Chapter- III FALL OF SUHARTO: THE PATH

TOWARDS EAST TIMORESE REFERENDUM

CHAPTER- III

FALL OF SUHARTO: THE PATH TOWARDS EAST

TIMORESE REFERENDUM

In a dramatic three minutes speech, on 21 May 2001,

Suharto announced the end of his long tenure of more than thirty

years. The long innings of this powerful man was brought to an

end amidst massive student demonstrations and in the aftermath

of the devastating two-day riots following the 12 May killings at

Trisakti University and destruction of Jakarta's business districts.

With Suharto's resignation, his deputy B.J. Habibie was

immediately sworn in as the new President. But before coming to

the Habibie tenure, it is important to analyse the conditions which

led to the impossible turn-round, that is, the stepping down of

Suharto.

The Indonesian economy deteriorated rapidly following the

onset of the regional economic crisis that began in the middle of

1997 in Thailand. Indonesia was the hardest hit by the Asian

economic crisis and was forced to accept a US $43 billion bail-out

under the International Monetary Fund in September. The value of

rupiah had fallen more than 50 per cent, from Rp 2,350 per US

dollar in June 1997 to Rp 16,500 in January 1998. With prices

1going up and companies closing consequently leading to increased

unemployment, it was predicted that the per capita income in

Indonesia would go down as low as $750 from $1200. That means,

the number of people classified as absolute poor swelled from 24

million to 42 million or one out of five Indonesians.! These

developments affected the Indonesian politics directly.

Margot Cohen, 'Unlucky Country', Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 1997, p. 16.

87

There were two different interpretations to the crisis. The

government view was that the causes were mainly economic which

could be solved by undertaking economic reforms. The situation

would then improve, and political reforms would not be required.

The other view was that the crisis was both economic and political

in nature. Economic problems included over-expansion of the

Indonesian economy without sound infrastructure, overuse of

foreign investments in non-productive sectors (for example, real

estate), and rampant corruption and cronyism, which resulted in

large debts being incurred by both private (US $74 billion) and

state (US $ 63.4 billion) sectors. Indebted private companies were

mostly owned by the New Order elite and the Chinese

conglomerates. Many argued that this was the root of the

problem.2 Renowned academician Hall Hill would describe the

econJmlc downturn in Indonesia as 'strange sudden death of a

tiger'.

It can be observed that when there was the economic crisis,

lthe weakness of the system began to reveal one after another.

According to famous Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs, Indonesia

'was paying the price for increased reliance on foreign capital to

finance domestic investments, and for the erosion of export

competitiveness by rapid capital inflows. Alongside, the financial

system had grown fragile with excessive short-term debt'.3 Sachs

was of the view that by rescuing the banking system, economic

stability can be brought in. But many others disagreed, arguing

that as long as the existing system continued, the crisis could not

be solved. During the last twenty years of Suharto's rule, there

2 Leo Suryadinata, 'A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Suharto and Rise of Habibie', Southeast Asian Affairs, 1999, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p.11 I.

Ascent 7, no.2, April 1998, p.1.

88

had been rampant corruption and cronyism. The Suharto family

had business in almost all the spheres, and according to Forbes

magazine, accumulated wealth amounting to US $ 4 billion.4

Later, in a detailed investigation, the famous Time magazine

stirred Indonesia and the rest world by revealing this amount to be I

US$ 15 billion. The Suharto and Company, and their cronies had

complete monopoly over the Indonesian economy since 1980s with

corruption and collusion, which had a heavy burden on the public.

The IMF was asked to come to rescue the country from the

crisis. However, the IMF was either not very sensitive to the

Indonesian problem or did not really understand the situation.

The IMF conditions for its massive bail-out required Indonesia to

undertake financial reforms, dismantle monopolies and withdraw

subsidies on basic commodities. Nonetheless, IMF assistance did

not produce any immediate economic improvement. The IMF

blamed the Indonesian government for not implementing the

reform programme. The government, on the other hand, resisted

IMF suggestions, fearing that implementing IMF conditions would

only cause further price hikes and in turn, worsen the socio­

political situation. The cost of many food items and other

commodities had been raised by 100 per cent during early 1998,

crossing the government's estimation of inflation to be about 45

per cent.s

The monetary crisis resulted into social un·rest. The worst

targets were thr.:: Chinese businessmen who form the main

economic backbone of Indonesia. The economic crisis had indeed

'Suharto family, net worth: At least $4 billion, may be much more', Forbes, 6 July 1998, p. 54.

Leo Suryadinata, 'A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Suharto and Rise of Habibie', Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p.ll3.

89

ignited democratic aspirations, and the source of Suharto regime's

legitimacy ceased to. exist as economic hardships mounted.

Observers say that without the collapse of the economy, there

i would not have been the opportunity for political change. 6

Demanding the introduction of both economic and political

reforms, the university students in Java and the outer islands

staged violent demonstrations. They also demanded Suharto to

resign. It appeared Suharto still underestimated the seriousness of

the crisis. In Mach 1998, he announced a new 'crony' Cabinet,

with his daughter as Social Minister. Beforehand, he had also

appointed Habibie as Vice President. Suharto's reply to the

agitation that reform will be undertaken in the year 2003 only

found much outrage against him.

There were some other issues for the demonstration to turn

into a greater movement. Suharto was over-confident to order a ..

subsidy cut on fuel and electricity. The price of gasoline increased

from Rp 600 to Rp 1,200 per litre and the food prices too followed.

This had immediate effect in the city of Medan where the students

rioted. With all these developments at home Suharto flew to Cairo

to attend the G-15 summit of non-aligned leaders. His absence

resulted in more demonstrations, particularly after the killing of

four students from Trisakti University by the Army Special Force.

The unemployed, workers, urban poor and even youngsters joined

students, followed by the support from the intellectuals,

demanding immediate economic and political reforms, and asking

Suharto to step down. As the demonstrations turned violent,

Suharto cut short his Cairo visit and flew home on 15 May.7

6 John McBeth, 'Political Update', in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May, editors, Post Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p. 22.

Ibid., p. 113-114.

90

Suharto's promise for reform, but outright denial for

stepping-down further angered the demonstrators, as a result of

which the situation deteriorated into violent riots with burning,

looting and killings. Over one thousand people were killed. The

ethnic Chinese once again were the main target of the mob,

causing many to flee Indonesia. On 17 May, Amien Rais, a critic of

Suharto and leader of Muhammediyah, the second largest Muslim

association in Indonesia, announced that he would organise the

National Awakening Day demonstration on 20 May. The day after,

on 18 May, Harmoko, the Speaker of Indonesia's House of

Representatives (DPR) as well as the Assembly (MPR) surprised the

country by asking Suharto to step down. In an attempt to fight

back, Suharto invited nine Islamic leaders to his residence and

asked for their support; however, non-Muslims were not invited.s

Some Muslim leaders asked the people to support Suharto's plan

for reform and new general election within one and half year. But

it was too little and too late to silence the storm.

On 20 May, the Parliament threatened to impeach Suharto if

he did not step down. Fourteen of his ministers including Ginanjar

Kartasasmitra and General Wiranto asked him to resign. Dr. Dewi

Fortuna Anwar, who latter became Habibie's Chief Foreign Policy

Advisor, wrote that during that critical week, Suharto, possibly

influenced by his children, noticeably kept aloof from Habibie, as

he was led to believe that Habibie and Harmoko were working

closely together to force him to resign. In fact, Suharto's public

rejection against Habibie to be his acceptable successor surprised

Habibie to confront his mentor. He pointed out to the President

that the best course for him was to resign. Suharto apparently

agreed, but he still wanted to retain some control by planning to

S. Sinansari Ecip, Krono/ogi Situasi Penggu/ingan Soeharto: Reportase Jurna/istik, Penerbit Mizan, Bandung, July 1998, p. 99, as quoted in Ibid., p. 114.

91

appoint a new cabinet before res1gmng a few days later, a plan

which Habibie strongly opposed. Nevertheless, it came as quite a

shock to Habibie that a few hours after he left Suharto in the

evening of 20th May, he received a call that President Suharto

would resign the following morning. Suharto's abrupt decision

came about because he could not find anyone to join his new

'reform cabinet'. 9

In the brief speech, he told the Indonesian people that under

the present circumstances, it was 'very difficult to perform the

government task and [to promote] development of the country

anymore'.lO He had therefore decided to resign (berhentz) from the

presidency. Since 1997, Suharto had talked of lengser ke prabon, a

Javanese wagang term referring to a Javanese king withdrawing

himself from wordly matters to enter a rich spiritual world. But

that actually did not take place.

Then what really caused the sudden change? There can be

three important hctors. Firstly, Suharto could smell the military's

indifference towards him, with General Wiranto asking him to

resign and even the army showing a soft corner for the student

demonstrators marching to occupy the parliament building.

Secondly, he felt a deep sense of betrayal with his once close

associates including Harmoko and the Cabinet ministers asking

him to resign. Thirdly, as a matter of external pressure, the

American Secretary of State, Madelene Albright openly stated on

20 May that the Clinton administration wanted Suharto to

resign. 11 Thus, the 'student power', which had brought Suharto to

9

10

II

D.ewi Fortuna Anwar, 'The Habibie Presidency', in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? ._Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p. 34.

For the text of the speech, see Ibid, pp. 136-39.

Leo Suryadinata, 'A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainity: The Fall of Suharto and Rise of Habibie', Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, pp. 114-115.

92

power thirty-two years before, turned to be the main factor for his

downfall.

Habibie's Innings

From the very moment President Habibie was sworn m,

many questioned the legitimacy of his appointment according to

the Indonesian constitution. Also, questions regarding Habibie's

suitability to lead the reform process were raised, particularly by

the students. This was because of Habibie's earlier close

association with Suharto. Many accused Habibie of being a mere

puppet or just a continuation of Suharto regime without

Suharto 12. On his part, Habibie tried to cast off his negative image

by implementing a wide range of democratisation policies,

including: (a) releasing labour movement members and others held

as political prisoners; (b) freeing political parties ~rom restrictions

on their activities; (c) allowing the formation of labour unions; (d)

greatly easing restrictions on the mass media; and (e) speeding up

the ratification of all international human rights treaties. Through

deliberation of People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) convened in

November 1998, and of the National Assembly session which

1 ended in January 1999, laws on organisations and elections were

rewritten, establishing the basic pillars of political reform.l3

Despite all efforts on the part of Habibie government, a weak

government had to face a sudden political implosion and

resurgence of civil society. They demanded greater

democratisation, but at the same time there was increasing civil

12

13 Jusuf Wanandi, 'Indonesia Long term Objectives', The Jakarta Post, 23 April 1999, p.4

Asian Security 1999-2000, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japan, 2000, pp. 109-10

93

disorder as exemplified by continuing violence and riots,

blossoming of separatist movements and ethno-national concerns,

and a politically battered and discredited army whose image

needed overhauling. 14 On the face of these, Habibie's attempts

were not enough to meet the demands and aspirations of the

people. Holding together a multi-ethnic nation under these chaotic

conditions, bring to fore the issue of legitimacy and political

authority and the challenge on how to transform Indonesia into a

more democratic society were thus a Herculean task for the

Habibie regime.

· Certain steps taken by the Habibie proved his mentality as

opposed to Suharto's. In his first two days in office, he faced his

first major challenge, a potentially dangerous split within the

1 army, between the Islamic faction led by Major General Prabowo,

Suharto's son-in-law, and the nationalist faction of General

Wiranto. Prabowo, famous for ruthless actions and statements

during his East Timor involvement was signed by Habibie to be

shifted to a less powerful position, to head the ABRI staff college in

Ban dung, from the Chief of Army's Strategic Command (Kostrad).

This decision wa:.> made due to emerging allegations that Prabowo

had been involved in the kidnappings of political activists

throughout 1997-98.

On 21 May, Prabowo tried to persuade Habibie to appoint

Wiranto as the Minister of Defence and Security only, while the

army's chief of staff, Subagyo, would take up the position of

commander of the armed forces. Despite Habibie's earlier

closeness to Prabowo, the President kept Wiranto as the Minister

of Defence and Security and commander of the armed forces. This

14 Rowena G. Layador, 'Indonesia and the Military at the Crossroads? The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. XXVII, No.3, 1 999, p. 210.

94

decision enabled the military leadership to carry out an

investigation into Prabowo's alleged involvement m the

kidnappings, which eventually led to Prabowo's dismissal from the

military and trial by a military tribunal.lS

There were some economic, political and legal reforms

I during Habibie's tenure.l6 It closely followed the programmes

already agreed with the IMF in restricting and strengthening the

financial and the banking sectors. Responding to the call for faster

democratisation, Habibie promised to hold the general election

around the middle of 1999, although constitutionally his term of

office was to run ti112003.

Habibie also publicly apologised after the reports made by

the NGOs about the atrocities committed against the Chinese

community during the May riots, where 168 women were raped,

20 of whom had since died, some from suicide. About 150,000

people reportedly left Indonesia during the May riots, of which

70,000 were ethnic Chinese.l7 Many fled the country with their

capital making Indonesia's economic recovery more difficult. Soon

after the May riots, Habibie visited Chinatown and urged the

Chinese to continue to help stabilise the situation. The

government ended the practice of specially making the identity

cards of those of Chinese origin. But in July 1998 he told the

Washington Post that he did not care whether the Chinese

returned - if they did not return, their role would be taken over by

15

16

17

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'The Habibie Presidency', in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, pp. 36-7.

See for details, ibid, pp. 38-43.

Waspada, 6 June 1998, as quoted in Leo Suryadinata, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, Singapore, p.l22.

95

others. He also noted that Indonesia 'will not die' without the

Chinese. 18 This obscure attitude increased further uncertainty.

The Habibie attitude and style of functioning had marked

contrast as opposed to his predecessor. Suharto was

stereotypically Javanese in behaviour who kept his thoughts to

himself and as a .Javanese abangan he had inherited the Javanese

mores and traditions.·· In contrast, Habibie was born and brought

up in South Sulawesi where people are much more spontaneous

and direct. Being a devout Muslim and then, spending over 20

years in Germany he inherited both Asian and Western values. To

Suharto on the other hand, Western ideas and values such as

democracy and human rights were alien concepts. While Suharto

had an indifference towards intellectuals and journalists, Habibie

had made himself available to journalists and was close to

intellectuals. On a number of occasions, Habibie had stated that

he was not a king, but just an ordinary person who could be

anyone's next-door neighbour.19 All these differences in personal

attitude and public perception had filled much input for major

national policy decisions.

The Habibie regime saw the use of Islam as a socio-political

force to suit his own interest. The first two Presidents, Sukarno

and Suharto, did not use Islam as their foundation, but Habibie

was the first President to use Islam as his political base.2o In the

special session of MPR in November, the law on Pancasila as the

sole ideology and symbol of tolerance was abolished. He selected

18

19

20

Leo Suryadinata, ',\Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Suharto and Rise of Habibie', Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p. 122.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'The Habibie Presidency', in Geoff Forrester (ed.). Post Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, p.44.

Tajuk, Jakarta, 12 November 1998, p.21, as quoted in Leo Suryadinata, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, ISAS, Singapore, p. 120.

96

many ministers who had strong Muslim background; some were

even known to be anti-minority religionists. Dr. A.M. Syaefuddin,

his Agriculture Minister said in October that people from minority

religion could not become President of Indonesia, and termed

Megawati as Hindu (as her grand mother was a Balinese) and

thus, unsuitable to be President.21 His statement had angered the

Balinese. Even the pro-Habibie Muslim groups gathered and

announced that the top posts in Indonesia, such as President and

Vice-President, could not be filled in by women as per the Islamic

law, thus tried to squeeze Megawati's chances.

The Habibie period saw innumerable student

demonstrations, religious and ethnic conflicts and even riots.

When the MPR held a special session in November, the opposition,

especially the students tried to pressurise the government by huge

demonstrations, some trying to disrupt the session. They

demanded immediate election to bring a more legitimate and

democratic government and to put an end to Korupsi, Kolusi,

Nepotisme (KKN), preceded by an investigation of Suharto's wealth.

The students from different universities gathered near the

MPR/DPR building and in the two-day conflict, there were twelve

casualties, six of whom were students from the Atma Jaya

Catholic University.

After the 13 November riots, the Indonesian political

atmosphere became unstable. The East Java region was tensed

with the assassination of Muslim leaders linked to Nahdlatul

Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation. Religious

and ethnic conflicts escalated in many parts of Indonesia,

particularly in Kupang, West Timor, Sulawesi, and Ambon;

21 'Menyoal Ucapan AM Saefuddin', Media Indonesia, Jakarta, I November 1998, as quoted in, ibid., p. 12.

97

between Dayaks and Madurese in Kalimantan. Churches were

burnt down and this was followed by the burning of mosques.

According to frequent rumours, the ethnic and religious conflict

was engineered by the pro-Suharto group to divert attention away

from the call to investigate his wealth. Many observers believed

that as long as Suharto and his family were free to move around

there would be no solution to the Indonesian problem.22 Although

Andy Ghalib was appointed as the Attorney General by Habibie to

investigate Suha:cto's a.lleged corruption, no significant result came

out. The Suharto factor, like a ghost, was running after his

successor Habibie creating much public resentment against him.

The Great Decision on East Timor

With Indonesia in a transitional phase, a great decision was

awaiting for East Timor. It would be wrong to say that the

Indonesian crisis was the only reason behind. Indeed the process

had started with the famous 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, which

had earned maximum international headlines so far. This had

opened the eye of the world on Indonesia and brought only

international humiliations for it. The November 1994 APEC

summit time tragedy added fuel to the fire. Then, a high point was

reached in October 1996, when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded

to two East Timorese, Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, ' to

honour their sustained and self-sacrificing contributions for a

small but oppressed people'. International opinion was growing

day-by-day to free the jailed East Timorese independence leader

Xanana Gusmao, who had already turned into the symbol of

22 Leo Suryadinata, 'A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Suharto and Rise of Habibie', Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, ISAS, Singapore, 1999, p. 119.

98

Timorese freedom struggle - widely seen as the Mandela of East

Timor.

On the ground of East Timor, the organisation and

operations of Indonesian army changed dramatically in response

to these developments. The military operations switched from a

combat to a territorial structure in which control was increasingly

handed over to KOPASSUS, the Indonesian army's Special Forces

unit. With the decline in military engagements with the

independence movement's Falantil fighters, the army began to

devote its energies towards targeting independence supporters and

intimidating local population. In this process, the very

commanders who had been influential in directing the Santa Cruz

mas~acre in Dili were promoted to the most senior positions.23

This period rather saw more human rights abuses along with the

terror-spreading, suspicious ninja gangs, who were entering homes

and kidnapping people at night being hooded and dressed in

I black.

At the face of growmg international awareness of the

worsening East Tj.morese situation during post-Santa Cruz period, I

the policy intellectuals in Indonesia had begun considering major

changes in the approach taken to the territory. But any new

departure was vetoed by President Suharto. When, within three

weeks of Suharto's resignation, President Habibie remarked in

June 1998 that a new status for East Timor should be

contemplated, this was the culmination of a process that had

begun in 1991.24 This sudden offer of a 'special status' to East

Timor within Indonesian Republic was, however, quite surprising.

23

24

John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York 1999, p. XIV

James Cotton, 'The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 22, no. I, April, 2000, p.S.

99

Habibie also declared his willingness to release Xanana Gusmao,

the Timorese independence leader in exchange for international

recognition of East Timor.

By now, affected by the serious economic and political crisis

and various demands for secessionism, Indonesia eventually

agreed to resume talks with Portugal, the former colonial master of

East Timor. Soon in August Foreign Minister Ali Alatas made the

offer more specific by proposing a 'wide-ranging-autonomy', which

would exclude 'only the areas of foreign affairs, defence and

finance. '25 In Dili, five East Timorese political parties - Fretilin,

UDT, Apodeti, Kota ·and Trabalhista rejected the autonomy

proposal. As a symbolic gesture, 1,000 Indonesian troops were

' withdrawn from East Timor although 17,941 troops still remained.

However, the independence leader Xanana Gusmao rejected the

autonomy proposal.

In the middle of September, more than 700 East Timorese

graduates belonging to universities in Indonesia and overseas set

up a graduates' forum for a referendum and the development of

East Timor (Forsarepetil). By the end of 1998, it thus seemed that

one effect of Indonesia's crisis with its resultant - overthrow of

Suharto - might create conditions in Indonesia which could assist

East Timor's independence movement.26 In the mean while, huge

protest strikes were organised against the statement of East Timor

governor Abilio Osorio Soares that all government employees who

do not support East Timor's integration into Indonesia should

resign voluntarily or be sacked. As protests against the governor's

declaration gained momentum, the Eastern Indonesia's military

25 Jakarta Post, 6 August 1998. 26

John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p. XVII.

100

commander warned, 'there is a limit to the new era of openness, a

limit to our tolerance. '27

As these developments were taking place the Australian

government in .,July-August 1998 initiated an active round of

consultations with East Timorese representatives, canvassing a

wide spectrum of East Timorese views in Australia, Indonesia,

Portugal, Macau, the United State and elsewhere. The Australian

government came to conclusion after the survey, that the East

Timorese should have a popular consultation before advancing on

the matter of wide ranging autonomy to the province as proposed

by the Indonesian government. On the basis of this, Prime

Minister Howard wrote a letter to Habibie on 27 December

underlining the importance of Indonesia to grant the East

Timorese the opportunity to exercise an act of self-determination

at some stage of the autonomy process.2s The Howard letter

portrayed the aggressive Australian view on East Timor. It read -

27

28

" ....... Observing the developments since your offer of

autonomy, however, I fear that the boldness of your

offer has not been matched with the degree of progress

in negotiations which might have been expected. In

our view, one reason for the difficulties is that

negotiations with Portuguese do not give an adequate

role for the East Timorese themselves ...... I would urge

you to take this course, and to focus or winning

acceptance for your offer from the East Timorese

themselves. The best way of achieving this may be for

you to enter into direct negotiations with

Canberra Times, 24-25 October 1999.

Alexander Downer, 'East Timor - Looking Back on 1999', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 54, no. I, April2000, p. 6.

101

representative leaders from East Timor, including the

two East Timorese bishops and Xanana Gusmao ...... It

might be worth considering, therefore, a means of

addressing the East Timorese desire for an act of self­

determination in a manner that avoids an early and

final decision on the future status of the province

"29

According to Tim Fischer, the letter was a diplomatic

dynamite, which worked at least to the extent of breaking the

stalemate over East Timor.3o The letter caused consternation in

Jakarta, with Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas saying that

the letter had angered President Habibie. On 27 January 1999,

Habibie, however, surprised the world by announcing that the

East Timorese would be given the opportunity to vote on an

autonomy package; if they rejected it he would seek the approval

of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to grant East Timor

independence.31 What influence Howard's letter had on Habibie's

announcement on 27 January is unclear. It was certainly not the

only factor in Habibie's decision but may have been one trigger.32

Indeed, it may take many years to work out the full impact of John

Howard's letter and perhaps at some future date it will be equated

with such famous letters as the Balfour letter to Lord Rothschild,

written on 2 November 1917.33

But what could have been the pressing factors behind

Habibie's offer of self-determination to the East Timorese? The

29

30

31

32

33

For details of the Jetter see Tim Fischer, Ballot and Bullets: Seven Days in East Timor, Allen and Unwin, 2000, pp. 10-13.

Ibid., p. 14.

The Jakarta Post, 28 January 1999.

'East Timor: Sudden Impact', Far Eastern Economic Review, II February 1999.

Tim Fischer, Ballot and Bullets: Seven Days in Eastern Timor, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2000, P.l5.

102

mam reason might be economic. Indonesian army like other

armies in Southeast Asia had suffered greatly from the Asian

economic meltdown, which began to have its major impact from

June 1997. Budget allocations were cut and buying power of the

national currency greatly reduced, thus limiting overseas

equipments and maintenance contract purchases.34 There were

some reports that due to the economic crisis in Indonesia, many

soldiers in East Timor were not paid regularly. Some suggested

that the occupation was becoming too costly for the Jakarta

government. Historian Peter Carey estimated the daily costs of

maintaining 20,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor in 1998 was

approximately US $1 million per day.3S Similar conclusions were

also put forth by several Indonesian political analysts.

Indonesia's East Timor invasion was increasingly seen as a

blunder by many. It can be recalled that once Indonesia's Foreign

Minister Adam Malik had remarked that East Timor is a 'pebble in

Indonesia's shoe'. Economically it was soaking Indonesia. During

the first decade after integration, huge amounts of rupiah were

pumped into the province to rehabilitate and construct new

infrastructure. A conservative estimate of the cost was close to US

$ 100 million annually for the last twenty years. 36 Strongly voicing

for East Timor's separation to be good for Indonesia, Didin

Demanhudi, an economist from Bogor Agricultural University, said

that Indonesia did not gain any economic benefit from the

integration, but politically its reputation in the international arena

had been at its expense. 37 Touching on Indonesia's possible

interest at the much talked about Timor Gap- an area between

--·---------34

35

36

37

Ibid., p.16.

Quoted in John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p.XXXV.

Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo, 'East Timor's History Ignored', Jakarta Post, 13 August 1999.

'East Timor Separation Good for Indonesia,' Jakarta Post, 6 September 1999.

103

Indonesia and Australia (Timor Sea) which some had said as rich

in energy resources, another prominent economist Umar Juoro

said, 'the Timor gap will not yield any significant economic value,

therefore, there is nothing to lose if East Timor goes. The cost of

exploitation in Timor Gap is greater than what it could give in

return.'38

With a drastically changed situation in Indonesia, the

Indonesian army whose strong muscle had sustained East Timor's

integration to Indonesia, was off balance, having lost its long

serving patron, the former five-star general President Suharto.

There had been increasing protests from students, intellectuals

and human right organisations to cut the Indonesian army to size

by putting a full stop to dwifungsi. Indonesian army was no longer

seen as the force of national integration and symbol of national

pride, an image inherited since the colonial struggle; rather was

hated for its high-handedness, corruption in rank and alleged

atrocities in different parts of Indonesia.

The armed forces had made large sums of money in their

commercial activities in East Timor. The individual generals had

been supplementing their low official pay through these. But due

to the serious economic crisis, the commercial activities of the

army were highly affected. As one Australian commentator gave

the account, some generals moved quickly, and switched their

reserves of local currency into US dollars and other hard

currencies and parked large amounts of money in Singapore

and/or Switzerland.39 As a result of this, the senior command of

38

39

Ibid.

Tim Fischer, Ballot and Bluets: Seven Days in East Timor, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, p. 15-6.

104

the army lost by some degree its power of bargain and veto in key

government decision -making.

At the backdrop of all these developments, Howard's letter to

Habibie was seen as timely when the possibilities for a great

decision on East Timor was due. Had it been sent earlier, the

Howard message would have no impact on President Suharto with

the army at his command. Also, if the letter had been sent after

Habibie's transitional rule, his successor, President Abdurrahman

Wahid and Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri would have

reacted strongly against it. Their view on Indonesia's unity and

integrity was well-known. On the other hand, the Habibie-led

Indonesia partly thought in terms of the Australian government's

policy decision, as is well-known that Australia serves as the gate­

way to Western opinion on Southeast Asia (and realists equate

Western opinion as international opinion), which mattered much

1 for the pressurised Habibie regime.

There could be some other calculations behind Habibie's

offer of self-determination. 'The main reason for Habibie's offer was

probably his determination both to distinguish himself from

Suharto, and to try and establish himself as a figure

internationally and then to use this to bolster his position as a

serious contender in the 1999 Presidential elections. '40 In his own

words, 'I will prove to the world that I can make a major

contribution to the world peace as mandated by our constitution.

It will roll like a snowball, and no one can stop it. '4 1 Habibie's

desperatism to be remembered in history could be known from the

fact that even not consulting the UN which was sponsoring

40

41

John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p. XVII.

Komelius Purba, 'Habibie Wants to be Remembered for East Timor,' Jakarta Post, 16 February 1999.

105

Indonesia-Portuguese bilateral talks, he was in a hurry to let East

Timor go, witho·Lt even having any idea how it could be done. We

do not want to be burdened by the problem of East Timor after 1

January 2000', he said.42

It is clear that Habibie and his advisors were of the opinion

that there was little advantage in case of allowing a period of

autonomy before holding a referendum. In the event of East

Timorese choosing for independence, which was expected from

some quarters, Indonesia would have the burden of continuing to

1 find an economically dependent province. It, therefore, seemed

better to be rid of the 'pebble in the shoe' altogether.43 As against

Habibie's hurry, Megawati Sukarnoputri, then the most popular

opposition leader questioned the legitimacy of the transitional

government to take decision on such a major issue. She rather

suggested it would be better if decisions like East Timor and

regional autonomy were left to the next government.44 However,

ultimately the President's view prevailed.

If some confidential reports are to be believed, it was the

President's Chief Foreign Policy Advisor Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar

who convinced Habibie for this historic decision on East Timor.

The main Indonesian newspapers had often commented that

Habibie had Dewi as his ears in major foreign policy decisions.

Lindsay Murdoch recounted that when Habibie first announced

his change of East Timor policy in an interview with Jonathan

Head, of the BBC, his advisor Dewi asked Head not to file the story

until Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had been told. This was highly

revealing of the extent to which the policy did not reflect a well-

42

43

44

'Fast Solution on East Timor Favoured', Jakarta Post, I2 February I999.

'East Timor: Sudden Impact,' Far Eastern Economic Review, II February I999.

John Aglionby, 'Megawati Puts East Timor Vote in Doubt," Guardian, London, 9 April I999.

106

integrated government decision. Even Damien Kingsbury wrote,

the idea for the East Timor ballot had been developed between

Habibie and his advisor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, and then presented

to Habibie's Cabinet.45 A Western-educated Dewi had a strong

feeling that Indonesia's involvement in East Timor was a 'bad

investment'. In a statement in the Financial Times, she added that

Habibie was fed up with continued international condemnation.

'Why do we have to bang on to East Timor if it is hurting us so

much and the East Timorese feel so unhappy about it', she

asked. 46 She used to compare East Timor to an appendix giving

fever to the rest of the country.

Informed Indonesians were aware that support for

integration with Indonesia was restricted to a small group of East

Timorese. On th<:. other hand, the TNI was more optimistic with its

intelligence wing estimating that 20 per cent of East Timorese were

committed to integration with Indonesia and only 20 per cent

strongly supported independence. The rest 60 per cent, it hoped,

could be persuaded not to vote at all, or by using some means, to

vote for integration.47 The TNI big shots had their own

calculations. Even a sizeable minority in favour of integration

would be a face-saving solution for the TNI and leave a significant

political role for East Timorese supporters of integration. It might

even explore scope to unwind the UN process. Knowing it could

not win a political campaign, the TNI embarked on a campaign of

intimidation.48 With an objective of whitewashing its intentions

45

46

47

48

Damien Kingsbury, 'The TNI and the Militias', in Damien Kingsbury (ed.), Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 2000, p.69.

Sander Thoenes, 'Habibie Plays High Risk-Hand in Indonesia', Financial Times, 29 January 1999.

Bob Lowry, 'East Timor: An Overview of Political Developments,' in Chris Manning and Peter Van Dierme (ed.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasis and Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2000, p. 93.

Ibid.

107

before the world media, it banked on the activities of the militia.

The militia was n?thing but a creation of TNI itself.

The TNI Chief General Wiranto was not consulted about this

January 22 decision on East Timor before its presentation at the

cabinet. The military felt betrayed with Habibie's sudden

declaration which had so far lost more than 5,000 of its cadres in

defending East Timor. General Wiranto said nothing during the

Cabinet meeting, reflecting his anger at the decision. Each time

Habibie appeared in public to make statement on East Timor, he

was surrounded by generals whose demeanor was quietly, but

overtly, disdainful. Lieutenant- General Sintong Panjaitan

commented, 'it is the President's own decision.'49 It appeared that

despite the President's decision, the important elements in

Indonesian army were busy implementing their own plan for East

Timor's future.

The Bloody Path to Referendum

As a response to Hobibie's decision, the Indonesian army

was getting ready for a different game in East Timor. By the end of

the year 1998, people living near the military base in the border

town Atambua reported about a massive influx of military

personnel and new recruits from West Timor, numbering about

SOOO. They were trained and then infiltrated into East Timor in

groups during the next three months. On 4 November, another

group of 400 soldiers of the elite KOPASSUS Special Forces unit

from Java arrived Atapupu. Some of them exchanged their

uniforms for typical East Timorese clothing and then, went across

19 John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p. XIX.

108

the border. Their entry into East Timor marked the beginning of

Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation Global Clean-Sweep).

It was from Habibie's January 22 announcement that East

Timor's 13 TNI-backed pro-integration militia groups became

active. Militia has long been part of policing and defence in

Indonesia. In the Indonesian law they are referred as 'trained

civilians'. As East Timor came to international attention, the term

militia became popular. They had been part of the military strategy

since 1975. However, beginning in late 1998 many more were

conscripted, bribed and forced to join their ranks; and each

district had its C'Wn militia. They were supposed to be paid Rs. '

100.000 per month (about US $ 12) as well as receive ten

kilograms of rice. When they did receive rice, according to reliable

sources, it was the cheap rice that Indonesia had received for

humanitarian aid to the many displaced people already in East

Timor.so The different militia groups drilled and paraded with

Indonesian military in attendance, and their activities signaled to a

general plan to intimidate the population and destabilise the

independence camp.

Two days after Habibie's announcement on East Timor, a

'Crisis Team on East Timor' was established to wage a 'dirty war'

against pro-independence group. This team was led by Major­

General Zacky Anwar Makarim who was head of intelligence in

East Timor at the time of the Dili massacre in 1991. With Zacky in

charge, the 'Crisis Team' set up a series of militias. They gave

themselves new names - Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Steel),

indicating the colour of the Indonesian national flag, Mahidi (Dead

or Alive for Indonesia), Aitarak (Thorn) and Darah Merah (Red

50 Helene van Klinken, 'Taking the Risk, Paying the Price: East Timorese Vote in Ermera District', in Damien Kingsbury (ed.), Gun and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 2000, p. 45.

109

Blood). They coordinated their tactics in a command structure

named Milisi Pro-Otonomi, headed by Joao Tavarres, a long time

KOPASSUS collaborator, with Eurico Guterres, the Aitarak

commander as his deputy. The militia groups were to function as

the paramilitary troops of the army.

The militia members were often armed with very crude

home-made weapons, in part to show that the militias are

somehow self-supporting; and to take care the international

criticism that TNI IS backing the militias. However, later

throughout August, the month of referendum, the militias were

increasingly armed with TNI's own weapons, including M-16s, G-3,

SS-1 and AK-4 7 automatic rifles and, in the period just before the

ballot, hand grenades.s1 In Maliana, the hometown of militia

Panglima (supreme commander) Joao Tavares, the local Halilintar

militia openly operated from the local TNI headquarters.

In March, US $2 million were released from KAPASSUS

offices to finance paramilitary operations. In the meantime, the

Indonesian Foreign Ministry organised a series of seminars for

militia leaders in the art of pubic relations, including how to field

awkward questions from foreign reporters. A session held at Bali's

four-star Bali Padma Hotel in March cost Indonesian taxpayers US

$60,000.52

Senior generals playing active role included Lieutenant­

General Tyasno Sudarso, Major General Adam Damiri,

Commander of the Udayana military command which included

East Timor, and Lieutenant-General Zacky Anwar Makarim.

Influential retired Generals Tri Sutrisno and Benny Murdani were

51 Ibid., p. 72. 52 'School's out', Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 September 1999, p.l5.

110

backing them actively. Sacked Lieutenant-General Prabowo,

despite his exile to Jordan, was in close touch with every

operation. Lieutenant-General Yunus Yosfiah, now Habibie's

Information Minister, who was deeply implicated in the murder of

five British, New Zealand and Australian journalists in East Timor

in 1975, also played an active role.s3 All these veterans and others

who had somehow been involved in their previous military

campaigns in East Timor were ganged up for the now-or-never

project.

The first major action started on 4 April in the village Dato,

in the Liquica sub-district, with the cadres of the Besi Merah Putih

attacking the village known to be a stronghold of pro­

independence supporters. The Indonesian troops supported the

paramilitary action in which five people were killed and twelve

houses burnt down. Most of the villagers numbering about 2,000

fled of Liquica and took shelter in the church. But church no

longer proved to be a safe haven. On 6 April, a larger BMP force,

supported by soldiers from Battalion 142 and mobile police

brigades and commanded by Eurico Guterres, began firing into the

church, into which they threw tear-gas grenade. As people ran

away, they were stabbed with knives and machetes, and hacked or

shot to death. When the killings finished, 57 were dead, 35 were

wounded and 14 disappeared. 54

The reports of the victims were so pathetic. Jose Ramos, a

farmer, was grabbed by two policemen wielding machetes. 'One

sliced my right thumb off and as I fell the other slashed my back. I

managed to get up and run into the forest', he said.ss Father

53

54

55

John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, pp. XIX­XX.

Ibid., p. XXI.

John Aglionby, 'Massacre That Made Liquica a Ghost Town', Guardian, 9 April1999.

111

Rafael dos Santos, the parish priest suspected, 'their aim was to

murder all the people in the church. There was blood everywhere,

and my bedroom was full of blood'. 56 From his hospital bed, victim

Miguel Perreira dos Santos told while struggling out of pain from

bullet wounds, 'they want to destabilise East Timor so badly that

the consultation process will not be able to take place'. 57

In responS'.:! to the Liquica killing by militia, Xanana Gumao,

m Jakarta, authorised the resumption of military action by

Falintil, the military arm of the CNRT, the umbrella group of East

Timorese pro-independence political groups. However, under

international pressure Gusmao cancelled his order. All throughout

the East Timorese referendum process, there were innumerable

provocations for the Falintil to jump into the fire, but it tried to

maintain low profile. Strategically, it was a right step. The

Indonesian army wanted to portray to the international

community the image of a chaotic island indulged in group

fighting, riots and killing between each other, nevertheless, unable

to self-rule. Secondly, had Falintil's members descended from their

mountain hideouts, they would have exposed themselves to the

superior numbers and fire-power of groups supported by TNI,

·something they had avoided for past 24 years. And finally, by

remaining silent to the militia attacks, they could draw the

sympathy of the world for their cause getting praises as

necessarily a peace-craving community.

On April 17, the next target of Operasi Sapu Jagad was Dili.

Following a rally organised outside the governor's office by Milisi

Pro-Otonomi, the houses of known independence supporters were

56

57

As quoted in John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p. XXI.

John Aglionby, 'Massacre That Made Liquica a Ghost Town' Guardian, 9 April 1999.

112

attacked. Interestingly, the rally was attended by the governor and

East Timor's military commander, Colonel Tono Suratman. The

paramilitaries attacked the home of Manuel Carrascalao, a former

East Timorese Provincial Assembly member, who by recently, had

turned to be a vocal pro-independence supporter. About 170

people who had taken refuge in his garden were mercilessly

attacked. The casualty was 17, including Carrascalao's 17 year-old

son.

In the meantime, the killings and violence led by army­

backed militia had brought severe condemnation for Indonesia

from different parts of the world, particularly the Western nations.

On ? 1 April, Wiranto presided over a peace agreement between the

CNRT and the militias, giving the appearance that the TNI was a

mediator, rather than a party to the conflict. The agreement

resulted in a number of charades in which militia units paraded to

hand over weapons- which were handed back soon after.ss

As expectect, there was hardly any real impact of the peace

agreement. Scores of people were reported dead in Suai, in

southwest of the territory, with bodies being thrown into a local

river. According to a local priest, the numbers killed would be 100.

In Ermera also, paramilitary brutalities continued against pro­

independence supporters. 'People are being taken away every day

to be interrogated and beaten. They have to move around every

night and no one can discuss anything in open. Seven CNRT

leaders had been murdered by soldiers,' said Father Amaral to a

journalist.S9 On April 23, the United States President Bill Clinton

wrote to President Habibie outlining his concerns over East Timor

and calling on him to do more to bring the militia to heel.

58 'East Timor Peace Claims Denied', The Guardian, 21 Aprill999. 59 John Aglionby, 'Army Talks Peace But Makes War', Observer, 25 Aprill999.

113

,. ,, The historic agreement with principal parties, the

Indonesian and Portuguese Foreign Ministers, was signed on 5

May 1999 under the United Nations auspices in New York. In

order to have the popular consultation, the East Timorese would

be asked: 'Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East

:Timor within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia?' or,

'Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor

leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?' There would

be no middle course.6o

It was decided that the ballot was to be conducted on 8

August 1999 a'.l.d would be preceded by a UN information

campaign followed by a two-week political campaign. The process

would be implemented by the United Nations Assistance Mission

in East Timor (UNAMET) headed by Ian Martin, an Englishman.

The mission was divided into three phases: the period preceding

the ballot, the period between the ballot and the transfer of

administrative responsibility to the UN, and the implementation of

political arrangements for autonomy or independence.61 Most

importantly, the 5 May 1999 agreement called for the need for

Indonesian authorities to co-operate with UNAMET, given the

growing levels of violence, but left the responsibility for creating a

secure environment devoid of violence with the Indonesian police

force who were to exercise absolute neutrality.

The UNAMET formally began its operation in Dili on 1 June,

with 241 international staff members, 420 volunteers, and

unarmed police force of 280 civilian police officers, and 50 military

liaison officers, and 4,000 local East Timorese staff. The

60

61

Bob Lowry, 'East Timor: An Overview of Political Developments', in Chris Manning and Peter Van Dierme (ed.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2000, p.95.

Ibid., p. 96.

114

Indonesian national election was held four days after its arrival.

! On 22 June, the newly created Forum for Unity, Democracy and

Justice, the political wmg of the paramilitary umbrella

organisation Milisi Pro-Otonomi, claimed the entire UNAMET team

was anti-integrationist, thus demanded its replacement.

The staunchly pro-integration governor of East Timor, Abilio

Soares, started campaigning for autonomy without any respect to

the conditions in the 5 May agreement, which restricted political

campaigning to two weeks prior to the ballot.62 In June, Eurico

Guterres, head of the Aitarak militia, was appointed head of a

newly created civil defence guard in Dili the PAM Swakarsa, whose

aim was supposed to assist the Indonesian police in securing law

and order. This appointment was endorsed by Colonel Timbul

Silaen, East Timor's chief of police. 63

In the mean time, the UN personnel had to withdraw from

UNAMET offices in Maliana and Viqueque in late June following

militia attacks. The Maliana office was severely damaged; a UN

officer wounded and several East Timorese sheltering in its

complex were hospitalised with serious injuries, as hundreds of

Darns militia members attacked it armed with sticks and rocks.64

Concerned with the increasing unrest by militia and the grave

failure of Indonesia to control it, the UN Secretary General Kofi

Annan twice pcstponed the referendum from 8 August to 21

August, and again to 30 August.

The frequent postponements of the date of ballot must have

pleased the elements in the Indonesian army who were the

masterminds behind the tragedy. On 14 June 1999, Australian

62

63

64

Ibid. John. G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p. XXII. Jakarta Post, 30 June 1999.

115

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer briefed UN officials on the

security situation in East Timor, including the linkages between

TNI and the militia, and later held discussions with US Assistant

Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth.

Downer advised Kofi Annan against postponing the ballot on the

ground that it would only encourage those who wanted to foil the

progress.65 On 18 June, Falintil and the militia agreed in principle

to disarm. But despite highly publicised shows of disarmament,

neither side did so. All the same, the Dare II conference in Jakarta,

sponsored by the Catholic Church and attended by members of

both the sides, like Xanana Gusmao and Ramos-Horta from CNRT

and Joas Tavares and Eurico Guterres from militia, achieved little

in substance.

The world opinion was getting stronger against Indonesia to

maintain security in East Timor, conducive to the referendum

process. Presider.t Habibie categorically rejected Australian calls to

invite a peace-kJeping force into East Timor in the lead-up to the

vote. In these circumstances, there was no prospect of persuading

Indonesia to agree to accept an UN-run election in East Timor

along with an international force. To push the issue with Jakarta

would have resulted in the cancellation of the 30 August vote.66

Despite Indonesian apathy to stop violence, voter registration

finally took place on 16 July. The enthusiasm and large turnouts

with which 450,000 East Timorese registered themselves for voting

was a matter of solace for the international community. Certainly,

for the militia and their mentors in the army it was a bad news

and a warning bell. Frustrated, they started their next mission - to

prevent a peaceful voting.

65

66

'The Secret Timor Dossier', The Bulletin, 12 October 1999.

Alexander Downer, 'East Timor- Looking Back on 1999', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No.I, April2000, pp. 6-7.

116

On 28 July, in a daylong Cabinet session, General Wiranto

opposed the East Timorese ballot on the grounds that it would

provoke separatist violence in Aceh and elsewhere in the country.

President Habibie and his civilian ministers rejected Wiranto's

proposal to abaridon the ballot, warning that it would come at a

huge cost to Indonesia's international credibility and prestige. 67 By

early August, fearing the possible win for independence and a dark

future for them in the province, a mass exodus of non-East

Timorese was under way. It had started early that year, despite

call for the province's 70,000 bureaucrats, mainly the non-East

Timorese, to remain at their posts.6s Small business, medical

facilities, schools and other services were severely affected without

skilled labour and most of these got closed as a result. In fact,

there had been incidents of threatening, attacks, and burning of

shops belonging to the non-East Timorese by the indigenous

!imorese in retaliation to the army's support to the militia-backed

violence.

By 6 August, the church sources in East Timor reported that

militia attacks have claimed 5,000 -6,000 lives in the past six

months having eighty thousand internally displaced.69 There were

innumerable complaints from remote areas about militia

threatening people by entering houses at night to vote against

independence. A week before the referendum, Eurico Guterres

addressed a pro-integration rally in Dili, attended by an estimated

15,000 people. ,./he Aitarak leader ended by threatening that if

East Timor voted for independence, it would become a sea of fire. 70

67

' 68

69

70

'Cabinet Split', Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 August 1999.

'Tolk Ada Droping Senjata Di Timtim', Suara Pembarnan, Jakarta, 2 February 1999, as quoted in Chris Manning & Peter Van Dierme (ed), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, ISAS, Singapore, 2000, p. 98.

John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p. XXIII.

Ibid.

117

No sooner the rally ended, paramilitaries went on a rampage in

Dili, killing three people. Journalists were forced to evacuate a

hotel after they smashed its windows and pistols.

The US Defence Secretary William Cohen wrote to General

Wiranto expressing concern about TNI links to the militia and the

latter's campaign of violence and intimidation. The US, Australia

and British ambassadors also met General Wiranto in Jakarta,

demanding that he rein in military support for militia and even

warned of repercussions if he failed to do so.71 As the voting day

was nearing, the paramilitary campaign was allegedly going to take

a new direction. It was widely suspected that their end game

solution would be to destroy most of the central and eastern parts

of the territory, remove a significant number of its population to

western areas, and demand a partition of the country, creating a

pro-integration buffer state. 72 The ground realities supported this

allegation. Already three of East Timor's western districts -

l Liquica, Ainaro and Ermera were under the military control, m

addition to the Occusse enclave in West Timor.

The 30 August 1999, a day expected to create history for the

East Timorese dawned finally. Before the first light fell on the

ground, hundreds of people could be seen streaming down from

out of their mountain hideouts, wearing their best Sunday clothing

and with ballot papers and identification cards clutched firmly in

their hands. Many people had begun walking the day before, in

order to reach the voting stations by first light, while others

arrived by trucks and motorcycles. Even before the voting stations

opened . for public voting at 6.30 am thousands of people were

71

72

'A Fair Referendum or Else, US Warns Indonesia', Australian Financial Review, 30 August 1999.

John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, p.XXIII.

118

lined up. This was their day and nothing could take it away from

them. Despite all the fears that voting might be disrupted, 98.5 per

cent of registered voters were successful in casting their votes. 73

Indeed, this was an unbelievable outcome, a matter of great

satisfaction to tr.e East Timorese independence leaders and the

international community, although frustration to the militia and

their patron, the Indonesian army. Their months of labour lost its

cause.

I Barring few stray incidents of violence, the voting went on

peacefully. The US ambassador, Roy Stapleton, had come to view

voting at the Gleno polling station, and was in a yard when

shooting broke out and rocks were thrown at the walls of a polling

station. The Timorese could hardly believe their fate to have the

ambassador of the super power actually witness this attack.74 On

the same day, Wiranto called on all parties to respect the result

regardless of who won, and urged reconciliation between the two

sides fighting in East Timor. He also said that UNAMET had done

its job well despite a few deficiencies and imperfections.75

However, East Timor governor Abilio Soares was harsh, when on

the next day he accused UNAMET of inviting unrest, inciting

hatred and anger, preaching to the Timorese and Indonesians,

acting in a partisan manner and failing to respond to complaints

by the Indonesian side.76

73

74

75

76

Helene van Klinken, 'Taking the Risk and Paying the Price: East Timorese Vote in Ermera District', in Damien Kingsbury (ed.), Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 2000, p. 61.

Ibid., p.62.

'Wiranto: Hormati Hasil Jajak Pendapat', Suara Pembaruan, 31 August 1999, as quoted in Chris Manning & Peter Van Dierme (ed), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, ISAS, Singapore, 2000, p. I 00.

When the counting was finished on 4 September, it was

announced that 344,000 or 78.5 per cent of 98.5 per cent of East

Timorese eligible voters had rejected the autonomy proposal and

voted for independence. The massive rejection of autonomy was, in

fact, more a rejection of the TNI/militia campaign of intimidation.

'We ·are happy, but afraid', said a farmer in Memo village, 'afraid

that the militias will continue the war'.77 True to the expectation of

the common East Timorese, the island saw unthinkable

devastation and rampages from after the end of the ballot.

Post Ballot Devastation

Observing the extra-ordinary turnout for the East Timorese

ballot the Indonesian army had already smelt the coming of a

humiliating defeat for the cause of the integration. It was

preparing to teach a lesson to the 'ungrateful' East Timorese. On 1

September it was reported that Major Generals Zacky Anwar

Makarim and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin were preparing to implement a

campaign to destroy East Timor's infrastructure and muder pro­

independence pditicians and supporters.78 Unfortunately, this

contingency plan prepared on 3 July 1999 by the Coordinating

Ministry of Political and Security Affairs in Jakarta was leaked and

reported in the 19 July edition of The Sydney Morning Herald.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, President Habibie's Foreign Policy Advisor

lashed out at the Australian media by alleging, 'as a country which

claims to be a friend of Indonesia, Australia should have

maintained friendship and not published the documenf.79 The

77

78

79

Richard Lloyd Parry, 'East Timor Sees Birth of Democracy', Independent, 31 August 1999.

'Sjfrie Sjamsoeddi Siapkan Rencana Darurat', apakabar @saltmine.radix.net, I September 1999, as quoted in Chris Manning & Pater Van Dierme (ed), 1999, p.IOO.

'Australia Under Fire Over Document Leakage', Jakarta Post, 21 July 1999.

120

document had reaffirmed the government's support for pro­

integration militias, but had predicted a loss for pro-integration

forces in the UN-sponsored ballot next month.

On the night of the ballot, the devastation had started in

gigantic form. The village of Ritabou near Maliana was burned to

the ground. There were innumerable roadblocks by militia to

search for the local East Timorese UNAMET employees, as they

were the first targets. James J.Fox, an international observer for

Carter Centre wrote, 'on our return to Dili, we had to pass through

six roadblocks of armed militia, beginning at Atabae and

continuing right up to the outskirts of Dili. Five of these

roadblocks were manned by Besi Merah Putih and the last one by

Aitarak .... Those who confronted us wore black balaclaves that

showed only their eyes and ranted crazily in Indonesian about

rejection of autonomy and demanding the surrender of the UN's

local East Timorese stafr.so A day after, seven local UN staff were

killed at Maliana and this pattern was repeated throughout the

territory. The UNAMET was criticised by many for leaving these

people to the militia.

In the capital Dili, militia members wearing black shirts with

Aitarak printed on them spread on to the streets and fired from

their automatic rifles whomever they encountered. As an American

cameraman witnessed, 'I saw one man hit with a rifle. He fell to

the ground where about five or six people attacked him with

machetes. His body was already lifeless by the time the last two

joined in'.81 Such kind of brutal incidents were many in Dili

80

81

James J. Fox, 'The UN Popular Consultation and Its Aftermath in East Timor: An Account by One International Observer', in Chris Manning and Peter Van Dierme (ed.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2000, p. 115.

'Call for International Aid as Violence Escalates', Guardian, 2 September 1999.

121

throughout the coming week along with burning and looting of

houses and offices. To Indonesia's irritation and utmost shame,

hundreds of influential and committed, professional and media­

responsive journalists had assembled in East Timor from all over

the globe representing major newspapers and magazines. Their

eyewitness report and observation on Timor only helped earning a

very low international image for Indonesia. The Timor incidents

became the biggest international media drama in the country's

history.

The announcement of result on 4 September made a hell out

of East Timor, which turned to be the fiefdom of the militia terror

and rampage. In a pre-planned operation, around 280,000 people

were evacuated from the province, many of them forcibly by sea

and land to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia. A five

members delegation of the UN Security Council visited Jakarta

and East Timor and on their return to New York reported, 'that the

violence could not have occurred without the involvement of large

elements of the Indonesian military and police', and nevertheless

concluded that 'the Indonesian authorities were either unwilling or

unable to provide the proper environment for the peaceful

implementation of 5 May agreement'.82 On the basis of this

assessment, the Security Council pressed Indonesia to accept the

intervention of international peace-keepers to restore peace.

On 5 September, Bishop Belo's residence in Dili was

ransacked and dozens of people were killed as militia attacked the

6,000 refugees who had sheltered there. The Bishop himself was

saved and evacuated by police helicopter to Baucau. In the

editorial titled 'East Timor Burning', the Jakarta Post wrote, 'if the

82 'Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili', www.un.org/peace/etimor/9926220E.htm, 14 September 1999.

122

spiritual leader of a region is not respected, who else is? ..... Their

aim is reportedly to turn this region or some portion of it back to

the Indonesian fold'. 83 Following the visit of Wiranto and Alatas to

East Timor on 5 September, the next day, with Wiranto's pressure

on Habibie, a state of emergency was declared in East Timor. 2000

more troops were sent to the troubled island. At this development

the New York Times commented, 'Indonesia's military is the

problem, not the solution' and suggested for 'getting Jakarta's

consent for an international peace-keeping force, even at the cost

of strong and immediate pressure from US, Australia, which have

strong ties with Indonesia's military, and Japan, a large donor of

economic aid'. The editorial goes to length of saying, 'an

international force is clearly the last resort, to be tried only if Mr.

Habibie and Indonesia's military leader, General Wiranto will not

stop the violence'. 84

The Suai n:1assacre on 8 September, however, was the most , . severe of any area. The church was packed w1th refugees, women

and children after the vote result was announced. All the three

priests and two nuns were gunned down as they tried to protect

the refugees. The gunmen then entered the church firing

indiscriminately and then, while leaving, they threw three

grenades to kill those who remained. The Suai massacre toll was

at about 100.

The capital Dili was the most devastated place materially. In

the words of a Portuguese journalist, Dili turned to be 'a ghost

city'. Everything was destroyed, not only the houses but also i

apartment buildings, the shops, everything. The only East

Timorese seen were in police trucks. 'It is horrible Dili is dead', he

83 'East Timor Burning', Jakarta Post, 7 September 1999. 84

'~ast Timor under Siege', New York Times, 9 September 1999.

123

I

wrote.ss Another reporter described as she saw, 'Dili could be

glimpsed, utterly transformed. It felt like a science-fiction film, a

journey through a town overtaken by body-snatchers. During the

15-minute journey to the airport, I saw not a single ordinary

person. The shops were boarded and shut, the houses still. In

front of them, milling singly and in groups were hundreds of

Indonesia soldiers and the black-shirted members of the Aitarak

militia'. 86 To the world viewers form television screens, the rising

smokes from the burnt houses could only be seen. 'We will burn

East Timor down and start all over again,' said a paramilitary

leader, Herminio da Silva Costa.s7 That was exactly what Dili and

the island had turned to become.

Worse was the situation m West Timor, with swelling

number of refugees, deported forcefully by trucks, boats and even

by air. An Australian election observer discovered many cases of

East Timorese refugees who had been departed to West Timor by

boat were murdered by Indonesian soldiers and their bodies

dumped into the sea.ss Those who reached West Timor received no

better treatment. Militia was present there too. They had to face a

series of 'processing' phases conducted by the militia. The first

stage was 'political identification' in which their names were

checked against a list of 20,000 known pro-Jakarta supporters. If

they were on it, or could authenticate their support for Indonesia,

they were put to one side. The remainders were taken away to

camps specifically for pro-independence supporters.s9 Anything

85

86

87

88

89

Christopher Zinn, 'Life Means Absolutely Nothing to These People', Guardian, II September 1999.

Maggie O'kane, 'll Night of Peace from Those Saved from UN Betrayal,' Guardian, 15 September 1999.

John Aglionby, 'UN Ultimatum on Timor,' Guardian, 8 September 1999.

John G. Tailor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, New York, 1999, P.XX VIII.

John Aglionby, 'Herded, Sifted and Cut off,' Guardian, 10 September 1999.

124

could happen to -them. By 30 September, the number of refugees

registered in West Timor had been 230,000 in more than 28

camps.

International Reaction and Intervention

There had been growing demand for international

intervention, for Indonesia was unable, rather unwilling, to control

the army-backed militia. On 7 September, UN Secretary General

Kofi Annan warned Indonesian government that it had 24 hours to

restore security and order in East Timor. Despite pressures,

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reacted to the world by suggesting not

to issue ultimatums.90 The next day, the Indonesian National

Human Rights Commission pressed Habibie government to roll

back the declaration of martial law in East Timor and suggested to

allow the UN peace-keepers.

But then, President Habibie's announcement that Indonesia

agreed to the entry of peace-keeping force came as something

surprising. There could be some reasons behind such a step.

Firstly, as Indonesia was passing through a serious economic

crisis, the perceived threats for sanctions played a great role. On 9

September, the United States announced the suspension of

military ties with Jakarta and pledged reviewing arms sales. On

the same day, the World Bank President, James Wolfensohn,

asked Indonesian government to restore order and honour the

outcome of referendum.91 He then decided to hold back the$ 600

million loan negotiated earlier in the year. Even the International

Monetary Fund suspended the next loan disbursement amounting

90

91

John Gittings, 'Humiliation as Jakarta Talks Tough,' Guardian, II September 1999. Ian Black, 'West Threatens a Tougher Stance,' Guardian, II September 1999.

11"\,.,..

$ 450 million. The British Foreign office stated that it was 'alarmed

and dismayed' at the reports of Indonesian Air Force flying British

made Hawk jets over East Timor in violation to the previous

undertakings. Also, on 10 September, President Bill Clinton

strongly criticised Indonesia's inability to stop violence in East

Timor, which he warned, might damage its ability to attract

investment.

Secondly, coinciding with the East Timor crisis, the regional

leaders had assembled on 13-14 September in New Zealand for the

APEC conference, where they could not evade the issue of such a

great importance. Despite Indonesia's absence, the leaders decided

to take tough actions with regard to Indonesia's East Timor

handling. Thirdly, the Howard government lobbied unceasingly to

press for a 'coalition of the willing' prepared to furnish the

necessary troops, logistics and political support and to marshal

President Clinton's support for rapid intervention. Australia also

volunteered to provide the lion's share to the intervention force as

well as to meet the support facilities - all these at the cost of the

traditional Australian policy of engagement with the regional elite.

The Korean President Kim Dae-Jung's prompt offer of a

substantial force was an encouraging step in this regard.

The first batch of International Force for East Timor

(Interfet) landed in East Timor on 20 September commanded by

Major General Peter Cosgrove from Australia, which provided more

than half of the 7,500 troops. The appointment of Major General

Songkitti Jagabatra of Thailand as the deputy commander was to

assuage the regioaal sentiment. Apart from peace-keeping, Interfet

helped assisting an international relief effort in the devastated

territory with the repatriation of refugees and deportees returning

from Indonesia. Interfet also assumed the role of investigating the

126

crimes committed by militia. On 23 September, the bodies of 30

tortured East Timorese were reported to have been found in a well

behind the home of pro-independence leader, Manuel Carrascalao.

In the subsequent weeks, such kinds of burial sites were spotted

in various other places in East Timor.

In the meanwhile, the UN dispatched Mary Robinson, High

Commissioner for Human Right to Darwin and Jakarta. In her 17

September report, she claimed there had been 'overwhelming

evidence that East Timor has seen a deliberate, vicious and

systematic campaign of gross violation of human rights and urged

the setting up of an international commission of inquiry. At a

specially convened meeting on 27 September, the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) voted by a

narrow margin to appoint a commission of inquiry. Immediately,

prior to this step, Indonesia announced its own Commission of

Inquiry into Human Rights Violation in East Timor (KPP-HAM).

Importantly, both bodies had found strong evidences of human

rights abuses and the involvement of the Indonesia military, the

TNI, in it.

:, Despite the presence of the peace-keepers, the pro-Jakarta

militia Eurico Guterres warned his men would not be pushed out

of East Timor and said East Timor must be split in two to

accommodate the 21.5 per cent to be part of Indonesia as per the

ballot result. 92 For some weeks, there were innumerable instances

of border tensions and firing near the East and West Timor

boundary region. However, the day 27 September 1999 became

one very emotional occasion for the Indonesia army. The TNI

92 'Pro-Jakarta Rebel Leader Defiant,' Hindus tan Times, New Delhi, 19 September 1999.

127

formally ceded responsibility for security in East Timor to the UN

multinational force.

Meanwhile, the Habibie government was replaced by the

new government under President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice

President Megawati Sukarnoputri. It is widely believed that

Habibie's handling of the Timor issue was probably the main

cause of his political demise. But back in East Timor, the people

felt grateful to Habibie as a courageous architect of their

independence. :\ccording to Ramos-Horta, ' President Habibie

reminds me of Charles de Gaulle, the former French President,

because De Gaulle was a great French patriot who told France to

get out of the Algerian war. The dignity and honour of France was

not to continue the colonial war in Algeria. There is a similarity to

De Gaulle in Habibie's courage to want to get out of Indonesia's

Algerian war. '93 On 25 October 1999 the Indonesia People's

Consultative Assembly (MRR) ratified the East Timor's ballot

result. Finally, the pebble in Indonesia's shoe was out.

93 'Ramos-Horta Speaks on East Timor Independence Ballot,' Jakarta Post, 28 May 1999.

128