Chapter IV: THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION SEC. 18.Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three (3) days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latters residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. the judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three (3) calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made during saturdays, sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.SEC. 19.Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three (3) days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five (5) days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three (3) days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.SEC. 26.Restriction on Travel. In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.He or she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.

REQUISITES OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANTFrank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et alSearch and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search WarrantIn Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.NOTESRule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

a. The place to be searched in the warrant is controllingPeople vs Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 400)FACTS: A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant. >An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.HELD: The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers'own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searchedalthough not that specified in the search warrantis exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it was not just a case of obvious typographical error, but a clear case of a search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURTSUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING.

b. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informers tip1. People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y MenguinSearch and Seizure Informers TipIn the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.ISSUE:Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.NOTES:When is a warrantless search allowed?1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

2. The People of the Philippines vs Ruben Montilla y GatdulaPolitical Law Search and Seizure Informers Tip Warrantless ArrestOn 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant.ISSUE:Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.HELD:The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:(1) customs searches;(2) searches of moving vehicles,(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;(4) consented searches;(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender(1) dangerous weapons, and(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.3. People V RachoOn appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2(RTC) Joint Decision3dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.The case stemmed from the following facts:On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant.4The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.6Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.CONTRARY TO LAW."7"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.CONTRARY TO LAW."8During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.9On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11Hence, the present appeal.In his brief,12appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.The appeal is meritorious.We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.13Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.14After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.15As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"3. Search of a moving vehicle;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.19The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.20Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.21Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.22The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.23The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.24We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25People v. Tudtud,26and People v. Nuevas.27In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.29In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.30In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.Maspil, Jr.,31People v. Bagista,32People v. Balingan,33People v. Lising,34People v. Montilla,35People v. Valdez,36and People v. Gonzales.37In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.38Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.39Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.40One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.42WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.No costs.

C. General or roving warrants1. Harry Stonehill et al vs DOJ Secretary Jose Diokno et alSearch and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado DoctrineStonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.ISSUE:Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

2. Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et alSearch and Seizure Personal Examination of the JudgeOn 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.ISSUE:Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled inStonehillSuch is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search WarrantUnregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

3. DOJ Sec Vicente Abad Santos vs CFI Benguet Judge Pio MarcosSearch and SeizureOn March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio; he was attracted by the sight of several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside the house and when the curtain was moved he saw a Buddha that was inside the house; he observed what was going on inside the house and he heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he overheard that it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and some bullets inside the house. By these facts, Colonel Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about 12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the warrant. And eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were seized from Roxass house. Santos assailed the warrant averring that the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.ISSUE:Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.HELD:The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into consideration to nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did, so that here, since certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal defects.

4. Castro v PabalanThis Court is confronted anew in thiscertiorariproceeding with the claim that a search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the Constitution1and the Rules of Court2should have been nullified, but was not in the challenged order of respondent Judge Javier Pabalan.3More specifically, it was the failure of the application for the search warrant as well as the search warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the assertion of illegality. When required to answer, respondent Judge did not bother to refute specifically the allegations of the petition for certiorari, but merely contented himself with inviting attention to the challenged order as well as the resolutions denying the motion for reconsideration and with the statement that he "has no particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an assertion thereafter repeated in the second paragraph of his two-paragraph answer that he "has no request to make in this particular case leaving the issues entirely to the discretion of the Supreme Court."4The tone of diffidence, almost of apology, is easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought that respondent Judge failed to pay heed to authoritative decisions of this Court. The most cursory perusal of the application for search warrant5by respondent Lumang and the search warrant itself,6yields no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored what the Constitution requires on two points, the existence of a probable cause and the particular description of the things to be seized. The limitation as to the specific offense as mandated by the Rules of Court was not observed either. Even on the assumption then that he could notrelevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." Section 4 provides: "The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." be held chargeable with knowledge of the leading Stonehill decision,7announced barely twenty days before the search warrant in question was issued, still from Alverez v. Court of First Instance8the first to be decided under the 1935 Constitution, promulgated in 1937, toOca v. Marquez,9that came out in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the view that for a search warrant to escape the imputation of being unreasonable, there should be strict conformity with the requirements of the Constitution and the applicable procedural rules. The finding then should have been against the validity of the search warrant. Nonetheless, insofar as such order limited itself to requiring the return solely of the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin, all of which may be considered as personal effects of petitioners, with the rest of the goods taken falling under the category of things forbidden by law and therefore need not be restored,10it can be sustained. So we rule.In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant, respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the belief that petitioners Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not even indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other contraband."11There is a claim that he had verified the report and that therefore he had "reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other contraband.12The application was accompanied by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary.13Again, mention was merely made of their information about narcotics and other contraband being kept by petitioners. They did allege therein that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after verification, he was not registered in the Immigration Office.14Then, on the very same day, July 10, 1967, the search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband.15Again, there was reference to the possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the complete and detailed description of the properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of petitioners.16In the resolution upholding the validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did state the following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in chamber before the Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union. The three submitted to the Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a joint affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang said, testifying regarding this incident, those appearing were asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some questions by the Presiding Judge regarding their request of the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The inquiry was brief. The barrio to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant which is Exhibit C."17As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the Constitution and the procedural law in terms of the existence of a probable cause, a particular description of the property to be seized and the requirement that there be only one specific offense, is quite manifest.1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno18is highly relevant: "Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue butupon probablecause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shallparticularlydescribe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a 'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.' In other words, nospecificoffense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed wereabstract. As a consequence, it wasimpossiblefor the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performedparticularacts, or committedspecificomissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a 'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,' as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes."19That same approach is reflected in the two subsequent cases ofBache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz20andAsian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera.21It bears repeating, as was emphasized in Stonehill v. Diokno, that the averments as to the alleged commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner wereabstract. As admitted in the challenged order, the inquiry was brief. Subsequently, reference was made to "the routine taking of [their oath] and examination questions and answers ..."22Nor can such perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind [him]."23Moreover, contrary to the Rules of Court, he did not even bother to take the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record.24There was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause, as so clearly enunciated in Stonehill.2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."25As was admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. Nonetheless, and again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the Constitution is quite explicit that there be a particular description of the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional provision, the elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with.26To quote from the landmark American decision ofBoyd v. United States:27"It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should beobsta principis."283. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."29Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes. Necessarily then, more than one offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged order, reference was made to at least three charges having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium. It would seem that once again what was correctly pointed out byChief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Dioknoas unjustified and unwarranted finds application. Nor can there be any plausibility to the possible excuse, to repeat what was said before, that the Stonehill opinion having been rendered only twenty days previous to the issuance of the search warrant, respondent Judge could not be held chargeable with a knowledge thereof, considering that as far back as July 30, 1965, two years earlier, inOca v. Marquez,30this Court, through the then Justice J. P. Bengzon, enunciated: "The decision herein has applied the provisions of th Old Rules of Court since this case arose under said Rules. Attention of the Bench and Bar is however called to the fact that effective January 1, 1964 the issuance of search warrants is governed by Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which among other things requires that a search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense."314. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by law. This is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction. As far back asUy Kheytin v. Villareal,32a 1920 decision, it was held: "That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium. and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge."33Among the authorities cited is Cooley: "'Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or Prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety.'"34So, also, inYee Sue Koy v. Almeda,35handed down in 1940, Justice Laurel, speaking for this Court, stated: "If it be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as alleged by the respondents the articles in question constitute thecorpus delictiof the Usury Law, their return to the petitioners cannot be ordered."36Magoncia v. Palacios,37promulgated in 1948, reiterated such a doctrine. Thus: "En el asunto de Uy KheytincontraVillareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935), los recurrentes pidieron la devolucion del opio de que se incautaron los constabularies al registrar su casa armados con un mandamiento de registro expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden General No. 58; sostenian que los requisites exigidos por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como si no existiera; que al registro se ha hecho sin mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego la peticion, declarando que la irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de registro ne era suficiente causa para ordenar la devolucion del opio. El Hon. Juez recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la devolucion al acusado delpaltik, 42 municiones y una granada de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana discrecion al denegar la peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar tales efectos como prueba en la vista."385. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any possible use that may be made by the prosecuting authorities of the articles seized under an invalid search warrant. Here, again, the Yee Sue Koy opinion of Justice Laurel is illuminating, especially in view of the inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized under the present Constitution39At this stage, the question does not have to be faced. The words of Justice Laurel follow: "While we reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant ' for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself ..., the said rule has no applicable force in the present case. ... In the application for the issuance of the search warrant in question, it was alleged that the articles seized were 'being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is now suggested (memoranda of respondents) that the only object of the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is to prevent the petitioners from employing them as a means of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state of the record, without deciding the question whether the petitioners will in fact use the articles in question, if returned, for illegal purposes, we are not prepared to order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394-395.)"40WHEREFORE, the writ ofcertiorariis granted and the order of September 12, 1967 denying the motion of petitioners to annul the search warrant as well as the resolutions of October 26, 1967 and January 29, 1968 denying the motions for reconsiderations are reversed, the decision of this Court being that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative both of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise the decision of this Court that notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search warrant. No costs.Barred, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

5. Asian Surety vs HerreraPetition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following language:It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oathNBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.and his witnessManuel Cuaresmathat there are good and sufficient reasons to believe thatMr. William Li Yaoor his employees has/have in his/their control in premisesNo. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenuedistrict of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned.You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and other papersconnected therewith... for the years1961 to 1964to be dealt with as the law directs.Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnessed he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons, or things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court)Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the peace is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) ."Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.1While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."I.In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense either in the American books on Criminal procedure or in American decisions."2It was applied in the celebrated case ofHarry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice3where this Court said:To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.II.Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides:SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:(a) Property subject of the offense;(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility because the description of the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to see how the above-described property can simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its business,4petitioner in several motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public.5And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case ofUy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896, cited with approval in the Bache case,supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.III.Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.IV.The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126.6Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities7are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.In their Memorandum8respondents, relying on the case ofMoncado v. Peoples Court(80 Phil. 1), argued:Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality thereof would not render the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence.This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case,supra). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States declared:9If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.V.It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point:From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:(1) xxx xxx xxx(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definiteand must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is made or the search warrant issued, but,generally speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is thus expressed:The nearer the time at which the observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.

6. Collecter vs Villaluz7. Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553Post under case digests, Taxation at Monday, January 30, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic MindFacts: The search warrant issued by petitioner Viduya who was the former Collector of Customs is quashed by the lower court upon motion by private respondent Berdiago. The warrant of seizure and detention was issued on the basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release from the Bureau of Customs of a Rolls Royce, it being made to appear that such car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966, thus enabling respondent to pay lower custom duties. There was a demand for the correct amount due and Respondent expressed his willingness to pay. Unfortunately, he was not able to live up to his promise so a search warrant was issued, pursuant to Section 2099 of the Tariff and Customs Code which requires a search warrant if such goods are located in a dwelling house because the car was located in the Yabut Compound. Moreover, it was not shown that Berdiago did not own the dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent judge quashed the warrant.

Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in quashing the search warrant? Yes

Held: Petition is granted. As the car was kept in a dwelling house in Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law namely to assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have been performed.

8. Dizon v CastroThe facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 forrebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion.15. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in