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Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e24

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Space Policy

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Charting the evolution of satellite programs in developing countries e The SpaceTechnology Ladder

Danielle Wood*, Annalisa WeigelEngineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 01239, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 26 July 2011Accepted 21 November 2011Available online 16 January 2012

Keywords:Developing countrySpace programTechnological capabilitySatellitePolicy

* Corresponding author.E-mail address: dradams@alum.mit.edu (D. Wood

0265-9646/$ e see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd.doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.11.001

a b s t r a c t

This paper analyzes the historical paths of eight countries e from Africa, Asia and Latin America e asthey have pursued technological capability in the area of space technology. The analysis is unfolded inthree stages. The first stage introduces a framework called the Space Technology Ladder. This Ladderframework posits a path through four major technology categories, as follows: 1) establishing a nationalspace agency; 2) owning and operating a satellite in low Earth orbit; 3) owning and operating a satellitein geostationary orbit; and 4) launching satellites. The second stage of the analysis uses data to createa graphical timeline, by mapping the historical achievements of the eight countries onto the Ladderframework. The results provide information about the similarities and differences in the technologystrategies of the various countries. The third stage is a discussion of the strategic decisions faced by thecountries under study. Exploring their diverse strategies is an initial step toward developing prescriptivetheory to inform developing country space programs.

� 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The international space community is growing. New countriesare demonstrating interest and capability in space. In the beginningof the space era, the funding, expertise and accomplishments weredominated by the USA and USSR. Gradually, however, many othercountries have carved their own place in the spacefaring societyand currently many developing countries are seeking to increasetheir level of space activity. Some of these countries, such as SouthAfrica, Nigeria and Malaysia, have invested in their second gener-ation of satellites. Others, such as India and Brazil, plan to drasti-cally extend their established space programs to include newcapabilities.

This paper considers the policy choices made by countries asthey pursue space activity. It uses historical summaries of spaceprograms in developing countries to find models of technologyprocurement and adoption. It explores how closely their progressfollows an assumed process driven by progressive increases intechnical complexity and managerial autonomy. Countries areconsidered from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The trajectories ofeach country’s space achievements are summarized and compared.

).

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The results highlight the various options that have been exercisedin the past for achieving increased national space capability.

2. Theoretical framework: The Space Technology Ladder

This study builds on the literature in four ways. First, it drawsdefinitions and perspective from the scholars who study howdeveloping countries establish new capabilities in technology.These scholars define the process of acquiring and implementingnew technology as a vital part of the national development process.Such technology may be well-established by world standards.Learning mature technology is a beneficial and challenging form ofinnovation in developing countries. It can also lead to the creationof new technology. The study builds on a specific community that isprimarily composed of economists and technology policy scholars.This community emphasizes the need for developing countries toengage in technological learning e the process of increasing theircapability to use technology effectively in economic or governmentactivity [1e5]. The technological learning literature builds onNelson and Winter’s evolutionary view of the economy [6]. Thisview emphasizes that the foundational unit of economic activity isthe set of individual skills and organizational routines throughwhich firms produce useful goods and services. Much of theknowledge required to achieve these skills and routines is tacit andtherefore difficult to describe inwords, formulas or instructions [7].Organizations learn and maintain skills and routines by acting on

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e2416

them. The environment in which organizations act changesunpredictably, especially because of new technical inventions.Schumpeterian entrepreneurs bring innovation by using theseinventions to apply new techniques to create economic outputs. Asnew technology innovations emerge, people and organizationsneed to update their skills and routines to incorporate the newopportunities. Organizations that harness and apply innovationssuccessfully are more successful in a competitive marketplace [8].In parallel, countries that successfully harness new technology canimprove their national development. Within any particularcountry, there is a network of related firms, research laboratories,government offices, educational institutions and non-governmental organizations that must collaborate to create aneffective ‘national innovation system’ that facilitates successfultechnological learning [5,9]. Technology is a broad term used hereto include both tangible objects e such as capital equipment andproducts e and intangible resources e such as information,processes and organizational approaches. The process of buildingtechnological capability requires consistent effort from the learningorganization. The more effort expended, the greater the absorptivecapacity. This latter term describes the ability to learn and applynew technology [10]. When developing countries pursue a newtechnology area, they can seek insights from foreign technologysources. Some of these sources involve formal relationships withforeign actors. For example, organizations in developing countriesmay pay for training, licensing of technology, consultancy, equip-ment purchase or a joint venture with a foreign partner. Othersources of foreign technology are indirect. A learning organizationmay use reverse engineering, explore published literature, or learnto mimic a foreign organization through trial and error. Kimexplores these foreign sources of technology further and proposesopportunities to use them [11].

Based on the discussion above, the authors view efforts toestablish new national space capability through the lens of theoverall process of technological learning in support of nationaldevelopment. There are other candidate lenses, such as the stra-tegic or political aspects of the space programs. These are not thefocus here. The technological learning community has writtenmany accounts of building technological capability in the devel-oping world. A few examples include the following. Amsdendocumented the experiences of countries such as China, India,Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil and Turkey as they moved intomanufacturing consumer goods and high technology products [2].Figueiredo provided a detailed account of technological learning intwo steel plants in Brazil [3]. Hobday considered progress in theelectronics industry in Singapore [12]. Kim wrote about experi-ences of Korean firms in industries such as ship building and carmanufacturing [4]. Ahmed and Humphreys investigated Malaysia’sestablishment of a national car industry [13]. This literatureprovides many useful concepts for considering the entry of devel-oping countries into space technology, as described above. Thisparticular community, however, has not written much about spaceactivity. It has mainly focused on industries with a more traditionalbusiness model in which a commercial firm (private or state-owned) produces a product for direct market sale. National satel-lite programs often have a different dynamic, as a governmentorganization usually purchases a satellite as a form of infrastructurein order to provide satellite imagery or communication service asa quasi-commercial product. This paper is part of a larger study toexplore how the concepts and examples from the technologicallearning literature can be applied to the experiences of new satelliteprograms in developing countries.

The second connection to the literature relates to the use of theterm “Ladder” to denote progress along a technological continuum.This study is not unique in this approach. Other scholars have used

a Ladder concept as a metaphor for technical progress [14,15]. Song,for example, placed electronic products from Asian firms ona hierarchical ladder in order to discuss the dynamics of upgradinginvestments [16]. In the space community in particular, Paikowskyused a ladder metaphor. Her 2009 paper discussed the motivationfor small and medium sized countries to participate in space. Sheproposed political reasons for countries wanting to join the spaceclub. Within the space club, there is a pyramidal ladder ofachievements ranging from space activity as part of a collective toindependent human space flight programs [17].

A third connection is to the literature that provides historicalaccounts of national space activity. There have been many histor-ical, political and strategic studies of national space programs.Larger countries that have achieved major milestones in spacehave, understandably, received more coverage. Countries such asthe USA [18], Russia/USSR [19], China [20] and India [21] have beenstudied in detail. Countries with slightly younger programs, such asSouth Korea, are starting to receive more coverage [22]. This papertakes a different approach from pure historical studies. Here theaim is to emphasize key milestones that represent steps forward incapability building and technological learning, rather than toprovide exhaustive historical description.

Finally, this study builds on previous publications by the authorsand a broader research program that studies the relationshipbetween developing countries and space. Previous work exploredthe satellite applications and services being pursued by countries inAfrica [23,24]. The scope included activity enabled by remotesensing, communication or navigation satellites. These spaceactivities were ranked on metaphorical “Ladders” that highlightedthe different avenues through which countries accessed satelliteservices. Other work addressed the capability building processand motivations for investing in national satellite assets in moredetail [25].

The present work examines the policy choices made by devel-oping countries in their pursuit of space technology. The analysisincludes information about the order in which new technicalmilestones are achieved as well as the procurement model that isused to reach each new milestone. In order to make a comparisonacross several countries, the investigation begins by establishinga hypothetical technology path that a country could follow as itdevelops space capabilities. Note that the technology path is notmeant to serve as a prescriptive standard. It merely providesa convenient way to compare all the countries against a consistent,fictionalized example. The technology path is summarized in theSpace Technology Ladder. The Ladder is developed by building a listof milestones that some countries achieve in space. These mile-stones are ranked according to technical complexity. For eachtechnical milestone, there are also procurement milestones thatrepresent an increase in the level of national autonomy whenexecuting a given technical feat.

In the context of this study, national space activity is defined asinvestment in the areas of satellites and launch vehicles. Specifi-cally, the Space Technology Ladder framework explores examplesof owning, operating and manufacturing satellites and operatinglaunch vehicles. It also assumes an institutional investment tosupport such activity via a government office. Other relevantactivities in space, such as astronaut programs, ground-based andsatellite-based scientific research, microgravity research, applica-tion of satellite services and public outreach are not consideredhere. The framework also does not distinguish among the variousnational space programs on the basis of sector e such as military,commercial or civil.

The Space Technology Ladder includes four major categories ofspace technology achievement. The lowest is the act of establishinga national space agency or a national office in charge of space

Table 3Five LEO satellite sub-categories.

Low Earth Orbit Satellite

Build LocallyBuild Through Mutual International

CollaborationBuild Locally with Outside AssistanceBuild with Support in Partner’s FacilityProcure with Training Services

Table 4Four GEO satellite sub-categories.

Geostationary Satellite

Build LocallyBuild through Mutual International

CollaborationBuild Locally with Outside AssistanceProcure

Table 5Two launch sub-categories.

Launch Capability

Launch Satellite to Geostationary OrbitLaunch Satellite to Low Earth Orbit

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e24 17

activity. A country reaches the second technology category byowning and operating a national satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO).Category three is achieved when a country owns and operatesa satellite in geostationary orbit (GEO). In category four a countryhas independent capability to launch a satellite. The four categoriesare ranked to show an increase in technical complexity. These fourtechnology milestones are chosen because, historically, they reflectthe initial efforts of both developed and developing countries inspace.

Table 1 shows the four major milestones of the Space Tech-nology Ladder, providing a summary view. Each of these fourtechnology categories can be further divided into sub-categories.The sub-categories represent different options for procuring therelevant technology. The sub-categories of the Ladder are describedbelow.

Category one on the Space Technology Ladder is establishinga national space agency. For some countries, there are severalmilestones within this category. Some countries establisha national office in charge of space policy or research before theylater establish an official space agency. Therefore the expandedversion of category one contains these two possible levels, asshown in Table 2 below.

Countries achieve category two on the Space Technology Ladderby owning and operating a national satellite in low Earth orbit.There are many ways a country can achieve this milestone. Forexample, they can design and build the satellite locally; they canproduce the satellite in partnership with another country; or theycan buy the satellite from a foreign company. The sub-categories inlevel two reflect the diversity of ways that countries might procurea LEO satellite. One category is labeled “Build through MutualInternational Collaboration”. Collaboration is a broad concept thatdoes not specify the types of contributions provided by eachpartner. The term “Mutual Collaboration” is used here to refer tocollaboration projects in which the financial and technical contri-butions of each partner are similar. These sub-categories alsorepresent different levels of technical autonomy in a country’sability to gain access to a satellite. Table 3 shows the sub-categorieswithin owning a satellite in LEO, moving upward from lowautonomy to high autonomy approaches.

Category three is reached by owning and operating a satellite inGEO. As with the LEO satellite, there are a variety of ways thatcountries procure a GEO satellite; these methods are ranked toshow increasing technical autonomy. Four options for obtaininga GEO satellite are listed in Table 4. They range from straightforward procurement to building the satellite locally.

Finally, consider the fourth category of the Space TechnologyLadder, launching a satellite. This analysis considers two sub-categories within launching a satellite. The lower level milestone

Table 1The Space Technology Ladder e summaryview.

Launch CapabilitySatellite in Geostationary OrbitSatellite in Low Earth OrbitNational Space Agency

Table 2Two national space agency sub-categories.

National Space Agency

Establish Current National Space AgencyEstablish First Government Space Office

is to launch a satellite to the desired orbit in LEO. The higher levelmilestone is to launch a satellite to the desired orbit in GEO. Toachieve these milestones, a country must launch based on locallymastered and controlled technology. Table 5 shows the expandedview of the launch category.

The Space Technology Ladder has four major categories oftechnical milestones. Table 6 combines the four categories andhighlights the 13 distinct actions within the framework. Table 6provides the version of the framework that will be referencedthroughout the remainder of the discussion. Note here a caveatabout the philosophy behind the Space Technology Ladder asshown in Table 6. In general, the goal of the framework is to showa series of potential technology milestones in the area of spacetechnology and to rank them according to their level of technicalcomplexity and managerial autonomy. This is consistently donewithin each of the four major technology categories, but notnecessarily across the categories.

Consider, for example, that action 7 (LEO Satellite: Build Locally)is ranked below action 8 (GEO Satellite: Procure). Action 7

Table 6The space technology ladder e detailed view.

The Space Technology Ladder

13 Launch Capability: Satellite to GEO12 Launch Capability: Satellite to LEO11 GEO Satellite: Build Locally10 GEO Satellite: Build through Mutual International Collaboration9 GEO Satellite: Build Locally with Outside Assistance8 GEO Satellite: Procure7 LEO Satellite: Build Locally6 LEO Satellite: Build Through Mutual International Collaboration5 LEO Satellite: Build Locally with Outside Assistance4 LEO Satellite: Build with Support in Partner’s Facility3 LEO Satellite: Procure with Training Services2 Space Agency: Establish Current Agency1 Space Agency: Establish First National Space Office

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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

GEO Satellite

LEO Satellite

Launch

Space Agency

NigeriaAlgeriaEgypt

Milesto

ne

Year

Milestone Timeline – African Countries

Future

Fig. 1. This graph shows the first time Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt achieved Milestonesfrom the Space Technology Ladder.

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e2418

represents a great deal of technical independence. It implies thata country has achieved the ability to locally design and builda satellite. The country has also established the facilities needed forsatellite integration and testing. Action 7 arguably demonstratesmore technical autonomy than Action 8. The framework isdesigned, however, to emphasize the four major technology cate-gories (Space Agency, LEO Sat, GEO Sat, and Launch). Thus, specificactions are ranked to show increasing technical autonomy withina technology category, but not necessarily across categories.

This section has discussed the theoretical framework that is thefoundation of the analysis in this study. The Space TechnologyLadder is defined by its four major categories and various sub-categories. This Ladder is proposed as a hypothetical path thata country could follow in achieving national space milestones. Thesub-categories within the various levels are chosen based onhistorical evidence of common technology strategies. The levelsand sub-categories are ranked such that a country increases intechnical complexity and autonomy as it ascends the Ladder. TheLadder thus provides a basis by which to compare the actualchoices made by countries as they pursue new space technology.The a priori assumption is that a country will work its way up theLadder, achieving milestones in order. The framework furtherassumes that countries will choose some, but not all, of the sub-categories as methods of gaining technology. In order to test thisassumption, historical data were collected about developingcountry space programs on three continents. These historical dataare graphed visually and compared to the theoretical path laid outby the Space Technology Ladder. Section 3 explains in detail whatdata are used and how they are organized for analysis.

3. Data and analysis methods

The study uses a structured, qualitative analysis approach tomap the technical progress in the area of space technology ach-ieved by countries from several regions. The visual mapping teststhe assumption that countries move linearly up the Space Tech-nology Ladder as they increase their space capabilities. Thehistorical progress of select countries is graphed on a timelineshowing the year they achieved a specific milestone on the SpaceTechnology Ladder. In order to provide scope to the analysis, thetimeline only shows the first occasion in which a country achievedone of the 13 milestones from Table 6. This avoids the need to findand visualize a complete timeline of events for each country. Italso emphasizes the occasions in which countries take a majorstep forward in their level of technical autonomy in the area ofspace or build new technological capability. Data about nationalspace milestones are drawn from the space agency websites ofvarious countries, from conference papers and news articles. Thedata are also supplemented by interaction with stakeholders frommost of the countries, and site visits to Nigeria, Malaysia, andSouth Korea.

The eight countries included in the analysis represent threegeographical regions e Africa, Asia and Latin America e that aretraditionally considered to be developing. The African countries areAlgeria, Egypt and Nigeria. From Asia the study includes India,Malaysia and South Korea. Argentina and Brazil are the LatinAmerican countries. The countries were chosen because they haveachieved e or they are actively pursuing e at least three of themilestones shown in Table 6. The eight chosen countries are not theonly ones that meet this criterion. Other countries from theseregions have demonstrated a commitment to space, includingIndonesia, China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Venezuela,Vietnam and Mexico. These countries could also be considered tosee if they had reached three of the milestones in Table 6. Thisinitial exploration of data from eight countries thus provides

a starting point that can inform further research based on the sameframework.

Once the data about the first time each of the eight countriesachieves a milestone from the Space Technology Ladder have beencollected, the information is summarized visually on a graphicaltimeline. The vertical axis of the timeline shows the number of thetechnical action taken; this ranges between 1 and 13, as on Table 6.The horizontal axis shows the year in which the action wascompleted. In the case of a space agency, the year refers to the datethe office or agency was established. For a satellite project, the yearrefers to the launch date. For a launch project, the year shows thefirst date in which a satellite was successfully launched into thedesired orbit.

In some cases, a project is currently underway, but the completemilestone has not been achieved. For example, if a satellite has beenbuilt but has not yet been launched, the milestone has not yet beenreached. Also, if a launch has been attempted unsuccessfully, thereis clear evidence of the pursuit of this capability but credit cannotbe given for reaching the milestone. In these cases, the actions areshown on the timeline as “Future” milestones. Section 4 presentsthe results of graphing the first time milestones of each country.

4. Results

The timelines for achievement of first time milestones from theSpace Technology Ladder are shown in regional groups in thissection. The regions are presented in alphabetical order. Note thatthe words describing each specific milestone on the y-axis of thetimeline are replaced with the corresponding number shown inTable 6.

4.1. African countries

Fig.1 shows the timeline results for the three African countrieseAlgeria, Egypt and Nigeria. Egypt has the earliest milestones of thethree countries. In 1971 it established a government office related tospace studies. This was a partnership with the USA that was affili-ated with the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Research and Tech-nology. In 1994 this precursor institution was re-established as thecurrent Egyptian agency that leads space in the area of remotesensing. This newagency is called theNational Authority for RemoteSensing and Space Sciences [26]. Egypt’s next milestone from theLadder is at level 8. In 1998, Egypt procured a first geostationary

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e24 19

communication satellite [27]. Later, in 2007, the first low Earth orbitsatellite procured by Egypt was launched. The country boughtEgyptsat-1 from a Ukrainian company and also paid for the trainingof Egyptian engineers [28].

The timeline highlights several aspects of Egypt’s path. First,there was gap of about 20 years between the establishment of thefirst space office and the next milestone on the Space TechnologyLadder. Second, it invested in buying a geostationary satellite tooffer commercial communication services before it bought its firstremote sensing satellite. There is more to Egypt’s space story. Itplans to procure other satellites for both communication andremote sensing.

Nigeria’s first milestone came in 1999 with the establishment ofthe National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA)[29]. In 2003, the first low Earth orbit satellite procured by Nigeriawas launched. Nigeria bought a remote sensing satellite calledNigeriaSat-1 from Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL). It alsopaid for the training of Nigerian engineers [30]. The next milestonecame in 2007, the launch year for a communication satellite thatNigeria purchased from China’s Great Wall Company [31]. In 2011Nigeria launched its first satellite built by local engineers withsupport in a partner’s facility. The NigeriaSat-X satellite was built incollaboration with SSTL [32]. Nigeria’s progress in the past decadeshows a clear focus on building up local technical capability,especially in LEO satellites. Nigeria has other projects which do notrepresent new milestones on the Space Technology Ladder.

Algeria has three milestones from Table 6. In 2002 Algeria bothestablished a national space agency (ASAL) and saw the launch ofits first satellite to LEO (ALSAT-1) [33,34]. This remote sensingspacecraft was purchased from SSTL along with a training package.Algeria is working toward gaining its next milestone with thelaunch of ALSAT-2B [35]. This will be the country’s first LEO satellitebuilt locally with outside assistance. It is just one of the satellitesthat Algeria hopes to use in the future.

4.2. Asian countries

Fig. 2 shows the results for Asian countries. The country with theearliest milestone is India. Over the decades India has had manyspace technology projects. This is not a complete list; instead itshows the projects that represent milestones according to theSpace Technology Ladder. India formed the first government spaceoffice in 1962; it was called the National Committee on Space

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10111213

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

GEO Satellite

LEO Satellite

Launch

Space Agency

Milesto

ne

IndiaMalaysiaSouth Korea

Year

Milestone Timeline - Asian Countries

Future

Fig. 2. This graph shows the first time India, Malaysia and South Korea achievedMilestones from the Space Technology Ladder.

Research. Later, in 1969, the current space agency (the Indian SpaceResearch Organization e ISRO) was founded. In 1975, Indialaunched Aryabhata, the first LEO satellite built with outsideassistance from the USSR. India reached a launchmilestone in 1980,with the first successful launch of its Satellite Launch Vehicle-3. Itsent a satellite to LEO. This was followed in 1981 by the launch ofBaskara II, India’s first locally built LEO satellite. 1981 also sawa milestone in terms of GEO satellites. India built its first GEOspacecraft with outside assistance from Europe; this was APPLE-I,an experimental communications satellite. In 1982 India saw thelaunch of INSAT-1, another GEO satellite procured from a UScompany. In 1992 the first locally built GEO satellite, INSAT-2A, waslaunched for India. The next milestone in 2001 demonstratedIndia’s capability to launch its own geostationary satellites with itsGeostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle [21,36].

India’s record is impressive; it has achieved nine of the 13milestones on the Space Technology Ladder. Notice that it mademajor progress in several technology areas simultaneously, espe-cially in the 1980s. Between 1975 and 1985 India reached mile-stones in LEO satellites, GEO satellites and launch capability.

The second Asian country is South Korea. An organization calledthe Korean Aerospace Research Institute was created in 1989,signaling South Korea’s first milestone. Later, in 2005, the NationalSpace Committee was established as the leader for Korean spacepolicy [37]. In terms of technical milestones, a South Koreanuniversity procured KITSAT-1 (launched in 1992) and used theopportunity to train local engineers; this was the first LEO satellite.South Korea’s first locally built LEO satellite was KITSAT-2, launchedin 1993 [38]. In 1999 KOMPSAT-1 launched; it was the first satellitebuilt locally with outside assistance [39]. South Korea’s first GEOsatellite to be procured was COMS; it was launched in 2010 [40]. Asof the time of this writing, South Korea is actively pursuing a localLEO satellite launch capability. Attempts in 2009 and 2010 almostreached this milestone [41].

Like South Korea, Malaysia’s first milestone is from 1989 at theestablishment of the first government space office. For Malaysia,this was the Planetarium Division which pursued space-relatededucational outreach. Malaysia’s next area of achievement was ingeostationary satellites. It has purchased several; the first waslaunched in 1996. In 2000 TiungSat was launched for Malaysia. Thiswas the first LEO satellite to be procured. The process includedtraining for local engineers in a partnership with SSTL. In 2002 thecurrent Malaysian space agency (ANGKASA) was formed. The latestmilestone came in 2009: the first Malaysian satellite to be builtwith the support of a partner in that partner’s facility was RazakSat.Malaysiaworkedwith a South Korean firm called Satrec Initiative todevelop this satellite [42].

4.3. Latin American countries

Both Argentina and Brazil started their first national space officein 1961, as shown in Fig. 3. From there Argentina’s next Laddermilestone came in 1991 when it established the current nationalspace agency, known in Spanish as CONAE (Comision Nacional deActividades Espaciales). In 1996, Argentina saw the launch of itsfirst LEO satellite to be built through a mutual collaboration. Thiswas the SAC-B mission. In 1998 it completed the SAC-A mission,which was the first LEO satellite built locally with outside assis-tance. SAOCOM is planned to be the first Argentinean satellite builtlocally [43].

Brazil founded a group to lead national space activities in 1961.In 1985, Brazil procured its first GEO communications satellite.Brazil achieved a locally built LEO satellite in 1993 with SCD-1,which launched in 1993. The current national space agency ofBrazil was established in 1994. Brazil’s next milestone from the

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1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

GEO Satellite

LEO Satellite

Launch

Space Agency

Milesto

ne

Year

BrazilArgentina

Milestone Timeline

Latin American Countries

Future

Fig. 3. This graph shows the first time Argentina and Brazil achieved milestones fromthe Space Technology Ladder.

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e2420

Ladder was in 1999. This was Brazil’s first LEO satellite built viaa mutually beneficial collaboration with China. The satellite wasa remote sensing project with China called CBERS-1. Brazil ispursuing the capability to launch LEO satellites; this continues to bea goal for the future [44].

The graphical timelines illustrate that the actual historical pathsof these eight countries did not follow a simple, unidirectional paththrough the levels of the Space Technology Ladder. Instead, thecountries move up and down the Ladder in unique paths. Section 5discusses what can be learned from these explorations of thehistorical paths of eight countries in space technology.

5. Discussion: strategic decisions

There are various angles from which one could view the infor-mation presented in Section 4. One approach could be to considerthe historical and political context of each country and try tounderstand how these factors influenced their technology path.Another approach could be to consider the countries within eachregion and compare how these neighboring countries are similar ordifferent. One might also group countries into cohorts based on thetime frame in which their major space activities began. With thesedivisions, one could compare how strategies for achievement inspace technology have changed over time. These avenues ofinvestigation are opportunities for future work, as they are beyondthe scope of this paper. Instead the current paper will focus on thestrategic decisions made by countries about how to achieveparticular milestones on the Space Technology Ladder. Thesedecisions reveal common issues faced by multiple countries. Insome cases it is instructive to see occasions in which two countrieshandled a situation in the same way. At other times the starkdifferences between country strategies are revealing.

This work is directed to the community of people engaged in orsupporting satellite programs in developing countries. The purposeof the following analysis is to explore the options that are availablefor countries to increase their local technological capability. Thestudy achieves this purpose by laying out a number of strategicpolicy choices that countries make in the process of attainingmilestones from the Space Technology Ladder.

The discussion divides the policy decisions into three categoriesbased on the context of the decisions. The three categories are asfollows: space program capabilities, national context, and inter-national context. Decisions about space program capabilities relateto the specific human skills and technical facilities in whicha country invests. The national context refers to the relationship of

the space program to domestic actors in government, industry andacademia. The international context refers to the relationship of thespace program to foreign governments or commercial actors. Thedecisions that facilitated Space Technology Ladder milestones forthe eight countries in this study can be categorized in one of thesethree areas. Each area will be explored in turn below.

5.1. Space program capabilities

The eight countries presented in this study made consciousdecisions to achieve technology milestones in the area of space. Aspart of this process, priorities were set as to what specific technicalinvestments would be made. These priorities may have been set bydifferent players in different countries e players such as the centralgovernment or the technical specialists in the agencies. Researchfor this study revealed several specific examples of decisions abouttechnical facilities and skills.

5.1.1. Make or buy the satellite?In general, countries who want to engage in the independent

use of space technology start by considering the option of havinga national satellite. At this stage, a country may compare the costsand benefits of buying a satellite versus developing local capabilityto manufacture satellites. This decision is influenced by the kind ofsatellite services a country needs. Many countries beginwith eithera remote sensing imagery satellite, science satellite or a communi-cation satellite. Remote sensing and science satellites are typicallyflown in LEO and can be relatively small and simple. Communica-tions satellites are normally larger, heavier and more complex thanremote sensing satellites because they typically operate in GEO.

Of the eight countries studied here, all have invested in owningand operating at least one LEO remote sensing satellite. All of thesecountries also show evidence that they are working towarddeveloping a local capability to manufacture such satellites. All thecountries, except Argentina and Algeria, have chosen to own andoperate a national GEO communication satellite. Argentina is aninteresting exception. This country did not choose to build or buya satellite independently. Rather, in the 1990s Argentina licenseda consortium of European companies to operate communicationsatellites over its territory and accessed satellite services in thismanner [45]. This is not considered a milestone on the SpaceTechnology Ladder, but it is an effective way to access the satelliteservice. Although six countries in this study are investing innational communication satellites, only India has thus far suc-ceeded in mastering the technology to produce communicationsatellites locally.

5.1.2. Make satellites, payloads or both?If a country chooses to invest in local technical capability to

produce satellites, there are still several layers of decisions to bemade. Should a country start by focusing on both satellite buses andinstrument payloads? Should it instead choose one of these onwhich to focus? Argentina provides an interesting story on thispoint. The SAC-B satellite was Argentina’s first LEO satellite built inmutual international collaboration (Level 10 on the Space Tech-nology Ladder). SAC-B was an astrophysical, science mission.Argentina leveraged its growing skills in manufacturing the satel-lite bus, but it did not try to provide all the instruments indepen-dently. Instruments and solar cells were added by the USA, Italy andBrazil. Through this collaboration Argentina could achieve morethan its own resources could provide [46].

5.1.3. What is the program’s purpose?At the start of a satellite project which comes early in the space

program, a country must often decide whether the goal of the

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e24 21

project is primarily to learn, to test new technology, or to producean effective operational satellite. The outcome of this decisionstrongly affects the choice of how to obtain the satellite. Malaysia,for example, had a different purpose for each of its two LEO satelliteprojects. TiungSat (launched in 2000) was an opportunity fortraining of personnel in a new field. Malaysia worked with theEnglish company SSTL to build this spacecraft and sent Malaysianengineers to England for training. For its second satellite, RazakSat(launched in 2009), the goal was to develop a satellite that wouldprovide specific imagery services. Malaysia partnered with a SouthKorean company on this project, but took local responsibility forensuring that the optical aspects of the satellite would functioneffectively [47]. South Korea also provides an example of the waysthat mission purpose shape procurement philosophy. The KITSAT-2mission was South Korea’s first locally built LEO satellite. Theprimary purpose of the mission was to confirm the technicallearning that South Korea had gained by working with theUniversity of Surrey on KITSAT-1. Later the Kompsat-1 projectbecame the first locally built satellite with outside assistance. Theassistance helped ensure the quality of the Kompsat-1 mission [37].This illustrates that countries can move both “up” and “down” theSpace Technology Ladder over time.

5.1.4. When to build satellite facilities?Another aspect of the decision about building satellites locally

relates to the physical facilities required to execute satelliteprojects. When most countries start their pursuit of space capa-bility, the requisite facilities for manufacture, integration andtesting of satellites are not available. It may be the case that newfacilities must be built or old facilities altered to enable thesatellite projects to take place. Countries from this study faceda decision regarding when to build facilities locally to supportvarious aspects of satellite projects. Consider several examples.Both India and Argentina started their satellite programs bybuilding LEO satellites locally with outside assistance or partner-ship. Thus, they developed the facilities at the same time as theydeveloped the human resources. In contrast, Nigeria and Malaysiaprocured their first satellites from a company along with a trainingprogram for their engineers. They later sent teams of engineers tobuild additional satellites in a partner’s facility. Both of thesecountries are facing the issue of when and how to establish localfacilities that will allow them to build future satellites locally.Nigeria and Malaysia focused first on training people and later ondeveloping facilities.

5.1.5. Satellites and launchers?Finally, when a country pursues space technology, it faces the

choice of whether to focus on building satellites or extending itscapabilities to include launching. Launching is a very differenttechnical activity than manufacturing satellites; it is no smalldecision to invest in local launch capability. Of the eight countriesstudied here, only India has successfully established an indepen-dent launch capability to LEO and GEO. Both Brazil and South Koreaare actively working toward achieving the capability to launch LEOsatellites. The current form of the Space Technology Ladderframework includes two categories of activity for launching. Thesecategories capture two levels of technical complexity (Launching toLEO and GEO), but only one level of technical autonomy. This levelrepresents independent capability to operate launch facilities. TheLadder does not specify the source of the technology that countriesuse for launch activity. It is common for countries to partner withforeign countries in order to establish the infrastructure andcapability to launch satellites. Countries may pass through severalstages of autonomy, such as adapting a foreign rocket design beforedeveloping local technology. The present data set does not

emphasize these dynamics; future work can consider them inmoredetail.

5.1.6. Summary of space program capabilitiesTo summarize Section 5.1, the historical paths of the eight

countries revealed several strategic decision points regarding theprocess of building up capabilities in the space program. These arequestions a country may face once it decides to pursue a satelliteproject. These decision points can be summarized as follows.

1) Will we acquire satellites through purchase or throughmanufacture?

2) Will we build the satellite bus as well as payloads or only buildthe bus?

3) What is the primary purpose of this satellite project e to testnew technology, to train people, or to acquire a satellite thatprovides specific services?

4) When should we build local satellite processing facilities?5) Should we invest in local launch capability?

The examples of these eight countries reveal a variety of ways ofanswering these questions. The answer will depend on the needsand resources of each country.

5.2. National context

Section 5.1 discussed decisions faced by countries with regard totheir space program capabilities, facilities and human resources.This section considers strategic choices made by countries withregard to the relationship between the space program and otherplayers in the national context. These players may be within thegovernment, industry and academia, for example. One area thatdifferentiates the strategies of the countries in this study is therelationship between the space program and domestic commercialactors. In part, countries approach this issue differently because ofvariation in their levels of industrial development. Beyond thatdifference, however, countries still face a choice about how theprocurement of space technology involves local industrial playersand fits into overall national technology policy. Consider a fewdistinct examples. South Korea encourages the involvement ofdomestic industry as component suppliers for satellite payloads.This was an explicit goal of the KITSAT series of satellites. Ina similar case for Argentina, a well-established company calledINVAP was the prime contractor for the SAC series of satellites,which include Argentina’s first two LEO milestones [48]. In both ofthese cases, the satellite projects were an opportunity to stimulateand include existing commercial companies. Malaysia’s story issomewhat different. During their first satellite project, a newcompany was created to provide technical leadership and institu-tional structure for the newly established community of satelliteprofessionals [49]. In the case of Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt, localcommercial companies seemed to have played a less prominentrole in past milestones.

A related question to that discussed above regards the type ofinstitutions a country establishes or empowers to execute the spaceprogram. Such organizations can be government, commercial,academic or hybrids that combine various aspects. All eight coun-tries in this study have a government office that leads the nationalspace effort. This office may partner with external companies,universities or other government offices to execute projects. InSouth Korea’s case, policy is made by a National Space Committee,but projects are executed by a national research institute (KoreanAerospace Research Institute), a university (Korean AdvancedInstitute of Science and Technology), and a company that spun outof the university (SaTReC Initiative), among others [37]. South

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e2422

Korea’s story shows how satellite programs can lead to a complexnetwork of institutional associations within a country. Furtherstudy can explore how to design such a network in a manner thatsupports national needs.

In summary, countries have pursued different strategies fororganizing the institutions that execute space projects. There areexamples of initial leadership coming from central government andfrom academia. It is less common for an industry player to lead,which is not surprising given the high level of risk and capitalinvestment required for space activity. The discussion of thedomestic context relates to the concept of National InnovationSystems (NIS), introduced in Section 2. The NIS literature empha-sizes the need for strong relationships between actors fromdifferent societal sectors to facilitate technological progress. Thequality of these relationships is potentially more important thanthe specific institutional arrangement. In the case of Malaysia andSouth Korea, the official titles and status of key organizationsevolved, but the partnership between sectors was maintained.Future research can further explore the implications of institutionalapproaches by harnessing this and other literature.

5.3. International context

A third area of decision making exhibited by countries in thisstudy regards relationships with foreign companies and govern-ments in collaborative space projects. These collaborations tookvarious forms, but they affected every country. All eight countriesobtained at least one satellite through a relationship with a foreignpartner. More precisely, all eight countries achieved at least onemilestone on the Space Technology Ladder between Level 3(Procure LEO satellite with training) and Level 6 (Build LEO satellitewith mutual international collaboration). This means all eightcountries chose to depend on a foreign government or company toexecute one of their early milestone projects. Although interna-tional collaboration on major technology projects is common, it isby nomeans a simple proposition. This section explores some of thequestions addressed by countries as they managed their interna-tional space projects.

5.3.1. When to partner?One question a country faces is when to involve external part-

ners during the process of building up capability in space tech-nology. It can choose to establish partnerships early in the process.These relationships may be advantageous in terms of facilitatinghuman resource development. They are difficult to manage,however, because the country that has lower technical sophistica-tionmay be at a disadvantage in the relationship. Another approachis to work independently during the early stages to build up localcapability and focus on partnering later as a technical equal. Thisdiscussion brings up another question e how does a country learnabout space technology if it does not partner with outsidecompanies or governments? Consider the following examples ofpartnership strategies. Brazil’s first LEO satellite was SCD-1; it wasbuilt locally by the National Institute for Space Research andlaunched by the USA in 1993. After establishing this local satellitecapability, Brazil collaborated with China on the CBERS series ofsatellites (first launched in 1999). In contrast to Brazil’s indepen-dent start at Level 7, the other countries did their first projects inpartnership. Argentina’s first LEO satellite project was at Level 6(Mutual International Collaboration); India started at Level 5 (buildlocally with outside assistance). Meanwhile, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt,Malaysia and South Korea started their LEOwork at Level 3 (ProcureLEO satellite with training). Of course, these brief outlines do nottell the whole story. These examples are presented to highlight theinternational aspect of space policy decision making. The issue of

harnessing external technology sources is also addressed in thetechnological learning literature, which proposes that both directpartnerships and indirect interaction can be used. Indirect learningapproaches may include attending conferences and learning viareverse engineering. This is much more difficult when the tech-nology involves many tacit aspects, which is the case for satelliteengineering. Further research and description is needed to under-stand the mechanisms that enabled learning and cooperation ineach case. It could specifically explore the role of indirect learningapproaches to support partnership methods.

5.3.2. Partnership or purchase?A final category of decision making relates to a country’s choice

about whether to form an international partnership on a commer-cial or political basis. Generally, this means choosing betweenpartnering with a foreign firm or a foreign government. Examplesof both kinds of partnerships are evident in the history studiedhere. A non-commercial partnership with a foreign governmentcan be attractive as a way to bring both technical and politicalbenefit. It may also be billed as a way to save money by sharingcosts, although decreased expense is not guaranteed. The chal-lenges of political partnerships come from the nature of govern-ment projects. They must be vetted by the political process at somelevel. They are subject to risk due to policy changes, and they maybe based on interests that do not necessarily promote the tech-nology objectives. A commercial partnership can benefit from theefficiency of a profit-driven company. If a country hires a foreignfirm, it can exercise more unilateral control as a customer than asa political partner. There are also challenges to working withforeign commercial partners, however. Costs may be prohibitive,and regulation may affect international trade options. Someexamples of commercial and political partnerships among theprojects studied here are discussed below.

In the case of GEO satellites, most countries in this analysispurchased their communication satellites from foreign companies.Only India moved further up the Ladder to develop GEO satelliteslocally. Several countries e including Malaysia, Egypt, Nigeria andBrazile established commercial companies to own and operate theircommunication satellites for profit. This is logical in the case ofcommunication. This facet of the satellite market is the most histor-ically successful in the commercial sector. The case of LEO satellitesshowsmore variety.Malaysia represents one extreme. Both of its LEOsatellites were developed through partnerships with commercialcompanies. This model of commercial partnership was also followedby South Korea, Egypt, and Algeria. Argentina is at the other extreme.All its partnership milestones involve non-commercial partnershipswith other governments. Meanwhile, India’s long history includesa mix of milestones via government and commercial partnerships.

5.3.3. Summary of international contextJust as a new space program must decide how to arrange an

institutional structure to organize space efforts domestically, manycountries must also decide how to manage the complexity ofinternational partnerships. Countries have made distinct, strategicchoices about when to pursue partnerships and the types of part-nerships they pursue. The literature also suggests that the impact ofpartnerships is affected by their effort to learn independently andincrease their absorptive capacity.

6. Summary and conclusion

This study has used three tools to explore capability building inspace programs in developing countries. These tools are the SpaceTechnology Ladder framework, the graphical summary of historicalmilestones, and the analysis of strategic space decisions.

D. Wood, A. Weigel / Space Policy 28 (2012) 15e24 23

The Space Technology Ladder is a framework that can be used todefine the milestones reached by countries while pursuing nationalspace technology capability. The framework has four major tech-nical categories and within each of these four major categories aresub-categories that provide additional information about the levelof technical autonomy achieved within the category. The SpaceTechnology Ladder is not proffered as a prescriptive standard, butrather as a descriptive tool that facilitates comparison of countrieswith very different patterns. The historical path of eight countriesto achieve milestones along the Space Technology Ladder is map-ped in a graphical timeline. The timelines reveal that countries havenot traveled in common, unidirectional paths through the ladder.Instead they have pursued unique paths that represent differentpriorities and contexts. Part of the variation in the historical pathsresult from the different approaches countries have taken to a set ofstrategic decisions. These decisions relate to defining spaceprogram capabilities, the national context, and the internationalcontext. Within each of these themes, there are challenging ques-tions about how and when to invest in specific technologies orpartnerships.

Part of the motivation for the study was the evidence from thetechnological learning literature of the importance of building localcapability in new technologies as part of the development process.There is inherent benefit in building up skills of people and orga-nizations to harness the potential of space technology. Skills alone,however, do not contribute to development. These humanresources can aid development when they improve the country’sability to consume services and scientific return from space. Satel-lite services such as earth observation, communication and navi-gation provide useful information and infrastructure. The benefitsof these services are harnessed by creating effective informationsystems that deliver the appropriate product to end users.

The analysis approach used in this study has both strengths andweaknesses. The strength is that the Ladder Framework andgraphical timeline are flexible. They can easily be extended toinclude other countries and other technical milestones. Theapproach of finding first time achievements of countries reducesthe overall data requirements of implementing the study. Thisallows a high-level comparison of many countries that is quicklydigested. The weakness of the study is that it does not explain thevariation among the countries’ technical and procurement strate-gies. In order to address this, the authors propose a more detailedstudy of a smaller number of countries. This in-depth study willcontinue to draw from the technological learning literature to findpriority areas for exploring the factors that may affect capabilitybuilding. It will also consider more contextual informationsurrounding the countries’ approaches to answering strategicquestions about technology and partnership. Issues of particularinterest include models for learning via international collaboration,opportunities for independent learning and factors that influencethe development of a National Innovation System for space.

Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported in part by fundingfrom the National Defense Science and Engineering GraduateFellowship of the US Department of Defense and the NationalScience Foundation. The funders had no involvement in the studydesign, data collection or reporting.

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