CHAPTER-II

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION: A

politico-historical examination

Chapter- 2

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

A Politico-Historical Examination

l.INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War was marked by the emergence of intra-state conflicts in

many parts of the world with threats not only to regional but also to international

peace and stability. It brought about sudden systemic changes in the geo-political

balance of power on regional and global levels. Since then, the concept of !

peacekeeping has come to occupy a major area ·of interest among the international

community. The recent past operations in Africa and Middle East have shown that

the traditional concept of peacekeeping is out- dated. As a result, despite several

UN peacekeeping efforts to stop conflicts, post Cold War world has witnessed

increasing number of conflicts where the casualty of both peacekeepers and the

civilian population was very high. Most of these disputes were caused by .ethno-

nationalist conflicts. These conflicts pose a threat to the neighbouring states of

multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies, like the one which took place in the former

Soviet Union republics. The massive displacement and flow of a large number of

refugees into the bordering countries as well as to the whole continent has

remained one of the major characteristics of these conflicts.

In this context, it is quite true that the sudden surfacing of ethnic conflicts

in Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) on the one hand and rise of

Islamic fundamentalism with its increased terror activities in southern Russia

Federation on the other posed a threat to Russia's national security. It was this

development, which challenged the national security in the post-Soviet

environment that led to the formulation of a new function of the Russian military

i.e. the role of peacekeeping in order to keep and restore peace in the region.

Therefore, Russia for the first time incorporated conflict management including

peacekeeping activity as a necessary measure for this conflict in their National

Security Concept of 1993.

15

This Chapter examines the evolution and development of peacekeeping in

the post War international system. It will further outline the changing concept and

practices of the peacekeeping mission in the post Cold War period. It also

focussses on the Russian approaches to peacekeeping operations as well as its

evolution. However, the main theme of this chapter is to analyse some of existing

theories of peacekeeping in post Cold War intra-state conflicts and its implications

for Russian peacekeeping operations in the CIS.

Before proceeding further, it would however be in place to undertake a

brief examination of the concepts which are frequently employed In peace

operations both in the field as well as in the academic literature.

2. PEACEMAKING, PEACE-ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEBUILDING:

A Conceptual Clarification

In the studies of peace and conflict, confusion often arises over the use of concepts

such as peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building as these are often

employed interchangeably. Whereas both peacekeeping and peacemaking are

interrelated, they are distinct from each other. Peacekeeping is only a supplement

to the peacemaking mode. However, the complexity of conflicts and lack of

peacekeeping contribution from the member states sometimes led peacekeeping to

drift into peace-enforcement.

2.1. Peacemaking

Peacemaking refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict

to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement to their dispute. Article

33 of the UN Charter mentions some of the specific tools of peacemaking. It states

that the disputing parties should seek a solution through negotiation, enquiry,

mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies

or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice (United Nations

2003: 19). Peacemaking according to Boutros-Ghali is the 'action to bring hostile

parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in

Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. As in the case of peacekeeping,

16

the end of the cold war has further strengthened the efforts of the UN to revive and

revamp its peacemaking function in world politics.

The Secretary General plays a central role in peacemaking, both personally

and by dispatching special envoys or missions for specific tasks, such as

negotiation or fact-finding. Under the Charter, the Secretary General may bring to

the attention of the Security Council any matter which appears to threaten

international peace and security. For instance, the mediation by the Secretary

General and his personal envoy led to the 1988 agreements that resulted in the

withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Both peacekeeping and

peacemaking are linked to each other in their efforts to bring an end to violent

confrontation. In their efforts to maintain international peace and security, both

peacekeeping and peacemaking use the same methods of mediation and

negotiation at the macro-level. In short, peacemaking can be defined as the

negotiation for agreements on disputes, whereas peacekeeping is the

implementation of those agreements.

2.2. Peace-building

Peace-building is the third main area of UN activity associated with the peaceful

settlement of disputes. Its relation to peacekeeping has received less attention than

the link between peacemaking and peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994: 131). Boutros

Ghali points to the importance of post-conflict Peace-building, which he defines as

the 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and

solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Boutros Ghali 1992: 11).

Peace-building, in short, can be defined as the process of UN efforts to reconstruct

economic and social development in the aftermath of a conflict. Thus, the UN

. often called upon its agencies to carry out peace-building- action to support

structures that will strengthen and consolidate peace. Some of its areas of function

include military security, civil law and order, human rights, elections, local

administration, health, and education (United Nations 1998b: 77).

17

2.3. Peace-intervention

Peace intervention is another method for the management of conflicts, which

became visible in post cold war international system also known as the post-

Westphalian international system (Ibid.). It is different from traditional

peacekeeping operations both in the nature of intervention as well as the

participant countries. Under this method, a superpower like the US intervenes in

other country's internal affairs or sovereignty. The intervention can be in the name !

of bringing about reforms or to remove the so called 'ro.gue regimes' that are

believed to violate human rights or disturb international peace. Peace intervention

is based on a unilateral use of military power by the super powers for their own

interests and thus, undermines the basis of sovereignty of the nation state.

2.4. Peace-enforcement

Peace-enforcement is another means for conflict prevention, management and

resolution, particularly in the post Cold War intra-state conflicts. It is neither

specifically mentioned in the UN Charter nor is it a part of peacekeeping. Peace-

enforcement is presumed to be derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. An

Agenda for Peace has suggested for the formation of peace enforcement units with

the tasks of restoring peace and maintaining ceasefire. In fact, peace-enforcement

arose only after the publications of An Agenda for Peace in June 1992 and The

Supplement to An Agenda for Peace in 1995.

In contrast to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement involves use of force.

Peace enforcement units "would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping

forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their

national forces" (Groom 1998:18). In Peace-enforcement, the consent of the

warring parties is not required (Boutros Ghali 2003: 8). It involves coercing one or

more of the parties to a conflict to reach a settlement or a capitulation or to do

something else which it would no be inclined to otherwise do (Finlay 1997: 34). It

is something more or less similar to Peace-intervention.

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3. BACKGROUND: Evolution and Development of Peacekeeping Missions

History reveals that most of the Post War conflicts have been inter-state disputes

(see table 1) which were based on the combined problems of decolonisation and

nationalist movements. Moreover, most of these conflicts were fought between the

former colonies and. their imperialist Western colonisers over the issues like the

demarcation of borders and the possession of natural resources. However, after the

end of Cold War most of the conflicts have been fought within the state. The

evolution and development of peacekeeping operations can be analysed under the

following two phases.

3.1 First Phase (1947-1988)

International peacekeeping (UN Peacekeeping operations) was evolved to halt

armed conflicts or to stop hostilities so that they would not develop into broader

conflagration. The first UN peacekeeping mission was launched in 1947 during the

post War Balkans crisis. It was a mission to monitor ceasefire and engage in fact-

finding with small number of military personnel, but without enforcement powers.

This mission was followed by UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision

Organisation) for monitoring ceasefire along Israeli borders in 1948 (UNDPI

1998). However, the first armed UN peacekeeping operation was UNEF-I (United

Nations Emergency Forces), launched in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis

entrusted with the task of observing the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the British,

French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory.

The main functions of these missions were to monitor borders and establish \

buffer zones after the agreement of ceasefire. The missions were typically

composed of lightly armed soldiers from small and neutral UN member states.

Since then, the UN has established peacekeeping machinery from time to time and

formulated principles for peaceful settlements. By now, it has become an important

instrument for ensuring peace and stability in the world. However, as Cold War

politics suppressed the UN peacekeeping missions, they remained in a low profile

while extensive post World War II decolonisation in Africa, Asia and Middle East

needed the UN intervention.

19

•

Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War 1945-1985

MISSIONS YEARS D,ESCRIPTION'

UN Special Committee on 1947-51 Investigate outside support for the Balkans (UNSCOB) guerrillas in Greece.

UN Truce Supervision 1948 - Monitor cease-fire along Israeli Organisation (UNTSO) borders.

UN Military Observer 1949 - Monitor cease-fire in Jammu and Group in India and Kashmir. Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

UN Emergency Force 1956 - 67 Separate Egyptian and Israeli forces (UNEF I) in Sinai.

UN Observation Group in 1958 Monitor infiltration of arms and Lebanon (UNOGIL) troops into Lebanon from Syria.

UN Operation in the 1960 - 64 Render military assistance, restore Congo (ONUC) civil order.

UN Temporary Executive 1962 - 63 Keep order and administer W. New Authority (UNTEA) Guinea pending transfer to Indonesia

UN Yemen Observation 1963 - 64 Monitor infiltration into Yemen via Mission (UNYOM) Saudi border.

UN Force in Cyprus 1964 - Maintain order, from 1974 monitor (UNFICYP) buffer zone.

UN India Pakistan 1965 - 66 Monitor cease-fire in 1965 India-Observer Mission Pakistan War. (UNIPOM)

UN Emergency Force II 1974 -79 Separate Egyptian and Israeli forces (UNEF II) in Sinai.

UN Disengagement 1974 - Monitor separation of Syrian and Observer Force (UNDOF) Israeli forces on Golan Heights

UN Interim Force in 1978 - Establish buffer zone between Israel Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Lebanon.

Sources: UN Department of Public Infonnation (l998a) New York.

20

During this long period of Cold War, the Superpowers used peacekeeping

as an instrument to pursue their own interests. Peacekeeping was mainly conceived

by Western powers as a means of promoting the stability and friendly regimes as

well as for securing their economic interests in former colonies. However, during

the same period, Moscow maintained a low profile in the UN peacekeeping

missions until 1973 as the idea of peacekeeping contradicted its ideological

principles which was sought to be embodied in its foreign policy. Considering the

nature and origin of peacekeeping, Andreu Sola Martin opines that "peacekeeping

was initially a creation of power politics and a tool of conflict containment"

(Martin 2005: 1). However, the very concept of peacekeeping was born out of

necessity as the volatile problems of post War politics required active UN

intervention.

These traditional peacekeeping missions consist of a troop of not more than

10,000 military personnel (Diehl, Paul F. et al 1998: 33). The operations are

voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. Therefore, during this period,

the main developments in the field of peacekeeping were the ideas of consent from

the conflicting parties, impartiality and non-use of force as the three main

principles of peacekeeping.

3.2. Post Cold War Peacekeeping

Throughout Cold War period 13 peacekeeping operations has been recorded. But

the end of Cold War and replacement of traditional form of dispute i.e. inter-States

by intra-states conflict significantly increased the number of peacekeeping

missions since 1991 (SIPRI 1993: 86). For instance, four out of five peacekeeping

operations which had taken place in early 1988 were related to inter-state wars

(Boutros Ghali 1995: 7). However, out of II operations which took place from

1992 to 1995, only 2 were related to inter-State wars, whereas 9 were related to

intra-States conflicts (Ibid). These intra-States conflict became a common

phenomenon in the post Soviet environment. In fact, the sudden collapse of the

USSR was marked by the conflicts in Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova and separatist

movements in the Russian Federation. T H -16 7 87

21

3.2.1. Nature Post Cold War Conflict

The post Cold War conflicts were fought not only by regular armies but also by

militias and civilians with little discipline (Ibid. 1995: 8). In this loosely formed

militias and factions, the involvement of child soldiers became a common

phenomenon in most of the African continent. The uncertainty over the nature of

the causes along with a rise in the number of casualties among the UN peacekeeper

has characterised the post Cold War conflicts. Civilians became the main target of

violence. According to Dr Benjamin Seet', the increase in number and scale of

peacekeeping operations after the Cold War as well as change in nature and

characteristics of peacekeeping has been responsible for the increase in fatality of

peacekeepers. However, he also adds that the casualty of peacekeepers has also

increased from hostile acts after the Cold War. Therefore, it has been a

combination of direct hostilities as well as the disruption and deprivation from

attacks by the militias that has raised the fatality of peacekeepers in Asia and the

Middle-East. It has also been the cause behind the massive displacement and flow

of a large number of refugees toward the neighbouring countries.

This development is one of the pre-eminent features of the post Cold War

international system. Perhaps, it is because of the increasing use of guerrilla war

tactics without a clear front line. The publication of the report of enquiries into July

1994 Rwanda genocide and siege of Bosnian Muslims by Serb militias under the

eyes of the UN contingent confirms that the neutral, impartial and mediating role

of the UN has been proving to be inadequate (United Nations 1998a; United

Nations 1998b). In fact, the complexity of post Cold War intra-states conflict has

compelled a fundamental change in the nature of UN peacekeeping, particularly in

its functions and composition. This complexity in fact characterises the new

operational environment. Meanwhile, there has been an expansion of purpose and

objectives of missions. As a result, the UN Department of Peacekeeping

Operations was created in 1992 in order to provide for the increasing demand for

, Dr Seet was formerly with the Medical Support Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations.

22

such forces into the complex contlict zones and to deliver humanitarian assistance

and foster the process of post-conflict reconstruction.

3.2.2. New Developments in Peacekeeping

In above mentioned context, peacekeeping operations have come to be re-

conceptualised in order to adapt to evolving conditions and to carry out missions in

a more efficient and effective way. Both An Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi

Report on UN Peace Operationi have reflected this important evolution of

international peace operations from single function of monitoring/observing the

ceasefire to more active engagement. This new form of peacekeeping with

functions distinct from the traditional mission model has been referred to as "new

peacekeeping" (Rotner 1995) or "Second generation missions" (Mackinlay and

Chopra 1992). Though the missions that have taken place after Cold War are very

different one from another, they have been deployed under the same denomination

of Peacekeeping.

In its new avatar, peacekeeping includes multiple and diverse functions

such as Preventive Deployment, Peace enforcement, Humanitarian Assistance, and

Peace-building. Furthermore, it has expanded from traditional light armed troops to

a multi-dimensional mission with well-trained armies equipped with highly

sophisticated weapons. At the same time, the number of military personnel for

operations has also increased tremendously. For instance, in Cambodia, almost

30,000 soldiers were deployed as peacekeepers while in Bosnia, the number was

raised to 60,000 military personnel (Diehl, Paul F. et al 1998: 34). In October

2000, the surge in peacekeeping activity raised the number of peacekeeper to

54,000. The number of civilian police also increased to 5,900 and the civilian staff

to I 1,600. By the fall of 2006, the deployment number reached an all time high of

93,000 men and women. However, the operations were not completely military in

nature. Many Civilian police and diplomatic personnel, who were selected from a

variety of occupation, nations and cultures, were also included.

> - Since the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict.

23

A significant development in the UN peacekeeping lies in the nature of

troop contributions to the missions. In fact, until the end of Cold War the UN

peacekeeping operations deployed troops traditionally contributed by the smaller

states. But since 1990, every permanent member of the UN Security Council with

the exception of China has begun to contribute troops to an overseas peacekeeping

or humanitarian mission either sanctioned or sponsored by the UN. This

development was further accompanied by the increasing role of the regional

organisation as a regional peacekeeper, which became legitimate under chapter

VIII (article 52) of the UN Charter (UNDPI 2003: 34-36). In this context, the

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) soon became one of the powerful

regional peacekeepers. And its eastward expansion already reached the former

Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe and started to deploy peacekeepers in the

former Yugoslavia.

However, the basis of this new form of peacekeeping operations has been

challenged under article 2.7 of the UN Charter that requires respect for internal

state sovereignty. Under Chapter VIII (regional arrangement) many regional and

superpower nations have begun to intervene in the internal problems of developing

or third world countries under the principle of the humanitarian intervention. The

UN Security Council resolutions like, 680 of March 1991 on Iraq, Resolution 794

of December 1992 on Somalia and Resolution 940 of September 1994 on Haiti are

some of the resolutions under chapter VII of the UN Charter which are based on

this principle. The USA and its NATO allies are the main peacekeepers or

mediators under these resolutions. In fact, since 1990, it has been generally

accepted that most of the expansion in the UN peacekeeping operation has been

driven directly or indirectly by the policies of the US.

It has been generally criticised that countries like USA have contributed or

deployed their troop only to those regions or conflict zones where their national

interests are present. For instance, the American interventions in Iraq, Somalia and

Central Asia have been perceived to be not merely for ensuring peace but with an

eye to the region's natural resources like oil, gas and petroleum, diamond, other

precious stone. It is in the context of these new developments that Russia

24

conceived its new approach to peacekeeping operations In the CIS under the

regional arrangements clause in the UN Charter.

3.2.3. Rise of Regional Peacekeeping Operation

One of the new developments in post cold war peacekeeping is the emergence of

regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. The traditional structure of UN

peacekeeping forces comprises a number of contingents provided from selected

countries on the request of the UN Secretary General. The contingents were

selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned,

bearing in mind the need for equitable geographic representation. However, with

the increasing involvement of UN in the post Cold War complex emergencies, the

character of peacekeeping forces began to alter. These new risks and challenges

demanded peacekeeping forces with different characteristics than before (Alao et

a11999: 7).

In addition, due to the complicated nature of the post Cold War conflicts,

regional organisations, such as, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African

States), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), CSCE (Conference for

Security and Cooperation in Europe) and CIS (Commonwealth of Independence

States) under the leadership of Russian Federation started playing an important role

in peacekeeping operations. They used their collective geographical encirclement

of the crisis zone either to exert strong pressure to support the success of the peace

process or to ensure its failure.

The shrinking of the peace-restoring efforts by international forces is one of

the important causes behind the emergence of peacekeeping forces of regional

organisations. In some cases, regional peacekeeping arrangements or forces were

formed by the states at risk such as the Russia led CIS peacekeeping operation in

the CIS. The authors of the United Nations Charter mentioned the legal basis for

regional organisations to play an important role in the maintenance of international

peace and security under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Under this Chapter,

article 52 gives regional organisations or agencies the right to deal with such

matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are

25

appropriate for regional actions, while Article 53 talks about the enforcement

action by the regional organisation.

Table 2. UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Post Cold War (1991-2006)

Missions ·Years .;Description .. . .,', ........ '

UNIKOM, ONUSAL (UN 1991 Observatory mission in the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and in EI Salvador.);

UNAVEM II (UN Verification mISSIOn ill

Angola)

UNPROFOR (UN force in 1992 former Yugoslavia) and UNTAC (in Cambodia);

UNOSOM I (UN ill

Somalia); UNUMOZ (in Mozambique).

UNOSOM II (in Somalia); 1993

UNOMUR (in Uganda-Rwanda);

UNOMIC (in Georgia);

UNAMIR (i~ Rwanda).

UNMOT (in Tajikistan) 1994

UNAVEM III (in Angola); 1995 UNCRO (in Croatia); UNMIBH (in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

UN mission under the UNIKOM, ONUSAL and UNA VEM II were to monitor buffer zone after Gulf War Temporary armed component; to monitor human rights, elections, government restructuring; and to monitor general cease-fire and creation of new joint army respectively.

In former Yugoslavia the UN mission was to replace Yugoslav forces in Serbian controlled areas of Croatia. And in Cambodia the mission was to supervise government functions and eventual elections while rebuilding the country and disarming the factions.

As an observer Russia led CIS peacekeeping operation mission in Georgia

As an observer Russia led CIS peacekeeping operation mission in Tajikistan

For restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for Angola, signed on 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994, and relevant Security Council resolutions ...

26

UNSMIH (in Haiti); 1996 UNMOP (in Prevlaka),

MlNUGUA (in 1997 Gautemala); MONUA (in Angola)

UNOMSIL (in Sierra 1998 Leona)

UNMIK (in Kosovo); 1999 UNTAET (in East Timor)

UNMEE 2000

UNMISET (in East Timor) 2002

UNMIL (in Liberia) 2003

ONUB (in Burundi) 2004

To assist the Government m the professionalization of the police, maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of efforts to establish and train an effective national police force, and to coordinate activities of the United Nations system m promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation ...

To verify the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

To monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. It was also asked to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law.

To maintain liaison with the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire.

To provide assistance to East Timor over a period of two years until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities.

To support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.

To support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as

----+-pr--,~vided under the Arusha Agreement.

27

UNMIS (in Sudan) 2005

UNMIT (in Timor Leste) 2006

To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement! Army on 9 January 2005; and to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, and protection and promotion of human rights.

To support the Government in "consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion".

Sources: UN Department of Public Information, (1998) New York, and also see http://www . un.orglDeptsl dpko/missions

The Charter further reasserts that any action undertaken under Articles 53

requires the approval of the Security Council (UNDPI 2003: 34-36). But it is

important to note that this action of restriction does not apply to collective defence

operation which is undertaken in self-defence. Any coercive military action taken

outside the structures of self-defence would require approval of the Security

Council. In the same way, consent- based peacekeeping does not require Security

Council approval, as it falls under Articles 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter,

which provides for "resort to regional agencies or arrangements" as a first resort

for situations which may prove to be a threat to peace and security (Ibid.: 24).

During the Cold War era, some of the regional organisations played a prominent

part in dealing with conflicts and breaches of peace in their respective regions, for

instance, peacekeeping role played by the OAS (Organisation of American States)

in the Cuban crisis of 1962 as well as in Dominican Republic in 1965, and the

peacekeeping role played by the Arab League in 1976-83 during the Lebanon

crisis.

However, the nature of the their involvement often fell outside the

conceptual framework already identified for peacekeeping operations undertaken

by the United Nations, raising questions about the neutrality and impartiality by the

regional actors and peacekeepers (James 1990). None of these regional operations

28

was the result of any systematic co-operation with the United Nations. The

attempts to deal with conflict at the regional level were not allowed to be expanded

and tested in the climate of Cold War rivalry; many were marginalized, only to re-

emerge in the post-Cold War period. After the Cold War, the rise of coalition

forces deployed under the UN authority created opportunities to devise innovative

ways in which the United Nations could cooperate with regional structures in the

management of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Based on the characteristics and functions including the role of regional

peacekeepers and their force structures, Diehl, Druckman and James Wall classify

peacekeeping missions into twelve categories, which are:

a. Traditional peacekeeping

b. Observation mission

c. Collective enforcement mission

d. Election supervision mission

e. Humanitarian assistance mission

f. State/nation building mission

g. Pacification mission

h. Preventive deployment

i. Arms control verification mission

j. Protective service mission

k. Intervention mission (in support of democracy)

l. Sanctions enforcement.

4. BASIC FEATURES OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In practice, a broad consensus on characteristics of peacekeeping operations has

been evolved from time to time. Following are some of the new characteristics of

the UN peacekeeping operations.

4.1. Consent of the Parties

The main essential characteristic of peacekeeping operation is the consent of the

parties to the conflict. The consent is not only for the establishment of the

29

operation but also for the way in which it will carry out its mandate. Missions or

operations are significantly more complicated and dangerous when the consent is

only partial or limited to only one (or two) of the parties in the conflict. Therefore,

both the warring parties should be consulted about the countries which will

contribute troops to the operation. The operation must not interfere in internal

affairs of the host countries and must not in any way favour one party against

another. Therefore, the UN peacekeepers should remain neutral and impartial

between the warring parties. This is the key principle of the UN peacekeeping

operation. The warring parties' cooperation is expected to provide support to the

peacekeeper by allowing it the freedom of movement and the facilities to carry out

its task.

However, in post Cold War civil war or intra-states conflicts operated by

splinter groups, irregular militias and smaller factions do not respect the

peacekeeping tasks such as ceasefires and frequently disagree with the major

parties or act independently. Therefore, peacekeeping personnel were not able to

deal with the situation on the basis of self-defence backed by clear rules of

engagement. In such as a case, the mission mandate could switch toward peace-

enforcement, involving military operations against one or more of the parties.

4.2. Use of Force

The use of force by peacekeepers is limited to the purpose of self-defence only

(United Nations 1990: 5). However, under the post Cold War peacekeeping or

Second Generation peacekeeping, peacekeepers have been regularly authorized to

use force in the context of their mandate because of the more complex nature of

conflicts. The humanitarian mission in Northern Iraq (April 1991) was the first .

mission authorized to use force, not as a measure of peace eniorcement but to

guarantee the protection of the population and the delivery of assistance. The

mission to Somalia (Resolution 733) was another operation in which the use of

force was authorized in order to fulfil the tasks of disarming the fighting factions

and distributing humanitarian aid. These two cases bear out that a change in

mandate can transform the Peacekeeping missions into something closer to peace-

enforcement.

30

Following the above precedents, all other PKOs have come to be directly

authorized to use force for the fulfilment of their mandate. It became a commonly

accepted procedure, as early as 1992, as it was suggested in An Agenda for Peace.

In the Agenda, Boutros Ghali argues that the use of forces is authorised under

Chapter VII of the Charter but the troops can use force only for logical purpose and

not to bring the war to an end (Boutros Ghali 1995: 9). He further pointed out that

the UN Security Council is responsible for ensuring that the operation is given a

mandate which is clear, accepted by the parties concerned and practicable in the

existing situation. He also stresses the need for the operation to have a sound

financial basis. However, the issue use of force has remained hugely controversial

and least satisfactory as a principle in peacekeeping operations.

4.3. Multi-dimensional Function

In the post Cold War environment, peacekeeping operations were further expanded

with the increasing involvement of more non-military elements. To fulfil the

growing demand of the peacekeepers, the UN Department of Peacekeeping

Operation was established in 1992. The multiplicity of functions became a

common characteristic of the post Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. The

functions of the post Cold War peacekeeping operations can be divided into three

overlapping categories of tasks: Military, Political (governmental) and

Humanitarian (civil) (see Fig.l.).

However, the basic aims of all these three functions are:

1. the supervision of cease-fire;

2. the demobilisation of forces;

3. the return ofthe refugees and displaced peoples;

4. supervising the existing administrative structures;

5. monitoring of human rights;

6. overseeing the conduct of election and so on. (Diehl, Paul F. et al

1998: 34 and also see Hansen, Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse: 4-5). It was

with the same objectives or similar tasks that Russian peacekeeping operations

were conducted in the CIS.

31

Fig. 1. Tasks of the Three Main Functions of Peacekeeping:

Source: Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, ABC-CLIO

5. ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION!

MANAGEMENT

Due to the varied nature disputes, there is no single generally accepted theory of

international peacekeeping. As mentioned above, international peacekeeping

missions were the outcome of necessity to problems requiring active action. Along

the process, it became a flexible instrument of policy and has seen the adoption of

variety of methods and measures aimed at a final settlement of conflicts.

32

According to Boutros Boutros Ghali, the post Cold War peacekeeping

operation mandate includes various peace-building activities since the collapse of

the state institution (police and judiciary) damages the law and order of that

particular state. Moreover, in states where many government officials got killed or

fled the country, the societies were rendered paralysed. This was rarely the case in

inter-State wars (Boutros Ghali 1995: 9). He therefore contends that protection

should be given to all humanitarian agencies that have been entrusted with the

responsibility to provide assistance to civilian victims of war as they undertake

their tasks in chaotic and lawless conditions.

Ghali further underscores the need for unity of command. Because the lack

of co-operation and unity adds to the difficulties already inherent in a multinational

operation which further increase the risk of casualties. The commander in field

must consult the commanders of national contingents and make sure that they

understand the Security Council's overall approach as well as the role assigned to

their contingents. All the member states of the UN need to maintain rapid action

force as a back up plan for the emergency deployment when needed. The personnel

that comprise such forces must be given a standard training and should be made to

take part in joint exercises at regular intervals.

5.1. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution /Management theory

Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall classify PKO (peacekeeping

operation) as a tool of conflict containment. The traditional function of conflict

control has been extended to include peacemaking and peace-building as an

important part of present peacekeeping missions. According to them, PKO also

uses several similar conflict resolution processes or skills like negotiation,

mediation, facilitaiion, consultation, conciliation and communication (Diehl, Paul

F. et al 1998:36). Their theoretical framework of PKO as a conflict management

and conflict resolution is structured along two fundamental dimensions:

A. The role played by peacekeepers in the conflict and

B. Their bargaining orientation.

33

5.1.1. Primary Parties

However, the role assumed by conflict manager which is the peacekeeper in

conflict can also be categorised into primary parties and third parties. The primary

parties sometimes attempt to deal with the cause of conflict whereas at other times,

they may simply attempt to lower the costs of conflict to keep it from escalating.

On the other hand, they can resort to violence attempting to hurt the opponents

enough to cause them to agree. Therefore, in the primary parties' model of

peacekeeping, there is a direct or indirect participation of the peacekeeper in the

conflict. The peacekeeper's roles were coded as primary party in missions like

collective enforcement, state/nation building, pacification, protective services and

intervention in support of democracy (Ibid: 44). At the same time, in missions like

humanitarian assistance and preventive deployment, the third party roles of

peacekeeper have carried the possibilities of becoming a primary party.

5.1.2. Third Parties

In third parties model, the peacekeeper plays the role of a mediator or arbitrator. It

manages the dispute under three different ways. Firstly, it can manage if the

conflict parties ask for a third party intervention for resolving their dispute.

Secondly, it may also intervene in its own interests or to its own benefit as may be

dictated by its foreign policy. Finally, the third party may be directed to do so by

other parties such as neighbouring states who want the conflict resolved. The

traditional peacekeeping, observation, election supervision and arms control

verification are coded as third party roles of the troops.

6. RUSSIAN APPROACH TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Russian peacekeeping operations In the CIS are often accused by Western

countries as part of its Neo-imperialist foreign policy. They argue that post Soviet

Russia's peacekeeping operations are aimed at expanding Russian influence and

consolidating a powerbase throughout the region and subduing the newly

independent states of Trans Caucasus and Central Asia. McNeil characterises

Russian peacekeeping operation as "humanitarian intervention disguised as

34

peacekeeping missions" (McNeil 1997). However, at least in theory, Russian

peacekeeping operations were launched with the required mandate and by fulfilling

the three necessary principles of peacekeeping. Therefore, before making any

conclusion it would be important to discuss the situation which led Russia to

deploy its troops in Former Soviet republics, for better understanding of the

Russian approach to peacekeeping.

6.1. The Post Soviet Scenario in the Former Soviet Republics and its Impacts

on Russia

As mentioned earlier, tile post Cold War World has been characterised by ethnic

tensions and regional conflicts, with civil and regional wars becoming the norm as

was the case in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Nikitin 1996:83). The former

Soviet republics largely conformed to this norm. The greatest concern amongst the

Russian policy makers in early 1990'swas to ensure stability and survival of the

Russian Federation (RF), threatened both internally and externally by ethnic

conflicts in the CIS. Since then, Russia has been involved in peacekeeping

operations in the Former Soviet Union republics like: Moldova (1992),

GeorgialAbkhazia (1992), GoergiaiSouth Ossetia (1992) and Tajkistan (1992).

According to Holoboff, Russian approach to post Cold War peacekeeping

operations is driven by the desire to protect ethnic Russians and prevent the spread

of instability into Russia. It is also aimed at securing Russian geopolitical interests

and maintaining its position as a great power (Holoboff 1994: 156-157). This view

is premised on the existence of threats to Russian national security as well as to its

efforts of maintaining a regional power status with the civil war and ethnic

conflicts in its neighbourhood. According to Sagramoso, the proximity of the post

Soviet conflicts to the Russian Federation was perceived by Moscow as a threat to

its national security (Sagramoso 2003: 15). Moreover, the increasing influence of

the other regional powers like Turkey and Iran as well as the presence of the US

both politically and military has added to the potential threats to Russia's national

interests (Chenoy 2005: 29-33). In fact, the US has already shown its interests in

the natural resources of the region. Threats to Russia's national security exist three

ways:

35

(a) Threat from the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asian

conflict zones

(b) Threat cause by large number of migrants or refugees into

Russia and

(c) A New threat arising out of the increasing presence of the US

and the increasing influence of other regionai powers.

a. Threat by Islamic Fundamentalism

The rise of the Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asian states along with

increased use of the neighbouring countries like Afghanistan by the rebel militias

as a safe haven for hideout and supply of weapons continue to pose a threat to the

region in general and to Russia in particular. The threat is enhanced in the light of

fact that the southern Muslim dominated border of Russian Federations has been

already marked by secessionist violence.

b. Massive Displacement and Refugee

As a result of large casualties in post Soviet conflicts, there was a maSSIve

displacement problem and thousands of migrants or refugees fled the country and

took refuge in Russia. For instance, since 1992 the South Ossetia and

Transdniestria conflicts turned into ugly disputes where local ethnic Russians and

civilian popUlation were victimised. This resulted to a massive displacement and

migration. This development naturally posed a threat both to its national security

and economy which was already in crisis. In the context of these developments in

the post Soviet republics, Russia sought to conduct peacekeeping operations in the

fonner Soviet space.

As far back as 1993, in an interview to Nezavisimaya gazeta, the then

Foreign Minister Andre Kozyrev admitted that 'the resultant vacuum would be

immediately filled by other forces possibly not always friendly and might be even

hostile to Russian interests' (Nezavisimaya gazeta 1993). Therefore, the protection

36

of the rights and interests of the Russian diaspora apart from ensuring peace and

stability in the region was presented by Moscow as a basic argument for the

deployment of peacekeeping operation in the CIS. For instance, in 1994 during his

New Year speech, Boris Yeltsin proclaimed that to protect those ethnic Russians

living in the Near Abroad as well as to use the necessary measure to defend them

was Russia's basic responsibility (Slates 1994).

C. Threat from the Presence of the US and Increasing Influence of other

Regional Powers

From the Russian point of view, the prolonged instability in the region has a

potential to invite those countries or regional powers like the USA and Turkey who

were already ready to intervene in the region. This increased Western interest

(including the US) in Central Asia and the Caucasus can largely be explained by

the fact that the region is rich in natural resources, especially oil and natural gas,

access to which has gained strategic importance for the West in general and the

United States in particular. For instance, former U.S. Secretary of State James

Baker states in New York Times: "Caspian Oil may eventually be as important to

the industrialised world as Middle East oil is today" (Baker 1997: 17, in Chenoy

2005:31). Further, the NATO's eastward expansion and its role of peacekeeping in

the former Yugoslavia naturally led Russia to perceive a threat to their national

interests. This politically gave an obstacle to Russia's effort for achieving the

status of a regional power and the creation a multi-polar World. Perhaps, it was

another reason behind Russia's unwillingness in the beginning to share the third

party role in peacekeeping operations in FSU and its opposition to any other

military and political presence there.

However, the deployment of Russia's peacekeeping forces in the CIS is not

only because of these above mentioned issues; it was also compelled by its national

interests in the region. Central Asia was once the strategic frontier of the former

Soviet Union in which Russia still has an interest and hence, Russia can not afford

to neglect its strategic significance in the post Cold War international politics. But,

the instability in this region with the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan and the

second wave of Islamisation in most of the Central Asian states including

37

Tajikistan that had already started soon after the collapse of the USSR led to

Russia's fear of loosing out on this strategic frontier.

In Georgia too, Russia's interest was on maintaining a strategic frontier and

keeping a Black Sea foothold in Georgia. While in Moldova, it (Russia) has a

focus on establishing a westward facing strategic outpost beyond its international

frontiers. Such an analysis points to the huge geo-strategic importance of the

former Soviet republics to the Russian Federation's efforts to regain the regional

power status. This is also another factor behind the deployment of the Russian

peacekeeping operations in FSU. Is this Russian effort or aim to recreate the

former Soviet republics into one entity? For understanding or answering this

question the present work examines case studies in chapter 4 and 5 on said

countries.

6.1.1. Russia's Peacekeeping Approach and its Characteristics

Different nations have different interpretations regarding what can be classed as

"peacekeeping" operations. This is an issue where major disagreement exists

between Russian foreign policy and Western foreign policy both in theory and in

execution. Nikitin points out three main differences between the Russian and

Western concepts of peacekeeping (Nikitin 1994:92). Firstly, Russia has acted

under a reduced mandate in all operations in the former Soviet Union republics.

Secondly there is no commitment to using military forces from a neutral party with

no interests at stake in the conflict so as to avoid accusations of impartially.

Thirdly, international observers should work separately, rather than alongside

peacekeeping forces. Use of belligerents in peacekeeping forces is also another

area of conflict between Russian and the Western philosophies of peacekeeping.

Under the UN and NATO peacekeeping operations the warring factions

were not allowed to participate as a legal operational force. It has generally not

been a part of traditional peace operations. In case of Russian led peacekeeping

operations particularly in CIS direct control of peacekeeping forces in a region is

exercised by a joint staff composed of representatives from Russian forces as well

as the combatants in the conflict zone. These forces also further take part in

38

policing the zone of separation and other activities (Allison 1994: 14). Sometimes,

using these peacekeeping forces is perceived to be very risky as the possibility of

being caught in the middle of renewed fighting is very high. On the other hand, it

may also provide require environment by creating cooperation between the parties

for bringing a political settlement to conflict. Russians believe that combatant

participation has the potential to build relationships and mechanisms for resolving

future conflicts. These differences in policy further help others to accuse Russia's

peacekeeping in the CIS as a neo-imperialist plan.

However, it would be wrong to assume that Russia operates with a total

disregard for World opinion or without caring for legitimacy through the UN.

Evidence shows that in 1994 Boris Yeltsin claimed that the norms and principles of

international law would be the basis of Russia's foreign policy (Ibid: 86). Yeltsin

also sought the UN recognition of Russian peacekeeping operations in the FSU.

Theoretically, it could be said that Russian peacekeeping in these regions has

differed greatly from Russian support for the UN based missions, for example in

Bosnia and Angola where Russian observers supported the UN missions.

In theory, Russian peacekeeping operations in the Near Abroad have been

conducted with tasks similar to the peacekeeping activities of other regional

organisations. The tasks were clearly mentioned in their military doctrine of 1993

as follows:

1. Separating armed groups

2. Delivering humanitarian aid

3. Maintaining cease-fire between the warring factions

4. Evacuation of refugees

5. Carrying out the provisions of the mandate and

6. To create the environment for a political settlement of the armed

conflicts (Raevsky and Vorob'ev 1994: 6 and also see Jane's

Intelligence Review 1994: 10).

39

The same tasks remained unchanged in the 1999 military doctrine too. In

fact, Russia has no separate doctrine on peacekeeping. It is the military doctrine of

1993 which provides an insight to Russian peacekeeping operations both in

international and the CIS conflicts. The nature of the Russian peacekeeping

operation III the CIS also underscores the complexity of the post Cold War

conflicts.

Furthermore, Russian conceptions of peacekeeping have differed from

traditionally accepted ones in many ways. Most of post Cold War Russia's

peacekeeping operations were conducted in "Russia's backyard," where Russia is

the strongest player in the region since Second World War. The areas of operations

or environment are very familiar to operating military commanders. Subsequently,

Russian activities were not constrained by anything besides the available means,

the resolve of the command in Moscow, and political infighting or indecisiveness

(Ibid: 5). Problems of legitimacy, rules of engagement, collateral damage, and

public scrutiny were raised but did not have a significant effect on operations as

compared to most other UN operations.

But Russian peacekeeping operations are legitimised under Chapter VIII

(regional arrangement) of the UN charter. Moreover, Russian peacekeeping

operations in CIS conflict have been deployed through various bilateral or

multilateral agreements which basically provide mandate for operation. However, a

clearer understanding of Russia's approaches to post Cold War peacekeeping calls

for a further examination of the history of Russia's peacekeeping operations under

the command of the UN Security Council.

7. EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Russia has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations since

1973 but its post Cold War approaches to peacekeeping were different and

considered unique. Russia argued that it was in their national interest that they kept

themselves away from UN peacekeeping operation most of the time. Since 1990

however, Russia began to send both military and police personnel for participation

40

in new peace support operations which were conducted under the auspices of the

UN Blue Helmet programme.

However, Russia's peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Republics

that are now independent states have been severely criticised by other regional

powers over the use of forces and mandate. Russia was further accused of

implementing a neo-imperialist plan, despite the fact that the growing danger and

the complex causes of the post Cold War conflicts demanded strong peacekeepers

possessing both a well-equipped and well-trained army. This change in type of unit

sent for peacekeeping and their command structure brought about changes in

traditional UN peacekeeping activities. For instance, both the USA and Russia

have come to use their elite forces for peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the

extensive use of military power by the world's leading nations highlight the

problematic nature of the new international peacekeeping and peace support

operations.

It would be unfair to say that the peacekeeping role played by Russian in

the recent past was new and inexperienced. Russia has a 25-year history of

participation in international peacekeeping. Although Russian peacekeeping

operations in FSU were conducted without proper UN mandate and international

support both financially and militarily, Russia as a successor to the former Soviet

Union had been playing peacekeeping role since 1973 under the UN blue cap.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been regularly contributing to the UN

peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world mainly in the capacity of a

military observer.

The Russian history of peacekeeping began in Cairo (1973) when 36 Soviet

military officers were sent as military observers under the UN Truce Supervision

organisation in the Middle East (UNTSO). It was a direct result of the Vladivostok

Agreement signed between the erstwhile Soviet Union and the USA for monitoring

and containing the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 (Yerrnolaev 2000). Before this, neither

any written history nor the UN records highlighted Russian involvement in any UN

peacekeeping activity. It was a time when both the super powers, USA and USSR

maintained a buffer zone. Both super powers also tried to advance their national

41

interests by different means. However, during this period the Soviet Union neither

devoted any serious attention to the issue of training cadres for peacekeeping

operations nor developed any military theoretical thinking about the conduct of

peacekeeping activities.

Table 3. Russian Peacekeeping Missions 1973-1995

LOCATIONS YEARS ' ..

In Cairo

Namibia Angola

Cambodia,

and

in Iraq-Kuwait,

and Western Sahara

Mozambique,

Cambodia

South Ossetia and Abkhazia

1973

1989

1991

1992

CONFLICTS:~>i:\ ·REMARKS ...; .... :<:.;: .:'

Yom Kippur War As an observer under the UNTSO, (Egypt-Israel conflicts) and to assist the UNEF II In

monitoring the Egypt-Israeli border and maintine a buffer zone.

Namibian Independence struggle

Under UNT AG, Soviet Union took part as a military observer in order to ensure Namibian independence trough free and fair election.

Fall of the Khmer Participated in UNAMIC by Rouge; contributed the military personals to

mine awareness training to civilian population.

Gulf War And

Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara

Participated In monitoring the withdrawal of the armed forces that were deployed in it assigned zone during occupation under the UNIKOM.

Contributed the military personal as a military observer under the MINURSO.

Mozambican Civil War It military personal were participated In ONUMOZ to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces and maintain the cease fire.

Fall of Khmer Rouge

South Ossetian Abkhazian War

42

War,

Both Civilian and Military personals were the part of the UNT AC with the task of organising and conduct of election.

As a mediator

Georgia Abkhazia

Rwanda

Haiti

Tajikistan,

In Abkhazia

Bosnia Herzegovina Angola

Angola

Guatemala

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone

East Timor

Democratic Republic Conga

Eritrea Ethiopia

East Timor

Liberia

1993

1994

and 1995

1997

1998

1999

of

and 2000

2002

2003

Abkhazian War

Rwanda Genocide

1991 Coup and military rule in Haiti

Tajikistan civil war

Abkhazian War

Bosnian War

Angola Civil War

Angola Civil War

Guatemala Civil War

Its military and Police personal were also the part of the UNOMIG.

Contributed both the Military and Civilian troops as a part of the UNAMIR

Under the UNMIH, Russia contributed its military personals to sustain a stable democratic government. As a regional peacekeeper under the CIS collective peacekeeping operation

As a regional peacekeeper under the CISPKF mandate.

Contributed both the Civilian and Military units and took part 10

UNMIBH.

lSI troops and 7 Civilian Police took part 10 UNA VEM II for restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation.

Military personal were contributed and took part the MONUA.

Military observers and Medical personals took part in MINUGA

Sierra Leone Civil War Russian military personals were took part UNOMSIL to monitor the military and security situation.

Sierra Leone Civil War Both the Civilian and Military

Indonesian invention and occupation

Second Congo War

personals were part of the UNAMSIL

Contributed both Civilian and Military personals in UNT AET

Its Military and Civilian personals were contributed and taking part in MONUC

Eritrea - Ethiopian War Military personal were the part of the troops in on going UNMEE.

Indonesian invention and occupation

Second Liberian War

43

Contributed its Military personals and Civilian Police as a members of UNMISET

Under the UNMIL, Russian Military and Police personals as a part of the peacekeeper has been monitoring the cease fire agreement.

Burundi 2004 Burundi Civil War Only the military personal were contributed to ONUB

Cote' d'Lvoire Civil War In Cote' Its military personals were part of d'Lvoire the UNOCI

Sudan 2005 Second Sudanese Civil Contributed both the Military and War Police personals to UNMIS.

East Timor 2006 2006 East Timor crisis Contributed its Police personals in UNMIT.

Sources: 'Lists of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions' (Website) http://en.wikipedia.org/wikifList_oCaltUN yeacekeeping_ missions

Since 1990s, Russia began to contribute military and police personnel for

participation in most of the new peace support operations, conducted under the

auspices of the UN, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the

Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS). Therefore, it may be said that until 1973 Russia did

not have any practical experience of peacekeeping. From 1973 to 1998, Russia

participated in eleven out of 48 UN peacekeeping operations. Hence, the

contemporary history of Russian peacekeeping can be analysed in four phases of

evolution i.e., 1989-1992, 1992-1995, 1995-1996 and 1999-till date.

7.1. First Phase (1989-1992)

By the late 1980s particularly soon after Perestroika, Russian attitude toward the

international peacekeeping took a new tum. Kremlin recognised the legitimacy of

'classical' UN peacekeeping and began to participate in a number of newly

established UN operations (Ibid.). For example, from April 1991 to 1993, Russia's

UN military observers participated in the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission

(UNIKOM); in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

(MINURSO) and in the UN mission in Cambodia (United Nations 1998a).

However, it was only in 1992 that Russian peacekeeping operation was introduced

for the first time in FSU when the conflicts in South Ossetia, Moldova, Tajikistan

turned into ugly violence and posed a threat to its national security due to their

proximity to Russia. In June 1992, under the bilateral agreement signed between

Russia, Georgia and North and South Ossetia, Russian peacekeeping forces were

44

deployed to separate the warring factions. It was soon followed by peacekeeping

missions in Transdniestria and the Tajikistan conflicts under the CIS peacekeeping

operation mandate and a bilateral agreement with Moldovan government to

negotiate a ceasefire.

7.2. The Second Phase (1992-1995):

Since 1992, Russia started expanding its contribution to international peacekeeping

both by sending military and police personnel to international peacekeeping

missions in FSU and in other parts of the world. In the ethno-political conflicts of

the Balkans states, particularly in Bosnia, Russia sent their First Airborne Battalion

as a part of UNPROFOR. Again in 1995, under the UN mandate, Russia sent its

peace enforcement troops in Croatia. In 1995, Russian military took part in the

NATO-led peace support operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Yennolaev 2000).

In addition, Russian military also participated in two other UN missions -

the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from December 1992 till

December 1994, and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from

October 1993 till March 1996 (United Nations 1998a). During this phase, a sharp

criticism became a common response towards the Russian peacekeeping operations

in the CIS. It was a time when traditional peacekeeping did not enjoy any more

relevance in the complex nature of post Cold War conflicts. The announcement of

new Military Doctrine of 1993 clearly acknowledged the growing enthusiasm of

the role of Russian peacekeeping in the CIS. In the last two phases, Russian

peacekeepers became actively involved in the CIS peacekeeping operations in

former Soviet republics.

8. STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES

A feature of the post Cold War peacekeeping operations is that the consent of the

warring factions seems to count much less in comparison to the previous era.

Changes were thus introduced in the structure of the peacekeeping forces to meet

the new requirments. As different from the traditional structures, elite forces got .

included in peacekeeping operations. For instance, elite forces like the US Army

45

Rangers and the Russian Airborne Forces were used in the post Cold War

peacekeeping operations (Raves~y and Vorob'ev 1994: 3). This is because of the

increasing complexity in nature of the root causes of the conflicts as also the

growing danger of intra-state conflicts. It is under this context that Russian

government has included its elite forces which were drawn from the Ministry of

Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.

Most of the Russian peacekeeping forces till 1999 were the former Soviet

armies. For instance, 201 5t Motorised Rifle Division (MRD), (l49th Motor Rifle

Regiment, 1915t Motor Rifle Regiment) the core peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan

is part of the former 40th Soviet army (Orr 1998: 151-152). In Georgia, the role of

the peacekeeping is played by the 2ih and 45th Motorised Rifle Divisions, which

previously served in Czechoslovakia and Hugary and Afghanistan (Ekedahl and

Goldman 2001: 272f). The 14th Army undertook the role in Moldova. The common

problem with these forces was the lack of skill on peacekeeping operation since

they were not trained for it. They did not possess any special training on

peacekeeping. The Volga and Urals Military Districts were chosen as the central

base for the Mobile Forces just because of the proximity to the former Soviet states

and because of it strategic location.

Therefore, lack of training on peacekeeping activities has remained one of

the major drawbacks of the Russian armed forces engaged in the FSU. Moreover,

insufficient funding and problems arising out oflow morale due to non-payment of

arrears and other personnel issues were other shortcomings of the early 1990's

Russian peacekeeping forces in the CIS (Makros and Saunders 2001: 50). After a

prolonged debate over two models, one proposed by the then Vice President, A.

Rutskoi and the other by the Lieuutenant-Clonel, O.Vladykin, Russia adopted the

second model of Mobile Forces structure. The Mobile Forces was divided into

'Immediate Reaction Forces' (IRF) and 'Rapid Deployment Forces' (RDF)

(Raevsky and Vorob'ev 1994: 19). It is noteworthy that the Russian Mobile

Forces has more powerful fire support than the NATO's forces. The following

figures 2 and 3 shows the proposed structure of the Russian Mobile Forces.

46

Figure 2. Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF)

Name of Forces .. Number ..

Brigades 4-6

Artillery Brigades 1

SAM 1

Assualt Helicopter Regiment 1

Aviation Squadrons 2-3

Air Assualt Battalion 1

Reconnaissance Regiment 1

Assualt Crossing Battalion 1

Expanded Engineer-snapper Battalion 1

Chemical Defense battalion 1

Signal battalion 1

Artillery command and control 1 battalion

Medical regiment 1

Material support Brigades 1

Service regiment 1

Source: ARaevsky and l.N. Vorob'ev, 'Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations,' New York, UN Publication, 1994,

However, along with the establishment of the Russian Mobile Forces which

contains Rapid Deployment forces (RDF), Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF),

Russian military has begun to maintain two different types of training for

peacekeeping forces:

1. UN peacekeepers: the combined forces of the airborne and

motorized rifle divisions designated for deployment to the UN

peacekeeping operations. The troops are trained at the Vystrel

Academy near Moscow for a period of two to three months.

47

Figure 3. Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF):

Airbone division 4-5

Independent Airbone brigades 8

Light motor-Rifle brigades 6

Independent Spetsnaz 1

Air defense brigades 3

Independent Helicopter regiments 12

Satcom I

Interceptor aircraft regiments 5-7

Bomber aircraft regiment 5

Close Air Support aircraft regiment 2

Military Transport Aviation division 4

Independent Naval airbone assault 2

battalion

Naval infantry assault battalion 6

Source: A.Raevsky and LN. Vorob'ev, 'Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations,' New

York, UN Publication, 1994,

2. The for~es for other peacekeeping operation such as operations in

the CIS. This troop is led by the Airborne Forces (VDV) (Ibid).

VDV forces are equipped with light armor, which are deployable by

standard military transport aviation and have maintained a high

level of discipline, training, and combat experience. The Volga

military District is the training centre of this peacekeeping force.

The new tasks of peacekeeping forces (mobile force) have been given the

same functions as those of the post Cold War the UN peacekeeping forces, such as:

1. Providing medical assistance

48

2. Regular patrolling to separate warring factions

3. Arresting offenders and confiscate weapons and ammunition

4. Helping in reconnaissance work of all kinds etc.

However, Russian peacekeeping units are far more heavily armed than the

international standard practice for peacekeeping units. The inclusions of their elite

forces in peace support operations continue to be a matter of concern in the eyes of

critics who see it as a tool of neo-imperialism inherent in Russia's foreign policy

toward the CIS.

9. PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The complexity of the conflicts wherein Russian peacekeepers were deployed

resulted in high casualties among the Russian peacekeepers till 1999. Since 1992 to

mid 1994, 105 Russian soldiers got killed in the CIS and almost 200 were wounded

(Russia TV channel in SUI1954 SV3, 1994). To make matters worse, the Russian

peacekeepers were undermanned. As a result, many volunteers were recruited even

from outside the Russian Federation (particularly from the host countries where the

Russian armed forces had been deployed), e.g., the recruitment of Georgian

citizens for border troops to serve in Russian units (Lepingwell 1994: 69). These

soldiers were the ones who were mainly involved in supplying arms and

ammunitions and providing support to the warring factions and thus involving

themselves into the conflict in ways determined by ethnic solidarity and sympathy.

The lack of an effective command of the armed forces has been

acknowledged during the first four years of Russian peacekeeping in the FSU.

Moreover, Russian Diplomatic efforts to obtain the UN and other international

financial support for peacekeeping operations remained unsuccessful. Hence, the

Russian Federation alone has carrying the financial burden of the expensive

operations in the FSU with its huge army. Due to such problems, Russian

peacekeeping operations have remained prone to allegations of having ulterior

motives or hidden agendas, particularly from Western countries as well as from

other CIS member-states.

49

10. THE CIS COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The collective peacekeeping missions of the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) are formed on the basis of the Treaty of Collective Security which was

signed in 1992 in Tashkent by six states - Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Later it was joined (mid 1990's) by

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. The deployment of the CIS Peacekeeping

operations requires a mandate from the Council of Heads of the CIS which include

the CIS Foreign Ministers or their Plenipotentiary representatives. This Council of

the Heads of the CIS states appoints the commander in chief, who has direct

control over any specific operation of peacekeeping units.

Like the UN and other regional peacekeepers, the CIS Peacekeeping

operations also have had a task of monitoring the ceasefire between the warring

factions, providing the humanitarian aid to the civilian population, securing

unimpeded access of humanitarian aid. They also protect refugees and undertake

re-settlement programmes both for refugees and other conflict tom civilian

population, though the lack of specially trained soldiers for peacekeeping missions

has been the main characteristic of the CIS peacekeeping operations in 1990's.

Since, the Russian Federation is the only country within the CIS which has a

capacity to provide military contingents for peacekeeping operations, the CIS

peacekeeping operations have been dominated by the Russian forces. Due to such

dominance, there has persisted a fear among neighbouring states that Russia might

be attempting a reintegration of these states into a new Union. This suspicion has

also served as the source of the accusation that Russia is pursuing an imperialist

agenda behind its peacekeeping operations.

11. CONCLUSION

Peacekeeping continues to be one of the most visible measures of the peace

operations of the UN. Simultaneously, international peacekeeping is in a state of

crisis in terms of finances, doctrine, co-ordination, and quality troop contributions.

Further, the end of cold war marked the beginning of a new phase in the theory and

practice of modem peacekeeping with an increase in the role of civilian personneL

so

On the other hand, some troop contributing countries have been hesitant to

participate in peacekeeping operations since the rise in causalities of peacekeepers

has been a major concern to all.

The extensive use of military power by the world's leading nations

highlights the problematic nature of the new international peacekeeping and peace

support operations. The nature of the conflicts has also changed from inter-state

disputes to intra-state conflicts. So, in the present context, it is apparent that

Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace and the related definitions on non-use of

forces are no longer relevant to the realities of intra-state conflict. The absence of a

genuine peace agreement has become a popular nonn in the present situation.

Moreover, the neutral stand of Third parties and the consent of the parties in the

dispute have become less absolute.

As a result, despite several UN peacekeeping efforts to stop conflicts, post

Cold War world has witnessed an increasing number of conflicts where the

casualty of both peacekeepers and civil population remains very high. The regional

organisation has also increased its role as a peacekeeper in this post Cold War

environment. The time has come for cooperation between the UN and regional

organisations for peace support operations given the complex nature of the present-

day conflicts coupled with of the problem of international terrorism.

In the case of Russian peacekeeping operations, it was the proximity of the

conflicts in the CIS and· their increasing threat to the Russian national security as

well as a to its national interest that led the Russian Federation to continue to

deploy their annies in FSU despite the several agreements signed for the

withdrawal of its troops. The Russian peacekeeping operations in CIS conflicts

was operated in the same fashion and style with that of the post Cold War UN

peacekeeping operations and is legitimate under chapter VIII of the UN charter.

The military measure was one of the major characteristics of the Russian

peacekeeping operation in FSU until 1999. But in theory, the Russian

peacekeeping operation was deployed with the similar tasks as it was with the

peacekeeping activities. The Russian Military Doctrine of 1993 provides an insight

to its peacekeeping operations both in international and CIS conflicts. The nature

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of the Russian peacekeeping operations in FSU, like other international peace

support operations in various part of the world, acknowledges the same complexity

of the post Cold War conflicts.

It is a little immature to conclude if the Russian peacekeeping operations in

FSU are part of a neo-imperialist policy. But it is true that Russian Federation has

been trying to regain regional power status in this post Cold War period.

Furthermore, Russia has also been using the ethnic Russian diaspora in the former

Soviet Union as a tool in pursuing this status. Accordingly, since the early 1990's,

Russian peacekeeping operations became part of its foreign policy towards the

CIS.

However, despite the complex nature of the rationale and ambitions behind

Russian peacekeeping operations, it would be crucial that Russia and the

international community join hands to maintain peace and stability in the world,

particularly given the problem of increasing threats from international terrorism.

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