Chua vs NLRC

4
Celia Chua et. al vs. NLRC et. Al GR 89971-75 Gutierrez, Jr. Facts: 1. I DECEMBER 1985 , !ta"#r$ %icr#s&ste's Ic (!ta"#r$) *le$ a +etiti sus+esi# #" +a&'ets a$ a++#it'et #" reha ilitati# receiver ith the ! C /. 0 FEBRUARY 5, 1986 , ! C $eclare$ !ta"#r$ t# e i a state #" sus+esi# #" +a&'ets a$ a++#ite$ !G as the reha ilitati# receiver. 2. 3ecause #" these $evel#+'ets, "#r'er e'+l#&ees #" !ta"#r$ *le$ ith 4 several cases "#r '#e& clai's (8 r#u+s #" cases). 0" the 8 cases, 5 as si res+#$et La #r Ar iter 4#'ia$#r %. Cruz. 6. I JANUARY 1987, ! C $isa++r#ve$ the reha ilitati# +la thus lea$i t# the li ui$ati# #" !ta"#r$. 5. 0 MARCH 13, 1987, the 7 secure$ cre$it#r a s a$ 261 71/6 #" i e'+l#&ees etere$ it# a %0A hich essetiall& +r#vi$e$ that, u$er the c#tr# a$ a$'iistrati# #" the MOA LIQUIDATION COMMITTEE, the a s ill "#recl#se all their real estate a$ chattel '#rt a es a$ su se uetl& t# $is the +r#cee$s acc#r$i t# a +re-$e*e$ shari "#r'ula. . 0 OCTOBER 2, 1987, the ! C a++#ite$ the %0A Li ui$ati# ;ea' as th +er'aet ! C Li ui$at#r #" !ta"#r$. 7. As re ar$s the '#e& clai's, the "#ll# i evets tras+ire$: a. 0 JUNE 30, 1988, the %0A li ui$ati# c#''ittee *le$ a 'ai"estati# ith the la #r ar iters, a$visi sai$ la #r ar iters #" the e<ecuti# #" %0A. . 0 SEPTEMBER 19, 1988, +etiti#ers*le$ a MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS i the la #r cases +e$i e"#re the'. 0 the #ther ha$, a r#u+ #" /5 e'+l#&ees, re+resete$ & a certai Att&. 0ca'+#, * +etiti# "#r i=ucti# ith +ra&er "#r issuace #" a ;R0 i the c#s#li$ la #r cases +e$i e"#re LA Cruz. c. IN R !>0N! ;? R ;0, all the la #r ar iters e<ce+t res+#$et Cruz issu #r$ers sta&i the +r#cee$i s. I "act, i #r$er t# +reserve the ri ht +arties $uri the +e$ec& #" the cases, res+#$et CR@ RESTRAINED the i'+le'etati# #" the %0A. (2/66 261) $. I vie #" this #r$er, +etiti#ers*le$ ith NLRC a +etiti# "#r +r#hi iti# i=ucti# a$ #r ;R0. e. ?# ever, the NLRC $eie$, "#r lac #" 'erit, +etiti#ers +etiti# "#r Bri >r#hi iti# t# sta& +r#cee$i s i the *ve (5) la #r cases +e$i e"#re Cruz. ". !u se uetl&, +etiti#ers *le$ a '#ti# "#r '#ti# "#r rec#si$erati# ell as *rst a$ sec#$ ur et '#ti#s "#r earl& res#luti#, '#ti# t# l restraii #r$er a$ thir$ ur et '#ti# "#r earl& res#luti#. .?# ever, the '#ti#s #t ithsta$i , the NLRC $i$ #t act u+# the' #r $i$ it res#lve the i=ucti# case $es+ite the +arties su 'issi# #" thei res+ective 'e'#ra$a. h. At the ti'e #" the uesti#e$ NLRC res#luti#, the %0A Li ui$ati# C#''ittee as alrea$& i the +r#cess #" $istri uti '#e& clai's t# the "#r'er e'+l#&ees #" !ta"#r$. i. ;here"#re, i vie t# the D;R % @RG NCE ( reat u' er are ue'+l#&e$ a$ ere a aiti "#r the $istri uti# sice the cl#sure i 1985, a$ th hi h +r# a ilit& #" #ut rea #" vi#let urest $ue t# the u=ust a$ uc#sci#a le $ela& i $istri uti#) i all# i the $istri uti# #" +r# +etiti#ers # *le this istat +etiti# "#r CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION ITH PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION a aist the NLRC, averri that the NLRC acte$ ith Grave A use #" 4is a'#uti t# lac #" =uris$icti# a$ #r ith#ut #r i e<cess #" =uris$i issue$ the res#luti#s # the "#ll# i r#u$s: i. ;he ! C has #ri ial a$ e<clusive =uris$icti# #ver the li ui$ati !ta"#r$, iclu$i the +r#ce$ures "#r settli the '#e& clai's # "#r'er #r ers a$ e'+l#&ees.

description

Chua vs NLRC

Transcript of Chua vs NLRC

Celia Chua et. al vs. NLRC et. AlGR 89971-75Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:1. In December 1985, Stanford Microsystems Inc (Stanford) filed a petition for suspension of payments and appointment of rehabilitation receiver with the SEC. 2. On February 5, 1986, SEC declared Stanford to be in a state of suspension of payments and appointed SGV as the rehabilitation receiver. 3. Because of these developments, former employees of Stanford filed with DOLE several cases for money claims (8 groups of cases). Of the 8 cases, 5 was signed to respondent Labor Arbiter Dominador M. Cruz.4. In January 1987, SEC disapproved the rehabilitation plan thus leading to the liquidation of Stanford. 5. On March 13, 1987, the 7 secured creditor banks and 6341/7124 of its employees entered into a MOA which essentially provided that, under the control and administration of the MOA LIQUIDATION COMMITTEE, the banks will foreclose all their real estate and chattel mortgages and subsequently to distribute the proceeds according to a pre-defined sharing formula. 6. On October 2, 1987, the SEC appointed the MOA Liquidation Team as the permanent SEC Liquidator of Stanford.7. As regards the money claims, the following events transpired:a. On JUNE 30, 1988, the MOA liquidation committee filed a manifestation with the labor arbiters, advising said labor arbiters of the execution of the MOA.b. On SEPTEMBER 19, 1988, petitioners filed a MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS in the labor cases pending before them. On the other hand, a group of 25 employees, represented by a certain Atty. Ocampo, filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a TRO in the consolidated labor cases pending before LA Cruz.c. IN RESPONSE THERETO, all the labor arbiters except respondent Cruz issued orders staying the proceedings. In fact, in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the cases, respondent CRUZ RESTRAINED the implementation of the MOA. (3244/6341)d. In view of this order, petitioners filed with NLRC a petition for prohibition/injunction and or TRO.e. However, the NLRC denied, for lack of merit, petitioners petition for Writ of Prohibition to stay proceedings in the five (5) labor cases pending before LA Cruz.f. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for motion for reconsideration, as well as first and second urgent motions for early resolution, motion to lift restraining order and third urgent motion for early resolution.g. However, the motions notwithstanding, the NLRC did not act upon them nor did it resolve the injunction case despite the parties submission of their respective memoranda.h. At the time of the questioned NLRC resolution, the MOA Liquidation Committee was already in the process of distributing money claims to the former employees of Stanford.i. Therefore, in view to the EXTREME URGENCY (great number are unemployed and were awaiting for the distribution since the closure in 1985, and there is high probability of outbreak of violent unrest due to the unjust and unconscionable delay in distribution) in allowing the distribution of proceeds, petitioners now file this instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against the NLRC, averring that the NLRC acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction in issued the resolutions on the following grounds:i.The SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the liquidation of Stanford, including the procedures for settling the money claims of former workers and employees.ii.The MOA is valid, fair and reasonable and is in accord with law, morals, public policy and established jurisprudence.

ISSUE: WON, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE AFOREMENTIONED RESOLUTION.

Ruling:Yes.

Jurisdiction over liquidation proceedings of insolvent corporations is vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended. On the other hand, jurisdiction over money claims of employees against their employers is vested in the Labor Arbiter whose decision may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code.

The rule is that a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation must be present before preferences over various money claims may be enforced. Since liquidation proceedings are proceedingsin rem,all claims of creditors whether preferred or non-preferred, the identification of the preferred ones and the totality of the employer's asset should be brought into the picture. There can then be an authoritative, fair and binding adjudication.

However, the money claims of workers pose a special problem of jurisdiction when liquidation proceedings are on-going because of the highly preferred nature given by law to said claims.

BUT, IN THE CASE AT BAR, THERE IS NO ISSUE because the workers themselves have voluntarily opted to participate in the liquidation proceedings. They participated in the discussions and proceedings which led to MOA. The workers themselves oppose the orders of the NLRC which have denied them to the speedy receipt of funds they urgently need. IT IS THUS A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE NLRC TO RAISE A TECHNICAL QUESTION OF ITS OWN JURISDICTION WHEN THE WORKERS OVER WHOM IT IS RAISED REJECT THE ASSERTION OF SUCH JURISDICTION.

Moreover, only 3244 of the 6341 employees were covered under the labor cases assigned to respondent Cruz. Now because of the NLRC resolution, all the other workers (3097) were also adversely affected.

In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that the MOA entered into is valid, fair and reasonable, and is in accord with law, morals, public policy and established jurisprudence.

Article 13, paragraph 3, section 3 provides that The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

This policy is echoed under Article 227 of the Labor Code which provides that Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.

Undoubtedly, the MOA was executed in good faith and the employees were duly represented during the negotiations which were supervised by a Regional Director of the DOLE. More importantly, the rights of the employees were safeguarded and protected not only during the negotiations but also at the implementation of the compromise agreement.

In view of the foregoing, the order of the NLRC are hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Court orders:1. Respondent LA Cruz to desist from conducting further proceedings in the labor cases pending before him;2. Respondent NLRC and LA Cruz to desist from interfering in the implementation of the MOA.3. Respondent Atty. Ocampo, et al to desist from interfering in the implementation of the MOA.

As a secondary issue, may a minority which is equivalent to less than 1% (25) of the total employees prevent the enforcement of the MOA executed by employees representing about 89% of the total number of employees (6341/7124)?

The Supreme Court, in the case of Dionela vs CIR, ruled in the negative. The High Court said:

It is an accepted rule under our laws that the will of the majority should prevail over the minority. The action taken by petitioners herein as minority members of the Union 'is contrary to the policy of the Magna Carta of Labor, which promotes the settlement of differences between management and labor by mutual agreement,' and that if said action were tolerated, 'no employer would ever enter into any compromise agreement for the minority members of the Union will always dishonor the terms of the agreement and demand for better terms.' The view thus taken by the lower court is correct. Indeed, otherwise, even collective bargaining agreements would cease to promote industrial peace and the purpose of Republic Act No. 875 would thus be defeated.

In view of the foregoing, the order of the NLRC are hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Court orders:1. Respondent LA Cruz to desist from conducting further proceedings in the labor cases pending before him;2. Respondent NLRC and LA Cruz to desist from interfering in the implementation of the MOA.3. Respondent Atty. Ocampo, et al to desist from interfering in the implementation of the MOA.