Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel...

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Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil Ying Tang

Transcript of Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel...

Page 1: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy

Policy in Texas

Daniel SchroederLaura Lein

Deanna SchexnayderJulie Beausoleil

Ying Tang

Page 2: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

What is Devolution?

• Devolution refers to the transfer of responsibility from a more centralized to a less centralized authority.

• In this study, devolution is the transfer of responsibility for setting certain child care subsidy policies from the Texas Workforce Commission to local workforce development boards.

• Authority to set some of these policies was transferred to local boards between September 1999 and January 2000.

Page 3: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Project Overview

• This research project examines the Texas subsidized child care program from Fiscal Years (FYs) 1998 through 2003

• This time period begins two years before policies were devolved to the local level and ends four years after this change in authority.

• Its purposes are:– to describe the processes by which local boards develop

child care policies, and– to determine the extent to which these local policy changes

are associated with changes in subsidy participation patterns (subsidy dynamics), family economic outcomes, and child care markets in these local areas.

Page 4: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Research Questions from the overall project:Econometric modeling questions are highlighted

1. How do local child care policies in Texas vary following the devolution of responsibilities for child care policies to the local workforce boards?

2. What is the process by which local policy changes governing the provision of publicly subsidized child care are decided upon and implemented?

3. Which changes in local child care markets are statistically associated with local policy variations?

4. Which changes in the patterns of child care use and family outcomes are statistically associated with local policy variations?

Page 5: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Scope of Econometric Modeling:Question addressed here is highlighted

1. Child Care Subsidy Use and Dynamics:• Exit from Subsidy• Share of Care Provided by Texas Rising Star Providers• Use of Center-Based Care

2. Family Economic Outcomes • Earnings of Subsidy Recipients• Exit from Employment among Subsidy Recipients• Entry or Re-Entry to TANF

3. Child Care Market Outcomes• Providers receiving subsidy as share of total formal market• Share of Market to which Child Care Subsidy Provides Access

• Factors Associated with Provider Turnover

Page 6: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Provider Turnover: Rationale

• Excessive turnover among child care arrangements can prevent children from building lasting bonds with their caregivers, which can have negative implications for their healthy development.

• Some of the turnover in child care arrangements is caused by providers quitting the business of child care.

• Policies of the child care subsidy system could have a significant role in provider turnover.

• With devolution of child care subsidy policy making to the local level in Texas, a natural experiment has emerged with 28 different sets of local policies.

Page 7: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Provider Turnover: How long do providers survive in the child care business?

• Typical “lifetimes” of child care providers are estimated using registration (or licensing) and de-registration dates in state provider registry.

• Event history regression analysis is used to determine factors associated with provider turnover.

• Provider spells are analyzed using proportional hazards regression with time-varying covariates.

• Independent variables include a combination of local child care policy, local child care market rate data, economic environment measures, and local child care board governance, composition, and dynamics.

Page 8: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Local Policy and Local Board Measuresthat Vary over Time

• Maximum reimbursement rates, as measured relative to market rates (see next slide).

• Co-payment policies measured in terms of percent of income. Some groups do not pay co-payments.

• Basic income eligibility limits vary from 50% to 85% of State Median Income.

• Local board composition and dynamics measures:– Whether the local board has a child care committee

– Whether the local board has changed child care contractors

– For-profit status of child care contractor

Page 9: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Maximum Reimbursement Rates

The ratio of maximum reimbursement rates to the 75th percentile of market rates for care varies by region and over time.

Page 10: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Control Variables

• Provider history – the longer they are in business, the less likely they are to quit.

• Provider type – Centers, Registered Homes, Licensed Homes

• County unemployment and employment growth rates

• County size and commute patterns:– Large metropolitan core county (> 1 million)

– Large metropolitan commuter county

– Small metropolitan core county (< 1 million)

– Small metropolitan commuter county

– Micropolitan county

– Rural county

Page 11: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Results across Facility Types

Variable description Hazard ratio

Months provider in business, log 0.805 **Basic income eligibility limit, percent of SMI 0.997 **Co-payment for one child, percent of income 0.967Co-payment for two children, percent of income 1.051Local board changed CC contractor 0.964Local board has CC advisory committee 0.897 **Ratio of max. reimbursement to 75th percentile of market rate

0.638 **Local board contractor is for-profit 1.028Local board contractor for-profit status unknown 0.987County unemployment rate, percent 1.010 **County employment growth rate, percent 1.006County commutes to large metro area 1.022County is core of small metro area 1.125 **County commutes to small metro area 1.246 **County is micropolitan 0.998County is rural 1.179 **Licensed home-based facility 1.766 **Registered home-based facility 2.339 **

*=p<.05, **=p<.01. Omitted: Centers, Large metro core

Highlights

Higher reimbursement rates = lesser turnover

Higher eligibility limits = lesser turnover

Board has CC advisory committee = lesser turnover

Most counties outside large metro areas = greater turnover

Home-based facilities = greater turnover

Page 12: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Results by Facility Type

Variable description Centers Home-basedMonths provider in business, log 0.726** 0.833**Basic income eligibility limit, percent of SMI 0.992** 0.999Co-payment for one child, percent of income 1.035 0.932Co-payment for two children, percent of income 1.050 1.062Local board changed CC contractor 0.975 0.967Local board has CC advisory committee 1.268** 0.820**Ratio of max. reimbursement to 75th percentile of market rate

0.471** 0.691**Local board contractor is for-profit 1.202* 0.990Local board contractor for-profit status unknown 1.062 0.978County unemployment rate, percent 0.999 1.012**County employment growth rate, percent 0.983* 1.012**County commutes to large metro area 0.980 1.022County is core of small metro area 1.136* 1.115**County commutes to small metro area 1.145 1.291**County is micropolitan 0.935 1.026County is rural 1.120 1.212**Licensed home-based facility . 0.746**

*=p<.05, **=p<.01. Omitted: Large metro core

Highlights

Board has CC advisory committee = lesser turnover among home-based, greater turnover among centers

Employment growth = greater turnover among home-based, lesser turnover among centers

Page 13: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Interpretation and Conclusions

• Maximum reimbursement rates are the single biggest factor in provider turnover.

• Estimates suggest that increasing the reimbursement rates to the 75th percentile of market rates would be associated with about a 7% decline in the odds of providers leaving business.

• The relationship is even stronger when looking only at centers, for which an increase to the 75th percentile would be associated with a 10.6% decline in odds of providers quitting.

Page 14: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Interpretation and Conclusions

• Whether the local board has a child care advisory committee is also important, but its effect depends on the type of facility.

• Among home-based facilities, odds of providers quitting the business are reduced by 18% when boards have an advisory committee.

• However, among centers the odds of providers quitting are increased by 27% when an advisory committee is present.

Page 15: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

Interpretation and Conclusions

• Employment growth is associated with reduced turnover among centers, but with increased turnover among home-based facilities.

• This could be an indication of the attractiveness of outside employment to home-based providers when the economy is growing.

• In general, provider turnover is lowest in large metro areas.

Page 16: Child Care Provider Turnover and its Relation to Devolution of Subsidy Policy in Texas Daniel Schroeder Laura Lein Deanna Schexnayder Julie Beausoleil.

For More Information

• Questions about the overall project:– Deanna Schexnayder at [email protected],

512-471-2193– Laura Lein at [email protected], 512-471-9248

• Questions about this paper or statistical methods of overall project:– Daniel Schroeder at [email protected], 512-

471-2196• On the web:

– www.utexas.edu/research/cshr/childcare/