113

Chapter III

MILITARY RECRUITMENTS, DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS

Comprehensive social system defines Military organization as a whole that reflects the

social, political and cultural values of each particular society of the country. Since the

Iili~itary organization is formed as national units, it represents the consequences of

historical and traditional values1, and also social and national character of the country.

Certain characteristics of military organization explain both its capacity of strength in

terms of numerical strength and skill, and its cohesive ability to influence or intervene in

politics as well as s~stainability after such intervention. Such characteristics depend upon I

the organizational format of military. Its orientation or education, history or background,

ideology, and its social origin and cohesion are vital for studying and understanding the

political behaviour of the military institution of a country that reflect the level of

professionalism2•

In addition, the professionalization is also dependent on the military policy of the

statesmen and their capacity. to execute the policy objectively while the military

institution is in the process of selection, recruitment or commission, promotion,

organization, advanced and established education (general and special), etc. It is further

influenced by the adtpinistrative capacity of the military leader of the organization, how

he initiates efficient staff system, and develops a sense of corporate unity and

responsibility with the recognition of the limit of professional competence. It seems

superior and dominating in nature organizationally because of "its three political

advantages over the civilian organization". Firstly, marked "superiority in organization"

with "unity and hierarchy'' that provides the institutional ethic and professional

discipline, through unity and peremptory obedience to the orders of its superior,

permanency, prestigio¥s perception and its highly peculiar structural feature. The second

is a highl~ emotionalized symbolic status among the state institutions accepting it as a

1 Morris Janowitz, "Military Organization", in Roger W. Little (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, California: Sage Publications 1971, p.13.

2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, · Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957; Morris Janowitz, "Military Organization", in . Roger W. Little ( ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, California: Sage Publications 1971.

114

national pride or defender. Lastly, it makes others feel inferior because of its "monopoly

ofarms with specialization ofviolence"3•

The government sets the goal and allocates the resources to be used in attaining the goal.

Against the theoretical background, the chapter examines whether the Nepal Army (NA)

is responsible to the elected government or not, being an apolitical professional

organization. The chapter further examines whether the military can represent the social

character of the Nepali state or not. It evaluates to what extent the recruitment,

promotion, retirement and punishment systems are transparent. The chapter further deals

with the development process of institutional structure of military, the trends of

recruitment, education and orientation. It also covers its mobilization for the warfare,

involvement in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) and the

developmental activities in the country until 2007.

Standing Army as Institution in Nepal

Historical,ly, the kings ofBaisi and Chaubise Rajya4 (Principalities) used to make a policy

to organize and deploy the army for the three purposes: (1) territorial security of the

principality from the external threat posed by other principalities, i.e., defensive action,

(2) peace maintenance within the principality, i.e., internal security, and (3) expansion of

th¥ territory of the principality, i.e., offensive action. For fulfilling such purpose through

enforcement of state mechanism, there were two kinds of annies: permanent and

tTmporary5• Among the permanent, only three kinds of armies could be found within the

territory of Nepal: army on foot, horse riding army, and elephant riding army. Both

permanent and temporary armies called Umraos at local level were under the

quathnayaks6, generally from the Rajput family, who were directly under the king. There

3 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, p.72.

4 Ancient and medieval Nepal was fragmented into 22 and 24 (Baise and Chaubise in Nepali language, respectively) small states called Rajya.

5 Because of the small size of the permanent army, the subject of the state could be used to collect the temporary army especially during the war through Jhara and Bisti, if it was required for defensive and offensive action of the state. And permanent army was not so organized. It was mainly deployed for security purpose in the strategically important places in terms of economy, culture, political and social fervour for security purpose, except warfare.

6At the local level, one of the major posts of the army was that of quathnayak who used to be recruited

fi:om either the nearest person of the king of the principality or from the feudal family that had influence and control over the society. The king was the head as its Commander-in-Chief of the army.

115

was no caste discrimination except in leadership, so somehow the military strength

re11resented the social'structure of the army at the local level. Thus, naturally the anny I

had been dominated by some castes in accordance with the social structure within the

principalities. In the eastern principalities, 'Kirat force' was in existence within the

'Limbuwan' area, i.e., between Arun River and Sikkim border. But Chhetris, Mallas,

Shahis and Magars mainly dominated the military organization in the principalities of the

western part of Nepal. Before the modem age, the chief of army personnel was in the

third position of state next to the king and prince. In the middle age, the kings were more

ingaged in the art and cultural development within the country than to strengthen and

organize military7• King P.N. Shah of Gorkha inherited the Gorkhali forces from his

father, King Narabhupal Shah. The soldiers tenned "Bisti" or Jhara comprising people in '

the age limit of 12-80 years, were being used as temporary soldiers at the time of war.

Under the Jhara system, soldiers could neither get honorarium for their duty of security

nor during the battle, except a little quantity of food as tiffin8•

The number of Jhara soldiers used to increase in the ratio of enlargement of military

op~ration. Each household was required compulsorily to send a person to the army

carrying his own weapons9• They could function as farmers as well as soldiers, and were

also given training in the use of weapons periodically. After having failed twice in the

Nuwakot attack, first the king felt the necessity of more trained regular soldiers to engage

them purely in military duty for making the military conquest possible, and then

developed regular soldiers including the commanders who were generally recruited on a

permanent basis for performing civil functions generally during the peace time. He

started the tradition of regular field commanders and soldiers, and promoted the

traditional Jhara soldier system using them for fighting in battles, transpo1iing weapons

and food, involving them in construction repairing of the roads and forts ( Gadhis), and

performing garrison duty at fq~s, etc. Secondly, he realized the lack of modem weapons

in his army and made an in-depth study of arts of warfare, the system and organization of

the Indian armies in different states, and then understood the usefulness and efficiency of

7 Tulsi Ram et al. Vaidya, Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda 1993.

8 Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995. 9 Ibid, p.9.

116

the standing army10•

P.N. Shah later raised an army in Gorkha, after observing the British army in India,

popularly known as "Tilang" in Nepal 11 giving training based on the European pattern

and adopting the organizational pattern of Bengali army12. He hired Indian experts to

train armed forces in handling guns, formed five companies in a year dividing his armies

into three groups-first: bearing traditional weapons such as khukuri, khuda, spear,

javelin, second: with archers;, and the third with guns. The first two groups were used to

mount attacks in the beginning, and the third one to launch sudden attacks for softly

annihilating and chasing enemies. In the same way, he fonned military unit tenned as

company, and the soldiers constituted in the companies were conceptualized as gun­

bearing regular soldiers with the concept of chain of command of the institution under the

king who was at the top. The Mukhtiyar who looked after civil affairs as well as

performed as Commander-in-Chief, as in recent understanding, and Bhardars,

Chautariyas, Kazi (having sufficient civil authority), Captain, Sardars, etc., used to lead

the army in the field. No concept of military headquarters was prevalent till the reign of

B$adur Shah and one company had 101 gun-bearing soldiers under the command of

Subedar13• Later the military term, Captain, was introduced by Bahadur Shah, second son

ofP.N. Shah, after the death of his elder brother, Pratap Singh Shah.

Bhimsen Thapa, the1first powerful civil-leader, took several steps to advance the military

administration and organization. Lal-Dhadda (military record) was initiated under his

instruction in 1809 to maintain the military record systematically. Making a classified

military organization with designations, he added the post of General and Colonel by

delineating their responsibilities to look after and command the soldiers of Kampu and

Companies stationed in Kathmandu Valley and outside Kathmandu, respectively. He

10 See in detail, Krishna Kant Adhikari, Nepal Under Jang Bahadur: 1846-1877, Vol.l, Kathmandu: Buku, 1984; Ludwig F. Stiller, The Rise of the House of Gorkha: A Study in the Unification of Nepal: 1768-1816, Ranchi: Patna Jesuit Society 1973, reprinted in 1975; Bikrama Jit Hasrat, History of Nepal: As Told by Its own and Contemporary Chroniclers, Punjab: Bikrama Jit Hasrat,1970.

11 According to Dibyopadesh, he got the idea of raising a standing army after he observed the British army in India and he was impressed by the Tilang, most popular army in Southern India, which had received training on the European pattern and structured on the basis of Bengal army. The same structure was adopted in Nepal army for forming fue standing army, thus prompting the people to call it as "Tilang" in Nepal also.

12 Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995, p.29.

13 Ibid, p.l3.

117

.. int~oduced Kampu, Platan and Company, and clearly differentiated them - the military

companies located in the Kathmandu Valley, which were under the command, of General,

were called Kampu, and outside the valley were called Platans. He created military posts

like Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) and General, and Kampus as a whole was kept under

the command of Commander-in-Chief, and Platoons under the command of General, with

differentiation in their roles in the hierarchical military institution. The General had an

authority of mobilizing the military officers, dismissing them, or giving physical

punishffient to those military men who did not obey his order. He

consciously/unconsciously · confined the role of the Commander-in-Chief in the

administrative chief of the army staff rather than that of the Chief of the Field Marshal of

the military institution, as General Bhimsen Thapa was not only Commander-in-Chief of

the military institution but as Mukhtiyar of the civil government having full authority of

both powers. Similarly, he established the tradition of fragmentation and distribution of

companies that fixed 200 and 100 gun-bearing trained personnel under the command of

Chautariya and Kazi, respectively14• The tradition established by General Thapa provided

spa~e to every civil-military functionary by involving them in the power game of the state

directly, in which each could try to exercise their power to influence military for '·

upgrading their position. The military distribution in accordance with the position in the

power system sharply boosted the ambition of the Chautariyas and Bhardars, who started

exercising military might under them to gain the ultimate power. This initiated not only

in polarizing and fragmenting the military, but also in getting involved in power politics.

In addition, Bhimsen Thapa institutionalized the military establishment in the country by

creating different administrative departments systematically with various roles, functions . I

and responsibilities. He established a headquarter of the company called Sardar Kampani . I

Dafdar Khana in 1809 having the responsibility of maintaining the record of companies

as well as the Jagir lands owned by the companies, according to the Vamsavali.

Similarly, he established Kampu Dafdar Khana (Kampu office) to keep the service record

of military personnel and to depute Jamadars, who had knowledge of operating common

and other weapons, in strategically important areas as approved by the Kampu Dafdar

Khana. It had the authority to conduct inspections of strategic areas and deploy

14 Ibid, p.32.

119

excluding brigade. The role of Commander-in-Chief was confined mainly for

administrative work and Jangi Lath was the de-facto head of the military institution

during the Rana political system where military had been given the responsibility of the

civil police to handle the day-to-day cases or to engage in simple public affairs at the

l?callevel. Bhim Shamser reclassified the military force after the First World War into

three Divisions: Infantry, Artillery, and Calvary18.

After establishing democracy in 1950, there was no change in military organization for

two years. Only in 1953, Nepal Army began its new history. The King regained his

position and established his control over the army. Institutionally, the militia system was

removed, 9 battalions and 23 companies were formed decreasing from the two brigades,

30 ·battalions and 39 companies existing till 1953 19. Modem communication systems

within and among the military units, and units to headquarter, were introduced: and a

military school was established to train military personnel. Military barracks were built.

Several posts, which were created by Rana rulers at different times, for their service were

ren:10ved; military A in was formed. The tradition of providing military training to officer

corJ>s from foreign expertise, especially from India, was established. After introducing

the· Panchayat system by King Mahendra, the name of Nepal Army was changed to Royal

Nepal Army, and the military headquarter became Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda. Self­

contained war-craft system was developed creating a section within the military for

introducing the role of airforce in Nepal Anny. Establishment of military training at night

was introduced for the help of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Helicopters were

provided to the military to enable it to expedite action for mobilizing a self-contained

system, thereby making effective military action possible. During the royal regime,

military engagement in construction was started for providing additional financial support

to soldiers engaging them in road and bridge construction. The military unifonn, which

was modernized later is still in use today. Birendra Military School was opened. A ten­

year military plan was introduced. Adda Nos. 2 and 3 were formed. Sipahi, the annual

journal ofNA, was introduced to make the public aware of the military activities, and to

18 Tulsi Ram et al. Vaidya, Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda 1993; also Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996.

19 Ibid, pp.545"547.

120

motivate and orient lower level military about the military policy at the national and

international level. Finally, the present organizational structure, hierarchy, education and

training, and infrastructure ofN epal Army were developed after 195020.

AU the developmental evidences show that the ambitious rulers have not only

modernized military by providing sophisticated instruments, but also supported the

military personnel by providing several kinds of facilities for their professional and

family enhancement. Similarly, military also provided help to fulfil their rulers' ambitions

to be powerful and to rule the country with the backing of military. The history before

and after the Rana oligarchy exposed that the military of Nepal has been showing its

loyalty to those who provided more facility to the institution and personnel. Hence, it

seems that the relationship of rulers and military was determined by the mutual

understanding and benefits for both. The exchange of support of military to the strongest

ruier and his quid pro quo to the military established both personal and professional

rapport between the rulers and the army in the country. It thus helped create the ruler­

military tandem making military as an independent variable. Those who enjoyed the

confidence of the military could become the de facto strongmen, as had happened to the

kings not only after the 1950 change, but also after 1990 when democracy had been

restored by the Mass Movement.

Social Composition of Nepal Army

Before the unification of modern Nepal by P.N. Shah, no principalities of Baisi and

Chaubisi had standing armies except Umraos, royal favourites from different localities

for mobilizing militia, Dhakte and Jhara recruited in emergency closing unauthorized

tracks, maintaining check posts, and detaining criminals. However, during the unification

process, focusing on physical and mental fitness and skills of the axmy as weH as guerrilla

warfare policy and tactic, Shah used Pandey as a shield, Basnets (Chhetris) as weapons21,

and Brahmins as strategists, ana made a policy to include other castes in army "without

20 Ibid; and also, Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995; and Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996.

21 Morris Janowitz, "Military Organization", in Roger W. Little (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, California: Sage Publications, 1971, p.13.

118

companies to report about these to the concerned authority15.

The categorization of military force as Kampu, Platan and Company by Bhimsen Thapa

was continued by Jang Bahadur Rana who started the system of militia by mobilizing

temporary soldiers with physica~. fitness under the command of Umrao for the third time

during Nepal-Tibet war16• Ranodip Singh divided the militia into two categories -

permanent and temporary, keeping these under the control of militia Goswara, where the

command-in-charge, commanding General, was under the supervision of Jangi Pared.

The militia system was abandoned in Nepal in the 1950s17•

Similarly, in 1858, Jang Bahadur divided the Dafdar Khana into many units and carried

out the provision of the Jang(Ain (Military law) 1854, defining the Kampu Dafdar Khana I

as an office for dealing with the salary and dues payable/due recoverable. He also I '

established the Jangi Adda (Military Headquarter) at the central level making separate

arrangements through this office for conducting surveys, as well as conduction of

courses to operate guns and machine-guns and looking after the Khangi (entitlement),

pay, medical treatment and other functional benefits of the anny personnel. This also

functioned as a Jan.gi Adalat (Marshal Court) to take up and deliberate on the different

types 0f cases of military personnel, trails for culprits, take disciplinary action, make

judgements and give verdicts for punishment. It used to arrange for translation of books

pertaining to military administration and law into Nepali language and preserve them.

Later, Chandra Shamser separated the office introducing Jangi Lath as the head office,

·which began to function for conducting inspection of barracks, issuance of ordinances,

publication of magazines, Kampu Kot, factories, weapons and stores. Similarly, military

posts such as Jangilath, Hajuriya, General, Commanding General, Major General,

Commanding Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major Captain, Lieutenant, etc., were tenned

an~ created. After the fall of Bhimsen Thapa, King Rajendra Bikram Shah restarted the

posts of Chautariya,' Kaji and Sardar instead of Generals and Colonels. The military was

restructured in 1883 into three divisions and each division had eight platoons. Again it

was reformed in 1890 dividing the military into seven brigades, including artillery and

15 Ibid, p.32. 16 .• . Ibid, pp.33-34. 17 Ibid, 34.

121

discrimination" on the basis of skill, experience, and ability2• Military conquests and

annexations of P.N. Shah and his immediate successors were not so remarkable in

themselves as for the manner in which they led to a feeling of unity and patriotism among

the people as a whole. The discriminatory policy in the recruitment of people in military I

had been started after conceiving the concept of permanent army, while P .N. Shah got

suggestions from his maternal uncle, Udyog Sen, King of Palpa, as follows23 •

. . . riding on the Brahmin was meant riding on the bull and the act was sinful, riding on the Thakuri was meant riding on the lion and there was a chance of being betrayed, riding on the Magar meant riding on the ordinary horse and that would move slow, but riding on the Khasa (Kshetriya) was meant riding on the Turki horse, so the work would be completed soon if one would ride Khasa.

The common people, belonging to different castes and creeds, used to participate in the

army as Jhara or militia; though not all were allowed in the actual fighting service, their

divided tasks were in. accordance with the traditional professional castes. Even during the '·

conquest in the east and west, Shah did not accept the soldiers of tribes of the controlled

area except Khas, Magar, Gurung, etc. He never thought of recruiting Newars in his

·defense army but made it a policy to provide opportunities to them in other areas,

especially administration, assuming that the Newar rulers (especially in Kathmandu

Valley) were his most powerful threats who could be supported wholeheartedly by the

Newar people all over the country, as he did not want to give them any chance to betray

by turning his army against him and his rule. Pursuing the same policy of appointment of

soldiers in the army, the Sunwars, the Rais and the Limbus were allowed to bear arms as

.Jhara soldiers during the Nepal-China war, but were not recruited in the regular army

. that was trained for defense field. Only the Ranas recruited these people in the militia and

·regular army, but other tribals including Newars appointed in the army were given

: alternate responsibilities such as mechanics, tailors, official workers, accountants, store-

keepers, etc., but not in defense. To a great extent, P.N. Shah had tried to prioritize the

~romotion of the physically and mentally fit or qualified persons among the recruits to

. the post of soldiers. The criterion was based on their performance and the warfare

· 22 Ibid; p.l3. 23

, Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995, p.47; Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996; Tu\si Ram et al. Vaidya, Nepalko Sainikltihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda 1993.

122

skills/experience they possessed~4 • He recognized one's contribution by continuing his

job, promoting him in his profession, and punishing those who were not sincere and loyal

to their assignedjob. He dismissed such unwanted persons throughpajani.

T~e subject population of the Gorkha Empire was divided into two categories, eligible

and ineligible on the narrow social and territorial base. Four communities - Khas,

Thakuri, Magar and Gurung, were accepted as eligible, while other several etlmic groups

and other communitie& collectively called as praja (subject) - Rai, Limbu, Kushel, Darai

KU:mhale,• Danuwar, Chepang, etc., were ineligible. Newars of Kathmandu Valley, as

well as people from Tarai and Himalayan regions, were ineligible for military recruitment

because of absence of warrior tradition among these communities25• Similarly, P.N. Shah

did not include Brahmins in his army generally in practice, except to use their intellect as

consultants and strategists in warfare policy-making, statecraft and guerrilla warfare. This

kind of mindset of the Shah ruler in categorizing the people for civil administration and

J11lilitary purpose on the basis of so-called Hindu orthodox division of labour was

.responsible for determining the present composition of military organization and power

structure of the state.

The success of unification of P.N. Shah could be attributed to his military ability,

selection of commanders and tactical policy. The senior officers of the anny were drawn

from the king's own "Rajput" relatives and from a number of Khas families, most of

whom had been associated with the Shah dynasty for several generations. However,

because of some sort of simplicity to respect the quality of military personnel and to treat

them all equally, P.N. Shah was able not only to organize, establish and develop the

military, but was also able to control and command it comfortably, at a time when there

were no modem means of communication, and commanders under him were dispersed in

different parts of the country for defensive and offensive purpose. The situation

continued till Bahadur Shahs' regency. Even quathnayak of rival principalities, who could

24 Shaha's evaluation basis onpajani were: A company of 100 barrels should be formed; the Subedar (head of the company) should be appointed from those who had already encountered four or five battles; the Subedar should appoint his seven subordinates from those who had also faced two to four battles; the seven deputies should appoint Huddas from those who would be ready even to sacrifice their lives with them, and the Hudda should appoint Sepoys after examining them, Ibid, p. 49.

25 Nava Raj Pant, Sri 5 Prithvinarayanshahako Upadhesha (Teachings of King Prithvi Narayan Shah) in RNAHQ nd., p.327; D.R. Regmi, Modern Nepal: Rise and Growth in the Eighteenth Century, Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadahyay, 1961.

123

really be key figures to know about the weakness of the respective principalities and

~elpful in making a military strategy to attack them, used to recruited in Gorkha military

during his period. Until the end of the 18th century, a large proportion of Nepal's military

force at local level was made up of irregulars raised and maintained by officers known as

Umraos. They were generally Rajputs26• The system of delegation of authority to local

·military units was discontinued by Rana Bahadur Shah after the troops were raised, paid

and largely concentrated centrally under the direct control of the king or his

representatives. The system developed by P.N. Shah in terms of recruitment, evaluation

and promotion was misused during the regency of Queen Rajendra Laxmi Shah,

victimizing the Bhardars, who sacrificed their lives for the countrl7 presuming that they

were supporters of Bahadur Shah, her brother-in-law. The civilian leaders, Bhimsen

Thapa, Mathbar Singh Thapa including the Ranas, misused the system appointing their

.male family members, close relatives and favourites in the top posts, without assessing

their capabilities and qualifications, and at the same time victimizing their non-favourites

and sacking their opponents in the name of doubtful loyalty.

These structural features are characterized by (1) central command, (2) hierarchy, (3)

discipline, (4) inter-communication, and (5) esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation

and self-sufficiencl8• It runs entirely in the system bounded by the law in tenns of

recruitment, promotion and retirement, so that military character, ethics and discipline

can be maintained. However, the military in Nepal was weakened professionally not only

because of the recruitment of non-military in senior military posts randomly, but also

because of a psychological division between the favourite and unwanted among the

· military personnel. Good understanding could not be developed among the commanders

in different levels of command, and between the military commander and Bhimsen Thapa

himself, thus creating a gap between the commander and soldiers, and military and civil­

.· cum-military leaders. In the later days of Bhimsen Thapa, several power centers were I

created and groups of military personnel were kept under other civil-cum-military

functionaries such as Chautariyas and Kajis. The recruitment policy of Bhimsen Thapa

26 John Whelpton, Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Rise of Jang Bahadur Rana, 1830-1857, New Delhi: Manohar, 1991, p.14.

· 27

Baburam Acharya, Aba Yasto Kahi/yae Nahos (Never Again), Kathmandu: Sri Krishna Acharya, 2004. 28

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957, p.72.

124

helped not only in decreasing the quality of the professional military in spite of his effort

to ,train and modernize it, but also in weakening himself. Random recruitment of his

favourites, who had neither professional qualification nor combat skills and experience,

made the army further weak during his time29. As a result, the military could not rescue

him while he was sacked from the post by using power of pajani by the king and kept

him in jail under humiliating conditions up to the end of his life. The reality was that after '·

weakening the military, Bhimsen Thapa, simple guard of the then king, was upgraded to

General and Commander-in-Chief of military, having full authority of Kazi ~y the king.

He had neither any interest in being developed as a professional military man, adopting

military as a career, nor had he any emotional relations with military professionalism and

establishment. Because he had never been involved in combat activities nor commanded

any military unit, his every effort for enhancing military strength and capability was just

grabbing the political authority and power. For that, military itself cuuld be a threat, if it

was purely professional.

Furthermore, the Rana system was operated entirely by the military command that did not

elevate general people beyond the post of Colonel. It created a class within the military

that also prevented the military from being a highly powerful institution in the country. It

categorized the system ofpajani that assured the continuation of job for their favourites 30

and created uncertainty to the general people. Fresh land grant as Birta was confined only

to the Rana family as Jang Bahadur stopped the land as Jagir in Tarai and then started

cash salary for non-Rana civil-military functionaries. The discrimination in the Jagir

between Rana and non-Rana officers and soldiers ultimateiy helped emerged the corrupt I

tradition of Mukhtiyari Salami a't the time of appointment, continuation and promotion of

Jagir. It is said that the military officer had to present some amount of cash money--even '

valuable materials as a gift for making him happy--to the Maharaja as in the tradition of

Darshan Bhet in Shah reign, discouraged the non-Ranas from continuing the job, for

which the salary paid was too low for maintenance of livelihood. In addition, other

29 Bambahadur Thapa, Rastriya Akhandata ra Swabhimanko Surakshaka Khatir Amarshingh Thapako

Yogdan (contribution of Amarshingh Thapa for National Integration and Self respect), Sipahi (Yearly)-41, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 12008, pp. 90-92.

30 During the Rana period (1846-1950), there were four categories of pajani: (1) Commander-in-Chief and

· the General, (2) Guru, Purohit, Kazi and Sardar, (3) members of the Rana family, and ( 4) the remaining others such as district administrator personnel. It used to be on the basis of report of head of the service

· and Bada Hakim of the concerned districts.

125

service I holders, except ruling class people, were also compelled to provide not only

money and materials to the ruler in the name of Gaddi Mubarak and Chumban, but also

other taxes at stipulated times3 1•

For the first time, Bhimsen Thapa, the first civilian military leader and first Commander­

in-Chief of army, started random recruitment of his relatives in the military for

consolidation and longevity of his power and position. Since then, the Chhetri domination

in military that was' established by the Shah King himself on the basis of Dharmasastriya

division of labour was glorified32• The control and command of the military was

monopolized by Chhetris as was done by the king before. After establishment of Rana

oligarchy, Chhetria domination, ~n officer's level was remarkably increased because of

their policy to recruit the members of Ran a family in the top posts of military, as given in

the table below.

Table 111.1

Caste-wise Study of Military Officers

:Khas rrhakuri Magar ~ewar Other

Brahmin (Chhetri) (Rajput) k:astes

No. of !Year No. of Year INo. of Year No. of !Year INo. of Year INo. of Year Military

I Military Military Military !Military !Military Officers Pfficers Officers Officers Officers Officers

~ 1841 14 1845 51 1841 17 1841 4 1841 1 1841 14 1854 61 1854 4 1854 ~ 1854 7 1854 3 1854

NOTE: The table has been fonned from the infonnat10n gtven in John Whelpton, Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Rise of Jang Bahadur Rana, 1830-1857, New Delhi: Manohar, 19991, p.l98.

After being Commander-in-Chief and PM, Jang Bahadur recruited all his brothers and

rplatives in the top posts of military and distributed the military portfolios of officer corps

(Colonel to General) to infants of Rana family shortly after his birth and in some cases

before. All members of Rana were placed on the roles, holding military titles with the

rank of a Lieutenant Colonel to begin with. Non-members of the Rana family could not

aspire for any rank higher than that of a commanding colonel in the army and that of

31 Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995. 32 The main cause of increasing Chhetris as military officers was the recruitment of Ranas. But the Chhetris

in military from other nobilities were decreasing because of using pajani by the Rajaim (kingly authority).There were 12 and 10 Basnet, 16 and I Pandey, 6 and 3 Thapa and Kuwar 3 and 26 officers in 1841 and 1854, respectively. On the other hand, Magar, Gharti and Newar military officers were increased in military because of laying down the Muluki A in in 1854, as given in the table.

126

B~da Kazi in civil service. Though he used other castes seeking to strengthen his hold

over the army by taking advantage of ethnic diversity, he was aware of the possible

mutiny by excluding majority of the people in the power structure of the state against

Rana oligarchy.

Until 1846, troops had been recruited from mainly two ethnic groups - Magar and

Gurung. Certain families were treated as "honorary Khas/Chhetris", whilst ordinary

Magars and Gurungs, who possibly accounted for Non-Commission Officers (NCOs) and

privates33, were dispersed throughout all units of the army. Similarly, Jarig Bahadur

altered the rule through open recruitment of the Kiranti tribes (Rai and Limbus) of eastem

Nepal and decided to segregate the different groups in their own regiments in 1847 with

1e intention of minimizing the danger of the mutiny spreading from one regiment to the

other. He formulated the units of three different ethnic groups - the Indo-Aryan, Gurung

~md combined Kiranti, and "Tamang" -in the Kampu34• With the outbreak of war with

Tibet in 1854, separat~ corps was also set up comprising Bhotias, a tribal community

with Tibetan cultural affinity. Nepal military, by tradition, was not confined only to its

professional responsibility, but also had a capacity to influence state power and

administration. Hence, to get an opportunity for being recruited into military as an officer

means to be included in the ruling class and get power, prestige and prosperity as well;

because only the civil-military functionary could get the land as Birta and Jagir in the

name of sacrifice and contribution. To be deprived of the opportunity meant to be Raiti

(subject), where one had no access to and control over state power, administration and the

source of power, the land.

Gurungs and Magars were to be admitted to the Raja Paltan (select regiments or

phitoons) composed earlier by pure Khas through declaration of the Royal Order in 1863.

It opened up military ranks up to Colonel only to these two ethnic groups. The trends of

inclusion in terms of recruitment, promotion and retirement of caste and ethnic groups in

military were established by making the law. However, the opportunity could be provided

on· the basis of the Nigaha '(favour) of the ruler that formally ended in 1950, after

33 John Whelpton, Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Raise of lang Bahadur Rana, 1830-1857, New Delhi: Manohar, 19991, p:201.

34Kampu is the biggest military unit located in Kathmandu, especially for the security of the Singha Dm·bar, residence of PM and Commander-in-Chief of military and central administration of the Rana government.

127

establishment of democracy, by making a neutral policy of recruitment, promotion and

~etirement, giving equal opportunity to all on the basis of qualification35• It was not only

the civil-military institution, but also all organs of government were separated36

.

However, the tradition, deeply rooted in the minds of ruling class, state institutions and

society for about two centuries, could not be rooted out in the true spirit of democracy. It

became one of the main obstacles to include traditionally deprived people of an equal

footing even after 1990. The considerable increase of hill ethnic groups in military

service has been recorded with 38.10 percent of the officer rank of Brigadier General and

above. However, the percentage cannot represent all ethnic groups and tribes, except

some historically known as warrior groups. The situation in the table below shows the

caste and ethnic background of officers during 1994-2007

Table 111.2

Social Composition of the Officers/Senior Offices in (R)NA ' h R ti fP I f P mt e a o o opu a IOn ercentage

s. Caste and Population in Senior Senior Officers Officers No. Ethnic Groups .(%) . (2001 Officers Officers in 2004 in 2007

Census) in1967 in 2003 1. Chhetri (including 15.80 74.4 38.10 54.13 55.34

Rana) 2. Brahmin (Hill) 12.74 6.5 7.90 19.80 15.21 3. Gwung (Hill 1.47 6.5 15.90 8.91 4.49

Ethnic) 4. Newar 5.48 6.5 6.30 5.28 9.20 5. Magar (Hill 7.14 0.5 7.90 3.63 3.85

Ethnic) 6. Limbu 1.58 - 9.50 1.32 0.57 7. Tamang (Hill 5.64 1.1 1.60 0.99 1.49

Ethnic) 1

8. Thakuri 1.47 Others 9.50 8.91 6.06 9. Sun war (Hill 0.42 3.8 - 0.33,j(37 Others"

Ethinc) 5.0 10. Rajbanshi (Tarai 0.42 - 0.33*5 ~

Ethnic) 11. Rai (Hill Ethnic) 2.79 1.1 3.20 - 0.95

35 HMG/N, SainikNiyamawali (Military Act)-2015, Kathmandu: GMG/Nepal, Ministry of Law and Justice, 1959.

36 HMG/Nepal (1951), Interim· Government of Nepal Act, 2007, Kathmandu: Ministry of Law and Justice 37 * Sunwar (hill ethnic) 0.33% and Rajbanshi (Tarai ethnic) 0.33%, all together 0.66% of the military

officers, are not recorded in 2003; .# Sanysi occupied the largest number among the rest (1.08%) or 34 officers in 2007. Other 18 castes and ethnic groups cover the rest (in percentage): i.e, Kami (0.06), Damai/Dholi/Gandharba (0.25), Sarki (0.06), Kuwar (0.3), Thakali (0.09), Dusad/Paswan/Pasi (0.12), Te1i (0.03), Hajam/Thakur (0.03), Raji (0.38), Darai (0.06),Jirel (0.03), Thami (0.03), Pahari (0.03), and Rajdhob/Pela (0.09). ,

38 ibid

128

Source: "Appendix D ... Senior Army Officers, 1967", Kumar Pradhan, The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and Consequences of the Unification of Nepal, with Particular Reference to Eastern Nepal, Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.273; Jana Astha, Nepali National Weekly, 13 August 2003; Ekaishaun Satabdi, Nepali Fortnightly, 7 September 2003, Shivapuri (Annual Journal of RNA, Kathmandu: Coinmand and Staff College (CSC)','1994-2004 as cited in Amresh Kumar Singh, The Rise of Ethnic and Regional Movements in Nepal: A Case Study of Madhesi Movement, M.Phil. Dissertation, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2005; NA (2007), Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ 30 December as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p 51.

Some units and battalions, including Muslim and other religious minorities, have had

been formed by composing different ethnic castes and religious minorities such as Mule

company. For example, Kali Bahadur Battalion and Purano Gorkha formed purely by the

Magar,,the Gurung and the Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups39• The trends of participation of

different castes and ethnic groups provided the room to the general people generally to

serve in the· army but could not end the legacy of some castes/ethnics- Aryan ethnic

gr<;>ups and Gurung-Magar- in top posts that could play an important role in decision­

making. Regionally people from some parts of the hill area have been recruited in NA.

Low-castes and all Madhesis and Bhotias (Thakalis) have not been easily promoted to

higher posts. Only the elite section of society or members from selected families who had

been serving in the military during the Shah and Rana regime are mainly privileged to

hold higher echelons in the NA 40•

Hence, the reality ' is that p~ople having poor econom1c background and from

marginalized social groups, lower caste, and so-called "illegible" or traditionally deprived

ethnic and indigenous groups have been deprived of recruitment as Commission Officer

(CO) and promotion as Non-Commission Officer (NCO), including other higher posts,

because of lack of qualification. No government has ever made a positive discrimination

policy for including those who have lack of education and access in the de-facto

administration of NA that played an important role to select, train, groom and promote

c~didates. The main 1problem is to achieve the post higher than Colonel; staff college

I

exam and war college training is a must, but it is conducted by NA Headquarters (HQ)

excluding Ministry of Defense (MoD) with less transparencl 1• No women have been

39 General Rukmangad Katuwal told so in an interview taken by the researcher during the field visit. ~0 Jana Astha, 13 August 2003 41 On the basis of interview taken by the researcher with ex-Defense Secretary of the HMGIN, Vishnu

Datta Upreti.

129

inCluded in the senior officer's level in the RNA, except in the health sector in the Am1y

Hospital and in reaching.jobs in Army School, no Dalits, Muslims, Tarais and Bhotias

were senior officers until 2002. One Dalit (Damai) was promoted upto Major General of

NA. As of now the military hierarchy and posts are as given below: Chief of the Anny

Staffs, General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier General, Colonel,

Lieutenant Colonel, I Major, Captain, Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant, Subedar Major,

Subedar, Jemdar, Sergeant, Lance Corporal, Corporal, respectively42•

Table 111.3 Social Composition of Senior and Junior Officers in NA, 2007

Senior Officers Junior Officers s.~o Castes Remarks

•· No. % No. Yo

1. Chhetri 30 44.8 499 18.6 Senior officers 2. Brahman 6 8.9 405 15.1 range from 3. Thakuri 11 16.4 175 6.5 Brigadier General

4. Guning I 8 11.9 123 4.6 to full General

5. Magar 3 4.5 89 3.3 6. Newar 4 6 230 8.6 Junior Officers 7. Damai 1 1.5 8 0.3 constitute 8. Limbu 4 6 24 0.9 2/Lieutenant and 9. Rai - - 29 1.1 above, to full 10. Others (32 castes) - - 1,101 41.0 Colonel

Total 67 100 2,683 100 Source: Rajesh Chamlmg "Senabhttra Jatlya Tukutt", Mzyo (natiOnal monthly magazme), Vol. 2, 15

January-14 February, 2007, p.7.

The table shows how the inherent promotion system within the NA organization helps to

tbake Chhetri as a dominant caste group in NA. The senior officers who are engaged in I

the policy/decision making process of NA are mostly from Chhetri caste group covering

roughly 45 percent. The gap between the Chhetri and others is vast--that is not easily I

bridgeable. But the scenario of junior officer level given in the table is seen as optimistic-

-that provides a chance to promote officers from marginalized groups up to senior level,

he~ce obviously helpful in making gradually NA inclusive in the near future in terms of

social character.

Issue of Inclusion in NA

The issue of inclusion (Samabesikaran) of people from different castes/ethnic groups,

42 Rajesh Chamling, "Senabhitra Jatiya Tukuti", Miyo (national monthly magazine), Vol. 2, 15 January-14 February.2007, p.8.

130

ge~ders and regions 'has been a hot issue in Nepal after 1990 as Nepal has 103 I

castes/ethnic groups and more than 93 languages according to the population census

2001 43• People have been demanding that Nepal Army be accepted it as "National Army

of Nepal", and must maintain a national character primarily in terms of representation of

all castes, ethnic communities, genders, regions and religious groups in a ratio directly

proportional to the population. However, the Government of Nepal never made any

formal policy on inclusion in the state organs except making 33% women representation

i.h every area of governmental sector in 2007. Militarily men claim that Nepal Army, .I

which is the only institution in Nepal having a system of reservation for five different

castes/ethnic communities-Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Kiranti/Limbu and Madhesi,

creating different com~anies, is a more inclusive institution than others in the country44.

But it is not true that the military institution is really inclusive in the real sense. The total

strength of these five battalions is about 3,950 which makes 4.4 percent of the current

strength, which is really nominal in terms of their population. Such increase in percentage

has not been determined by the intention of inclusiveness but it has been done with a

view to pacifying these groups that can eliminate the possible revolt against

discrimination.

Participation of Kiranti in the hill indigenous communities, and Tharu and Rajbanshi in

'rarai, among several other castes, is worth mentioning within these special battalions.

Even within the Madhesi community, there are several sub-castes but only Rajbanshi and

Tharu. are in dominant position in the Mulla Company. The rest of the fonnations, units

and subunits where all castes/ethnic groups, religious and regional communities are given

equal opportunity based on open competition 45 have provided space to only a handful of

people from marginalized groups. But institutionally, realization can hardly be found, NA

took such advocacy and initiatives as a ploy to disintegrate the population of the country.

It rationalized the logic that every NA member is the first Nepali, then only other

identities based on caste, gender, region, religion and ethnicity. The table gi~en below is

comparatively the various castes and ethnic communities represented in Nepal Army with

43 See, NA Website, http://www.cbs.gov.np/PocketBook2006/content.htm 44 Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Anny: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, . Kathmandu: NAHQ. ~008.

45 Ibid.

their respective population size.

Table 111.4

State of Castes/Ethnic Inclusion in NA

(As of December 30, 2007)

S. . Castel Population INo. !Ethnic Groups (2001

~ens us) (a) (b) (c)

1. : Chhetri !Brahmins

.. Magar . · Tamang

5. Newar40

6. Kami 7. ~i 8 .. Gurung

. !Dhamai/Dholi! 9

· Gandharba

,593,496 ,896,477

1,622,421 1,282,304 1,245,232

895,954 635,151 543,571

~90,305

10. Limbu ~59,379 11. Thakuri 334,120 12. Sarki 318,989 13.' Gharti/Bhujel 117,568 14. Sanysi 199,127 15. Kuma! ~9,389 16 ~hakali 12,973

· Sherpa 16,7585

17 frharu q33,879 · Rajbanshi ~5,812

18. Dusad!Paswan/ Pasi47 158,525

19. ~eli 304,536 ~0. lfiajam!Takur 98,169 21. [Muslim 971,056 22 .. Mechhe 13,763 23. !Zaji 12399 ~4. Majhi 72,614 2_5. IR_arai 14,859 26. Danuwar ~3,229

27. ire! 5,316 28. Thami ~2,999 ~_9. Chepang 152,237 ~0. Pahari 11,505 ~ 1. !Rajdhob, Pela

rrotal 18115,029

% of Tota1;Flepresentation % of !Population 'n NA Total

[R.epresentation d) (e) 1)

15.80 12.74

.14 5.64 5.48

.94

.79 '· 2.39

1.72

1.58 1.47 1.40 0.52 0.88 ~44 p.o6 0.68 6.75 0.42

p.70

1.34 0.43 4.27 0.02 p.Ol 0.31 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.10 0.23 tl.05

179.90

7,762 8,979 8,696 5397

,981 2,435

,562 ,053

1,909

~52 ~.358 ~43 645 924 461

139

~,765

34

14 437 26 47 12 1305 142 116 61 62

24 8 ~0 274

1.85 9.95 9.63 5.98 6.62

2.69 2.83 J.38

~.11

1.05 3.72 1.04 0.71 1.02 0.51

0.15

5.28

0.03

0.01 Q_.48 p.oz 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.06 KJ.02 0.02

100

131

n. % o1 1nepresentation Offi 'n Officer leer

C Flepresenta

orps t' ( )

lOll

g h)

1735 55.34 77 15.21

121 3.85 7 1.49

283 9.02 2 0.06 30 0.95 141 ~.49

8 0.25

18 ' 0.57 190 6.06 2 ~.06

34 1.08 I 0.3

3 p.09

17 0.54

4 0.12

1 0.03 1 0.03 r -

12 0.38

2 0.06

1 0.03 1 0.03

1 0,03 3 0.09 ~,135 100

Source: Wikipedta for columns {b) and (c).NA, Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 30 December 2007 for (d) to (g), as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p.51.

'46Dhobi, Chyame/Pode, Kusle, Nau are also included. 47Rajput and Marbadi included.

132

There are 50 castes and 49 ethnic groups - all together 109 castes/ethnic groups -

identified by the population census conducted by the government in 2001. Among them,

only 36 castes and ethnic groups covers roughly 80% out of the total population -

22,736,93448• Among various castes and ethnic communities, Chhetri is in the most

dominant position in Nepal Army. Other fifteen castes/ethnicities (Magar, Newar, Rai,

Gurung, Damai!Dholi, Gharti/Bhujel, Thakuri, Sanysi, Kumal, Hajam/Thakur, Darai and

Jirel) are also slightly over-represented in comparison to their respective populations;

whereas Brahmin, Tamang, Kami, Limbu, Sarki, and Tharu are slightly under­

represented. Various Madhesi castes (Serial Nos. 18-25 in the above table) make 14.25

percent of the total population, whereas only 6.26 percent serve in the army.

Very senior to junior service holder officers and most retired senior officers, except the

Generals who are involved· in party politics after their retirement - Gopal Bohara and

Kumar Fudung - expressed logically that recruitment is voluntary, people of each and

every caste and community should not be forced to join Nepalese Army in the name of

Samabeshikaran (inclusion). Such inclusion will not prove to be helpful for

professionally developing the military and maintaining its existing qualification and

discipline.

The provision that every qualified Nepali citizen has an equal opportunity to serve in the

Nepal Army has have been applied since 1959. Quality of military should not be

compromised in any case49• Our neutral knowledge shows that only "Madhesi leaders are

demanding reservation for Madhesi people in military on the basis of population, but

Madhesi people neither are highly enthusiastic to apply for their recruitment in NA nor

are able to adopt the profession after recruitment"50 as the former COAS claimed. If one

examines the issues objectively, the environment and treatment for the people of Madhesi

origin and Dalits may not be favourable in the army. Even equal ranking personnel in the

48 Khanal, Krishna, Rajyako Punarsamra Chana: Ek Prastab (Restructuring of State: A Proposal), Samasamayik Lekhmla- 9, Kathmandu: NCCS, 2004, p.9; HMG/Nepal (2002), Population Census 2001:

, National Report, Kathmandu, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 49Interview with fonner COAS, General Prajwal Shamsher Rana, Retd. Lt.General C.B. Gurung, Retd.

Major General Govinda Gurung, Retd. Major General Dilip Karki and Retd. Lt.General BaJa Nand Shanna.

5° Fernier COAS Prajwal Shams her Rana

133

institution undermine the Madhesis, calling them Dhoti (wrapper of Dhoti), a pejorative

word used for identifying them with the Indians who also wear a similar dress in the '

plains. "Madhesis" are compelly,d to leave the job even after recruitment due to lack of

respect and dignity within the friends circle, group, society and institution. Secondly,

Madhesi people do not have the habit of climbing up and down on the hills because of the

difficult terrain and topographical features. After recruitment, one should fulfil the

criteria fixed for physical training in which running, and climbing up and down with

heavy instruments is required at the initial stage, as it is fully contradictory to their

working habit. Thirdly, it is the system of knowledge production or knowledge

recognition. The motlier tongue of Madhesi people is not helpful for recruitment and . I

promotion system of the Nepal Army, because only Nepali language and English, to

some extent, for officers is required51.

The system is also a barrier to the other indigenous and ethnic communities who have

their own culture, tradition, language and social system that make them ineligible to meet

the criteria fixed by the state. Madhesi people do not have the tradition of joining the

military and generally do not develop the ambition from their childhood to become

~litary men. On the contrary, they want to be technicians in health, forest and other

administrative fields for their career. "The rationale for less inclusion seems to be lack of

interests of people to join the NA"52 "because of lack of hope to be selected and

promoted as well", as given in Table Nos.III.2 and III.? respectively.

Similarly, in the 21st century, the priority of youth of ethnic communities was to be

recruited in Gorkha British Army that paid handsome amounts with more facilities for

their families and children. Its pension also was enough for a family to live comfortably

after retirement. The additional attraction to Gorkha British Army is that every child born

in Britain could settle there and others could get education as its citizen. If one gets

recruited in the army, the second generation of the family could be upgraded to the elite

51 Indra Adhikari, "Basis of Recruitment in Nepal Army'', The Rising Nepal, available at http://www.gorkhapatra.org.npldetail.php? article id= 7 517 &cat id= 7

52 When Silwal asked his Sipahi Deependra Yadav ~orking in Supply & Transport Battalion, Kathmandu, about relatively less recruitment of Madhesis in NA, he said it is primarily due to rugged training. Madhesis prefer to join the Police and other government sectors rather than the Nepalese Army. See in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008.

134

class of the country economically, socially and educationally. Their second priority is to

be recruited in Gorkha Regiment in Indian military, which provides better salary, family

quarters and pension after retirement compared to that of Nepal Army. Children could get

education there and medical treatment for their dependants. Comparatively, one small

family of a soldier of Nepal Army can hardly sustain on the salary of his service even if

he spends the whole life in the arm/3• Their "rich culture is really expensive that can

hardly be maintained by a soldier of Nepal Anny"54• Nowadays, educated youth of

Indigenous communities are attracted to Commission Officers in NA directly because of

the charm of United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).

Competition by Different Castes/Ethnic Groups in NA

A voice is raised that the discrimination based on ethnicity is existing in the process of

recruitment in NA even for the post of Sipahi (soldier). The table helps to find a realistic

picture of the hopeful aspirants from various castes and ethnic communities for joining

the.NA in the post of soldier. The statistics show the aspirants who registered their names

to join the NA in January 2007 in Dhading, Patan, Sarlahi, Dang, and Okhaldhunga

recruitment centres as given in the table below. Out of 13,363 applicants, only 1,149

(8.6%) Madhesi and 683 (5.1 %) Dalits have shown their interest in joining NA.

Applicants from Brahmin-Chhetri and Janajati groups from the hills are at the top of the

figure occupying 53.4% and 32.9%, respectively. People from Tarai region have shown

lesser interest than the Dalits, in terms of population ratio.

'· Table 111.5

Candidates Applying For the Post of Sipahi (Soldier) and Follow~rs

js.No. !Recruitment Centre !Brahmin, ~ anaj atillndigenous

lnalits IMadhesi,

tfotal Chhetri !community tfharu 1. IDhading, Baireni 1294 1280 141 53 768

12. Sarlahi, Nawalpur 1764 1468 148 !289 1,569 13. IPatan, Lagankhel 14,240 2,768 258 1273 7,539 14. !Dang, Tulsipur 1,303 1473 152 534 2,462 5. Okhaldhunga 531 1410 84 0 1,025

ITo tal I 17.132 14,399 683 1,149 13,363 !Percentage ~3.4 132.9 ~~~ 10.6 100

Source: NA, Application for recrUitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/

53 Indra Adhikari, "Basis of Recruitment in Nepal Army", The Rising Nepal, see in, · http://www.gorkhapatra. org. npldetail.php? article id= 7 517 &cat id= 7

54 On the basis of a talk with a ex-Gorkha British Army, Som B~hadur Ghale, Parbat who was recruited into the British Army after leaving the job of RNA.

135

Recruitment Selection Directorate, Kathmandu: NAHQ, November, 2007; as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p.51.

As applications for recruitment of Officer Cadet (to be commissioned as 2/Lt after

tralning) was called, 55 a total of 4,993 male youths from all five development regions and

75.districts applied for the post, making it very tough in getting selected. The table given

below shows the status of representation from various castes/ethnic groups and regions.

Table III.6

Applicants for Officer Cadet on Caste/Ethnic and Regional Basis

jS.No !Development !Brahmin,

~anajatil !Madhesi,

~ndigenous !Dalits rrotal % ' !Regions Chhetri

Community rrharu

1.. !Eastern 1411 168 9 14 602 12.05

~· Central ~.056 11_01 56 @_5 Jb848 57.03 ~. Western 651 197 ~8 10 886 17.75 14. !Mid-Western 286 137 14 14 351 7.02 5. !Far Western ~79 21 ~ 13 306 6.15

rrotal Applicants ~.683 h124 110 76 ~993 100 !Percentage I 73.8 122.5 12.2 1.5 100 100

Source: NA, Application for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/ Recruitment Selection Directorate, Kathmandu: NAHQ, November, 2007; as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p. 51

Out of 4,993 applicants for the post of Officer Cadet (2/Lt), there were 3,683 (73.76%)

from Brahmin/Chhetri community, 1,124 (22.51 %) from Janajati/indigenous community,

'110 (2.2%) from Dalit community, and 76 (1.5%) from Madhesi community. From

geographical point of view, more than 57% youth applied from the Central Development

Region, about 12% from the Eastern Region, approx. 18% from the Western Region,

about more than 6% from the Far Western Development Region, and roughly more than

7% from the Mid-Western Region.

The table given below shows 'the trend of gap between the applicants (in terms of

numbers and percentage) and those selected for training. The selection percentage in both

[IQ test (82.33) and written (85.5)] exams of high caste candidates is high compared to

the total percentage of applicants (73.5). Similarly, the gap is negative and decreasing in

55 NA, Application for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/ Recruitment Selection Directorate, K&thmandu: NAHQ, November 2007.

I

136

ratio for the Madhesis and Janajatis unlike Dalits whose percentage of application (2.2)

and passed in written exam (1.4) is high rather than the IQ test (1.2). . I

No.

1.

2.

Table 111.7

Comparative Results of IQ and Written Exam for Officer Cadet

Brahmin/Chhetri Janajatillndigenous Dalits Madhesi/ Total Community Tharu

No. % No. % No. % No. % Applicants/percentage 3,683 73.5 1,124 22.4 110 2.2 96 2 5,013

Passed in IQ test '1,267 82.33 237 15.4 19 1.2 16 1 1,539

Passed in written 312 85.5 46 12.6 5 1.4 2 0.5 365 exams

Source: NA, Apphcation for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/ Recruitment Selection Directorate, Kathmandu: NAHQ, November, 2007; as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ.,2008, p.Sl.

The probability of selection can· be equal or approximately the same for all applicants

because of competitive exams in NA. Recruitments from Madhesi, Dalit, Mid-Western

Dev((lopment and Far Western Development Regions are likely to be relatively less

because of lack of their access to private or quality education. The social motivation

factors, individual agency and linkage or relationship with the military individually and

institutionally, also play an important role for the opportunity to serve in the NA. Without

developing unifonnit~ in the education policy all over the country, the probability of

proportional representation of all ethnic groups and regions seems less likely as in other

armies of the world. Random selection on the basis of caste only, or only on so-called

quality lines, would not solve the issue but adversely affect the professional competence

and quality of the NA.

Participation of Women in NA

Nepali women participated in the Nalapani war with the East India Company for the first

tlme in Nepali history, but their participation was neither organized nor professional.

Women were confined to their usual household work as before, and the contribution of

women in Nalapani War was limited to the oral history of Nepal. After reforms in the

Nepal Army in 1953, women were recruited into the military in 1960 initially being given

the traditional role in the military: the technical fields - especially in nursing. Service

sectors for women have been widening since 1960, as women were involved as parachute.

137

folders in 1965; as doctors in 1927; in the legal services in 1997; and in the engineering

field in 200456• Women are being recruited purely for military purpose such a's military

police, military band, military civil, military drivers, office runners, signaliers, etc., from

2005 after the Maoist insurgency was intensified following the massive involvement of

female militants. Women's role was successful in making military people-friendly. Thus,

it was not only the NA, but government also realized the importance ofwomen's role in . I

the milit¥)' and made the policy for recruitment of women for defense purpose.The

present status of women's participation in Nepal Army is given below.

Table 111.8

Women's Participation in NA

~ .. Castes/ Officer Pfficer Officer ~unior iN on-

Other No. Community 1st Class 2nd Class ~rd Class

Commission Commission ~anks [Total %

Officer Officer 1. IBrahmin 25 32 55 54 166 15.52

2/. Chhetri 3 9 ~0 35 179 195 511 47.75 3. ~i 3 14 1 5 10 23 ~.15

4. Gurung 2 11 1 4 15 ~3 3.08 5. !Magar 5 1 12 34 52 4.86 6. IDamai 1 ~ 10 0.95 7. INewar 1 ' 3 26 28 45 146 149 13.9 8. Sarki l ~ 4 0.38 9. !rhakuri 1 14 14 4 17 40 ~.74 10. frharu, Rajbansi 1 - 5 ~ 10 0.95 11. IKuman 1 14 5 ~.42 12: 'Jiri Yogi 4 G 7 0.65 13. ~ishokanna 1 14 5 0.42 14. Gharti ~ 3 0.28 15. Sherpa, Thakali 2 1 ~ 0.28 16. !Muslim 1 1 0.09 17. !ramang 2 17 23 142 3.93 18. IPasawan - I I 0.09 19. JLimbu 1 \4 5 0.42

tfotal 14 18 180 103 ~35 1430 1,070 100 Source: NA, Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ 30 December 2007; as

given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p.51.

Women constitute more than half of the total population of the country. There are I ,070

females covering all ranks57• All female military personnel are recruited in other services,

56 See.. NA website,

http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/wialindex.php?hdng=W omen%20i n%20the%20Army&pg= 1 51 Ibid; and also, Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier in Nepal Army),

Sipahi Annual, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, p.158 ..

138

$uch as doctors, nurses, helpers, etc., but few women are in the defense $ector. The junior

officers range from Second Lieutenant to Colonel, and senior officers range from

Brigadier General to G~neral. No women from defense are in the rank of "senior military

officer". Senior Generals are mostly involved in the decision making process. The table

clearly says that no women can be evolved in any major decision of the NA. Among the

total officers of Nepalese Army, females as officers - Second Lieutenant to Colonel -

occupy 6.44% as Junior Commission officers recruited directly from Second Lieutenant

18.87%, and as Non-Commission officers promoted from the non-officer posts 9.62% in

total female strength 58•

The responsibility of the military is really significant and its fulfilment in the battlefield is

a very hard task. Therefore, women representation in infantry, particularly in Special

Forces such as Armour, Artillery, etc., is less or rare. Even women's participation in

warships and fighter flights has not been noticed in other countries of the world where

strong navy and air force are in existence59. Women have been given the responsibility

for the combat support and combat services as well. It is perceived that the major cause

behind it is their biologically sensitive and social responsibilities, i.e., role in maintaining

harmony in the family. Secondly, justification from the military point of view is that '·

wqmen's mobilization in frontline of the battlefield is really risky not only for the state,

but for herself also. Several cases can be found in the history of wars w~ere women

soldiers captivated by the enemy have not only been compelled to disclose the secret

military strategy and policy of the country through torture, but are also harassed,

humiliated, raped and even killed after rape. The prime reason of low representation .of

women in military is the patriarchal mentality of senior military officers and civil-leaders

who neither recognize the capacity of women involved in warfare, nor do they expect any

creative thought from her in security policy of the state60•

In addition, most women do not show their interest to adopt the profession in the security

. .' 58 . .

NA, Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ 30 December 2007; Puma B. Siiwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064,

· Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008. 59 Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier in Nepal Army), Sipahi Annual,

2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, pp.157-59. 60 It is written based on the experience of a couple of female officers in NA They shared the information

with the researcher in an informal meeting with them in the condition that the researcher should not acknowledge them, nor their name and designation in NA should be mentioned in the thesis .

..

139

sectors because of the social perception that women themselves are not secure in the

security force. It is perceived that women are being sexually harassed, verbally abused

and physically exploited in the police and army by their bosses and male counterparts,

whose role is important for their job security and professional career because of the rigid

chain of command. But there is no stringent provision of legal punishment for the

criminals and no transparency can be seen in court-martial. Furthermore, there is no

woman friendly barrack, nor can women soldiers get quarters for settlement of their

families61. A soldier with family cannot sustain out of the barrack because of the low rate

of salary, and women are hardly allowed to live alone out of home. As such, after

marriage, women soldiers can hardly balance their profession and family, except in the

case of women officers who are from the technical field, or are born in a family of I

military officers and get married to the military officers or higher middle class people I

located in cities. That is why, most women prefer the day-time administrative jobs in

non-military services.

If one compares women in NA with other armies in terms of recruitment trends, and

percentage initiation of service, the trend of recruitment of women in military institutions

of other so-called developed and most democratic countries cannot be found as

remarkably good as that of Nepal. There are approximately 20 percent women of the total

U.S. Armed Forces (military, air force and navy) serving in other countries which have a

long tradition of inclusion. India started to recruit women officers for defense purposes

from 1992, except in the technical field. Now, more than 900 women officers are

working in the Indian army, excluding navy and air force, which have just three percent

of the total officers. Similarly, 100 (1.5%) in navy and 450 (4.5%) in air force in India are '

constituted by women in officer level of the respective total strength. But 131 women are

working for defense purpose, 106 in technical field in officer level in Nepal Anny.

Altogether, women constitute , 1.2% of the total strength of Nepal Army (90,274),

dispersing: 39 in Para folder, 163 in nursing, 180 in technical field, 164 in military

administration, 58 in f\)llowers, 554 in soldiers 62, though NAhas aimed to add up to 5%

61 A female officer in NA recruited from legal background told to the researcher in an informal talk, analyzing the situation of women in armed forces on the basis of experience of her female friends in and out of the country.

62 Female strength in NAhas been dealt with by two writers from NA in its Sipahi yearly-41, published in 2008. One has dealt with the caste and post-wise participation referring to 1070 women in Puma B.

140

women in the organization63.

Similarly, neither the UN as a judge of the international legal system is able to make

women participate on an equal footing with men in peace keeping operations, nor is the

rebellion group (such as the Maoists of Nepal which had struggled in favour of the

suppressed, oppressed and discriminated groups) able to treat women equally with the

men. In addition, women in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were not above the

Vice-Commander of their brigade, though they claim that women covered more than one­

third PLA during the insurgency. Women involved in PLA accepted that they could not

contribute to PLA despite their" expectation and interest before they joined it mainly

because of physical constraints. To illustrate, more than 17% women guerrillas are not

participating in military activities in the Third Division of the PLA Cantonment, which is

now under the UN supervision because of their reproductive role - bearing, rearing and

caring for children. All together, only 12% women are in ex-PLA cantonments after the

UN verification64• They also have grievances with their leaders that they could not get the

po~ition and treatment ,as their male counterparts got65.

Female soldiers in NA also are more confined to the conventional role as prescribed by

the society rather than modem one. Within the armed forces, it seems that the personnel

recruited and trained for combat purpose are felt as superior and the rest as inferior. In

addition, institutional provision of NA itself made them inferior because the duration of

training for female soldiers is softer than that of their male counterparts66. Indian Anny,

where women officers are upto the rank of Lieutenant General in Armed Force Medical

eyervice and Military Nursing Service, has promoted women neither as combatants nor for

flying fighter aircraft67• The cause, as analyzed by one of the officers in Indian Army, has

Silwal "Democratization' and InClusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008. p. 51; and another dealt with the role-wise parti~;ipation referring to 1158 women in NA Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier· in Nepal Army), Sipahi Annual, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, p.158. The differentiation in the data about women participation at a time when dealt with by different writers of the same institution shows that only the trend of women participation in NA may be actual, but numerical data is confusing.

63 The COAS, General Rukmangad Katuwal, during the interview. 64 Barsa Man Pun "Ananta" indicated to the researcher while interviewing him. 65 Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier in Nepal Army), Sipahi Annual,

2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, p. 153. 66 Piyush Kumar Sanwal, "Role of Women in Indian Armed Forces", Journal of United Service Institution

of India, Vol. CXXXVIII, No. 571, January-March, 2008. 67 Ibid, p.34.

been framed in Figure No. III.l.below.

Figure 111.1 I

Cause of Inferiority of Women in Armed Forces

Causes of Female soldiers'

inferiority in Military

Law professional output and

enhanced workload due to shortage of

officers

141

Source: The diagram has been prepared on the basis of (1) information given in Piyush Kumar Sanwal, "Role of Women in Indian Armed Forces", Journal of United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVIII, No: 571, January-March, 2008, and (2) interviews taken with Retd. senior officers ofNA.

The diagram rightly shows how the stresses manifest on women, and how not only

women but military institutions also face its implications. What seems the reality of not

promoting women to higher ranks in armed forces is that the officers are directly

142

attributed to extensive combat arms experience, but women are denied the opportunity to

compete for these positions because they have limited access to combat anns positions68.

Women in Nepal Army, unlike in Indian Army, are not provided less training compared

to that of their male counterparts, but softer treatment - separate physical tests and

standards for womenJ and modification of "service subjects" and outdoor exercise to •.·

accommodate women trainees also made women soldiers inferior in military

institutions69• Likewise, lowering physical standards, soft treatment and shorter duration

of their training in Army created resentment and attitudinal differences from their male

counterparts, as women are preconceived as inferior for their role and capabilities in

accordance with the traditional combat concept of the military.

Military Recruitment, Policy and Trends

No literature provides the exact figure of the number of troops m the compames

established first in the country, .bY P .N. Shah. The history of establishment of professional

military institution has shown that first the Nepal Army adopted th· basic values of

western model from its establishment. P.N. Shah, founder of modern Nepal and king of

Gorkha principality, was the first person who established a military institution with five

companies in 1763 70 comprising the defeated Bangali troops with 400-500 guns of

Nawab Mir Kasim of Bengal under the British command. The troops, under the

command of Gurgin Khan, were sent for military assistance to the king of Makwanpur­

one ofthe princely states ofNepal-for offensive action against the Gorkha Empire71• It

is prov~d by the term "company'' that was formed by composing the defeated the English

troops who have obviously played an important role in developing the military ethics,

values and institution. Secondly, the institution is formed by the traditional monarch

un~er his command and is traditionally loyal and obedient to him. Thirdly, the military is

commanded and controlled by a de facto ruler. Finally, the politicized role of the military

that was not separated from the civil administration cannot be ignored. As such, the

68 Ibid. p.35. 69 Almost all ex and in-service senior military officers of Nepal Army whom the researcher had interviewed

agree on the logic of the Retd.senior officer oflndian Army, Sanwal. 70

Shree Nath, Kali Buksh, Barda Bahadur, and Sabuj were formed in September 1762 and Purano Gorkha was formed in February 1963. See, Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995, p. 42. , .

71 D.R. Regmi, Modern Nepal: Rise and Growth in the Eighteenth Century, Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay. 1961, p. 65.

143

military strength in terms of quality and quantity was more dependent on the interest of . '·

the ruler, rather than the necessity of the state and the people72.

P.N. Shah, having a dream to make Greater Nepal, was aware of the limitations of

Gorkha and made a plan enhancing its military and bringing in a number of Matchlock

Rifles and a few experts skilled in the art of making traditional weapons of war73 from

Varanasi in 1744. He established workshops in Gorkha, and increased the number of

warriors by giving military training and distributing weapons to them. He used the rest of

the people engaged 1

in agriculture for defense. Moreover, he had made a policy to grant I

land to the military personnel and his family in the name of Birta and Jagir for rewarding

and promoting the military profession and started a punishment system for establishing

discipline and maintaining military ethics in the military organization. He mobilized

around 12,000 permanent and 80,000 other personnel, such as Dhakre Jhar and Umraos

during his rule (1742-75)74.

Similarly, the first civilian ruler Bhimsen Thapa (1804-37), adopted the French model in

terms of training, discipline and dress (red) for organizing the military, as he had a

perception that the French Army was well trained and stronger than that of the British,

which was at that tiii;le the biggest threat to Nepal. In spite of several efforts of the rulers

on professional development 'to make the military strong through training, new

recruitments and weapons, the military organization became weak in tenns of skill and

quality, since there was a large number and strength due to the favouritism and nepotism

in recruitment, promotion and retirement system randomly. The decreasing quality of

:t;nilitary officers and the standard of conduct after the death of P.N. Shah had been

furthered by Bhimsen Thapa, who recruited his brothers, relatives and nephews - all non­

military people having1 no training - in the leading posts of military. This was proved after

the defeat of Nepal by the British during the Anglo-Nepal war in 1814-16, and was

72 lndra Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Pelhi, 2006.

73 As far as production of anns and ammunition in Nepal is concerned, old-fashioned weapons such as bows · & arrows, and Khukuris were produced in large scale before unification of Nepal, but in early 1770,

crude kind of arsenal howitzers, mountain batteries, trench mortars and other necessary artilleries, and rifles of Enfield model had been used. See, Ludwig F. Stiller, The Rise of the House ofGorkha: A Study in the Unification of Nepal: 1768-1816, Ranchi: Patna Jesuit Society, 1973, p.89; Madan Kumar Bhattarai, Diplomatic History of Nepal (1901-1929): A Critical Appraisal of Nepal-British India

1Relations, New Delhi: Madan Kumar Bhattarai and Royal Nepal Embassy 1990, p.53. 7? Rishikesh Shaha, An Introduction to Nepal, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar 1975, p.89.

144

proved from the review by H.B. Edwards and H. Mervale: "There is not a soldier in

Nepal; scarcely a single man that has seen a shot fired, and not one that could lead the

army. The chiefs are very poor set, effeminate debauched creatures, wanting in all the

spectable qualities"75.

He developed 155 companies (19,293 permanent and 150,000 temporary) during the war.

It was reduced to 24 companies76 after the Sugauli Treaty in 1816. He had reorganized

the military organization in 1811, introduced the Commander-in-Chief, General and . .

Colonel posts as in the Western form, ended Umraos system at local and district level, as

practiced by Mughals in Hindu states in the plains before the war. He introduced Kampu,

Platon77 and Company, commanded by the Commander-in-Chief himself, Colonels and

General, respectively78• He enhanced the institution for systematization and

. I

professionalization and adopted the western system of military structure, words of I

command, bugle sounds, accoutrement of the men, battalion maneuvers, manual exercise,

military uniform and training system79 inviting British experts from India. He provided a

huge amount of money for increased strength of the army and its traiuing by resorting to

the state for endowments80 allocating huge sums of money for military promotion and

provided a residence to military personnel known as Chhauni for their facility. He further

consolidated the military organization and introduced the post of Jamadars. However,

~ecause of the division in military and nobility of court after the fall of Bhimsen Thapa,

Mathbar Singh Thapa had exerted all power as Commander-in-Chief with the right to

punish, in accordance Vfith caste, all those who did not obey the order of Commander-in­

Chief.

Rana Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Janga Bahadur (1846-56 and 1857-77)

75 Edwards and Merivale 1872:8-9 as cited in Rishikesh Shaha, Modern Nepal: A Political History 1769-1955, Vol. I, 1762-1885, New Delhi: Manohar 1990.

76 Tulsi Ram Vaidya et al. Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda. 1993.

77Kampu was a regiment stationed at the capital and Platan was one of the military units commonly known as platoon in English.

78 Tulsi Ram Vaidya et al. Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali JangiAdda. 1993,p.110.

79 Bikrama Jit Hasrat, History of Nepal: As Told by Its Own and Contemporary Chroniclers, Punjab: Bikram Jit Hasrat 1970, p.228.

80 Rishikesh Shaha, An Introduction to Nepal, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar 1975, p.l!3.

145

pl~ced all male members of his family on the role holding military titles with the rank of

Lieutenant Colonel to begin with, as his "family affair". Non-members of the Rana

family could not aspire for any rank higher than that of a commanding colonel in the , I

:arml1• ~e strengthened the military in terms of numbers, established hold on the anny

by exploiting ethnic diversity, and modified the organizational structure introduced by

Mathbar Singh Thapa. He further introduced a new rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, increased

the number of Colonels and Generals, and established standard Rifle Regiments in 1846

and adopted a somehow inclusive recruitment policy. Thus, he included other excluded

ethnic castes selectively: people - Rai and Limbu from the eastern part and employed

~ikh soldiers from religious minoritl2 and Bhotias from the Himalayan region during the

Nepal-Tibet War in 1855-56. Similarly, he granted an opportunity to the ethnic soldiers

of promotion up to Captain, especially for Gurung and Magar who were Jamadars earlier

on the one hand, and ilwluded other ethnic groups in his Regiments, Kampu on the other

through the Jangi A in (Rule of J ang Bahadur) in 1854 proclaimed by him.

Similarly, civil administration and military organization were separated m 1951 after

establishri1ent of democracy in Nepal. The new leaders initiated not only military

institution reorganization, but also decreased its numerical strength from 25,000 to 6,000.

And an effort had been made to develop it as a professional institution providing training

by Indian Military Mission since 1952. However, King Mahendra developed its strength

up to 45,000, provided more facility, and equipped it with modern weapons after taking

over power in his hands from the elected government after 1960 in order to make the

institution of monarchy more secure83• The same situation was repeated after 1996 in the

name of establishing "peace,, and security" in the country for countering the Maoists

insurgency. No substantive change in its recruitment and promotion policies in RNA has

taken place even after the restoration of democracy in 1990. The officers , from ethnic

.81 Ibid, p.l40. 82B.ut the Sikh corps of 104 soldiers and a few Hindustanis were recruited as drillmasters and artificers in

the magazines. The Indians were desisted by Jang Bahadur on the strong request of British government because they belonged to the Koka sect known for its virulent anti-British stance. See, Kanchanmoy Majumdar, Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century, Calcutta: Firma SLM 1872, p.166 as cited in Madan Kull¥lr Bhattarai, Diplomatic History of Nepal (1901-1929): A Critical Appraisal of· Nepal-British India Relations, New Delhi: Madan Kumar Bhattarai and Royal Nepal Embassy 1990, p.55, I

83 R.S. Chauhan, The Political Development in Nepal1950-70: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity, New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1971.

146

groups, especially Gurung and Magar, who were familiar with warfare, have not yet

reached the level of Commander-in-Chief till 2007. Thus, one important question had

be~n raised after 1990 how Nepali people could expect the RNA of being automatically

an apolitical professional institution that could help institutionalize democracy, as it was

led by the same group of people who led the NA before 1990, and its structure also

remained the same? Nepal Army has been occupied by the so-called "legible" "High­

caste Hindu male", especially Chhetris and Raj puts from the hilly region. Out of 3 7 Chief

of the Army Staff, 26 are from Rana and 11 from Shah, Thapa, and Basnet families who

served the Gorkha Kot politics84. It thus does not mean that sacrificial change in polity

does not necessarily make structural transformation, for which behavioural change in

holistic approach is required. '·

The basic realities of the country: geopolitical situation and external environment, '

internal political situation or an ambition of the de facto ruler also creates ups and down

. in the military strength in terms of quality and quantity. The military that has rarely been

used for security of state has not only been used for getting, exerting and maintaining

power of the state, but also for getting external support to make either imperial British or

democratic India happy during the Rana regime. The military numerical and professional

strength was highly developed and used by Bhimsen Thapa, Jang Bahadur Rana, King

Mahendra and Gyanendra in comparison to others during 1804-16, 1846-77, 1960-65 and

·after 2002 to 2007, though the coordinating and coercive performance of the military

seemed poor. Even the King (Rajendra) had formed a military unit separately twice for

recapturing power from the Commanders-in-Chief and PMs- Mathbar Singh Thapa85 and

J.B. Rana - inside and outside the country. It had been increased and used mostly for

personal purpose, except in the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-16) and Nepal-Tibet war (1855-

56) waged by Bhimsen Thapa and J.B. Rana, respectively. Otherwise, the country as a

whole was militarized for the sake of security of the ruler who used to mobilize it for

fighting under the flag ofeither India after its independence or British during World yYars

84 Indra Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New D('!lhi, 2006.

85 King Rajendra formed a military regiment, Hanuman Dal in 1838, for personal security of the king and queen and to recapture power from Mathbar Singh, PM and Commander-in-Chief of military. He formed and trained a military regiment in 1847 for collecting nobility in exile for getting back power from Jang Bahadur. Most of them w~re killed in Alau massacre.

147

I & II, including for suppression of the mutiny in India. Nepal had provided more than

49,000 and 160,000 military personnel to British India in 1915 (First WW), and 1939

when Britain attacked Gennany in the wake of the Second World War, respectively. The

table given below shows this reality. The total military strength (numbers within I

bracket~), indicates the temporary military recruited either at the time of national crisis,

or for military support to British-India86.

Table 111.9

Trends of Military Recruitment and Permanent Strength

s. !Year

!Number De facto Ruler Source No. of Strength 1. 1769 1,200 P.N. Shah Server 1993:8 2. 1802 18,000 Girvan Yuddha Bhattarai 1990:52 3. 1814 19,293 (150 000) Bhimsen Thapa l.Jandon 1928:187 4. 1834 12,000 Do- Satish Kumar 1967:27 5. 1836 18,00 Mathbar Singh Thapa Basrat 1971 :225 6. 1841 19,000 Do- Bhattarai 1990:51

~· 1847 18,000 ~.B.Rana ;Basrat 1971:323,

8. 1857 50,000 (1/4 million men mobilized in

Server 1993:123 & 90 ~epa!-Tibet war during 1755-56)

9. 1859 26,000 Do- !Bhattarai 1990:51 10. 1861 17,000 Do- iBasrat 1971:344 11. 1873 17,000 Do- Shaha 1990d:259 12. 1877 16,000 Do- IBhattarai 1990:51 13. 1883 18,000 (46,000)* !Ranudip Singh Server 1993:171 14. 1915 .•• (49,000)* k:;handra Shamsher (WW-l) Server 1993: 256 15. 1922 f'9 454 Do- •. !Bhattarai 1990:51 16. 1925 ~6,500 Do- Bhattarai 1990:52 17. 1938 160,000# Juddha Shamsher _{WW-II}_ Server 1993: 349 18. 1951 25,000 Mohan Shamsher/Tribhuvan Server 1993:399 ' 19. 1952 6,000 Do- Server 1993:399 20.' 1963 145,000 Mahendra . Chauhan 1971:235 21. 1990 35,000 Birendra Kumar & Sharma 2005:40 22. 2000 47,411 Do- Adhikari 2008:70 23. 2001 53,000 Gyanendra Mehta 2005:54 24. 2002 63,000 Do- Rajdhani Daily 25 July 2002 ~5. 2004 70,000 Do- The Kathmandu Post 17 January2004 ~6 .. 2004 85,000 Do- The Himalayan Times 11 October 2004 27. 2007 90,226 Do- NA 2007 .. Source: Indra Adhikan, Mzlztary Democracy Inteiface zn Nepal, 1990-2002, D1ssertat10n submitted to JNU,

New Delhi, 2006, p.63.

Note: *The numerical strength of standing army could not be found, but the numbers given within brackets

86 Indra Adhikari, Military Democracy Inteiface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Delhi, 2006; Laxman B. Hamal, Military Hist01y of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir. 1995; Tulsi Ram Vaidya, et al. Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda, 1993.

148

indicate only the dhakres, i.e., irregulars, I '

#The number includes the total military strength: standing army and irregulars.

Several measures had been taken by the regimes in different times of history for

1;trengthening the military organization. One was the promotion of agriculture by P.N.

Shah for defense purposes by collecting tax on more than fifty percent of production in

the hills. Second, land used to b~ granted under the scheme of Birta and Jagir directly to

military personnel and their family in the name of reward and allowance. The third, huge

portions of land, known as Guthi, were used for getting blessings from Hindu Gods and

Goddesses to motivate and strengthen the military psychologically during the Shah and

Rana regimes, where the sources of income of the state were used for defense purposes.

There was no distinction between the personal income of the PM, and the state budget

that was never known to the 'subjects'. The revenue of the state used to be distributed to

the. PM's brothers, sons, nephews and relatives, apart from receiving the most senior post I

and position, whilst the salaries of other functionaries remained static. Bhimsen Thapa

allocated a large sum of money for military promotion and provided a residence to

military personnel known as Chhauni for their facility. During the Rana regime, Chandra

Shamsher distributed a generous amount of money to the military personnel involved in

First WW and made a hospital for providing facility to them and their families. Juddha

Shamsher established a military fund for promoting the military. The defense budget was

~'eparated formally in 1951 for the first time in Nepal after the formation of the interim

government.

The trends of prioritizi.Jilg the socio-economic sectors were started and automatically the

military felt being marginalized comparatively until the 1960 coup of King Mahendra, as

it had enjoyed the whole source of the country before. King Mahendra expected to further

strengthen the position of the army in the country's political setup in order to make the

institution of monarchy more secure. Thus, he not only increased the strength of the army

by .Providing it with more facilities and equipping it with modem weapons, but also

changed its name from Nepal Army to Royal Nepal Army as personal anny of monarchy

and increased defense expenditure that reached 30% (of GNP) in 1963, "more than

international standard"87•

87 R.S. Chauhan, The Political Development in Nepa/1950-70: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity,

'·

41

149

In 1989, the defense expenditure in Nepal (29.5% of GNP) was more than that of other

South Asian countries (16.7% in India and 19.0% in Pakistan of their GNP) except Sri

Lanka (32.6%)88, which was seriously fighting for curbing the ethnic conflict (LITE)

since the early 1980s as gi ven in the Figure III.3 below. Even during Birendra's regime

(1972-90), the number of military personnel was more or less similar, but the rate of

defense expenditure had increased as given in the Figure III.2. These two figures show

the trends of defense expenditure in Nepal during 1960-198689.

Figure 111.2

Trends of Increasing Defense expenditure(in million $)

OO T---~------~--------------.

70

Figure 111.3

Budget Allocation and expendi t ure o defense after 1960

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Source: Appendix-III.2 . Source: Appendix- Ill. I

The character and composition of the army, especially of the officer corps , could not be

altered after political change in 1951 . Absolute power over the army was with the King90.

Even defense ministers used to be appointed from amongst the royal favourites or e~

military officers, and no provision of check and balance in terms of strengthening,

New Delhi: Associated Publishing House 197 1, pp.234-235 . 88 Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepa l 1980-1 990: Referendum. Stalemate and Triumph of People Power,

New Delhi : Manohar, 1990, p .56. 89 See Appendix 1 and II , as given in lndra Adhikari , MilitGiy Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002,

Dissertation submitted to JNU, ew Delhi, 2006, p . l37. 90 Article 64, HMG!Nepal, Nef!al Adh irajya Ko Samvidhan-2015 (The Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal -

1959), Kathmandu, 1959

150

deploying, controlling and commanding was with the people's representatives during the

democratic era 1950-59. The King used power to control and strengthen the military.

King Mahendra '\Vas absolute King holding the top military title of Supreme Commander­

in-Chief of military. He became his own defense minister in 1960-62 and brought about

the· numerous changes in the command of the army at all levels. The officers of RNA are

mostly drawn from the same castes and families which supplied the officers during the

Sh~h and Rana rule. Promotion to ranks above Lieutenant-Colonel is not based only on

professional skills and recommendations of the army, but also requires approval of the

king and the government. After establishment of the Panchayat system in 1960, the motto

of RNA is reflected in this declaration - "Raksha, Samman, ra Kalyan, aafno desh ra

naresh sarbapratham sada janu dharma, karam sipahi ko"91•

The King ·could take decisions on the welfare and training of the officers and the army

through special powers and grants bestowed on him by tradition that brought the anny

closer to the King naturally. Thus, the RNA regarded the King as the personification of

the state and had developed its perception that "there is no such thing as loyalty to the

state and the people as distinct from loyalty to the king as a person"92. The role of the

king had been limited, but the subject of liberating the psychology of military in the

context of democracy was ignored; and the separation of King from the anny was

unthinkable even during the democratic era in the post-1990 Nepal. .. The constitl;ltional provisions for a "Defense Council consisting of Prime Minister,

Defense Minister and the Commander-in-Chief did not work out because oftlle continued

interest shown by the King in defense matters. The Army, on its side, also looked upon

the King as the ultimate power centre regardless of the constitutional spirit since the April

2006 Jana Andolan II. The president had replaced most of the power and authority of the

King93, the name and structure of National Defence Council was replaced by National

I

Security Council. The diagram given above shows the present structure of the Military I

Institution ofNepal.

'· 91 Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepal I 980-I 990, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1990; Ashok K. Mehta, The

Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co, 2005, p.41; Indra ,Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, I 990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Delhi, 2006, p.66.

92 Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepal 1980-1990: Referendum, Stalemate and Triumph of People Power, New Delhi: Manohar 1990, p.25.

93 Government ofNepal, Interim Constitution ofNepal 2007, Fourth Amendment, 2008.

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152

Experience of Exposure of NA

The Nepal military force was not able to share its expertise, except to learn from its

counterparts even during the Second World War because of lack of knowledge about

modem weapons which had been used and for which they had been trained. The poor

performance and cohesive capacity of the Nepal Anny (NA) in the modem age, made the

govemrn~nt realize the importance of the training and exposure that make the military

men aware of the new tools and techniques for advancement of military skill and

capacity. Historically, different rulers from its establishment had trained the Nepal Anny

based on the western model at different times. After reorganizing the military by

seiecting "serviceable" elements of the old Rana army subsequent tol951, Nepal army

was trained by an Indian Military Mission for over a decade since 1952. The same

~ission was renamed as Indian Military Training and Advisory Group (IMT AG) after six I

years94• Again, IMTAG was redesigned as the Indian Military Liaison Group that was

turned, after scaling it down, into a Stores Liaison Group and worked for receipt of

military equipment for the NA until 1970. There has been an addition of Sandhurst and

Dehra Dun Military Academy-trained junior officers over the year95. The bulk of NA's

training was handled by India under the Special Aid Programmes of the Ministry of

D~fense. Moreover, the UK and the USA96, including India, have also been providing

training on military courses. In addition, Nepali military engagement continues today

through International Military Education and Training (IMET), Enhanced International

Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)97, and various conferences and seminars. The U.S.

military sends many NA officers to America to attend military schooling such as the

Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. Commander-in­

Chief Pacific (CINCP A C) coordinates military engagement with Nepal through the

94 Ashok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co, 2005, p.5. Indra Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU,

. New Delhi, 2006, p.66:5. 95

Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepa/1980-1990, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1990, p.25. 96T~e US-Nepali military relationship focuses on support for democratic institutions, civilian control of the

military, and the professional military ethic to include respect for human rights. Both countries have had extensive contact over the years. RNA units have served with distinction alongside American forces in places such as Haiti, Iraq and Somalia.

97EIPC. . IS an mteragency programme between the Department of Defense and the Department of State to increase the pool of international peacekeepers and to promote interoperability.

153

Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)98. The ODC Nepal is located in the American

Embassy, Kathmandu. ,

Similarly, UNPKO provided various opportunities to NA to be exposed worldwide by

participating actively in most UN activities following the UN process99, when Nepal

betame a member of UN in 1955. NA's involvement in Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

with different roles started with its first deployment as Military Observers in the Middle

East with UNOGIL in 1958. The first Nepali contingent in UNPKO (five personnel of

Purano Gorkha battalion) was deployed as an observer in Egypt in 1974 accepting the

b~ic principle of the UNPK0 100• Over 64,616 Nepalese soldiers have served in support

of UN peacekeeping endeavours in the 44-year long history of participation in the UN

peacekeeping operations101• Currently the Nepalese Anny has some 3121 soldiers serving

in 16 different Missions around the World. Nepal has a commitment to provide upto 5000

soidiers for UN operations if so requested 102•

Nepal Anny has contributed outstanding Force Commanders, elite military contingents,

impartial military observers and dedicated staff officers in the missions. The recognition

in UNPKO is good enough not only because of NA's devotion to duty and "excellent

perfonnance", but also because of their participation in some of the most difficult

operations, though some of them suffered casualties in the service of the UN. Till

D~cember 2007, 54 NA personnel have sacrificed their lives in the line of duty and 57

98 RNA website, www.ma.mil.np, 10 February 2006. . 99First, the Under-Secretary General of UN DPKO will request the Permanent Representative of Nepal at

UN HQ. The Permanent Representative will forward the request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal. The request is then forwarded to Ministry of Defense (MoD), Nepal. MoD will in tum forward the request to Army HQ. Consultation takes place at Army HQ. The feasibility survey of the mission is conducted. Request for Approval is sent by the Army HQ to the Cabinet. Approval by the cabinet is sent back to the Army HQ. Letter of Acceptance is sent through Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Advisor to the Permanent Representative at UN Head Quarters. Then the UN Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Inspection team inspects all the equipment of the unit going to be deployed. Final approval from UN DPKO is sent to Army HQ. Memorandum of Understanding is signed and troops are then deployed.

100 Basic principles to approaching military participation in different peacekeeping operations are: (1) Peacekeeping operations should be under the command and control of the UN, (2) Formally approved mission by United Nations Security Council should synchronize with our national objectives, (3)Availability of adequate resources to accomplish the mission, professionally trained and equipped troops, and ( 4) to fulfill the com~trnent of mission as directed by UN mandate and level of risk should be taken

101 Rajendra Chhetri, Rastra Sanghiya Shanti Senama Nepali Senako Sahabhagita ra 50 barsako upalabdhi, chunauti ra sambhabana (NA participation in Peacekeeping Mission and gain, challenges and

. possibilities), Sipahi (yearly)-41, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2008, pp. 1-4. 102 NA website, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na un.php, server date 24 July 2010.

154

were disabled. Its most significant contribution has been of peace and stability in Africa.

NA has never turned down a request for troops, which has come with almost every

UNPKO. It has the distinction of having a Nepali General, Brig, Gen. C.B. Gurung, as

the first officer from the Third World as military advisor to the UN Secretary General on

PK0 103 and Lt. General Bala Nand Sharma as UN special representative of Security

General, Head of UN Mission, since 2006-07. The table below gives NA's involvement

in UNPKO until2007.

Table 111.10

Participation of NA in Different UNPKOs

S.No. !Mission [Year 1. IUNOGIL, Lebanon (Military Observers) 1958 2. UNIPOM, India/Pakistan (Military Observers) 1966 3. UNEF II Sinai, Middle East (Peacekeeping Troops) 1974 4. UNIFIL, Lebanon (Peacekeeping Troops) 1978 5. UNGOMAP IIII, OSGAP IIIIIIII (Military Observers) 1989 6. UNMOT, Tajikistan 1989 7. UNIKOM Kuwait/Iraq (Force Commander) 1991 8. UNMIH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops) 1991 9. UNTSO, Israel , Middle- East (Chief of Staff) 1992 10. PNISOM; Somalia (Peacekeeping Troops)- 1993 11. IUNPFIUN PROF OR, Former Yugoslavia 1994 12. IUNGCI, Iraq (Peacekeeping Troops) 1995 13. IUNOMIL, Liberia(Military Observers) 1996 14. IUNTAES, Eastern Slovenia (Military Observers) ' 1996 15. iUNPREDEP, Macedonia (Military Observers) 1996 16. IUNMOP, Prevalaka (Military Observers) 1998 17. IUNOMSILIUNAMSIL, Sierra Leone (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 18. IUNAMETIUNTAETIUNMISET, East Timor (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 19. iUNFICYP, Cyprus (Force Commander) 1999 20. IUNMIK, Kosovo (Military Observers) 1999 21. IMONUC, DR Congo (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 22. IUNMEE, Ethiopia/Eritrea (Military Observers) ~000 23. IUNMIL, Liberia- Provost (Peacekeeping TroopS) ~003 24. IMINUCIIUNOCI, Ivory Coast (Military Observers) 2003 25. IUNOCI, Cote d'lvoire 2003 26. IMINUSTAH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops) 2004 27. IUNDOF, Israel/Syria (Force Commander & StaffiS 2004 28. IONUB, Burundi (Peacekeeping Troops) 2004 29. ~S, Sudan (Peacekeeping Troops) 12004 30. IUNIFIL (Lebanon) 2006

I 31. IUNOMIG(Georgia) 2007 32 MINURCAT, Chad (Military Observers) 2008 33 UNAMI, Iraq 2008

UNMIT, Timor-Leste 12008 Source:http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/pk/peace support operatJons.php?hdng=Peace%20Support

103 ·~shok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co, 2005

155

%200perations&pg=l. Server date 21 March, 2008; http://www.nepalam1y.mil.np/na !:!.!lJ2!m, server date 24 July 201 0.

It has demonstrated its unique capacity of sustaining large troop commitments over

prolonged periods. Presently;·Nepal is ranked as the fourth largest troop contributing

country {TCC) to the UN. As a "peace loving and non-aligned nation", NA's image has

remained ideal in strengthening the world body for international peace and s~curity. The

NA is now deployed across 31 missions around the world, namely Congo, Liberia,

Kosovo, Lebanon, Israel, Haiti, etc. In addition, NA has sent an officer to the UN HQ .. Mission Planning Cell and one liaison officer at Tampa Bay, Florida. However, the

appointment of senior officers of NA in New York and in the field has ,not been I

satisfactory as expected104• Comparatively, Senior Officers from developed countries are

I

mostly in dominant position of UNPKO in the ratio of the participation of fonned units

from different countries of the world. Similarly, the upper caste officers from Nepal,

especially from the "warrior clan", have got the opportunity of being represented in

UNPKO; officers mostly from marginalized socio-economic background and having no

linkage with military authority and royal palace get the chance. It is because there are

fixed criteria to select the officers in UNPK0105• Only the· officers who have good

exposure, advanced training and skill development opportunities can be selected, but

these opportunities can hardly be provided to the personnel from the deprived sections

and· committees in N~pal Army in comparison to the high castes.

Similarly, officers from the developing country in higher ranks of UNPKO have less I

<fhance to meet the criteria compared to those of developed countries. Several officers and

non-bfficer , ranking soldiers are not satisfied with the selection process of NA

participating in UNPKO, which is clear in document106 but not transparent in practice. '

Even wives and children of retired military officers expressed grievances that they never

got the chance to leave the country because their husbands could not become military

104 Ibid, p.3 105 Ibid. 106A commanding officer, a Subedar Major, one platoon, and a battalion flag are chosen as the nucleus. 600

soldiers are selected from across the Army and another 200 are chosen for outstanding contribution to the RNA by the method given here: (I) about 25% of the battalion strength is made up of soldiers recommended by their unit commanders for the exceptional work and bravery that they have shown during operations against insurgents in the country, and (2) working on the quotas distributed by RNA Department ofPKO to the various units of RNA, the other 75% is also selected by the unit commanders according to seniority, discipline and other factors and guidelines as prescribed by the department.

156

attaches in Nepal Embassies in overseas countries.

As· a troop contributing nation, Nepal ranks fourth m the South Asian region and

currently Nepal Army has 3,112 soldiers serving in different missions around the world.

It ~as contributed directly to the foreign policy of the state. It provides an opportunity to

be experienced having exposure that directly helps the participants for enhancing their

professional qualification. In addition, the economic benefit accruing to the personnel can

ease the financial burden of the personnel. Money sent by the soldiers is also used as WF,

'/hich can be used for the dependants of the retired and in-service soldiers for medical

treatment, schooling, vocational or skill development trainings, etc. 107

One of the attractions of a job in NA is the service opportunity in UNPKO. In spite of ad

hoc recruitment system; unattractive pay, pension and perks, and absence of a regimental

system, camaraderie gap between officers and soldiers and between officers themselves,

rampant "corruption ... at various levels, especially at the very top" 108 and low morale,

Nepali youth join the NA with an eye on a lucrative UNPKO mission. By serving one

year in the UNPKO, a soldier earns a handsome amount of money, which cannot be

earned even during his entire service period in the NA. Thus, on the suggestion of a

fl.eighbouring country, India, and some intellectuals in Nepal, to suspend UNPKO and

mo,bilize NA for counter-insurgency services to avert the threat of the Maoist insurgency

in the past, the COAS viewed that such a move would lower the troops' morale and lead

to a decline in recruitment109. Each soldier contributes 12% of his UN emoluments to the

NA Welfare Fund (WF) 110. The WF source entirely depends on the contributions of the

soldiers directly or indirectly. Not only general people, but also ex-military men started

charging the NA authority for increasingly using the WF for corruption purposes, as its

status was not publicized in spite of the claim of the concerned people for their right to be

informed. The criteria, such as collection and use of the WF, its transparency, decisive

body to change or make relevant policies, etc., has been published in 2006 111, after the

Supreme Court ordered for the fourth time in 2006 to publicize its audit. Prior to this,

107 NA, Kalyankari Darpan, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2006, p.4-32 108 Ashok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2005. 109 KantipurDai/y 3 August 2005. 110 NA Kalyankari Darpan, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2006, p. 5.

157

there was no transparency 112 and no one was clear about the Fund. People defame the

NA without sufficient knowledge of the use of the fund 113•

The question of the general public about how the process is being operated and how

much money is collected in the name of the 'fund', is now answered by RNA in a book

distributed to the upper ranking officers or conscious personnel and officers. However,

general soldiers and the staff are not aware of how much money they get from UN, what

expenses have been made for sending them in the mission, how much from their side has

been deducted towards WF, and how can they be benefited from the Fund. Soldiers know

what kind of facility they are getting and will be getting from the NA, but they do not

know how they are benefited from the Fund. They do have the tradition to clear soldiers'

doubts from higher officers, or concerned body ofNA, if they ask. They could easily ask

'why a small sum of two rupees was cut in Ashbin from their salary to celebrate Dashain,

but could not question about the handsome amount of money that came from the UN

directly to the NA institution for services rendered by them, and the deductions made

towards WF114• (They do not know exactly how much money they get from the UN and

how much NA cut for the WF 115). Most facilities given to the soldiers and their

dependants are managed from the WF (NA 2006). There is unconfinned rumour that out

of this fund, abuse has been reported. A case was also filed in the Supreme Court which

asked for clarification from the Military Headquarters. Only then, Kalyankari Darpan

was published clearing the doubt.

Corruption cannot be ruled out even in NA, but this does not mean that it prevailed at

each and every level. Only the high-ranking officers involved in the decision-making and

execution process, having a leading role in other units, might have the chance to misuse

and abuse their authority of power. Not only the WF, but also other funds allocated under

.. 111 Kalyankari Darpan, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2006. 112 See, Ashok K. (Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa

Co.2005. • 113 According to Ashok K. Mehta, each soldier contributes 30% from his UN emoluments in the fund. It is

reportedly said that one has to sacrifice more than 50% remittance for the fund but one of the retired Major General cleared "40% remittance should be contributed in Welfare Fund of Nepal Army". It seems there is some gap in understanding.about the fund even in the higher-ranking military officers. The retired officer shared his experience that a Colonel can get about US$ 1000, but $ 400 should be contributed in WF.

114 The COAS, Rukmangad Katuwal during the interview with the author. 115 Based on interview t~ken by the. researcher with Major General (Retd.) Dilip Karki.

158

different headings might be misused. "Officers leading road cor~struction, bridge

construction, artillery arrangement, logistic arrangement, selection of soldiers to send in

UNPKO are reportedly charged with corruption even from the people within the

institution, but it can be claimed that the level of corruption in NA in comparison to the

civil institutions and other security organs is "less or rare" 116• Ministry of Finance also

justified the logic, as they find well-managed documents with comparatively good

auditing117, compared to other governmental institutions.

Opportunities for Education and Training

To provide a pre-mission training for Nepali Contingents participating in PKOs in the

country, Birendra Peace Operations Training Centre (BPOTC) was established in 1986

on an ad hoc basis but it turned into a full-fledged POTC after organizing international '·

platoon sized exercise in 2002. The centre as a training institution was established

formally in November 2001 118•

Table III.ll

Military Educational Institutions and Training Centers in Nepal

~.No. IMilitarv Educational Institutions Nature of Work/Education 1. Nepal Army Command and Staff College Shivapuri ~. Nepal Army School Nagarkot 3. Military Academy Kharipati 4. Nepal Army Recruit Training Centre Trishuli 5. !Nepal Army Jungle Warfare School A.inlekhguni 6. !Nepal Army High Altitude and Mountain Warfare School !Mustang 7. !Nepal Army Intelligence School !Kharipati 8. !Nepal Army Logistics School Chhauni 9. IBirendra Peace Keeping Operations Training Centre IPanchkhal 10. rrhe Nepal Army Para Training School IMaharaiguni 11. !Engineer Training School ~irport 12 .. Signal Training School [ripureswor 13 .. ~illery Training School !Lagankhel 14. lA viat10n Training Centre !Airport 15. !Electrical and Mechanical Training School. IK.hari oati Source: Va1dya et a!., 2049 VS. (1993), op c1t; RNA website www.ma.mil.np (as cited in Adhikari 200~:71).

Actually, Nepali Army started to be trained with the establishment of the Nepalese Army

School in Chhauni in 1953. Some army training and teaching schools are established with

116 Based on interview taken by the researcher with Lieutenant General (Retd.) BaJa Nand Sharma. 117 An experienced Joint-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance shared his experience with the researcher . about the corruption case in NA.

ns "Selection Criteria of Soldiers for Peacekeeping Operations", www.ma.mil.np , server date, 16 June 2004).

159

the establishment of companies and battalions in the field. The Nepal Army Air Service

consists of both helicopters and fixed wing transports with limited gro~nd suppoti

capability. Training assistance is funded by an annual International Military Education

and Training Programme (!MET) grant, with physical training assistance provided by .. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the UK and the US. Now, NA has established many army

level academies and schools under the Directorate General of Military, Training . I

(DGMT) 119 as given above, to develop a professional performance in the military

leadership and subordinates.

NA in Developmental Activities

Nepal has been usin~ NA as "one of the most efficient or trained manpower and

resourcesj cost effective and dedicated machineries" for development and support of

national progress for many decades. Except its role in 'Malami, Shalami and Gulami'

(funeral procession, salute and buttering) popularly tenned after 1950, the NA has been

involved in civilian developmental activities like construction of roads and bridges,

construction of schools, natural conservation works and social service. The table below

shows NA's contribution in road construction in the country.

Table 111.12

Roads Constructed by NA

~.No. !Name of the Road \Length 1. IK.antirajpaht, Kathmandu-Birgunj* 60 miles 12. IPasang Lhamu Highway, Trisuli-Somdang* 105 km 13. IKattari-Okhaldhunga road 88 km 14. Salyan-Mushikot road 86km 5. IHile-Bhojpur road* 82 km 6. IMushikot-Burtibang 145 km t?. IDevasthal-Kainkanda road 131 km 8. Surkhet-Jumla road 1232 km 9. IBaglung-Beni-Jomsong road 60km 10. IBeshisahar-Chame road 65 km 11. Chhinchu-Jaiarkot road 107 km 12. IDrabya Shah Marga, Abuba-Sirandada Bhakshek, Gorkha# 145 km 13. Satdobato Nibel, Baluwa Sadak# 37 km 14. IGorkha Manokamana Road# ~9km 15. Gorkha Arughat-Arkhet Road# 145 km

Source: *Royal Nepal Army's website www.ma.mil.np, 10 February 2006

# The roads were constructed under the integrated security development programme project scheme after

119 Tulsi Ram Vaidya, eta!. Nepallw Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jiillgi Adda 2049 VS.(l993); and also RNA website www.ma.mil.np

160

2000 in the Maoists affected districts, hty?://www.nepalanny.mil.np/stn/images/Sadak.pdf, 3 January 2008.

NA has also been active in rescue missions of natural calamities such as landslides,

floods, earthquakes, fire, epidemics and other accidents related to the ground and air. It is

¥so engaged in protecting national parks and wildlife reserves. Similarly, the NA has

been instrumental in opening up remote areas through rugged mountainous terrain with a

large number of road and bridging projects at less cost. Military engagement in

construction and development activities, guarding the installation and important areas and

involvement of military in UNPKO was started during the Panchayat period and

continues till today. The engagement of military in development activities became

finimciitlly helpful in making the soldiers sustain their family. Now military officers are

worried about the side-effects that reduce the quality of soldiers, if the soldiers are

diverted for a long time in developmental activities leaving their training and education.

In their opinion, it is better to develop a separate construction unit in the military

organization to confine to such works 120•

In addition, the NA ha:s been continuously involved through its short and long range

patrolling even by foot in the conservation of National Parks and Endangered Species and

other animals 121 since 1975 AD due to the rugged geographical structure and limitation of

inotorable roads. There are 22 protected areas covering some 26,921 sq. kms in Nepal

today, including 9 National Parks (NP), and 4 Wild Life Reserves (WLF). The NA

protects no less than 11 of the most critical areas covering 9,767 sq. kms with some 4,897

troops in 13 battalions/independent companies 122• Total area of parks/reserves conserved

by' the NA is about 9,767 sq. kms. See table below on the trend of Nepal Army's

involvement for natural conservation.

120 Most retired officers have viewed that NA's involvement in developmental activities is decreasing the

quality of NA as it is a non-military job but officers in service have contradicted the view. They mentioned that the activity is the chann of NA recruiting as soldiers for whom it is an extra source of money.

121 RNA, Sipahi, No. 37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004. 122

It was recorded in RNA website, www.ma.mil.np, accessed on 10 February 2006).

161

Table 111.13

RNA's Involvement for Natural Conservation (Parks/Reserves)

js.N·o. !Parks/Reserves ~attalion/Company ~ince BS !Area 1/sq. km)

1. Shivapuri National Park, Shivapuri rrokha Battalion 2060/9/13 144 2. !Royal Chitwan National Park, Kasara Chitwan Battalion 2060/01/1 932

~· 11-angta~ National Park, Dhunche !Rasuwa Battalion ~059/2/18 1,710 f4 .. Sagarmatha Wildlife Reserve, Namche Solukhumbu Company 12059/12/21 1,148 5. !Koshi T~u Wildlife Reserve, Kulaha Sunsari Company 12059/10/18 175 6 .. IParsa Wildlife Reserve, Adhabhar IParsa Company 2058/3/1 [499 7. !Royal Bardiya National Park, Purba Chisapani IBardiya Company 2060/2/15 608 8. Royal Bard~ National Park, Thakurdwara Bardiya Battalion 2059/1/26 J60 ~. Shey Phoksundo National Park DolQ_a Com_pa~ 2060/2/18 3,555 10. Rara National Park, Rara Mugu Company 2060/2/5 106 11.' Khaptad National Park, Khaptad Bajura Company 2059/12/15 225 12. Shahi Suklaphanta Wildlife Reserve, Majha Gaun Kanchanpur Company 2057/12/26 155 13. Royal Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve, Arjuni Kanchanpur Company 2060/8/27 150 .. Source: Nepal Army's website www.rna.mil.np, 10 February 2006 Indra Adh1kan, Mzlztary Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Delhi, 2006, p.73.

Ariother main role of units deployed for conservation is the protection of endangered wild

animals, vegetation, habitat of the parks and reserves, and for controlling the

encroachment, illegal poaching and deforestation for protecting plants and natural

'heritage as well (NA 2004). The tasks carried out for the fulfilment of that role are: (1) to

arrange foot and mounted patrols inside the areas, (2) to take necessary action, in

coordination with the forest wardens, against unlawful encroachers and poachers, (3) to

take measures to protect the forests, such as to assist in habitat preservation and research

activities, assist the local populace and civil authorities during natural calamities and

disasters, and assist the local population through social activities 123•

Similarly, the deployment of' the NA in preservation duties under the Directorate of NP

and WLF has not only assisted in protecting the habitat, but also directly helped save

many endangered species like the one-homed rhinoceros, wild buffalo, Royal Bengal

tiger, musk deer, magar/gharial crocodiles, snow leopards and various types of birds.

Government of Nepal has been deploying NA in disaster relief124 viewing the NA as an

inseparable agency in Disaster Relief Operations. Nepal's status as a developing country

. has not afforded the high costs of maintaining a separate disaster relief organization. I

· Cons~quently, the NA has been providing emergency assistance or relief during floods,

. 123 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepalese Army#Domestic Operations 124 - -

NA, Sipahi, No. 37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004.

162

earthquakes, avalanches, fires, landslides, air and other transportation disasters, to needy

people all over the country because125 of the unique suitability and capability of the

armed forces to respond effectively to such incidents that is less likely from any civilian

organization.

The primary roles of the NA in disaster relief are: search & rescue missions, medical

assistance & evacuation, air rescue, mass evacuation, flood control, etc126• Nepal Anny

has already been involved in disaster relief and rescue missions in more than two dozen

operations all over the country till 3 December 2007127• The NA has been protecting

different types of rare plants llaving vital medicinal value, such as Yarcha Gumba, Panch

Amle and Jatamasi, from some areas of the country especially the high mountainous

region. It also has been providing support to various experts for research work on natural

conservation, wild species rehabilitation, maintaining a database of the number of wild

species, as well as providing bas~.c information about natural conservation128.

Role of Military Commanders

The institution of military can never be and should not be democratic, if you define

democracy as recognition of opposition129• The major character of a military institution is

a single command system on the basis of pyramid hierarchical organizational system, and

periodic change of th<i military commander systemically. The success and failure of the

command depends on his capacity to fonn unity of command regiments under him and

control them in accordance with th,e security strategy of the institution and policy of

goyernment. There is a single command system at all levels, and each command should

be informed about the expectation of the supreme command that is accountable directly

to ,the government. No one can raise any question against it and ignore the order of the '

respective command. Authority exists with the Supreme Commander, who delegates it to

tis (http/ I :www .nepalarmy.mil.np/stnlindex/php?hdng=Disaster"/o20Reli ef&pg= I). 126 Some remarkable incidents, where the NA has served the people in this regard, are the infamous and

· highly devastating earthquake in 1990 BS (1933), the damaging earthquake in East Nepal in 2045 BS (198a), the plane crash of Pakistan International Airlines, the Thai Airways jet crash in mountain terrain, etc. (NA website www.ma.rnil.np, 10 February 2006).

127 (htto//:www.nepalarmy.mil.np/stn/index/php?hdng=Disaster"/o20Relief&pg=l). 128 NA, Sipahi, No. 37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004. 129General Rukmangad Katuwal, then COAS, shared his view in an interview taken by the researcher

during field visit.

163

a lower command. It is not only' essential to conduct campaigns and combat for wars, but

also to maintain the professionalism during the peacetime. The Commander-in-Chief or '

COAS is only the 1authority to· direct and order subordinates to perform duties or to

accomplish actions to attain military objectives. Only he has the legal authority to assign

duties to all his subordinates. Therefore, the military commander is unchallengeable

within the organization and the supremacy of his leadership differs from other civil

institutions.

Vision, fteedom of action under the assigned job and responsibility are perceived as

Command philosophy, where the commander is accountable to the government and

responsible in all aspects of the organization, including operations and administration.

The commanders at all levels, who comply with different degrees of command authority

according to the concept of chain of command, are equally responsible to make a

successful Chief Commander130• All subordinates should be under their respective

command, and high-ranking commanders under the supreme command, that is called

military discipline and hierarchy. The authority of the commander differs according to

tradition, circumstances, personalities and deliberate limitations imposed by the

command process. The socio-economic background and educational status of the

commander that help to create personal character and capacity of the Chief Commander

are also equally significant for effectively organizing, maintaining, controlling and

moving the military. Similarly, the national and international political environment and

security situation also help to determine the role of military Chief in the cmTent situation.

Most importantly, it seems that military training, orientation, its culture and tradition are

.also the contributing factors to create and guide the military leadership and to determine

how he plays his professional role.

Commanders-in-Chief ofNA and their Background

The first Commander-in-Chief of Nepal Army was P.N. Shah himself, under whom the

·military was formed, controlled and commanded. The first civilian Commanding Chief of

Nepal Army was Kaji Kalu Pandey who had played a vital role during the unification of

Nepal under P.N. Shah in the initial stage. Though he has been recognized as the first

.130 NA, Sipahi- Yearly-37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004, p.87; Ratindra Khatri, "Military Command", Sipahi

(Annual)=41, Kathmandu: Nepal Army Head Quarters, 2008.

164

Chief of Army Staff only because of his role and responsibilities, at that time the post of

<6ommander-in-Chief or COAS was not termed by formalization of role and

responsibility of the post. The second and third army chiefs were both the elder and

younger sons of Kalu Pandey - Kaji Bamsha Raj Pandey and Kaji Damodar Pandey,

respectively. The fourth Chief of Nepal Army was Aviman Singh Basnet, son of Shiva

Singh Basnet, whose contribution in the wake of unification of Nepal is highly

appreciated in the military history of Nepal. Bhimsen Thapa, who started his military

profession from the post ofSubedar and ADC of the then prince- Surendra Bikram Shah,

wa~ the fifth civilian Commander-in-Chief of army staff with the portfolio of Mukhtiyar

(prime minister), then head of both civil government and military institution. Thapa was

the grandson of Bal Bhadra Thapa a renowned contributor for unification of Nepal and

sori of General Amar Singh Thapa who is different from Kaji Amar Singh 131, as

Balabhadra and Kaji Amar Singh were highly honoured for their militarily courage not

only by the Shah dynasty of Nepal, but also by the "Imperial British in India". The sixth

Commander was Kaji Rana Jang Pandey, middle son of Damodar Pandey and grandson

ofKalu Pandey. The seventh Chief of Nepal Army was Mathbar Singh Thapa, grandson

of General Amar Singh and nephew ofBhimsen Thapa132.

During the Rana regime (1846-1950) in Nepal, Rana members commanded the military

on: the basis of role of succession propounded by J ang Bahadur Rana in 1846133, though

coup and counter coups had been hatched by the strongest Rana member to get the

chance even before his role of succession. Thus, there could not be any rotational as its

spirit and the command could not go out of hand of the Ranas, because only members of

the Rana family and their loyal relatives occupied the top-most ten ranks of the military.

The subjects (general people) could serve in the military as sipahis (soldiers). The

Commander-in-Chief was the second position of the governing hierarchy of the state just

under His Highness, Sri 3 Maharaj, who was supreme Commander-in-Chief. 16 male

members on the basis of seniority were in the rotational queue of the military hierarchy.

Most of them were brothers of Jang Bahadur Rana, then his sons. The table given below

131 General was hOnored by Bhimsen to his father, but Kaji Amar Singh Thapa was a commander who fought with British East India Company during 1614-15 that concluded in Sugauli Treaty.

132 Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chiefs: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999: 15-53. 133 Satish Kumar, Rana Polity in Nepal: Origin and Growth, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.

2nd edition, 1967 reprinted in 1993.

165

shows the COASs during the Rana Period, and their family concoction.

J.B. Rana was the first Commander-in-Chief and His Highness of Rana family then

Krjshna Bahadur Rana, Ranodip Singh Rana, Jagat Shamsher Rana, Dhir Shamsher,

respectively had been guaranteed and commissioned later in the post of Commander-in­

Chief. The sixth Commander-in-Chief of army from Rana family was Jit Jang Rana, the

second son of JB. Rana. Then five sons of Dhir Shamsher (K.hadga SJBR, Rana SJBR,

Dev SJBR, Chandra SJBR, Bhim SJBR and Judda SJBR, respectively) were continuously

one after another commissioned in the post through coup and counter coup flouting the

role of succession. Again, the sons of Chandra SJBR- Mohan SJBR, Babar SJBR and

Keshar SJBR--commanded military using merely the same method until the reforms in

the military after 1950134• Almost all chief commanders of Nepal Army before the

establishment of Rana oligarchy were members of noble families originating from

Gorkha principality - Thapa, Basnet and Pandey only. During the Shah period, the

military was the domain of the king and COAS was his confidante who was picked up

from the core group of senior officers of military. During the Rana rule, the Ranas were

designated as m,ilhary officers from their very birth. As a result, several other people such

as Gurung, Magar, Rai,' Limbu, Newar, even Chhetri K.hadka, who had been contributing

their mite to the country,' could not get the chance to control and command the military .. till today. Such a situation has continued until quite recently.

Bhimsen Thapa, for the first time, termed Commander-in-Chief of Anny as the COAS of

military organization in modem term. From that day only 35 COAS from the family

·members of Gorkha-based Bhar~ars or courtiers got the opportunity to serve the NA till

2007. General Rukmangud Katuwal is an exception as he comes from the eastern hill

district of Nepal and does not belong to the traditional elite families. Among the· COAS, 7

.were non-Rana Chlletris including Shah, but the rest were Ranas. Even Genenil Katuwal,

is a royal protege adopted by King Mahendra and Queen Ratna. His loyalty to the Palace

was the guiding factor for being appointed as Second-in-Command and was promoted by

the interim government after the end of absolute monarchical rule inN epal in 2006.

134 Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chi eft: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999.

pp.55-l 06.

Table lll.14

Chiefs ofthe Army StaffofNA from 1950 to 1990

~- !Name rostl !Recruited Education Levell !Father's !Relatives in Army ppportunity After ~0. Duration !Post/Date Institution !Designation in NA - IRetirement

1. !Field t-in-C !Direct Entrance passed !General & Former lfM Surendra B Shah, SIL lfhe first Nepali Ambassador !Marshal 12008/l/30- peneral Kolkata lc-in-C Dhir SJBR ILK Siris Chandra Shah, GS o UK in 1947, the first !His 200817/30 University, India !ADC, LK Budhendra B Shah BIL ~bassador to USA in lfiighness - IBG Sadip B Shah, GS 194 7, and Ambassador to !Keshar jcMC, MG Shanta K Malla, SIL !France in SJBR ic, ADC, Prakash Bikram Shah, SIL 1947

~- Oeneral 1951-56 !Direct !Former C-in-C !CoL Kama Bikram Shah, SIL ~ !Ambassador to UK during

~ranSJR ~

peneral ~uddha !General Rajendra Pd Shah 1973-77 including court of SJBR !Col Lalit Bikeam Shah !st. James to Notway,

IMG Dharma B Shingh, BIL Sweden, Denmark, !MJ, ADC Bharat Keshar Sing_h, C Winland and Scotland.

3. General 'J013/217- Pirect Schooling in !Former C-in-C Bir !Brothers BG Balaram SJBR and Toran 2017/217 Lt. Colonel IDarbar HS, SJBRGF, jcol. Laxrnan SJBR SJBR 197(J BS matriculation Patna, !commanding Col.

India LSc. Indra SJBR-F uncompleted

4. FMNir ~017/217- Direct Major ISanti Niketan, !Former C-in-C Major Diwakar SJBR- son SJBR ~022/1115 in 1988 BS !Kathmandu in 1Oth phir SJBR-GF

by C-in-C !class and two years !Former C-in-C Juddhaand ~tudy in Banarash ~uddha SJBR Sri3 Bhim !Hindu School, Shamsher [but uncompleted. first time of jDarbar School Nepal !Matriculation History) ~ncompleted

5. p.FM :2022/l/15- Direct !B.A. pass iflis Highness Major. Devendra BDR Shah- son & Surendra 2027/l/28 Captain ~rom Pehendra Bahadur d. Col. Srishchandra Shah, son IBahadur n 1995 Wlahabad Shah, His Highness Sri 3 Kesher SJBR, FIL Shah !University, lndia lsalyani king

8.

osephs Convent, India,

atriculation from e al

xamination assed from entral High School, dia and B.A.

.AfromBHU, dia but B.A.

ncompleted

F, Chief Col. anshing Basnet Engineer F

hakta BDR Basnet

F C-in-C Khadga father BG Hasta

JBR

F - MG Bhairab arsingh Rana & ather - Lieutenant ol. Narahari

aptain. Dibya Bdr Basnet, . Col. Prakash Bdr Basnet -

rothers, Engineer Col. Tilak Bdr imajhi- father-in-law~

ajorUjjwal Singh- son, G. Dharmapal

arsingh Thapa - SIL

ormer SP. Chiranchivi Rana- brother

rother- G Mohan Pratap Shah, ousin- Former C-in-C G. Aijun arsinghJBR

rother- Major Dhurba Narsingh na,

-in-law-GM. Gehendra Shamsher Thapa,

aughter - Major Dr. Arya Pandey, aughters-in-law- Col. Gyan

ang Thapa, & Major Dr. Rajiv Pandey (wife-husband)

F - G. Pratap SJBR Son - Llieutenant Sadaya SJBR ather-G Madhab SJBR

167

ember of Raj Shava in 2032 V ember of Commission

or Constitutional Body eform in 2032, epali Ambassador to Arab epublic Egypt during -035-39 VS.

orked as Nepali bassador to People's

epublic China during 039-042 VS.

orked as an bassador to Germany

or five years after 2042. etherlands, Greece, uxemburg, Switzerland, ugoslavia, Austria, eheran and Vatican

bassador to Pakistan ·ncluding Iran, Turkey, Syria or four years from 1988.

orked as Ambassador to Burma

*There was Commander-in-Chief in stat of COAS and the Commander-in-Chief used to be terminated after 5 years but duration the COAS was fixed just for four years.

But the term of Nepali remained the same "Pradhan Senapati" with the same responsibility. * (star) used above indicated hierarchy of Generals.

FM =Field Marshal; C-in-C =Commander-in-Chief; G =General; C =Cousin; BIL =Brother-in-law, SIL = Sister-in-Law, FIL =Father-in-law, MG = Major General.

168

The method of comrhissioning of Commander-in-Chief was changed after 1950.

Promotion and recruitment system was introduced, the strength of military was reduced

but the high-ranking officers could not be changed because no one except the Ranas

co~ld be the COAS. Similarly, the general people could not meet the required

qualification fixed, after 1950 in commissioning directly at the officer level. Since the

Rana generals and other officers enjoyed a luxurious life in the past, they were not at all

anxious to develop professionalism in the army. The members of the traditional elite

families thus continued to be the commanders in the army. The kings who were also

.relatives of the Ranas by marriage revived the old family tradition by confining the top

army post to the Rana, Shah, Thapa, Basnet, etc. After 1958, military refonn was

. introduced but could not make any departure from the past in the appointment of COAS

·and other important posts after their retirement: Member of Raj Parisad; ambassador to

·other countries; members of commissions; etc. 135• Hence, out of 10 COAS commissioned

. during the Panchayat period, 8 were Ranas, except 2, Surendra Bahadur Shah and Shimha

Bahadur Basnet, who got staff college training in Pakistan in 1951-52, prior to

establishment of Staff College in India, as officers trained in Pakistan were considered to

be ·good staff and commanders 136•

Sir,nilarly, education and training were not given preference for appointment of COAS

because upper ranking officers (lnd rulers, who did not have higher education, training in

warfare and statecraft, felt the threat from other castes and qualified persons. The old

mindset was not changed. The old officers recruited by the Rana rulers were continued

135 Kiran Shamsher worked during his service in military as Planning and Development State Minister under Tanka Prasad government in 1956; Member of Raj Sabha in 1963; Member of Planning Commission under Himalaya Bikram Shah; ADC of the kings during 1953-83 (three kings). Nir Shamsher initiated a change of Nepali Army into Royal Nepali Army and opened the lottery on the occasion of the birthday of King Mahendra. Surendra B. Shah had contributed as Member-Secretary in the process of reconstruction and reformation of militia after 1951; initiated NA in development work; Nepalized the English terms related to command structure and word of command to make military in present structure; Nepalized the military uniform which is used today; started providing health, treatment to the family members of military officers; sent RNA to UNIPOM for the first time in 6.12.2022; Sipahi magazine was started in 2025. Atjun Narasinha Rana was Member of Raj Parisad; got an Honorary General of Indian Army, and Honorary of ADC General of the king; established Birendra School for the children of soldiers. Most of the COAS during the Panchayat period (and even after 1990) were appointed as ambassadors of Nepal to other countries. See, Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chiefs: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999; Ratindra Khatri, "Military Command", Sipahi (Annual), Kathmandu: Nepal Army Head Quarters, 2008.

136 See, Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chiefs: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999.

169

regardless of change of governments and systems. No COAS during the Panchayat

regime had passed Bachelor's level except for getting professional training 137• It alone

became the sole criterion of promotion to higher posts. Hence, officers from other castes

regretted saying "that relationship between officer corps and non-officer soldiers, and

treatment between officers and soldiers was like the relation between landlord and tenant.

The tradition is still continuing138• However, addition qualifications such as education,

skill and capacity of men were only supplementary qualification in N A. One needs

exposures for promotion, but the opportunity could be provided only to those who have

strong influence in official level of NA. It is said that the unofficial channel was really

strong, which not only controls the official channel but was also decisive to detennine

who would get the training and other opportunities. Along with the age factor, the

opportunity ·for exposure, training, and capacity to influence through official and

unofficial channels, etc. are all important components to determine promotion and

opportunity to command the NA. However, the unofficial channel was not accessible to

general officers or soldiers. Even the ADC group of Royal family members was more

powerful than the officers in the NA. It has become essential to get training in the Staff

College in Nepal, the USA, the UK, India and Pakistan for getting promotioh in the NA.

Without knowledge and experience about modem weapons, instruments and warfare

·tactics, the military would not be professionally competent and internationally '·

recognized. Thus, NA has a criterion that Military Academy and Staff College Training is

a must for promotion for the posts above the rank of Major.

In short, among the ten Commanders-in-Chief after 1950 to 1990, seven were from the

Rana family, two were from the Shah family and one was from the Basnet family.

Similarly, the trend and tradition continued even after 1990 to 2007: two from Rana

family and two from Thapa family were promoted as a Commander-in-Chief, except ' . Rukmandad Katuwal. All together, nine from Rana family, two from Shah Family, two

I

from Thapa Family and one from Basnet Family served after 1950-2007. In 2009, the

leadership shifted to a general from ethnic community, Chhatra Man Singh Gurung. All

137 ·see, Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996.

138 Interview with Lt. General Bala Nand Sharma.

170

of them, except General Katuwal and Gurung139 were residents of Kathmandu Valley

migrated from Gorkha during.the unification of Nepal. No officers from ethnic or other

socio-economically marginalized people were promoted up to the level of Commander­

in-Chief till Mass Movement 2006. The table below shows how the class, caste and

character of leadership in national army remained the same, even after the political

changeinin1990

Table 111.15

Chiefs of the Army Staff ofNA and their Background after 1990 , I

I Name of the S.N

CO ASs Duration Date of Birth Place

1. Sachchit 15 May 1987 to

15 January 1934 Kathmandu Shamsher JBR 14 M<lY_ 1991

2. Gadul Shamsher 15 May 1991 to

20 March 1936 Kathmandu JBR 4 May 1995

3. Dharmapal Sinigh 15 May 1995 to

17 Sept. 1939 Kathmandu Thapa 14 May 1999

4. Prajwal Shamsher 19 May 1999 to

8 Sept. 1941 Kathmandu JBR 8 Sept. 2002

5. Pyarjang Thapa 9 Sept. 2002 to

15 Sept. 1946 Kathmandu 8 S~t. 2006

6. Rukmangad 9 Sept. 2006 to

10 July 1949 Okhaldhunga Katuwal 4 Sept 2009

7. ChhatraMan 5 Sept. 2009 to 18 July 1952 Tanahu Singh Gurung Till date

Source: Rajendra Upacharak (ed.), Bimochan: Nepali Sena Biseshaanka (Bimochan: Nepal Army Special Issue), Kathmandu: Bimarsa Pvt. Ltd, 2008, pp. 83-85.

The interim government formed after the successful movement promoted and appointed

General Katuwal as COAS and the interim government formed through CA promoted

General Gurung at that level. Thus, it can be observed that the beginning has just been

made for the improvement of the NA. The appointment of General Katuwal as COAS

heralds such a beginning. As he comes from the non-elite family of the remote hill

district, his present role in making the political transition smooth is noteworthy. Other

generals in line are also likely to follow this tradition, because most of them are really

from the so-called subject class not only by birth, but also by their socialization and

education like General Gurung.

139 Katuwal is from Okhaldhunga, a remote district of the eastern hill, and Gurung is from Tanahu, western hill ofNepal.