Church-State Relations, National Identity, and Security in Post-Cold War Greece

8/11/2019 Church-State Relations, National Identity, and Security in Post-Cold War Greece

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A different and more intense drama began to unfold a year

later connected with the issue of national identity cards (IDs). In

an effort to further modernize and democratize the Greek society

and bring it in line with EU standards, the government decided

to exclude religious affiliation from the new IDs. From the gov-

ernment's point of view, religious preference is personal informa-

tion that the state did not need or care to have. In view of the fact

that the overwhelming majority of Greeks are O rthodox, inscrib-

ing religious preferences on identity cards violated EU legislation

on human rights, and would be discriminatory against people of

other faiths or those who select not to reveal a religious preference.

Fearful that this was merely the tip of the iceberg that may

lead to a w estern-style separation of church and state, and w ith it

loss of state subsidies, the church vociferously opposed the gov-

ernment's policy and demanded that declaring one's religious

identity be optional. Proclaiming a diachronic and unbreakable

bond between Orthodoxy and Hellenism, Archbishop

Christodoulos and other hierarchs bemoaned the politicians' ser-

vility and defeatist attitude toward foreigners, and conducted a

grass roots campaign, consisting of peoples meetings and signa-

ture collection, to force a na tional referendum on the issue.

Though different, the two developments are connected in the

sense that two pow erful social actors, with entirely different mis-

sions, have diametrically opposing views on important national

matters. However, these and other disagreements between the

political leadership and the Orthodox Church are more than mere

quarrels over policy choices. They reflect profound differences in

vision concerning Greece's national/cultural identity and national

security orientation in the post Cold War world. This article will

discuss, analyze, and substantiate the position that in the post

Cold War era the state and church have developed diametrically

opposing views regarding Greek national security interests: while

state authorities define the country's national security interests in

terms of state sovereignty, the Greek Orthodox Church views cor-

rosion of religious and cultural identity as one of the m ost impor-

tant threats facing the Greek nation.

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O U R N A L O F T H E H E L LE N I C D I A S P O R A


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O n C ul ture, Ident i ty , and S ecuri ty

Cold W ar international relations theory and practice was dom-

inated by the realist and neorealist theoretical formulations of

Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and other like-minded schol-

ars and practitioners. The realist view is state oriented and defines

national security strictly in terms of sovereignty, and focuses on

material capabilities and the use and con trol of military forces by

states. Richard Ullman's definition of national security enjoyed

wide currency during this period. In his mind security is defined

and valorized by the threats which challenge [the state). These

should be understood as those events that threaten drastically and

over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for

the inhabitants of the state [or] narrow the range of policy choices

available to the government of a state or to private, nongovern-

mental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.

2

The end of the Cold War and the accelerated pace of global-

ization challenged this view of national security which had mar-

ginalized culture and identity.

3

Realist international relations

theory had a great deal of difficulty dealing with the eruption of

separatist nationalism and the new global order, which is trans-

forming itself culturally even faster than it is changing geograph-

ically or economically.

4

Taking their cues from W. Bloom,

Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price argue that (t)he end of

the East-W est conflict has produced a new series of uncertainties

and insecurities. Many different communities and collectivities

have sought to define a new identity for themselves in an increas-

ingly fluid, dynamic and multipolar worlda world increasingly

torn between the contradictory forces of economic globalisation

and deepening economic interdependencies on the one hand, and

political fragmentation, the break-up of multinational states and

centrifugal forces on the other.

5

Linda S . Bishai concurs, pointing

out that fg)one are the days when security was obviously

'national' and when 'national' obviously referred to the territorial

state. 6

The time had come to reformulate the concept of national

security. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J.

Katzenstein define the broad parameters for a new conceptualiza-

tion. They argue that in the post Cold W ar national security envi-

ronments in which states are embedded are in important part

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cultural and institutional, rather than just material.

7

In his own

work Katzenstein stresses that identity and culture are becoming

more salient. 8

Aggestam and Hyde-Price are even more direct.

They see a crucial relationship between security and the search for

identity to the point that identity and security are intimately

connected.

9

But what are culture and identity and how do they affect

national security? Culture encompasses both evaluative and cog-

nitive criteria. In Theodore Schwartz's words, [Oulture consists

of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or

created by the individuals of a population, including those images

or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted

from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by indi-

viduals themselves. ' Culture helps define a country's nature,

idiosyncrasy and societal norms, and influences its national secu-

rity doctrine and policies. In Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein's

words, cultural environments affect not only the incentives for

different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of

stateswhat we call state identity. Bishai is equally emphatic,

arguing that [m)ethods and means of providing security are cul-

ture-specific, and therefore the very meaning of security is depend-

ent upon and defined by the society-object.

12

If culture is the tree, identity is the fruit or the flowers of that

tree. According to sociologist Manuel Castells, identity is the

process of construction of meaning on the basis of cultural attrib-

ute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority

over other sources of meaning. Identity, he adds, is a people's

source of meaning and experience.

13

However, identity is not

monolithic and, according to Castells, comes in three forms: legit-

imizing, resistance, and project. Legitimizing identity is intro-

duced and nurtured by the dominant institutions of society,

usually leads to nationalism, and is intended to extend and ration-

alize their domination vis a vis social actors. Resistance identity,

in contrast, is associated with suppression and is generated by

those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stig-

matized by the dominant culture. Finally, project identity refers

to an effort by a social group to build a new identity for itself. In

so doing it defines its own standing and at the same time seek[s]

the transformation of overall social structure. Castells cites the

feminist movement as an example of project identity building.

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OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA


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A host of subjective and objective factors contribute to iden-

tity construction. Such identity-building blocs include religion,

history, geography, biology, ethnicity, and other real or imaginary

elements: But as Castells aptly points out, individuals, social ,

groups, and societies process these materials, and rearrange their

meaning, according to social determinants and cultural projects

that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time

framework. '

5

In the post Cold War world religion has emerged as the most

important identity-building bloc, as witnessed by the revival

of

religious activity in Eastern/Central Europe and Soviet and

Yugoslav successor states. Marx has been replaced once again by

Jesus as the fountainhead of wisdom and social justice. Fernard

Braudel sees religion as the strongest feature of civilizations, at

the heart of both their present and their past.

6Benedict Ander-

son places it at the center of cultural systems,

17while Donald

Smith argues that in transitional societies religion is the most

important expression of the basic ideas, attitudes, and assumptions

found in the culture? Citing Clifford Geetz, Diana Kendall

believes that religion establishes powerful and pervasive moods

and motivations to help people interpret the meaning of life and

establish a direction for their behavior? Samuel Huntington is

even more emphatic and makes religion the principal defining ele-

ment responsible for the coming clash of civilizations. In his view,

religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction

between believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group

and a different and inferior out-group.

2 And unlike most other

identity building blocs,

religion has the

considerable political

advantage of reproducing its 'we' identity across generations in a

more or less automatic fashion. 2 1

Moreover, scholars agree that individuals or groups can have

multiple identities and that identity is constructed, can change,

and is perceived in relation to others. Huntington is up to some-

thing when he observes that identity at any levelpersonal,

tribal, racial,civilizationalcan only be defined in relation to an

'other,' a different person, tribe, race, or civilization.

22

He ampli-

fies his point further stating that qpieople define their identity by

what they are not.

23

This has particular significance regarding

national security, especially in the post Cold War era. Depending

on the constructors, time, and space, identity and its meaning can


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either identify with it or place themselves on the fringes. As

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein observe, national security

interests [frequently) depend on a particular construction of self-

identity in relation to the conceived identity of others.

24

This can

form the basis of a collective cultural logic that leads to notions

of us and them. 25

Citing M. Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, Hyde-

Price write that lildentity is now 'flashing in neon' because the

end of the Cold War has `opened up spaces for people to reassess

their identities and for groups to claim the right to their identity

often in response to a perceived threat'.

26

Aggestam and Hyde-

Price are on the mark when they stress that Whe search for iden-

tity in the post-Cold War Europemost often on ethno-national

criteriais usually motivated by the desire for security on behalf

of the community concerned.

27

In an effort to fill the post-Cold War national security concep-

tualization vacuum, Barry Buzan offers a definition that is sensi-

tive to traditional state sovereignty as well as identity and cultural

concerns. For Buzan security is about the pursuit of freedom from

threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their inde-

pendent identity and functional integrity against forces of change

which seem hostile. 28Building on Buzan's work, Ole Waever pro-

poses a conceptualization that is anchored on the duality of state

and societal security. Waever believes that while state security

relates to sovereignty, societal security is concerned about threats

to a society's identity (if a society loses its identity it will not sur-

vive as a soc iety)

29He views societal security as the ability of a

society to persist in its essential character under changing condi-

tions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about

the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution of

traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious

and national identity and custom. Societal security is about situa-

tions when societies perceive a threat in identity terms.

3

Concurring with Waever's arguments, Paul Roe identifies

threats to societal security. He maintains that such threats can

occur when societies perceive their identity is threatened. This

usually results from the suppression of its cultural expression to

interference with its ability to reproduce its traditions and way of

life. Threatened societies fight back by seeking to strengthen their

societal identity. This, in turn, tends to create a societal security

dilemma: when the actions of one society, in trying to increase its

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societal security (strengthening its identity), causes a reaction in a

second soc iety, which in the end, decreases the first society's own

societal security (by weakening its identity.)

' In Buzan's words,

{t}he security of a society can be threatened by whatever puts its

'we' identity into jeopardy.

32However, perceptions of identity can

vary, even within the same society. Bishai asserts that regardless of

common language, religion, culture or other identity markers,

mem bers of a group can never m aintain identical perspectives, and

ideological separations will always exist.

33

Post-Cold W ar Greece exemplifies the main components of the

preceding theoretical discussion. The political leadership as well

as the Orthodox Church aspire to maintain and strengthen Greek

national security in the post Cold W ar world, but differ as to what

should be protected and how. As the following pages will show,

state authorities in Greece perceive good standing membership in

the EU and other western institutions paramount to the country's

interests, and view national security in more traditional terms,

centering on military, econom ic, and related sovereign factors. In

contrast, the church sees security in societal terms, i.e., protection

and preservation of the nation's cultural/religious/national iden-

tity, threatened by what Bradley Klein regards as a calculated

social offensive to affirm and propagate western culture, identity

and values.

34

T he B att le O v er Ident ity and S ecuri ty : O rig in and T ex ture

The citizens of the modern Greek state see themselves as the

descendants of the ancient Greeks and take special pride in the

achievements of their glorious ancestors. Yet strange as it may

sound, the Greek soc iety has been in an unending search for iden-

tity since the country becam e independent in the late 18 2 0s. Two

distinct and conflicting views emerged regarding Greece's identity

and with it the nation's place in the east/west cultural and civi-

lizational divide: the Europeanized/W esternized or liberal and the

Byzantinist or nationalist. Influenced by the liberal ideas of the

French Revolution and the enlightenment, Europeanized, pro-

western Greeks saw the achievem ents of the Ancient Greeks as the

bedrock of w estern civilization and advocated the establishment of

a modern secular state along European lines. Led by Adamantios


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Korais, they felt that Greek national identity should be based on

Greekness and not Christian O rthodoxy.

In contrast, the Byzantinists or nationalists believed that the

modern Greek character was shaped by an amalgam of ancient

Greek values and Orthodox precepts. Instead of Greek, they pre-

ferred the term

ro m i o s ,

which was derived from the Ottoman

R um

Mil l e t

(Greek Orthodox nation). This view was supported by the

Constantinople based religious establishment and many of the

military leaders of the 1821 revolution. For them the roots of

Greek civilization are eastern and a reformed Byzantium should

serve as the model for the modern Greek state.

Despite the fact that a host of domestic and international fac-

tors mitigated in favor of a centralized European modeled state,

the Europeanists never managed to impose their views. Despite

the fact that the Byzantinists were forced to accept a Europeanized

state, they did not possess sufficient strength to preven t the secu-

larization of the Greek society and its institutions. As such, the

battle of identity has been a persistent theme in the politics and

the character of the modern Greek state. The recent row over iden-

tity cards is part and parce l of the same conflict. But what role did

the Orthodox Church play in this equation?

Owing to the conflict over the nature of Greek society, state-

Orthodox Church relations in Greece are difficult to characterize.

In cultural and civil matters the church has played and continues

to play a major role. But until recently, the church's political role

has been less felt and often inconsistent. Though economically

weak and politically unstable, the state has been able to co-opt the

religious hierarchy to support its domestic and foreign policy

objectives, even when such policies appeared harmful to the

church's own interests. For example, despite objections from the

Ecum enical Patriarchate in Istanbul the church supported the irre-

dentist policies of the

M egal i Idea

(roughly 1860 to 1920), which

aimed to expand Greece's frontiers at the expense of the decaying

Ottom an Em pire. Though this policy helped expand the country's

frontiers, it also had disastrous results not the least of which was

the ultimate expulsion of Greek populations from Asia Minor. It

should be noted that the behavior of sister Orthodox Churches in

Russia and Serbia has been remarkably similar. The Russian

Church was co-opted by the czarist as well as the communist

regimes. More recently, the Serbian Orthodox Church lent its

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support to the nationalist and suicidal policies of M ilosevic and his

ilk.

The uneven influence of the Greek Orthodox Church is clearly

reflected in the literature. Howard J. W iarda, for example, asserts

that even though the Orthodox Christianity in Greece is bound

up w ith culture, society, and na tional identity, (it) is struggling to

remain relevant in an increasingly secular society.

36

The noted

historian Theofanis Stavrou is even more explicit. He argues that

the Orthodox tradition has been and will continue to be an

important ingredient in the political culture of Greece, regardless

of the tensions that multiply as tradition and modernity confront

each other. And he adds that the presence of the church is real

enough to lend the country a 'theocratic' aura. Yet a few para-

graphs later he asserts that the church was helpless to prevent

the overall policy of modeling the Greek state along European

lines in matters of administration, education, cultural tastes, and

of course, church-state relations.

37

The seeming contradiction is not an intellectual inconsistency

on Professor Stavrou's part or numerous other observers who have

reached similar conclusions. Instead, it is inseparably connected to

Orthodox theology itself, as well as the environm ent in which the

church operated and the different political, social, and other forces

that constrained and molded its character and behavior through-

out the eons. The Eastern or Orthodox Church owes its origin to

the division in 3 95 of the Roman E mpire between East and W est.

W hat began as a m ere adm inistrative separation eventually led to

deep cultural and religious differences between the two parts. The

ecclesiastic schism between Rome and Constantinople (1054)

made the split final and irrevocable. The western part remained

under the ecclesiastic jurisdiction of the Vatican. The eastern ha lf

eventually became Byzantium and acquired its own, more decen-

tralized, church in which the patriarch of Constantinople holds the

title first among equals.

Though multiethnic and polyglot, Byzantium eventually

became Greek dominated in culture, religion, and language. Occu-

pants of the ecumenical throne were drawn from the Constantino-

ple's wealthy Greek ethnic but cosmopolitan elite. Resentful of

Greek m onopoly on the patriarchate and dominance in other areas

of life, Bulgarians and Serbs demanded ecclesiastic autonom y from

Constantinople and eventually acquired their own patriarchates,

C hurch-S tate R elat ions, N ational Ident i ty , and S ecu ri ty


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leading to the ethnicization or nationalization of Orthodoxy. In

other words, the Orthodox Church's characteristics resemble the

e c d e s i a

type of religious organization. According to K endall,

e c d e -

sia is

a religious organization that is so integrated into the domi-

nant culture that it claims as its membership all members of

society. M embership in the

e c d e s i a occurs as a result of being born

into the society, rather than a conscious decision on the part of indi-

vidual members. In these types of religious organizations, asserts

Kendall, W ile linkages between the social institutions of religion

and government are very strong in such societies.

38

Byzantium possessed many of the characteristics of a theocratic

state. The emperor was the undisputed political leader who gov-

erned the B yzantine edifice according to the doctrines and precepts

of Orthodox Christianity. Led by the ecum enical patriarch of Con-

stantinople, the church ensured that the head of state was properly

and thoroughly educated in church doctrine. Kyriakos Kyria-

zopoulos succinctly captures the essence of Byzantine church-state

relations stating that Whe empire's form of government was

theocratic in the sense that the emperor was the governor of a

Christian commonwealth, even in religious matters, but always

operated under the ideological dominance of the church. 39

This

explains, at least in part, that the concept of separation of church

and state has little basis in Orthodox tradition.

Such attitudes and practices were reinforced by the almost four

centuries long Ottoman conquest of Byzantine territories, which

began in the early 1400s. The key componen t of Ottom an admin-

istration was the

millet system. Using religion as a basis, Ottom an

rulers divided up the empire into national groups or

millets.

Place

of residence was irrelevant; one's religion determined his or her

nationality and status in the diverse Ottoman social and adminis-

trative system. Unlike European absolutist monarchs, the

Ottom an sultan concerned himself with military preparedness and

the collection of taxes, and had no interest in the daily lives of h is

subjects. Spiritual, fam ily, educational, and cultural matters were

left to the head of each

millet , i.e., the religious establishment.

The immediate and long-term implications of this structure

were far reaching. Conquered people were able to maintain their

religious, cultural and ethnic identity. Although a second-class

citizen in the M uslim state, says Barbara Jelavich, his religious

leaders taught him that on a moral basis he was infinitely superior

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to h i s c on q ue r o r s . I n h i s p e r s on a l , d a i ly l ife , s he a s s e r t s , the

Balkan peasant was surroun ded by Ch r i s tian symbols , by crosse s

and i cons , and no t remind ers o f Ottoman dom inat ion .

40I n o t h e r

w o r d s , th e O tt o m a n e d i fi ce g a v e t h e c h u r c h e v e r y o p po r t u n i t y t o

t each the G reek language an d cus toms an d p lay an important ro le

in the revolut ion. Archbisho p C hris tod ou los ' frequen tly repeated

point that G reece owes i ts independen ce to the chu rch , thou gh

exa g g era t ed a n d s e l f- s erv in g , is n o t t o t a l ly w i th o u t fo u n d a t io n .

P rofessor Ky riazopoulos observes that th is na t ional Sa lvat ionist

s e lf- im a g e h a s b e c o m e a n d r e m a i n s a c e n t r a l c o m p o n e n t i n t h e

church 's ecc le s io logy and miss ion .

41

R egiona l and o ther d i fferences a s we l l a s ideo log ica l and per -

s o n a l id eo lo g ica l j ea lo u s i e s n o t w i th s t a n d in g , po s t r ev o lu t io n a ry

G reek po l it ica l e l it e s (both na t iona l is t s and wes tern izers ) dec ided

to bui ld a s ta te a lon g Euro pean l ines . Expan din g the s tate 's fron -

t i e r s a t t h e Ot t o m a n Em p ire ' s exp en s e

Megali Idea) d o m i n a t e d

G reek fore ign and secu r i ty pol icy un t i l the 1920s. To achieve th is

o b je c t iv e s u c c e s s iv e g o v e r n m e n t s s o u g h t h e lp fr o m t h e G r e a t

P owe rs , especia lly Bri ta in an d Franc e. Bu t G reek pol it i ca l l eade rs

a l s o r e c o g n i ze d t h a t s u p po r t fr o m t h e c h u r c h w o u l d h e l p le g it -

imize the ir fore ign pol icy aspirat ions a s wel l as the ir n at ion bu i ld-

ing efforts . They a lso fe l t that the ch urc h's inf luence cou ld no t be

i gnored , and wou ld have to be res tra ined .

T he f ir s t im p or tan t s t e p i n th i s d i r e c t i on o c c u r r e d i n 1 8 33 ,

when the s ta te , wi th the tac i t acqu ie scence of the church h ierarchy

but wi thout the Ecumen ica l P a tr iarchate 's consen t , e s tab li shed an

a u t o c ep h a lo u s ch u rch . Th e He lla d i c C h u rch f e lt th a t a u t o n o m y

would bring both institutional and national benefits and sup-

ported the m ove . But a s V ic tor R oud ometof s tres ses , by becoming

i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e P a t r i a r c h a t e , (t h e c h u r c h ) s u r r e n d e r e d i ts

auton om y in to the ha nd s of the s ta te .

42

I n a d d i ti o n , a u t o c e p h a l -

i za t io n h a d a n i so la t in g e f fec t , a s r e la t io n s w i t h C o n s t a n t in o p le

remained frozen for ne ar ly two d ecade s . Despite the fac t tha t con -

tacts were eventual ly restored, the row between the two never fu lly

mended. The recent (and ongoing) quarrel over the issue of

whether the patr iarch ' s name shou ld be men t ioned in l iturg ie s and

the la t ter ' s neutra l , i f no t mo re con c i li a tory pos i t ion on the i s sue

of ident i ty card s , exempl ify the tenuo us s ta te of r e la t ions be tween

C o n s t a n t in o p le a n d t h e H e lla d i c C h u r c h , a s t h e la t t e r be c a m e

known. ,

C hurch-State R elat ions, Nat ional Ident i ty , and Security

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The Greek state took additional steps to control the church.

S y n o d m e m b e r s ( th e c h u r c h ' s g o v e r n i n g b o d y ) w e r e a p p o in t e d b y

the government. A government representative attended synod

m e e t i ngs and , a s P r ofe s sor S tavr ou s ta t e s , no d e c i s ion tak e n i n h i s

ab se nc e or w i thou t gove r nm e n t ap pr ova l was va l id .

43

T h is m e a n t

that the state was effectively in control of the most important

soc ia l ins t i tut ions .

44S p e c i a l a t te n t i o n w a s p a i d t o t h e s e l e c t i o n o f

the archbishop. It should be noted parenthetically that the

colonels' junta (1967-1974) was especially interventionist; they

fo r c e d t h e r e s i g n a t io n o f t h e a r c h b is h o p a s s o o n a s t h e y t o o k o v e r

and han d p i c ke d a suc c e ssor , b ut se ve r a l y e ar s l a t e r r e pl ac e d h i m as

ar b i tr ar i ly a s the y had d i sc ar d e d h i s pr e d e c e ssor .

I n a d d i t io n , t h e s ta t e c lo s e d a n u m b e r o f m o n a s t e r i e s a n d c o n -

fi sc a t e d s o m e c h u r c h p r o pe r t y . I n e x c h a n g e , l a w s ( in c l u d i n g t h e

v a r i o u s c o n s t it u t i o n s ) w e r e p a s s e d e s t a b l is h i n g O r t h o d o x y a s t h e

of fi c ia l re l ig ion o f t he G ree k s ta t e an d forb id d ing prose ly t i za t ion .

The church was allowed to maintain control over marriage,

d i v o r c e , a n d o t h e r c i v ic m a t t e r s , a n d t o h a v e i n fl u e n c e o n p u b li c

education curriculum. More importantly, however, high rank

c l e r gy w e r e gua r ante e d s ta t e sa l ar ie s . T hi s was e ve ntua l ly e x te nd e d

t o t h e i r l o w e r r a n k i n g c o l l e a g u e s , i n c l u d i n g v i ll a g e p r i e s ts . E v e n

though the church hierarchy did not always accept state

encroachments without protest, it nevertheless sufficiently

a p pr e c i a t e d t h e b e n e f it s a c c r u e d fr o m t h e o ffi c ia l s t a tu s a c c o r d e d

the chu rch by the s ta te . 45

T h e B o l s h e v i k r e vo l u t io n i n R u s s i a , a n d t h e e s t a b l is h m e n t o f

c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e s i n Ea s t e r n E u r o p e a n d t h e B a l k a n s fo l lo w i n g

W W I I , fu r t h e r i n s u l a t e d t h e H e ll a d i c C h u r c h . T h e s h r i n k in g a n d

i s o la t io n o f t h e E c u m e n i c a l P a t r ia r c h a t e i n K e m a l is t Tu r k e y , a n d

t h e A r a b i za t io n o f s is t e r c h u r c h e s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t, h a d a c o n -

comitant effect. By the 1960s, Greece, along with religiously

d i v id e d i sl a n d o f C y p r u s , b e c a m e t h e o n l y Or t h o d o x c o u n t r i e s free

of communist rule. Cold War realities dealt a severe blow to

Orthodox ecumenism; intra-Orthodox relations at the official

c h u r c h l e v e l c a m e t o a v ir t u a l h a l t .

T h o u g h m o r e i n s u l a te d t h a n e v e r , t h e c h u r c h f e lt n o d o m e s t ic

t h r e a t a s i ts t r a d i ti o n a l a d v e r s a r y , t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , h a d b e e n

c r u s h e d d u r i n g th e 1 9 4 6- 4 9 c i vi l w a r . U n d e r t h e m o t t o t h a t G o d

punishes those who deviate from His path, the church had little

difficulty selling its triptych motto: religion-family-country.

18



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Churches were filled to capacity by a citizenry struggling to

recover from nearly ten years of war and devastation. In the minds

of church leaders the identification of Orthodoxy and Greekness

had never been stronger. As such, the church hierarchy had little

choice, and no qualms, to render its support to the country's polit-

ical establishment and Athens' essentially pro-western national

security policies in the Cold W ar period. Under the circumstances

the liberal-nationalist conflict over national identity had been

pushed under the carpet.

W hile historical and environmental factors profound ly shaped

the nature of the church in G reece (and elsewhere), doctrinal and

structural considerations contributed as well. Orthodoxy has no

centralized doctrinal or administrative center equivalent to the

Vatican. Since the Creed contains God 's word, it requires no inter-

pretation. Thus behind its apophatic character and mystical out-

look, Orthodoxy is decentralized and has no administrative or

doctrinal center. Each patriarchate or national church is auto-

cephalous and, as first among equals, the Ecumenical Patriarch

possesses little adm inistrative or doc trinal authority. Citing som e

of the most notable scholars, Bishop Kallistos (Timothy Ware),

one of the foremost living Orthodox theologians, notes that the

characteristics permeating Orthodoxy include changelessness,

determination to remain loyal to the past, [and a) sense of living

continuity with the Church of ancient times.

46

These characteristics, along with historical rea lities, prevented

the church from unveiling itself to the intellectual ferment of the

Renaissance and Reform ation. As such, it deprived itself of a body

of theological literature that could have synthesized theology and

rational thought. Unlike Catholicism, O rthodoxy d id not produce

political theologians like Augustine and Aquinas who explained

and clarified Christian teachings by means of concepts and princi-

ples derived from Greek philosophy. 47

As a result, the Catholic

state-church-people connection was never resolved in Orthodox

doctrine and tradition. Forced to concentrate on survival, the

church has been led to a sad confusion between Orthodoxy and

nationalism.

48

As such, though representative of the people, (the

church] was expected to support the state and be subject to it.

49

Despite doctrinal proclivities and restrictive state po licies, the

Helladic Church was able to hold it own and maintain profound

cultural and civic influence, especially in rural areas of the coun-


9


14/31

try . Though latent , it s pol i t ica l mu sc le could not be ignore d e i ther .

Political influence is felt both at the local or grass roots and

nat iona l l eve l s. Throughou t the co un try , and espec ia ll y amon g the

poor ly ed ucated rura l populat ion , the loca l pr ie s t was a nd remains

an a utho r i ty figure . His influenc e transce nd s pure ly re l ig ious ma t-

t ers an d sp i ll s over in to o ther area s o f li fe , inc lu d ing fami ly an d

inter-vi llage re lat ions .

At the n at ion al leve l , pol it ica l inf luence w as an d rem ains sub-

t le , i f not cry ptic . The arcan e an d often u nstable ch aracter o f G reek

poli t ic s , coupled wi th s ta te in terven t ion i s t and ma nipulat ing ten -

d e n c i e s, h a v e t a u g h t t h e c h u r c h v a l u a b l e l e ss o n s . As P r o f e ss o r

Stavrou correct ly points out , these experiences have sharpened the

p ol it ic a l o f the c h ur c h a nd ha s taug h t it s o f fi c ia l s t o an t ic i pate

cr i s e s a n d p repa re fo r a pp ro pr ia t e re s p o n s es . I n o t h er w o rd s ,

W i le ch u r ch h a s fo u n d i t s e lf co n s t a n t ly in po l i ti c s p o l it i c s o f

improvisation and opportunism? Greek clergymen are not

ca l led Byzan t ines for noth ing .

T h e C h an g e t o C h an g e

P a t r ic k Q u i n n o f T h e A s s o c ia te d P re s s

wr ote o n J u l y 2 8 , 2 0 0 0 ,

tha t the is sue o f IDs ma rks the f ir s t t im e in i ts 150-year h i s tory

tha t the G reek Ch urch h as so openly cha l l enged the author i ty o f a

governm ent to l eg is la te . In a mo re recen t ed i tor ia l (August 29 ,

2 0 01), th e co n s er v a t iv e b u t h ig h ly reg a rd ed A th en s d a i ly

athi

m e rin i s truck an equal ly a larmin g ton e: This i s the firs t t ime that

t h e p r im a t e o f t h e G r e e k C h u r c h c h a l le n g e s t h e c o n s t it u t io n a l

order , d i sput ing th e m os t fundam enta l prerogat ives

of

the leg is la-

t ive , execut ive , an d jud ic ia l bran che s o f govern me nt . P resen t ing

himsel f as the on ly genuin e represen tat ive of popular sovereignty ,

C hr is todo u los appeared eager to cross the rubicon tha t separate s a

sober spir i tual lead er from th e hea d of a popul is t an d even su bver-

s ive pol i t ica l m ovem en t. 52

I f chu rch-s ta te re la t ions h ad re ached a s ta te o f congruen cy , a s

the foregoing d iscuss ion ind icated , wha t , then , expla ins the rec en t

a n d o n - g o i n g qu a r r e l b e t w e e n t h e t w o ? T h e b a s ic c o n t e n t io n o f

th i s ar t ic le is that the con fl ic t i s rooted in d iverg ing percept ions

r e g a r d i n g t h e c o u n t r y 's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i ty o r i e n t a t io n a n d n e e d s .

W hat are th e causes , e ffec t s , and implica t ions con nec ted w i th th is

s ignif ican t chan ge?

20



15/31

E ve n t h o u g h t h e q u a r r e l b e tw e e n t h e c h u r c h a n d t h e s t a te

b eca m e m o re a p pa ren t in t h e l a t e 19 90 s , i ts ro o t s ca n b e t ra ced

back severa l deca de s . The fa l l of the co lon els ' d ictatorsh ip in 1974

and the ree s tabli shment an d con so l ida t ion of democra cy that fo l -

l o w e d a c c e n t u a t e d t h e c h u r c h - s t a t e c o n f li c t. A h o s t o f e c o n o m i c ,

soc ia l , an d pol i t ica l deve lopme nts co ntr ibuted to th is cha nge. Dif-

feren ces o v er K o s o v o , id en t it y ca rd s , t h e p o pe ' s vi si t, a n d o t h er

i ssues are m ere ly symptoms , no t the c ause .

After decades of weakness the Greek economy showed

improvemen t in the 1960s . Increa s ing urban izat ion , pressure for

more political democracy, and demands on the part of lower

soc ioeconomic groups for a greater share of the econom ic pie were

s o m e o f t h e e f fec t s . Th es e ch a l len g ed t h e d o m in a n ce o f t h e co n -

servat ive po l i t ica l forc es ; the extrem e r ight respond ed w ith the

colonels' dictatorship. Taking its ideological cues from the

Metaxas d ic ta torsh ip (1936-1941) , the jun ta ad opted the s logan

G r e e c e o f C h r i st ia n G r e e k s a n d so u g h t t o t u r n G r e e c e i n to a

C hrist ian , buco l ic parad ise .

Bu t the mi l i tary re gime 's bruta l ity an d d ismal fa i lure , as wel l

a s t h e C y p r u s d e b a c l e i t c a u s e d ( 19 7 4) d e s t r o y e d t h e n a t i o n a l is t s

(extrem e r ight) as a po l i ti ca l force . The m ore m od erate e l emen ts

r e g r o u pe d , l e d a n d s u p po r t e d t h e r e s t o r a t io n o f d e m o c r a c y , a n d

mo ved to the cen ter of the G reek po li t ica l spec trum . The na t ion-

a l is t s G reece of C hr i s t ian G reeks was rep laced by C onstan t ine

Kara man l is 's una bashed ly l ibera l G reece be longs to the W est . A

d e m o cra t i c co n s t i t u t io n w a s pu t in pla ce in 1975, w h ich d im in -

i shed th e role of the chu rch. For the f irst t ime in the cou ntry's h is -

t o r y t h e c o n s t i tu t i o n d i d n o t p r o h i bi t pr o s e ly t i za t i o n a n d d i d n o t

require that edu cat ion be based on the pr inc iple s of G reek-Chr i s -

t ian civi lization.

53

Disappointed with American and NATO backing of the

c o l o n e l s a n d a c q u i e s c e n c e i f n o t o u t r i g h t s u p po r t o f Tu r k e y ' s

aggress ive des igns , Athens began looking toward Europe to pro-

tec t democracy and safeguard the coun try's nat ional secur i ty inter-

es t s . U n d er K a ra m a n l i s 's lea d ers h ip, G reec e jo in ed in 19 81 t h e

E u r o pe a n C o m m u n i t y , a s t h e E U w a s k n o w n a t t h e t im e . Tr a u -

ma tized by the ne gat ive publ ic react ion o f the ch urch 's support for

the d ic ta torsh ip , the h ierarchy en dorsed the move toward Europe .

T h e r o a d t o E u r o p e w a s s tr e n g t h e n e d a n d c o n s o l id a t e d w i th

the advent to power in 1981 of the socialists (PASOK) under


1


16/31

Andreas Papandreou. The socialists winning coalition consisted of

the non-communist left, the economically underprivileged, and

non-religious nationalists troubled by Washington's foreign pol-

icy behavior and tendency to intervene in Greece's internal affairs.

It took Papandreou's charisma and considerable political skills to

forge such a coalition and lead it to victory under the slogan

Greece belongs to the Greeks.

PA SO K's victory brought to power the center-left, which had

been frozen out of power since the early 1950sa development

that contributed immensely to the healing of the wounds of the

civil war. W ith the extreme right defeated and discredited and the

shrinking Com munist Party legalized, Greece achieved elite con-

vergence.

5 4

The country had firmly entered the path of demo-

cratic consolidation. As Juan Linz and Alfred S tepan persuasively

argue, democracy becomes the only game in town when all the

actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political

conflict will be resolved according to the established norms and

that violations of these norm s are likely to be both ineffective and

costly.

Rhetoric notwithstanding, Papandreou followed a pro-Euro-

pean policy. Except for the shrinking and confused Communist

Party, a strong consensus had been reached by G reece's economic

and political elites that the country's political, econom ic, and secu-

rity interests lie in Europe. The Europeanist/Westernist view had

triumphed. Simitis, Papandreou's eventual successor as PASOK

leader and prime m inister, placed at the top of his agenda Greece's

entrance in to EU's em erging econom ic institutions, including the

Central Bank and the Euro. Simitis' technocratic and slogan-shy

tenure was marked by an almost-single minded determination to

erase Greece's image as a laggard and to harmonize the country's

institutions and policiesincluding foreign and securitywith

EU standards. The prime m inister's efforts met w ith considerable

success, but not without social and econom ic cost.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the communist

regimes in the former Eastern bloc, including the Balkans, and the

democratization that followed added another dimension to the

increasingly complex Greek landscape. The new and more open

environment in these countries increased contacts and threw the

gates of political, econom ic, social, and even religious cooperation

wide open, especially among countries in Greece's immediate

2 2



17/31

neighborhood, the Balkan peninsula. Practically overnight, yes-

terday's enemies became today's friends.

With a firmly consolidated democratic system and the area's

strongest economy, Greece had much to gain from and to offer in

this new environment. Economic contact between Balkan coun-

ties, anemic at best prior to 1990, increased dramatically. Axel

Sotiris Wallden reports that from 1990 to 1996, Greece's exports

to various Balkan countries tripled in volume.% But with these

came an influx of Bulgarian, Rom anian, Albanian, and other work-

ers who crossed the Greek border in search for employment. 'W ill-

ing to do m enial jobs at lower wages, these laborers benefited the

Greek economy. At the same time, they have helped increase

unemployment among their Greek counterparts, causing resent-

ment and dissatisfaction. Though not entirely justified, Greeks

blame these foreigners for worsening levels of crime. Greece's

already changed social landscape became even more diverse.

Indicative of this new environment is Athens' Omonia Square.''

Once a favored meeting place of promenading Athenians and their

families, the square has been turned in to a polyglot Mecca of illicit

drugs, prostitution, and o ther forms o f crime.

These phenomenal political, econom ic, and social changes had

a negative impact on the church's image and connection with the

citizenry. Church attendance dropped and the hierarchy watched

its diminishing influence with dismay and apprehension. The rise

of drug abuse and crime, especially among the young, and the

Greeks' more tolerant attitude toward sex and divorce alarmed

church leaders even more. Although the church managed to m od-

erate Papandreou's proposals to legalize divorce and institute civil

marriage, and later forced his government to back down on plans

to expropriate church property, the hierarchy, led by the aging

Seraphim, found itself on the defensive. In their minds, the nation

had abandoned its religious roots.

The church diagnosed the problem but lacked the where-

withal to treat it. The triptych of religion-family-country that

worked so well in previous decades had run its course. The church

no longer had the people's ear to influence their behavior; it was

out of touch. Father Nektarios Moulatsiotisthe head of a reli-

giously conservative group of monks (Paparokades) who sing rock

music and other forms of modern entertainment to entice young

people to go to churchopenly admitted the problem. In a July


3


18/31

26, 2001, television interview with Antenna's Rania Thraskia and

Yiannis Papadopoulos, he acknowledged that the church's public

relations approach and connectedness to people, especially the

young, was out of sync and 50 years behind times.

Upon Seraphim's death several years ago, the synod turned to

Christodoulos as the leader most capable to reverse the church's

sagging appeal and tackle mounting social and moral problems.

Chosen over a less charismatic but more moderate and theologi-

cally sophisticated opponent, Christodoulos is a relatively young

cleric with considerable social skills and an affable personality. A

reputed polyglot, he is fond of fancy vestments and is given to fiery

rhetorical outbursts. His theological sophistication appears to be

only moderate, but the highly verbose, publicity prone, and cam-

era-happy prelate is eager to offer his views on all social, economic

or other matters. Christodoulos has surrounded himself by fellow

metropolitans with strong conservative views. Kallinikos of

Pireaus, Ignatios of Demetriados, and his erstwhile opponent,

Anthimos of Alexandroupolis, seem to be the most influential.

True to their Orthodox training, the archbishop and his asso-

ciates set out not to redefine the role of the church, to modernize

its doctrine, or to bring it closer to the people, but to draw the peo-

ple closer to the church. For them, Greece's most salient security

menace is loss of identity. The problem is severe enough to

threaten the society's very survival. The root of the problem, as

they see it, is dechristianization; the Greek society is being

dechristianized, i.e., is losing its Helleno-Christian identity. The

church sees itself as the guardian of the nation's cultural legacy and

identity. Kyriazopoulos is perceptive when he states that Wile

church cannot let go its salvationist mission without losing its

own identity.

58

The church's nationalist posture finds support among a small

but vocal group of academics and politicians. Professors Dimitris

Kitsikis and Christos Giannaras are joined by a disparate group of

ideologically conservative political figures. The latter are drawn

mainly from the ranks of the New Democracy (ND), but a few, like

Stelios Papathemelis, represent the socialist party (PASOK). Pro-

fessor Kitsikis believes that Greece has been invaded culturally,

economically, and politically by the non-Orthodox dominated EU;

and the church is the only entity resisting this invasion. The Hel-

ladic Church, argues Kitsikis, is and always was middle eastern

4



19/31

in thought, practice and most importantly in mentality. He

attributes these to the fact that the church was never emancipated

by the Jews and its ethos and customs are free of Jewish influence.

In Kitsikis' view the Orthodox way of life is entirely anti-capi-

talist and is unbreakably tied with the diachronic and living Greek

language, from Homer to the present. The only way out of the

morass Greek political leaders have led the nation into is return to

the precepts of Orthodoxy. Kitsikis endorses the Byzantinist view

that monasteries preserve intact the model of Helleno-Orthodox

individual and society, and w ill serve as the ark of salvation.

59

Like K itsikis, Giannaras is also obsessed with the glory of Hel-

lenism and blames political leaders and the dehellinization and

westernization of Greek education since 1974 for the loss of Greek

identity. In his view, the major political parties (ND and PA SOK)

share equal responsibility in the systematic undermining of

national conscience. Unlike Kitsikis who sees salvation in Ortho-

doxy, Giannaras is pessimistic if not fatalistic and detects no way

out of the cultural and national extermination. In his view, no

political party or political formation seems to understand the

irreversible, tragic and extortionist dehellinization of the Greek

land. 6

Christodoulos and his associates sought to impose these

Byzantinist views on the church and the faithful. Though largely

successful, they faced some opposition w ithin the synod. A sm all

group of metropolitans disputed the assertion regarding the indi-

visibility of Hellenism and Orthodoxy, and they felt that identity

cards are a state matter. For exam ple, Metropolitan Theok litos of

Ioannina, one of Christodoulos' most persistent critics, observed

that since an identity card is a state document, the latter is solely

competent to determine the appropriate elements needed for citi-

zen recognition. 6

' Responding to the archbishop's frequently

repeated assertion that Hellenism and Orthodoxy are synonymous,

Theoklitos noted that such contention is outside the spirit of the

bible, . . . and the tw o are d ifferent entities. 6 2

Some support for the opposition came from Greek Orthodox

churches in the diaspora. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew , for

example, noted that [t]he faithful must obey the law. Christ said:

Mender unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and render unto God

that which is God's.

63

Though belatedly, Metropolitan Anthony

of San Francisco added his voice. In an August 27, 2001 interview

C hurch-S tate R elat ions, N ational Ident i ty , and S ecu ri ty

5


20/31

he held that the issue of identity cards is insignificant and that

the church should occupy itself with deeper problems facing the

people and not what is in [official state] documents.

64

Worth noting are the views of Anastasios, Archbishop of

Albania. A Greek cleric with substantial missionary experience,

Anastasios was appointed by Bartholomew to the post in the early

1990s. Although he never addresses directly the issue of identity

cards, Anastasios' message is unambiguous. In his view, a true

Christian Church cannot be conceived as a closed, self-contained

community, or like a corporation which seeks growth in order to

increase its own power, but a symbol and a stage of bringing about

much needed international unity. And he concludes that identi-

fication of nation and church brings injustice to 'the one holy,

catholic, and apostolic' nature of the [Orthodox Church.

6 5

Ow ing to the autocephalous nature of O rthodox churches, these

conciliatory sentiments had little impact on the leadership of the

Helladic hierarchy. Christodoulos and his supporters had no diffi-

culty marginalizing the skeptics. Bred in the politics of improvisa-

tion and opportunism, the hierarchs blame loss of identity on dark

{exogenous} forces and see westernization and Europeanization as

the main culprits.

66

In one of his many outbursts, Christodoulos

claimed that the row over IDs was part of a Jewish conspiracy: You

know who is behind the identity card issue? The Jews, and for the

first time we have proof of that. His spokesman stated that the arch-

bishop's statement stood on its merits.

6 7

The leader of the Helladic

Church and his associates smell a connection between these sinister

forces and government actions: In the primate's view, the authori-

ties have a carefully drawn up strategic plan and, with help from the

mass media, aim to eliminate the church's influence among the peo-

ple. 6 8He vows to never let it happen.

In true Byzantine fashion, the primate and many of his fellow

metropolitans believe that clerical authority supersedes that of

temporal leaders. Metropolitan Ambrosios of Kalavryta, for

instance, stated that the holy synod is above the president of the

republic, the parliament, the government and the courts.

69

The

archbishop endorsed his colleagues' rather extreme position. By

this logic, the church is not bound by state law and is free to defy

it. This view was clearly expressed by Metropolitan Kallinikos on

May 10, 2000. As synod spokesperson, he stated that Whe church

is bound by holy canons and not state laws. If a state law is anti-

26



21/31

t h e t ic t o h o l y c a n o n s , t h e h i e r a r c h y i s o b l ig e d t o f o ll o w c h u r c h

rules. 7

Operat ing w i th in th i s fram e of th ink ing , C hr i s tod ou los

assum es the ro le of a prophet adm on ish ing h i s flock that I ha ve

b e e n a s s ig n e d b y G o d t o le a d a n d y o u m u s t fo l lo w m e .

71

C h r i s t o d o u l o s h o l d s t h e p o l it ic i a n s r e s p o n s i bl e fo r t h e c o u n -

try 's soc ia l i l ls . He refers to th em as

Evroligourides (Eurocravers)

a n d l a m e n t s t h e i r s e r v il it y a n d i n fe r i o r it y c o m p l e x to w a r d fo r -

eigners. Depicting himself as the champion of tradition,

C h r i s t o d o u lo s b era t e s t h o s e ( i.e ., S im i t i s a n d h i s g o v ern m en t )

who are des t roy ing i t in the name of mod ern ization . The pr imate

h a s eq u a l ly s t ro n g w o r d s f o r G reece ' s in t e l le c t u a l s . On M a y 14 ,

2 0 00 , h e th u n d e r e d : t h e a d v o c a t e s o f a n e n l ig h t e n e d a n d r e li -

gious ly co lor b l ind soc i e ty , a l leged ly in th e n ame of hum an r ights ,

s e e k t o im p o s e a h e in o u s a n d in h u m a n e s ta t u s qu o o n t h e c o n -

scien ce o f the faithful.

72

The f lamboya nt Ambros ios end orsed h i s

co l l eague 's v iews. In an April 6 , 2004 serm on he a sser ted : con -

temporary G reece that i s , the people , soc ie ty , an d the pressare

b e t r a y e r s o f o u r h i st o r y . T h e G r e e k s o f t o d a y h a v e n o n a t io n a l

vision/dreams.

73

Mind fu l of the cr i t ic i sm tha t he a nd h i s fe l low Metropol i tan s

seek po li ti ca l power , the archbishop dec lares : R N chu rch and i ts

lead ers do no t fl irt with political pow er an d w il l never pursu e posi-

t ions of pol i tica l author i ty , we are sat isfied w ith our role as th e peo-

ple 's spir itua l fath ers tha t G od ha s ass igned to us . Our s tru ggle ,

dec lared C hr i s todou los on ano ther occas ion , i s abou t preserv ing

t h e s p ir i tu a l a n d e t h n i c i d e n t it y o f t h e G r e e k pe o p le , a n d c a n n o t

but be crown ed by su ccess .

74

T h e p r e la t e s t a t e d t h a t h e a n d h i s

col leagues labor to br ing abou t a chr is t ian G reek pol ity a pos-

t u r e /go a l w h i c h e v e n t h e c o n s e r v a t iv e

Kath imer in i

l abe led theo-

c r a t ic a n d d i s m is s e d i t a s a n a n a c h r o n i st ic a n d c o n t r a d i c t o r y

neologism reminiscent of the junta's Greece of Christian

Greeks.

75

W hi le profe ss ing suppor t for G reece ' s as soc ia t ion in the EU,

N ATO, and o ther w es tern ins t itu t ions , Ch r i stodou los and the ru l -

ing h ierarchy of the church fee l that the C atho l i c -do minated wes t

i s afraid of Orthod oxy, and a ided by Judaism, is bent on destroy ing

i t. S ince He l len i sm an d Orthod oxy are on e and the sam e , hur t ing

O r t h o d o x y a m o u n t s t o h u r t in g H e l le n i s m , i.e ., G r e e k i d e n t it y .

This an imos i ty toward Orthodoxy da tes back to Rom an t imes and

i s blamed o n the Vat ican's refusal to prevent the destruc t ion of Con-

C hurch-S tate R elat ions, N ational Ident i ty , and S ecurity

7


22/31

stantinople by the crusades in 12 04 . Despite some efforts to mend

the schism, relations between the Vatican and Orthodox churches

remain frosty. Only reluctantly did the hierarchy agree to support

the recent visit of Pope John-Paul, who ultra conservative religious

and other elements, including the Paparokades, referred to as [the

two-horned, grotesque monster from Rom e.

76

This frame of thinking prompted the church to openly side

with fellow Orthodox Serbs during the Kosovo crisis. The mil-

itary command's refusal to cease operations on Easter Sunday,

Orthodoxy's most important holiday, angered the church hierar-

chy and many Orthodox believers everywhere. It was seen as

insulting and arrogant behavior, typifying the lack of respect the

west shows toward the Orthodox world. Christodoulos' anti-

western reflexes showed up again following the September 11,

2001, attack on the US by Muslim fundamentalists. Although he

expressed his shock and sorrow, the archbishop appeared to sug-

gest that the heinous act was the result of America's habit of stick-

ing its nose everyw here.

Though less organized, the church's response was equally

determined with respect to the Greek minority in Albania. Church

circles felt that Tirana's policies to restrict the religious and cul-

tural activities of the Greek minority in Albania in the early to-

mid 1990s were orchestrated by Turkey and aided by anti-Ortho-

dox elements in the west. Even Greece's row with FYROM was

seen in a similar light. From the church's point of view, efforts to

establish a separate M acedonian nationality had no historical base

and threatened Greek identity and cultural heritage. It should be

noted that, at least for a while, these sentiments found support in

some segments of the G reek society, including the nation's politi-

cal elites.

The archbishop and many of his colleagues use church insti-

tutions to legitimize their positions. Christodoulos' own popular-

ity and strong public support in favor of the church's position on

the issue of identity cards embolden their determination to chal-

lenge the state.

77

In speeches and hom ilies the hierarchs invoke a

mixture o f evangelical parables, religious aphorisms, thinly-veiled

threats, and often h ighly inflamm atory and even vituperative lan-

guage to spread the message and influence the public. Examples of

such statements include: Nobody will succeed to silence us

because our strength derives from God, Those who do not want

2 8



23/31

religion on identity cards represent the forces of evil, Whoever

threatens the church loses the use of his arm, The church repre-

sents the people and does not recognize [state] laws, The people

are with us and will punish them (governm ent), or Let us retake

the city (Constantinople). Metropolitans Ambrosios and Kalli-

nikos hurled personal insults toward the prime minister. The for-

mer denounced Simitis as a highhanded dictator, and the latter

referred to him as a dwarf.

78

Such u tterances resonate well in the

countryside and among the elderly and the poorly educated.

How has the Greek state responded to the church's problema-

tique and related activities? Besides perennial problems with

Turkey, the demise of comm unism in the Balkans and the breakup

of Yugoslavia presented Athens with essentially three national

security problems: the row with FYROM over the name, issues

relating to the Greek minority in Albania and Tirana's counter-

claims, and dealing w ith and responding to M ilosevic's actions in

Bosnia and Kosovo.

As far as the first two are concerned, Athens's initial response

had many of the characteristics associated with societal oriented

perceptions of national security. For similar reasons both Tirana

and Skopje answered in virtually identical fashion. All three placed

at the top of their agenda preservation and protection of their

respective cultural and national identity. As discussed earlier, secu-

rity problems arise when one society's sense of identity is threat-

ened by the strengthening of another society's own sense of

identity. Such fears led the governments of the three countries to

pursue policies that endangered peace in the area. For example,

Greece's strong pressure on Albania regarding the Greek minority

and the embargo on FYR OM prompted Tirana and Skopje to seek

closer ties with Turkey, Greece's strongest adversary.

But Athens soon realized that the poor state of its neighbors'

econom ies could be of substantial benefit to its own. Greek entre-

preneurs took the lead and put pressure on the government to de-

emphasize identity and culture related differences. Likewise,

authorities in Skopje and Tirana came to the conclusion that

Greece's more advanced and prosperous economy can help them

climb out of the econom ic slump facing their countries. Societal-

oriented securities policies of the early 1990s were eventually

abandoned in favor of more traditional state sovereignty maximiz-

ing security. Even though differences still remain, Athens' rela-

C hurch-S tate R elat ions, N ational Ident i ty , and S ecurity

9


24/31

t io n s w i th A lb a n ia a n d F Y R OM h a v e exper i en ced co n s id e ra b le

improvement .

The s i tuat ion w i th Y u gos lav ia w as an d remains m ore com plex .

But e ven h ere Athen s ' approach h as fo ll owed a s imi lar t ra jec tory .

I n t h e ca s e o f B o s n ia , A th en s 's a t t it u d e w a s a m b iva len t . On o n e

h a n d , t h e c o n s e r v a t iv e , pr o - w e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t o f P r i m e M i n i s -

t er C o n s t a n t in e M it s o t a k i s o ffi c ia l l y s u p po r t ed U n i t ed N a t io n s

sanctions against Belgrade, but on the other it was unable or

u n w i l lin g t o en f o rce t h em . R e l ig io u s a f fin i t y a n d h i s t o r i ca l t ie s

between th e two co un tr ie s influenced Athen s ' behavior . C aught in

a d i le m m a , M i ts o t a k is m a d e d e t e r m i n e d a n d c o n s i s te n t e f fo r t s t o

h e l p b r in g t h e B o s n i a c r i si s to a n e n d , b u t w i th o u t m u c h s u c c e s s .

In a w ay , Athens ' ambiva lence mirrored the con fus ion and lack o f

resolve that cr ippled th e EU during th is per iod.

By the t ime the Kosovo cr i s is ro l led aroun d , G reece ' s pos i ti on

h a d e v o l ve d . I n s t e a d o f s tr a d d l in g b e t w e e n c u l t u r a l a f fi n it y a n d

his tor i ca l t i e s wi th Yugos lav ia on the on e han d an d s t i ck ing wi th

i ts EU partners o n th e o th er , the S imi t is governmen t mad e a quie t

but c lear ch oice; it s tuck with i t s partner s . So cieta l cons idera t ions

t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y t h a t h a d i n fl u e n c e d A th e n s ' a p pr o a c h i n t h e

Bosnia issue gave way to state sovereignty calculations in the

Kosovo quagmire. This substantial shift was not the result of

ch a n g e in g o v ern m en t p ers o n n e l , b u t re fl ec t ed a d e l ib era t e a n d

genera l ly success fu l po l icy a iming to ch ange G reece ' s image from

the poster-boy of nonco mplian ce to a fu l l and respected partn er in

the European family .

Despite prote s t s from certa in segmen ts of soc ie ty , inc lud ing

t h e O r t h o d o x C h u r c h , t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d l it t le d i ffi c u lt y j u s t i-

fy ing th e leg i t ima cy of i ts pol ic ies . The logic fo l low ed wa s s imple:

European m embersh ip carr ied both benef it s an d re spons ib il it ie s ,

and the cou ntry ' s s ecur i ty an d eco nom ic in teres t s li e in Europe . I t

w o u l d b e fo o l is h f o r G r e e c e t o s u p p o r t a n u n s c r u p u lo u s d i c ta t o r

(Milosevic) and jeopardize i ts nat iona l intere sts . EU's mo de rate ly

s u cce s s fu l e ffo r t s t o c l ea n u p it s a c t a n d r e s p o n d in u n i s o n co n -

t r ibuted to the ch an ge o f a t t i tud e in Athe ns . The S im iti s govern -

m en t fo l lo w e d a s im i la r l in e w i th r e s p ec t to t h e o n g o in g co n fl ic t

between the FYR OM governme nt and the coun try 's large Alban-

i an m inor i ty .

I t is a l so interes t ing to no te that Athen s i s seeking to de a l wi th

l o n g s t a n d in g G reco - Tu rk i s h p ro b lem s b y s u p po r t in g An k a ra 's

30



25/31

application for adm ission in the EU. Greek authorities reason that

EU membership would act as a restraint on Turkey's behavior. Yet

the church has a very different view. In a recent sermon Archbishop

Christodoulos expressed strong opposition to Turkey's EU mem-

bership. Using highly inflammatory language, he referred to Turks

as barbarians who have no place in Christian Europe, asserting

that the Greeks cannot live with them. The archbishop's statement

drew criticism from two of his strongest detractors in the synod.

Metropolitan Theoklitos said clergy and lay alike have no right

to desert Jesus' messsage. There are no barbarians. Chrisostomos

of Zakynthos was even more direct, characterizing the prelate's

positions as tragic and unacceptable. Spinning efforts by a

church spokesperson could not undo the damage caused by the

archbishop's vitriolic and undiplomatic language. Journalist Con-

stantine Zoulas is correct when he observes that Christodoulos'

statement was in clear and direct opposition to governm ent policy

supporting Turkey's admission to the EU a position endorsed by

the newly installed conservative administration. 79

Interestingly but not surprisingly, the governm ent's reasoning

and justification on the issue of identity cards traveled a similar

path. European law on human rights required member states to

refrain from asking citizens to reveal their religious preferences:

the government is simply ensuring that Greece lives up to its EU

obligations. For the EU religious identity is a human rights issue

and cannot be subjected to the w ill of m ajorities or minorities.

A Pa rt in g W o rd

Armed with over three million signatures, a committee of

metropolitans, led by Christodoulos, visited the president of the

Republic on August 30, 2001, and asked the head of state and

guardian of the constitution to call a referendum on the issue of

identity cards. President Kostis Stephanopoulos put an end to the

impasse. His rejection of the church's position could not have been

more emphatic. The president's terse but carefully worded state-

ment, issued following the meeting, stated that the issue of iden-

tity cards did not meet the constitutional and legal criteria

required for a referendum . M oreover, the collection of signatures

was done outside the legal framework and could not be used to


1


26/31

overturn existing law. Finally, in stern but clear language

Stephano poulos remind ed h i s v is itor s that everyone is ob l igated

to com ply wi th the law .

8

Despite some statements to the contrary (including a few

m a d e f o l lo w i n g t h e r e c e n t c h a n g e i n g o v e r n m e n t ), C h r i st o d o u l o s

and h i s assoc ia te s have come to rea l ize that the church los t and the

issue of identity cards is effectively over. Yet the debate over

national identity and the church's self-assigned role as the

guardian o f the va lues of He ll en ism an d Orthod oxy show n o s igns

of abat ing . Though w oun ded and fac ing a more a sser t ive in terna l

oppos i t ion , the arch bi shop and h i s as soc ia te s appear prepared to

take on a ne w cru sade . In the October 11 , 2001 mee t ing the syno d

d i s c u s s e d t h e s m a l l b u t g r o w i n g pa g a n i s t m o v e m e n t in G r e e c e .

Syn od spokesperson , Metropoli tan Anth imos , argued that these

c l ever neopagani s t s take advan tage of the G reeks ' l ove and adm i-

rat ion for the ir anc ient ance stors and seek to revive o ld re l ig ion s.

In h i s v iew, the church canno t s i t id le and mu st und er take organ-

i ze d a c t io n t o c o m b a t t h i s d a n g e r o u s ph e n o m e n o n .

8

' Th e s e a n d

o t h e r a c t iv it ie s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p e r e n n i a l is s u e o f G r e e k

i d e n t it y h a s n o t b e e n r e s o lv e d . S t a t e a n d s o c ie t y a r e m o v in g w e s t

wh i le the chu rch c l ings to By zantin is t , na t iona l is t views. The con -

fl ic t i s s t il l simm ering an d i s a m atter o f t ime before i t reappears .

A h o s t o f is s u e s , in c l u d i n g r e l ig io u s e d u c a t io n a n d c h u r c h p r o p-

er ty , are s t il l pend ing and could e as i ly spark anoth er s ta te -church

row.

The preced ing ana lys i s ind icate s that soc i e ta l and s ta te sover -

e i gn t y o r i e n t e d p e r c e pt io n s c a n l e a d t o d i a m e t r ic a l ly o p po s i n g

v ie w s o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r it y n e e d s . D u r in g t h e C o l d W a r p e r io d

wh en the s ta te wa s s trong or cou ld impose it s wi ll throu gh heavy-

ha nd ed ta c t i c s , d i fferen ces in s ta te versus soc i e ta l vi ews on sec u-

r i ty m attered very l it t le ; the s ta te ha d the w herew i tha l to preva i l.

This can no longer be taken for granted in the P os t Co ld W ar env i -

ronm ent . For Jepperson , W end t , and Ka tzens te in i t i s c l ear that

the security domain has become less exclusively an interstate

r e a l m : s t a t e 's h e g e m o n y o v e r s e c u r i t y h a s pa r t ly e r o d e d . T h e y

c la im that sta te s have undercut the ir own secur i ty by promot ing

var ious e thno-re l igious and other groups, and warn that (v)ar ious

d i s s ip a ti ve f o r c e s c o u l d u n d e r m i n e o r o v e r w h e l m e x is t in g f o r m s

o f c o o r d i n a t io n o r e le m e n t s o f w o r l d in s t it u t io n a l a n d c u l t u r a l

structure. 82

32

O U R N A L O F TH E H EL L EN I C D I A S P O R A


27/31

E ve n t h o u g h t h e G r e e k s it u a t i o n d i s pl a y s o n l y a f e w o f t h e s e

chara cter is t ic s , never the l ess the conf li c t be tween the s ta te a nd the

Orthod ox Chu rch regard ing Kosovo and ident i ty card s revea l that

differen ces over ide nt i ty an d sec ur i ty can be d isru pt ive; an d i f le f t

un reso lved ca n lead to m ajor d i srupt ions . Despi te the fact tha t the

S imi ti s governme nt ' s reasoning was sound and l egi timate , it s han -

dl ing of the IDs is sue lacked p lan n ing an d preparat ion . The pub-

l ic was cau ght by surpr i se and the governmen t was no t adequate ly

prepared for the s torm o f prote s t un leashed by the ann oun cement .

Despite the ir pro-Euro pean stand s , opposi t ion pol it ica l part ies

h a v e s h o w n t im id i t y a n d p o l i ti ca l o pp o r t u n i s m . Th i s w a s e s p e -

c i a ll y t r u e w i th N e w D e m o c r a c y . Th i r s t y fo r p o w e r a ft e r n e a r l y

two d ecad es in the po l it i ca l wi ldern ess , ND sou ght to explo i t the

i s sue for po l i ti ca l ad vantage . After in i t ia l hes i ta t ion a nd de spit e

t h e a d v ice o f s o m e s ea s o n ed co n s erv a t ive p o l it i ca l figu re s ( lik e

Stephanos Man os , Andreas Andr ia .nopoulos , and Mar ie t ta G ian-

nakou) , the par ty annou nced tha t when i t comes to power i t wou ld

support a pol icy of volun tary insc r ipt ion. At the sam e t ime, ma ny

of it s mem bers , inc lud ing par ty l ead er C os tas Ka ram anl i s , s igned

the re ferendu m peti tion the chu rch c i rcu la ted . But i t is a l so c l ear

that par ty do es not w an t to a l iena te G reece ' s EU par tne rs . Elec -

toral pol it ics is abo ut taking a dvan tage of oppon en t missteps; but

s o m e t h i n gs d o n o t g o a w a y e a s i ly a n d h a v e a w a y c o m i n g ba c k t o

bite the h and that f ed them . Even th ough the fa te of the IDs i s sue

h a s b e e n l e g a l ly s e a l e d , n e v e r t h e l e ss t h e c h u r c h c a n s t il l b r in g i t

up and seek to use i t a s l everage to ge t governm ent con cess ions in

o t h e r m a t t e r s . C h r i s to d o u l o s a n d s o m e o f h is c o l le a g u e s r e c e n t l y

r e m i n d e d e v e r y o n e , in c l u d i n g t h e n e w l y e l e c te d N D go v e r n m e n t ,

that the s ignature s are kept in a safe place and the i ssue of IDs i s

a m atter of principle an d m ay be revis ited a t an a ppropriate t ime.

Fina l ly , the ch urc h bea rs the bru nt of the respon sibil ity . Fac-

ing a p le thora o f modern soc ie ty -re la ted problems , the G reek peo-

ple are hu ngry for mora l and sp ir itua l gu idan ce from a re l ig iou s

institution in tune with the times. The Orthodox Church has

fa i l e d to s a i l w i th th e wi nd s o f h i s tor y . H av i ng the a r c h b i s hop

s h o o t b a s k e t s o r pl a y m o d e r n m u s i c t o e n t ic e t h e y o u n g is t r e a t -

ing the symptom an d n o t the d i sease . The party is good on ly whi l e

i t la s t s , b u t t h e m o r a l a n d s pi r it u a l p r o b le m s r e m a i n u n t r e a t e d .

R ather than was te t ime an d e nergy fight ing po int le s s ba t t le s , such

a s t h e I D s i ss u e , th e c h u r c h s h o u l d s it d o w n a n d h a v e a n h o n e s t

C hurch-State R elat ions, Nat ional Ident i ty , and Security

3


28/31

conversation with itself. The church needs to search its soul and

immerse itself in its vast literature for relevant answers to modern

problems. If the church is to save the people's souls it must first

save its own. Instead of fearing separation of church and state, the

church should welcome it with open arms. Secularism will give it

autonomy and space to define its social mission and goals.

The ancient Greeks taught us that the only permanent thing

in life is change. Mikhail Gorbachev, one of the towering figures

of our times, heeded this maxim and warned that life punishes

those who come too late. The Orthodox Church cannot and must

not let it happen.

References

'Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National

Security, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed.,

T he C ul ture o f N ational Securi ty : Norm s and

Identi ty in W orld Polit ics

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 9.

2

Richard Ullman's definition is cited by Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian

Hyde-Price, Introduction, in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, eds.,

S ecur ity and Ident ity in Europe: Ex ploring a N ew A genda

(London: Macmillan Press

Ltd, 2000), p. 5 .

3

YosefLapid, Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Rela-

tions Theory, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds.,

T h e R e t u rn o f C u l-

ture and Ident ity in IR T heory

(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 3.

lb id . , p. 4.

5

Aggestam and Hyde-Price, Introduction, p. 7.

6

Linda S. B ishai, Secession and Security: the Politics of Ethno-Cultural

Identity, in Aggestam and Hyde-Price, eds.,

S ecur ity and Iden t ity ,

p. 154 .

7

Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms,

Identity, and Culture in National Security, in Katzenstein, ed.,

T h e C u l tu re o f

N ational Sec ur ity , p. 33 .

8

Katzenstein, Introduction, in Katzenstein, ed.

T he Culture of N ational S ecu-

ri ty ,

p. 2 .

9

Aggestam and Hyde-Price, Introduction, pp. 6-8 .

'Theodore Schwartz's definition is cited by Kevin Avruch,

C u l tu re a n d

Conf l ic t R esolut ion

(Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,

1998), p.17.

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, Norms, Identity, and Culture, p.33 .

'

2

Bishai, Secession and Security, p. 155.

Manuel Castells,

T h e Po w e r o f I d e n t it y

(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,

1997),

P.

6

'4lbid.,

p

8

.

I b i d . ,

p. 7.

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16

F ern ard Brau de l , A His tory o f C i v i li za ti ons

( N e w Y o r k : P e n g u i n B o o k s ,

1993), p. 22.

B e n e d i c t A n d e r s o n , Im agined C om m uni t ie s : R e f l ec t ions on the O rig in and

S pread of N ational ism

(Lond on : Vers o, 1983) , p. 12.

8

D o n a l d E u g e n e S m i t h , Religion and Poli t ical Development

(Bosto n: Lit tle ,

Brow n an d C om pany , 1970), p. 169.

D i a na K e nd a l l ,

S ocio logy in Our T im es: T he E ssen tials ,

3rd ed . (Be lmon t :

W ad s worth /Tho ms on Learn ing , 2002), p. 356.

2

Sam ue l P . Hunt ingt on ,

T he C lash o f C iv i li zat ions and the R em aking o f W orld

Order

( N e w Y o r k : S im o n

Sc hu ster , 1996) , p. 96.

21

01 e W aev er , S oc ie ta l S ecu r i ty: th e C on cept , in Ole W aev er , Barry Bu zan ,

Morten K els trup and P ierre Lemaitre , eds . ,

Iden t ity , M igra tion and the N ew S ecu-

ri ty A genda in Europe

(Ne w Yo rk: St . Mart in 's Pre ss , 1993) , p. 23.

22H u n t i n g t o n ,

T he C lash of Civ i liza tions , p. 129.

23

/bid.,

p. 67.

24

Jepperson , W en d t , an d K atzen s te in , N orms , Iden t i ty , an d C u l tu re ,

p.

60.

2

'Agges tam an d Hyd e-P r ice , Introdu ct ion , p. 6 .

26

A d r i a n H y d e - P r i c e , R e f l e c t io n s o n S e c u r i ty a n d I d e n t it y i n E u r o p e , i n

Agges tam an d Hyd e-P r ice . eds . ,

S ecurity and identi ty , p. 25.

27

Agges tam an d Hyd e-P r ice , Introd uct ion , p . 7 .

28B uzan ' s de f in i t ion in c i t ed by ibid. ,

p.26.

29W a e v e r 's w o r k i s c it e d b y P a u l R o e , Th e S o c i e t a l S e c u r i ty D i le m m a , in

Agges tam an d Hyd e-P r ice , eds . ,

Identi ty and Sec urity ,

p. 139.

C i t e d b y

ibid. ,

p. 140.

31 /bid, p. 142.

32Barry Bu zan, Societa l Secu ri ty , S tate Secu ri ty and Intern at ional i sat ion , in

Church-State Relations, National Identity, and Security in Post-Cold War Greece

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