Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos

7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos

1/15

Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian EthosAuthor(s): Elaine FanthamSource: Phoenix, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 262-275Published by: Classical Association of CanadaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1088043.

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2/15

CICERONIAN

CONCILIARE

AND

ARISTOTELIAN

ETHOS

ELAINE FANTHAM

IN

THE SECOND BOOK

of

De OratoreCicero

analyses

the ratiodicendi

n

terms

of

three functions:

1)

ut

probemus

vera

esse,

quae

defendimus;

(2)

ut conciliemus os

nobis,

qui

audiunt;

(3)

ut

animos

eorum,

d

quem-

cumque

ausa

postulabit

motum,

ocemus

2.115).

This

paper

is

concerned

with the

second

of

these

functions s

presentedby

Cicero,

and

with

the

Aristotelian

heory

of

ranrs

..

&&..

.

70r

-00ovs

(Rhet.

1.2.1356 a

5-13)

from

which he

derived this

second

function.'

shall

try

to

explain

the

modifications

icero

made,

his motives

n

makingthem,

and the

diffi-

culties

arising

fromhis choice of

adaptation.

The

theme

of

conciliare

returns

briefly

n 2.121

among

the

VTrexvOL

riLares,

lla

quae

totaab

oratore

ariuntur.

There are tres es

quae

adfidem

faciendam

olae

valent

..

ut et

concilienturnimi

t

doceantur tmoveantur.

These

receive further

omment

n

128:

tres

sunt

res,

ut

ante

dixi:

una

conciliandorum

hominum,

altera

docendorum,

ertia

concitandorum. arum trium

partium prima

lenitatem

orationis,

secunda

acumen,

tertia

vim

desiderat,

am

hoc necesse

st,

ut

s,

qui

nobiscausam

adiudicaturus

it,

aut

inclinatione

voluntatis propendeat in nos aut defensionis rgumentis dducaturaut animi permotione

cogatur.

From

these

ntroductory

emarks

we derive

the dea that

115)

the

urors

must be

won

over

to

us,

the

advocates2

114

has

parenthetically

ncluded

xThe

association

of

conciliare

with

the

Aristotelian

iaortsb,&

70oi

ovs

is

not

made

explicit

in the

literary

and exoteric

De

Oratore,

which

generally

avoids

Greek

terms.

Antonius

acknowledges

his

debt

to

Aristotlefor

he

analysis

of

ogical proof

n

2.160,

but

does

not

repeat

the

acknowledgment

for

the

"ethical" or

emotive

proofs.

Cicero

explicitly

mentions

'0LKbV,

and

gives

ts

motive as ad

benevolentiam

onciliandam

inOrator128: duo sunt enimquae bene ractata b oratore dmirabilem loquentiamfaciant;

quorum

alterum

est

quod

Graeci

1O0LK6V

ocant,

ad

naturas et

mores

et

ad

omnem

vitae

consuetudinem

accommodatum;

alterum

quod

eidem

iraerTLK6b

nominant, uo

pertur-

bantur

animi et

concitantur,

n

quo

uno

regnat

oratio.

llud

superius

come, iucundum,

ad

benevolentiam conciliandam

paratum.

It should

be

noted that if

OLK6V

nd

7ra7erTLK6P

re

here

used

as

nouns,

rather

than

adjectives,

this

is

a

Hellenistic

extension

of

Aristotle's

practice

(see

below,

note

9).

Cicero here

defines

r07LK6P

s

speech

adapted

to

mores,

the

natural

translation

of

i607.

As

J.

E.

Sandys

comments

on

Orator,

oc.

cit.

[Cambridge

1885]

p.

131),

the

mores are

not

clearly

identified

s

those of

the

speaker,

or

the

audience,

whereas

there can

be

no

doubt

that the

animi

affected

byira07?1LKb6

re

those of

the

audience. We

must

there-

fore

go

back to the earlier

and fuller

ccount

in

De

Oratore

o

see

whereCicero

places

the

emphasis

of

the

genus quod

ad

vitam

t

mores

ccommodatur

De

Orat. 2.213

=

Orator128

above).

This is one of

the

problems

which I

attempt

to

solve in the

following

pages.

2See

now

George

Kennedy,

"The

Rhetoric of

Advocacy

in

Greece

and

Rome,"

A7P

89

(1968)

419-436. In this

broad historical

study

he

traces

the

principal

effects

of

the

262

PHoENIx,

Vol. 27

(1973)

3.

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3/15

CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN

ETHOS 263

both

advocate and

client),

nd

(128)

this

requires

enitas

o

make

the

ury

inclined o favour

us.

There

may

also

be

a contrast

ntended

between

the

conscious inclinatiovoluntatis nd the unwitting r unwillingpermotio

animi.

The

concept

of

lenitas is

important

for Cicero's rhetorical

theory

because

it enables

him to

bridge

he

gap

between he

ethical

and aesthetic

aspects

of

speech;

in

Cicero's

theoretical

writings

t

is

most

often

ssoc-

iated with

style;

compare, .g.,

Leg.

1.11,

n

which

Atticus,

emarking

n

Cicero's

adaptation

of

his

style

to

increasing

ge

and his

reduction

of

contentio,

dds

ut

iam

oratio

tua

non

multum

b

philosophorum

enitate

absit. Historical

writing

s said

in

De

Orat.

2.64

to

require

genus

orationis

fusum tquetractumt cum lenitatequadam aequabiliterprofluens ine

hac

iudiciali

asperitate;

nd

for

he

combinationwith

equabilis,

compare

Orator

3,

elaborant

lii

in

lenitate

et

aequabilitate

et

puro

.

.

et candido

genere

dicendi.

t

is

also

applied

to

delivery

nd

intonation,

s

in

2.184

below

and

Orator

6

(with

Sandys'

note ad

loc.,

p.

65 of

his

edition).

But

at the

moral

evel enitas

s the

quality

of

wise

and merciful

ecision

n

the

judge

or

jury,

defined

by

Cicero in

Part.

Or.

78,

in

relation

to

justice:

ea

(sc.iustitia)

n

moderatione

nimi

advertendienitas

nominatur.

ot

only

does this

correspondclosely

to the

Aristotelian

ccount

of

irLELKEta

n

Rhet.

1.13,

1374

a

30

following;

but

brLELKEL

nd

the

trVLLKr7S

n

a more

general

ense

are

important

lements

n

the deal ethoswhich

Aristotle ets

up

forhis orator

t Rhet.

1.2.

1356

a

7

and

a

13,

and

2.1.1378

a

15.

While

this

wider

sense of

irLEKls-"reasonable,

moderate,

gentlemanly"-

extends

beyond

the

range

of

lenis,

Cicero's

choice of

lenis and

lenitas

enabled

him

to

include,

s

I

will

show,

esthetic nd

stylistic

onnotations

which

-LeLKeLa

acked.

Of the three

functions icero

discusses

first he

varietiesof

ntellectual

proof docere)whichare closest to theorthodox nventio heoryof post-

Aristotelian

hetoric,

nd

leads

up

to

a

catalogue

of

the

Aristotelian

opoi

in

163-173.

After

conversational

digression

Antonius

proceeds

to con-

sider the

psychological functions,

onciliare

and movere:

182-184 deal

separate

dentities f

advocate

and client

found

ccasionally

n

Athens

nd

almost

universally

n Rome.

He

discusses

e

Orat.

.182-184,

n

pages

34-435, oncluding

hat

"most

especially

he

possibility

f effective

ontrast

etween

atron

nd client

s

not

recognised,"

nd

comments n

the

slowness f

Roman

rhetoricalheory o assimilatethe

mplications

fthe

eparate

ersonalities

f

advocate nd client. he

whole rticle

is

full

f

valuable

comments n

many

spects

of

Ethos,

nd

I offer

my

own

discussion

(written

efore

consulted

ennedy's

work)

n

the

hope

that

this

nalysis

f

the

con-

flicts

enerated

n

Cicero's

daptation

f

Greek

heory

ill

provide

useful

ppendix

o

his

paper.

For

further

iscussion

ee

Kennedy's

he

Art

f

Rhetoric

t

Rome

Princeton

1972)

139

(on

the

treatmentf

Ethos

n

rhetorical

heory),

nd

220-221

(on

De

Orat.

2.182-184).



4/15

264 PHOENIX

specifically

with the former. ince 182 is a difficult

ection,

t seems

wise

to set it out in fullbefore

ttempting

n

analysis.

Valet igiturmultum d vincendum robarimoreset instituta tfacta et vitameorum, qui

agent ausas,

et

eorum, ro quibus,

et tem

mprobari

dversariorum,nimosque

eorum,

pud

quos

agetur,

onciliari

quam

maximead benevolentiam

cum

erga

oratorem um

erga

llum,

pro

quo

dicet

orator.Conciliantur

utem nimi

dignitate

ominis,

ebus

gestis,

xistimatione

vitae;

quaefacilius

ornari

possunt,

i

modo

unt,

quamfingi,

i

nulla

sunt.

Sed

haec

adiuvant

in

oratore;

enitas vocis

voltus

pudor[is

significatio],

erborum

omitas;

si

quid persequare

acrius,

ut

invitus

t

coactus

acere

videare.

Facilitatis,

liberalitatis,

mansuetudinis, ietatis,

grati animi,

non

appetentis,

non

avidi

signa

proferre erutile

est;

eaque omnia, quae

proborum,

emissorum,

on

acrium,

non

pertinacium,

on

itigiosorum,

on

acerborum

unt,

valde

benevolentiam

onciliant

balienantque

ab

eis,

in

quibus

haec non

sunt;

itaque

eadem

suntin adversarios x contrario onferenda.

In

the first entence

he

aim

is

given

as

winning

pproval

for he

mores

et

instituta

..

etc. both

of

patrons

(eorum

qui

agent

causas)

and clients

(eorum

pro quibus),

with

a

corresponding

iscrediting

f

the

adversaries.

While the

second sentence

ppears

to be

merely

rephrasing

f

the

first,

it

brings

nto

prominence

he

third

party

concerned,

he

iudices

(apud

quos

agetur)

and the theme verb

conciliare,

which

is

then

expanded by

what

follows;

uch

goodwill

s

won

by

a

man's

prestige, chievements,

nd

reputation,but these may be lacking.What is the next connectionof

thought?

Sed

relates to the

problem

of

the

defendant without

these

merits.

Certain

qualities

in

the

patron

such

as

lenitas

of

delivery'

and

demeanour

can

compensate

for

hese deficiencies.We are now

discussing

the

character

isplayed

by

the

peaker,

nd

thenext

entence,facilitatis...

signa proferre

erutile

est,

appears

to continue

this theme.

"It

is

very

advantageous

to

display

the

marks

of

good

and

amiable

qualities."

Only

with

the commenton

bestowing

he

corresponding

ad

qualities

on

the

adversaries,

do

we

realise

that

signa

proferre

may

refer

o

adducing

evi-

denceof theamiablequalitiesof theclientrather han thespeakerhimself,

as

a

means

of

benevolentiam

onciliare.4

8The

text here

is

damaged.

The

mss

read lenitas

vocis

voltus

pudoris

significatio

verborum omitas.

Wilkins

follows

Kayser

in

bracketing

-is

significatio;

Harnecker

extends

the

brackets

to

pudoris

significatio

erborum

omitas, reading

lenitas

vocis et

voltus.

The

problem

does not affect ur

interpretation

s a

whole,

but I believe

that

the

three elements

of

vox,

voltus,

and verba

are all

necessary,

and would

not

extend the

brackets

beyond

pudoris

significatio.

4Antonius' reference

ere

corresponds

o the

recommendationshe will himself

give

for

the

principium

n

2.320

ff.

imilarlypopuli benevolentiam

ihi conciliaram n

200

relates

to the

captatio

benevolentiae,

ttributed

by

traditional rhetoric

to the

beginning

of

the

speech.

A

comparison

of

Aristotle's

comments

on

the exordium n the

Rhetoricawith

the

Roman

texts

reveals the

tradition

and

its

modifications. he

starting

point

is

Rhet.

3.14

1415

a

35 f.:

MXyerzat

U

raDra

EK

/re

ro

X-yov70OS

(1)

KaL

rov

&KpoarofD

2)

Kal

ro

D

rp&hyparos

3)

Kal

ro

V

avwrtov

4).

Compare

Rhet.

Her.

1.5.8:

Benivolos

auditores

facere

quattuor

modis

possumus;

ab

nostra

(1),

ab

adversariorum

nostrorum

4),

ab

auditorum

persona

(2),

et

ab

rebus

ipsis

(3).

Cic.

Inv.

1.16.22:

Benivolentia

quattuor

x



5/15

CICERONIAN

CONCILIARE

AND ARISTOTELIAN

ETHOS

265

Section

183

adds

in

parenthesis

that

this

style

of

speaking

is

most

successful

n cases where t is not

possible

to

play

on the audience's

emo-

tions;heregentle nd mild' speech s mostappropriate, nd mostrecom-

mends

client,

nd

a

definition

s

offered

or

heword

reus,

which s the

ink

returning

s

to

the

main

argument

n 184. Horum

igitur

xprimere

mores

oratione

ustos,

ntegros,

eligiosos,

imidos,

erferentis

niuriarum

mirum

quiddam

valet eems to

recapitulate

the last

sentence

of

182

above,

but

relates

to the

client.

Antonius

dds that

f

peakers

do

this,

whether

n the

preamble,

narrative,

r

conclusion,

t

will

often

e

even

more

ffectivehan

the

case

proper.

Further

autem),

from he

feeling

nd nature

f

the

peech

it

can resultthat

quasi

mores

ratoris

ffingat

ratio;

genere

nim

quodam

sententiarumtgenereverborum,dhibitaetiam actione enifacilitatemque

significante,

fficitur

t

probi,

ut

bene

morati,

t

boni

viri

esse

videamur.

n

the

ast

sentencefacilitatemque

ignificante

ppears

to

resumefacilitatis

..

locis

comparatur;

b nostra

(1),

ab adversariorum

4),

ab

iudicum

persona

(2),

ab

ipsa

causa

(3).

Cic.

De

Orat. 2.321: aut

ex

reo

(1)

aut

ex

adversario

4)

aut

ex

re

(3)

aut

ex

eis

apud quos agetur

2)

sententias uci

licebit.

Rhet.

Her. and

De

Inv.

are

clearly

transcriptions

f

the

same

source,

which

altered the

Aristotelianorder

to

give

greater

prominence

o

the adversarius.

De

Oratore iffersn two

ways: by

postponing

the

referenceto the audience

to

fourth

position

it restores

the

emphasis on their role; also, just as Antonius in 2.80-82 had refused to accept the

limitation

of

captatio

benevolentiae

o the

principium,

o

in 322

he

concludes

his

summary

of

the

sententiae:

ex

eis

autem

apud

quos agetur

ut

benevolos

beneque

existimantes

efficiamus,

uod

agendo

efficitur

elius

quam rogando.

est

id

quidem

in totam

orationem

confundendam

nec minime n

extremam,

ed

tamen

multa

principia

ex

eo genere

ignuntur.

Because

of this belief

n

the

diffusion

f

the

captatio

throughout

he

speech,

Cicero

has

included

his comments

on

this

technique

in the context of

his discussion

of

conciliare

(182-183)

and

movere

200;

cf.

206-209)

rather than under the

heading

of

dispositio.

Aristotle

also,

in

his

section

on

arrangement,

mentions

r76

evovv

rodafcat

s

a

goal

of

the

exordium,

isted,

as

in

De

Oratore,

under

'rp6s

rTv aKpoarCyv.

He

too

refers

back

(3.14.1415 b 29) to his previous discussion, that is to 2.1.1378 a 22-23, on EC-oLa as an

ingredient

n

irtins

v

7r4

Oete

nd

to

2.4,

on

the

7rd06os

f

tXLta.

6In

Dionysius

of

Halicarnassus

(see

Lockwood, CQ

23

[1929]

183-184)

and

in

Quin-

tilian,

6.2,

Ethos and

)0GKL

are

identified

with

a

quieter,

milder evel

of

speech

than

Pathos

and

7rar7rLK'.

Grube,

both

in

The

Greek nd

Roman

Critics

291-292)

and

in his

notes to

Aristotle

n

Poetry

nd

Style 51,

n.

2), suggests

that

Quintilian's

words reflect

the

practice

of

Cicero

and

perhaps

earlier

critics;

even in Aristotlethe

application

of

the

adjective

'OLK6S

o the

Odyssey

n

Poetics

24

may

depend

on

associating

W0os

with

a

quieter

emotional level. This

distinction between Ethos

and

Pathos does not

seem

to

occur in the

Rhetorica;

t

is

however

present,

without

being

used

to

definethe

terms,

n

Cicero as

in

Dionysius. Compare Dionysius De Dem. 8,

in which

IG0KK

s the

last of

a

parallel sequence 1Xap

...

vetLvy...

.EZ6a

contrasted

with

7raOI7tK';

or ib.

43:

r7d

V

da'roTpayvvEL

tE

E

L

TLKpaLvEL

rv

aKO7V,

r

a

rpavbEL

KaL

XEaLvEL,

al

7-t

V

i&

7rOos

KTpo7reL

robs

&KObOVT7s, &

5'

els

'Oos brad'7yera.

From

Cicero,

compare

the

contrast made in

De Oratore

.200:...

generi

orationis

vehementi

tque

atroci

genus

illud

alterum

..

lenitatis t

mansuetudinis,

r

212: in

his

duobus

generibus uorum

lterum

ene,

alterum

vehemens sse volumus ..

,

and

the antithesis of

asperitas

contentioniswith

remissio

enitatis,

r the comments n

Orator

128

(above,

note

1).



6/15

266

PHOENIX

signa

proferre

f the end of

182,

and,

at the same

time,

learly

efers o

the

amiable

qualities

of

the

speaker

himself.

There are several confusionsatenthere: is Antoniusdiscussing he art

of

recommending

he

speaker,

or the

client? s he

commenting

n

style,

r

content?

he

end

of

184 s

clear n

tself.

Conciliare

will nvolve

portraying6

by

one's

sentiments,

tyle,

and

delivery,

he

excellenceof the

speaker's

character, straightforward

iece

of

self-dramatisation

y

the orator

as

his

own

playwright

nd

performer.

ore

difficults

the

entence

beginning

horum

gitur xprimere

mores,

oth n its relation

o the end of

182,

and

to

the

placida,

summissa,

enis

oratio ecommended

n 183.

If we take

signa

proferre

n 182 in the

sense first

roposed,

displaying

marksof the

orator's

own good qualities,this is consistentwiththe end of 184, and withthe

emphasis

on

style

and

manner

mpliedby

placida,

summissa,

enis oratio.

This

then

eems

to be the

sense

required.

But how can the

orator

express

the excellent

characterof

his

client

n

his

speech

by placida,

summissa,

lenis... oratio?

That

is,

by

his

style

and

delivery?

This

presupposes

an

amazing

degree

f dentification etween

patron

and

client;

without

t the

orator

can

express

his

client's merits

only

by explicit

statements

bout

them.

In

this

difficulty

oth

the double

meaning

of

lenis,

passing

from

morality

o

style,

and Cicero's

own

intense

faith

n

the

effect f

style,

influencehis

statements;

but it

would seem

that the initial

distinction

betweencommendation

f the

speaker

himself,

nd

of the

client,

has not

been

maintained,

nor

ts

implications

onsistently

xplored.

n

the atter

part

of

this

paper

I

shall

argue

that the

distinction

ailsto

be

maintained

because

it was irrelevant o

Cicero's Aristotelian

ource,

and

has

been

grafted

y

Cicero onto a

presentation

n

quite

different

erms.

More

problems

arise from

the later references o this function

n

Antonius'account

of

his

great

defence f

Norbanus

(200

ff.).

quod

ubi sensi me in

possessionem

udicii

ac

defensionis

meae

constitisse,

uod

et

populi

benevolentiam mihi

conciliaram,...

et

iudicum

animos

totos...

ad

causam nostram

converteram,

um

dmiscere

huic

generi

rationisvehementi

tque

atroci

genus

illud

alterum,

de

quo

ante

disputavi,

lenitatis et

mansuetudinis

coepi.

Paradoxically

n

this

passage

the

conciliaram lause is associated

with

the

violent and emotive

function,

while

the

characteristic

enitas

f technical

conciliare

omes

second,

associated with

Antonius'

vindication

f his own

role

as

defending

ounsel,

and consists

only

of

winning

he

goodwill

f

the

audience forthepatronus.This is confirmed y the later sentence (201)

where

the

antithesis

commendatio: oncitatio

orresponds

o

ut

mansue-

6Exprimere

nd

ejingere

both

belong

to

the

vocabulary

of

the

plastic

arts;

ef. Austin

on

Pro

Caelio

12,

non

expressa

sed adumbrata

igna

virtutum

notes,

p.

60);

Ac.

1.27,

e

qua

omnia

expressa

atque

eficta sint;

N.D.

1.47,

cum

artificium

ffingitisabricamque

divinam;

Off.

.69,

solidam

atque

expressam

figiem,

nd

De

Orat.

3.15,

in

quibus

omnibus

fere ocrates

exprimitur,

f

personal

portrayal

through anguage.



7/15

CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN

ETHOS

267

tissimus

viderer nd

ut et

acerrimus

in

Caepionis

invidia

renovanda

(viderer).

hus

in

practice

Antonius'

technique

does not

conform

o

the

theoretical oleofconciliare s presenting he mores fthe defendantn a

favourable

ight,

while the

emotivedefence

f

seditio

s

actually

described

by

a

contradictory,

on-technical se

of

conciliare.

Similarly

nalysis

of

the

emotions o

be

roused eads to

a

conflicting

se

of

conciliare

n

the idiom amorem onciliare

206):

in

the discussion

on

arousing

the

affection

f

the

udges

in

206-208,

the

first ection of

the

catalogue

of

emotions,

Cicero

s

basically

repeating

he

aims

and

methods

included

n

the function f

conciliare

n 182-184.

Confronted

by

this

overlap

Cicero

reveals his embarrassment

n

212.

He has ended theaccount of the emotivefunctionn 206-211with nvidia

(210)

and misericordia

211),

and his demands made

upon

the

speaker

enable him

to reiterate n

211

the

distinctionmade

in 201

between

the

commendatio

robitatis,

hich

hould be

lenis

.

.

atque

ummissa,

nd

the

(pars)

quae

suscipitur

ab

oratore d

commutandos nimos

atque

omni

rationeflectendos,

hich

should

be

intenta c

vehemens. ut he

has

finally

to

admit the

overlap

of

categories.

est

quaedam

in

his duobus

generibus,

uorum

alterum

ene,

alterum

vehemens

sse

volumus,

difficilis d distinguendum imilitudo;nam et ex illa lenitate, qua conciliamur eis, qui

audiunt,

ad

hanc vim

acerrimam,

ua

eosdem

excitamus,

nfluat portet liquid

...

neque

est

ulla

temperatior

ratio

uam

lla,

n

qua

asperitas

ontentionisratoris

psius

humanitate

conditur,

emissio

autem lenitatis

quadam

gravitate

t

contentione

irmatur

212).

The

discussion s

already taking

another

direction,

s the

reference

o

humanitas

shows;

and Cicero

is

leading

off

gradually

towards

Caesar

Strabo's

digression

n

wit,

but

before

he

leaves the

psychological

func-

tions

he

makes

one final

comment

216).

illa autem, quae aut conciliationis causa leniter aut permotionisvehementerguntur,

contrariis

commotionibus

uferenda

sunt,

ut

odio

benevolentia,

ut

misericordij

invidia

tollatur.

Conciliatio

has

here

become

merely

a

label

for

one

section of

movere;

that

part

whose business t is

to stir

up friendly

r

favourable

motions,

and

can be

cancelled

by

arousing

contrary

motions.What

started

as

an

apparently

ndependent

spect

of the

orator's

skill,

with a

differentunc-

tion from he

emotiverole of

movere,

as

been

transformednto

the

gentler

sub-group

ncluded

n

the wider

range

of

movere.

he

descriptive

ole of

conciliare,

ts connectionwith

characterisation

y

style

and

content of

(a)

the

patron

and

(b)

the

client,

has been

blurred

y

the

application

f

the

same

term

o

a

category

f

the more

mportant

motion-rousing

unction

in

the

longer

following

ection.

Why

does Cicero

choose the

term

onciliare o

distinguish

his

eparate

characterising

function?

After

all,

the

verb

clearly

implies

a

form of



8/15

268

PHOENIX

acting

upon

the

emotions,

ifferingnly

n

intensity

f

passion

from

ther

forms

f

movere.

e

does

not seem to

rely

on

any

philosophical

istinction,

such

as that conciliare

cts

upon

the

reason,

movere

pon

the

emotions;

the

only

hint

of such a distinction ies in the

phrases

nclinatio

voluntatis

as

opposed

to

permotio

nimi

in

129

above.

If both functions re

emotive,

why keep

them

distinct?

The

only special

quality

of the

conciliare-

function s

its

descriptive

ontent.

The choice of

terminology

ecomes more

meaningful

f

we turn

to

consider

(a)

the classification

of Cicero's ultimate

or direct

source,

Aristotle,

in

his

analysis

of

rhetorical

proofs,

and

(b)

the

different

circumstances nd values

of

oratory

ssumed

by

the Greek

and Roman

critics.

In

his introduction

o

the

Rhetorica,

ristotle

istinguishes

hree

kinds

of

bEXvoL

t1orELS

(1.2.1356

1-4):

a')

al

t

y&p

low

v

$7v

1W0^et

0

XM'ovos,

a(')

it

7T

T6

Tpoa)vKLaOLVtatl

rws,

Y')

C4

Av

brW

o

6yCy,

bd

ro

5ELKVubVaz

aiLveaOa E5KVbva.

e

then

comments

n

the

rLoTeLs

&&& o

0ovys,

describing

hem

s

b0av

oT'r

Xex05

6

X6'yos OTeE

Al6rtTrov

roL7aL

rTv

Xeyovra.

Tots

ydp

erieMLEKEaL

rLaoebOAev

XXOV

Kal

OTTov

... et Kal

roVro

avpalvl

tv

ik&V

X6yov,

&,XX,&

b&d

6

rpobebo?&o0aL

ovbyWta

tva

TbV

XMyovra.

....

&XX& xeb6V

cr

E

reV KvpLWTrr)YV

XEL

rTv

T740os

(1356

a

5-15).7

The

speech

mustbeuttered o as to makethe orator

&dAerutros

compare

Cicero's

adfidemfaciendam,

.121).

This element

n

the

definition

ecurs

in Rhet. 1.9.1366 a

34;

2.1.1378 a 19 f.

There

is

emphasis

on

the

need

for

brLeLtKeLa8

compare

Cicero's use

of

lenis,

lenitas, 2.128, 182,

etc.);

the

problem

is

to make

himself

appear

7rotov

rva;

this recurs

in

Rhet.

1.9.1366

a

30;

2.1.1378

a

22

(roCovrov).

side

referencen 1.8.1366

a

12

f.

ties

up

this

type

of

proof

with the

1j0l

of

states and

constitutions,

making

it clear

that

the orator

should know

the nature and

aims

of a

state,

so

7On

the use of

'0os

in

Aristotle's

Rhetorica,

ee

E.

M.

Cope,

Introduction o

Aristotle's

Rhetoric

London

1867)

110-113. He

distinguishes

hree

applications

of the

word.

(1)

the

present

reference,

g0os

Cv

7TY

X&yoV'T

(2)

"The

character

of

constitutions

or

formsof

government

and

of

the

different

eriods

of

life,

youth,

manhood..,

.and so

forth;

(these)

are to

be

studied

for

he

purpose

of

accommodating

our

language

to the

tone

and

sentiments

prevailing

under certain

forms of

government,

and

characteristic

of,

or

peculiar

to,

certain

ages

and

conditions

of

life,

and

thereby

conciliating

the

audience,

when

it

happens

to

be

composed

of

members

of

one or

other

of

these

classes."

(3)

i0os

belonging

to

style;

this

appears

only

in

Book 3

(see

pp.

271-272

below).

8Aristotle's discussion of

?brclKeta

in

1.13.1374

a

30

f.

starts from

this

definition:

Tar

8~

rteKrs

T6

rap&

T6V

vyeYpappvZO

V

V61o

V&

LKCatoV

see

Cope,

op.

cit.

[above,

note

7]

190-193).

This

is

very

close

to

his

definition f the

brnKEKIs

n

Eth.Nic.

1137

b

34

f.:

6

ICt)

&KpqfoiKatos~

~a

76

XELpov.

But

the

adjective

(and

noun)

had a

wider

sense

in

general

Greek

usage,

as a

basic word of

social

recommendation,

ike

gentlemanly,

respectable;

so

Socrates in

Apol.

22

a

5,

36

c

1

opposes

it to

caDXos

(see

Burnet

ad

loc.).

In

Aristotle

too,

where

hrLEteK7'

explains

&L6brtLtros

n

Rhet.

1.2.1356 a

7,

it is

genera-

lised.

On

its

range,

and

relationship

with

enis

see

p.

263

above.



9/15

CICERONIAN

CONCILIARE AND

ARISTOTELIAN ETHOS

269

as

to

be ableto

ssume

imilar

0G

imself:

T6

hv

'p

K&rrTs

30os

ravW7arov

&ddVY4l

r1

s

e&Kar4v7

tvac.

is

analysis

f

virtue

n

1.9. eads

to a

comment

on thevalue of thisanalysis or he

5evrTpa

7rLrTas:

vUCf7ieraL

p

&Jaa

irept

robrvTWXeyovTra K&KEWila 7IXOv 4v

irotoi

r

wes

broXn-Orlb06~E0a aTA

7T

10os,

i

7rep

v bevrTepa

irtrtLs.

TK

r7y

Tbr&v

ydp

Lav rTE&Kal

XXov

d&AtrwTroV

5vvba6;eOa

7rotety

rpbs

ApETr'

1366

a

29-33).

Facts

about

virtue,

asically

seful

or

raising

thers

(Tr

'trawoiVTr,

1366

29),

will nable he rator o

represent

imselfs virtuous. ristotle

subsequently

oncentrates

n

the

ogical roofs,eaving

he

bevrEpa

iLrTLS

until

Book

2.

This

begins

2.1)

by distinguishing

ntellectualrommoral

proofs.

hen

he

repeats

he

mportant

lements

f

his

riginal

efinitionf

the

7rLaTLrs

v

7

Oet:

av&dyKrl

.

.Kal

abrVT6robv

rTa alIv

,V

rpLTV

aratKEV6AEW

roXZ

yap &badpet

7rpbs

7rLTW,

&XATcraAvV ra

ts

at

ovXaZs,

dra

Kal

v

raTs

tKas r6rOSby

tva

6atv'elaua M'XOTra

Kal

r

6rpbs

aCbrobs

V7roXaI3cz'vEU

XEtU

7rws

abrT6

(2.1.1377

24-29).

This

type

f

proof,

hen,

epends

n

two

hings:

he

haracter

hich he

orator

resents

n

his

peech,

nd

the

ttitude owards

he

udiencewith

which

he

represents

imself.

hese

are

elaborated n

2.1.1378a7f.:

r70o

I

.LV abrobStvaL

rtrobs obsMyovras

rpLarL

rdTLrTa..rT.

.

Tapra 6pbV7it

Kat

l ET

Kaltivota.

ollowing

his,

n 1378

19,

Aristotle

refers

he

reader ack to

1.9

for he

means

by

which

rators an make

themselves

ppear

6pbpveo al

rovbatot.

The

question

f

presenting

ne's

eDvota

s

to be

studied

n

the

section

n

7raif0.

his is

generallygreed

o

refer he

readerforward

o the

sectionon

OXla,

n 2.4

(1380

b

43-

1381

b,

end).

The whole

nature f

this

proof

onsists

n

portrayal

r

description;

resenting

he

speaker

n

a

certain

ight;

he

evoLa

t

issue

is

the

speaker's

wn

(real

or

supposed)

goodwill

o the

audience,

not

theirs owards im. pecificoncernwithwinningheir

eivota,

heequi-

valent

fCiceronian

onciliare,

lthough

his

s

the

underlying

otive

f

the

rLrTa

s

Tod0

ovs,

s not

discussed ere.

When

Aristotle

omes

o

discuss

OtXMa

n

2.4.,

he

does

so

analytically,

without

tating

motive

r

application;

t

s

merely

ne

of

he

r6.

which

the

oratormust

knowhow

to

rouse.

n

one

sense sizable

proportion

f

this

hapter

eflectshe

ssue

f

ivoca

nderlying

he econd

roof,

or

is

emphasis

s

repeatedly

n

the

tXla

men

feel

for

hose

whose ttitude o

themselves

nd their

oyalties

s

favourable.

e

has

ncluded

his

hapterto satisfywoneedsoftheorator: a) accordingo itsclassification,o

show

by

what

persons

nd causes

he

r&0o

f

tXta

s roused:hence

how

can

the

speaker

rouse

t

in

the

audience,

owards

thers r

towards

himself?

b)

to

satisfy

he

reference

rom

.1.1378

22-3:

what

s

tXtta

like?

Hence howcan

the

peaker

ortray

imselfo show hat

he

feels t

towards

the

audience? Yet it

should

be

noted that the

words

Evovs,

ivoLa



10/15

270

PHOENIX

do not occur even

once.

That

is, although

Aristotle

has referred

he

readers

to

this

section

for

he

technique

of

making

oneself

ppear

edvous,

he has formulated hechapterto illustrate

rdos,

and has notadapted it

to

the

needs

of

the

taTsLu

be

ro

i^0ovs.

The

later sections

2.12-17,

on

the characteristics ssociated with

age,

class,

and

fortune,

re

designed

to

continue he

analysis

of motions

n

the

audience so that the

speaker

may

know how

to

appeal

to

the

type

of

audience he

is

dealing

with.

It

is

a

discussion

of

4,

in

one

sense,

but

is

aimed

at

the

third,

emotive

category

of

proof.

Yet

M6d6ric

Dufour

(Aristote:

Rhitorique

ivre

2

[Paris

1960]

ntroduction

9)

is too

absolute

in

denying

ts

relevanceto

the

rlrn

tLT

roDT

0ovs.Cope

(Introduction

o

Aristotle'sRhetoric, 10) points to the directions n 2.13.1390 a 29-33,

oTe

fre t

t?ldroexovral

rdlres

obs

7T^o

bTerTpqy

Oe

XeyopJEovsO

6

OV

Kal

robs

6Solovs

bK

87Xov

ws

XpCopeV0oOTs

67yos

roLDroT

avodWvra

Oal

TO

Kal

o

X6roL.

This makes

the

same

connection

with ethical"

proof

s

in

1.8.1366

a

12

(above,

page

268).

Thus when

n

2.18.1391

b

34

Aristotle

tates

rnt

'

W

V

GOLKobs

obs

X6yovs

WxeraL

roteY,

Kai

rept

Trovrwcv

&6opwrat,

t is

reasonable

to take

?70LKobs9

s

covering

oth

he

rtLarets

t

ro4Oovs

and

those

tIv

os

rar0eat;

orhe

has

used the

analytical

material f 2.4.

and

2.12-17 to

equip

the

peaker

withboth

ategories

f

proof.

O90n

he

range

of

meaning

of

710LK6s

n

Aristotle's

Rhetorica,

ee

Lockwood in

CQ

23

(1929)

180-181.He

analyses

hree

passages

ncluded

n this

discussion,

nd

suggests

three

eparate

usages

for

the

word,

which

do

not,

however

orrespond

o

the

three

distinct ses

of

i0os

listed

n

note

7.

(1)

In

3.7.1408 22

f.,

the

adjective

s

applied

to

speech

n

character

morata

ratio

the

third

se

of

80os).

2)

In

2.18.1391

29,

t s

rather

"adapted

to

the

character f

the

audience

o

whom

t is

addressed"

the

second

use

of

~Oos).

He

does

not

discuss

heuse of

OmLKbs

n

2.18.1391

b 34.

(3)

In

2.21.1395

b

17,

t

is

connected

ith

2rpoalpeors,

nd

related

o a

man's

rtXos.

Here

t s

"moral,"

of

moral

value,"or"tomark particular oral haracter."This sequally he ase n3.16.1417

20,

on

7'0LKJL

7,cyfls,

not

considered

by Lockwood,

whereas in

1417

a

27

10LK.d

re

utterancesn

character,

s

at

3.7.1408

22

above.)

Some

additional

omments

re

needed.

Lockwood

ignores

.8.1366

a

12:

brel

6'

ob

pb6o'

at

trLerEtsylouraW

.'

ro6EfrtKKo

6yo

V

XXa

Kal

W&'

076LK0o

r~

y^p

roL

va

a

alveo-Oa&

pXb

Myovra

Lretebopev,

roro

6'

EOr

Wv

&

dyaObs

qathlnra&

depovs

&JAow),

bo&

&

a

d

T

7i1j

,

roXLrecwu

pKaars

xew

~

IES.

Here

the

adjective

s

specifically

pplied

o

the

9Oos

f

the

peaker,

hefirst

sage

of

70os

listed

by

Cope.

This

appears

o

be the

nly

nstancen

the

Rhetorica,

nd

theuse

s

adjectival,

nd

has

not

yet

taken

n

an

independent

ife

s a

noun,

which

may

be the

ase n

Orator

28

(above,

note

1).

Lockwood

oints

ut that

0mLK6bis notrecordednAst, ndapparentlynotused

by

Plato. Aristotleeemsto use

it as

an

innovation, espite

previous

ccur-

rences

n, e.g.,

the

Poetics

ch.

24),

and

s careful o

associate

t

with

ts root

noun

0os.

In

2.21.1359 17

and

3.7.1408 22

f.,

nd

16,

1417

20

and

27, although

ifferent

ses

of

0bLK6s

re

involved,

t

is

supported

by

references o

70os

EXetw,

r

roL~elI.

It

seems

that

whatever

0os

rOLte

makes

speech

770LK6v;

whatever

i0os

9XEL

s itself

7706KbP.

hus in

1.8.1366

12

and

2.18.1391

b 34

O&Kd6s

67os

reflects

he

30os

of

either

peaker

r

audience.



11/15

CICERONIAN

CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN

ETHOS

271

Unlike

the recommendations

f

Cicero,

Aristotle's ccount

s

entirely

n

terms

f

representation: escription

f the orator'scharacter

nd

attitude.

The Ciceronian mphasison theact ofconciliare, fwinning enevolence,

has converted

the

unstressed

motive

of

Aristotle's

proof

nto

its

actual

method.At the

same

time,

he Aristotelian

iscussion f contenthas

been

largely

displaced by

Cicero's

emphasis

on

style

and

manner

of

delivery.

There is

another

major

difference.

ristotle

enerally peaks

as

though

the orator

s

acting

on

his

own

behalf,

nd excludes

the client

element.

n

deliberative

oratory,

in which as Aristotle

says

(2.1.1356

a

15)

the

speaker's t0os

s

most

mportant,

here

s

no

client,

nd

normally

no

other

party

to

defend

r

support.

n

forensic

ratory

n

Greece,

the

speech

was

normally eliveredbythedefendant, o that fthe oratorwas nothimself

the

defendant

Aristotle's

remarks

would

have to be

applied

to

the

defendant s

speaker

of

the

orator's words.

K.

J.

Dover,

in

Lysias

and

the

CorpusLysiacum

Berkeley

1968),

Chapter

8,

pp.

149-150,

discusses the

circumstances

overning

consultant's

decision whether

o

speak

in his

own

person

for

he

defendant,

r

to write

speech

wholly

r

n

part

for he

client to

perform.

ristotle akes

no

notice

of

this ssue

in

Books

1

and

2

of

the

Rhetorica,

n

connectionwith

90os.

The

sole

references

o a

client-

figure

are

fK

c7v

ar&Pvydp

a^ts

rTE

alc

AXXoprv

lOttrLtT0o

8vvf67Oa0a troseT rpbs

cpEripv

1.9.1366

32),

and

(in

a referenceackto

1.9)

EK

7'Wv 'brTWvp

KAP

Tep6v 7LS

&Y

avrbv

aaaKEvae

Le

r7Lorop

2.1.1378 21-22).

He

does not

regard

he

client,

ither

s

subject

or

performer

f the

speech,

s a

significant

lement

n

his

discussion."'

In

his earlier ook

The

Art

of

Persuasion

n

Greece

Princeton

963),

pp.

91-92,

Kennedy

aw a reference

o

this

ype

f

composition

or

client-speaker

n

Rhet.

.7.

'HOoroda,

he

stylistic

haracterisation

f a

client-speaker,

as

practised yLysias

ong

before

he

omposition

f he

Rhetorica,nd is described y Dionysius fHalicarnassusnLys. 8 ff.

What

Aristotle

says

in

3.7.1408 a

24

is:

r&Oavo

T

7b

rpa-Aa

Kal

7 oIKELa

ts~

...

(6)

Kcl

1OLKU1

LiT

7

EK

rL'v

cfr/ELCEov

EL,

05

&KOXOVOEJL

&pJ6r77ovaa

dtaryq've&L

al

ies,

uchas the

anguage

ppropriate

o a

Spartan,

r

Thessalian,

r

a

woman.He

adds

(1408

30)

MAv

i

Kal

d

ra

v6Para

iLca1a

Xy

7~

e,

roL~

r

b

Oos.

ob

ydp

7rabr7

obby'

raabros

ypoPos

Av

Kai

reraLbev8J.Lvo

Zlretev.

There

need be no

reference here to

language

as

designed

to

characterise

he

speaker,

as there

was

in

the

account of

X~cts

,raf7O7Ki

in the

preceding

section

(1408

a

20-24).

Instead Aristotle

is

"oCompare

ennedy,

The

Rhetoric

f

Advocacy,"

20-421.He

shows

hat

lthough

Aristotle

wice

n

the

Rhetorica

efers

o

anecdotes n

which

specific

dvocate

poke

himself or

his

client

1.13.1374

36;

2.20.1393

b

22-23)

he

"never

discusses he

varied

possibilities

hich

dvocacymight

pen"

. .

"in

rhetorical

heory

he

itigant

s as-

sumedto

speak

for

himself,

resumably

ecause this

s the basic

situation n

a

Greek

court."



12/15

272

PHOENIX

discussing

how to make

language

fitting

o

a

Spartan,

Thessalian,

or

a

woman.

But women and

foreigners

ould

not

plead

their wn

cases,

so

Aristotlecannot be discussinghow to characterise client,but rather

how to

include

narrative

uotations

n

the

style

of

those

quoted.

This is

apparent

in

Kennedy's

second reference

3.16.1417

a

27),

aXX&

7'7LK6d

Tr6peva

&T1rq

0 Oe,

olov

b~

Ita

Xycowv

aLObt?e:

this

technique

of

charac-

terisation

s foruse in

narrative,

when a

third

party

has

to

be

portrayed.

This was

seen

quite

clearly by Cope

(Introduction

o

Aristotle's

hetoric,

112):

"The third

variety

of

0Oos...

belongs

to

style,

and

accordingly

appears

only

n book 3 .... It occurs

usually,

and

is most

appropriate

n

the second

division

of the

speech,

&t?irttEs

r

narrative."

It would seemthen thatin theRhetoricaAristotle oes notdiscuss the

implications

f

the

orator-client

elationship,

either

ssuming

the

client

as

possible

speaker,

nor

giving

more

than

minimal

ttention o the

type

of

oratory

which

nvolvesdefence f

another.The

double role of

depicting

the

character

nd attitudeof both

speaker

and client

would

be

more

rare

in Greek

courts,

nd is

not

thereforen

issue n the

Rhetorica.

Whether r

not his

interests

re

primarily

n

deliberative

ratory,

Aristotle

makes

it

clear

that this

type

of

oratory

s

the

main field

f

the

7rlo~s

Ld

70rov

0ovs,

so

that

the

t0os

to be

represented

s

that

of

one

man,

the

orator.

Comparing

the Ciceronian withthe

Aristotelian

resentation,

we can

see

that Cicero's

difficulties

ave

arisen

for

four

easons.

1)

Since

Cicero

sets

his comments

n the contextof

forensic,

ot

deliberative

ratory,

he

has

to accommodate

them to

Roman

forensic

practice.

Unless the

defendantwas himself n

orator

such

as

Caelius

Rufus,

who

spoke

in

his

own defencede

vi,

56

B.c.),

this

always

entailed

a

distinction

etweenthe

patronus,

speaking

in

his

own

person,

and the

client;

hence

conciliare

involved

a

double

function,

f

creating

credit for the

character

and

attitudes of both parties. (2) Cicero's choice of the verb conciliare,

appropriate

o the

purpose

of

this,

as also

of

other

categories

f

proof,

s

too

general,

nd

prevents

him

from

istinguishing

etween

he

descriptive

role

of

the "ethical"

proof,

with

its

emphasis

on

ror6v

uva

salvea0at

r

XMyovra

Rhet.

2.1.137

b

27)

and

the

emotive

role

of

the

7rior&

ldl

rWVP

eKpoaracv

Rhet.

1.2.1356

a

15).

It

is

probably

awareness of

this

conver-

gence

of

the two

proofs

n

conciliare

enevolentiam

hich

eads him to

put

Amor

first n

his list

of

emotions,

whereasAristotle

had

begun

with

6pyq

(2.2), passing

on

through

,rpapvE0ta

o

OItla,

s the

opposite

2.3

and

4).

NeverthelessheAristotelianescriptiverinciplesbroughtut nthe

phrases

exprimeremores,

nd

ut

quasi

mores

ratoris

Jfingat

ratio

2.184),

and the

expressed

im

ut

probi,

ut

bene

morati,

t

boni

viri

esse

videamur.

Videri is used

again

in

201,

ut

..

mansuetissimus

iderer,

but the real

counterpart

to

rotLb6

va

4alvpeOB

comes in

two

earlier

passages

not

explicitly

ssociated

with

the verb

conciliare,

t

1.89,

ut

et

ipse

eis

apud



13/15

CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIANETHOS

273

quos ageret

alis

qualem

se esse

optaret

ideretur,

t ut ei

qui

audirent

ic

adficerentur

nimis

ut

eos

adfici

ellet,

nd

(virtually

epeated)

at

2.176,

in

the transitionfromdocere o the other functions: i vero dsequetur, t

talis videatur

qualem

se videri

velit,

et

nimos

orum

ta

adficiat,

pud

quos

aget,

ut

eos

quocumque

velit

vel trahere

el

rapere

possit,

nihil

profecto

d

dicendum

equiret.

3)

Aristotlehimselfmakes it

difficult

o

discuss the

question

of

qOLK6V

learly,

since

he

uses the same

chapter

(2.4.)

as

raw

material for he

two aims of

(a)

creating

MXLa/eivota

n the audience

and

(b)

representing

he

duvoLa

of

the orator.

This has

a

psychological

ustifica-

tion,

since

edora

in the orator

begets

d5voza

n

the

audience,

but it

may

explain

why

Cicero's

presentation

of

the two aims

in

Antonius' trial

narrative, singthe same key-word,onciliare, orbothiOLuK6vnd partof

7raOnpLK6V,

as become

inextricably

onfused,

and

it

contributes o

the

overlap

of

functions

which

causes

him

evident

difficulty

n

211-212.

(4)

Finally,

Cicero's

professional

ove

of,

and faith

n,

style,

means

that

he

sees

style

and

delivery

s

a

primary

lement

n

the

representation

f

the orator's

enitas

intended

to

translate

irLLKELa).

Now

lenitas of

style

can indeed

effingere

ores

oratoris,

but

barely

exprimere

mores of

the

client,

as

he

seems

to

maintain

in

2.184.

This

difficulty

as

however

nothing

o

do with

7o0roda

to

suit

the

client,

which

as we have seen is

absent

from

Aristotleand

irrelevant o Roman

practice.

Roman

taste

admitted

only

one

form

f Ethos n

this

ense;

that

of

the

wise,

good,

and

benevolent statesman

(Aristotle's

opo6vLwL,

arov&saoL,

nd

edvoL

f

2.1.1378 a

6

f.).

For

Cicero a

mild and

virtuous

tyle

portrayed

he

Ethos

of

the

orator,

and would

reflect ts

excellence

upon

the

client

described

and

defended.

The last two

points require

further

omment

n

the

light

of

Cicero's

later

practice.

He

obviously

valued

the

implications

of

the

verb con-

ciliarewhenhe chose it to represent heAristotelian se ofEthos. Yet he

uses

it

only

once"

afterDe

Oratore

n

connection

with

this

theme of the

three functions.

n

Brutus,

delectare12

erforms

his role in

185,

187-188,

197,

276

(and

compare

322,

where

t

is

associated

with the

conciliatory

effect

f

humour).

Combined

with

delectare

refidemfacere,

87, 197,

and

animos

a

severitate

raducere,

97

(cf.

322

again),

animos

devincire

olup-

"At

Orator

128,

quoted

in

note

1

above. The

index

to Cicero's

Rhetorica

ists

seven

uses

of the verb

subsequent

to De

Oratore;

of

these three are in

the idiom

conciliare

benevolen-

tiam:

Part. Or. 15.2; 28.7; Orator128.7 above. Add Part. Or. 53.2, c.fidem;Brut. 156.11,

c.

gratiam

social,

not

rhetorical);

Orator

22.7,

c.

auditorem

in

the

exordium);

and

162.10,

c.

voluptatem

urium

(on

compositio).

The noun

conciliatio

ccurs

only

n De

Oratore:

.216

and

2.292

allude

to this use of

Ethos

and mark

the end of the

topic

of

psychological

proofs (216)

and Antonius'

recapitulation

after

the

digression

on

humour;

3.205 is

general,

in

a

long

list

of

emotional

devices.

1sA.

E.

Douglas,

Cicero: Brutus

(Oxford

1968)

Intr.

xxxv,

no.

28,

is

misleading;

conciliare occurs in

none of

these

passages.



14/15

274 PHOENIX

tate,

276.

The different

mphasis

in the

set-piece

describing

Crassus'

famous

speech

in the civil causa Curiana

at 197

f.,

the

counterpart

f

Antonius'greatspeech forNorbanus described n De Orat.2.197 f.,may

account

for

the choice of

delectare,

ince the issue

in court

was

more

academic,

and less

provocative;

conciliare was

not

an

urgent

need.

However,

the absence

of the

verb

from he

other

references

o

the

three

functions oes

suggest

deliberate

avoidance

of

conciliare s a

term.

n

De

Optimo

Genere nd

in Orator

lso,

when Cicero

distinguishes

he

three

functions,

e

uses

delectare

or he

second,

most

explicitly

nd

repeatedly

at

Orator

69,

wherehe elaborates

this in the

process

of

reconciling

he

three functions

with

the three

genera:

subtile

n

probando,

modicum

n

delectando,vehemensnflectendo."1onciliareremainsabsent fromthe

ensuing

discussion,

lthough

t occurs

casually

in 122 as

one

of

the

three

requirements

f

the

exordium.

The

exception

associated

with

Ethos is a

brief

llusion in

128,

where

one

paragraph

covers

Aristotle's

econd and

third

proofs

n a

summary

f

miscellaneous

heory

121-128),

opening

the

transition rom

he first heme fOrator

othe

econd

ection n

compositio.

This is

already

the

pattern

n

the earlier

Partitiones

Oratoriae.When

Cicero

discusses the element

of

Ethos in

oratory

n

22,

the

key

word

is

delectat... oratio .quae significatratoris psius amabilismores.Con-

ciliare s

reserved

for

he

specific

enevolentiam

onciliare f

the

exordium

(15,

28)

and

for

the

amplificatio

n

the

peroration

which

(53)

motu

animorum

onciliet n

dicendo

idem-surely

a

case of

movere,

he

third

function

hus this

special

use

of

conciliare

apses

after

De

Oratore,

which

would

suggest

that

Cicero

became

dissatisfied

with

the

term

ome

time

beforehe took

the further

tep

of

modifying

he

three

functions

o

fit he

three

tyles

n

Orator.We

may

then

be

ustified

n

explaining

he

substitu-

tion

of

delectare

with or

without

idem

acere

by

the

difficulties

e ex-

perienced n the application of conciliare n De Oratore, s at 211-212

above.

Certainly

andys

is

right

o

note on

Orator 9

that

delectare

as

no

connection

with

the

Aristotelian

riors

td

roD

fliovs

nd "in

Aristotle's

view is

strictly

speaking

superfluous,"

but

mistaken in

denying

an

original

connection

between

the

Ciceronian

functions

nd

Aristotelian

Pisteis;

the

original

term

onciliare,

s

used

in

De

Oratore,

was

chosen to

laSee

A.

E.

Douglas,

"A

Ciceronian

ontribution

o

Rhetorical

heory,"

ranos

55

(1957) 18-26,

whose

account I follow n the chronologyof Cicero's changing approach

to

the three

functions.

He

does

not,

however,

comment

on

the

replacement

of

conciliare

by

delectare;

s in

the

reference

uoted

in

note

12,

he

treats

the

two

verbs

as

equivalent.

This

article

seems

to

have been

neglected

by

recent

scholarship

e.g.,

Kennedy,

The Art

of

Rhetoric t

Rome,

255,

sees no

change

in

the

three

functions

rom

De

Oratore o

Orator),

and

is

a

valuable

corrective

to the

scepticism

which

explains

all

discrepancies

between

one work

of

Cicero

and the

next in

terms

of

his

acquiescence

in

the

structure

and

principles

of

his

different

ources.



15/15

CICERONIAN

CONCILIARE

AND ARISTOTELIAN

ETHOS

275

reflect

n

aspect

f

Aristotle's

resentation

f

Ethos;

t

was

n

discarding

it,

nd

dopting

electare,

hat

Cicero

evered

he

onnection.

ToreturnoCicero's igh aluationf tyle;nthis edidnot hange.

In

Orator

0

f.he

prefaces

is iscussion

ith

categorical

ssertion

f

ts

primacy

nddomination

f he ourt

ituation:

um utemt

uid

t

uo

locodicat

nvenerit,

llud

st

onge

maximum,

idere

uonam

modo.

f

this

s

true

even

in

philosophy,

how

much more so

in

causis...

quibus

totis

moderatur

ratio? ts

importance

ay

in

its

power

to

persuade,

which

Cicero saw as

equal

to,

f not

greater

han,

that

of

truth r

logic,

because

it

appealed

like music

to

the uncritical

enses,

and

persuaded,

as

it

were,

subliminally.

his

emerges

from

he

major digression

t

Brutus

187-200,

ending n the portrayalof the perfect rator n absolute controlof his

audience

like

a

virtuoso nstrumentalist-it

has

become

his instrument.

If

Cicero claimed

for

tyle

more

than

Aristotlewould have

thought

ither

possible

or

desirable,

his

too

may

explain

why

he

moved

from

he

partial

representation

f

Aristotle's

econd

proof

by

conciliare,

o a

termwhich

had

nothing

n

common with

Aristotle,

ut

carried richer

esthetic and

stylistic

ssociations.

TRINITY

COLLEGE,

TORONTO

Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos

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Transcript of Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos