inthe use of VT fuzes.

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C Q S F 1

PART 1 ­

SECTION IV - (3-4). INCLUDINS EXCHANGE OFFICER AND FISCALOFFICER. : ~~^~: ' ~

A. PREPARATION.

1. Planning.

a. The Joint staff study Iceberg prepared by JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) 024/8 and CinCPOA, was the basis of plan­ning for the Okinawa operation.

b. Prior to the decision to seize Okinawa, an assaulthad been planned against the island of Formosa. The groundworklaid in preparation for this campaign was used as a basis forplanning the Okinawa operation.

c. Decisions as to supply levels to be shipped withthe assault forces and supply levels to be maintained at theobjective were reached by Joint staff study.

d. All policies affecting the Army, Navy, and Marineswere implemented by interstaff planning and coordination be­tween related staff sections.

e. The USAFPOA GU4 section coordinated all logisticalplanning with other staff sections of HUSAFPOA as well as withCinCPao, CinCPOA, and the Tenth Army. The principal matterscovered in the planning phase were:

(1) Determination of troop requirements as anti­cipated by HUSAFPOA.

(2) Review of troop requirements recommended bythe Tenth Army for submission to CinCPOA forapproval.

(3) Conference with the Tenth Army and ComPhibPacon preferred and alternate tactical plans.

(4) Preparation of operational projects for fur­nishing rehabilitation and resupply require­ments.

(5) Assistance in the issue of packaging materieland equipment to units mounting for the oper­ation.

(6) Check and review of operational plans.

(7) Determination, in conjunction with CinCPOAand the Tenth Army of the assignment of units

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to assault and garrison echelons, and effec­ting necessary changes.

(8) Coordination with CinCPOA as to plans con­cerning maintenance shipments for support ofthe operation.

(9) Planning changes or revisions to the CinCPOAbase development plan in conjunction withother USAFPOA staff sections.

(10) Determination of amount of necessary rationsfor supply planning, and transmission of sameto proper agencies.

(11) Promulgation and preparation of the admini­strative order published for ComG-enPOA.

(12) Coordination of the shipment of housing mate­rials and refrigeration units to insure thatno one service or organization would receivepriority for construction.

(13) Revision of supplements to base developmentand operational projects for the Okinawa op­eration.

(14) Preparation of movement orders and speciallists of equipment for troops shipped fromthe continental United States, in coordina­tion with the War Department and the TenthArmy.

(15) Coordination of redeployment plans with theWar Department and the European and Mediter­ranean Theaters of Operation to insure thattroops directly redeployed would arrivefully equipped and properly trained.

f. &-4 supervised and coordinated the preparation ofrequirements for base facilities as prescribed by CinCPOA. Therequirements of the USAFPOA staff sections were reviewed andconsolidated by the USAFPOA G-4 and engineer sections. Thetechnical planning for airfields and base facilities was accom­plished by the USAFPOA engineer and coordinated with the Cin-CPOA and Tenth Army staffs.

2. Organization. The requirements for service units forthis operation were based on directives prepared by CinCPOA.Due to the magnitude of phase I of the Okinawa operation, therewas a definite shortage of service units. The War Departmentmade available as many of the required units as possible that

could be staged in time to meet shipment dates. The balanceof required service units was secured from existing install­ations in the Hawaiian group and their functions were takenover by combat troops not yet committed to an operation.

3. Supply an&. .equipment.

a. The USAFPOA G-4 maintained close liaison withComGenFMFPac, ComServPac, ComAirPac, and ComGenTen in order tocoordinate initial supply for units mounted in the PacificOcean Areas, and the resupply of all personnel and organiza­tions at the target. Furthermore, as the XXIV Corps wasmounting out from Leyte, it was necessary to coordinate logis­tical activities with G-4 representatives of CinCSWPA.

b. Four principal problems confronted the XXIV Corpsin the preparatory phase of the operation.

(1) Clarification and delineation as to what ser­vice and AA units were to be released to XXlVCorps and what units were to be turned overto SWPA.

(2) Early relief of all corps units from SWPAduties in order to initiate rehabilitation,overhaul of equipment, and planning.

(3) The unloading, sorting, and issue of suppliesand reequipment to prepare troops for em­barkation.

(4) The filling by SWPA agencies of the 30-daylevel of classes I, II, III, and IV suppliesplus five POA units of fire as directed byCinCPOA.

c. As in previous campaigns, tables of equipment andtables of allowances for units scheduled for the operation wereeither revised or newly prepared. This was accomplished withthe assistance of the Tenth Army, CPBC, and associated staffsof HUSAFPOA. Wherever possible, the supplies and equipmentrequired to fill the needs of the forces were either obtainedfrom theater stocks or were fabricated or purchased. Suppliesand equipment that could not be obtained from resources withinthe theater were requisitioned from the continental UnitedStates. .

d. Due to the magnitude of the operation, it was ne­cessary to build up and maintain emergency reserve stocks Inareas as close to the objective as possible. ComGen USAFPOAwas assigned the mission of establishing an emergency reserveof supplies at Salpan by 15 February 1945. The amount of

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supplies stocked on Saipan for this purpose is shown in Adden­dum No. 1 to this section.

e. The initial supplies and'equipment for the TenthArmy garrison force exchange and finance section were requi­sitioned from CPBC.

4. Training. The status of training for all service unitsscheduled for the operation was reviewed and deficiencies cor­rected.

*>* Orders. The USAFPOA G-4 section prepared and issuedan administrative order to the Tenth Army on procedures ofsupply, evacuation, construction, and administration. In addi­tion, the G-4 section submitted material for inclusion in theLetter of Instructions (LOI) prepared by the G-5 section andIssued to ComG-enTen.

6. Loading and embarkation. The Tenth Army was responsi­ble for the loading and embarkation of its units mounting forthe operation. Arrangements were concluded whereby the TenthArmy provided a rear detachment which would continue to super­vise the mounting of units and continue to submit tonnage re­quirements to USAFPOA G-4 after departure of Tenth Army head­quarters. The USAFPOA G-4 section rendered such assistanceas was necessary in order to Insure the uninterrupted progressof the loading operation. This assistance Included coordi­nating activities between the various services and Tenth Army,and furnishing supplies and vehicles to move from bivouacareas to the docks.

B. SUPPORT.

1. General-.

a. In furnishing the required support for this opera­tion, a major function of the USAFPOA G-4 section was thepreparation of operational projects for submission to the WarDepartment for the purpose of procuring supplies and equipmentfor troops and base development. The projects submitted bythe USAFPOA &-4 section included CP-33, CP-80, and CP-83.Operational project CP-33 originally designed to procure equip­ment and supplies for the Formosan operation was subsequentlyamended by OP 33-A to meet the changed requirements of phaseI of the Okinawa operation. Project CP-80 was prepared torehabilitate organizational equipment in excess of tables ofequipment for troops scheduled to participate in phase I andin later phases. Project CP-83 covered base development re­quirements for phases II and III except for certain signal re­quirements.

b. Prior to submission of the projects to the War De­partment, requirements were carefully reviewed by the USAFPOA

section. Requests from ComG-enTen were screened, and thefollowing factors were taken into consideration:

(1) Participation in phase I of five reinforcedinfantry divisions.

(2) Losses to be sustained by these divisionsover a period of 90 days during phase I.(These losses were computed on the basis ofWar Department replacement factors for eachitem, except where experience indicated thatgreater or lesser losses could be expectedfor a particular item, or where no War De­partment factor for the item existed.)

c. Certain material was included in projects CP-33and CP-30 which was considered essential to the conduct of theoperation but was not believed to be appropriate for inclusionIn the base development project. No losses of equipment speci­fied by T/0 and E were included in project CP-80, since sepa­rate action was contemplated to meet these losses.

2. Services. The supervision and functioning of the ex­change, fiBcal, and other services in the newly captured areaswas a function of the Tenth Army. The USAFPOA 0-4 providedthe required supplies and equipment.

3. Resupply.

a. The efficient functioning of the resupply andemergency replacement supply program was due primarily to theclose cooperation with the War Department, SFPE, CinCPOA, andthe Tenth Army.

b. The basic plan outlined the imperative need for acomplete resupply at or near the target. To fill this need,resupply shipments were computed and submitted to the War De­partment for approval. At first a major portion of the ship­ments as submitted was disapproved because of a criticalshortage of most of the items requested. However, when theWar Department was subsequently informed that unless equipmentwas furnished immediately the operation would be seriouslyJeopardized, it transferred materiel scheduled for shipment tothe ETO to the Pacific theater for use in the Okinawa opera­tion.

4. Evacuation. The USAFPOA 0-4 assisted in the prepara­tion of the plan which provided for evacuation by air and waterfrom the target area to Guam, Saipan, and Oahu, and from Oahuto the continental United States if necessary. Where prac­ticable, air evacuation was utilized to the greatest extent,with stopovers made at Guam or Saipan, Kwajalein, and Oahu.

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5. Gom(8OTFen'*Blwgl!isdhargeddc&iarge wit!?4Salvage. witKfThe responsi­bility for the salvage and repair of equipment at the target.However, the policies pertaining to salvage, repair, and re­issue of materiel and equipment were prepared by the USAFPOA<x-4 section in conforraance with standing procedure prescribedby the War Department. Provision was made to include salvagecollecting units in the early echelons. As a result, muchmateriel was saved that might otherwise have become valuelessor lost to the service.

C. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Equipment shortages. There was a definite shortageof bulldozers and cargo handling and beach lighting equipment.In operations of a major scale in which large tonnages mustbe handled not only for the support of the combat phase butalso for intensive base development, it is absolutely essen­tial that engineer equipment be given a liberal basis of issue.

2. Amount of equipment issued. Experience has shown thata soldier will not carry equipment for which he has no apparentneed. It is much better to prescribe only a minimum to becarried and bring in the remainder under control of appropriatesupply services to be Issued as needed.

3. Rations. The inclusion of bread components and fruitJuices in the ration did much for the morale of the troops.The new rtCH ration with some 12 to 15 different meat dishesproved very acceptable by all units and indicated the impor­tance of variety in emergency type rations.

4. Ammunition. There was a critical shortage of artilleryammunition in this operation. Due to the type of oppositionencountered, more artillery ammunition was required than smallarms ammunition. It has been suggested that resupply ship­ments be adequate to prevent future shortages.

5. Losses. Accurate and timely reports of losses ofequipment and supplies must be submitted, as these are essen­tial for the preparation of the Materiel Status Report andother reports required by the War Department. In the future,all units will be directed to submit a summary report of lossesof critical items of equipment by letter, or by radio dispatchwhere long lines of communication require such action.

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EMERGENCY RESERVE

(1) Class I - 30-days' supply for 200,000 men.

(2) Classes II and IV (less construction and aviationmaterial) - 30-days1 supply for the followingArmy units:

Unit Number

Division 4 8" or 240mm Howitzer battalion 1 Medium tank battalion 2 JASCOS 2 Medical battalion 2 AM gun battalion (motorized) 1 AAA gun battalion (SU) 2 AAA AW battalion (SM) 2 155mm CA gun battalion (SM) 2 155mm gun battalion 2 155mm Howitzer battalion 2

(3) Class III (less aviation) - 30-days1 supply drummedproducts for ground force of 100,000 men.

(4) Class III (aviation) - 1,000,000 gallons Avgas andrelated lubes in drums.

(5) Class V - 15 U/F for one Army division20 U/F for one 155mm gun battalion15 U/F for one 155mm howitzer battalion5 U/F for one tank battalion (Army)15 U/F for one AAA battalion (Army)

Addendum No. 1 toSECTION IV, PART 1

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PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION V - LONG RANGE PLANNING AND LOGISTICS FOR OKINAWAOPERATION?

A. PLANNING,

1. Mission. The mission of the USAFPOA G-5 was to imple­ment the war plans directed by the War Department and CinCPOAand to coordinate and assist in all logistical planning for thescheduled operations.

2. Preliminary planning.

a« The preliminary warning order for the Okinawa op­eration was received in October 1944 and tentatively indicat­ed the troops, target dates, and objectives for the operation.The general concept of the operation was outlined in CinCPOAJoint Staff Study Okinawa, Serial 000131, dated 25 October 1944,covering phases I and II, and CinCPOA Joint Staff Study OkinawaSerial 0005625, dated 22 April 1945, covering phase III.

b. Phase I of the operation was directed againstOkinawa with the objective of establishing air and sea basesfrom which subsequent operations could be mounted. The assaultforces for this operation were to consist of the Tenth Armywith the XXIV Army Corps and the III Amphibious Corps (Marine).The 27th Infantry Division was designated as area reserve.Upon completion of the assault phase of the operation, garrisonforces consisting of the following units were to remain onOkinawa:

Two infantry divisionsNine AAA gun battalionsSeven AAA AW battalionsTwo AAA searchlight battalionsThree 155mm coast artillery gun battalionsNecessary service and supporting troopsFour Marine fighter groupsTwo Marine night fighter squadronsTwo Marine torpedo bomber squadronsTwo Navy heavy bomber squadronsTwo Army medium bomber squadronsTwo Army heavy bomber squadronsOne Army fighter group

c. Phase II, directed against Ie Shima, was to belaunched not later than 30 days after the initial assault onOkinawa. The assault"force established for this operationwa& one reinforced Army division to be designated from assaultforces previously made available to Tenth Army. The island wasto be developed as a major air base, and garrisoned by one re­

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gimental combat team, two AAA gun %£^eft$m&*,&&MB AAA AW bat­talions, and one AAA searchlight battery plus one platoon.Four airfields were planned for construction to accommodatefour very long range (VLR) bomber groups and two fighter groups.

d. Phase III of the campaign was sub-divided intofive separate operations:

(1) The first operation (Ilia) called for theoccupation of Okina Daito. This small is­land to the east of Okinawa was to be es­tablished as a LORAN station.

(2) The objective of the second operation (Illb)was the capture of Kume, which was to beestablished as an airfield for two (VLR)bomber wings.

(3) The third operation (IIIc) had for its ob­jective the capture of Miyako and its develop­ment as an additional air base and southernoutpost of Okinawa. A Marine corps of threedivisions was designated as the assault forcefor this operation. One Marine division wasto remain in garrison until relieved by a re­deployed Army division. The balance of thegarrison force was to consist of four AAAgun battalions, four AAA AW battalions, andthree 155mm coast artillery gun battalions.The air force garrison was to include twoMarine fighter groups, one night fightersqua4ron (Marine), one navy torpedo bombersquadron, and two very heavy bomber wings(Army).

(4) In operation (Hid) forces were to seize Ki­kai Jima which was necessary as an additionalair base and northern outpost for Okinawa.The assault force was to consist of one re­inforced Army division; the garrison force:one division, two AAA gun battalions, threeAAA AW battalions, and two 155mm coast artil­lery gun battalions. The air force garrison•was to comprise four fighter groups, two nightfighter squadrons, and one Navy torpedo bom­ber squadron.

(5) The fifth and final operation (Hie) calledfor the capture of Tokuno with an assaultforce of one reinforced infantry division.The purpose of this operation was to estab­lish additional airfields to the north ofOkinawa for Naval air units.

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M „, ** < h.

B. ORGANIZATION.

1. Designation of troops.

a. A preliminary troop list for the Okinawa opera­tion was prepared by the Tenth Army and forwarded to HUSAFPOAand CinCPOA for comments preparatory to publishing a finaltroop list for phase I. A total of 384,793 troops was indi­cated as necessary, and shortages were requisitioned from theWar Department. It was assumed that the XXIV Corps and theLeyte Army garrison force, then under operational control ofCinCSWPA, would be released for employment against Okinawa.CinCPOA was advised by HUSAFPOA of the Okinawa requirementsand shortages.

b. The USAFPOA G~5 summarized the current troop basisand indicated the following to Tenth Army:

(1) Those units available from thester sources.

(2) Those units which would require improvisation.

(3) The maximum troop lift currently allotted toCinCPOA.

(4) The maximum number of troops consideredessential to the success of the operation.

(5) Methods to be used in assigning and attach­ing units to the Tenth Army.

c. Inter-headquarters staff conferences were heldand minor changes were made to establish a final troop list.

d. On the basis of this final troop list, Army andNavy commanders concerned were directed to submit by 8 December1944 the specific designation of units to be employed in theoperation. By this same dispatch the Commanding General, IIIAmphibious Corps (Marine), and the Commanding General, XXIVCorps (Army), were directed to report to ComGenTen for plan­ning purposes.

e. Based on recommendations received from general andspecial staff sections, ComGenPOA published Designation ofArmy Units for the Okinawa Operation, Phase T, dated 8 January194&. This troop list indicated unit designations where known,table of organization, number of troops required, number avail­able, present location, and shortages for both Army air andground foroe units.

f. One of G-5's principal functions in the operationwas the coordination of units available for the operation with

the shipping necessary to lift the units. Troop lists were lieptcurrent by repeated modifications.

g. Early estimates of service troop requirements wererevised to provide for the additional needs of VLR aircraft onOkinawa and adjacent bases. This reviewing process was con­tinuous, each change requiring a further change in troops andin the procurement thereof,

2. Procurement of troops*

a. As the first step tov/ards providing the maximumnumber of supporting troops for the operation, HUSAFPOA direc­ted CPBC to make a survey of units in its command and deter­mine which units could be released to the Tenth Army.

b. By agreement between ClnCSWPA and ClnCPOA, the XXIVCorps and the Army garrison force which had been prepared forthe operation against Yap had been placed under the operationalcontrol of the former for participation in the Leyte operation.It was understood by ComG-enPOA that the entire XXIV Corps andall elements of the Leyte Army garrison force except certaintroops which had been intended for permanent garrison at theoriginal target would revert to POA control in time for theOkinawa operation. In mid-January 1945, however, it became ap­parent to HUSAFPOA, and was immediately brought to the atten­tion of CinCPOA, that the XXIV Corps would not be released byCinCSWPA in sufficient time to prepare properly for its employ­ment in the Okinawa operation. It was also pointed out thatthe majority of the troops in the Leyte garrison force countedupon to meet a large portion of the requirement for garrisontroops in Okinawa, would be retained by CinCSWPA for contin­ued employment in the Philippines. Representatives of HUSAFPOAand ClnCPOA proceeded to Leyte where conferences were held withCinCSWPA to discuss the'se problems. As a result of these con­ferences ComGenPOA was able to obtain an early release of theentire XXIV Corps, together with those elements of the LeyteArmy garrison force scheduled for employment in Okinawa,

c. A warning order to initiate preparation of phaseII (Ie Shima) was received from CinCPOA in January 1945. Atotal of 37,549 troops, consisting of one reinforced infantrydivision augmented by necessary service and construction unitswas allotted to phase II. Although separate troop lists wereprepared for Okinawa and Ie Shlma, later developments indica­ted that adherence to these troop lists was impracticable sinceconsiderable transshipment between the two islands was neces­sary to meet the changing requirements of both phases.

d. During the month of January 1945, phases Ilia (Oki­no Daito) and Illb (Kume) were postponed indefinitely. PhaseIII c (Miyako Jlma) was postponed indefinitely in April

, Phase H i e (Tokuno Shi ma) In May 1945, and Phase H i d(Kikai Jima) in June 1945. Troop resources previouslyallotted to phases IIIo and H i d of the operation were madeavailable for employment at Okinawa. CinCPOA screened thesetroop resources and indicated which units could be divertedto Okinawa. The Tenth Army had requested that all unitsavailable for the operation be moved to Okinawa as soon aspracticable.

e. Because of the stepped-up program for the devel­opment of Okinawa as a major VLR air base, there existed byMarch 1945 a shortage of 26,000 troops. To meet this short­age, the War Department made plans for the redeployment oftroops from Europe. A board of officers from the OperationPlanning Division, War Department, was sent to this theaterto plan for the employment of these troops. On the basis ofthe high priority of the Okinawa development and the urgentneed for service troops, 26,000 troops of the first 100,000scheduled for redeployment from Europe were allocated by theWar Department for employment at Okinawa. Most of thesetroops were to move by direct redeployment from Europe tothe Ryukyus.

3. Command relat\<•>"fft*p- Command relationship for theOkinawa operation was determined by CinCPOA. For the firsttime in the Pacific, a field Army was utilized for the cap­ture of an objective. This Army was to be engaged for aconsiderable period in an assault against a major enemybase. Initially, the operation was under the over-all com­mand of Commander Fifth Fleet. After the completion of theamphibian phase, the Commander Fifth Fleet was to passcommand of all shore forces to ComGenTen. ComGenTen was tocommand all the forces assigned to the Ryukyus, and wascharged with responsibility for base development, the defenseof the island positions, and the defense of the sea areawithin 25 miles. His command was to incorporate such shore-based tactioal air forces and looal defense forces as mightbe assigned thereto for operational control* The Navalforces assigned to the defense of the Ryukyus area was com­manded by a flag officer of the Navy, who in turn was opera­tionally responsible to ComGenTen. CinCPOA further speci­fied an Army general offioer as the Okinawa island commanderand a Marine general offioer as the tactical air force com­mander in the Ryukyus. An Army general officer was desig­nated as the i8land commander of IeSShima.

C. BASE DEVELOPMENT.

1. Planning, In planning for rapid base development,three general factors were taken into consideration: (1) avail­

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ability, of men and materiel, (2) availability of shipping,and (3) physical ability of the target area to accept avail­able men and materiel, more specifically expressed in terms ofbeach capacity and availability of suitable areas for develop­ment. Complementary to the base development plan was the eche­lon schedule published by CinGPac, which assigned men and mater­iel of all the participating services into certain arrival orlanding periods measured by periods of time. These periodswere 10 days in length. Each echelon, as this time period waiknown, contained maximum amount of personnel and tonnage whic]could be accomodated by the beach capacity.

2. Staff Implementation.

a. Actual staff implementation of the base develop­ment plan was initiated upon receipt from CinCPac of the basedevelopment directive. This directive distributed among theparticipating services specific responsibilities for the accoiplishmeht of base development, provided the basis for the re­quisition of materiel, and called for a detailed review of gairison troop requirements. In accordance with this directive,a schedule of men and material to fulfill the assigned respon­sibilities together with a proposal for that portion of the btdevelopment plan for which HUSAFPOA was responsible was sub­mitted to CinCPOA.

b. CinCPOA consolidated the information submittedby the participating agencies in the final base developmentplan which contained policies governing construction and out­lined procedures for development. This plan required constanireview and revision because of changes in beach capacity, ava!ability of suitable areas, and availability of troops and mat<

c. ComG-enTen was charged with (1) preparation of thedetailed Army portion of the base development plan, (2) prepa]tion of the recommended schedules for the first 12 echelons,and (3) coordination of all assault shipping.

d. On 27 December 1944, ComGenTen submitted the de­tailed base development plan to ComG-enPOA, After review byHUSAFPOA, CinCPOA was informed of recommended adjustments.These adjustments, together with others which were submittedfrom time to time, were incorporated into the base develop­ment plan by CinCPOA. The responsibility for effecting theseadjustments was vested with the Tenth Army until its departurefor the target, at which time this responsibility was assumedby ComGenPOA.

e. In accordance with the base development directive,the Tenth Army proposed an echelon plan, which was reviewed byHUSAFPOA and forwarded to CinCPOA on 3 January. Frequent adjust­ments of this plan were effected by the Tenth Army until the

4 l<

middle of June when available communication facilities at Oki­nawa could not carry this load. At this time ComG-enPOA assumedresponsibility for revising echelon and shipping schedules.

f. In mid-January 1945, CinCPOA approved a plan fordeployment of VLR forces in the Ryukyus, and the Joints Chiefsof Staff allocated the 316th VHB Wing for this purpose. Onrecommendation of ComGenAAFPOA, this wing was scheduled fordeployment to Ie Shima. Base development recommendations cover­ing the 316th Wing at Ie Shima were forwarded to CinCPOA on 3February, and incorporated into the base development direc­tive. On 9 April 1945, following the initial assault on Oki­nawa, physical reconnaissance of captured terrain and enemy-held areas indicated that the potentive development of Okinawawas greater than previously estimated. As a result, ComG-enTenrecommended relocation of VLR fields from Ie Shima to Okinawa.This was approved in principle 1/ CinCPOA on 12 April, togetherwith certain other air augmentations for Okknawa. On 28 April1945 CinCPOA issued a revised airfield development program forOkinawa which included the deployment of three VLR wings. Inorder that implementation of base development and the intensi­fied air program might be initiated at the earliest possibledate, base development planners met at CinCPOA headquarters on30 April and again on 2 May to discuss the proposed revisions.These revisions were contained in the consolidated base devel­opment plan was initially accomplished by diversion to Okinawaof the resources originally scheduled for the development ofMiyako. This action provided troops and materiel v/hich wouldnot otherwise have been immediately available for the develop­ment of Okinawa. In order that this program might be carriedthrough as expeditiously as possible, CinCPOA deferred certainconstruction not considered immediately essential. Highestpriority of construction was given to air field installations,communications, ship repair facilities, hospital facilitiesand certain water front and storage facilities.

3. Base development plan - Ie Shima. The base develop­ment directive for Ie Shima was published in CinCPac serial0001, dated 1 January 1945. The echelon schedules were deter­mined by HUSAFPOA in cooperation with the Tenth Army. The ini­tial echelon schedule was forwarded to CinCPac on 10 January,and the Army portion of the base development plan 14 January.Initially, development of Ie Shima was aimed at providing addi­tional VLR air fields to augment those planned for Okinav/a.However, when reconnaissance revealed that the potential de­velopment of Okinawa was greater than estimated, plans werechanged to divert all VLR strength to Okinawa, and to developIe Shima for immediate use as a fighter base.

4» Base development plans for later phases. The base de­velopment directives for Okjna Daito, Kume, Miyako, Kikai andTokuno were cancelled before they were put into effect. In

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each case, it was determ3|^|^y reconnaissance that the is­land selected was unsuitable for the mission intended. Aseach operation was cancelled, the resources intended thereforv/ere made available for the developnigfcnt of Okinawa.

D. SUPPORT. The Okinawa garrison forces were assigned the fol­lowing mission:

1. Defense of the area.

2. Air offensive in support of current and future opera­tions.

3. Fleet support for current and future operations.

4. Logistical support for future operations, such as hos—pitalization and accumulation of reserves.

5. Rehabilitation and staging of both assault and gar­rison forces.

6. Regulation of air and water transportation.

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PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION VI - POSTAL OFFICER AND MACHINE RECORDS UNITS.

A/ PREPARATION.

1. Planning.

a. HUSAFPOA was charged with the responsibility ofproviding postal services for all Army units participating inthe Okinawa operation. The plans for these services were for­mulated by the USAFPOA adjutant general's office in conjunc­tion with the Tenth Army. Conferences were held with repre­sentatives of the Naval and Marine forces in order to coordinatepolicies and expedite Joint operations.

b. Plans were made to procure two machine recordsunits for operation with the Tenth*Army.

2, Organization.

a» To provide a distribution point for temporary useat the beachheads, the Navy furnished an LST which was usedprior to the establishment of the Army Post Office ashore.

b. In addition to the organic Army postal units withdivisions, corps, and Army the following units were furnishedfor the operation:

Two type *-U* Army postal units, T/0 and E 12-605Three type ttJ" Army postal units, T/0 and E 12-605One postal regulating section, T/0 and E 12-602One base post office type F, T/0 and E 12-601DB V-mail team, T/0 and E 12-601

c. Fixed credits of $25,000 were allotted to each Armypost office (APO). This credit was shipped with the units andwas made available immediately upon the establishment of theunits ashore.

d. APO 331 (Okinawa) was activated on 5 April 1945with full postal facilities.

e. Five courier officers and five enlisted men wereincluded In the Army garrison force T/0 for the Okinawa oper­ation. Officer courier mail and Navy officer messenger mailwere handled by a Joint Army-Navy installation.

f. The 107th Machine Records Unit type BZH and the18th Machine Records Unit type *X* were procured for assign­ment to the Tenth Army.

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Postal supplies carried by unitsconsisted of all T/0 and E equipment and an additional quantityof supplies to insure against loss.

4. Training, Training of Army postal personnel was super­vised by the U FPOA postal officer and the commanding officerof the 15th Base Post"Office (CPBC). On-the-Job training wasprovided at the 15th Base Post Office and other Army post of­fices on Oahu.

B. SUPPORT.

1. Mail delivery. Mail was delivered to ship-side priorto departure of successive echelons. Thereafter the Navy ef­fected deliveries at Eniwetok, Saipan, and Ulithi, As suc­cessive echelons cleared the rendezvous points, mail was sentdirectly to the target.

2. V-mail processing. Outgoing V-mail was processed bymobile Navy and Marine units on Okinawa, and by Army facilitiesat Saipan and Guam. All incoming V-mail was processed at Oahuand flown to the target area pending establishment of facili­ties at Okinawa. Resupply of postal supplies was furnishedfrom stocks maintained at Saipan.

0. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. Because TenthArmy machine records units were scheduled to arrive at the tar­get in a late echelon, it was necessary, during the earlystages of the operation, to employ machine records units serv­icing other commands. The 136th and 103d Machine Records Unitsassigned to CPBC and the 3d Machine Records Unit assigned tothe Replacement Training Command were designated for this pur­pose. The overload of work and the distances involved, causeda delay in the submission of strength and casualty reports tothe War Department. It has been recommended that in futureoperations, machine records units arrive in an early echelonto insure accurate and timely submission of personnel and cas­ualty reports.

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PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION VII - ARTILLERY

A. PREPARATION.

1. Planning. The USAFPOA artillery officer supervisedthe preparation of the units for the Okinawa operation, in­cluding the assault, the garrison and rehabilitation phases.Necessary assistance was rendered in the determination oftroop requirements, and in the selection and allocation ofspecial equipment for corps, division and garrison forceartillery.

2. Organization.

a. Army field artillery in this operation includedthe XXIV Corps Artillery and the organic field artillery ofthe Army divisions operating under the Tenth Army. The XXIVCorps Artillery consisted of the following units:

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XXIVCorps Artillery

287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion419th Field Artillery Group145th, 198th and 225th Field Artillery Battalions

(155mm howitzer)420th Field Artillery Group

226th, 531st, and 532d Field Artillery Batta­lions (155mm gun) and the 749th Field Artil­lery Battalion (8-lnch howitzer). The 226thField Artillery Battalion (155mm gun) landedlate in May.

The 750th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch how­itzer) was originally scheduled for a laterphase of the Okinawa operation which was can­celled. At the request of the CommandingGeneral, Tenth Army (ComGenTen), it was di­verted to Okinawa, but did not arrive untilthe latter part of June, and therefore wasnot committed to action.

b. Army antiaircraft artillery units in this opera­tion were commanded by the Commanding General, Tenth ArmyAntiaircraft Artillery. For the assault on Kerama Retto andIe Shima, the 93d Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion andthe 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalionwere attached to the 77th Division. For the assault on Oki­nawa, the 97th Antiaircraft Artillery Group was attached tothe XXIV Corps. The units comprising the 97th AntiaircraftArtillery Group were:

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Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 97th Anti­aircraft Artillery Group

502d and 504th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Batta­lions

485th and 86lst Antiaircraft Artillery AutomaticWeapons Battalions, and Battery 0, 86th Anti­aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, BatteryA, and 1st Platoon, Battery C, 230th Antiair­craft Artillery Searchlight Battalion; BatteryA, 295th Antiaircraft Artillery SearchlightBattalion; and Battery 0 (less one platoon),294th Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlight Bat­talion.

c. The Army artillery with the garrison forces con­sisted of both antiaircraft and seacoast artillery units. Allantiaircraft artillery units which participated in the assaulton Okinawa and Ie Shima remained as part of the garrisonforces. Additional antiaircraft artillery units arrived per­iodically throughout April, May, and June in accordance withthe echelon schedule. Some of these units were used to garri­son nearby islands in addition to Okinawa and Ie Shima. The53d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade and the l62d AntiaircraftArtillery Operations Detachment arrived early in April. On20 April all antiaircraft artillery units on Okinawa wereplaced under, the command of the Commanding General, 53d Anti­aircraft Artillery Brigade. By 21 June the following antiair­craft artillery units,"in addition to those listed previously,were occupying tactical positions in the Okinawa Island Group:

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 136thAntiaircraft Artillery Group, and Head­quarters and Headquarters Battery, 137thAntiaircraft Artillery Group

98th, 505th, and 948th Antiaircraft ArtilleryGun Battalions

388th, 779th, 866th (remainder of battalion),and 870th Antiaircraft Artillery AutomaticWeapons Battalions (Semi-mobile); 834thAntiaircraft Artillery Automatic WeaponsBattalion (Self-propelled)

325th Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlight Batta­lion, and Battery A, 250th AntiaircraftArtillery Searchlight Battalion

3. Supply and equipment. Units were authorized equip­ment in accordance with HU3AFP0A operational projects, andwere equipped as follows:

a. Two L-5 aircraft were Issued to the headquartersand headquarters batteri-es of each corps, group, and divisionartillery in lieu of the L-4 craft.

b. One Athey trailer per firing battery was authorizedall divisional and non-divisional field artillery battalions.

c. One D-7 tractor with bulldozer was issued each105mm and 155mm howitzer battery, Qne D-8 tractor with bull­dozer was furnished each 8-inch howitzer battery.

d. The 38th, 179th, and 283d Coast Artillery Batta­lions were equipped with new 155mm guns (M2), prio^ tt mountJLngfrom Uew Caledonia. New radar sets, modified 3CR-584ls, wereissued to the firing units to replace the MK XVI sets. Eightfiring platforms (Ml) per battalion, and tractors with bull­dozers were also issued.

e. Special equipment in excess of T/E wad authorizedthrough special projects..- This equipment included D8 trac­tors with bulldozers on the basis of four per antiaircraftartillery gun battalion and D4 tractors with bulldozers onthe basis of•four per automatic weapons battalion. SCR-300sets for ail types of antiaircraft artillery units, and mis­cellaneous engineer tools and quartermaster equipment werealso issued. Because of the limited availability of thisequipment, it was not possible to make a full issue of allauthorized special equipment to all antiaircraft artilleryunits.

4. Ammunition.

a. The planning for initial supply and resupply ofthe field artillery assault and garrison force was based onexperience gained in previous operations. Units were providedwith a total of five units of fire for mounting. Resupplyfor 105mm howitzers and 155mm howitzers totaled approximately19 units of fire. Resupply for the 155mm gun and 811 howitzertotaled approximately 14 units of fire. This ammunition washeld at the Ulithi regulating station and shipped to targeton call. During the operation, three AKA's loaded with am­munition were sunk with approximately three units of fire forall field artillery units. Of the lost ammunition, approxi­mately 8,809 rounds of 105mm howitzer and 19,560 rounds of155mm howitzer ammunition were cavitized.

b. Seacoast artillery units were provided with atotal of ..five units of fire for mounting.

c. One unit of fire, containing no more than one ortwo lots of ammunition, was included in the loading of eachantiaircraft artillery assault unit. Four units of fire, bulkloaded, were included in the assault shipping of each division,making a total of five units of fire. Garrison antiaircraftartillery units were provided with a total of five units of

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m re

fire for mounting. Resupply of ammunition consisted of mis­cellaneous lots amounting to a total of five units of fire.

d. With minor exceptions, the composition of the POAunits of fire proved to be correct for all artillery weapons.The number of shells composing the unit of fire on Okinawa was:

(1) Field artillery.

105mm howitzer 250155mm howitzer 150155mm gun 1008" howitzer 100

(2) Seaooast artillery.

155mm gun 100Caliber .50 machine gun 600

(3) Antiaircraft artillery.

90mm gun 12540mm gun 2703?mm gun 270Caliber , 50 machine gun 600

5. Training.

a. The units selected for this operation were thosewhich had had previous combat experience on Leyte or thosethat were best prepared from a standpoint of all phases oftraining. During the preparation phase, units mounting fromOahu were assigned to $ke Tenth Army as soon as possible fortraining supervision. Units not on Oahu were trained attheir respective locations.

b. Antiaircraft artillery training under the generalsupervision of the CG-, Tenth Army Antiaircraft Artillery, in­cluded the following: '

Amphibious exercisesField exercisesVisual and radar gun firing at sleeve and radio-

controlled (PQ-14) targetsField artillery firingSeacoast artillery firingAutomatic weapons firing at sleeve and radio-

controlled (0Q-2A) targetsRefresher training in all basic and antiaircraft

subjects

c. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 144th CoastArtillery Group, was assigned to the Tenth Army and underwent

four weeks of intensive training on Oahu. The unit then movedto New Caledonia where its three coast artillery battalions,the 38th, 179th, and 282d were stationed, and continued train­ing there.

d. Training of the 749th and 750th Field ArtilleryBattalions on.Oahu, under the CG, IX Corps Artillery, in­cluded the following:

Service practice, including high angle fireSpecialized training for fire direction center

personnelTechnique of fire adjustment for forward observersRefresher training in basic and field artillery

subjectsCommand post exercises for communication personnel

e. The 388th Automatic Weapons Battalion and the421st Field Artillery (rocket) Battalion were trained in thecontinental United States and shipped directly to the target.

f. Battery A, 250th Searchlight Battalion was aSouthwest Pacific Area (SWPA) unit, and was trained under thesupervision of the 14th Antiaircraft Artillery Command.

g. Training of the 97th Antiaircraft Artillery Groupwas supervised by the XXIV Corps.

h. All field artillery units except the 421st, 794th,and 750th Field Artillery Battalions had participated in theSaipan and Leyte operations. Their training was supervisedby the XXIV Corps Artillery.

i. The USAFPOA artillery officer maintained super­visory contact with all training programs, and close liaisonwith Naval, air corps, and artillery commanders to coordinateplans in preparation for the assault.

B. SUPPORT.

1. Brodle ground device. During the course of the oper­ation, arrangements were made to ship a Brodie ground deviceto the Tenth Army, to arrive at Okinawa in August 1945. (TheBrodie ground device is a training aid for artillery pilotsto enable them to operate from the Brodie sea device rigged onan LST or similar vessel.)

2. Replacement tubes. Approximately 34 replacement tubesfor 105mm howitzers were shipped from Oahu on 24 May 1945 forunits of the Tenth Army. Remaining replacement tubes for 105mmhowitzers, 155mm howitzers, 155mm guns, and 8-inch howitzerswere shipped from the west coast of continental United States

f J u n e a n d J u l y

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3. Ordnance specialists. Ordnance specialists on modi­fication of 155mm howitzer recoil mechanisms (MWO C-39-W-11),arrived on Okinawa on 18 May 1945. Eighty-nine modificationswere effected for Army units and 27 modifications were madefor Marine Corps units.

4. Brodie LST. The Brodie LST 776, carrying liaisonplanes, was sent to the Tenth Army for experimental purposesduring the initial phases of the amphibious operation. Itmade possible the entry of liaison planes into action beforethe landing strips were available on shore.

5. 155mm guns, self-propelled* Because of the type ofterrain and the cave warfare technique used by the Japaneseon Okinawa, the need arose for self-propelled 155mm guns.Arrangements were made during the operation to ship twelve155mm gun motor carriages (M40), 12 tractors, highspeed (M4),12 trailers, ammunition (M23), and all necessary spare partsand tools to the Tenth Army.

C. REPLACEMENTS. Replacements for artillery personnel wereobtained through established channels. Initial replacementswere furnished by the 74th Replacement Battalion, which ar­rived at Okinawa on L plus 12. As the operation progressed,additional personnel was sent to Okinawa from the 23d Replace­ment Depot, which had been established at Saipan.

D. REHABILITATION.

1. Field artillery.

a. The plan for rehabilitation of field artilleryunits giving locations was as follows:

7th Infantry Division Artillery - - - Okinawa27th Infantry Division Artillery - - Okinawa77th Infantry Division Artillery Cebu96th Infantry Division Artillery - - Mindoro531st Field Artillery Battalion - - - Luzon

b. All other field artillery units were scheduled torehabilitate on Okinawa.

2. Antiaircraft and seacoast artillery. All seacoast andantiaircraft artillery units were scheduled to rehabilitate onOkinawa as part of the garrison forces.

E; LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.1* Liaison planes. The value of liaison planes in pro­

viding observation was again proved in this operation. L-5liaison planes were issued to the headquarters batteries of

artillery, field #*fb|llery groups, and division artil­lery. Field ar till ery^simal ions were equipped throughout withL-4 planes. Due to greater speed, longer range, and betterstability of the L-5 as compared with the L-4, field artillerybattalions should be equipped with the former.

2. M5 tractors. It was found that the M5 high-speedtractor is a more satisfactory prime mover for divisional105mm howitzer battalions than the 2^-ton truck. Authorityhas been requested for the conversion of divisional 105mmhowitzer battalions in this theater from truck-drawn to trac­tor-drawn.

3. Bulldozer-tractor. The D-7, D-8, and D-4 bulldozerequipped tractors proved indispensable throughout the opera­tion. They were used for prime movers, building up ammunitionrevetments, emplacing howitzers and antiaircraft weapons,constructing roads, and building landing strips for liaisonplanes.

4. Heavy artillery. Combat action against the Japanesecave defenses indicated that the proportion of heavy artil­lery should be increased. Light artillery weapons were foundto be inadequate for the destruction of caves.

5# Brodie sea device. The value of the Brodie sea devicefor launching and landing of liaison planes prior to the con­struction of landing strips ashore was proved in this opera­tion. Its use in future operations has been recommended.

6* Sandbags. The quantity of sandbags furnished antiair­craft artillery units for field fortifications was inadequatethroughout the operation. Plans for future operations willprovide for a substantial increase in the number of -sandbagsto accompany both assault and garrison antiaircraft artilleryunits. Provision will also be made for resupply beginningwith L plus 60 days.

7» Fungi-proofing. Difficulties were experienced withelectrical appara^saue to incomplete waterproofing and fungi-proofing. Many radar sets not adequately prepared were non-operative for unnecessarily long periods. More complete water­proofing and fungi-proofing will be stressed in future opera­tions.

8. Smoke shells. A need exists for a smoke shell forantiaircraft artillery gun units when firing ground supportmissions. The spotting of standard bursts is difficult andcauses delay in the adjustment of fire. For future opera­tions, It is planned to provide smoke shells to antiaircraftartillery gun units for this purpose.

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U

H

!>, ' f

I* /

0

PART 1 - USAFPOA

SECTION YIP- CHAPLAIN.

A. PREPARATION.

1. Planning. The USAFPOA chaplain supervised selection,training, and equipping of lower echelon chaplains for theOkinawa operation.

2. Organization.

a. Four experienced chaplains were assigned to theOkinawa garrison force headquarters. T/0 vacancies in otherunits were filled to the appropriate chaplain strength.

b. When necessary, chaplains were exchanged betweenechelons in order to conform with denominational needs.Limited service chaplains were exchanged for those physicallyqualified.

3. Supply and equipment.

a. Supply activities were handled by the CPBC chap­lain as directed by HUSAFPOA.

(1) One public address system was provided forthe Okinawa garrison force chaplain's sec­tion, and one for the Ie Shima garrisonforce chaplain's section.

(2) Expendable religious supplies such as altars,breads and wine, grape Juice, rosaries,me'dals, devotional literature, etc., wereprovided each chaplain for use on board shipand during the initial stages of the oper­ation.

(3) Portable altar and communion sets and othernon-expendable articles of chapel equipmentwere furnished organizations for issue toIndividual chaplains on request.

b. Arrangements for resupply were made by the garri­son force chaplains.

4. Training. The USAFPOA chaplain, assisted by chaplainswith battle experience, supervised all training activities.Conferences were held on burial and graves registration pro­cedures, first aid, and ministration aboard ship and in thefield. Enlisted assistants were instructed in their duties,and those in key positions received training in correspondence,filing, and the preparation of reports.

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5. Inspections. Tne USAFPOA chaplain inspected all chaplains' supplies and equipment prior to embarkation.

B. SUPPORT,

1. Supplies. Due to unavoidable losses, emergency requisitions were received by HU3AFP0A for essential religious supplies. These were filled by the CPBC chaplain and shipped byair.

2. Replacements. During the Okinawa operation, two chaplains were killed and three wounded in action. Replacementswere received from CPBC and the 13th Replacement Depot.

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