CIA on CPC Leadership (1961)

8/2/2019 CIA on CPC Leadership (1961)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: MA Y 2007 I-. . -28 N o v e m b e r 1961O C I N o . 5539/61Copy N o . lrj6

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EO 1 2 9 5 8 3.3EO 1 2 9 5 8 3 . 3EO 1 2 9 5 8 6.2CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE CHINESE COldMuNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961( R e f e r e n c e T i t l e : POLO XIV-61)

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O f f i c e of C u r r e n t In te l l i genceCENTRAL' INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961

T h i s is a working paper , o u r f i r s t a ss es sm en t of t h eit u s e f u l t o make t h i s a s s e s s m e n t i n - t h e c o nt ex t (a) of t h edeve lopment o f t h e S ino-Sovie t d i sp u t e and (b) of t h e e r r a t i ccourse of Chinese domes t i c po l i c y i n t h e per iod 1958-1961--p a r t i c u l a r l y b ec au se , i n ou r v i ew, a f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o ni n t h e S in o- So vi et r e l a t i o n s h i p and in t h e regime's economicpo s i t i on may w e l l f o r c e a c r i s i s i n t h e C h in es e l e a d e r s h i p ,wi t h , and u se f ul comments from, s e v e r a l o t h e r a n a ly s t s , i np a r t i c u l a r Jac k Zlot nic k, John Heidemann and Maryann Grossackof t h e C hi na D i v i s i on of t h e Sino-Soviet Bloc Area of O C I ,Arthur Ashbrook and P h i l i p Jones of t h e Far E a s t e r n Branchof Analys i s Div i s ion of ORR, and Dorothy Parshley of t h e C u r -r e n t S uppor t S t a f f o f ORR. W alone, however, are r e s p o n s i b l ef o r t h e c o n c lu s s o ns , w hic h are c o n t r o v e r s i a l .

Chinese C o m m u n i s t l e ad er sh ip s i n ce POLO V-58. W have thought --

I n p re p a r in g t h i s p a pe r w e h av e had p r o f i t a b l e t a l k s

The Sino-Sov iet St ud ie s Group would welcome fu r ther com-ment on t h i s pape r , addressed i n t h i s i ns ta n ce t o t h e coord ina-t o r of t h e g ro up ,r


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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961

SUblMARY and CONCLUSIONS............................. ...... iIntroductory Note. . . . . . . . . ................................ 1Offensives, 1957-1958.................... ................. 1Retreats, 1958-1959.. ..................................... 6The Purge, A u t u m n 1959. .................................... 4 .N ew Offensives, Early 1960................................23 .The Hard Summer, 1960.......... ........................... 31Int rans igence and Retreat , A ut um n 1960.. ..................41 The Moscow Conference and After, Winter 1960-61 ........... 8The Sag Backward, E a r l y 1961..............................5 The Q u i e t Spring, 1961....................................61The 40th Anniversary, J u l y 1961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 1 .Continued C a u t i o n , July-October 1961... . . . . . . . . . . ......... 7

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Recapitulation, 1958-1961. ................................9


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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961Summary and Conclusions

I n t h e a g i ta t e d developments i n Communist China in t h eyears 1958-1961, t h e r e h a v e b e e n c e r t a i n a b i d i n g f e a t u r e s i nt h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Mao Tse- tung and var iou s g roups ofh i s l i e u t e n a n t s a nd i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s of those groups w i t hone another . The most important of t hese groups--not yetcabals, po ss ib ly no t even c l iques- -have been , and remain : t h epa rt y -m ach i ne f i gu re s a round L i u Shao-chi, which inc lude a tt h e po l i tb ur o l e v e l Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, KO Ching-Shih,L i Ching-chuan, and Tan Che n-l in; t h e adm i n i s t r a t o r - econom i s tf i g u r e s a ro un d Chou E n- l a i , which i n c l u d e a t t h e p o l i t b u r ol e v e l Chen Yun, Chen Y i , L i Fu-chun, L i Hsien- nien, and PoI-PO; a n d ( p o t e n t i a l l y ) t h e m i l i t a r y group once c l u s t e r e daround Peng Te-huai , which a t t h i s time has l e s s s t a t u r e asa group, b u t i n d i v i d u a l leaders of which would be importaanti n a ny s t r u g g l e f o r power.view from which a l l C hi ne se p o l i c i e s h a ve b ee n a l l e g e d l y de-r i v e d , t h e dogma from which t h e r e h a s been no appeal . Maohas been given c r e d i t f o r f o r m u l at i ng t h e m a i n p ropos i t i onsi n t h e d i s p u t e w i th t h e S o v i e t p a r t y and f o r d e s i g n i n g t h emost important of t h e Chinese domes t i c programs, and t h e s ehave been presen ted as s u r p a s s i n gl y b r i l l i a n t i n c o nc ep ti on .When cir cu ms ta nc es have forced a re t rea t i n e i t h e r area ( t h ere t rea t s i n t h e domest ic programs have been far g r e a t e r ) , ithas been s a i d t h a t Mao's t hough t had no t been f u l l y unde r st ood ,or t h a t Mao's p o l i c i e s had no t been p rope r l y executed, or t h a t"ob j ec t i ve c i r cum s t ances" (e .g . , weather ) had been overwlelm-i n g l y u n f a v o r a b l e . I n such p e r i o d s of r e t r ea t , Mao has a l w a y sbeen g iven th e c r e d i t f o r i n i t i a t i n g t h e d e s i r a b l e c h a n g e s ,t h e i r errors . I u p e r i o d s and areas of m i l i t a n t a d v a n c e ( t h ecourse t o which Mao is pred i sposed ) Yao h as been em pha t i ca l l yi n p e r i o d s and areas of r e t r e a t Mao h a s usua l l y chosen no t t oemphasize h i s p e r s o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e re t rea t .

Throughout the per iod , ''Maols t hough t" has been t h e world-

' f o r h a v in g i n s p e c t e d t h e work of h i s s u b o r d i n a t es a nd corrected' i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e m i l i t a n t p r o p o s i t i o n s and p o l i c i e s , whereas


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Throughout t h e per i od , Mao h a s c o nt in u ed t o g i v e h i s f a v o rp r i m a r i l y t o t he par ty -machine l eeder s around L i u Shao-chi ,t h o s e whose p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s are c l o s e s t t o h i s own. Althoughi n p e r io d s o f re t rea t Mao h a s s om eti me s g iv e n s l i g h t e r p u b l i cev i dence of h i s f a vo r f o r t h i s g ro up t h a n i n p e r i o d s o f ad-v an ce , i n a l l c o n f ro n t a t io n s which c o u l d become a t e s t ofs t r e n g t h , s u c h as pa r t y m eet ings; Mao has made c lea r t h a t t h eyremained h i s f a v o r i t e s , e ve n when t h e p o l i c i e s a s s o c i a t e d wi t hthem h ave be en m o di f ie d , P a r t l y i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h i s gr ou pc o n s t i t u t e s h i s most r e l i a b l e b a se of s u p p o r t i n t h e p a r t y ,and p a r t l y i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h i s g ro up ( e s p e c i a l l y L iu ) t obecome h i s p r i n c i p a l h e i r s , Mao h a s p er m i t t ed t h i s g ro up t os t r e n g t h e n i t s p o s i t i o n i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of power, w hi l e heh a s res t r i c t ed t h e adm i n i s t r a to r - econom i s t g roup and has brokent h e m i l i t a r y g ro up .

I t seems v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n t h a t Mao i n t h e years 1958-1961h a s l o s t f a v o r wi t h some of h i s l i e u t e n a n ts . H i s p r e s t i g e h a sd e cl in e d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e e y e s of some of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r -economi s t f i gu re s and t h e m i l i t a r y f i gu r es - -n o t s im p ly i n t h eobv i ous cases of t hose who have been di sc r i mi na te d aga in st oreven pu rged, bu t w i t h r e sp ec t t oo t o th os e who remain a c t i v el eaders i n a p p a r e n t l y g ood s t a n d i n g . H e may have l o s t p re s t i g ealso w i t h a few of t h e party -machine f i gu re s .dency of Chinese l e a de r s t o s t a n d t o g e t he r as C hi nese aga i n s tt h e S o v ie t p a r t y (a course which common prudence w o u l d a l s od i c t a t e , s i n c e t h e y a nd t h e i r f a m i l i e s a r e a t Mao's mercy),a t least some of Mao's l i eu tenan t s - -espec ia l ly among t h e ad-m i n i s t r a t o r - econom i s t and m i l i t a r y groups--have giv en ind ica -t i o n o f an unde r s t and ing of t h e p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i -t a r y consequences , bo t h immediate and long- t e rm, o f th e s t an da g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t p a r t y . T he se l e a d e r s cou ld reasonably con-c lude , and some of them a l mo s t c e r t a i n l y ha ve so conc luded ,t h a t Mao's ba s i c p o s i t i o n has been in e r r o r , o r , ev en i f h i sp o s i t i o n h a s b e e n more r i g h t t h an wrong, t h a t h i s a g g r e s s i v econduct of t h e d i s p u t e h a s been d e f e c t i v e , i n t h a t i t ha s en-c o u r a g e d t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s t o s t a n d t o g e th e r a g a i n s t t h eChinese .

Al though t h e pr es su re on Mao has been reduced by th e te n-

.Mao h as also l o s t s t a t u r e , i n t h e e y e s of some o f h i s

l i eu t en an t s - - e sp ec i a l l y among t h e adm in i s t r a t o r - econom i s tand m i L i t a ry l e a d e r s - - f o r h i s r ad i ca l domestic p o l i c i e s


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t hemse l ves , even cons i de red a pa r t from t h e ro l e o f t hesep o l i c i e s i n e x a c er b a ti n g t h e Sino-Soviet di sp ut e . Some ofthese l eaders cou l d h a r d l y f a i l t o conc lude t h a t Chinese eco-nomic and. mi l i t a ry development , p a r t i c u la r l y t h e developmentof a g r i c u l t u r e , cou ld have proceeded j u s t as r a p i d l y , w i t ha much more s o l i d b as e f o r China ' s l ong- te rm development i n t oa m odern i ndus t r i a l and m i l i t a r y power, i f Mao had no t over -t u r n e d t h e p o l i c i e s pursued p r i o r t o 1958.Eeyond t h i s , even t hose leaders of t h e admini s t ra to r -eco-nomist and m i l i t a r y gr oups who have remained i n f av or have hadgood reason t o r e s e n t Mao's preferment of the party-machineleaders and Mao's d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t , and even purges o f ,

some of t h e i r own long-t ime comades, i n c l u d i n g some whoseo n l y o f f e n s e has been t h a t o f be i ng r i g h t when Mao and the ,,,party-machine f i g u r e s were wrong.f a v o r of most of t h e l eader s of t h e m o s t impor tan t group ofh i s l i e u t e n a n t s , t h e party-machine f igur es- - th e most impo rtan t ,because Mao probab ly c an not do with ou t t h e i r s u p p o r t . Thepa r t y -m ach i ne f i gu re s , who have shared t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o rMao's po l i c i e s cons i de rab l y more t han have t h e leaders ofo t he r groups , have na t u ra l l y been di sposed t o exaggerate t h e

* successes of such p o l i c i e s and t o m i n i m i z e t h e f a i l u r e s . T h e yh av e o f c o u r s e be en g r a t i f i e d too t h a t t h e i r mistakes haven o t cost t hem Mao's favor- -no t on l y have th ey no t s u f f e r e df o r these mistakes, t he y have ac t u a l l y im proved t h e i r p o s i t i o n si n t h e s t r u c t u r e of power.

Ma0 has a lmos t c e r t a i n l y remained, however, i n t h e high

As of l a t e 1961, then, t h e t i m e seems t o have come f o rMao when a s i g n i f i c a n t , if indeterminable, number of h i s long-t i m e l i eu t enan t s w ou l d p r e f e r t o h av e a n o t h e r l eade r , a s woulda s u b s t a n t i a l s eg me nt of t h e p a r t y as a whole. Moreover, theS o v i e t p a r t y h a s made i t c l ea r t h a t it w o u l d l i k e t o b r i n gMao down, i n f a v o r o f a more co ns er va t iv e and more res pon siv e* leader l i k e Chou En- la i . M a o does n o t seem d i sposed t o s t e pa s i d e a t t h i s t i m e . , If he has even g iven any thought t o t h eque s t i on of whether t o r e s i g n a s p a r t y c h ai rm an a t t h e f o r t h -coming Ninth Congress, he seems t o have concluded t h a t , i n t h - st i m e of s o r e t r o u b l e s , he is i nd i spensab l e .

Although Mao announced h i s i n t en t i on t o r e s i g n fmm h i sp o s t as chairman of the government a t a time (December 1958)of re t rea t s i n h i s domestic programs and i n t h e a s s e r t i o n s- iii -


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made fo r them, i t seems very doub t fu l tha t he would be wi l l ingt o r e s i g n h i s r e a l l y im po r t an t p os ts -- ch ai rm an of t h e p a r t ypo l i tburo and cen t ra l commit tee - in a comparable per iod . TheDecember 1958 announcement was widely in te rpre ted- -we be l ie vein c o r r e c t l y - - a s a forced d e c i s i o n , a blow t o Mao. Mao isexceed ing ly va in , and he w o u l d n o t care t o prov id e g rounds f o rd e r o g a to r y s p e c u l a t i o n a g a in . Mao's r e s i g n a t i o n from h i sp a r t y c ha i rm a n sh ip i n a t i m e of t r o u b l e s w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e g o o dpresumpt ive ev idence tha t he had indee d been pushed, and i tw o u l d probab ly soon be followed by h i s d e a t h , as Mao is n o ta man who can be s a fe l y l e f t t o brood.If Mao s t e p s as ide v o l u n t a r i l y , i t is l i k e l y t o be i n t h e

e a r l y s tages of a m i l i t a n t ad van ce wh ic h h e h a s i n i t i a t e d a ndf o r which he can claim t h e cre dit --a n advance which wouldhave t o i n c lu d e a r a p i d advance i n Chinese economic develop-me nt , p a r t i c u l a r l y a n improvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e , i n order t obe meaningful. The ea r l i e s t s u ch p e r io d i n p r o s p e c t , a c co rd -in g t o t h e Chinese pa r t y ' s own fo re c a s t s , is i n 1963, and Maomay now intend t o s t e p a s i d e a t t h a t t i m e . However, it isd o u b t f u l t h a t t h e r e c a n be a n o th er r a p id a dv an ce u n l e s s andu n t i l t h e USSR res tores someth ing l ike the p rogram of a i d t oChina ( including l a r g e c r e d i t s ) t h a t e x i s t e d b ef or e mid-1960,and i t is e q u a l l y do u b t f ul t h a t Moscow i n t e n d s t o do t h i su n t i l Mao has e i ther backed down o r is no longer t h e l e a de r ,so co nd it io ns may no t be any more f a v o r a b l e fo r h i s v o lu n t a r yr e s i g n a t i o n i n 1 96 3 t h a n t h e y are now. If the Chinese leader-s h i p c o u ld c o n t e n t i t s e l f with becoming a f i r s t - c l a s s A s i a npower i n t h i s decade, Mao m ig ht n o t b e u n de r s i g n i f i c a n t p r e s -sure t o abdicate. However, a l l groups of Chinese l eadersappear ded ica ted t o t h e g o a l of making China a modern mil i taryand in du s t r i a l power , capab le of c o n t e s t i n g t h e . U. S , p o s i t o ni n t h e P a c i f i c . With Mao's i n t r a n s i g e n c e s e e n as s t a n d i n g i nth e way of t h i s goal , t h e r e seems t o be, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m es i n c e 1935, a p o s s ib i l i t y w o r th m e n t io n in g of Mao's i n v o lu n t a r yremoval from l e a d e rs h i p . T h is p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l be d i s c u s s e dp r e s e n t l y .around Liu have taken care to associate themselves as c l o s e l yas p o s s i b l e w i t h Mao's p o s i t i o n s , a n d L i u himself has beeng i v e n c r e d i t f o r h e lp in g t o formulate some of them. Theseleaders have been most pr om in ent d u r i n g t h e p a r t y ' s o f f e n s i v e s ,w i th r e s p e c t b o th t o t h e S ino-Soviet d i sp u t e ( they have beenth e p r i n c i p a l C hin es e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i n c e mid-1960 i n

Throughout th e ye ar s 1958-1961, t h e party-machine l eaders

- i v -


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c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i th t h e S o v i e t p a r t y *) a nd t o Chinese domesticprograms. In per io ds of r e t r e a t , t h e p a r ty im ac h in e f i g u r e shave been l e s s consp icuous , a l though they have re ce n t ly beenp u t t i n g t h e m s e lv e s forward as f a v o r i n g f o r t h e t i m e being con-se rv a t iv e po l i c i es i n econoni ic deve lopment. J u s t as Jlao cannever be wrong, so t h e s e l eader s moat f i r m l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t hh i s p o l i c i e s h av e b een a b l e t o contend t h a t t h e y to o have beenr i g h t a l l along . Although th ey have sometimes been c r i t i c i z e din d i re c t ly , no fundamenta l c r i t i c i s m of t h e i r p o l i c i e s h a sbeen p e r m i t t e d , and they theinsselves have been ab le t o s h i f tt h e i r p o s i t i o n s w it h Mao t o pre-empt any at ta ck .Throughout the per iod, L i u Shao-chi has been giv en add i -t i o n a l t o k e n s of Mao's p r e f e r e n c e f o r h i m as h i s s u c c e s s o r :e . g . , L i u gave th e p r i n c i p a l address a t t h e p a r t y c on g re s s i n1959, l e d t h e C h in e s e d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e Moscow confe rence ofth e pa r t i e s i n autumn 1960, and gave t h e p a r ty ' s 4 0 th a nn i-v e r s a r y address i n J u ly 1961. Moreover, i n each of t h e ' t h r e emain developinents affect ing the s t r u c t u r e of power i n t h i sper iod- - the changes i n th e composi t ion of t h e p o l i t b u r o a n ds e c r e t a r i a t i n s p r i n g 1958, t h e p ur ge of t h e regime i n autumn1959, and the re -es tab l i shment of t h e g r e a t r e g i o n a l b ur ea usi n o r about autumn 1960--the party -mach ine leaders s t r e n g th e n e dt h e i r p o s i t i o n s , g e t t i n g i n t o an i nc r e a si n g l y s o l i d p o s i t i o nf o r a showdown i n t h e e ve nt t h a t Mao's ar rangements fo r t h es u c c e s s io n are n o t r e s p e c t e d .J u s t as it seems c lea r t h a t Mao h a s l o s t p r e s t i g e w i tho t h e r groups of l eader s i f n o t w i t h t h e party-machine l e a de r si n r e c e n t y e a r s, s o it seems c l e a r t h a t a t l e a s t some of t h epar ty -mach ine f igures - - inc lud ing the most important ones , L i u ,Teng, and Peng Chen--have f a l l e n in to d i sf av or wi th a t l e a s tsome of t h e leaders of o th e r g r o u p s , f o r much th e same reasons .T h e s i t u a t i o n is not black -and- white . Some of t h e p a r t y -machine f i g u r e s have shown some concern with Mao's in t ra ns i ge ncei n th e Sino-Sovie t d i sp ut e and have shown some s e n s i t i v i t yt o problems of economic developme nt, w h i l e some of t h e admin-i s tr a to r -e c on o mi s ts , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e gi ve n j o b s i n t h e

,

*The administrator-economist leader Chou En- lai hezded t h eChinese de lega t ion t o t h e S o v i e t 22nd p a r t y c o n g re s s , t h e mostre ce nt c on fr on ta ti on . However, Liu ,, Teng, and Peng Chen haveplayed much larger ro l e s i n t h e p a s t 18 months; and Chou'sd e l e g a t i o n , a p a r t f ro m h i m s e l f , wa s composed ent i re ly of p a r ty -machine f i g u r e s . The Russians were i n v i t e d t o conclude, fromChou's ass ignment , t h a t they cou ld expec t no th ing even fromt h e i r f a v o r i t e s . - v -


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pa r t y machine and ass ig ned im por tan t ro l e s i n t h e c on du ct oft h e S i no -Sov ie t d i sp u t e , have been c l o s e l y associated w i t hr ad i ca l p o l i c i e s d u r in g per iods of "leap" and have s tood f i r mw i t h l a o ag ai ns t Moscow, so t h a t i n some per iods i t h a s beenh a r d t o f i n d a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e , on t h e record , be tweenr i gh t -w i ng pa rt y -m ach i ne f i g u r e s l i k e KO Ching-s hih and TaoC h u and left-wing administrator-economists l i k e L i Fu-chun o rPo I-PO. N e v er t h el e s s, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e o b vi ou s d i f f e r e n c e sbetween lef t -wing party-machine f i gu r e s l i k e Teng Hsiao-pingand Tan Chen-lin and r igh t -wing administrator-economists l i k eChen Yun and Teng Tzu-hui, t h e r e have been and remain s igni -f i c a n t d i f f e r ences between t h e par ty-machine f igures , averagedout, and the administrator-economists, ave raged ou t .I n a d d i t i o n t o l o s i n g f a v or w i t h a t leas t some of t h eothe r l eaders f o r t h e i r conduct of t h e S i no -S ov i e t d i spu t eand t h e i r o b s t r u c t i v e i n t e r v e n tion i n economic development,Liu, Teng, Peng Chen and other par ty-machine f igures , as t h eb e n e f i c i a r i e s of Mao's f a v o r i n t h e va ri ou s ways noted above,have un ques t iona bly provoked t h e resen tment o f some of t h el eader s of o t h e r g roups . They have a l so g i ven t h e S ov i e tp a r t y almost as much cause as h a s Mao t o w i s h t o s ee thembrou ght down. The f o r tu n e s of Mao and t h e party-machine l ead-e rs t h u s seem i n t e r t w i n e d . They a p p e a r ' t o need each o t h e r ,because t h e y have t h e same opponents , both domest ic andfo re i gn , and each has assets i mp or ta nt t o t h e o t h e r . More-ove r , w i t hou t t h e c o n t i n u i n g s u p p o r t of Mao, t h e party-machine

l eade rs may not become h i s h e i r s ; and i f o t he r l eader s becomeh i s h e i r s , Mao can have no confidence (he can never have as-s u r a n c e ) t h a t h i s p o l i c i e s w i l l p r e v a i l a f t e r h e has r e l i n q u i s h -ed t h e i n s t rum en t s of power.Throughout t h e ye ar s 1958-1961, most of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r -economi s t f i gu re s a round Chou En -la i have been associated w i t ht h e p o l i c i e s of t h e dominant l eaders (Mao and t h e party-machinef i g u r e s ) c l o s e l y e nough t o r em ai n i n a c t i v e ro l e s , b u t i n d i v i -d u a l members of t h e admi nis t r a tor -eco nomi st group have shownv a r i o u s d e g r e e s of r e s e r v a t i o n s about them. These l eadershave been most prominent i n per iods of re t rea t (much more mark-ed i n d om es ti c p o l i c i e s ) , b u t e v e n i n these per iods t h e y haven o t b ee n p er m i t t e d t o c o n te n d t h a t t h e y were r i g h t o r t c make

d i r e c t cr i t i c i sm of the dominant f ig ur es , t he y have been ob l ige dt o e x p l a i n c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i c i e s i n a c o n t e x t of de fend i ngt h e r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s f o r which o t h e r s were p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i bl e ,and th ey have had t o acquiesce i n d i s t o r t i o n s o f t h e record


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which could l a t e r be used (if necessa ry) aga ins t them. Calcu la t -i n g t h e b a l a n ce of power a nd r e a d in g c o r r e c t l y t h e s i g n s ofMao's f a v o r f o r the par ty-machine f igure , the y have appa ren t lybeen eq-ly cir cum spe ct i n p a rt y meetings and have avoideda t e s t of s t r e n g t h . I n t h e various c ha ng es i n t h e s t r u c t u r eof power i n t h e p a s t t h r e e y e a r s , t h e y ha ve n o t g a in e d i ns t r e n g t h n e a r l y a s much as has th e party-machine group, anda number of second-level admin is ra tor-em nomists have beenpurged.most of t h e adminis t ra tor-economist f i g u r e s sho u ld have ga inedi n f a v o r w i th Mao a nd t h e p ar ty -m ach in e l e a d e r s i n t h i s p e r i o d ,However, even i f t h e dominant f i gu re s were fa i r -minded, mostof t h e administrator-economists, t h r o u g h t h e i r i n c r e a s e d as-so c i a t io n wi th " leap fo rward" po l i c i es f rom autumn 1959 t o l a t e1960, have reduced the suuount of c r e d i t t h e y w o u ld otherwisebe e n t i t l e d t o . In an y case, the dominant l eader s do not ap-p e a r t o be fa i r -minded, do not seem disposed t o concede evenp r i v a t e l y , l e t a l o n e p u b l i c l y , t h a t o t h e r s ha ve be en moren e a r l y r i g h t t h a n t h e y h a v e . As suggested above, the adminis-t ra to r -economis t f i g u r e s have seemed t o b e c o n s c io u s o f t h i s ,have seemed t o b e c a r e f u l no t t o g i v e o f f e n s e t o the dominantleaders by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t he y ( t h e administrator-economists)had been more n e a rl y r i g h t .

In t h e l i g h t of t h e course of Chinese economic development,

As of l a t e 1961, most of t h e adminis t ra tor-economist lead-ers seem t o be i n t h e l i m i t e d favor of Mao a nd t h e p a r t y -machine le ad er s. They seem t o be i u . much b e t t e r f a vor w i t h t h eS o v i e t p a r t y t h a n a re Mao and t h e party-machine gro up, b u tthe y presumably recogn ize t h a t Sov ie t f avor f o r them,. a tl e a s t a t t h i s t i m e , is p o s i t i v e ly d a n g e r o u s t o them. I t seemsi n t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o t r y t o con t inue t o be regarded by thedominan t f igures as u s e f u l t e c h n i c i a n s , t o t r y i n de ed t oc o n c i l i a t e a nd p l e a s e t h e d ominant f i g u r e s , u n t i l c i rc u m st a nc e sare more f a v o r a b l e ( i f t h e y ever are) f o r a showdown.

I n t h e y e a r s 1958-1961, t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h ave n ot hada s t a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th Mao and w i th t h e o th e r g r ou ps ofl eader s , Some of t h e m i l i t a r y l eaders , f e e l i n g s t r o n g e noughi n 1958-1959 t o c o n t e s t t h e p r o p o s i ti o n s and p o l i c i e s of t h edorhinant non-mil i tary le ad er s , and the n de sp er ate enough t oc a r r y t h e i r case (through Peng Te-huai) t o t h e S o v i e t p a r t y ,were t h e main o b j e c t s of t h e p u r ge of autumn 1959. Since then ,t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t h as be en s u b o r d in a t e d t o g e n e r a l sr e s p o n s i v e f a r more t o Mao t h a n t o t h e i r m i l i t a ry comrades.- v i i -


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Since 1959, o n l y L i n Pia0 of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r yleaders (as d i s t i n c t from p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s , who are p a r tof t h e party-machine) h a s played an important pub l i c r o l e .I n t h i s r o l e , he has defended t h e subo rd i na t i on of t h e m i l i t a r yt o t h e par ty , app lauded Mao's p r o p o s i t i o n s o n world Communists t r a t e gy and p rocl a im ed t h e l o y a l t y of t h e m i l i t a r y t o t h ep a r t y a n d t o Mao pe rs on al ly . The pronouncements of Liu ando t he r m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s have shown an aw arenes s t h a t the non-m i l i t a r y leaders regard c o n t r o l of t h e m i l i t a r y as t h e mosti m por t an t pa r t of t h e i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y e f f o r t .As noted above, Mao's presumed l o s s of f a v o r w i t h someof h i s i m p o r t a n t l i e u t e n a n t s has d e r i v e d from h i s s t a n d a g a i n s t

t h e S o v ie t p a r t y , h i s r ad i ca l domestic programs, and h i s pre-ferment of t h e party-machine leaders . Of these i s s u e s , t h eS i no -Sov ie t d i s pu t e , i n t h e con t ex t of Chinese economic m i s -f o r t u n e s , seems t o have t h e grea tes t p o t e n t i a l f o r caus i nga c r i s i s i n t h e C hi ne se p a r t y i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e .a ' Sov ie t team' i n China-cente r ing on Chou En-lai , w i t h ChenYun as t h e p r i nc ip a l economic p lanner and t h e purged Peng Te-h u a i (or a more pruden t associate w i t h s i m i l a r views, p o s s ib lySu Yu) as t h e p r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y f i g u r e . But Moscow cannotf i e l d i t s team so l ong as Ma0 and the party-machine leadersdominate t h e p a r t y .a id t o China, i t is open t o Moscow t o e x p e l o r t o t h r e a t e n t oexpe l t h e P e i p i ng regime f r o m the bloc. This could be doneby d e c l a r i n g p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e USSR w i l l no longer honor t h eS i no -S ov i e t t r e a t y , or by w ar ni ng p r i v a t e l y t h a t t h i s a c t i o nis contemplated; the l a t t e r w o u l d seem preferable, i n ordernot t o encourage t h e C hi nese N a t i ona l i s t s . If t h e S ov i e tp a r t y chooses n o t t o push t h e d i s p u t e t o t h i s po in t , and ont h e assumption t h a t t h e a n t i c i p a t e d food c r i s i s i n C hi nadoes not become t h e kind of d i s a s t e r which would r e su l t i nanarchy, Mao can probably con t inue as t h e C hinese p a r t y leaderw i t h o u t ser ious cha l l enge-- i . e . , w i thout f i nd in g i t neces sa ryt o purge more t h a n a n i so la ted leader or two, as he d i d PengTe-huai. However, if t h e S ov i e t pa r t y w i shes t o p u t m a x i m u mpre s su re o n Mao a t a t i m e of i n a x i m u m Chinese weakness, an at-t r a c t i v e course would seem t o be t o t h r e a t e n t o withdraw fromt h e t r ea ty , t im in g t h i s a c t i o n t o immediately precede or t oco i nc i de with t h e a n t i c i p a te d food cr is is in sp ri ng 1962. The

There is ev idence t h a t t h e Kremlin has a l r e a d y se l ec t ed

I n a d d i t i o n t o con t i nu i ng t o wi thho ld subs t an t i a l e conom i c

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Sovie t c a l cu la t i on would presumably b e - - s t i l l assuming a c r i s i ss h o r t of a d i s a s t e r - - t h a t Mao would n o t g i v e i n bu t t h a t o t h e r swould wish t o , t h u s f o r c i n g a t e s t of s t r e ng t h be tw een t he Mao-l e d i n t r a n s i g e n t s and t h o s e who m u l d see no hope e i t he r fo rChina 's development or C hi na ' s de fense w i t hou t t h e a l l i a n c e .I t is n o t i n c o n c e iv a b l e t h a t , i n s u c h a n e v e n t , t h e p ar t y -machine l e ad er s would tu r n aga ins t M a o , b u t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t yseems small, i n view o f t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n e ve r yo n e' s e y e s(Chinese o r Russ ian) w i t h Mao's p o s i t i o n s . The p r o b a b i l i t yis t h a t Mao and most of t h e party-machine l e ade r s would standt o g e t h e r i n a showdown, and t h a t t he y m u l d win.

a new l e ad e r sh i p w i t h a new policy would be genuine ly deba tedamong t h e 18 vo t i ng members o f t h e po l i tb ur o , because t h ec h a l l e n g e r s co u ld n o t a f f o r d t o lose , and, even i f t hey couldwin a vote, t h e y could no t expec t Mao and the party-machinel e a d e r s t o accep t peaceab l y t h e i r d i s l odgem en t .

I t does no t seem l i k e l y t h a t t h e i s s u e of whether t o have

I f t h i s i s s u e d i d in de ed come t o a vo t e , i t is probab l et h a t t h e cha l l en ge r s would l o se r i g h t t he re . On t he assump-t ion -an u n r ea l i s t i c one- - tha t eve ryone w o u l d vo t e acco rd i ngt o h i s c o n sc i en c e a nd w i th c o n fi d en c e t h a t the r e s u l t s wouldbe a cc e pt e d, Mao and t h e party-machine leaders even in thosec i rcumstances cou ld probably count on a t l e a s t t e n v o te s :Mao, t he par ty -machine l eaders L i u , Teng, and Peng Chen, Mao'so l d m i l i t a r y comrade Chu Te, t h e m i l i t a r y l eader Lin P iao ,L i n ' s oldt ime p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r L o Jung-huan, and t h e l e s se rparty-machine f ig ur e s Tan Chen-lin , KO Ching-Shih and L i Ching-chuan . I f one of th e l e s s l o y a l o r l e ss r a d i c a l f i g u r e s , s a yKO, were t o j o i n t h e o p p os i t io n , Mao w o u l d still have a s t and -o f f , b ut r a t h e r t h a n a s h i f t i n t h a t d i re c t i o n , i t seems morel i k e l y i n s te a d t h a t Mao and th'e others named above would bejoined by some of t h e admini s t ra to r -economis t f igures - -perhapsby t h e p a r t y e l d e r Tung Pi-wu and by those who have workedm os t c l o se l y w i t h t h e p a r t y m achi ne , Li 3u-chun and L i Hsien-n i en . The oppos i t i on m ight co ns i s t , or example, only ofChou E n- la i, Chen Yun, Chen Y i , and t he d i s appo i n t ed one t i m ef i e l d army commanders L i u Po-cheng and Ho Lung.

S t i l l on t h e u n r ea l i s t i c as sum pt ion t h a t t h e C hi nese pa r t ywou ld adhe re t o p a r l i am en t a ry p rocedu re , i f a s t and-of f i n t h ep o l i t b u r o were subni i tt ed t o a p l e n a r y s e s s i o n of t h e c e n t r a lconunit tee (as Klirushchev has maintained was t h e case i n h i s- ix -


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,

.

c lash w i t h t h e " a n t i pa r t y g roup" i n June 1957) it is a g a i np robab l e t h a t Mao and t h e party-machine group w o u l d win. Oft h e 93 (a t m o s t ; perhaps no more than 85) f u l l ( v o t i n g ) membersof t h e c e n t r a l ' c o n u n i t t e e , t h e p a r t y ' s d om in an t l e a d e r s c o u ldp robab l y coun t on about 45 v o t e s f r o m t h e s ta r t , so t h a tv i r t u a l l y a l l t h e other members would have t o consbine from t h estart t o m a k e a s t a n d , As i n t h e case of t h e p o l i t b u r o , i tseems more l i k e l y i n st e ad t h a t t he r e w o u l d be a r a p i d t r a n s f e rt o t h e r a n k s of Mao's suppor t e r s , w i t h o n l y a few too proudo r t o o obtuse t o j o i n t h e r u s h .In any ca se , i t I s n o t c red i b l e t h a t Mao and t h e pa r t y -machine l eaders could be di s l od ge d by means s impl y of a vote

i n t h e p o l i t b u r o or c e n t r a l commit tee. Whatever t h e case mayhave been i n t h e c h a l l e n g e t o Khrushchev by t h e " a n t i - p a r t ygroup" i n June 1957 , i n t h e C hi nese pa r t y t h e c h a l l e n g e r sa l m o s t c e r t a i n l y w o u l d n o t act u n t i l ' t h e y had conf idence t h a tt h e y cou ld b r i n g g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y force t o b ea r t h a n could t h echa l l enged . In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , c e r t a i n r ep o r t s of develop-ments i n Moscow imme diat ely a f t e r S t a l i n ' s dea th i n 1953 arer e l evan t : nam e l y , t h a t Ber iya sur rounded t h e Kremlin w i t hsec re t p o l i c e t roops , and these i n t u r n were surrounded andn e u t r a l i z e d by regu la r army forces .I t w o u l d be h a r d f o r any group of cha l l enge r s - - t o Maoand t h e party-machine leaders--to have con f i dence t ha t t heycould command greater resources i n armed force . The forces

which cou ld be brought t o bear would presumably be some com-b i n a t i o n o f t h e f o r c e s b e l ie v e d r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e f o l l o w i n gf i g u r e s : L i n Pia0 ( m i n i s t e r of d e f e n s e ) , Lo Ju i - ch i ng (L i n ' sc h i e f - o f - s t a f f , and commander of p u b l i c s e c u r i t y f o r c e s ) , L iKO-nung (believed s t i l l chief of t h e secre t pol ice ) , L i u Ya-l o u (commander of t h e a i r fo rc e ) , H s u Kuang-ta (commander oft h e armored forces) , and Yang Yung ( the l a s t - i d e n t i f i e d com-mander of t h e P e i p i n g r e g i o n a l headquar t e r s and of t h e P e i p i n gg a r r i s o n command). The f i r s t two named are r ega rded as Mao'sown men and the t h i r d 2s b e l i e v e d r e s p o n s iv e to Ma0 and TengH s iao -p i ng j o i n t l y , w h i l e one (L iu ) of t h e r e m a i n i n g t h r e e isa l ign ed wi th L in P ia 0 and anoth er (Yang) was a s s o c i a t e d formany years w i t h Teng; Yang's assignment t o and c o n t i n u a t i o n i nthese s e n s l t i v e P e i pi ng posts presumably r e f l e c t s Teng's assess-ment of him as r e l i a b l e . I n s u m , no t on l y w o u l d t h e c h a l l e n g e r shave a ha rd time l i n i n g up s u f f i c i e n t armed suppor t f rom thesesources, b u t , i f they guessed wrong even once, t h e i r o v e r t u re swould be r e p o r t e d a nd t h e i r group would be wiped o u t .

- x -


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==L

It. was noted e a r l i e r , however, t h a t there w a s a p o s s i -b i l i t y w o r t h mentioning of Mao's invo lun ta ry remova l . Foro n e t h i n g , t h e w id th an d d e p t h of resen tment of Ma0 is b e l i e v e dt o be s u c h t h a t t h e r e is a c on ti nu in g p o s s i b i l i t y of h i sa s s a s s i n a t i o n . In Mao's ramblings about China, he mus t some-t i m e s be an easy t a rge t , a nd a n a s s a s s in a t i o n m ig ht be managedby a p e r s o n a c t f n g either on h i s own o r i n c o l l u s i o n w i t h someof Maots l i e u t e n a n t s . Mao might a l s o be k i l l e d by a smallgroup a t a m e et ing i n P e ip in g , w i t h t h e d e a t h e x p l a i n ed asdue t o cerebral hemorrhage o r whatever.Moreover, t h e a b o v e c a l c u l a t i o n s on t h e s t r u c t u r e ofpower-on t h e r e s p o n s iv e n e s s of individuals and components

t o Ma0 and t h e par ty -mach ine l eader s - repre sen t s imply proba-c a l c u l a t i o n s might l e a d t o a v e r y d i f f e r e n t c o n c l us i o n . F orexample, i f t h e party-machine l eaders as a group were t o t u r na g a i n s t Mao, i n c o mb in a ti on w i t h some of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r -down. If Teng Hsiao-ping al one , of t h i s group, were t o t u r na g a i n s t Mao and o t h e r party-machine l eade rs , in combinat ionw i t h othe r groups he might be able t o b r i n g down bo t h Mao an dt h e other party-machine l eader s , as he has a p p a r e n t l y b u i l thimse l f a p o s i t i o n i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of power i n f e r i o r o n l yt o Map's (he does n o t a p p e a r t o have Mao's r e s o u r c e s i n armedforce),hear ted a l l e g i a n c e t o Mao t h a t L in P i a o h a s had, b u t Pengn e v e r t h e l e s s t u rn e d a g a i n s t Mao, and i t is n o t im p o s s ib l e t h a tL i n w i l l do so; s h o u ld L in d o so, h e migh t , d e s p i t e t h e ill-n e s s t h a t reduces h i s a b i l i t y t o l e a d a m i l i t a r y g r ou p, be a b l et o p ut d e c i si v e force a t t h e d i s p o s a l of t h e c h a l l e n g e r s . ThePe ip in g hea dq ua rt er s and ga r ri s on commander, Yang Yung, who isnot known t o be close t o Mao, and sec r e t pol ice chief Li KO-nung, who has b e e n r e p o r t e d b y some sources as close t o ChouE n - l a i , are both we l l -p laced f o r s w i f t a c t i o n i n s u pp o rt ofa coup. Moreover, t h e r e have been renewed in d i ca t i on s i n re-cent months t h a t t h e p a r t y leaders are n ot y e t s a t i s f i e d w i t ht h e i r degree of c o n t r o l of t h e m i l i t a r y .

. b i l i t i e s , an d a mistake o r a change in any p a r t of these

economist and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s they cou ld pr oba b ly b r i n g h i m

Also, Peng Te-huai had t h e same p u b l i c r e c o r d of whole-

T h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s lo d ge m e nt t h a t e x i s t s f o r Mao e x i s t sa l so fo r the par ty-machine leaders , i f Mao were t o t r y t o pre-se rv e h i s own po s i t i oq by s ' a c r i f i c i ng them t o a s t r o n g c o a l i -t i o n of a d m in i st r a to r- e c o n om is t a nd m i l i t a r y c h a l l e n g e r s . B u tMad h i ms e lf would p ro b a bl y n o t l o n g s u r v i v e t h e f a l l o f t h e- , x i -


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party-machine l eaders . Moreover, i f not caugh t unpreparedand conf ro n ted by mass ive armed fo rce , t h e party-machineleaders could make a f i g h t f o r i t , and might win. They haveim p o r t a n t s o u r c e s of both i n t e l l i g e n c e a nd f as t -m ov ing (ifsmall-scale) armed force: Teng Hsiao-ping is t h e probables u p e r v i s o r of t h e sec re t p o l i c e , which among other t h i n g sg u ar d s p a r t y leaders and d i r e c t s c o u n t e r - i n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h earmed forces, and Teng has some of h i s own men i n t h a t body;as s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l Teng o v e r s e e s t h e p o l i t i c a l depar tment ,and h a s some of h i s own men the re too; t h e m i n i s t e r of p u b l i cs e c u r i t y and t h e p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r of t h e P e ip in g headquar t e r sare bot h Teng' s pr ot eg es ; and Peng Chen is t h e p a r t y s e c r e t a r yi n P e ip l ng .w i l l p r o b a bly n o t be h e l d on sche dule , and might even be pos t -poned u n t i l t h e p a r t y h a s a l o t more t o celebrate t h a n i t doesnow. On t h e assumption, however, t h a t t h e c o n g r e s s is t o beh e ld sometime i n t h e n e x t s i x m on th s, Mao and t h e party-machinele ad er s may be d e v i s i n g r i g h t now t h e changes i n t h e c e n t r a lp a r t y o r g a n s , t o be ' v o t e d ' a t and immediately a f t e r t h e con-g r e s s , which w i l l p r e s e r v e them i n t h e i r dominan t pos i t ions .

The par ty 's Ninth Congress , supposed t o convene i n 1961,

The ro le of p a r t y l eaders in making t h e p r i n c i p a l repor t st o t h e c o n g r e s s s h o u l d again i l l u s t r a t e ( d e l i b e r a t e l y so) t h er e l a t i v e s t an d in g of i n d i v i d u a l leaders and t h e v a r io u s g r o u p s .Some conc lus ions migh t be drawn too from t h e degree t o whicht h e congress is a n o p e n a f f a i r ; the September 1 9 5 6 s e s s io n wasopen, t h e May 1958 s e s s i o n l a r g e l y closed .a b l y make some r a the r b r i e f b u t impor tan t open ing remarks an dLiu Sbao-chi w i l l t h e n g i v e t h e p r i n c i p a l r e p o r t , which w i l lcover t h e f u l l r a n g e o f t h e p a r t y ' s a f f a i r s , o u t l i n i n g t h es i t u a t i o n , d e s c r i b i n g t h e p a r t y ' s g e n e ra l l i n e , and d e f i n i n gt h e p a r t y ' s t a s k s . Teng H sl a o- p in g seems l i k e l y t o make t h er e p o r t s e c on d i n im p o r ta n c e, a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s io n ( t h a ni n L i u ' s r e p o r t ) of t h e C hi ne se p a r t y ' s p o s i t i o n i n t h e worldCommunist movement (in p a r t i c u l a r , S in o- So vi et r e l a t i o n s ) andperhaps a l so of t h e C hi n es e p a r t y ' s s t a t e of h e a l t h .l i k e l y t ha t t h e t h i r d of t h e p r i n c i p a l r e p o r t s , a more d e t a i l e dd i s c u s s i o n ( t h a n in L i u ' s o r Te ng 's r e p o r t s ) of economic ac-complishments and plans, w i l l be g i ven by one of t h e a d m in i s t r a -t o r -e c on o m is t f i g u r e s , p r o b a bly Chou E n - l a i o r Li Fu-chun.

tAs a t bo t h s e s s i o n s of t h e Eighth Congress , Mao w i l l prob-

I t seems

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A t t h e May 1958 s e s s i o n a l l th ree of th e main r epor t s weregiven by party-machine f i g u r e s , b u t t h i s t i m e , i n a p e r i o d ofdep re s s i on , i t is doub t fu l t h a t any of them would care t om a k e t h e economic repor t . Af ter many more lesser speeches bylesser f i g u r e s ( p e r h a p s more t h a n l oo ) , t h e fo rmat c a l l s f o rt h e cong re s s on i t s l a s t day t o p u b l i s h t h e nam e l i s t of t h enew cen t ra l committee, which i n t h e f o ll o w in g da y or two h o l d si t s f i r s t plenum t o e l e c t t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e c e n t r a l committeeand ( con cu r ren t l y ) p o l i t b u r o and t h e members of t h e p o l i t b u r o ,sec re t a r i a t , and cont rol commission.As no t ed ea r l i e r , Mao ap pa re nt ly int en ds t o remain chai r -man of t h e c e n t r a l committee, i n which p o s t he is a u t o m a t i c a l l y

chairman of t h e p o l i t b u r o and s e n i o r member of t h e pol i tburo ' snow s m a l l s t a n d i n g committee ( t h e i n n e r c i r c le of t h e i n n e rc i r c l e ) . If i n s t e a d he becomes honorary cha irman (an ac t i onw e w o u l d r e g a r d as i nvo l un t a ry a t t h i s t i m e ) , L i u Shao-chiw o u l d probably become the chairman; t h e dark horse is TengHsiao-ping .The f i v e v ice-cha irmen of t h e c e n t r a l commit tee , con-c u r r e n t l y members of t h e s t a n d i n g committee, L i u Shao-chi ,Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Chen Yun, and Li n Piao, w i l l probablyr e t a i n these p o s t s ; there is a chance, however, t h a t Chen Yunw i l l be dropped from these p o s t s f o r r i g h t i s t s e nt im en t w h i l ekeep i ng h i s membership i n t h e p o l i t b u r o .l eaders might add Peng Chen t o t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e c e n t r a l com-

mittee and hence t o t h e s t and ing conuni t t ee , w h i l e t h e adminis-t r a t o r - econom i s t s would probably l i k e t o add Chen Y i or L i Fu-chun , t h e l a t t e r be i ng more acceptable t o t h e party-machinegroup; t h e a d d i t i o n of e i t h e r Peng or L i would p u t a secondpe r son i n t h e p o s i t i o n now occupied by Teng Hsiao-ping alone,i . e . be i ng a member c o n c u r r e n t l y of t h e p o l i t b u r o , s t a n d i n gcommittee, and sec re t a r i a t . Teng w i l l probably remain thesec re t a ry -gene ra l , hence a member of t h e s t a n d i n g committeeand s e n i o r m e m b e r of t h e s e c r e t a r i a t .

The party-machine

The o t h e r e i g h t f u l l (vo t ing) members of t h e p o l i t b u r o- -i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e se ve n of f i c e r s named above, p lu s PengChen, Chen Y i , and Li Fu-chun--wil l probably be r e t a i n e d .These are t h e par ty -m achi ne f i gu re s KO Ching-Shih, L i Ching-chuan, and Tan Chen-l in (al th ough there is an o u t s i d e chancet h a t t h e e x t r e m i s t T a n w i l l be dropped as a s o p t o other lead-e r s ) ; pa r t y e l d e r Tung Pi-wu and t h e adm3nis t ra to r -economis tL i H s ien -n ien ; t h e i n a c t i v e m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s Eo Lung and Liu Po-cheng

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( a l t h o u g h t h e r e is a n o u t s i d e c ha nc e t h a t L i u w i l l be dropped) ;and t h e i n a c ti v e p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r Lo Jung-huan. Any or a l lof t h e a l t e r n a t e ( n o n - v o t i n g ) m e m b e r s of t h e p o l i t b u r o - - t h eparty-machine f ig ur es Kang Sheng and Ulanfu, t h e adm inis t ra tor-e c o n o m is t f i g u r e s Po I-PO and Chang Wen-tien, and t h e propagand-is ts L u Ti ng -i and Chen Po-ta--might be el ev at ed t o f u l l member-s h i p , e x c e p t for Chang Wen-t ien , who may be drop pe d for r i g h t -is t a c t i v i t y .A few par ty l eaders w i l l probab ly be added t o t h e p o l i t -buro, as e i t h e r f u l l o r a l t e r n a t e members. A t l e a s t two p a r ty -machine f i gu r e s , i n c lu d in g o n e o r more of t h e f o l l o w in g f o u r ,w i l l probably be selected: Tao Chu (Southwest B u r e a u ) , SungJen-chiung (North east Bureau), Li u Lan-tao ( s e c r e t a r i a t , an dpo ss ib ly North China Bureau) and Hsieh Fu-chih (minis ter of

p u b l i c s e c u r i t y ) . ( I t shou ld be n o t e d t h a t L i u Lan-tao hasbeen o u t of the news f o r a year ; a l though w e t h i n k it l i k e l yt h a t he has been occup ied wi th an unpubl ic ized ta sk , ano the robs erve r may be r i g h t i n surmi s ing th a t Liu; who announcedand played a p a r t i n t h e pu rg e of autumn 1959, has himselfbeen purged.) Other party-machine f i g u r e s who may be con-s i d e r e d , each of whom seems t o have an o u t s i d e chance of mak-i n g t h e p o l i t b u r o , are L i u Ning -i and Li u Chang-sheng ( laborl e a d e r s ) , L i Wei-han (u ni te d f r o n t ) , Wang Chia- hsian g, L iHsueh-feng and Yang Shang-kun (members of t h e sec re t a r i a t ) ,Tan Cheng and Hsiao H ua ( p o l i t i c a l depar tment) , and Lin Feng(educa t ion coord ina to r ) .One or more of t he admin is t ra to r-economis t f i g u r e s w i l l

probably be added t o t h e p o l i t b u r o . Those who seem t o havet h e b e s t c ha nc e t o be named appear t o be Nieh Jung-chen (chair-man of t h e s c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n o lo g i c a l c om miss io n) a nd , of a l lpeople, Teng Tzu-hui ( r u r a l work department), whose appearance( s m i l i n g b r oa d ly ) w i th t h e l eader s on National Day may meant h a t h e is again i n good favo r . Those with an o u t s i d e chance,if t h e leaders wish t o b r i n g a woman i n t o t h e p o l i t b u r o f o rt he f i r s t t i m e , include Tsai Chang and Teng Ying-chao, b o t hact ive i n work among women, t h e wives re s pe c ti v e ly of L i Fu-chunand Chou En-lai.There are a f e w non-mi l i t a ry leaders not regarded as a l i g n e dw i th e i t h e r t h e p ar ty -m ac hine g ro u p or the admin is t ra to r -econo-m i s t group who seem t o have an outs ide chance of s e l e c t i o n f o r

o l d t e a c h e r H s u Te- l i and o ld follower Wu Yu-chang, LiaoCheng-chih (s pe ci a l is t i n ' 'peace" f r o n t s ) , and Chao Erh- lu(machine bui ld ing) .-

t h e p o l i t b u r o . These in c lu d e t h e p a r t y ' s o l d e s t elders, Mao's

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I t seems p ro ba bl e t h a t a n ot h er a c t i v e m i l i t a r y f i g u r e ,Lo Ju i-ch ing , ch i e f -o f - s ta f f , w i l l be added t o t h e s i n g l em i l i t a r y l e ad e r , Lin Piao, now on th e po l i t bu ro . However,as noted e a r l i e r , L i , l i k e Li n, is respons ive t o Mao, n o t t oh i s m i l i t a ry comrades. None of t h o s e e l i g i b l e who would bemore n e a r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of most m i l i t a r y leaders seems t ohave more t h a n a n o u t s i d e chance of being named: H s u Hsiang-chi en ( in ac t i ve ) , Hsiao Ching-kuang (navy) , Liu Y a - l o u ( a i rfo rce ) , Hsu Kuang-ta (armored fo rces ) , Yeh Chien-ying (m il i t ar yacademy), and Wang Shu-sheng (a d e p u ty m in i s t e r of d e f e n s e ) .Par ty -machine f i gu re s a l rea dy occupy e i g h t of t h e 11pos t s i n t h e sec re t a r i a t : Teng Hsiao-ping, secr e tar y-g ener al ,

who d i r e c t s t he work of t h e sec re t a r i a t and is beli'eved t os u p e rv i s e d i r e c t l y sec re t po l i ce work; Peng Chen, h i s sen io rdepu ty , and th e p robab le supe rv i s o r of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n de-par tme nt ; Tan Chen-l in, t h e l i n k wit h pa r t y and governmentorgans concerned with r u r a l work; Wang Chia-h sia ng, co nc er ne dwi th l i a i s o n wit h for e i gn Communist pa r t ie s ; Tan Cheng, t h el i n k w i t h p o l i t i c a l c o nt r ol of t h e m i l i t a r y ; L i Hsueh-feng,org an s concerned wit h in du st ry and communications; Li u Lan-t ao , di sc ip l i na ry and s e c u r i t y bodies ; and Yang Shang-kun,c e n t r a l committee a d m in i s t r a t i o n . The o t h e r s are the admin is -t ra to r -economis t s L i Fu-chun, th e l i n k wi th o rgans concernedwi th economic plan nin g, and L i Hsien-nien, f i nan ce and t r a de ;an d Mao's wri ter Hu Chiao-mu, i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . Huang KO-cheng,t h e sec re t a r i a t ' s l i n k w i th t h e p a r t y ' s m i l i t a r y committeeand t h e m i l i t a r y (as opposed t o p o l i t i c a l ) a f f a i r s of t h em i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , was dropped some t i m e ago for h i s a s -s o c i a t i o n w i th Pe ng T e- hu ai i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Mao's p o l i c i e s .

A l l of t h e above 11 (no t in cl ud in g Huang) appear to bei n good favo r , and almost a l l of them, exce pt thos e given keypos t s o u t s i d e Pei pi ng which would n ot permit them t o take p a r ti n t h e d a i l y work of t h e sec re t a r i a t , w i l l p r o b a b ly k e e p t h e i rp o s t s , w i t h some of t h e a l t e r n a t e members becoming f u l l mem-b e r s . I t is poss ib le , however , t h a t th e extremist Tan w i l lbe rep lace d (conceivab ly by h i s r i v a l , Teng Tzu-hui , more l i k e l yby a party-machine f i g u r e l i k e Liao Lu-yen or Chen Cheng-jen),t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e l y i n a c t i v e Tan Cheng w i l l be rep laced by as imi l a r b u t more e n e r g e t i c t y p e l i k e H si ao H u a , t h a t Wang Chia-h s i a n g w i l l be re pl ac ed by Wu Hsiu-chuan, h i s d ep ut y i n t h el i a i s o n d ep ar tme nt , a nd t h a t L iu La n- ta o w i l l be r e p l a c e d byChang Ting-cheng or Wang Tsung-wu i f Liu has been ass igned toone of t h e r e g io n a l b u r e a us .- xv -


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Some s e c r e t a r i e s .may be added t o t h e sec re t a r i a t , t o ac tas l in ks wi th p a r ty and government o rgans i n some o t he r areasof concern regarded as now meriting a f u l l - t i m e s e c r e t a r y .I t would seem n e c e s s a r y , f o r example, t o replace Huang Ko-cheiig ( th is may a l r e a d y have been done) as the link w i t h t h em i l i t a r y , a nd e a c h g r ou p of l e a d e r s w o u l d l i k e t o see one ofi t s own men i n t h i s impor tant po st . The party-machine lead-ers w i l l probab ly succeed i n i n s t a l l i n g a p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a lor s e c u r i t y t y p e l i k e Lo J ung-huan o r Lo Ju i -ch ing , whereast h e administrator-economists would 1 k e t o have a onetimem i l i t a r y l e a de r c l o s e t o t h e m s e lv e s l i k e N i e h Jung-chen o rYe11 C hien -y in g, a nd t h e a c t i v e m i l i t a r y l eaders w o u l d p r e f e rsoineone l i k e Su Yu o r Hsu Kuang-ta or Yang Cheng-wu.Some other areas of conce rn which may be give n gr ea t err e p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h e s e c r e t a r i a t th an t he y now have, andsome p a r t y leaders q u a l i f i e d t o d e a l w i t h them (party-machinef i g u r e s u n l e ss o t h e r wi s e s p e c i f i e d ) , are: minor i ty na t ion-a l i t i e s , which have been a problem, and which w o u l d probablyrequ i re a man w i t h a p u b l i c s e c u r i t y o r i n t e l l i g e n c e back-ground as w e l l , s u c h as L i Wei-han; t h e sec re t p o l i c e , H s i e hFu-chih, or L i Ko-nung; s c i e n t i f i c development, L in Feng orChang Chi-chun; fo re ig n a f f a i r s , Wu Hsiu-chuaa, t h e unalignedLiao Cheng-chih, or t h e adminis t ra tor-economist f i g u r e ChangHan-fu; foreign t rade , t h e administrator-economists Yeh Chi-chuang o r Pang I ; youth and women's work, Hu Yao-pang, o r oneof the wives of t he admin ist ra to r -economis t l e ad er s ; and th e

r e g i on a l b ur ea us , o ne of t h e c u rr e n t r e g io n a l f i r s t sec re t a r i e s ,such as KO Ching-Shih, o r an admin ist ra to r -economis t f i gu rew i t h s i m i l a r exper ience such as H s i Chung-hsun.' The re l a t i v e l y unimpor tant c on t r o l commission , concernedw i t h d i s c i p l i n a r y q u e s t i o n s below t h e c e n t r a l committee l e v e l ,c a n s a f e l y r em a in i n t h e h an ds of t h e u n im p or t an t p a r t y e l d e rTung Pi-wu, who i n any case is s u p e r vi s e d by h i s s e n i o r d e pu ty ,Liu Lan-tao, from L i u ' s p o s t on t h e sec re t a r i a t . Some inef -f ec tua l members of t h i s body w i l l probably be dropped.

The d i r e c t o r s a nd d ep u ty d i r ec t o r s of t h e p a r t y ' s c e n t r a ldepartments, which are s u b o r d in a t e t o t h e s e c r e t a r i a t , aren o t t o be named by th e pa r ty congress . These depar tments aree s t a b l i s h e d , a l t e r e d , and s t a f f e d as the need a r i s e s , by t h ep o l i t b u r o s t a n d i n g committee and the sec re t a r i a t .

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The p a r ty ' s c e n t r a l commi tt ee now probably has between85 and 9 3 f u l l members (depend ing on how many of th os e i nd i s f av or have a l re ad y been removed), and between 87 and 92a l t e r n a t e members, Both groups w i l l probably be expanded,as t h e pa r t y m em bership ha s i nc re a sed . Among t h e full (vo t -ing) members t h e r e are about 10 pe r sons a l i gne d w hol ly w i t hMao, about 35 party-machine f i gu re s (by f a r t h e l a r g e s t g ro up ),about 15 adm i n i s t r a t o r - econom i s t f i gu re s , abou t 15 m i l i t a r ymen, and about 15 m i sce l l aneous t ypes no t r ega rded a s b e i n gi n any group . Roughly th es e p ro por t io ns a re expec ted t o pre -v a i l i n t h e new c e n t r a l committee.Many of t h e members and a l t e r n a te members of t h e c e n t r a l

com mi tt ee e l e c t ed i n 1956 a r e no t expec t ed t o appea r on t h enew n a me l is t -- b ot h t h o s e p o s i t i v e l y i n d i s f a v o r and t h o s ewho have done n o t h i n g much t o r e t a i n f avo r . P eng T e-huai andHuang Ko-cheng s h o u l d be among t h e miss ing , as shou ld L i Taoand Chao Chien-min, t h e p r o v i n c i a l sec r e t a r i e s who f e l l i n1958. O t h e r s who may be dropped include: Ku Ta-tsun, FengPai -chu, and Pan Fu-sheng, pr ov in ci al s e c re t a r i e s c r i t i c i z e das r i g h t i s t s i n 1958; Chang Wen-t ien, who may have ven tur edtoo f a r t o t h e ri g h t i n 1959; Yang Te-chih, Hung Hsueh-chih,Chang Ta -chih , Teng H u a , Wan I , H s u Ha i-t un g, Chou Pao-chung, .Wang Sh ih -t ai , and Li u Chen, mi l i t a r y leaders who dropped o u tof t h e news du r i n g o r soon a f t e r t h e pu rge o f autumn 1959 ;Chia To-fu and Yang Hsie n-cheng, who a l s o d i sappea red i n 1959;Shu Tung, L iu Ko-ping, and Chou Ilsiao-chou, t h e p r o v i n c i a lsec re ta r ies removed i n 1960, and Chien Ying, t h e m i n i s t e r ofi n t e r n a l a f f a i r s re pl ac ed i n 1960; Lin T ieh and Cliang Chungl iang, among t h e p r ov i n c i a l f i r s t s e c re t a r i e s r e c e n t l y re-placed or mis sin g from t h e news i n r e ce nt months; Yang Te-c h i h , a m i l i t a r y leader m i ss i ng f o r t h e pa st yea r; Chen Shao-yu, Mao's ol d a n ta gon i s t who h a s been ill i n Moscow f o r manyyear s ; and se ve ra l o th er s who have been in ac t i ve owing t o ill-n e s s or some unappa ren t f a i l i n g , i nc l ud i ng (bu t n o t r e s t r i c t e dt o ) Teng Tai- yuan , Chang Yun-i, I a n g Wei-chou, Cheng Wei-san,L i Li-s an, and Chen Chi-han. The re are on ly two importantpa rty -m ac hin e f i g u r e s i n t h i s s p e c u l a t i v e l i s t , and two o rt h r e e i m p or t a nt a d m in i s tr a t or - e co n o m is t f i g u r e s , w he re as t h e r eare t e n i mp o rt an t m i l i t a r y f i gu r e s . Whatever th e p re c i se .composi t ion of t h e f i n a l c a s u a l t y l i s t , t h e m i l i t a r y areexpec ted t o be h i t t h e h a r d e s t , and t h e pa rt y- ma ch in e g ro upt h e l e a s t h a r d .

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- x v i i -'SESnET * ' - I . , .


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As t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n s u g g e s t s , i t is p r o b a b l e t h a t, - L i u Shao-chi w i l l succeed Mao--if, as thou ght prob abl e, Maosu rv i ves any cr i s i s i n t h e p a r t y i n t h e next few months andif , as is p o s s i b l e , he d i e s of n a t u r a l causes o r s t ep s as idev o l u n t a r i l y i n t h e pe ri od 1962-63. Again, however, t h e pos i -t i o n of Teng Hsia o-p ing and t h e m i l i t a r y leaders w i l l beimpor tan t . Teng seems t o have enough s t r e ng t h t o cha l l engeL i u , i f h e c h oo s es . L in P i a o ' s a l l e g i a n c e has been t o Mao,no t the par ty-machine l e ad er s , and many of t he p rofe ss i ona lm i l i t a r y f i g u r e s have e ve n l ess r ea son t o c h e r i s h L i u t h a nt h e y do Mao; t h e al ignment of L i n a nd /o r o t h e r m i l i t a r y lead-e rs w i t h t h e adminis t ra tor-economist group, after Mao' s de-pa r t u re , m i gh t even t h e odds f o r a s t r u g g l e w i t h L iu and Teng,

t o g e t h er o r s e p a r a t e l y . On t h e o t h e r han d, t h e p r e s e n t ad-mini s t ra to r -economis t leaders, wi thout t h e s t a n d i n g threat ofs i g n i f i c a n t s u p p o r t f o r them from t h e m i l i t a r y , might be pickedoff and squeezed o u t .machine leaders w i l l s t a n d t o g e t h e r s u c c e s s f u l l y a g a i n s t t h e i re x e r t s m a x i m u m p r e s s u r e on P e i p i ng a t a time of maximum Chineseweakness. There is a f a i r p o s s i b i l i t y , h o w e v e r , t h a t Mao w i l l

In s u m , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t Mao and most of t h e par ty-' opponents u n t i l Mao re t i res o r d i e s , e ven i f t h e S o v ie t p a r t y

..

.

be d i s l odged i n a coup, which w o u l d probably be-concea led f romt h e p a r t y masses and t h e p u b l i c . S i m i l a r l y , i t seems l i k e l yt h a t L i u w i l l succeed Mao, b u t t h e r e is a f a i r p o s s i b i l i t y t h a th e w i l l f a l l w i t h Mao o r be brought down soon a f t e r succeed inghim. However it goes, there are l i k e l y to be a d d i t i o n a l casu-a l t i e s among Mao's pres en t l i e u te n a n ts . The vaunted cohesionof t h e Chinese Communist party l e a d e r s h i p , once unique amongCommunist part ies, seems c l e a r l y t o be a t h i n g of t h e p a s t .


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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIPIn t ro duc t o ry N ote

In t h e e a r l y POLO pa pe r s , w e d i s c u s s e d Mao's l i e u t e n a n t si n terms of th ree p r i n c i p a l g ro up s: a group of "party-machine"f i g u r e s , l e d by Li u Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and inc lu di ngPeng Chen and Tan Chen-lin, whose power der ived main ly f r o mt h e i r key p o s i t i o n s i n t h e p a r t y a p p a ra t u s; a group of admin-i s t r a t o r s and economists around premier Chou En-lai and h i sse n i o r depu t y Chen Yun, including Chen Yi, who became f o r e i g nm i n i s t e r i n 1958, a nd i n c l u d i n g t h e e conomic s p e c i a l i s t s L i Fu-chun, L i Hsien-nien, Po I-PO, and Teng Tzu-hui, most of whomalso had pos ts i n t h e p a r t y apparatus b u t whose importance de-r i v e d m a in l y from t h e i r k ey p o s i t i o n s i n t h e government apparatus;and t h e m i l i t a r y leaders around Peng Te-huai o r ( i f h i s h e a l t himproved) Lin Piao.* The men whom w e a l ig n e d i n these groupsu s u a l l y had r e c o r d s o f l o n g and close a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h oneano t he r , seemed t o have common i n t e r e s t s as a r e s u l t of t h e i rfun c t i o ns , and appea red t o have a co rnon gene ra l a t t i t u d e andapproach . The party-machine leaders were t h o s e who seemed t ohave a rad ica l and ' * l e f t i s t " a t t i t u d e or approach t o bothdomestic and f o re i gn po l i cy - - t he a t t i t u d e m o s t c o n ge n ia l t oMao h i m s e l f , a l t hough ' *ob j ec t i ve c i r cum s tances" sometimes forcedMao (and t h e par ty-machine l eaders ) t o re t rea t toward morec o n s e r v a t i v e p o s i t i o n s n o rm a ll y o c c up i ed by other l eade rs .Offensives , 1957-1958

T o r e c a p i t u l a t e some of t h e e a r l y POLO papers , i n m i d -1957 Mao and h i s comrades were faced w i t h t h e f a i l u r e of t h e"hundred f lowers" experiment , a con t inu ing "ebb'' i n China ' seconomic development, and con fus i on in t h e b l o c as t o j us twhere P e i p i n g s tood on matters of i n t r a b l o c r e l a t i o n s . A new

* A l l those c i t e d i n t h i s pa rag raph are f u l l members o f t hep o l i t b u r o e x c e p t P o I-PO, an a l t e r n a t e member, and Teng Tzu-h u i , whose e a r l i e r "conservat i sm" kept him from being named t ot h i s body i n t h e e l e c t i o n s of 1956 and.1958.- 1 -

7 .

...


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h a r d l i n e became a p p a r e n t i n t h e p e r i o d J u n e - November 1957:i n t h e J u n e o f f i c i a l v e r s i o n o f Mao's e a r l i e r s p ee c h o n "con-t r a d i c t i o n s " ; i n t h e c o n du c t o f t h e a n t i - r i g h t i s t c am pa ig nan d t h e p a r t y ' s " r e c t i f i c a t i o n " campaign and t h e merger oft h o s e i n t o a na t ion-wide r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign i n September;i n a t t a c k s on " r i g h t i s t c on se rv at is m" and i n p r e d i c t i o n s o fa for thcoming "upsurge ' i n economic development i n t h e sameper iod; and in Mao's conduct a t the Moscow conference of theCommunist p a r t i e s i n November.The party machine leaders , who had seemed unhappy with

* t h e experiment w i t h " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " and w i th t h e "ebb" i neconomic development, came i n t o t h e i r own i n t h e l a t t e r h a l fof 1957. As t h e p r i n c i p a l s u p e rv i s o rs of t h e " a n t i - r i g h t i s t "r e c t i f i c a t i o n c am pa ig n- -t he p r o g r e s s r e p o r t o n w hic h was givenby Teng Hsiao -ping i n September--they were w e l l s i t u a t e d t od i r e c t t h e e n e r g i e s made a v a i l a b l e t hr ou gh r e c t i f i c a t i o n i n t ot h e n ew "upsurge" i n economic development, which was t o d e r i v ep r im a r i l y f ro m a n un p r ec e de n te d e x p l o i t a t i o n of l a b o r , Int h i s p r oc es s, t h e par ty machine was t o a s s u m e most of ther e s p o n s i b i l i t y a nd a u th o r i t y f o r eco no mic d ev elop me nt a t a l ll e v e l s . After Mao had g i v e n t h e s i g n a l a t a par ty p lenum,t h e p a r t y m ach in e l e a d e r s L i u Shao- chi, Teng Hsiao-ping andTan Chen- lin took t h e l ea d i n autumn 1957 i n pub l ic l y exhor t -i n g t h e " up sur ge " and i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h e m od er at e p o s i t i o n st a k e n ea r l i e r by o t h e r p a r t y l eaders such as Chen Yun andTeng Tzu-hui. The re seemed a happy c o in cid e n c e o f t h e i r p a r t yp o s i t i o n s , t h e i r ro l e s i n t h e major campaigns of 1957-58, andt h e c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n wh ic h t h e y p e r s o n a l l y f a v o r e d . F u r t h e r ,Teng Hsiao-ping w a s Nlao's principal aide i n h i s v i s i t t o Moscowin November 19 57 f o r t h e m ee ti ng of t h e p a r t i e s , and Liu Shao-c h i and Peng Chen made th e p r i nc ip al speech es i n Peip ing ont h e ev e o f t h e same oc cas io n. Chou En- lai and o t h e r s of t h ea d m in i st r a to r- e c o n om is t g r ou p c l e a r l y p l a ye d l e s s e r r o l e s i nt h e l a t t e r h a l f o f 1 9 57 , t h e i r pronouncements b ein g minor o runpubl i shed , a l though L i Fu-chun, L i Hsien -nien and Po I-POa l l pub l ic ly endorsed th e "upsurge" , and L i Hs ien-n ien wasone of th os e accompanying Mao t o Moscow. Peng Te-huai, t h ep r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y f i g u r e , a l so made t h e t r i p t o Moscow,where he and o t he r Chinese l e ad er s appa ren t ly t r i e d a n d f a i l e dt o secure a Sov iet promise of nu cle ar weapons .*

* U n t i l t h e t i m e of t h i s t r i p , Ch inese comment had sugges teda n e x p e c t a t i o n o f e a r l y a c c e s s io n o f n u c l e a r we ap on s; a f t e rt h e t r i p , C hin es e comment s t r o n g ly s u g g e s t e d t h e r e v e r s e .- 2 -


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The scope of t he i n t ended C h i nese cha l l enge t o Moscow--on .ques t ions r e l a t e d both t o t h e b u i l d in g of Communism andt o world Communist stra tegy --wa s no t app are nt i n 1957. T h i swas not t o become appa ren t u n t i l t h e l aunch i ng of t he unpre-cedented ly audacious commune program i n 1958 (d i scussed i nd e t a i l i n t h e e a r l y ESAU papers ) and t h e sys t emat i c deve lop-ment i n 1958-1959 (discussed i n d e t a i l i n l a t e r r p a p e r s )o f c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c concept s pu t fo rward by Ma0 i n oscowi n November 1957. N o doubt P e i p i n g ' s t h i n k i n g was n o t f u l l ydeveloped by t h e end of 1957. However, ev en ts of 1958-59s u g g e s t e d i n c r e a s i n g l y t h a t Mao and t h e pa r t y machine l eadershad made a number of undam en ta l and c l o se l y - r e l a t ed dec i s i onsas f a r back as t h e p e r i o d J u ne - November 1957. These were:t o abandon t h e con ser va t ive program of economic developmentbased o n t h e S o v i e t model, w hich had h i t h e r t o p rev a i l ed , andt o l aunch a r a d i c a l program based on t h e u t m o s t p o s s i b l eo r g a n i z a t i o n , e x h o r t a t i o n , and e x p l o i t a t i o n of the human mate-r i a l ; to abandon the r e l a t i v e l y l i b e r a l l i n e on i n t r a b l o cr e l a t i o n s , t o become champions of u n i t y and d i s c i p l i n e , anda t t h e same t i m e t o resist S ov ie t e f f o r t s t o bind China i t -s e l f t i g h t e r t o t h e b l o c ; f u r t h e r , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e r e h a doccurred a d e c is i v e s h i f t i n t h e b a la nc e of power, t o i n c i t et h e S o v i e t p a r t y t o l e a d t h e world Communist movement i n amuch more agg re s s i ve prog ram, e s pe c i a l l y i n A s i a and t h e o t h e runderdeveloped areas ; and , in t h e i n t e r e s t of a l l of t h e s ep o l i c i e s , t o denounce conse rva t i sm, co nc i l i a t i on , and " r evi -s ionism" wherever they were found .many w a y s , among them t h e f o ll ow i ng : i n e a r l y 1 95 9, t h e t r a n s -format Ion of t h e "upsurgef1 in economic development in t o t h e: 'great l e ap forward" ; i n t h e s p r i n g , t h e s u s t a i n e d Ch in es e a t -ta ck s on Yugoslavia and "modern re v is io ni s t s ' ' everywhere, a t -t a c k s aimed i n p a r t a t t h e R u ss i an s ; i n t h e s u m m e r , t he beg in-n ing of the mass campaign f o r t h e s t u d y of Mao's t hough t ; i nAugus t, d i r e c t ly fo l lowin g th e Mao-Khrushchev t a lk s , t h e or-ga ni za t on of t h e "peo ple ' s communes" on a nat ion-wide bas i s ;i n t h e l a t e sum m er and ea r l y f a l l , P e i p i n g 's v e n tu r e i n t h eTaiwan S t ra i t , which followed an appa ren t C hi nese e f f o r t (suc-c e s s f u l ) t o prevent Khrushchev from a r rang i ng a s u m m i t meet-ing on Middle Eastern developments .

During 1958, t h i s complex of d e c i s i o n s w a s e x p r e s s e d i n

The party machine 1 e a d e r s . b 1 95 8 c o n ti n u ed c l e a r l y t obe t he most powerful group of Mao's l i e u t e n a n t s . F o l l o w i n gMao's l e a d , t h e y were c o n s t a n t l y o n s tage t o p r o cl a i m h i sp o l i c i e s .- 3 -


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I n e a r l y 1 9 5 8, a g a i n on Mao's s i g n a l , p a r t y m achine f i g u r e splayed t h e p r i n c i p a l ro l e s i n e x h or t in g t h e " g r e a t l eap forward"(which was t o l a s t f o r t h ree y e a r s ) a nd i n t h r e a t e n i n g thoseopposed t o a headlong course. Although Chou En-lai and someothers of t h e adm i n i s t r a t o r - econom i s t group associated t hemselvesmodera te ly w i t h t h e "leap'' i n F e br u ar y 1958, these l eaders were' s i l e n t i n March and A p r i l d u r i n g t h e wi l des t g y r a t i o n s of t h el t l e ap l l , w i t h i t s p r o f u s i o n of u n r e a l i s t i c g o a l s - - g o a l s whichd i s p l a c e d those w i t h which t h e admini s t ra to r -economis t s werep e r s o n a l l y associated.

i l l u s t r a t e d a t t h e p a r t y c o n g re s s i n May: t h e m o s t i m por t an treport -summarizing t h e p a r t y ' s s i t u a t i o n , g e n er a l l i n e , andtasks--was gi ve n by L i u Shao-chi. The o t h e r t w o major r epor t s ,o n i n t r a b l o c r e l a t i o n s and on a g r i c u l t u r a l development--wereg iv en r e s p e c t i v e l y by Teng Hsia o-p ing and Tan Chen-l in; anda l l three of t h e p a r t y l eade rs added t o t h e pol i tburo- - the newa g r i c u l t u r a l spokesman Tan Chen-lin and t h e r e g i o n a l leaders

T h e s t a t u s of t h e p a r t y machine leaders was s t r i k i n g l yL .

- . -Y n Phinu-fhih and 1 . i P h i n a ~ ~ h n a n ~ ~ w o r arn+ncrnc i n i n + l . c r n 9 ~ n n.Lv YY*..e-"..-.Ia -* W"*..b --.-.--" l W r - u" "aYY J " I . . Y * J V I n*c&vand t h e party-machine leaders . Added t o t h e p o l i t b u r o s t and-i n g committee a t t h e same t i m e w a s t h e a i l i n g L i n P i a o, Mao'sl on gt im e f a v o r i t e m i l i t a r y l eader , who had apparent ly improvedenough for l i m i t e d a c t i v i t y .p a r t y s e c r e t a r i a t were L i Fu-chun and L i Hsien-nie n, two oft h e t h r e e most a c t i v e economic s p e c i a l i s t s , who were no t pa r t y -machine f i g u r e s and who almost c e r t a i n l y had r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u tt h e p o l i c i e s o f these leaders b u t who c o u l d s e r v e t h e p a r t ymachine w e l l i n i t s expanded role i n t h e Itleap" and t h e i m m i -nent "commune" program; t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e L i ' s t o t h e sec-r e t a r i a t was a shrewd move, as i t g a v e them a new point ofview, t h e view from i n s i d e t h e pa r t y machine , and t h u s s e r v e dt o reduce t h e di f ferences between party-machine leaders andthese k e y f i g u r e s of t h e admini s t ra to r -economis t g roup . \a l t e r n a t e members of t h e c e n t r a l c o mm it te e, each of them ap r o v i n c ia l p a r t y s e c r e t a r y , as " r i g h t i s t s I ' None of the three--Ku Ta-tsun , Feng Pai-chu, and Pan Fu-sheng ( f i r s t s e c r e t a r yi n Honan)--was regarded as an impor tan t f i g u r e o r as a memberof t h e w i l l ( " sub j ec t i ve" f ac t o r s . ) , cal led and s t i l l c a l l sf o r " go in g a l l - o u t , aiming h i g h , ach i ev i ng grea te r , f a s t e r ,b e t t e r , a n d more economical r e s u l t s i n b u i l d i n g s o c i a l i s m. "

And added t o Teng Hsiao-ping's

The pa r t y cong re s s of May 1958 i n p a s s in g c r i t i c i z e d t h r e e

_ .*Thk-Eeneral -ne, r e f l e c t i n g Mao s c o n f id e n c e i n t h e power

* * ,- 4 -


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. . .. .

...

of any one of t h e g ro up s i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p w i t h which w e havebeen concerne d. Pe ip in g ' s comment on them a t t h e t i m e d i d n o ts u g g e s t an immediate i n t e n t i o n t o d r op them from t h e c e n t r a lcommittee, and t h e y a p p e ar e d o c c a s i o n a l l y i n t h e news there-a f t e r , However, none has appeared s i n c e e a r l y 1959, and a l lthree may s i n c e have been dropped.Mao, Teng, and t h e m i l i t a r y leaders Lin P ia0 and PengTe-huai (Pen g's dominance of t h e m i l i t a r y group w a s now con-t e s t e d , w i t h t h e r e t u r n of L in t o a c t i v e d u t y) a l l spoke a ta con fe rence of m i l i t a r y leaders i n J u ly 1958, w i t h Peng alsomaking t h e summary speech. None of these was p u b l i s h e d , b u t ,i n t h e l i g h t of a r t i c l e s i n m i l i t a r y j o u r n a l s a t t h e t i m e ,

and a l s o i n vi ew o f t h e unusual l en g t h of t h e c o n f e r e n c e , t h ep a r t y leaders were a p p a r e n t l y t a k i n g up w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y t h ee n t i r e matter of p a r t y c o n t r o l of t h e armed f o r c e s , i n c l u d i n gt h e p a r t y ' s r i g h t t o impose doc t r ine (e .g. , Mae's s t r a t e g i ct h i n k i n g i n t h e l i g h t of f a i l u r e to ob t a i n nuc l e a r w eapons) ,and t h e r e l a t ed matter of Mao's pla ns f o r t h e m i l i t a r y i n t h e"leap" and commune programs; t h e conference may also haved i scussed t h e f o rt h co m in g v e n t u r e i n t h e Taiwan S t r a i t .spokesman Chen Po-ta) as t h e archi tect of t h e commune program,and t h e par ty machine leaders L%u Shao-chi and Tan Chen-lintook t h e lead i n p romoting t h e program i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e (L iufound o c c as i o n t o remark t h a t Communism i n Ch ina w o u l d ber ea l i zed "very soon," and Tan made a number of e q u a l l y e x t r a -v ag an t p r e d i c t i o n s ) , followed by Mao h i m s e l f i n t o u r s i nAugust. Also i n August, Mao i n i t i a t e d t h e campaign f o r m a s sproduc t i on of i r o n and s t e e l , i . e . t he ' backyard s t e e l ' pro-gram, which w a s probably opposed by most of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r -economist f i g u r e s , e s p e c i a l l y by Chen Yun, t h e on l y one o ft h e p a r t y o f f i c e r s no t cred i t ed by Pe ip ing w i t h hav i ng p rov i ded"guidance" f o r t h e ' ' leap.v1 In September, Mao, Li u, and TengHsiao-ping a l l found occas ion t o advoca t e t h e fo rm a t i on ofurban as w e l l as r u r a l communes. O t h e r p a r t y leaders p l ayedm u c h smaller ro les i n t h i s pe r i od , a l t hough Chou E n- l a i ac-companied L i u on an i n s p e c t i o n t o u r , L i Fu-chun sp en t Septemberon a t o u r of t h e Northeast w i t h h i s new boss Teng, Chou andPeng Te-huai took p a r t i n t h e Mao-Khrushchev t a l k s i n e a r l yAugust, and Po I-PO w a s a c t i v e .e a r n e s t i n l a t e A u g u s t 1958, s h o r t l y a f t e r h i s t a l k s w i t h

I n J u l y 1958 Mao Tse-tung was f i r m l y i d e n t i f i e d ( b y h i s

I n Mae's v e n t u r e i n t h e Taiwan S t r a i t , which began in

- 5 -


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Khrushchev , ind iv idua l leaders of t h e CCP d i d n o t p l a y p u b l i cr o l e s , ap ar t f rom Chou En- l a i ' s r o l e as p r e m i e r i n t h e re t rea t -i n g ph a se o f t h e v e n t u r e . E a r l i e r i n t h e y ea r , t h e m o s t i m -p o r t a n t p ar ty -m ac hi ne f i g u r e s ( L i u , Teng, Peng hen) and t h el eade rs of t h e admini s t ra to r -economis t g roup (Chou En-lai andChen Yun) had a l i k e associated t he m se lv e s w i t h c e r t a i n of Mao'spr op os i t i on s on world Communist s t ra t e gy -- es pe c i a l ly th e con-c e p t of t h e E a s t Wind preva i l ing- -which under l ay th e S t r a i tv e n tu r e i n t h e l a t e s u m m e r . However, a t t h e t i m e of t he ven-t u r e i t s e l f , t h e p a r t y ' s p o s i t io n w a s s t a t e d under a pseudonym,i n a h a r s h a r t i c l e i n R e d F l a g which j u s t i f i e d a nd i n e f f e c ts i g n a l l e d t h e v e n t u r e .--Retreats, 1958-1959

The Taiwan S t r a i t ven t u re w a s t h e beginn ing of a badautumn f o r t h e C h i n e s e l e ade r s . As w e have a rgued cont rover -s i a l l y i n o t h e r p a p e r s , Mao T se -tu ng , i n o r d e r t o e x e r t maxi-mum p r e s s u r e o n t h e N a t i o n a l i s t o f f s h o r e i s l a n d g a r r i s o n s andon the Sino-American a l l i ance , needed a f i rm and h i gh - l eve le x p r e s s i o n of S o v i e t s u p p o r t i n t h e a d v an ci ng s t a g e o f t h ev e n t u r e , i . e . i n l a t e August o r ea r l y S ep tember . B u t Mao d i dn o t g e t i t u n t i l t h e r e t r e a t i n g p ha se of t he ven t u re had beeni n i t i a t e d by Chou E n- l a i ' s 6 September o f f e r t o renew ambas-s a d o r i a l - l e v e l t a l k s wi t h t h e U ni te d Sta tes .P e i p i n g ' s h u m i l ia t i o n i n t h e Taiwan S t r a i t v e n tu r e c a l l e df o r a m a s s i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of propaganda. Mao and pa r t y lead-e rs of var iou s g roups- -e.g . Chou, Peng Chen, Peng Te-huai--p l a y e d r o l e s i n t h i s e f f o r t t o e x p la i n t h a t n o t P e i p i n g b u ta n o t h e r p a r t y ( t h e CPSU) w a s r e a l l y r e sp on s ib le f o r t h e f a i l u r e .By f a r t h e m o s t impor lant development i n t h e campaign w a s t h ep u b l i c a t i o n i n October 1958 of a c o l l e c t i o n o f M ao's w r i t i n g son t h e them e o f t h e i m pe r i a l i s t "pape r t i ge r , " w hich concededt h a t t h e p ap er t i g e r w a s s t i l l t o o much of a m at ch f o r P e i p i ngi t s e l f . A d d r e s s i n g i t s e l f , i n e f f e c t , t o t h e q u es t i on of whyt h e S o vi et d e c i s i v e s u p e r i o r i t y (asserted by Pe ip ing) w a s no tbrought t o bear i n C h in a 's j u s t cause i n t h e T a i w a n S t r a i t ,t h e c o l l e c t i o n r e p l i e d t h a t t h e q u e st i on of a s s e s s in g t h e b a l an c e

of forces was one which s t i l l bewildered "many people.1ti n s i s t e n c e o n t h e need t o e x p l o i t a g g r e s s i ve l y t h e w o r ld ' sr e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o r t u n i t i e s was made i n se v e r a l ways, mosts l y l y i n t h e s e terms:t h e West Wind, th en th e West Wind w i l l p r e v a i l o ve r t h e East Wind."

Mao's"If t h e E a s t Wind does no t p reva i l over

- 6 -


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During t h e same pe ri od , autumn 1958, t he r e developed as e r i o u s c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e commune i n t h e o ry and t h e communei n p r a c t i c e . R es po nd in g b o th t o t h e pres su re of even ts andt o i n c r e a s in g S o v i e t a n d domestic c r i t i c i s m of t h e commune pro-gram, t h e CCP l e a d e r s h i p i n a s e r i e s of urgen t confe rences ex-t e n d i n g t h r ough November and e a r l y December dec ided on a majoroverhau l of t h e commune progra m. The p a r t y re t reated from t h ep r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n " a c c o r d i n g t o need, modif ied t h er o l e of t h e commune as t h e o r g a n i z e r of a l l a s p e c t s of r u r a ll i f e , and enhanced t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e lower - leve l p roduc t ionbrigade a t t h e expense of t h e commune administrative committee.A t t h e same t i m e , th e p a r t y de c ide d t o under take a l e s s obviousand l e s s abrupt , b u t e q u a l l y s u b s t a n t i a l , o v e r h a u l of i t s " g r e a tl eap forward" program, which had adm it t edl y been under attackby a ''small number'' of p a r t y members.A t about t h i s t i m e , tb.e p a r t y a p p a r e n t l y p ur ge d two a l-t e r n a t e members of i t s c e n t r a l committee, bo th p r o v i n c i a lp a r t y sec re ta r ies . L i T ao, a secre t a ry i n L ia on in g , w a s re-moved from h i s pos t amid comment suggesting t h a t h e had beeng u i l t y of a Kao-Jao t y p e of a c t i v i t y , i . e . a t t e m p t in g t o d i s -p l a c e some of h i s s upe r i o r s i n t h e h ie r a r c h y . Chao Chien-min,a s e c r e t a r y i n S ha nt un g, w a s removed on t h e grounds of " ind i -vidual ism and localism." Nei the r has been ment ioned s ince .L i was not regarded as a l i g n e d w i t h an y of t h e p r i n c i p a l g r o u p sof leaders, b u t Chao had been a l i e u t e n a n t of Teng Hsiao-ping'sf o r some years; Chao was t h e f i r s t person regarded as a p a r t y

machine f i g u r e t o f a l l s i n c e t h e f a l l of Jao Shu-Shih in 1954 .This b rough t t o f i v e t h e number of a l t e r n a t e members of t h ec e n t r a l committee, a l l of them p r o v i n c i a l s e c r e t a r i e s and onea f i r s t secre tary , pu bl ic ly brought down dur i ng 1958.and commune programs, were formalized a t a p a r t y plenum l a s t -i n g from 28 November t o 10 December 1958, a t which t i m e Mao'sd e c i s i o n t o r e s i g n as chairman of t h e government was r e v e a l e d .The plenum was a t tended by a l l 20 of t h e f u l l members of t h ep o l i t b u r o (a de l ibe ra te d i s p l a y of s o l i d a r i t y ) a n d by 64 oft h e 77 remaining f u l l members of t h e c e n t r a l committee, p l u s82 of t h e 95 a l t e r n a t e members.

s T h e p a r t y ' s d e c i s i o n s t o re t rea t , i n t h e "leap forward"

The reso lu t ion adop ted by t h e plenum attempted t o concea lt h e e x t e n t of t h e r e t r e a t on t h e commune program, b u t i tsmagnitude was a p p a r e n t i n a clumsy e f f o r t t o ba lance the con-cept of ' ' u n in te r r u p te d r e v o lu t i o n ' ' by t h e concept o f " r evo lu t ion- 7 -

. . ,., 1-=a


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b y s t a g e s , '' by acknowledgement of t h e S o v i et p o s i t i o n t h a t mate-r i a l a b u n d a n c e i n i n d u s t r y a n d a g r i c u l t u r e were n e c e s s a r y f o rt h e advance to Communism, and i n su sp en si on of t h e claim t h a tt h e communes were a p p l i c a b l e t o othe r c o u n t r i e s . With r e s p e c tt o t h e '"leap forward," t h e plenum c a l l e d f o r t h e p a r t y t o p u teconomic planning on a "complete ly r e l i a b l e basis" an d t o main-t a i n s u i t a b l e p r o p o r t i o n s between t a rge t s . N e v e r th e l e s s , t h eplenum accepted a nd p u b l i c i z e d e x a g g e r a t e d estimates of 1958product ion and p u t forward v e r y ambit ious g o a l s f o r 1959, in-c l u d i n g t h e preposterous g o a l of 525 m i l l i o n t o n s of g r a i n .a The plenum was s a i d t o have been h e l d under t h e "guidance"of Mao, and Mao was credited w i t h o r i g i n a t i n g t h e d e c i s i o n s

t o re t rea t , The plenum went t o some e f f o r t t o demonstrate--f a l s i f y i n g t h e record t o do so--that Mao a l l a long had c h a r t e dt h e correct course d e s p i t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n of ' ' r i g h t i s t c on se r-vat ives" on one hand and of " l e f t i s t a d v en t ur i st s " on t h e othe r .In f a c t , it was p r e c i s e l y Ma0 and t h e p a r t y machine leaders--p r i n c i p a l l y Li u, Teng, and Tan Chen-lin--who had assumed per-sonal l e a d e r s h i p of t h e " l e a p forward" and commune movementsthroughout 1958. T h i s f a c t could not po ss ib ly have been con-cealed from t h e admin is t ra to r -economis t and m i l i t a r y leaderswho had had r e s

CIA on CPC Leadership (1961)

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Transcript of CIA on CPC Leadership (1961)