Chris Arthur - Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic and a Myth of Marxology.doc

7/27/2019 Chris Arthur - Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic and a Myth of Marxology.doc

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Hegels Master-Slave Dialectic and a Myth of Marxology

Source: Originally published in the New Left Review, November-December 1983, pp. 6775. Revised by the author for Marx Myths &

Legends. Used with permission of New Left Review for non-commercial, educational purposes only, and no permission isgranted to reproduce the text.

There is a widely held view that Marx was profoundly influenced bythe MasterServant (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) dialectic inHegels Phenomenology of Spirit. This view was first popularized by

Jean-Paul Sartre, who refers in his Being and Nothingness (1943) tothe famous Master-Slave relation which so profoundly influenced

Marx.[1] Sartre does not explain how he knows this.[2] Probablythis remark reflects the influence of Alexandre Kojves lectures onHegel in the nineteen-thirties. Kojve presents a reading of thePhenomenologywhich centralizes the place of the MasterServantdialectic in it, in a quasi-Marxist interpretation.[3] (Kojve may haveassumed that Marx himself read it in the same way. However, it isone thing to read Marxism back into Hegel, it is another to generateit out of Hegel.) Three years after Sartre we find Jean Hyppoliteagain saying that the dialectic of domination and servitude is thebest-known section of the Phenomenologybecause of the influenceit has had on the political and social philosophy of Hegels

successors, especially Marx.[4] As a matter of fact, despite theassertions of numerous commentators to the contrary, Sartre andHyppolite did notattend Kojves lectures. The myth that they sat atthe feet of the unknown superior is now well-established, but thesecondary literature concerned does not give any evidence for it.[5]Let us turn then to first-hand accounts. Kojves disciple RaymondQueneau, who was responsible for collecting and publishingKojves lectures in 1947, has given a list of participants which doesnot include Sartre or Hyppolite.[6] As far as Hyppolite is concernedwe have the additional testimony of Mme. Hyppolite[7] that he didnot attend for fear of being influenced.[8]

However that may be, by the time Sartre and Hyppolite made theirequations between Hegel and Marx a crucial document of Kojveswas already in the public domain. In the 14 January 1939 issue ofMesures Kojve published a free translation, with interpolatedglosses, of the section of the Phenomenology entitled Autonomyand Dependence of Self-consciousness: Mastery and Servitude. Stillmore interesting for our purposes is that Kojve includes as anepigraph the following words of Marx: Hegel ... erfasst die Arbeit alsdas Wesen, als das sich bewhrende Wesen des Menschen.[9]

(Hegel ... grasps labour as the essence, as the self-confirmingessence of man.) No reference is given, but in fact this is quoted

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from Marxs 1844 Paris Manuscripts, which remained unpublisheduntil the nineteen-thirties. Kojve is the first person, therefore, tomake a direct connection between this famous judgement of Marxson Hegel and the MasterServant dialectic in the Phenomenology.

Today it is dogmatically asserted in numerous books that Marx wasinspired by Hegels analysis of the labour of servitude.[10] This viewis completely false. The present note attempts to show that this isso and to explain the real significance of Marxs criticalappropriation of the Phenomenology.

If we are to consider the influence of Hegels Phenomenology onMarx, the crucial text to examine has to be Marxs manuscripts of1844, in which he introduces his theory of alienation, and thendevotes considerable space to a penetrating critique of thePhenomenology. In this latter section Marx praises Hegel for havinggrasped man as the result of his own labour. Nearly allcommentators, innocently assuming that material labour is meanthere, turn to the Phenomenology and find that there is indeed afascinating discussion in the MasterServant section of thesignificance of material labour; in and through this the servant findshimself. Furthermore, the fact that this labour is seen by Hegel asactualized in the context of servitude, leads some commentators tomake the more extravagant claim that in his theory of alienationMarx draws on this same section. Herbert Marcuse was probably thefirst to do so; he says in his Reason and Revolution (1941): In 1844,

Marx sharpened the basic concepts of his own theory through acritical analysis of Hegels Phenomenology of Mind. He described thealienation of labour in the terms of Hegels discussion of master andservant.[11]

The only difficulty with these presuppositions of the secondaryliterature is that Marx never refers to this section of thePhenomenologynever mind giving it any importance!when, inhis 1844 manuscripts, he embarks on a critique of Hegelsdialectic. He discusses the Phenomenologyas a whole and drawsattention to its last chapter especially; he singles out three other

sections for praise; but not one of them is on the masterservantdialectic.[12] This should make us suspicious, therefore, of theclaims made for the masterslave.

Before considering Marxs assessment of the Phenomenologylet usrehearse the dialectic ofHerrschaft und Knechtschaft. (Incidentally,although it is popularly nominated the MasterSlave, the correcttranslation of Knecht is servant.[13]) This section occurs early inthe Phenomenologyat the point where consciousness is to turn intoself-consciousness. Hegel believes that the self can become

conscious of itself only in and through the mediation of another self-consciousness. The first stable relationship that emerges in Hegels

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dialectical development of this topic is that of Lordship andBondage. The master is acknowledged as such by his servant, andhe achieves immediate satisfaction of his desires through goods andservices provided by the servants labour. The dialectic movesforward precisely through the servant, however, because through

work ... the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is. Workforms and shapes the thing, and through this formative activity theconsciousness of the servant now, in the work outside it, acquiresan element of permanence; for it comes to see in the independentbeing of the object its own independence. The shape does notbecome something other than himself through being made externalto him, says Hegel, for it is precisely this shape that is his purebeing-for-self. He concludes: Through this rediscovery of himself byhimself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his workwherein he seemed to live only the life of a stranger [fremder Sinn]that he acquires a sense of himself [eigner Sinn].[14]

These terms are superficially comparable to Marxs in that bothHegel and Marx see work not merely in its utilitarian aspect but as avehicle of self-realization; thus they see the servant rather than themaster as the locus of a more developed human existence.However, fundamental differences between Marx and Hegel becomeobvious when we notice that, whereas Marx holds that only achange in the mode of production recovers for the worker his senseof self and its fulfilment, Hegel thinks that the educative effect ofwork, even within an exploitative relation of production, is sufficient

for the worker to manifest to himself his own meaning in hisproduct. Furthermore, at this stage in the phenomenologicaldialectic, the condition of fear and service is stipulated asnecessaryto this end: that is, to the servants becoming objective tohimself.[15]

Hegel defines work as desire held in check: it involves putting adistance between the immediate impulses of self-will and formativeactivity grounded in objective principles. If you like, it is really themaster who is a slave because his object is the unalloyed feeling ofself-satisfaction: that is to say, he is a slave to his appetites, but his

satisfactions are only fleeting, lacking the permanence ofobjectivity.[16] The servant on the other hand, in the work hecreates, achieves mastery of his craft; it is he who rises to the levelof universal human reason. However, Hegel introduces the notionthat fear and service are necessaryto induce the check to desireand to ensure that consciousness rises above self-centred goals tothe freedom that comes from a consciousness of the universalpower of human creative activity.[17] Quite arbitrarily, apparently,Hegel assumes everyone must undergo breaking of self-will throughsubjection to an alien power before being capable of rational

freedom.[18]

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Let us now examine the crucial passage in Marxs complexdiscussion of the Phenomenology, in which Marx praises Hegel forgrasping the importance of labour. The great thing in HegelsPhenomenologyand its final resultthe dialectic of negativity as themoving and producing principleis that Hegel conceives the self-

creation of man as a process, objectification [Vergegenstndlichung]as loss of object [Entgegenstndlichung], as alienation[Entusserung] and as sublation [Aufhebung] of this alienation; thathe therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives objectiveman ... as the result of his own labour ... The realization of himself ...is only possible if man ... employs all his species-powers ... andtreats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form ofestrangement [Entfremdung].[19]

Does such a judgementas Kojve insinuates and so many laterwriters boldly assertrest on Hegels discussion of the labour ofservitude? The first thing that should give us pause is thatimmediately after this praise Marx qualifies it by complaining thatthe only labour Hegel knows and recognizes is abstract mentallabour.[20] The servants labour is clearly material, so this remarkshows that not only has Marx not drawn on that analysis, but he hasactually forgotten all about it and done Hegel a minor injustice![21]

What Marx does refer us to is the closing chapter of thePhenomenology ... (Absolute Knowledge), which contains theconcentrated essence of the Phenomenologyand its dialectic.[22] It

contains the upshot of its whole movement. The abstract mentallabour to which Marx refers is the labour of spirit. ThePhenomenologyis a spiritual odyssey, or, perhaps, a Bildungsromanof spirit, in which spirit discovers that the objective shapes given toit in consciousness and self-consciousness are nothing but its ownself-determination. Spirit comes to know itself through producingitself, in the first instance as something which stands over againstitself. In the final chapter, Marx notes, the world of estrangementthus brought to life is overcome, or negated, in a peculiar way inthatas Hegel puts itself-consciousness has sublated thisalienation [Entusserung] and objectivity ... so that it is at home

with itself in its otherness as such.[23] Within this frameworkspheres of estrangement such as religion, the state, civil society,and so forth, are grasped as spirits own work. Hegel emphasizesthat spirit can come to itselfonly through setting up opposition andthen negating it. This is the labour of the negative as he calls it.[24]

When Marx refers to the final result of the Phenomenologybeingthe dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle, itis to this entire labour of spiritin the Phenomenologythat he refers.

Of course, in Marxs view man produces himself through materiallabour. It would be a mistake, however, to assume therefrom that

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he praises Hegel for what he says about material labour such asthat of the servant. When Marx says Hegel grasps labour as theessence, he is talking not about what Hegel actually says aboutmaterial labour (hence the lack of reference to Lordship andBondage) but about the esoteric significance of the dialectic of

negativity in spirits entire self-positing movement (hence Marxsclaim that the only labour Hegel knows is abstract mental labour).Marx sees in Hegels dialectic of negativity the hypostatization ofthe abstract reflection in philosophy of the material processwhereby man produces himself through his own labour, a processwhich (Marx concurs with Hegel) must pass through a stage ofestrangement.

It is necessary to locate the MasterSlave within this perspective ofspirits development of its self-awareness. As we have alreadynoted, and now stress, it is an earlymoment in the story of spiritsrecovery of itself. It is much less concrete (in Hegels terminology)than cultural achievements such as law, art, religion and philosophy.[25] Nonetheless, it is located at a turning point of someimportance, for the problem Hegel faces is how to developdialectically self-consciousness out of the mere consciousness ofexternal objects. Consciousness cannot grasp itself in things. It mustdistinguish itself absolutely from them through their radicalnegation. The consumption of objects of desire accomplishes this inan evanescent way. To risk ones life in forcing anotherconsciousness to grant one recognition represents a more promising

mediation. But the master finds himself frustrated in reducing thevanquished to his servant, his thing. Self-consciousness can onlygain proper recognition through mutual respect such as thataccorded to individuals constituted in the legal and ethical relationsHegel develops later in the story.[26] At this stage the dialecticadvances through the despised servant. As we have seen, he findshimself through the negating action of work on things. However, itmust be stressed that the point of this is that it brings about anadvance in self-consciousness.

This does not have much in common with Marxs interest in the

realization of an objective being in forming the material world; but itis of a piece with the project of the Phenomenologyas a whole. It isworth noting that in Hegels Encyclopaedia Phenomenology nomention is made of the worker finding himself in his product; theemphasis in the outcome of the MasterSlave there is oncommunity of need and fear of the lord is the beginning ofwisdom.[27] As far as the Phenomenology of Spiritis concerned, asit is a spiritual odyssey it is quite wrong to place special stress onthis moment of material labour (as is the case with the overlyMarxist readings of Marcuse and of Kojve), for its importance lies

not in the material result but in the spiritual one. The next stage inthe dialectic is that, since self-consciousness lacks unity here in

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being split between different selves, it attempts to find itsfreedom in thinking; objectivity is negated in the pureuniversality of thought in the attitudes Hegel identifies with Stoicismand Scepticism.[28] This freedom of inner life is compatible withany social positionas Hegel says.[29]

Does Marx, as Marcuse claims (above), follow in his theory ofalienation the terms of Hegels MasterServant relationship? Wehave already said enough to cast doubt on this. Furthermore, notonly does Marx himself not refer us to this section, but Hegels owndiscussion in it does not mention alienation. It is obvious thatimmediately material labour is not as such a problem for Hegel justbecause it is material, as might be supposed.[30] Contrary to this,Hegel gives it an affirmative significance in the development ofspirit. It is perfectly true, however, that Marx finds in Hegel thetheme of alienation (Entusserung) and estrangement(Entfremdung)but he does not find it in the labour of servitude.Even those commentators who light on Hegels chapter Spirit inSelf-Estrangement (Der sich entfremdete Geist) are only partiallycorrect. It is true that Marx makes favourable reference to some ofthis material; he says: these separate sections contain the criticalelementsbut still in estranged formof entire spheres, such asreligion, the state, civil life and so forth.[31] However, in thesesections we are dealing with a realm of finite spirit, referredhistorically to the period from feudalism, through theEnlightenment, to the French Revolution. Marx mainly concerns

himself, not with this so much, but with spirits movement ofabsolute negativity, and especially with the final chapter AbsoluteKnowledge (and when he mentions the Encyclopaedia, it is theAbsolute Idea and its alienation of itself in nature that he discusses).

A complicating feature in discussing these issues is that translationsof texts by Hegel, and by Marx, may give either or both ofEntusserung and Entfremdung as alienation. However, in Hegelthese terms are widely separated in the text and have differentfunctions. We have just mentioned the chapter on Entfremdung.Entusserung, as Lukcs point out,[32] is the key concept in the

upshot of the Phenomenology: spirit grasps the sphere ofestrangement as the product of its own self-alienation. Entfremdungstands to Entusserung as phenomenological resulta state ofbeingto the activeprocess of spirits positing of itself in otherness.[33]

While Marx was impressed by Hegels phenomenological descriptionof estrangement, what really excited him was the metaphysicalaspect of the Phenomenologyspirit mediating itself with itself inalienation (Entusserung). This is the process of absolute

negativity and it is to this Marx refers when he says that, albeit in

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mystified form, Hegel grasps man as the product of his own labour,through alienation and the overcoming of alienation.

Nevertheless, Marx holds that Hegels discussion of theproblematics of alienation is embedded in speculative illusions, and

because of this it is a merely apparent criticism, shading over intouncritical positivism. In this connection one must draw attention tothe sophisticated use of quotation by Kojve in the above-mentioned epigraph to the effect that Hegel grasps labour as theessence. The passage from which Kojve quotes is as follows (withKojves quote stressed): Hegel adopts the standpoint of modernpolitical economy. He grasps labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man; he sees only the positive and not thenegative side of labour. Labour is mans coming to be for himselfwithin alienation [Entusserung] or as alienated man.[34]

Why does Marx qualify his praise of Hegel in this way?

Firstly, despite the wealth of content in the Phenomenology,everything is treated under the form of consciousness or self-consciousness. This means that a change in consciousnessabolishes estrangement because estrangement itself is understoodonly as an attitude adopted by consciousness. This abolition leaveseverything in reality as it is. Thus the critical apparatus issues inuncritical positivism.[35]

Secondly, since the subject of the movement is spirit, Hegelcannot conceive of objectification except as resulting inestrangementhence he substitutes for the category ofobjectification (Vergegenstndlichung) that of alienation(Entusserungwhich, like Vergegenstndlichung, has theconnotation of positing as objective but which also implies therelinquishment of what is manifested, constituting therefore analienation).[36] Nonetheless, Hegel sees something positive in thisprocess[37] because in this alienation spirit becomes objective toitself. It is an essential momentin spirits self-actualization and self-awareness. Hegel is not, then, opposed to objectification, on the

grounds that it leads to estrangement. He certainly thinks that itdoes lead to estrangement, but this does not mean that he thinksspirit should rest content in itself and avoid the misfortune ofalienation from itself. However, instead of a real historical solutionwe are provided with a displacement of the problem into generalphilosophical reflection issuing in a solution posed exclusively within

philosophy, which preserves estrangement (otherness as such) asa moment in the absolute. This is his merely apparent criticism(Marx[38]). In truth, Hegels equation of objectification andalienation makes him uncritical of the estrangement brought to life

in spirits self-actualization. That is to say, Hegel, in common withmodern political economy, grasps labour as the essence of human

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development but not as alienated from itself in capitalist societybecause, if one is unable to posit a genuine historical negation ofthe negation, the existing conditions become the horizon whichblocks off the possibility of a critical standpoint. In fact, theseconditions which twist and distort the objectification of man in and

through labour are endorsed as the necessary groundwork withinwhich the coming-to-be of man for himself must occur. The world ofestrangement is presented as labours absolute self-expression.[39]

In conclusion, one can say that focus on the master-slave dialecticreflects two biases. First: one must remark in Kojve, and Hyppolite,the beginnings of the existentialist reading of the Phenomenologywith its absurd over-emphasis on the life and death struggle, andits outcome in Lordship and Bondageas if the remaining sixhundred pages of the Phenomenologywere merely an afterthought!Second: while Marxist discussion used to lean towards immediately

political problems such as that of domination and class struggle, thediffusion of texts such as the 1844 Manuscripts, the GermanIdeology, and, more recently, the Grundrisse, has made possible aserious discussion ofontological questions; hence the influence onMarx of Hegel, and of his Phenomenology, must be differentlyinterpreted.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Jonathan Re and to Joe McCarney.

Footnotes

1. J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, London 1958, p. 237.

2. Marcuse in a review of Being and Nothingness says: Sartremakes reference to Marxs early writings ... Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, March 1948. But in fact there is nosuch reference. Marcuse probably has in mind this remark about theMaster-Slave influence on Marxa view held independently by

Marcuse and which he had already linked to Marxs early writings(see below).

3. A. Kojve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1947), New York1969.

4. J. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegels Phenomenology ofSpirit, Evanston 1974, p. 172. Also: the famous dialectic of theMaster and Slave that became the inspiration of Marxianphilosophy. Studies on Marx and Hegel (1955), New York 1969,

1973, p. 29.

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5. A typical example is George L. Kline who says Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Hyppolite attended some of Kojves lectures anddoubtless read the mimeographed versions of those they did notattend. See The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and Marx, inPhenomenology and Existentialism, ed. E. N. Lee and M.

Mandelbaum, Baltimore 1967, p. 120. He gives as his authority forthis a book by Wilfred Desan: The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, New

York 1965. This says early audiences ... including Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Hyppolite ... (p. 24); and again Sartre learned to study Hegelin the classes of Kojve just before W.W.II (p. 50n). However, Desangives no evidence. Mark Posters Existentialist Marxism in Post-WarFrance, Princeton 1975 is more cautious: It was even said that Jean-Paul Sartre himself was enrolled, although his attendance at theclasses was not recalled (pp. 89).

6. Critique nos. 19596, 1963. The list is cited by VincentDescombes in his Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge 1980, p.10n. A full list of those registered for Kojve's seminars is in theAppendix to Knowing and History, M. S. Roth (Ithaca 1988).However, registration was not a strict requirement for attendance,which explains divergencies between these two sources.

7. Interview with John Heckman. See his Introduction to Genesis ...p. xxvi. Heckman is under the impression that Sartre attended: p.xxiii.

8. This throws an interesting light on Klines judgment (op. cit. p.120): During the late 1930s Jean Hyppolite, under Kojvesinfluence, began to publish articles on Hegel and thePhenomenology; his 1946 commentary draws freely on both Wahland Kojve ...

9. Republished by Queneau, In Place of an Introduction, as the firstchapter of his Kojve collection. The (partial) English translation (seenote 3) includes it, also as chapter one. (Note that the GermanMensch or Menschen is non-gender specific, though difficult totranslate as other than man or men in English.)

10. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (1941), London 1954, p.115. R. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge 1961,p. 147. D. Struik, Introduction to Marxs Economic andPhilosophical Manuscripts of 1844, New York 1964, p. 36. W. Desan,The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, New York 1965, p. 34. M. Poster,Existentialist Marxism in Post-War France, Princeton 1975, pp. 1316. Z. Hanfi, Introduction to The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings ofLudwig Feuerbach, New York 1972, p. 42. R. Norman, HegelsPhenomenology, London 1976, p. 53 and p. 73. G. A. Kelly, Hegels

Retreat from Eleusis, Princeton 1978, p. 30. J. Israel, The Languageof Dialectic and the Dialectics of Language, Brighton 1979, p. 122.

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M. Petry, Introduction to G. W. F. Hegel, The BerlinPhenomenology, Dordrecht 1981, p. lxxxix. Allen W. Wood KarlMarx, London 1981 pp. 242-3.

11. See previous note. In fact Marcuse had already said in his 1932

review of the 1844 manuscripts that Marxs critical concepts pointback to the ontological categories of labour and domination andservitude developed by Hegel in his Phenomenology(From Lutherto Popper, London 1983 p. 13, 39). Pierre Naville gives prominenceto Hegels discussion but says that it is too simple to claim this wasMarxs source (De LAlienation la Jouissance, Paris 1957 p. 10).

12. K. Marx, Early Writings, Harmondsworth 1975, p. 385.

13. That this choice of terminology was deliberate is seen when wefind that in his Berlin lecture on Herrschaft und KnechtschaftHegeldraws a distinction between der Sklave and der Knecht. See:Hegels Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol. 3, ed. M. Petry,Holland/Boston 1979, appendix pp. 34243 ( Phil Slater in a briefunpublished paper, Objectification, alienation and labour: Notes onHegel, Marx and Marcuse (1980), in the context of polemics againstMarcuses early work for confusing objectification in Hegel andMarx.

14. Gesammelte Werke, Band 9, Phnomenologie des Geistes,Hamburg 1980, pp. 114-15

15. Phnomenologie p. 115

16. Loc. Cit.

17. Ibid p. 116

18. This is clearer in The Berlin Phenomenology, paras 434, 435.

19. Early Writings, pp. 385-86

20. Ibid, p. 386

21. See David McLellan Marx before Marxism, London 1970, p. 197.

22. Early Writings, pp. 386.

23. Phnomenologie p. 422.

24. Ibid, p. 18

25. This point is stressed by Phil Slater in his unpublished paperObjectification, alienation and labour (1980)

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26. Jonathan Re draws my attention to the fact that Hegel is notreally discussing individuality here, and a fortiori not socialrelationships. Hence there is no discussion of mastermaster orslaveslave relations. We are concerned here with consciousness ingeneral as against objects.

27. Op. Cit., paras 43435. By contrast, in the PhnomenologieHegel said: Albeit fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom,consciousness is not therein aware of being self-existent. Throughlabour, however, it comes to itself (p. 115). And on the next page:For the reflection of self into self the two moments, fear and servicein general, as also that of formative activity, are necessary... .

28. Norman is particularly good on the lack of a happy ending forthe servant, and the further dialectic (op. cit., ch. 3). See alsoKojve, ch. 2.

29. Whether on the throne or in chains ... its aim is to be free. Op.cit., p. 117.

30. Ernest Mandel says (Formation of the Economic Thought of KarlMarx, London 1971) that for Hegel material labour is alienatingbecause labour is, by its nature, the externalizing (Verusserung) ofa human capacity, which means that man loses something thatpreviously belonged to him (p. 155). Mandel seems to have in mindpara. 67 of Hegels Philosophy of Right which deals with the

Verusserung (= alienation in the sense of sale) of human powers. Ifso, this is a complete misrepresentation of Hegels text. So far fromlabour by its nature having an alienating import, Hegel again in thePhilosophy of Rightgives the forming of things (para 56) a role inactualizing freedom. For Hegel, however, human freedom is morereal in alienating things through contracts. When he faces theproblem that freedom of alienation is used to sell human capacitiesphysical and mental skills inherent in the personthis is achievedthrough the mediation of mind which reduces its inner possessionsto ... externality (para. 43). In virtue of the temporal restriction onsuch alienation in wage-labour, the labour-power sold acquires an

external relation to the substance of the labourers personality andhe remains a free subject notwithstanding it (para. 67). It is clear,then, that Hegel does notsay labour by its nature as externalizingis alienating; rather, he says complex social mediations achievealienation through setting labour in an (artificial) external relation tothe person. (For a full treatment see my Personality and thedialectic of labour and propertyLocke, Hegel, Marx RadicalPhilosophy26, 1980.)

31. Op. cit., p. 385.

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32. G. Lukcs, The Young Hegel (1948), London 1975, last chapter.Incidentally, Lukcs does not refer Marxs 1844 Mss. to the MasterSlave.

33. As Marx says: Entfremdung constitutes the real interest of this

Entusserung (op. cit., p. 384).

34. Op. cit., p. 386.

35. Ibid., p. 385.

36. Lukcs originated this understanding in The Young Hegel, p.551. Hyppolite defends Hegel on this pointsee the last section ofhis Commentary on G. Lukcss The Young Hegel in Studies ... pp.8690.

37. Phnomenologie, p. 422. See Marx, op. cit., p. 395.

38. Op. cit., p. 393.

39. This paragraph is a condensed version of an argumentdeveloped at length in my Objectification and Alienation in Hegeland Marx, Radical Philosophy 30, Spring 1982.

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